

GLOBAL JOURNAL

OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCES: F

Political Science



Transitional Justice in Colombia

Democratic Opening for Peace Building

Highlights

A Study of the Ghana Police Service

The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements

Discovering Thoughts, Inventing Future

VOLUME 20

ISSUE 2

VERSION 1.0



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE

GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE

VOLUME 20 ISSUE 2 (VER. 1.0)

OPEN ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH SOCIETY

© Global Journal of Human Social Sciences. 2020.

All rights reserved.

This is a special issue published in version 1.0 of "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences." By Global Journals Inc.

All articles are open access articles distributed under "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences"

Reading License, which permits restricted use. Entire contents are copyright by of "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences" unless otherwise noted on specific articles.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission.

The opinions and statements made in this book are those of the authors concerned. Ultraculture has not verified and neither confirms nor denies any of the foregoing and no warranty or fitness is implied.

Engage with the contents herein at your own risk.

The use of this journal, and the terms and conditions for our providing information, is governed by our Disclaimer, Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy given on our website <http://globaljournals.us/terms-and-condition/menu-id-1463/>

By referring / using / reading / any type of association / referencing this journal, this signifies and you acknowledge that you have read them and that you accept and will be bound by the terms thereof.

All information, journals, this journal, activities undertaken, materials, services and our website, terms and conditions, privacy policy, and this journal is subject to change anytime without any prior notice.

Incorporation No.: 0423089
License No.: 42125/022010/1186
Registration No.: 430374
Import-Export Code: 1109007027
Employer Identification Number (EIN):
USA Tax ID: 98-0673427

Global Journals Inc.

(A Delaware USA Incorporation with "Good Standing"; Reg. Number: 0423089)

Sponsors: Open Association of Research Society

Open Scientific Standards

Publisher's Headquarters office

Global Journals® Headquarters
945th Concord Streets,
Framingham Massachusetts Pin: 01701,
United States of America

USA Toll Free: +001-888-839-7392

USA Toll Free Fax: +001-888-839-7392

Offset Typesetting

Global Journals Incorporated
2nd, Lansdowne, Lansdowne Rd., Croydon-Surrey,
Pin: CR9 2ER, United Kingdom

Packaging & Continental Dispatching

Global Journals Pvt Ltd
E-3130 Sudama Nagar, Near Gopur Square,
Indore, M.P., Pin:452009, India

Find a correspondence nodal officer near you

To find nodal officer of your country, please
email us at local@globaljournals.org

eContacts

Press Inquiries: press@globaljournals.org
Investor Inquiries: investors@globaljournals.org
Technical Support: technology@globaljournals.org
Media & Releases: media@globaljournals.org

Pricing (Excluding Air Parcel Charges):

Yearly Subscription (Personal & Institutional)
250 USD (B/W) & 350 USD (Color)

EDITORIAL BOARD

GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE

Dr. Heying Jenny Zhan

B.A., M.A., Ph.D. Sociology, University of Kansas, USA
Department of Sociology Georgia State University,
United States

Dr. Prasad V Bidarkota

Ph.D., Department of Economics Florida International
University United States

Dr. Alis Puteh

Ph.D. (Edu.Policy) UUM Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia M.Ed
(Curr. & Inst.) University of Houston, United States

Dr. Bruce Cronin

B.A., M.A., Ph.D. in Political Science, Columbia
University Professor, City College of New York,
United States

Dr. Hamada Hassanein

Ph.D, MA in Linguistics, BA & Education in English,
Department of English, Faculty of Education, Mansoura
University, Mansoura, Egypt

Dr. Asuncin Lpez-Varela

BA, MA (Hons), Ph.D. (Hons) Facultad de Filología.
Universidad Complutense Madrid 29040 Madrid Spain

Dr. Faisal G. Khamis

Ph.D in Statistics, Faculty of Economics &
Administrative Sciences / AL-Zaytoonah University of
Jordan, Jordan

Dr. Adrian Armstrong

BSc Geography, LSE, 1970 Ph.D. Geography
(Geomorphology) Kings College London 1980 Ordained
Priest, Church of England 1988 Taunton, Somerset,
United Kingdom

Dr. Gisela Steins

Ph.D. Psychology, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Professor, General and Social Psychology, University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Dr. Stephen E. Haggerty

Ph.D. Geology & Geophysics, University of London
Associate Professor University of Massachusetts,
United States

Dr. Helmut Digel

Ph.D. University of Tbingen, Germany Honorary President
of German Athletic Federation (DLV), Germany

Dr. Tanyawat Khampa

Ph.d in Candidate (Social Development), MA. in Social
Development, BS. in Sociology and Anthropology,
Naresuan University, Thailand

Dr. Gomez-Piqueras, Pedro

Ph.D in Sport Sciences, University Castilla La Mancha,
Spain

Dr. Mohammed Nasser Al-Suqri

Ph.D., M.S., B.A in Library and Information Management,
Sultan Qaboos University, Oman

Dr. Giaime Berti

Ph.D. School of Economics and Management University of Florence, Italy

Dr. Valerie Zawilski

Associate Professor, Ph.D., University of Toronto MA - Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada

Dr. Edward C. Hoang

Ph.D., Department of Economics, University of Colorado United States

Dr. Intakhab Alam Khan

Ph.D. in Doctorate of Philosophy in Education, King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia

Dr. Kaneko Mamoru

Ph.D., Tokyo Institute of Technology Structural Engineering Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

Dr. Joaquin Linne

Ph. D in Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dr. Hugo Nami

Ph.D.in Anthropological Sciences, Universidad of Buenos Aires, Argentina, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dr. Luisa dall'Acqua

Ph.D. in Sociology (Decisional Risk sector), Master MU2, College Teacher, in Philosophy (Italy), Edu-Research Group, Zrich/Lugano

Dr. Vesna Stankovic Pejnovic

Ph. D. Philosophy Zagreb, Croatia Rusveltova, Skopje Macedonia

Dr. Raymond K. H. Chan

Ph.D., Sociology, University of Essex, UK Associate Professor City University of Hong Kong, China

Dr. Tao Yang

Ohio State University M.S. Kansas State University B.E. Zhejiang University, China

Mr. Rahul Bhanubhai Chauhan

B.com., M.com., MBA, PhD (Pursuing), Assistant Professor, Parul Institute of Business Administration, Parul University, Baroda, India

Dr. Rita Mano

Ph.D. Rand Corporation and University of California, Los Angeles, USA Dep. of Human Services, University of Haifa Israel

Dr. Cosimo Magazzino

Aggregate Professor, Roma Tre University Rome, 00145, Italy

Dr. S.R. Adlin Asha Johnson

Ph.D, M. Phil., M. A., B. A in English Literature, Bharathiar University, Coimbatore, India

Dr. Thierry Feuillet

Ph.D in Geomorphology, Master's Degree in Geomorphology, University of Nantes, France

CONTENTS OF THE ISSUE

- i. Copyright Notice
 - ii. Editorial Board Members
 - iii. Chief Author and Dean
 - iv. Contents of the Issue
-
- 1. Integral Rural Reform and Democratic Opening for Peace Building: Transitional Justice in Colombia. *1-10*
 - 2. The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements in Democracy: The Portuguese Case. *11-17*
 - 3. Security Challenges in Ghana, the Imperatives of States Security Agencies: A Study of the Ghana Police Service. *19-30*
 - 4. Military Intervention as a Means of Dealing with Dictatorship: The Zimbabwean Experience. *31-41*
 - 5. Studying Global Politics in the Post-Cold War Era: Possibilities for a Feminization. *43-49*
-
- v. Fellows
 - vi. Auxiliary Memberships
 - vii. Preferred Author Guidelines
 - viii. Index



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2020
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Integral Rural Reform and Democratic Opening for Peace Building: Transitional Justice in Colombia

By Bruno Galindo & Brivaldo Pereira Dos Santos Jr.

Federal University of Pernambuco

Abstract- This article deals with the transitional process in development in the neighboring country after the end of a conflict that lasted for more than fifty years involving guerrilla movements, paramilitary groups and public forces in Colombia. Its goal is to analyze two of the most peculiar aspects of the agreement between the protagonists of the confrontations: integral rural reform and democratic opening for the peace building. Firstly, the peculiar dynamics that involve law and politics in times of transition are highlighted, and then the peace process itself. Then, it moves on to the two points mentioned in the agreement, discussing how the obligations assumed by Colombian society with regard to expanding access to land and conducting political reform are in line with the idea of non-repetition that should guide transitional process. It is discussed how the agrarian question, related to the origin and performance of the FARC-EP guerrilla movement, could not be absent from the context of the agreement signed, while at the same time reflecting on the need to change the electoral system as an imperative for the expansion of competition in electoral disputes, which would convince those historically marginalized movements to surrender their arms and believe in the coming to power by the vote.

Keywords: *transitional justice; land reform; political reform; colombia.*

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 360199



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Integral Rural Reform and Democratic Opening for Peace Building: Transitional Justice in Colombia

Reforma Rural Integral e Abertura Democrática Para Construção da Paz: Justiça Transicional na Colômbia

Bruno Galindo ^α & Brivaldo Pereira Dos Santos Jr. ^ο

Resumo- O presente artigo versa sobre o processo transicional em desenvolvimento no país vizinho após o fim de um conflito que perdurou por mais de cinquenta anos envolvendo movimentos guerrilheiros, grupos paramilitares e as Forças Públicas na Colômbia. Tem por objetivo analisar dois dos pontos mais peculiares do acordo celebrado entre os protagonistas dos confrontos: reforma rural integral e abertura democrática para a construção da paz. Primeiro, salienta-se a peculiar dinâmica que envolve o direito e a política em momentos de transição para em seguida se debruçar sobre o processo de paz em si. Avança-se então sobre os dois pontos do acordo indicados, discutindo como as obrigações assumidas pela sociedade colombiana no que diz respeito à ampliação do acesso à terra e à realização de uma reforma política coadunam-se com a ideia da não-repetição que deve orientar todo processo transicional. Discute-se como a questão agrária, relacionada com a origem e a atuação do movimento guerrilheiro FARC-EP, não poderia estar ausente do contexto do acordo firmado, ao mesmo tempo em que se reflete sobre a necessidade de mudança do sistema eleitoral como um imperativo para a ampliação da competitividade nas disputas eleitorais, o que convenceria aqueles movimentos historicamente marginalizados a entregar as armas e acreditar na chegada ao poder pelo voto. Conclui-se ao final que a Colômbia pode se beneficiar de experiências transicionais vivenciadas por outros países que emergem de conflitos de natureza semelhante, mas que alguns dos aspectos peculiares da história de décadas de confronto impôs a inserção de condições diferenciadas nas negociações que conduziram à renúncia ao conflito. Outra conclusão a que se chega, tomando por base os momentos iniciais da implementação do acordo de paz, é que num ambiente democrático em que não apenas a Presidência da República atua em nome do Estado colombiano, os protagonistas do conflito precisam se acostumar com a ideia de que os outros poderes constitucionais atuam na conformação do processo transicional, seja na construção do arcabouço normativo pelo parlamento, seja na interpretação do acordo e das normas a ele subjacentes dada pela Corte Constitucional.

Palavras-chave: *justiça de transição; reforma agrária; reforma política; colômbia.*

Abstract- This article deals with the transitional process in development in the neighboring country after the end of a conflict that lasted for more than fifty years involving guerrilla movements, paramilitary groups and public forces in Colombia. Its goal is to analyze two of the most peculiar aspects of the agreement between the protagonists of the confrontations: integral rural reform and democratic opening for the peace building. Firstly, the peculiar dynamics that involve law and politics in times of transition are highlighted, and then the peace process itself. Then, it moves on to the two points mentioned in the agreement, discussing how the obligations assumed by Colombian society with regard to expanding access to land and conducting political reform are in line with the idea of non-repetition that should guide transitional process. It is discussed how the agrarian question, related to the origin and performance of the FARC-EP guerrilla movement, could not be absent from the context of the agreement signed, while at the same time reflecting on the need to change the electoral system as an imperative for the expansion of competition in electoral disputes, which would convince those historically marginalized movements to surrender their arms and believe in the coming to power by the vote. It is concluded at the end that Colombia can learn from transitional experiences of other countries emerging from conflicts of a similar nature, but that some of the peculiarities of the decades of history of the confrontation led to the insertion of different conditions in the negotiations, resulting in the renunciation of the conflict. Another conclusion, based on the initial moments of the implementation of the peace agreement, is that in a democratic environment in which not only the Presidency of the Republic acts in the name of the Colombian State, the protagonists of the conflict need to get used to the idea that the other constitutional powers act according to the transitional process, whether in the construction of the normative framework by the parliament or in the interpretation of the agreement and the underlying norms given by the Constitutional Court.

Keywords: *transitional justice; land reform; political reform; colombia.*

Author α: Associate Professor of Law School of Recife/Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE); Permanent Professor of the Post-Graduate Program in Law (Master's/Doctorate) at UFPE; Doctor in Law from UFPE/University of Coimbra-Portugal (PDEE).

e-mail: brunogalindoufpe@gmail.com

Author ο: Master in Law from UFPE; Federal Public Attorney in Brazil.

1. INTRODUCTION

This essay proposes to draw a picture of two very characteristic elements of the Transitional Justice process that unfolds in the neighboring country,

taking into account the content of the Final Agreement passed by the Congress of the Republic of Colombia in 2016.

The study of these specific points - Integral Rural Reform and Democratic Opening for Peace Building - highlights how transitional processes implemented in countries of the same subcontinent differ, exposing the importance of the local context for its configuration.

Before discussing these points that are part of the agreement, it is necessary to know about the context of Colombian transitional justice, focusing on the existence of a multiplicity of actors involved in its construction, based on what has been settled in the understandings celebrated in Havana.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be clarified that when the authors refer to the well-known guerrilla movement that took part in the Peace Agreement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC-EP acronym will be used, thus including the expression *Ejército del Pueblo* added by the organization itself in 1982.

On the other hand, when the reference targets the political party that succeeded it, the Alternative Revolutionary Force of the Common, will be adopted the acronym FARC.

Another interesting issue of the Colombian Transitional Justice is the way in which it is possible to see the dynamics that develops in such processes: an alternation between the approval of legal rules and the performance of political-institutional movements as propellers of the transition aiming at the end of the civil war.

Taking this nuance of Transitional Justice into account is one of the starting points of its study, once its comparison with ordinary justice, that in force in times of peace, is always tempting.

This type of understanding may lead to a trap pointed out by Ruti Teitel at the beginning of his Transitional Justice theory, citing the competition between those who believe that the law and the ideal of justice that accompanies it are the natural precursors of political change (she calls them idealists) and those who argue that the transition is driven by institutions and their balance of power (they would be the realists), and law is only a reflection of political change¹.

The side that each one takes in this debate is usually tainted by its academic-disciplinary bias or the generalization of a particular national experience².

Thus, lawyers tend to position law as the starting point of the transitional process, while political scientists assert that political-institutional circumstances

are the main aspect of transition, and law is merely a reflection of it.

Teitel teaches that neither of the two views, which also reflect the dichotomy between liberal and critical theorists of the relationship between law and politics, are able to explain the role of law in periods of radical political transformation.

This is clear from reading the following passage:

Again, neither liberal nor critical theorizing about the nature and role of law in ordinary times accounts well for law's role in periods of political change, missing the particular significance of justice claims in periods of radical political change and failing to explain the relation between normative responses to past injustice and to state prospects for liberal transformation³.

In this way, it is very important that anyone who proposes to study transitional justice should be aware of this feature and keep in mind this very peculiar dynamic that develops, always differently, between law, justice and politics in moments of transition.

II. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA: CONTEXTUALIZING ITS STEPS

Before analyzing the mentioned two points of the Agreement, it is necessary to study the path carried out by Colombian society and institutions aiming the end of a conflict that had been dragging on for five decades.

Due to the temporal magnitude of the conflict, it is natural that there should be alternation between moments of advance and retreat in the peace process, but it is possible to address that the promulgation of the 1991 Constitution was a relevant landmark.

This is related to the idea that the mentioned Constitution's inserted in a context of transformations carried out within Latin American constitutional law from the 1980s, as Professor Rodrigo Uprimny emphasizes:

Since the mid-1980s, and especially since the 1990s, Latin America has experienced a period of considerable constitutional changes, since almost all countries adopted new Constitutions (as in the cases of Brazil in 1988, Colombia in 1991, Paraguay in 1992, Ecuador in 1998 and 2008, Peru in 1993, Venezuela in 1999 and Bolivia in 2009, among others) or introduced very important reforms to their existing Constitutions (as in the case of Argentina in 1994, Mexico in 1992 or Costa Rica in 1989)⁴.

³ TEITEL, Ruti G. *Transitional Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

⁴ UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. *Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: tendencias y desafíos*. In: GUARAVITO, César Rodríguez (Coord.) *El derecho en América Latina: un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del siglo XXI*. 1. ed. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011, p. 109-137.

¹ TEITEL, Ruti G. *Transitional Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

² TEITEL, Ruti G. *Transitional Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

However, it is relevant to perceive that the changes in each country contain important differences, either by the origin and nature of the process or by its intensity or even by its orientation⁵.

In the case of Colombia, Uprimny points to the movement for the promulgation of a new constitution as an attempt to reinforce a regime that, although democratic, contained problems of legitimacy⁶, which certainly has a close relationship with the relay of political elites led by conservative and liberal parties during the 19th and 20th centuries⁷.

This frame of political asphyxiation did not permit the emergence of peaceful popular movements - as exemplified by the case of the Patriotic Union, which was discussed later, and was responsible for a constant sequence of episodes of violence that would explain, at least partially, the dissemination and longevity of guerrilla movements on Colombian territory.

It is not by chance that the new Constitution incorporates in its text legal democratic instruments such as plebiscite, referendum, popular referendum, revocation of mandate and the *cabildo abierto* (public meeting convened by a certain number of voters in which the head of the executive - local or regional - must participate).

Another signal of recognition of this lack of legitimacy in the regime is found in Point 2 of the Peace Agreement, entitled "Political participation: democratic opening to build peace", where it is clear that a democratic expansion is necessary with the emergence of new political trends in the country.

Nevertheless, the constitutional change, despite its importance, is not sufficient to carry out an effective transition, which is also coherent with the lesson of Ruti Teitel on the impossibility of determining a single element propellant of a transitional process.

