Governing International Financial Institutions: the power structures of the IMF and the World Bank

Laerte Apolinário Júnior

Authors

Laerte Apolinário Júnior

Keywords:

international institutions, global governance, IMF, world bank, principal-agent theory

Abstract

This paper analyses the governance structures of the international financial system, focusing on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Therefore, this study elucidates the functioning of these institutions through an analysis of its power structures. First, we examine the origins, evolution, and the institutional structure of these organizations. Second, we perform a literature review on the governance of international institutions to highlight the most appropriate theories to analyze the object in question. Then, we examine the cases in question through the Principal-Agent theory.

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How to Cite

Governing International Financial Institutions: the power structures of the IMF and the World Bank. (2020). Global Journal of Human-Social Science, 20(F7), 1-10. https://socialscienceresearch.org/index.php/GJHSS/article/view/3462

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