Central Bank Autonomy and Price Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for the Bank of Central African States (BEAC)

Tadadjeu Dessy-Karl; Soulemanou

Authors

Tadadjeu Dessy-Karl
Soulemanou

Keywords:

central bank autonomy, price stability, static panel data, sub-saharan africa (SSA)

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Central Bank Autonomy and Price Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). (2025). Global Journal of Human-Social Science, 25(E1), 51-68. https://socialscienceresearch.org/index.php/GJHSS/article/view/104317

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