Pedro Brandão, in a work directed by the first author of these lines, already warned that the new forms of representation foreseen in the Charter of 1991 were not effective and, citing Carlos Gaviria Díaz, stated:

It should be noted, however, that these forms of popular and democratic representation are paralyzed, practically reducing to the vote. The country is moving, in the political sphere, to deepen the traditional status quo and all its injustices and

inequalities, failing to achieve these constitutional goals⁸.

At this point, the role of the Colombian Constitutional Court, whose work in transforming character deserves to be emphasized, has already played a part in the constitutional history of Colombia, since it has played a crucial role in the realization of fundamental rights, especially by establishing an intercultural logic in the protection of these rights⁹.

But the Constitutional Court has also played an important role in the transitional process, since it has been called on several occasions to express its views on legal initiatives aimed at achieving peace, understandably elevated to the status of fundamental right by Article 22 of the Constitution.

An example of this occurred in the judgment of the constitutionality of Legislative Act n. 1/2012, which included a transitional article to the Colombian Constitution:

Transitional Article 66. The instruments of transitional justice will be exceptional and will have as their prevailing purpose to facilitate the end of the internal armed conflict and the achievement of stable and lasting peace, with guarantees of non-repetition and security for all Colombians; and will ensure, at the highest possible level, the victims' rights to truth, justice and reparation. A statutory law may authorize a different treatment under the terms of a peace agreement for the different armed groups outside the law that have been parties to the internal armed conflict and also for State agents in relation to with their participation in it¹⁰.

In fact, when it is called upon to express its view on a still embryonic transitional process, the Colombian Court, while recognizing the role of the Transitional Justice as a constitutionally adequate mechanism for peace building, tries to set limits on the negotiation to be carried out in Havana:

Transitional justice seeks to resolve the strong tensions between justice and peace, between legal imperatives for the satisfaction of victims' rights and the need to achieve a cessation of hostilities. This requires a delicate balance between putting an end to hostilities and preventing the return to violence (negative peace) and consolidating peace through inclusive structural and political reforms (positive peace).

[...]

⁵ UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: tendencias y desafíos. In: GUARAVITO. César Rodríguez (Coord.) El derecho en América Latina: un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del siglo XXI. 1. ed. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011, p. 109-137.

⁶ UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: tendencias y desafíos. In: GUARAVITO. César Rodríguez (Coord.) El derecho en América Latina: un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del siglo XXI. 1. ed. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011, p. 109-137.

⁷ PÉCAUT, Daniel. As FARC: uma guerrilha sem fins? São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010.

⁸ BRANDÃO, Pedro. O novo constitucionalismo pluralista latino-americano. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2015.

⁹ BRANDÃO, Pedro. O novo constitucionalismo pluralista latino-americano. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2015.

¹⁰ COLÔMBIA. Congreso de la República de Colombia. Acto Legislativo n. 01/2012. Available in: <<http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=48679>>. Accessed in 13 February 2018.

Although a correct reading of the Legislative Act allows conclude that it does not replace the Constitution, this Corporation considers it necessary to set a series of parameters in its interpretation to avoid that it can become an instrument for impunity and for the lack of knowledge of the rights of victims.

1. Termination of the armed conflict with respect to the demobilized group in the case of collective demobilization and the delivery of arms and non-commission of new crimes in individual demobilization as a requirement for the implementation of the Legal Framework for Peace. Should be required the termination of the armed conflict about the demobilized group in case of collective demobilization and the delivery of arms and non-commission of new offenses in individual demobilization as a condition for the implementation of the Legal Framework for Peace

2. Safeguarding rights of the victims. Under the recognized fundamental pillar, at least the following guarantees must be granted to all victims: (i) transparency in the selection and prioritization process, (ii) a serious, impartial, effective investigation, within a reasonable time and with your participation, (iii) the existence of an appeal to challenge the decision on the selection and prioritization of your case, (iv) specialized counseling, (v) your right to the truth, which, in the event of your case has not been prioritized must be guaranteed through non-criminal judicial mechanisms and extrajudicial mechanisms, (vi) their right to reparation, (vii) their right to know where the remains of their relatives are located.

3. Investigation and prosecution of all serious violations of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and the Rome Statute, which constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, or war crimes committed, and impute them to their maximum responsible¹¹.

The change of direction of the Executive Branch after the election of former President Juan Manuel Santos, although supported by Álvaro Uribe, is, in fact, an example of the oscillation that characterized the treatment given to the subject by Colombia, well described by Victor Manuel Moncayo:

That is why the political regime now returns to oscillate between those two positions, which have alternated or coexisted in the face of the Colombian conflict. On the one hand, the elimination, that is to say, extermination, which implies expanding and deepening the so-called legitimate exercise of force, a process in which can the State walk in ways that go beyond the limits imposed by the legal order or of appeal to parastatal modalities of repression; or, on the other hand, the

integration or cooptation so that the resistances accept both the institutional ways of handling and treating the conflict, and contents compatible with the good development of the order of domination, without altering or compromising it.

The Colombian State has always moved between these two positions and, for this reason, during these long decades many processes of dialogue and peace have been tried, but without abandoning the military logic. More recently, the option has been just the conflict, with the aim of defeating violent resistance, to achieve the imposition of "normality" by force¹².

The modification of the government's position on the issue of guerrillas, added the announcement in August 2016 of the celebration of the first version of the Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP, after four years of negotiation in Havana, introduced an effervescent political debate in the country.

Thus, the dispute becomes even more fierce between those who defended the approval of the Agreement and those who proposed its rejection with the prediction of its submission to a popular plebiscite.

In favour of the Agreement are not only the left-wing parties of the political spectrum but also those of center-right as the Party of La U, led by the then President Juan Manuel Santos. Its rejection is led by Álvaro Uribe, leader of the Democratic Center Party that, when presiding the country, adopted the policy of democratic security, which inspired militarist and far-right sectors for whom victory would depend on a final military solution, with the extermination of the terrorist enemy.¹³

Although its effectiveness has been recognized in the fight against violence and in the resumption of several territories previously under guerrilla control, the democratic security policy, coordinated curiously by former Uribe's Defense Minister, former President Santos, was severely criticized for its disrespect for international law.

Episodes such as the invasion of Ecuadorian territory to assassinate members of the FARC-EP summit¹⁴ and the use of symbols of international aid agencies on rescue missions, including the rescue of

¹¹ COLÔMBIA. Corte Constitucional. *Sentencia* n. C-579/13. Bogotá, 28 ago. 2013. Available in: <<http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2013/C-579-13.htm>>. Accessed in 13 February 2018.

¹² MONCAYO, Víctor Manuel. Las conversaciones de La Habana: una compleja oportunidad para la paz en Colombia. In: ESTRADA, Jairo (Coord.) *Solución política y proceso de paz en Colombia*. 1. ed. Querétaro: Ocean Sur, 2013.

¹³ ESTRADA, Jairo. Presentación. In: ESTRADA, Jairo (Coord.) *Solución política y proceso de paz en Colombia*. 1. ed. Querétaro: Ocean Sur, 2013.

¹⁴ AÇÃO contra FARC abre crise entre Colômbia e Equador. *O Globo*, Rio de Janeiro, 2 fev. 2012. Available in: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/acao-contra-farc-abre-crise-entre-colombia-equador-venezuela-3847030>>. Accessed in 14 February 2018.

former Senator Ingrid Betancourt, let know the exact notion of unrestrained determination to combat guerrillas.

At the end of a heated debate, the Agreement was rejected by the people in a plebiscite whose participation was not mandatory, for reasons that can only be speculated but which are probably linked to the risk of impunity:

[...] It is speculated that the reasons why the Colombian people did not accept the terms set forth for the agreement would be related mainly to the uncertainty of the realization of justice in relation to the perpetrated violations during the period¹⁵.

This led to the resumption of negotiations in Havana in an attempt to reconcile opposite political sides with the diffused message from the ballot box.

The absence of a clear justification for rejecting the first version of the Agreement ended up granting a wide margin of freedom to the negotiators, which meant that the second version was not so different from the first.

Among some important changes, it may be emphasized that the new agreement would no longer integrate the Colombian Constitution in its entirety, but only human rights and international humanitarian law, which is in line with the idea of a block of constitutionality provided for Article 93 of the Constitution:

Article 93. International treaties and conventions ratified by Congress, which recognize human rights and prohibit their limitation in states of emergency, prevail in the internal order. The rights and duties fixed in this Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the international treaties on human rights ratified by Colombia.

Another modified point was the express possibility of reviewing the decisions of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace by the Constitutional Court, although there are severe restrictions to the appeals that seek this objective.

And it was further specified that the FARC-EP should declare during the abandonment of arms its assets for the purpose of reparation of the victims.

After the changes, although the natural way was the submission of the renewed Agreement to a new plebiscite, it was decided to vote in the Congress of the Republic, where it was approved under strong protests from the opposition.

However, this did not mean that the implementation of the transition was free of changes,

and it should be mentioned, for example, that various legislative instruments adopted in the wake of the Agreement were and are being submitted to the Constitutional Court for scrutiny.

One of the situations occurred when the Constitutional Court understood unconstitutional two paragraphs (denominated *literales* in Colombia) of Legislative Act n. 1/2016, which imposed severe restrictions on legislative activity in the examination of draft legislation aimed at implementing the Agreement¹⁶.

In view of the above considerations, it is clear that political and legal elements are interconnected and alternated during a transition process, especially in a complex scenario such as Colombia, characterized by a multiplicity of actors involved in the conflict and institutions responsible for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement.

With all this in mind, it is already possible to analyze the agreement itself, initially through an overview of its content, and then focus on the two points most related to this work.

III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

Examining the new Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP is not a simple task, since it is a 310-page document whose complexity is to be understood as the main milestone in the struggle to end a conflict that has lasted for more than five decades.

In addition, it should be stressed that the Agreement is not a mere contract in which rights and duties are established. It proposes to go further, combining the establishment of mutual obligations with explanations on the causes of the conflict and serve as guidance on the interpretation of what was agreed upon.

Initially, the Peace Agreement is divided into five different points, which contain one or more agreements, all resulting from negotiations held at different times during the period of debates held in Havana between 2012 and 2016.

They are:

- Point 1 - Integral Rural Reform agreement;
- Point 2 - Political Participation: Democratic Opening to Build Peace agreement;
- Point 3 - three different agreements: a) Cease Fire and Definitive Cease of Bilateral Hostilities and Arms Delivery; b) Reintroduction of the FARC-EP to Civil Life - in the Economic, Social and Political Spheres - according to their Interests and c) Security Guarantees and Fight against Criminal Organizations

¹⁵ RIBAS, Ana Carolina; CARVALHO, Ana Paula Luciani de; RAMINA, Larissa. Processo de Paz na Colômbia: uma análise à luz do Direito Internacional Humanitário. Curitiba. vol. 62, n. 1, p. 273-298, jan./abr. 2017. Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFPR. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rfdupr.v62i1.50863>

¹⁶ COLÔMBIA. Corte Constitucional. *Sentencia* n. C-332/17. Bogotá, 17 mai. 2017. Available in: <<http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/C-332-17.htm>>. Accessed in 16 February 2018.

Responsible for Homicide and Massacres or against Human Rights Defenders, Social Movements or Political Movements, including those Criminal Organizations that have been Named as Successors of Paramilitarism and its Support Networks, and the Combat of Criminal Conduct Threatening the Implementation of Agreements and the Construction of Peace;

Point 4– Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs agreement;

Point 5 – Victims agreement.

A careless reading could lead to a questioning about the inclusion of Points 1 to 4 as worthy of the attention of scholars of the Transitional Justice, since they would be far from those traditional elements that integrate its concept.

In fact, many authors point out the ideas of memory, truth, reparation, punishment and institutional reforms as the main lines of the implementation of transitional justice, as some transcribed examples indicate:

Transitional justice can be defined as the effort to build sustainable peace after a period of conflict, mass violence or systematic violation of human rights.

The goal of transitional justice involves prosecuting perpetrators, revealing the truth about past crimes, providing reparations to victims, reforming institutions that had perpetrated abuses, and promoting reconciliation¹⁷.

In order to establish the starting points of the conceptions defended in this essay, I use the concept of Louis Bickford which gives a very broad definition of what transitional justice is before the variety of experiences discussed here. According to the author, transitional justice consists of a set of measures considered necessary to overcome periods of serious human rights violations during armed conflicts (e.g. civil wars) and/or authoritarian regimes (dictatorships), with the adoption of measures with the following objectives:

- Clarification of the historical and judicial truth, among other things, with the opening of the state archives of the period of exception;
- Establishment of memory places (e.g., the Holocaust memorial in Germany), so that present and future generations can know and understand the gravity of what occurred in the authoritarian period;
- Institutional reforms in relation to security services, adapting them to the axiological agenda of the democratic regime and rule of law, as well as

establishing a democratic and humanistic culture in public institutions;

- Reparation of damages to victims (indemnities, rehabilitations, etc.);
- Promoting material justice, with the accountability in varying degrees of those who committed serious crimes against human rights(BICKFORD, 2004, p. 1046-1047, GREIFF, 2007, p. 26)¹⁸¹⁹.

In point 5 are the issues that are most relevant to transitional justice, given the centrality the victim must have in order for transitional justice objectives to be achieved.

However, it must be recognized that points 1 and 2 are related to the idea of non-repetition – probably the most important goal of transitional justice –, which is why they cannot be ignored by those who wish to understand the Colombian framework.

IV. INTEGRAL RURAL REFORM

Born in the peasant struggle, the FARC-EP always showed in its ideology the need for a revision of the Colombian rural reality, and an agreement with them necessarily would have to deal with this issue.

This connection between the origin of the guerrilla and the struggle for land is explored in the work of Daniel Pécaut. According to this scholar, the formation of the FARC-EP is only intelligible in the light of two previous data. On the one hand, since 1920 intense agrarian conflicts are common in various regions of Colombia. Founded in 1930, the Communist Party played a considerable role in those conflicts and thus obtained durable support in a part of the peasantry. The new organization, therefore, already had old support. On the other hand, the most important thing is that Colombia left the episode of *La Violencia* - civil war that devastated the country from 1946 -, causing 200 thousand deaths. During those years, armed groups of variable orientations emerged, some more politicized than others. Among them, there were communist groups that were described as "*autodefensas*" or "*guerrillas*", who, while fighting against the regime, often pursued the struggle for land. The problem of guerrilla warfare is therefore in a very different context from that of other Latin American countries²⁰.

¹⁸ GALINDO, Bruno. Justiça de Transição na América do Sul: Possíveis lições da Argentina e do Chile ao processo constitucional de transição no Brasil. In: FEITOSA, Enoque (Org.) O judiciário e o discurso dos direitos humanos. Recife: Editora Universitária da UFPE, 2012, p. 197-240.

¹⁹ GALINDO, Bruno & CASTRO, Juliana Passos de. The rights to memory and truth in the Inter-American paradigms of transitional justice: the cases of Brazil and Chile. In: Revista de Direito Internacional (Brazilian Journal of International Law), vol. 15, nº 2. Brasília: UniCeub, pp. 307-323, 2018.

²⁰ PÉCAUT, Daniel. As FARC: uma guerrilha sem fins? São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010.

¹⁷ VAN ZYL, Paul. Promovendo a justiça transicional em sociedades pós-conflito. In: REATÉGUI, Félix (Org.) Justiça de transição: manual para a América Latina. Brasília: Comissão de Anistia, Ministério da Justiça, 2011, p. 47-71.

This relationship between the panorama of rural reality in Colombia and the armed struggle is throughout the Agreement, and it is constantly emphasized in its text that among its objectives is to solve the historical causes of the conflict: the question of land ownership and its concentration, the social exclusion of peasants and the backwardness of rural communities.

The integral rural reform, theme of Point 1 of the Agreement, brings a wide series of measures of responsibility of the Colombian State, the majority directed to the development of the peasant, family and community economy, with the purpose of creating a well-being situation for population and reduction of extreme poverty.

The creation of a fund for the distribution of land to those who do not have them, with prioritization of the female head of the family, as well as the provision of credit for the economic development of the rural regions, are among the planned initiatives.

There will also be development programs focusing on the territories most affected by the conflict and the creation of an agrarian jurisdiction to resolve disputes over land tenure quickly.

The restitution of land to the displaced who fled the violence is also part of this effort to transform the countryside, adding to the well-known Victims and Restitution of Land Act (1448/2011), whose effectiveness was conditioned to the pacification of the area that the property is pleaded, as explained by Gualano and Marinoni:

It is accepted that the demands for restitution have generated difficulties. In regulating 1448 /2011 Act (4829/2011 and 599/2012 Decrees), the National Government has established as a requirement for restitution the property in an area that has been "macrofocalized" and "microfocalized" by the Ministry of Defense as a region where there are minimum conditions of security for the return of the victims. These security conditions are seen primarily as a guarantee that the restitution of land will not put the victims in a position susceptible to further violence²¹.

However, it is important to say that even with the conclusion of the Agreement and the effective abandonment of arms by the FARC-EP, already certified by the United Nations Mission²², the pacification of the old conflict zones, as has even alerted the Colombian press, despite possible attempts by the Government to

cover up the absence of occupation by the state of the vacuum left by the guerrillas:

During the last months the cases of displacement, assassinations and threats to social and peasant leaders have been reactivated. The community maintains that it is not "líos de faldas", but armed actors who dispute the control of drug trafficking in the absence of the state in the territory.

While the Minister of Defense, Luis Carlos Villegas, affirms that the murders of social leaders take place "in their immense majority as a result of a boundary issue", the inhabitants of Putumayo have been denouncing the presence of armed actors and dissidence of the Farc who are threatening and murdering their leaders for the control of drug trafficking in the area. They are not the only ones. Yesterday, the Office in Colombia of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed its bewilderment at the disqualification of Minister Villegas and asserted that, according to their work in the field, up to yesterday they have registered 105 homicides of human rights defenders: 73 murders against leaders, 18 murders of members of social and political movements and 14 victims during social mobilizations²³.

In fact, the Colombian agrarian question is something that imposes a set of challenges that denote a huge effort, both in the historical and legal spheres:

Considering the magnitude of the process of expropriation and forced abandonment of land, the amount of material and immaterial damages of the massive victimization before the loss of assets, the destruction of life projects and the dismantling of fabrics and social communities, besides the survival of various forms of violence in large territories - consistent with the fact that more than 30% of the households surveyed in the Third Verification Survey (2010) claim to have no knowledge of what is currently happening with their abandoned land or dispossessed in their place of origin - some key challenges²⁴.

V. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEMOCRATIC OPENING TO BUILD THE PEACE AND REINCORPORATION OF THE FARC-EP TO CIVIL LIFE

There is no doubt that Point 2 contains some of the most controversial measures among those

²¹ GODOY, Miguel Gualano de; MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. A justiça transicional colombiana e as medidas de garantia para a reparação das vítimas. In: Revista de Processo Comparado, vol. 4, p. 229-251, jul./dez. 2016.

²² FARC concluem entrega de armas na Colômbia, diz Nações Unidas. *Folha de São Paulo*, São Paulo, 26 jun. 2017. Available in: <<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2017/06/1896320-farc-concluem-entrega-de-armas-na-colombia-diz-nacoes-unidas.shtml>>. Accessed in: 14 February 2018.

²³ PUTUMAYO, a merced de una nueva ola de violencia. *El Espectador*, Bogotá, 21 dez. 2017. Available in: <<https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/putumayo-merced-de-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia>>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.

²⁴ GARAY SALAMANCA, Luis Jorge; VARGAS VALENCIA, Fernando. *Memoria y reparación: elementos para una justicia transicional pro víctima*. 1. ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2012.

envisaged in the approved document and has aroused very strong criticism from opponents of the Agreement.

Criticism of this part of the agreement comes mainly from those who disregard the historical difficulties that organizations and social movements have encountered throughout Colombian history in order to gain access to an effective participation space in the dispute, which directly impacts the degree of effectiveness of the experienced democracy.

At the same time, the historical exclusion of the participation of some actors in the national decision-making process leads them to see in military force a way of compensating their lukewarmness in the political field, which is a complicating factor in moments of transition, delivery of arms and reintegration. In addition, it is a process with a huge escalation of violence, coming in part from those who were not included in the transitional pact and as they are politically weak, show their strength from the militarist side, which makes the process more complex. A political transition under these conditions hinders the proper correlation of forces to a democratic process of inclusion. The forces of opposition to the regime end up being heterogeneous and not necessarily agglutinated around the military force. This will only become clear when these forces transit the democratic world²⁵.

An emblematic case illustrates the extent of the problem and serves as a point of reflection for those who are considering what has been agreed in this part of the Agreement.

The Patriotic Union was a party created as a political branch of the FARC-EP in the 80's of last century because of advances in negotiations on a peace agreement still under the government of former President Belisario Betancurt.

The members of the Patriotic Union were subjected to violent persecution - some even call it genocide - that significantly damaged their electoral performance and led the party to the annulment of its legal personality by the National Electoral Council:

Since the Patriotic Union (UP) was born as a legal option for ex-combatants who had taken up arms against the State, they seldom had the opportunity to see the political victory in a democracy scenario. His presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, was assassinated in October 1987, and virtually the entire country knew that sooner or later that would happen.

As time went by, the violent wave against that party was raging. Little by little they were killing their militants, to the point that, between 1985 and 1988, there were 573 deaths among the members of the so-called political arm of today's unarmed FARC guerrilla. More than 20 years later, in September 2016,

President Juan Manuel Santos ended up asking for forgiveness, on behalf of the Colombian State, for the genocide committed against that community²⁶.

It is not by chance that many see with concern the violence of which has been victim the new party that happened to the FARC, which has launched candidates to the parliamentary elections of March of 2018:

With this background, and in the face of the systematic violence that has been recorded since the Peace Agreement of the Colón Theater was agreed upon, the likelihood of the repetition of that scenario is not at all distant. The members of the nascent Revolutionary Alternative Force (FARC) political party have been crying out to the government to provide security guarantees in this jump to legal life, without weapons and, so far, the murders, threats and harassment seem keep being bread of every day. (EL ESPECTADOR, 2018).

The FARC party announced on Friday the suspension of its electoral campaign after protests against its candidate for president, Rodrigo Londoño, Timochenko, in different regions of Colombia. The former guerrilla leader received insults in the department of Quindío, in the center of the country, in Cali and in the city of Yumbo, in the southwest, where he was thrown stones and eggs. According to the Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Common, "the successive attacks" reflect "the existence of a coordinated plan, aimed at preventing the political participation of a legally constituted party." After signing a peace agreement with the government of Juan Manuel Santos, the FARC became a political party last September that will have guaranteed representation in Congress from March and will attend presidential elections in May²⁷.

As can be seen, there were reasons for requiring the agreement that Colombia should assume responsibility for ensuring the secure exercise of political participation by those who renounced armed struggle and opted for peaceful opposition to the government, making it a democratic alternative of power.

Democratic strengthening is an indispensable condition for non-repetition of the conflict, and it has been a strong argument for the abandonment of weapons and violence as methods of political action.

Among the concrete measures aimed at expanding the locus of democratic discussion and political reintegration of FARC members, one of the most important is the adoption of the Statute of

²⁵ TORRES ÁVILA, Jheison. El constitucionalismo, transición política y justicia transicional. *Análisis Político*, Bogotá, n. 88, p. 126-147, set-dez. 2016. <https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v29n88.63882>

²⁶ FARC, en alerta por atentados. *El Espectador*, Bogotá, 23 jan. 2018. Available in: <<https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/farc-en-alerta-por-atentados>>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.

²⁷ EL PARTIDO de las FARC suspende su campaña por las protestas contra Timochenko. *El País*, Bogotá, 9 February 2018. Available in: <https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/02/09/colombia/1518186629_908819.html>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.

Opposition, as provided for in the text of the 1991 Constitution, and a more equitable distribution of resources between political parties.

In addition, it is envisaged that sixteen special transitional peace zones will be created, which will elect sixteen representatives to the House of Representatives.

For those seats, which will be temporary and will only last for two legislative periods (of four years each), political parties that are represented at the congress or those with legal personality, including the party that succeeded the FARC-EP, will not be able to launch candidates.

Another point discussed during the plebiscite (maintained in the new agreement) was the guarantee of five seats for representatives of the FARC in the House of Representatives and five in the Senate of the Republic during two legislative periods starting in 2018.

This point is justified both by the recognition of the difficulties imposed on the parties and social movements in the arena of Colombian democracy, whose most symbolic case is that of the Patriotic Union, as well as the need for political insertion of the members of the FARC-EP, guaranteeing them an effective space for presentation of their ideology and real chances of becoming a political alternative.

It should be noted that the establishment of transitional seats for ex-combatants is not an innovation of the Colombian transitional process, since similar measures have been adopted, for example, in the Philippines and the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

In peace processes such as that in the Philippines or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the participation of members of ex-combatants' political parties was allowed on a transitional basis, i.e. while other political decisions were taken. Most of these transitions were created to facilitate the creation of a National Constituent Assembly, however, after the transition, these parties had to contend politically with other parties²⁸.

Finally, the Agreement provides that obtaining and retaining the legal personality of political parties shall be no longer for electoral performance, but for membership, which will prevent the indiscriminate proliferation of political parties.

Taking into account what has been exposed in this item, the reinsertion measures adopted in this Point are essential for effective integration of FARC members into the political arena, with the permanent abandonment of arms, which will contribute for non-repetition of the conflict.

²⁸ SUAREZ, Beatriz; RUEDA, Bibiana. Lecciones aprendidas para Colombia desde las experiencias internacionales: In HENRIQUES, Miguel Barreto (Editor Académico) Experiencias internacionales de paz: lecciones aprendidas para Colombia. 1. ed. Bogotá: Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2015, p. 349-370.

VI. CONCLUSION

After all the above, it should be seen that the Colombian transitional justice has some advantage over other experiences, since, as it is a more recent process, it can learn the lessons of other international and foreign examples, taking advantage of the successes and failures of others countries.

On the other hand, a challenge that requires considerable caution is related to the complexity that accompanies a particularly long conflict, where there is a multiplicity of actors involved in serious human rights violations.

Another warning to be aware of is the fact that the Colombian transition occurs in a democratic environment, although it is fraught with imperfections as pointed out above, which prevents a single institution, the Presidency of the Republic, from being responsible for shaping the transitional process.

This means that the FARC must be prepared for changes imposed by other institutions such as the Congress of the Republic and the Constitutional Court, whose role cannot be removed without violating the Constitution in its most fundamental axes: the rule of law and separation of powers.

Anyway, the inclusion of unusual elements in the Peace Agreement, such as the obligation to implement reforms in the rural sphere and in the representative system, is an important point for serious confrontation with the causes of the conflict and seems to show that the Agreement has the potential to be managed to lead effective changes in the structure of Colombian society, without which it will be difficult to guarantee the objective of non-repetition.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. AÇÃO contra FARC abre crise entre Colômbia e Equador. *O Globo*, Rio de Janeiro, 2 fev. 2012. Available in: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/acao-contra-farc-abre-crise-entre-colombia-equador-venezuela-3847030>>. Accessed in: 14 February 2018.
2. BRANDÃO, Pedro. O novo constitucionalismo pluralista latino-americano. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2015.
3. COLÔMBIA. Congreso de la República de Colombia. Acto Legislativo n. 01/2012. Available in: <<http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=48679>>. Accessed in 13 February 2018.
4. _____. Corte Constitucional. *Sentencia* n. C-579/13. Bogotá, 28 ago. 2013. Available in: <<http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2013/C-579-13.htm>>. Accessed in 13 February 2018.
5. _____. Corte Constitucional. *Sentencia* n. C-332/17. Bogotá, 17 mai. 2017. Available in: <<http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/C-332-17.htm>>.

- corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/C-332-17.htm>. Accessed in 16 February 2018.
6. EL PARTIDO de las FARC suspende su campaña por las protestas contra Timochenko. *El País*, Bogotá, 9 fev. 2018. Available in: <https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/02/09/colombia/1518186629_908819.html>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.
 7. ESTRADA, Jairo. Presentación. In: ESTRADA, Jairo (Coord.) Solución política y proceso de paz en Colombia. 1. ed. Querétaro: OceanSur, 2013.
 8. FARC concluem entrega de armas na Colômbia, diz Nações Unidas. *Folha de São Paulo*, São Paulo, 26 jun. 2017. Available in: <<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2017/06/1896320-farc-concluem-entrega-de-armas-na-colombia-diz-nacoes-unidas.shtml>>. Accessed in: 14 February 2018.
 9. FARC, en alerta por atentados. *El Espectador*, Bogotá, 23 jan. 2018. Available in: <<https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/politica/farc-en-alerta-por-atentados>>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.
 10. GALINDO, Bruno. Justiça de Transição na América do Sul: Possíveis lições da Argentina e do Chile ao processo constitucional de transição no Brasil. In: FEITOSA, Enoque (Org.) O judiciário e o discurso dos direitos humanos. Recife: Editora Universitária da UFPE, 2012, p. 197-240.
 11. GALINDO, Bruno & CASTRO, Juliana Passos de. The rights to memory and truth in the Inter-American paradigms of transitional justice: the cases of Brazil and Chile. In: Revista de Direito Internacional (Brazilian Journal of International Law), vol. 15, nº 2. Brasília: UniCeub, pp. 307-323, 2018.
 12. GARAY SALAMANCA, Luis Jorge; VARGAS VALENCIA, Fernando. Memoria y reparación: elementos para una justicia transicional pro víctima. 1. ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2012.
 13. GODOY, Miguel Gualano de; MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. A justiça transicional colombiana e as medidas de garantia para a reparação das vítimas. In: Revista de Processo Comparado, vol. 4, p. 229-251, jul./dez. 2016.
 14. MONCAYO, Víctor Manuel. Las conversaciones de La Habana: una compleja oportunidad para la paz en Colombia. In: ESTRADA, Jairo (Coord.) Solución política y proceso de paz en Colombia. 1. ed. Querétaro: OceanSur, 2013.
 15. PÉCAUT, Daniel. As FARC: uma guerrilha sem fins? São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2010.
 16. PUTUMAYO, a merced de una nueva ola de violencia. *El Espectador*, Bogotá, 21 dez. 2017. Available in: <<https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/territorio/putumayo-merced-de-una-nueva-ola-de-violencia>>. Accessed in: 13 February 2018.
 17. RIBAS, Ana Carolina; CARVALHO, Ana Paula Luciani de; RAMINA, Larissa. Processo de Paz na Colômbia: uma análise à luz do Direito Internacional Humanitário. Curitiba. vol. 62, n. 1, p. 273-298, jan./abr. 2017. Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFPR. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rfdufpr.v62i1.50863>
 18. SUAREZ, Beatriz; RUEDA, Bibiana. Lecciones aprendidas para Colombia des de las experiencias internacionales: In HENRIQUES, Miguel Barreto (Editor Académico) Experiencias internacionales de paz: lecciones aprendidas para Colombia. 1. ed. Bogotá: Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 2015, p. 349-370.
 19. TEITEL, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
 20. TORRES ÁVILA, Jheison. El constitucionalismo, transición política y justicia transicional. Análisis Político, Bogotá, n. 88, p. 126-147, set-dez. 2016. <https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v29n88.63882>
 21. UPRIMNY, Rodrigo. Las transformaciones constitucionales recientes en América Latina: tendencias y desafíos. In: GUARAVITO, César Rodríguez (Coord.) El derecho en América Latina: un mapa para el pensamiento jurídico del siglo XXI. 1. ed. Buenos Aires: SigloVeintiuno Editores, 2011, p. 109-137.
 22. VAN ZYL, Paul. Promovendo a justiça transicional em sociedades pós-conflito. In: REATÉGUI, Félix (Org.) Justiça de transição: manual para a América Latina. Brasília: Comissão de Anistia, Ministério da Justiça, 2011, p. 47-71.



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2020
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements in Democracy: The Portuguese Case

By José F. Pinto

Lusophone University of Humanities and Technologies

Abstract- Since its birth in Greece, democracy has evolved mainly with regard to the role people or citizens must play in the system. That evolution explains not only the various modalities of democracy but also the formation of political parties and their change over time. There is no democracy without the parties, but the parties are not the owners of the democratic system, and this encourages the appearance of non-partisan movements that wish to be part of the power play. In Portugal, during Salazar's dictatorship, political parties were forbidden. After returning to democracy, Portuguese law currently does not allow regional or local parties, as political parties need to act at the national level. However, the Constitution stipulated that non-partisan groups had the right to present lists to the lowest level of local power, the parish council. Despite the official constraint, these groups accepted the challenge, and their power and influence have increased since the first local election in 1976, and it was no wonder that, after the 1997 constitutional revision, the law had recognized them the right to apply for all the organs of the local power.

Keywords: *non-partisan movements, political system, representative and deliberative democracy, and Portugal.*

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 160699



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements in Democracy: The Portuguese Case

José F. Pinto

Abstract- Since its birth in Greece, democracy has evolved mainly with regard to the role people or citizens must play in the system. That evolution explains not only the various modalities of democracy but also the formation of political parties and their change over time. There is no democracy without the parties, but the parties are not the owners of the democratic system, and this encourages the appearance of non-partisan movements that wish to be part of the power play. In Portugal, during Salazar's dictatorship, political parties were forbidden. After returning to democracy, Portuguese law currently does not allow regional or local parties, as political parties need to act at the national level. However, the Constitution stipulated that non-partisan groups had the right to present lists to the lowest level of local power, the parish council. Despite the official constraint, these groups accepted the challenge, and their power and influence have increased since the first local election in 1976, and it was no wonder that, after the 1997 constitutional revision, the law had recognized them the right to apply for all the organs of the local power. Later, due to political dissents, some politicians decided to constitute non-partisan movements to run against the party that they had just abandoned. Nowadays, these groups rule over 17 of the 308 municipal councils, namely Porto, the second most important city in Portugal. Moreover, the non-partisan movements are the third political force concerning local power, ruling over more than 400 parish councils. However, these groups cannot present lists to the central power, the National Assembly. This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it analyses the evolution of the participation of non-partisan movements in the electoral acts, their influence in the political life in Portugal, their complaints against the electoral law, and their fight trying to change it. On the other hand, it sets out to explain the reaction of the parties towards the non-partisan groups and reflects on the modifications that these groups bring to democracy, adding a richness and depth to politics that has an impact on it.

Keywords: *non-partisan movements, political system, representative and deliberative democracy, and Portugal.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since its birth in the Greek world, five centuries before Christ, the word democracy was subject to many debates and meanings, and not always in a positive sense. For example, Plato and Aristotle considered it a distorted regime, prone to chaos, because the crowds generally confused freedom with decadence, and "Athenian democracy was also the birthplace of the tendency to debunk discussion as sophistry or demagoguery" (Elster, 2012).

Author: Full Professor, and Research Coordinator at CIPES, Lusophone University of Humanities and Technologies (Lisbon).
e-mail: jose.pinto@ulusofona.pt

At the time, scholars usually considered democracy as direct due to the participation of the citizens in the political life of the city. However, taking into account the existence of some organs which were elected by the citizens, it would seem appropriate to name it as an assembly or town meeting democracy. It has taken many centuries for the establishment of the partisan system in which the parties accepted the role of giving a political voice to citizenship, assuming themselves as intermediaries of the political process between the citizens and the State. The enhancement of the passive electoral capacity based on universal suffrage and the non-imperative vote became the pillars of representative democracy, presupposing that "all its adult citizens possess a body of fundamental rights, liberties, and opportunities"¹ (Dahl, 2004, p. 59), and recognized that "voting is the most powerful voice a citizen has to hold elected officials accountable for their decisions and behavior in office.". However, this relationship does not mean that politicians are hostage to citizens. In fact, according to Bobbio, Pontara & Veca (1985, p. 19) the reason explaining the prohibition of the imperative vote was precisely in the exigence of changing the private political relation, conceived as the relation of exchange among people; a characteristic of a feudal society; into a public relationship, a quality of the legal and national State, according to the Weberian interpretation.

In that sense, the 1973 French Constitution, in its first chapter, section 3, point 7, stipulated that "the representatives elected in the departments shall not be representatives of a particular department, but of the entire nation, and no mandate may be given them.". However, the last part of the sentence led to the dissatisfaction of the citizens whenever they felt that the parliamentary members whom they had elected no longer represented them, creating a disconnection between how citizens imagined democracy and how politics took place. According to Santos (2020), there was a progressive inbreeding tendency in the parties and a tendency to capture institutional power by the

¹ Namely, "the right to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; the right to run for elective office; the right to free expression; the right to form and participate in independent political organizations, including political parties; the right to gain access to independent sources of information; rights to any other freedoms and opportunities that may be necessary for the effective operation of the political institutions of large-scale democracy."

party directories. This feeling was understood by Rousseau, who, reflecting on the English democracy model, said that, as soon as the members of parliament "are elected, slavery overtakes it [the people of England]", and he advocated the return to the direct democracy.

