A Conflict or War Impediment Strategic Approach: Perception Games, Deception Hypergames, and Deterrence in Global Politics

Mariam Ariba; DDC Code: 943 LCC Code: DD239

doi:10.34257/GJHSSFVOL22IS6PG59

Authors

Mariam Ariba
DDC Code: 943 LCC Code: DD239

Keywords:

game theory; hypergame theory; strategy; equilibrium; deterrence; conflict; war

Abstract

This article enhances the use of the applied game theory and hypergame theory in global politics and strategic security studies. It suggests first a (Deception Hypergame Model of Inter-state Conflict) where conditions of certainty and uncertainty, perception and deception are considered within a conflict/war impediment perspective. While inferring an interconnectedness of (Initial Stability in the Powers Conflict and Deterrence Relation) in the international system, we develop a (Deterrence Entanglement Law) second that can be applied effectively to inter-state conflict cases to preclude the (present/future) conflict or war possibility given that the balance reached might be relative, outright, or incomplete, as proven under this theoretic-strategic approach.

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How to Cite

A Conflict or War Impediment Strategic Approach: Perception Games, Deception Hypergames, and Deterrence in Global Politics. (2022). Global Journal of Human-Social Science, 22(F6), 59-86. https://doi.org/10.34257/GJHSSFVOL22IS6PG59

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References

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