Two centuries later, after two world wars, in the 1960s, the youth started to organize themselves claiming to participate in the decision-making process about political and social issues, namely about the war in Vietnam. Young people came onto the streets shouting their protests, as it happened in France during May 1968. Lijphart's criterion based on the concentration of political power to classify democracy proved to be insufficient as new social actors made their appearance in the political setting.

Later on, some authors in the USA proposed a participatory democracy, and Habermas presented a deliberative model in which a decision is made by discussion among free and equal citizens. Two new models, as "not all forms of deliberation are «participative»; and not all forms of participation are «deliberative»" (Florida, 2013, p. 3). This finding is crucial because, as Hochstetler & Friedman (2008, pp. 1-4) affirmed, "political parties are the primary channel for representation in democracies", but we cannot ignore that civil society organizations (CSOs) can also become mechanisms of representation while promoting "the values and interests of citizens in collective decision making processes.". However, as these organizations "are not chosen by an electorate, and they do not govern", some researchers hesitate "to use the term *representation* as a description of CSOs' activities."

This evolution constitutes proof of the fragmentation of the previous party systems and explains the rise of the populist parties, characterized in essence by charismatic leadership and the refusal of political intermediation. Santos (2012, p. 273) explained the way how Berlusconi used his enterprise, the Fininvest, to create a party, Forza Italia, following a business model closely associated with him. Later, the widespread use of social media, allowing citizens to become *prosumers* – producers and not only consumers –, led to a new model based on trouble-free and independent distribution able to reach followers at unprecedented speed. That new paradigm explains the political success of Beppe Grillo and the Five Stars Movement, a sort of digital populism.

However, the crisis of representation and the political anemia of mainstream parties also led to new political forms of organization, as citizens started to insist on playing a different role in political life.

A paper prepared by International Idea (2018, p. 6²) defends that "many new social and protest

movements have transformed themselves into political movements and are contesting elections in order to command decision-making power". This situation can be found in the Portuguese political system due to the action of non-partisan groups at local power, which represents a double challenge.

On the one hand, these groups do not want to change the matrix of representative democracy because they do not affect its two basic principles: universal suffrage and the non-imperative vote. On the other hand, they wish to show that, despite the increasing complexity of the problems, citizenship has a fair amount of say in what concerns to democracy. Nowadays, citizens consider that they met the conditions to put an end to one of the four Bobbio's paradoxes. That one assuming there is a "contradiction between the technical inability of the citizen, as such, and the increasing demand of technical specialization necessary to the knowledge of issues concerning the political ability, for example, the economic and financial policy." (Santos, 1998, p. 19).

II. PORTUGAL: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTORAL LAW

When Salazar came to power, he accused the political parties of being responsible for the crisis that Portugal was enduring. He said that, in general, he had no fear of the parties. However, he dreaded the partisanship existing in Portugal because the parties were formed around people with narrow interests and personal appetites, looking to satisfy them both (Ferro, 1933, p. 140). Later, in 1949, in a speech in Porto, Salazar reaffirmed that both during the monarchy and the first republic, with 52 governments in less than 16 years, the parties had forgotten the national interest, and the only conclusion was that the partisan model had failed. That was the reason explaining his refusal to accept the legalization of political parties, despite the Foundation in 1930 of the National Union, which many scholars consider as a supporting party to the regime.

During some decades, the opposition was controlled by the illegal Portuguese Communist Party, whose militants were persecuted and imprisoned, and the Socialist Party had its birth outside Portugal, in West Germany in 1973. Only after the 25th of April 1974, the new order accepted parties as pillars of democracy, the founding act of the partisan system. Then, it was not hard to convince the citizens that the parties, mainly those created by politicians who had been persecuted by the previous regime, would play a crucial role in the new democratic society. However, due to the peculiar conditions to keep the unity of the State, avoiding the independence of Azores and Madeira, the creation of regional parties was forbidden. Massetti & Schakel (2015, p. 866) believe that a great deal of the political

² Collaboration between Citizen Movements and Political Parties. Political Party Innovation Primer 3. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

struggle of regionalist parties “consists of trying to push the territorial dimension into the political agenda, thus making it a salient dimension of party competition”. In Portugal, the fear was that Azores and Madeira could no longer accept to be part of the country.

However the Constitution granted the right to the independent citizens to involve themselves in the political life outside the partisan world. Almeida (2010, p. 172) considers that this resolution intended to replicate the situation of Northern Europe, especially in Germany, where the federal regime allows a strong bet of political parties at the level of central and regional governments, and clear disinvestment at the lowest level. However, those parties do not exist only in Northern Europe. For example, Brancati (2008) studied this phenomenon in thirty-seven democracies around the world from 1945 to 2002, Massetti & Schakel (2015, p. 867) undertook a quantitative analysis of “74 regionalist parties distributed across 49 regions and 11 countries and participating in national and/or regional elections held between 1970 and 2010”, and Subhan & Kasi (2018, p. 220) presented a case study about the regional political parties of Balochistan, one of the four provinces of Pakistan in which they got to the conclusion that regional political parties acted “as a check on the mainstream parties” because they played a role of “catalyst and keep them from centralizing the powers”, and so “they flourish the democratic mindset and strengthen the system.”.

In the Portuguese case, besides the small dimension of the country, in the initial conjuncture, the parties and the militaries of the Revolution Council thought that the decentralization should be conducted by national parties, despite accepting that independent movements could act at the lowest level, but they did not follow the idea that “political decentralization encourages politicians to form regional parties, and voters to vote for them.” (Bracati, 2008, p. 136).

Thus, it is noteworthy to see if citizens took profit from this benefit. This study requires finding out the number of non-partisan candidacies as well as the electoral results that they have got.

III. THE ELECTORAL RESULTS

In the first local election, on 12th December 1976, the non-partisan movements were identified in the ballot paper not for a designation, as it happens with the parties, but through Roman numerals. Despite that, they elected 1.232 representatives for the Parish Councils, mainly in Braga – 209 seats, Porto – 139 elected, Coimbra – 119 representatives, and Aveiro – 103 places, districts located on the north and central coast.

In the second local election, on 16th December 1979, these non-partisan groups only elected 696 representatives, even being the sixth political force at the local level. It seemed that the parties had changed their strategy and decided to invest on the local level.

The third electoral act, on 12th December 1982, showed a slight recovery, but the fourth one, on 15th December 1985, led to a new decline, before the fifth election, on 17th December 1989, led to a small rise. However, in 1993 the non-partisan movements elected 1.234 representatives, thanks to 123.351 votes, 2,29% of the total, and in 1997, this amount increased to 1.594 representatives, corresponding to 152.055 votes and an average of 2,85%.

On 16th December 2001, the situation changed because the non-partisan groups started to apply for all the organs of local power. Then, they elected 31 municipal councilors, 93 deputies for Municipal Assembly, and 2407 members for the Parish Council, due to 232.861 votes, an average of 4,44%.

In 2005, the non-partisan groups continued the growth trend, and they elected 45 members for the Municipal Council, including 6 presidents, thanks to 133.146 votes, and an average of 2,47%. In that electoral act, there was an additional reason for this positive result. The leader of the social-democratic party, PPD/PSD, refused his support to the candidates who were facing problems with the law, and some of them, namely Isaltino Morais and Valentim Loureiro, formed non-partisan movements, ran against their former party, and won.

Rosenberg, Kahn & Trun (1991) proved that it was “possible to shape a political candidate’s image in a way which may affect electoral outcomes”. In 2005, the Portuguese voters showed that local governance based on a proximity policy was worth more than the symbol of the party. In what concerns to the Municipal Assembly, they obtained 115.999 votes, an average of 2,15%, and 121 deputies. Finally, for the Parish Council, they gained 245.740 votes, 4,57% of the total, corresponding to 2.202 representatives and the presidency of 292 Parish Councils, 260 of them by a large majority.

In 2009, the local elections should obey the Law nº 46/2005 preventing a president of the municipal council or the parish council from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same office. This law was more damaging to the parties than to the non-partisan groups that proved, once again, that the parties could not ignore them at the local level. They received 226.111 votes, i.e., 4,09% and 67 seats in the Municipal Council, 205.317 votes corresponding to 3,71% and 224 deputies for the Municipal Assembly and 337.613 votes, an average of 6,11% and 2 673 mandates in the Parish Council.

In 2013, the non-partisan movements reached a high level of representation, as they got 6,89%, i.e., 344.531 votes and 112 mandates for the Municipal Council, 6,52% or 325.724 votes and 352 places in the Municipal Assembly, and 9,57%, corresponding to 478.273 votes and 2.978 seats, namely 342 presidents, for the Parish Council.

Finally, in 2017, the non-partisan groups elected 130 representatives for the Municipal Council, thanks to 351.352 votes and an average of 6.79%. They also obtained 396 seats in the Municipal Assembly, due to 333.559 votes and 6.45%, and 3.355 mandates for the Parish Council, corresponding to 504.055 votes and the average of 9,75%.

These results prove that the non-partisan movements are more important than many political parties at the local level. Indeed, only two political forces – Socialist Party and Social-Democratic Party – elected more representatives than the non-partisan groups.

IV. THE COMPLAINTS OF THE NON-PARTISAN GROUPS

Since the 1997 constitutional revision, according to point 4 of article 239, "Nominations for elections to local authority organs may be submitted by political parties, either individually or in a coalition, or by groups of registered electors, as laid down by law". However, the Organic Law 1/2001 did not treat the parties and the groups which were identified by a Roman numeral as equals. It was a drawback in comparison with the parties, as these could use their symbol, which functioned as their brand image. This point survived for several years, though the actual Organic Law 1/2017, in its fourth point of the article 23.^o stipulates that each group of elector citizens has the right to a designation and that the denomination "may not contain more than six words, nor be based exclusively on the name of a natural person or integrate the official denominations of political parties or coalitions with legal existence, nor contain expressions directly related to any religion, national or local institution". The reference to the name of a natural person means that citizens should not see each of these groups as a one-person movement.

Moreover, according to the first point of article 19.^o of the Organic Law 1/2007, the lists of candidates of non-partisan groups for local governmental organs must be "proposed by a number of citizens corresponding to 3% of voters registered in the respective voter circumscription", being that in the largest municipalities the number of proposers can reach 4000. It is important to note that the non-partisan movements are obliged to present the list of proposers even when they intend to be reelected while the political parties do not need to deliver that list. Moreover, the non-partisan movements are dissolved immediately in the same day of the electoral act, and this situation can affect significantly the relationship between the citizens and the elected independent members. Finally, the non-partisan groups are obliged to pay a VAT rate of 23% in all the electoral expenses while the parties are free of

this payment and the Law 19/2003 gives them a big list of rights³.

For these reasons, many of the non-partisan movements decided to constitute an organization called the National Association of Independent Municipal Movements in 2010. Indeed, the influence of each non-partisan group was felt only at a very narrow level, and it was necessary to join other groups to fight against a system whose lawful functioning depends on the parties. Without a national organization, the non-partisan movements would not be able to mobilize civil society to recognize that it is necessary to change the law to respect article 113.^o of the Portuguese Constitution, which refers to equal opportunities and treatment of different candidates in electoral campaigns. The first results of this campaign have already appeared, as the Ombudsman's institution has advised the Republic Assembly to discuss the issue, and to find a solution to assure that the equity principle is respected.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, after winning the election, a non-partisan movement decided to turn into a party. It happened in the Autonomic Region of Madeira, more specifically in the parish of Santa Cruz. The group Together for the People (JPP) was legalized as a party by the Portuguese Constitutional Court on 27th January 2015 because its leadership wished to run in the 2015 regional election. It is an apparent contradiction because the Portuguese Constitution forbids regional parties, and this new party was specifically formed to run for the regional election.

V. THE CENTRAL POWER AS A DREAM

In Portugal, the Constitution allows independent citizens to apply for a seat in the National Assembly only if taking part in a party's list. At the beginning of the process, there were many independent deputies. Pinto (2012, p. 138) refers that "in 1976, when the opposition struggle, exile, and political prison served as a letter of recommendation, there were 48 independent deputies, that is, 18.25% of the total". However, in 2002, there were only 19 independent deputies, i.e., 8.3%, and, in 2005, the number dropped to 11 and a relative weight of 4.8%.

³ Parties are not subject to IRC and still benefit, in addition to the provisions of a *special* law, from the exemption from the following taxes: stamp duty; tax on inheritance and donations; municipal tax contribution on the taxable value of the properties or part of properties owned by them and intended for their activity; other taxes on assets provided for in paragraph 3 of article 104 of the Constitution; car tax on the vehicles they purchase for their activity; value-added tax on the acquisition and transmission of goods and services that aim to spread their political message or their own identity, through any media, printed, audio-visual or multimedia, including those used as advertising material and means of communication and transport, the exemption being effected through the exercise of the right to the tax refund; value-added tax on the transmission of goods and services in special fundraising initiatives for its exclusive benefit, provided that this exemption does not cause distortions of competition.

Nevertheless, the results that the non-partisan groups got at the local level led them to fight for changing the first point of article 151.^o of the Constitution. They knew that if they presented a petition with 1000 signatures it would be published in the Assembly Diary, and if the number of signatures reached 4000, it would be discussed in the plenary of the Assembly. Then, they presented a petition with 6.285 signatures, and this petition n. ^o 240/XII (2.^a) was discussed on 10th October 2013. The citizens did not need to wait for the end of the discussion to know the result. The parties played a 'double deal' as they were both judge and jury. The citizens could not take part in the debate. They had the right to participate but just as listeners.

Thus, they heard the representative of the Socialist Party say that the parties, in contrast to occasional groups, had forms of internal and external control. Moreover, he criticized the atomistic representations because they defended particular or local interests and not the national will. Later, the representative of the Communist Party remembered that the concept of «independent» was far from consensual, and that there was a campaign against the parties and that some movements met all the legal requirements to be considered parties, but they refused that designation. He did not point any example of that campaign, but it should be said that there are multiple cases. For instance, in the USA, there is the Citizens Against Political Parties (CAPP) whose goal is "to eliminate or minimize both the Republican and Democrat parties so that our nation can become closer to the goal of a true democracy", and in the Netherlands, Fortuyn (2002, p. 186)⁴ defended that the country "should become a real lively democracy of and for the ordinary people, and depart from the elite party democracy we are currently acquainted with".

Returning to the debate, the representatives of the Christian-Democratic Party and of the Social-Democratic Party agreed with the communist position, and the non-partisan groups were described as "episodic and inorganic movements". Only the Left Bloc supported, partially, the idea of the petition because its representative said that it was a process that "should be returned to society". Because it was within "Portuguese society that strength and consensus should be created", a necessary desire "so that, at a proper time, the Constitution can recognize this space that society has created". The independent groups liked to hear that it was necessary "to discuss the monopoly of representation by political parties", but they left the session with a hand full of nothing. The dream of presenting lists to the National Assembly was between the mirage and the utopia, as all the changes on the law are under the monopoly and responsibility of the parties.

⁴ Quoted by Van Kessel (2011).

History shows that the system protects itself, even when it recognizes the need for change. Once the Portuguese legislative life is based on the existence of parliamentary groups, parties affirm that the non-partisan movements, being directly linked to local interests and visions, cannot establish a unique parliamentary group.

VI. THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE NON-PARTISAN MOVEMENTS

Several years after applying for all the organs of local power, the government of so many Parish Councils and some high-ranking Municipal Councils, namely Porto and Oeiras, provided the non-partisans groups increasing visibility, and this presence in the public arena led to permanent scrutiny. Citizens wanted to know if these groups represented a new way of doing politics, enhancing a closer relationship between representatives and voters. As these groups maintained many of the Parish and Municipal Councils that they have won, we should believe that voters were satisfied with them. However, some attitudes of the leaders and main executives of these groups proved that they were not completely devoted to the public cause, as they placed their interests before common ones. The case of Oeiras, a municipality in the western part of the Lisbon metropolitan area, can be pointed as an example.

As already said, Isaltino Morais was the president of the Municipal Council when he started to have problems with the judiciary, and his party solved to express a lack of confidence in his new candidacy. Then, he formed an independent movement – the IOMAF (Isaltino, Oeiras more ahead), and he conquered not only the Municipal Council and Assembly but also almost all the Parish Councils. Later, after losing the judicial appeals, Isaltino was jailed and his vice-leader, Paulo Vistas, became the new president, after replacing Isaltino who accepted to become the head of the list for the municipal assembly. However, after being released, Isaltino intended to return to his former position, and he formed another non-partisan group, INOVAR (Oeiras coming back). Besides, a third municipal member of IOMAF also decided to form a new group. Thus, the 2017 electoral act was not only a battle between parties and non-partisan movements but also a war among the independent groups, and this situation can represent a growing gap between citizens and representatives.

Another complaint against the non-partisan groups results from the fact that several leaders have not resisted the call of the parties, accepting to lose their independent label. This situation is particularly serious when a politician, who was a member of a party, became independent before returning to his former party because citizens can see it not only as the lack of coherence but also as the lack of a genuine commitment to defending democratic values. This example proves that when a non-partisan group has its

origin at a party disagreement is possible to reverse the situation. That is why some voices start saying that the independent movements are not always independent. Klaukka, Van der Staak & Valladares (2017, p. 109) state that "in response to reduced membership and public trust, many parties are aiming to re-establish ties with broader groups in society, such as citizen movements". In Portugal, the mainstream parties understood that, in some cases, regaining the head of a non-partisan group is the step required to control the system at the local level.

Finally, we should note that the demarcation line between parties and movements is not always unambiguous. Indeed, some leaders of non-partisan movements do not refuse political support coming from a party. For instance, in Porto, Rui Moreira was elected then reelected and, in both cases, backed by CDS.

VII. CONCLUSION

The first conclusion to take is that non-partisan groups represent an increasing reality in the Portuguese political landscape, and they should not be considered an epiphenomenon. Their electoral results do not depend on luck. In fact, after conquering a Municipal or Parish Council, the non-partisan movements seldom lose it, and this proves that citizens are satisfied with the movements' performance once in power and value them highly.

Secondly, it is worth noting that not all of these groups are really independent because some of them resulted from partisan cleavages and other ones do not refuse partisan support. However, there are many truly independent movements, mainly at the parish level, and this circumstance can be regarded as a kind of revisiting the ancient spirit of neighborliness of the community theorized by Ferdinand Tönnies.

Thirdly, despite their aim to apply for the National Assembly, at least for the time being, the non-partisan groups must make do with the local level. For changing the law, powerful social pressure would be necessary, and, at the moment, the parties have control of the situation, and they do not bet in profound alterations.

Finally, in what concerns to ideology, Lipset & Rokkan (1967) affirmed that the existence of regionalist parties was the political manifestation of the center-periphery cleavage in a given political system. This essay accepts that statement and considers that it can be suitable to explain the case of the non-partisan movements in Portugal. Massetti & Schakel (2015) proved "very clearly that regionalist parties in relatively rich regions tend to develop a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology."

In Portugal, when the non-partisan movement appears due to a partisan dissidence, it might seem tied

down to the former matrix. When the non-partisan movement is independent, we can say that the proximity policy goes beyond the traditional opposition left-right. Hughes, Runfola & Cormier (2018, p. 192) defend that "the drivers of policy response vary with the proximity of the problem", and this is the reason explaining that "when an issue is highly local, the policy response is influenced by problem severity". That means severity is the main criterion concerning the hierarchy of the problems. As Hedegaard (2014, p. 366) recognizes, "being proximate to recipients of a social benefit affects attitudes towards the benefit".

To summarize, non-partisan groups can help to keep democracy alive and healthy, and they already play an important role in Portuguese political life, but their fight for space is far from being finished. They won successive battles, they consolidated their position, but they surely aspire to more than that.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. Bobbio, N. (1977). *Qualesocialismo?*. Torino: Einaudi.
2. Bobbio, N. Pontara, G. & Veca, S. (1985). *Crisis de la democracia*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel.
3. Bracati, D. (2008). The origins and strengths of regional parties. *British Journal of Political Science* 38(01):135 – 159.
4. Dahl, R. (2004). Democratic polities in advanced countries: success and challenge, In B. Atílio (Coord.). *New worldwide hegemony. alternatives for change and social movements* (pp. 51.70). Buenos Aires: CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales.
5. Elster, J. (Ed.). (2012). *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Ferro, A. (1933). *Salazar – o homem e a sua obra*. Lisboa: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade.
7. Floridia, A. (2013). Participatory Democracy versus Deliberative Democracy: Elements for a possible Theoretical Genealogy. Two histories, some intersections. Paper presented to the 7th ECPR General Conference Sciences Po, Bordeaux.
8. Hedegaard, T. (2014). The policy design effect: proximity as a micro-level explanation of the effect of policy designs on social benefit attitudes. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 37, issue 4, 366-384.
9. Hochstetler, K. & Friedman, E. (2008). Can civil society organizations solve the crisis of partisan representation in Latin America ?. University of Miami.
10. Hughes, S., Runfola, D. & Cormier, B. (2018). Issue proximity and policy response in local governments. *Review of Public Research (RPR)*, vol. 35, issue 2, 192-212.

11. Klaukka, G, van der Staak, S. & Valladares, J. (2017). The changing nature of political parties and representation. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience (*Stockholm: International*), pp. 98–118.
12. Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Democracies*. Yale: Yale University Press.
13. Lipset, S. & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An introduction*. New York: Free Press.
14. Massetti, E. & Schakel, A. (2015). From class to region: How regionalista parties link (and subsume) left-right into centre-periphery politics. *Party Politics*, vol. 21(6), 866–886.
15. Pinto, J. (2012). *O Poder em Portugal. Partidos e cidadãos: espaço para dois?*. Coimbra: Almedina.
16. Rosenberg, S., Kahn, S. & Trun, T. (1991). Creating a political image: shaping appearance and manipulating the vote. *Political Behavior* 13(4), 345-367.
17. Rousseau, J. (2006). *The social contract*. Penguin.
18. Santos, J. (2012). *Mídia e Poder. O poder mediático e a erosão da democracia representativa*. Lisboa: Vega.
19. Santos, J. (1998). *Os paradoxos da democracia*. Lisboa: Fenda.
20. Subhan, F. & Kasi, A. (2018). Regional political parties & democracy: a case study of Balochistan. *Journal of education and research*, vol.5, n.º 1, 219-231.
21. Van Kessel, S. (2011). Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties. The Netherlands as a case study. *Perspectives on European politics and society*, 12 (1), 68-88.
22. Wood, Curtis. 2002. Voter turnout in city elections. *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (2), 209-231.



This page is intentionally left blank



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2020
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Security Challenges in Ghana, the Imperatives of States Security Agencies: A Study of the Ghana Police Service

By Addae Kwadwo Jedidiah, Opoku Prince, Dagba Gershon, Amankwa Mark Opoku,
Opoku Prince & Dagba Gershon

Abstract- Security is necessary for a stable democracy as well as flourishing development. Security challenges are prevalent in both developing as well as developed countries. However, a historical as well as recent security challenge in less developed countries suggests a rather interesting picture in comparison to developed countries. This study sought to unravel the security challenges in Ghana and the imperative of Ghana Police Service as a security agency. The mixed-method of data collection was used. The study established that, armed robbery, cybercrime and political vigilantism are the major security challenges in Ghana. It was revealed that, the inefficiency of the police is as results of political interference, lack of logistics, poor condition of service like accommodation, unfair treatment of junior officers among others. The insight gained led to the following recommendations: depoliticizing the police institution, upgrading their system to enhance effective communication, organization of periodic refresher courses among others.

Keywords: security; challenge; agencies; ghana police service; crime.

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 369999



SECURITYCHALLENGESINGHANATHEIMPERATIVESOFSTATESSECURITYAGENCIESASTUDYOFTHEGHANAPOLICESERVICE

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Security Challenges in Ghana, the Imperatives of States Security Agencies: A Study of the Ghana Police Service

Addae Kwadwo Jedidiah ^α, Opoku Prince ^σ, Dagba Gershon ^ρ, Amankwa Mark Opoku ^ω, Opoku Prince ^υ & Dagba Gershon ^ς

Abstract- Security is necessary for a stable democracy as well as flourishing development. Security challenges are prevalent in both developing as well as developed countries. However, a historical as well as recent security challenge in less developed countries suggests a rather interesting picture in comparison to developed countries. This study sought to unravel the security challenges in Ghana and the imperative of Ghana Police Service as a security agency. The mixed-method of data collection was used. The study established that, armed robbery, cybercrime and political vigilantism are the major security challenges in Ghana. It was revealed that, the inefficiency of the police is as results of political interference, lack of logistics, poor condition of service like accommodation, unfair treatment of junior officers among others. The insight gained led to the following recommendations: depoliticizing the police institution, upgrading their system to enhance effective communication, organization of periodic refresher courses among others.

Keywords: security; challenge; agencies; ghana police service; crime.

I. INTRODUCTION

The international political discourse has appreciably broadened in the past century, after the two brutal world wars and the great era of the cold war. The devastating nature of the two world wars and the cold war has brought issues of security to the forefront of the international community and to a larger extent has contributed to the establishment of United Nations and other states and non-states organizations. For lots of the cold war period, principal vicinity of hobby for both scholars and statesmen tended to be on the military capabilities that states should develop in order to deal with external threats because nation states have over the years served as hazard to each other. According to Okwori (1995) until recently, most of the mainstream writing on security studies literally defined it in terms of state capabilities to defend its territorial integrity from threats as well as actions of potential enemies.

The meaning of security has assumed a wider spectrum in the post-cold war era because the significance of non-military threats has over shadowed the significance of military threats. Security as an old concept and a continuously evolving phenomenon has been defined variously. Kofi Anan, the former UN

secretary general defined security as the protection of commodities and individuals from internal violence. He identified the need for more human centered approach to security and added that human security can no longer be understood in military terms. In summary, the definition of security, detours from the traditional disposition that threats to state emanates from external realm.

In spite of the contested conceptualization of security, it is worth saying that, the state has kept its importance in security narratives as existed in the Hobbesian state of nature. Omoyibo & Akpomera (2013) confirm that, security is a concept that is prior to the state, and the state exists in order to provide that concept. It is based on these that states all over the world keep on employing robust mechanisms through established security agencies to deal with the emerging threats to security.

Upon the numerous devices such as collective security, deployment of armies, disarmament and arm control, balance of power among others employed by the United Nations to fulfill its aim of maintaining world security. Security challenges are still an issue in both developing as well as developed countries. However, historical as well as recent security challenges in less developed countries suggest a rather interesting picture in comparison to developed countries. It is not an exaggeration to say that, security agencies in Africa needs to be restructured and strengthened due to recent internal security challenges in Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Mali and Gabon which is the present one.

Ghana is seen as an oasis of peace as compared to many African states. However, no state is immune to security threats. Historically, Ghana's experience in protracted military intervention, political upheavals coupled with tribal conflict just after independence cannot be underestimated when talking of security challenges. The inception of the Fourth Republic brought high expectation for peace and progress however recent literatures have confirmed that, the security system in Ghana faces the problem of ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy disputes, students agitations, political vigilantism, cyber fraud, crimes

which encompasses armed robbery, drug trafficking, murder, rapes and defilement which is fueled by unemployment, poverty, uneven distribution of state resources, fragile state institutions.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM

This study is situated within the theoretical construct of structural functionalism. The major idea underpinning this theory is that, society is a complex system whose part work together to promote solidarity and stability. Functionalism addresses society as a whole in terms of the functions of its constituent elements namely, norms, customs, traditions and institutions. In grounding this theory, the work of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parson, and Hebert Spencer is worth mention. The application of this theory is that, state institution plays vital role in addressing issues of security. In order words, in order to promote a stable society, strong state apparatus need to be set up. Failure of the institution to perform their role will hinder stability and solidarity.

a) *The Concept of Security*

The concept of security lacks a precise definition. As noted by Baldwin (1997) some scholars have depicted security as an “essentially contested concept”. In the traditional sense, security is defined as the removal of external threat by strengthening the military capabilities of the state. Scholarly articles have always been limited to military statecraft in the world war era. When conditions in the world change, the accepted definitions of some terms can become insufficient, or even confusing, if they retain their traditional meaning. In such cases, the attempt to apply these old definitions to the changed character of the world reveals their limitations. The term security seems to be such a case. (Malec 2003).

In similar vein, Okwori (1995) confirms that, until recently, most of the mainstream writing on security studies literally defined it in terms of state capabilities to defend its territorial integrity from threats as well as actions of potential enemies. Recent development has called for a rethinking of the concept of security. Kofi Annan former UN Secretary-General argues that “In the wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of the concept of security is evolving. Once synonymous with the defense of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence. The need for a more human-centred approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used.

b) *Security Challenges in Ghana: A Retrospective Glance*

The pre-colonial periods cannot be excluded when the history of security challenges are mentioned in Ghana. Chieftaincy disputes and ethnic upheavals dates back in the pre-colonial period. Berry (1998) note in the case of the Asante's that, though the position of the chief in the pre-colonial Asante was a relatively privileged one, it did not go unchallenged.

According to Quantson (2008a) security issues in Ghana until recently were ethnic in nature. The tensions in the state were mounted by strong ethnic groups like the Ashanti, Fantes among others. It is never an exaggeration to say that politics too were clothed with tribal garments which generated parties like National Liberation Movement an Ashanti based party, Ga Steadfast, Northern People's Party.

Before the inception of the Fourth Republic, power has been alternating between Civilian government and military government. (Quantson, 2008b) confirms that, since independence the country has experience five encounters with the military. The first was in 1958, barely a year after independence, when the word “coup” entered the political lexicon.

(Paalo, 2017) postulates that, political vigilantism which is seen as a menace today had it historical antecedence from youth activism in politics during the British colonial era where the Conventions People's Party youth wing known as “Veranda boy” were formed.

c) *Contemporary security challenges in Ghana*

The existing literatures on security challenges in Ghana revolve around: criminal activities which includes armed robbery, drug trafficking, cybercrime, kidnapping among others, religious, tribal, electoral, chieftaincy, political vigilantism, mob justice, agitations. Although security challenges faced by the country go beyond the above stated themes, these literatures are nevertheless relevant to the framework of this study.

d) *Crime*

Crime can be said to be an act that goes against the established laws of the land. The following are examples of crime: armed robbery, terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrime. (Quantson, 2008c).

Also, the 2018 first quarter report of the Ghana Police Service identified the forms of crime prevalent in Ghana as Armed robbery, defilement and rapes, drug trafficking, kidnapping, domestic abuse.

Appiah (2018) succinctly said that “The occurrences of illicit drugs use, robberies, rape, murders, moral crimes, money laundering, infiltration and use of illegal firearms, chieftaincy and land disputes are daily security issues in Ghana. There are other types of crimes which occur but are hardly given attention in the media”.

Dr. Kwesi Anning, a security expert, said there was 45% increase in crime rate in the Greater Accra region. Some offences which were considered most

serious and attracted public concern are shown in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Criminal offences which attracted public concern.

OFFENCE	YEAR		% CHANGE
	2016	2017	
Murder	549	609	10.9
Robbery	1397	1772	26.8
Rape	497	514	3.4
Defilement	1341	1686	25.7
Possession, use & distribution of narcotic drugs	681	644	-5.4

Source: (<https://citinewsroom.com/2018/08/30/robbery-topped-crimes-by-27-report>)

e) Armed Robbery

Armed robbery involves the theft of property and carrying (or pretense) of a weapon. "A person who steals a thing is guilty of robbery, if in and for the purpose of stealing the thing, he uses any threat or criminal assault or harm to any person. Robberies comes in various forms including residential robbery, bank robbery, car hijacking, highway robbing, market robbing. Armed Robbery is at increased in Ghana. News articles about armed robberies in Ghana demands a wake-up call of the police. On the 20th day of April, 2018, Citi news reported an incident of bank robbery at Pelungu market of the Nabdum in the Upper East region. Four suspected robbers on motorbike attacked and robbed the First Allied bank branch in Pelungu. To crown it all, on 23rd January 2018, four gangs stormed the Kwabenya Police station which raised numerous questions about the quality of our security service.

f) Murder

The spate of murder in the country has raised questions by Ghanaians. The intriguing aspect of these fatal developments is that of Hon. J. B. Danquah (Member of Parliament), Mrs. Josephine Asante (Public Affairs Manager – Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority), Captain Adams Mahama (military personnel) and Ahmed Hussein-Suale (Investigative Journalist of the Tiger Eye PI).

Also, in December 2018, the Tema Community Central Assemblies of God church pastor was also stabbed to death. In that same month, the Mankralo of Prampram in the Greater Accra Region was gruesomely murdered. All these are high profile persons with tight security than an ordinary Ghanaian.

g) Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs that are subject to drug prohibition laws. (United Nations Office on Drugs and crimes [UNODC], 2017). "The issues of drugs which was affiliated to the South American Country's had gained popularity in West Africa. There are enough evidence to support the claim. According to the World Drug report 2016, the West

African region in general had become a major passage point for cocaine from South America en route to Europe. The report said between the five year period; 2009-2014. The proportion of total cocaine seizure increased to 78%. Ghana was named among the top transit points. When talking about drug issues in Ghana, let us ponder on the views of Dr. Kwesi Aning, This [narco-trafficking] is the new frontier of war and an attack on West Africa's fragile states. A threat that is more insidious and dangerous than the conflicts that engulfed West Africa in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. This is because the increasing flow of drugs through West African States is beginning to undermine the state, through weakening its institutions, its local communities, and its social fabric. (Aning, 2008).

h) Kidnapping

Kidnapping has now become a new criminal code in Ghana. Violent crime such as Kidnapping is posing threat to the security of the state. There have been several news articles with the current one being the Kidnapping of the three girls at Takoradi.

i) Cybercrime: the new threat

As the level of Technology increases, there is a lapse in security. Cybercrime is the new challenge to both domestic and external security of a state. Cybercrime is a term for any illegal activity that uses a computer as it primary means of commission (Halder & Aishankar, as cited in Barfi, Nyagome & Yeboah, 2018). A report by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2011 confirms that in West Africa, there is a proliferation of cybercrime. These internet frauds are compounded by increasingly global nature of information systems, and the difficulty of trading the fraudsters. The report further mentioned Nigeria and Ghana as hosts of cybercrime. Ghana has gained the unsavory distinction along with Anglophone African neighbors Nigeria and Cameroon as one of the top ten cybercrime generating states worldwide. Warner (2011) grouped Cybercrimes that are prevalent in Ghana into three: First of all, He mentioned identity fraud or romance fraud. Second type of fraud is Gold fraud and the third as estate fraud.

The prevalence of cybercrime in Ghana may affect the state economically, politically as well as socially. His Excellency Nana Akuffo Addo expressed the need to improve the forensic capabilities of state security agencies in his speech delivered on the National Cyber Security Week (Ministry of Communication [MOC], 2017).

j) *Chieftaincy dispute*

The institution of chieftaincy in the pre-colonial era and modern times are very relevant tool for development in Ghanaian states. However, Ghana is losing its respect and image in the country as a result of numerous disputes within these institutions. Various news headlines are an indication that, chieftaincy disputes is a challenge to the security apparatus of the state. The Minister of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs, Mr. Samuel Kofi Dzamezi made a statement that; there are 352 chieftaincy disputes which remained unresolved.

Literatures have identified some few causes of chieftaincy disputes in Ghana. Boafo-Arthur (2003) asserts that, traditionally every stool is expected to possess a land and many conflicts in this case are as a result of oppositions from families to chiefs. Corruption as a destructive tool has been attached to chieftaincy institution and a cause of chieftaincy disputes. Mensah (2018) agrees that, almost every paramountcy or traditional area suffer crises when the stool is vacant. But money is being taken to install people to fill the vacant position.

k) *Electoral Violence*

The practice of democracy in most states of which Ghana is part has paved way for the employment of the tool of election. Election is a major feature of democracy and a medium to swallow the consequences of political competitiveness. However, failure of the process results in numerous outbreak of order which has been the case of many African states like Cote Divoire, Kenya, Nigeria and the latest case in Gabon. Ghana's success in all the seven elections in the Fourth Republic should not create the picture that, these elections were violent free. According to Aning and Larrey (2009) even though Ghana has achieved a relatively peaceful political existence, the country's democratic process has always been fraught with localized conflict and electoral violence.

l) *Political Vigilantism*

Political vigilantism has assumed a wider spectrum in the Ghanaian political arena. Although some people do not see it as a new phenomenon, Paolo (2017) postulates that, political vigilantism which seen as a menace today had it historical antecedence from youth activism in politics during the British colonial era where the Conventions People's Party youth wing known as "Veranda boy" were formed. Currently, there

are over twenty-four (24) registered political parties in Ghana some of which include Convention People's Party (CPP), People's National Convention (PNC), NDC and NPP (Paalo, 2017). Gyampo, Graham and Asare (2017) identified that, political vigilantism is affiliated to all political parties and they are present in all the ten regions.

Political vigilante groups in Ghana have been tools for violence before, during and after elections. The Azoka boys, Invincible forces, Delta force among others can be named.

m) *Ghana's Security Apparatus*

Many efforts have been made by the Ghanaian state to promote stability in the country. Ghana's security apparatus according to the 526 of 1996 is structured into three tier hierarchy of National, Regional and District Security Council. Agencies that form the National Security Council include: Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), the Military, the Police, the Prisons Service and the customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority. For the purpose of this study, the police will be analyzed.

n) *Ghana Police Service*

The Ghana Police Service, a constitutional creature, is guided by the Police Service Act, Act 350 of 1970 with the mandate to prevent and detect crime; apprehend offenders; maintain public order; and safety of and property. The Police are being resourced as per Article 200 of the 1992 Constitution of the persons Republic of Ghana. In order to effectively carry out her mandate, the Police have initiated innovation into their operations, some of which include community policing, visibility policing, night patrols, snap spot checks, all in an effort to prevent crime in the first place. Even though a lot has been done by the Police to prevent crime by the Police Administration, the conduct of some of its personnel leaves sour taste in the mouths of many Ghanaians. These include allegations of bribery, aiding drug smugglers, leasing of Service weapons to armed robbers, among others.

o) *General Public Perception about Ghana Police Service*

The police play a vital role so far as the internal security of the state is concerned. Many cases of security lapses recorded in Ghana have affected the public view about the police service in Ghana. The Police Service faces an image problem. Generally, the mere mention of the Police Service in Ghana invokes images from the large segment of the populace as an institution riddled with corruption, brutalities and disregard for human rights and that it is characterized by amateurism or that it lacked professionalism in the performance of its duties. This negative frame of the police by the general public in Ghana has dented its image to the extent that its performance in crime combat

has been lost to many a Ghanaian. The negative frame is reinforced by various researches undertaken by civil society organizations in Ghana whose research outcomes are embarrassing spectacle to the police administration (Centre for Democratic Development Ghana, Institute for Democratic Governance [IDEG]). Though the actions and inactions of the Ghana Police Service are inescapably noticeable, the unbridled public vilification of it has risen to a crescendo that has created an "image crisis" for the institution. The Service is therefore saddled with and enmeshed in an "image salvaging or cleansing war" to restore its professional identity or image. (Brammah & Mbowura, 2014).

III. METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a mixed-method of the research approach to investigate the problem the study sought to unravel. As suggested by Creswell (2003), quantitative and qualitative methods are used as a way of counterbalancing the intrinsic flaws of one method with the strengths of the other. Relating this to the study, the method was essential in inquiring from the two sides of respondents which are the police officers and the civilians. The qualitative approach was a slice of the mixed method which helped the researchers in exploring, collecting, interpreting and analyzing data to meet the objectives of the study. The sample size for this study was 50 police officers and citizens who are 18 years and above in the Ga West Municipality of Ghana. To ensure fair representation of the targeted population, both probability and non-probability methods was employed. In terms of non-probability, the purposive method was used to select 10 police officers who have worked for more than 5 years in order for them to be well positioned to give valued opinion about the study. The purposive sampling method was selected because it

was deemed the appropriate means of getting respondent who were knowledgeable and well abreast with the subject matter of interest. On the other hand, random sampling was employed as a probability method to select 40 civilians because it reduced bias. For this study, primary data were collected by administering questionnaires and interviews. The questionnaires were answered by the civilians while the police officers were interviewed. Secondary data for the research was collected from textbooks, journals, thesis, articles, magazines from renowned authors and researchers. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences software (SPSS) was used to analyze the data collected.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

This chapter presents the findings obtained from the field in the light of the research question as well as the objectives of the study. With the research rigged in the mixed-method of research approach, the quantitative aspect of the study was first presented followed by the qualitative aspect (Explanatory mixed-method analysis). Descriptive analysis of the questionnaire and a thematic analysis of the interview followed respectively.

a) Presentation of demographic data

A sample size of 50 respondents which included 40 civilians and 10 police officers were used for the research. To comply with research ethics, the Socio demographics of the police officers were not analyzed. Gender was used to imply the classification of sex into male and female groups. In considering sex, the study sought to have appreciable number of each sex group. Out of 40 respondents, 22 (55%) were males and 18 (45%) were females. Only a marginal difference in sex was evident.

Table 4.1: Gender of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	22	55.0
Female	18	45.0
Total	40	100.0

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

i. Age Distribution of Respondents

The age distribution indicates that 7 (17.5%) of the respondents fell within the ages of 18-29 years, 14

(35.0%) of the respondents fell within the ages of 30-39, 8 (20%) fell within the ages of 40-49 and 11 (27.5%) were 50 years and above.

Table 4.2: Age Distribution of Civilians

Age Group	Frequency	Percentage
18-29	7	17.5
30-39	14	35.0
40-49	8	20.0
50 and above	11	27.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

ii. *Educational Background*

Evidence gathered from the sampled respondents showed that 5 respondents representing 12.5% had no formal education, 9 respondents

representing 22.5% had Primary/J.H.S/M.S.L.C. 9 respondents representing 22.5% had secondary education and 17 respondents representing 42.5% had tertiary education.

Table 4.3: Educational Background of Respondents

Educational Background	Frequency	Percentage
No Formal Education	5	12.5
Primary/J.H.S/M.S.L.C	9	22.5
Secondary	9	22.5
Tertiary	17	42.5
Total	40	100

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

iii. *Number of Years as Resident*

The number of years the respondents have lived in the municipality was sought as an indication of the knowledge, experience and familiarity with the activities

within the municipality. This was done to give more credence to the respondent ideas and submissions. From table 4.4 it is evident that, most of the respondents have lived in the municipality for more than five years.

Table 4.4: Number of years as residents

Number of years as resident	Frequency	Percentage
5-10 years	15	37.5
11-15	7	17.5
16-20	8	20.0
21 years and above	5	12.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

b) *Quantitative Analysis*

This section presents the analysis of the quantitative data which was based on self-administered test. The data presentation and analysis of this section presents a categorization of the data gathered. The themes for the presentation are: *security challenges in Ghana, general public perception about the Police, Problems facing the Ghana Police Service and mechanisms to ensure security.*

i. *Security Challenges in Ghana*

To establish a solid base for the study, the first part of the questionnaire contained a Likert scale which sought to unravel the security challenges in Ga West Municipality and how prevalent it occurs.

Armed robbery was stated to be extremely prevalent by 22.5% of the population and the other challenges that were also rated as extremely prevalent differently by the participants are as follows: murder (10%), Kidnapping (7.5%), drug trafficking (17.5%), Cybercrime or fraud (20.0%), chieftaincy disputes (7.5%), ethnic conflict (5%), electoral violence (2.5%) and political vigilantism (5.0%).

Kidnapping, Chieftaincy disputes are possibly least prevalent from the outlined challenges because 50% of the respondent stated it as not prevalent. Also,

12.5% indicated that Armed robbery is not prevalent, 45% indicated that murder is not prevalent, 25% indicated that drug trafficking is not prevalent, 20% indicated that cybercrime is not prevalent, 47.5 indicated that ethnic conflict is not prevalent and 35% indicated that political vigilantism is not prevalent.

On the other hand armed robbery and cybercrime was stated to be either highly prevalent or extremely prevalent by 50% or more of the study cohort. This shows that, these challenges are extensively experienced.




Figure 4.1: Shows security challenges and how prevalent it occurs

ii. *General public Perception about the police*

The researcher asked the general public perception about the Ghana Police Service. This section consisted of six sub themes which intend to illicit public perception about the police.

a. *Public-Police contact*

In response to this question, 55% of the respondents indicated that they had no contact with the police and 45% constituting the minority have had contact with the police within the past five years.

Table 4.5: Civilians contact with police in the past five years.

Contact	Frequency	Percentage
Contact	18	45.00
No Contact	22	55.00
Total	40	100.00

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

b. *Payment of Money to the police to overlook an unlawful behavior*

With this question, the focus was on the 18 who have had direct contact with the police because they were privy to the information needed. Evidence from figure 4.2 indicates that 33.3% and 27.8% of the respondent who have had direct contact have paid bribe to the police many times and sometimes respectively. 22.2% of the sample size confirmed that they have not paid bribe to the police and 16.7% rarely paid bribe.

HOW RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN PAYING BRIBES




Figure 4.2: Shows how respondents respondent pay money to the police.

c. Witnessing payment of money to the police

Deduced from figure 4.3, 9(22.5%) of the respondents chose "not at all" in response to whether

they have witness people paying bribe to the police. 12(30%) indicated sometimes, 7(17.5%) indicated rarely and 12(30%) indicated many times.




Figure 4.3: Shows respondents witness to payment of money to the police

d. Corruption

The Police service as a state institution is arguably seen as a corrupt institution. It is upon this logic that the researchers made a slot which demanded

for the respondents take on the assertion. The analysis showed that 67.5% of the respondents answered yes and 32.5% answered no.

Table 4.6: Do you agree to the assertion that the police are corrupt?

Corruption	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	27	67.5
No	13	32.5
Total	40	100.0

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

e. Public Confidence in the Police

The survey showed that 18 (45%) respondents have confidence in the police and 22 (55%) respondents have no confidence in the police.

Table 4.7: Do you have confidence in the police?

Do you have confidence in the police?	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	18	45.0
No	22	55.0
Total	40	100

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

f. *Public perception about the Effectiveness of the police*

Table 4.8 makes it clear that 5 (12.5%) of the respondents tagged the operations of the Ghana Police Service as very effective, 12 (30.0%) also hold the view

that, the operations of the Police is effective, 16 (40.0%) of the respondents expressed that the operations of the police is fairly effective and 7 (17.5%) of the respondents tagged the operations of the police as not effective.

Table 4.8: Public perception about police operations

Public Perception about Police Operations	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Very effective	5	12.5
Effective	12	30.0
Fairly effective	16	40.0
Not effective	7	17.5
Total	40	100

Source: Field Data (April, 2019)

iii. *Problems Facing the Police*

The survey showed that 37.5% and 47.5% of the respondent strongly agreed and agreed respectively that lack of logistics is a major problem the police service is facing while 12.5% and 2.5% disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively.

Also, 35.0% and 22.5% which constitute majority of the respondent disagreed and strongly

disagreed that poor remuneration is a problem facing the police while 15% and 27.5% strongly agreed and agreed. Again, minimal public cooperation, political interference and indiscipline in the Police force recorded 7.5%, 10.0% and 15% disagreement respectively.

Political Interference among all the stated problems was strongly agreed by 60% of the respondents.




Figure 4.4: Shows the problems facing the police.

iv. *Mechanism needed to be adopted to improve service delivery*

The respondents when asked about the depoliticizing the police service, provision of adequate

logistics, in-service training and recruitment of more police officers, motivation and incentives, the analysis showed that, 34.2% noted that depoliticizing the police service will help improve the service delivery of the

police service. 32.9% of the respondents expressed that; the provision of adequate logistics will improve the service delivery of the Police service.

On the minorities, 12.3% indicated that in-service training, 15% on recruitment of police officers

and 5.5% on motivation and incentives will help improve the service delivery of the police.




Figure 4.5: Shows mechanisms to employ to increase service delivery of the police.

c) Qualitative Data Analysis

Interview was used to obtain qualitative data for this study. The respondents were 10 police officers in the Ga West Municipality. The data was transcribed and grouped under the following themes: *security challenges in Ghana, duties and responsibilities of individual police officers, public perception about the police, institutional challenges of the police, mechanisms to ensure police effectiveness.*

i. Security Challenges in Ghana

Security is an ideal concept however no country in the world has ever realised its fullness. There is variation in security threats with regards to countries. In order to establish a strong base for the research, a question was asked about events and recent happenings that poses threat to security. Interviewees mentioned a plethora of events that indicates insecurity in Ghana. These includes: the rise of political militia (political vigilantism), murder, armed robbery, Kidnapping. Most of the interviewee expressed concerns on political vigilantism in relation to the above threats.

ii. Duties and Responsibilities of individual police officers

The duties and roles of individual police officers were examined during the interview. Some of the

questions that were asked aimed at finding out the individual duties of the police officers, factors that enhances their respective duties and the hindrances to their duties.

a. Duties of the police officers interviewed.

From the interview, it was gathered that, policemen in the audio room were responsible for administrative duties such as typing and receiving letter, preparation of data.

The crime officers are to apprehend, investigate and take issues to court for prosecution. The station officer is to supervise the station and report outcomes to the commander. The researchers found out that, most police officers perform general duties which include guard duties, night patrol, road safety, station orderly.

b. Factors that help the individual to perform efficiently.

Interviewees were asked factors that improve efficiency of their work. According to the officers interviewed: good supervision, cooperation from the public and logistics help to improve the efficiency of their work. Out of the 10 officers, 5 said that logistics are mostly needed, 3 made mentioned of good supervision and the remaining 2 accredited it to public cooperation.

The implications are that, the absence of the above factors negatively affects their duties.

c. *Hindrances to the duties*

The hindrances mentioned by the interviewee outnumbered the factors that accounts for their efficiency. Some of the hindrances mentioned were non availability of vehicles which makes mobility very difficult, lack of logistics and lack of motivation and poor incentives, poor supervision, minimal public cooperation. Most of the interviewees laid emphasis on lack of logistics. These include factors such as transport, weapons, communication gadgets and other facilitators in the operations of the Police Service. As a result of absence of these factors it leaves the police agency with a poor understanding of how to execute its responsibilities.

iii. *Public Perception about the Police*

Police-Civilian relation is indispensable as far as security provision is concern and also sensitive measurement of public opinions play crucial role in policing. On this note, question was posed to the interviewees, to unearth their knowledge on how the public perceive them.

It was pretty clear that most of the respondent, share the view that they are tagged to be a corrupt institution. While the majority has been fixated with the corruption allegation others expressed a different opinion.

iv. *Institutional challenges of Ghana Police Service.*

Traditionally, the police are mandated to maintain law and order. The role of the police as a state agency in maintaining law and order is bedevilled with challenges. It is against this backdrop that, the researchers asked a question to illicit the interviewees' response. Political interference has been identified as one of the major hurdles for effective police operations. All the 10 officers interviewed mentioned political interference. The findings also revealed that, there is discrimination in the Police Service. It was also gathered that, inadequate in-service training, poor accommodation and lack of logistics are also problems the police faces as state security agency.

v. *Mechanisms to ensure effective service delivery*

In this section, two sub themes are presented. These themes include the following: *existing mechanisms in ensuring effective service delivery and mechanisms needed to improve the service delivery.*

a. *Existing mechanisms in ensuring effective service delivery.*

In a probed attempt to know the existing mechanisms to ensure effective service delivery, interviewees highlighted on frontline supervision, duty parade, disciplinary measures.

Frontline supervision is authorized to check duty men on post. It is worth to note that, supervisors come unannounced and officers who absent themselves from duty will be exposed.

Also, morning parade serves as a platform for checking lateness, absenteeism and indecent dressing.

b. *Measures to be adopted to improve service delivery.*

Interviewees were asked about measures that are needed to be adopted by the police to ensure effective service delivery. A pool of answers which include, empowering the police to work independently, upgrading of the police system and organization of periodic refresher courses was mentioned by the interviewees. Throwing more light on empowering police to work independently, majority of the interviewee asserted that, allowing an independent body to appoint the Inspector General of Police (I.G.P) is the way forward.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The importance of security to national development cannot be underestimated. The attainment of total security is utopian myth however systems in place can help promote security. Based on this, the study sought to unravel the Security challenges in Ghana and the imperativeness of Ghana Police Service.

The study confirmed that. Armed robbery, cybercrime and political vigilantism contribute to the blowing wave of insecurity in Ghana.

It was also revealed that, the public perceives the police as corrupt and ineffective in keeping their mandate.

Moreover, the study identified, lack of logistic, minimal public cooperation, political interference are problems that affects the effective operations of the police. However these problems are not mutually exclusive in constraining the effectiveness of the police, some cascade into other.

The study also argued that, in spite of measures employed by the police to promote security; there should be improvement and employment of new measures to ensure effectiveness.

The findings of the study have necessitated the following recommendations.

1. *Depoliticizing the police*

The Ghana police service should be empowered to work independently. It was identified that, the top officials in the Ghana police service are all appointed by the president. Internal mechanisms should be created for the police to elect their own key officials in order to inject professionalism and independence.

2. *Training*

It would be necessary to offer training sessions to enhance their knowledge and service delivery. Training could be in the form of symposiums and workshops. The Police Service can collaborate with public as well as private universities to organise short courses for the Police Officers some of the courses



that will be offered is the Leadership Seminar Programmes, Ethics among others.

3. Public Cooperation

Cooperation from the general public to the directives of the Ghana Police service continues to be a mirage. There is the need for citizens to be more receptive and cooperative to the directions and guidance of the police. Citizens' support can be achieved by educating the public to increase consciousness of their operations; the public should also be circumspect in providing the right kind of information which is community-based information on crime and criminals to the police to make operations and service delivery easier.

4. Corruption

Police Officers should also introduce a ticketing system where tickets are given to offenders of the law. Each ticket should have a specific price tag and it should be based on the offence committed. Police Officers should be given a certain percentage of the amount; this is a way to check the bribery and corruption and serve as a motivation for them to apprehend criminals. Also, the mode of recruitment should be revised in order to reduce patron-client relation.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

- Aning, K. (2008). From "voluntary" to a "binding" process: Towards the securitization of small arms. *Journal on Contemporary African Studies*, 26(2), 169-181.
- Aning, K., & Lartey, E. (2009). *Parliamentary oversight of the civil sector: Lessons from Ghana*. Accra: Kofi Annan Institute for Peace Keeping.
- Appiah, K. A. (2018, May 04). *Troubling crime rate in Ghana*. Retrieved January 28, 2019, from The Finder: <http://www.thefinderonline.com>
- Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The concept of security. *Review of International Journal*, 5-26.
- Barfi, A. K., Nyagome, P., & Yeboah, N. (2018). The internet users and cybercrime from Senior High School in Brong Ahafo region. *Library Philosophy and Practice*.
- Barker, T. L. (1999). *Doing social research*. New York: McGraw Hill Incorporation.
- Berry, S. (1992). *Hegemony on a shoe string: The field around ban opticon and colonial difference*. (N. Sakai, & J. Solomon, Eds.) Hong Kong: Hong Long University Press.
- Boafo-Arthur, K. (2003). Chieftaincy in Ghana: Challenges and prospects in the 21st Century. *African and Asian Studies*, 2(1), 125-153.
- Braimah, A. I., & Mbowura, C. K. (2014). Crime combat in developing economies: The delima of the Ghana Police Service. *Developing Country Side*, 4(17), 1-14.
- Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed-method approaches*. Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gyampo, R. E., Graham, E., & Asare, B. E. (2017). Political vigilantism and democratic governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic. *African Review*, 44(2), 112-135.
- Malec, M. (2003). *Security perception: Within and beyond the traditional approach*. Masters Thesis: Naval Postgraduate University.
- Mensah, P. (2018, October 20). *Corruption is the main cause of chieftaincy dispute in Ghana*. Retrieved from Ghanaweb: <http://www.ghanaweb.com>
- Okwori, A. S. (1995). Security and deterrence: Towards alternative deterrence strategy for Nigeria in the 21st Century and beyond. *Journal of the Nigerian Defence Academy*, 5, 19- 28.
- Omoyibo, K. U., & Akpomera, E. (2013). Insecurity mantra: The paradox of Nigerian growth and development. *European Scientific Journal*, 8(5), 132-142.
- Paalo, S. A. (2017). Political party youth wing and political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A case of Ghana. *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies*, 8(1), 1-14.
- Quantson, K. B. (2008). *Beyond the frontiers of national security*. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- United Nations Office on Drugs.(2017). 2016 world report on drugs. retrieved from <http://www.unodc.org>
- Warner, J. (2011). Understanding cybercrime in Ghana: A view from below. *International Journal of Cyber Criminology*, 5(1), 736-749.



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2020
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Military Intervention as a Means of Dealing with Dictatorship: The Zimbabwean Experience

By Anna Rudo Motsi & Jeffrey Kurebwa

Bindura University of Science Education

Abstract- The purpose of the study was to understand the effectiveness of a military intervention in dealing with dictatorship. Qualitative methodology was used. A case study approach was used to explore findings in Zimbabwe. Key informant interviews and semi-structured interviews were used as data collection methods. The results showed that there was a degree of democracy that is currently enjoyed after the ousting of the late former President Robert Gabriel Mugabe. Harmonized elections held on 31 July 2018 were less violent, international observers were invited to observe and the opposition parties campaigned in areas traditionally regarded as ZANU PF strongholds. Results also showed that the military intervention was indeed constitutional as it was carried out observing the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Findings of the study also showed the link between democracy and military intervention. Recommendations proffered include formulating legislations that limit Presidential powers and for the President to account to Parliament. There is need to effect laws that govern the role of the military in civilian matters, so as to avoid another military intervention.

Keywords: *coup d'état, military intervention, constitution, stability, zimbabwe, elections, robert gabriel mugabe, emmerson dambudzo mnangagwa.*

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 160699p



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Military Intervention as a Means of Dealing with Dictatorship: The Zimbabwean Experience

Anna Rudo Motsi ^α & Jeffrey Kurebwa ^σ

Abstract The purpose of the study was to understand the effectiveness of a military intervention in dealing with dictatorship. Qualitative methodology was used. A case study approach was used to explore findings in Zimbabwe. Key informant interviews and semi-structured interviews were used as data collection methods. The results showed that there was a degree of democracy that is currently enjoyed after the ousting of the late former President Robert Gabriel Mugabe. Harmonized elections held on 31 July 2018 were less violent, international observers were invited to observe and the opposition parties campaigned in areas traditionally regarded as ZANU PF strongholds. Results also showed that the military intervention was indeed constitutional as it was carried out observing the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Findings of the study also showed the link between democracy and military intervention. Recommendations proffered include formulating legislations that limit Presidential powers and for the President to account to Parliament. There is need to effect laws that govern the role of the military in civilian matters, so as to avoid another military intervention. The international community is recommended to denounce military incursions in politics as soon as possible to stop the trend from erupting again.

Keywords: *coup d'état, military intervention, constitution, stability, zimbabwe, elections, robert gabriel mugabe, emmerson dambudzo mnangagwa.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Military interventions are usually marked with violence, instability, illegitimacy, and loss of lives. In some cases, military interventions are used to grab power for personal gains. However, recent military interventions have shown a positive trajectory that has made them more acceptable by both citizens and the international community. Due to the dictatorial tendencies of most African governments, the military has been viewed as the savior that releases citizens from the bondage of dictators. In a society where dictators have no place, military interventions justify for dealing with dictatorship and authoritarianism.

According to Kasza (2013), dictatorship is a system of government characterized by the rule of a single person or a group of people who maintain all power. It is viewed as dangerous by non-dictators because of the way citizens are treated. A military dictatorship (known as a military junta) is defined by Bull (2015) as a form of government where the military force applies complete control over political authority.

Author ^α ^σ: Department of Peace and Governance, Bindura University of Science Education, Bindura, Zimbabwe.
e-mail: jeffkurebwa2015@gmail.com

Despotic, absolutist, or tyrannies are some of the words used to describe dictatorial governments. Friedrich (2012), indicated that dictators often call their governments democratic. He further argues that dictatorship is seen as the adaptation of autocracy to twenty-first century industrial society.

Global studies have revealed Africa as the most coup d'état prone region, with West Africa being singled out (Kemence, 2012). McGowan (2004) provides that since the independence period, between 1960 and 2004, there were forty successful military interventions and eighty unsuccessful military coup d'états. Such a situation is a clear indication that military coup d'états have placed themselves in African culture, bringing out the importance of studying the subject. However, due to the democratic wave in the 1990s, military coups were banned as African countries joined regional and international groups, for instance the African Union (AU), Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

There are various reasons put forth to justify the possession of power by the military. Wiking (1983) states that factors such as corruption, economic failure, price hikes and inflation, and government lack of ability to deal with opposition political parties, including political instability and chaos, are all reasons why the military can stage a coup d'état. These conditions create opportunities for the military to legitimize their intervention. Wiking goes on to say that the military uses public disorder, demonstrations and performance failures to legitimize their intervention. Citizens display their displeasure over government inadequacies and therefore leading to the welcome of a military takeover by citizens, regional groupings and international organizations. Nordlinger (1977) pointed out that the military is very much unwilling to intervene against a regime which cannot be regarded to be faced by a legitimacy crisis. These reasons show how military coup d'états have found a place in a society, making them more acceptable as compared to dictator governments.

On the evening of 14 November 2017, members of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) gathered around Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, and seized control of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and other strategic areas of the city. On the 15th of November 2017, the ZDF issued a statement saying that it was not a coup d'état and that

President Robert Mugabe was safe, although the situation would return to normal only after the ZDF had dealt with the 'criminals' around Mugabe responsible for the socio-economic problems of Zimbabwe (The Guardian, 2017). The military intervention took place amid tensions in the ruling ZANU-PF party. between former First Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa (who was backed by the ZDF) and First Lady Grace Mugabe (who was backed by the younger G40 faction) over who would succeed the then 93-year-old Robert Gabriel Mugabe. A week after Mnangagwa was fired and forced to flee the country, and a day before troops moved into Harare, Commander ZDF Constantino Chiwenga issued a statement that purging of senior ZANU-PF officials like Mnangagwa had to stop (The Guardian, 2017).

On 19 November, ZANU-PF removed Mugabe as party leader, replacing him with Mnangagwa, and issued a deadline of 20 November for Mugabe to resign or face impeachment. Mugabe did not resign. On 21 November 2017 a joint session of Parliament and Senate met at Rainbow Towers Hotel to impeach him. While the impeachment session was in motion, Mugabe sent a resignation letter to the Speaker of Parliament indicating that he was now resigning as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe. (www.bbc.co.uk).

Huntington (1991) sees the military as the solution to severe political and social instability. The military possesses the strength to seize power and the capacity to facilitate a transition of power. He further argues that the military establishment stands as the only institution, serve for politicians that can rule as the clergy, students, and workers do not have the capacity. While these groups affect politics in several ways, which include strikes and demonstrations, they do not have the strength to gain power. Hence, a military coup d'état as a means of dealing with dictatorship becomes ideal.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study relies on the democratic coup theory and the democratic backsliding theory.

a) *The Democratic Coup Theory*

The Democratic Coup Theory proposed by Varol (2012) argues that democracy may be achieved through a military coup. He argues that even though coups have anti-democratic attributes, some coups are more democracy-promoting as compared to others since they respond to resistance against dictatorial or totalitarian regimes; they overthrow those regimes and facilitate democratic elections. Military interventions are justified by the fact that the army responds to resistance against an authoritarian regime. In explaining how a military intervention brings about democratic attributes and remove an authoritarian regime, Varol (2012) states seven features of a democratic coup. These are:

- (a) A coup is staged by the military against a dictatorial or authoritarian regime,
- (b) The military answers to popular resistance against that government,
- (c) The dictator fails to resign in reaction to the popular resistance,
- (d) A strongly regarded military stages a coup within its country,
- (e) The military performs a coup to remove the authoritarian regime,
- (f) The military enables the conduct of free and fair elections in a short time and finally,
- (g) The coup d'état finalizes with a power transfer to leaders who are elected through a democratic process.

Zimbabwe went through all the seven traits of a democratic coup d'état. The Mugabe-led government was disposed of through a militarily-assisted intervention. The support given to the army by the many citizens who marched against Mugabe on 18 November 2017 eventually led him to resign, thereby handing over power to the former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa. The existence of a prominent opposition against a dictator is necessary in establishing a democratic coup. According to Varol (2012), that opposition naturally assumes the form of an uprising which is a gathering of citizens from varied societal backgrounds united by a single political cause. People usually gather in a symbolic place. In Zimbabwe, citizens gathered at Africa Unity Square and Zimbabwe Grounds in Harare. These gatherings were considered a call to resign to the incumbent president and the institutionalization of democracy. The gathering of citizens indicated a shared will for democratic processes, a will that was denied to citizens during the electoral process. After a democratic coup, elections must be held within a reasonable time. Varol (2012) argued that the military is determined to transfer power to democratically elected leaders so that it escapes from the unknown business of governing a country and return to what it knows best - defending the country from external threats. For instance, the Turkish and Portuguese military, which staged coups in 1960 and 1974, both returned the country to civilian rule within two decades.

The critique of the Democratic coup theory was propounded by Ackermans (1992), who claimed that by giving undemocratic institutions a part in constitution-making, these States are sacrificing fundamental legitimacy. He argued that a new ministry could not live as the new democratic charter when it is riddled with provisions that are supposed to guarantee the survival of regime players. This line of thinking refutes, allowing the army to meddle in politics as it remains an undemocratic institution in addressing dictatorship. Ackermans (1992) goes further to state that elections or

impeachment of the sitting president are constitutional means of removing dictatorial power.

Collier (2008) justified the involvement of the army in politics. He argued that a country's power (the military) is the genuine opposition to dictatorial power. The military is the only structure that has the strength and capacity to unseat an elected official. Coups are often swifter and bloodless events, as compared to civil wars that negatively affect a country's foreign investment and infrastructure (Powell, 2014). Hence, a military coup is a necessary means of dealing with dictatorship. Scholars such as (Miller, 2012; Marinov & Goemans, 2014) argued that types of regime change lead to democratic gains. They further indicated that coups are more likely to be followed by elections. Varol (2012) goes on to state that in democratic coups, the people and the army strike a 'Faustian bargain,' where the army extracts a cost in the kind of constitutional entrenchment in exchange for deposing a dictator and thereby retaining the power to civilians. A recurrent feature of a democratic coup is that it brings not only political change but structural change.

Baumann (2018) criticized Varol's justification for a coup. He indicated that a coup does not lead to stable everlasting democracy, especially if measured by Western standards. Acceptance of coup can perhaps lend legitimacy to undemocratic coups. Baumann's argument makes sense and is explained by how the Zimbabwean army did not refer to the coup as a coup but a 'military-assisted transition.' The argument put forth hence is, by definition, a 'coup' is fundamentally flawed as it uses or threatens to use force. But an underlying feature of a successful one is that some coups are democracy-promoting as they seek to dispose of dictatorship.

b) *The Democratic Backsliding Theory*

The democratic backsliding theory by Mounk & Kyle (2018) posits that noteworthy changes were made in political institutions and informal political practices that reduced the capacity of citizens to create claims upon the government. Backsliding can often occur in both authoritarian and democratic governments-degrading the rights of citizens and their interaction with the state. The democratic backsliding theory further argues that a democratic breakdown can exist due to political leaders making poor tactical decisions that fail to side-line extremists who can take advantage of electoral competition to gain strength but remain committed to overthrowing democracy. The theory goes on to say that political elites who adopt extremist and anti-democratic positions, and naturally demonstrates a normative commitment to democracy as a political system are more likely to draw the state into democratic backslide. This theory goes in line with a dictatorship as both have tendencies of pursuing unpopular policies

that cripple the voice of the people in pursuit of radical notions.

According to Lust & Waldner (2018), the concept of democratic backsliding entails corrosion of qualities with democratic governance within any regime. Essentially, it is a decrease of democracy and its quality. There are two views of thought within the theory. The minimalists strictly focus on elections whilst maximalists need "highly informed" citizens to take part in near continuous deliberation to make policies which maximize social, economic and cultural equality.

c) *Justification of a Military Coup*

Kposowa & Jenkins (1993), defined a military coup d'état as the irregular seizure of the state's central executive by the armed forces or the internal security forces through the use or the threat of the use of force. It is also defined as the sudden, extrajudicial deposition of a government, usually by a small group of the existing state institution, typically the army, to replace the deposed government with another body, either military or civil. A coup d'état succeeds if the usurpers set their dominance once the incumbent government neglects to prevent or successfully resist their thought of power (Webster, 2013).

Boniface (2007) argued that coup d'états had become effectively banned as a means of change that was national. A study by Simcic (2013), showed that coup attempts were most likely to lead to democracy when they occurred in strongly authoritarian states or states with leaders who remained in power for a long time. Collier (2008), indicated that coups are an efficient way of taking out a dictator, and a military coup may be a last resort to rid a state of an authoritarian ruler. Several military interventions in Africa led to competitive multi-party elections, and created a necessary condition for successful democratization (Simcic, 2013). Some of the coups that had been experienced in Africa include Mali 1991 and 2012; Lesotho, 1991; Nigeria, 1999 and 2000; and Burkina Faso 2014.

This research argues that military interventions are not the ideal way of dealing with dictatorship. Military interventions must be carried out by a professional army as a means of correcting the wrongs committed under dictatorship. This is possible if elections are carried out in a democratic, transparent manner, and power is transferred to civilian rule. According to Marinov & Geoman (2014), economic transformation and the development of political organizations are the main reasons why the army intervenes in politics. While economic modernization transfigures rural and urban communities, governments face enormous pressures to meet the demands of new classes of politically modernized citizens. Upon failure to deliver, instability erupts, and lawlessness follows, thereby forcing the army out of the barracks and into the position of retaining sanity. The above is a perfect example of the

Zimbabwean case, whereby upon failing to deliver election promises which made the living conditions unbearable, chaos followed with the army ultimately siding with citizens in removing an authoritarian government.

Cheibub (2006), noted that the military holds a special force in society. For instance due to events surrounding the origin of the state, the incursion of the army in politics is easily justified and welcomed. Hence, if an army that initially fought to liberate a state is to stage a military coup d'état, given this background, that army will likely receive less resistance. Kandeh (2004), observed that the relations of civilians and the army in most African states are also a determinant in the uprising of coups. He attributes coups to low levels of professionalism and political institutionalization, citing the lack of schooling of the military with reference to the subalterns. For instance, military intervention in Guinea Bissau showed a lack of sound civil-military relations as the military controlled every single move of the civil rulers- who happened to be dummies.

Kunzru (2017) argues that corruption is another factor that leads to a military coup. He indicated that the sudden departure of most colonialists from Africa left a lot of African governments under-developed and the political systems weak, causing stagnation of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), growth rate and mismanaged economies that led to corruption. He claimed that Zimbabwe was losing \$100 million to corruption every year. Under such a situation, the military feels obliged to intervene to stop corruption from plummeting the country into chaos.

Simpson & Hawkin (2018) agree with the above scholars that corruption and deteriorating conditions of the economy are a condition for the army to intervene in politics. They go on to add that the cutting of army spending is also another cause for a military coup d'état. In Zimbabwe's case, Simpson & Hawkin (2018) stated that army commanders showed their disappointment on the 2018 budget submissions after their allocation was reduced from US\$965 million to US\$77 million.

d) *Effectiveness of Coups in Dealing with Dictatorship*

Very few scholars agree that coups act as catalysts for democratization. The existing literature pre-Cold War season does not acknowledge the army as a tool in dealing with dictatorship. However, scholars like Huntington point to coups as a catalyst in democratization and credits the third wave concept to the capability of coups in democratic efforts. Powell (2014) claims that multivariate analysis from 1952 to 2012 showed that coups statistically advance a country's democratization prospects. He further states that coups are likely to be precursors for democratization in authoritarian regimes. Their positive

effect has reinforced since the end of the Cold War. States that experienced coups after 2012 had been projected to be four times more likely to witness a democratic transition than those which remained coup-free. As compared to civil wars in removing dictators, coup d'états are often bloodless events. Coup d'états preserve infrastructure and promote foreign investment, as witnessed by the spike in interests to invest in Zimbabwe's economy after the 2017 coup.

Pfeiffer (2017) noted that military coups are useful circuit-breakers and sometimes, they even set countries on a different developmental path. He argued that countries such as Chile, Taiwan, and Korea experienced more efficient and successful civilian administrations after military coups. Luzer (2013) provides that the unacceptably unopposed powers of military dictators can only be suppressed by military pressure. Since tyrants can shield themselves from economic sanctions, there is only one credible counter to dictatorial power- the country's military. Luzer (2013) goes on to say coup d'états are one of the most common ways of transferring power in countries that do not have stable democracies. Since dictators often stay in power indefinitely, most likely until death, coups pose as the primary way that tyrants can be removed from power. Hence, the army is an effective tool in dealing with dictatorship. Luzer (2013), indicated that the original generation of coups had been less harmful to democracy than their historical predecessors.

e) *The Portuguese Coup of 1944*

The Portuguese coup of 1944 disposed Estado Novo, whose regime denied the political voice to all but a minor part of the population and preserved the existing socio-economic structures. Marinov & Geoman (2014) claim that the coup d'état had been organized by a group of soldiers belonging to the Armed Forces Movement. The military coup was followed by unanticipated civilian resistance in the form of demonstrations. The military coup marked the end of Novo's 48-year dictatorship rule. Reasons for staging the coup varied from the repression of liberties, the outlaw of political parties, the suppression of voter registration, and under-development. The coup led to elections and civilian rule which ushered in social, economic, territorial, and political changes. A new Constitution was drafted which did away with the repression of basic human rights, release of all political prisoners, and guaranteeing of freedom of speech. The new regime ended colonial wars and started negotiations with African liberation movements which. In 1975, these negotiations led to the independence of Mozambique, Principe, and Angola which were under Portuguese rule (Marinov & Geoman, 2014). The military coup was not a traditional coup marked with violence though four civilians were killed. The coup was marked with unity between soldiers and the civilians.

f) *The 1960 Turkish Coup*

The Turkish coup of 1960 is a perfect example of a linkage between democracy and military coup d'états. According to Marinov & Geoman, (2014), the Turkish militia initiated a coup d'état against the totalitarian Democratic Party regime in response to resistance against the command. The coup was carried out under socio-political turmoil and economic depression. While Colonel Alparslan Turkes, the leader of the coup did not outline the reasons for the coup, the move was welcomed as it brought the end of an era in Turkish history that ushered in a new wave of democracy. Upon assuming power, the military came up with a timeframe of independent elections and eventually renounced its power to the popularly elected leaders within two years. Marinov & Geoman (2014) posits that the army also came up with various reforms. Two hundred and thirty five generals, Three hundred Commissioned Officers, Five hundred Judges and Prosecutors, and more than One thousand university staff were forced into early retirement. The army also arrested the President, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Prime Minister and additional significant members of the administration. Trials were also commissioned and supervised by the military. While the Minister of Interior, Namik Gedik, committed suicide in detention, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, President Celal Bayar, and various significant members of the former administration were charged with high treachery, misappropriation of public funds and abrogation of the Constitution. They were later executed on 16 September 1961. A referendum for a new Constitution was held on 9 July 1961 with 61.7% voting in favour. The new Constitution paved the way for elections on 15 October 1961. Power was smoothly transferred to civilians even though the army has sustained its hold on the politics of the country since 1965.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study relied on qualitative methodology using the 2017 military intervention as a case study. Data was collected using participants drawn from the military, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), ZANU PF, and Movement for Democratic Alliance (MDC-A) party members. Documentary searches were conducted using journal articles, books, Constitution of Zimbabwe and newspaper articles that captured the 2017 military intervention as it unfolded.

IV. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The findings of the study are based on both primary and documentary searches.

a) *Effectiveness of Military Intervention in Dealing with Dictatorship*

The effectiveness of using a military coup d'état is brought out by how the military intervention was

carried out and the target. Military interventions are known to be violent, and are illegal in nature. Contemporary military interventions have changed, and have ushered in democratic trajectories.

A member of the military argued that:

"We will always stand guided by the army. The army is not only meant to fight wars outside of Zimbabwe but elements that question the liberation war gains and putting the country in disarray can only be corrected by the army. It was time for Mugabe to go anyway, and there is no better way we could have done this but by means of a coup. From time and again, we tried using elections, but it was not working. So we support what the ZNA did for the country."

The above views show that a military intervention was the only option for Zimbabwe to remove its dictator. The military representative indicated that they still support what the ZDF did to ensure a new dispensation for Zimbabwe. Politicians interviewed from political parties indicated that Mugabe would not have stepped down under normal circumstances as the ruling party had already endorsed his candidature for the 2018 harmonized elections. An MDC Alliance representative mentioned that:

"While we might regret having been used by the army to achieve its agenda, I will say that it was time for Mugabe to go. His 37-year-old rule was long overdue. On 18 November 2017, we fully supported the stance taken by the army to remove their Commander-in-Chief and had the coup not been successful, I can assure you that Zimbabwe would have been under Grace and Mugabe's rule till now."

CSOs interviewed indicated that the military intervention was a necessary tool in dismantling authoritarian rule as there were improvements noted after the 'New Dispensation' in the conduct of elections. It must be noted that Zimbabwe's elections were often marred with political violence. The post-Mugabe elections held on 30 July 2018 saw some improvements in terms of reduced political violence. The European Union Election Observer Mission (EU EOM) Report (2018) indicated that while the elections had flaws, the political environment, media freedom, and political tolerance had improved during the 2018 harmonized elections. The Report went on to say that the invitation extended to observers by the government of Zimbabwe was a step in the right direction. This was premised on the fact that Zimbabwe had not allowed international observers since their ban in 2002 by Mugabe.

A CSO member indicated that:

"The 30 July 2018 harmonized elections were probably the most peaceful elections Zimbabwe has ever held since 2002. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was very accommodating to CSOs, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) was

always on standby, international observers could observe, few electoral, and political reforms were recorded. The new dispensation was a bit lenient as compared to the Mugabe government.”

This goes in line with the Democratic Theory proposed by Varol (2012). He argued that democratic elections are a prerogative and should take place within a year or two after the military takeover. Marinov & Geoman (2014) also stated that coups are mostly to be followed with democratic elections as those who would have gotten in power through a military intervention want to be internationally recognized. The trend in Africa already shows that elections are messy and controversial, hence the step taken by Mugabe to ban international observers. However, after the military intervention, improvements were noted pre, during and post elections, thereby showing that a military intervention is indeed necessary for dealing with dictatorship.

It should however, be noted that popular opinion changed after the 30 July 2018 election period. While citizens and opposition parties welcomed the military intervention of November 2017, post-election period was comprised of heavy handedness by the military. One participant from the CSOs indicated that:

“We were used by the army. They needed us more than we needed them. They only wanted to show the world that they had support, but the coup did not benefit anyone but them. The two governments are just the same and the fact that Mugabe committed so many atrocities with Mnangagwa as his lieutenant can never be wrong. We replaced one dictator with another.”

Baumann (2018) indicated that most of the military interventions do not necessarily lead to everlasting democracy. He argued that the acceptance of coup d'états can perhaps lend legitimacy to undemocratic coups. This holds substance to some extent as the army in Zimbabwe is involved in the politics of the nation. For instance, on 01 August 2018, seven people were killed by soldiers after opposition supporters demanded election results. The involvement of the military is not acceptable according to the internationally accepted standards. Hence, most participants argued that the military was the necessary tool for dealing with dictatorship as this created a favorable electoral environment compared to the previous dispensation. The holding of elections alone can be viewed as a democratic trajectory if the military is successful in transferring power to civilian rule.

b) *Reasons for the Military Intervention*

Different reasons were given as to why the military intervened in Zimbabwe. A participant from the military argued that:

“If the voters are not happy and their grievances are not being addressed through the ballot, a military coup d'état is the next best option, especially against a dictator. A military coup d'état has the potential to address such issues.”

A member of a CSO mentioned the economic decline as one of the major reasons for the coup. He indicated that:

“The economy was one of the most important reasons for the coup. Shortage of basic commodities, rising prices, a decline in the economy, and a general lack of confidence in the economy were the major reasons. The Mugabe-led government was no longer able to control the course of events that were being caused by economic frustration. The economy was at the center of the coup d'état, the country was corrupt, economic decline was increasing, demonstrations after demonstrations and the political wars happening were not helping. Mugabe was old and frail; he was physically and mentally not capable of controlling the state.”

Another respondent from CSOs interviewed noted that the rising of the wife of the former President, Grace Mugabe was also another significant reason for the coup. Grace Mugabe had grown too strong in the ruling party and her utterances during public gatherings were mainly aimed at former Vice President, Mnangagwa and the military. The participant indicated that:

“Grace Mugabe had grown too big for her shoes and she had to be stopped. She was going around the country insulting everyone who had stood by Mugabe's Presidency during difficult times. The same army that she was insulting was the same that was holding Mugabe's reign intact. It was either a military coup or the Mugabe's had to die. Grace Mugabe was the root cause of the coup. She had become too powerful and Zimbabwe was not ready for a female President. USA was not ready for a female president in the form of Hilary Clinton, what about Africa, let alone Zimbabwe?”

Another reason noted for military involvement was the fragility the Mugabe-led government had become. It was noted that power was slowly moving away from the core, which is Mugabe and the executive due to political fragmentations. According to an NGO participant:

“The firing of Mnangagwa was ill-timed. It was a direct call for the military to step in. The G40 (faction aligned to Grace Mugabe) had taken over and won. Their efforts would have been paid off by posts in government and tenders. For the military, it was now or never, Mugabe had to be crippled.”

E. D. MNANGAGWA'S DISMISSAL LETTER

6th November, 2017.

VICE PRESIDENT EMMERSON DAMBUDZO MNANGAGWA
PRESS STATEMENT

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AS VICE PRESIDENT

In accordance with the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013, Section 329, 6th Schedule, Paragraph 14, Sub-paragraph (2), His Excellency the President, Comrade R.G. Mugabe, has exercised his Powers to relieve Honourable Vice President E.D. Mnangagwa, of his position as Vice President of the Republic of Zimbabwe with immediate effect. It had become evident that his conduct in the discharge of his duties had become inconsistent with his official responsibilities. The Vice President has consistently and persistently exhibited traits of disloyalty, disrespect, deceitfulness and unreliability. He has also demonstrated little probity in the execution of his duties.

Hon. S.K. Moyo (Sen.)

MINISTER OF INFORMATION, MEDIA AND BROADCASTING SERVICES

c) *Measures to Avoid Future Military Interventions*

Since military interventions are most prevalent in Africa, there are a few procedures that can be taken to stop their intervention. According to De Bruin (2014) separating existing units from the military chain of command makes it different for any one force to seize power. A successful coup d'état requires coordination between coup plotters and all other important institutions. Hence, if multiple security forces take orders from different bosses, the task of formulating a successful solid coup d'état becomes difficult. He goes on to say that having a strong democratic system in place also acts as a precautionary measure to military coup d'états. In most Western countries, civilians practice good democratic tenets by constantly changing their leaders through holding of free, fair, acceptable and uncontested elections. Democratization of key state institutions is also another way of coup proofing states against military coup d'états. According to the representative from the military:

"While the civilians can never fully control the army's actions, a culture of democracy and upholding of the Constitution goes a long way in ensuring that coups don't erupt. If a country does not adhere to its own

Constitution, it is very easy for the army to turn rogue at any time and for any reason. Democracy is key."

d) *The Role of Citizens during a Military Intervention*

Interviews carried out indicated that the citizens were in full support of the move taken by the army. Zimbabwean citizens endorsed and approved the military coup d'état as evidenced by the numbers of people who marched in partnership with the army, taking pictures with the military and embracing them. The fact that the army was not shooting on civilians showed that the move was welcomed. He mentioned that:

"The army did an impressive job and everyone approved it. If Zimbabweans did not approve, why were the streets flooded with people carrying placards that embraced the army generals? Why then were people taking pictures with the army?"

The media also showed that citizens were in support of the military. The internet was flooded with pictures of citizens embracing the military, taking pictures and greeting army personnel. Some of the placards read:

"Mugabe must go."

"Chiwenga: the voice of the people."

The representative from the Ministry of Defense also indicated that the fact that no one came forward to challenge the coup also shows that the coup d'état was welcomed by all. He said;

"Not only did the High Court sanitize the coup but not one person came forward to question the military stance. Not even the opposition. That alone should tell you something."

High Court judge Justice George Chiweshe ruled that "Operation Restore Legacy" which was mounted by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and resulted in a military takeover of power was constitutionally permissible and lawful. The military takeover of power ultimately resulted in the resignation of former President Robert Mugabe. Mugabe stepped down to make way for his former deputy, now President Emmerson Mnangagwa. In passing judgement, Justice Chiweshe ruled that the military takeover was necessary to prevent unauthorised people from exercising executive function and to stop former president Robert Mugabe's abdication of his functions. The ruling was made in a case which was brought by Joseph Evurath Sibanda and Leonard Chikomba. Then-President Robert Mugabe, the Minister of Defence, Commander Defence Forces of Zimbabwe, and the Attorney General were the First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents respectively.

Justice Chiweshe in his ruling said:

1. *The actions of the Defence Forces (Zimbabwe Defence Forces of Zimbabwe) in intervening to stop the take-over of first respondent's (Mugabe's) constitutional functions by those around him are constitutionally permissible and lawful in terms of Section 212 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe in that:*
 - a. *They arrest first respondent's abdication of constitutional function, and*
 - b. *They ensured that non-elected individuals do not exercise executive functions which can only be exercised by elected constitutional functionaries.*
2. *The actions of the Defence Forces being constitutionally valid, the second respondent has the right to take all such measures and undertake all such acts as will bring the desired end to its intervention.*

The High Court sanitized the coup. No one challenged the legitimacy of the proceedings is a clear indication that shows that the citizens were in support of the coup. However, this is in contrast with Murenje (2018) who indicated that all state institutions in Zimbabwe are captured and this explained why no one questioned or opposed the ruling by the High Court. He argued that there was a mistaken view that all Zimbabweans supported the coup that brought to an

abrupt end former President Robert Mugabe's tyrannical regime. The departure of Mugabe was only done by coup perpetrators so as to replace and entrench dictatorial rule in Zimbabwe. It is not everyone who welcomed the move by the army as this was done through the bullet and not through the ballot.

e) *"Coups or not a Coup"*

The military intervention in Zimbabwean sparked a lot of debate as to whether to call it a coup or not a coup. This is because while it had obvious coup tenets, there were other characteristics which made it indifferent to a traditional coup d'état. The fact that no violence was recorded indicated the huge success rate of the military incursion. A participant from the military indicated that the army had not carried out a "military coup", but a military intervention to ensure the transition of power.

"Zimbabwe has never undergone a military coup. The military did not remove Mugabe through a coup. The ZNA simply helped with the smooth transfer of power. You cannot call that a coup."

The above sentiments were buttressed by the fact that during the news on the 14th of November 2017, Retired General Sibusiso Moyo indicated that the army was carrying out 'Operation Restore legacy', targeting 'criminals' surrounding President Mugabe.

f) *Full statement from Zimbabwe military on situation in Zimbabwe*

Fellow Zimbabweans following the address we made on 13 November 2017, which we believe our main broadcaster Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the Herald were directed not to publicise, the situation in our country has moved to another level. Firstly we wish to assure our nation, His Excellency, the president of the republic of Zimbabwe and Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Comrade R. G Mugabe and his family, are safe and sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them to justice.

As soon as we have accomplished our mission we expect that the situation will return to normalcy. To the civil servants, as you are aware there is a plan by the same individuals to influence the current purging which is taking place in the political sphere. To the civil Service, we are against that act of injustice and we intend to protect every one of you against that. To the judiciary, the measures underway are intended to ensure that as an independent arm of the state you are able to exercise your independent authority without fear of being obstructed as has been the case with his group of individuals. To our members of parliament,

your legislative role is of paramount importance, of peace and stability in this country, and it is our desire that a dispensation is created that allows you to serve your respective political constituencies according to democratic tenants.

To the generality of the people of Zimbabwe, we urge you to remain calm and limit unnecessary movement. However, we encourage those who are employed and those with essential business in the city to continue their normal activities as usual. Our wish is that you will enjoy your rights and freedoms and that we return our country to a dispensation that allows for investment, development and prosperity that we all fought for and for which many of our citizens paid the supreme sacrifice. To political parties, we urge you to discourage your members from engaging in violent behaviour. To the youth, we call upon you to realise that the future of this country is yours. Do not be enticed with the dirty coins of silver, be disciplined and remain committed to the efforts and values of this great nation. To all churches and religious organisations in Zimbabwe we call upon your congregations to pray for our country and preach the gospel of love, peace and unity and development.

The ZANU PF representative interviewed agreed with the military in claiming that this was not a coup but military assistance. The representative from the ruling party indicated that as soon as the dictator was disposed, the army went back into their barracks and left the country in civilian hands, hence, it is not fair to call the stance taken by the army as a coup d'état. He indicated that:

"There was no coup d'état in Zimbabwe. You cannot possibly say simply because the military was in the streets and therefore that was a coup. No one was hurt, the army is no longer in the streets and the UN did not condemn what happened. There was no coup."

However, there are different views on the terminology used. Uganda writer Charles Onyango Obbo indicated that it was indeed a coup. In his words;

"If it looks like a coup, quacks like one, walks like a coup, then it's a coup."

This is backed up by Powell (2012) who posits that the military will provide a rhetorical justification to legitimize their actions. N. Singh, assistant Professor at the U.S Naval War College tweeted that "The President is safe" is a classical coup catch phrase (Taylor, 2017).

The above submissions show that no matter what the military says, they will always try to justify their actions by firstly redeeming themselves by referring to the intervention as a "military mission." The above quotations also show that it was indeed a military coup d'état despite the terminology used. Taylor (2017) goes on to compare the Zimbabwean and the Egyptian coup

and quotes former Secretary of State, John Kerry as he said that the Egyptian military were in effect restoring democracy. This greatly shows the international perspective on the subject that and their position was the military takeover was indeed a coup, however used to bring democracy.

The MDC Alliance representative indicated that Mugabe was ousted through a military coup d'état. He said that:

"Mugabe was removed through a military coup. There are no questions there. How do you explain tanks in the street, house arrest of him and his wife and the talks that were happening? The army generals had to see this through because if Mugabe had stayed in power, they knew their lives would be at stake. It was indeed a coup."

The circumstances mentioned above, shows that the army was in cahoots with Mnangagwa to topple the former President thereby qualifying it as a military coup d'état. The coup d'état followed all the steps articulated by Varol (2012) and hence, it was indeed a military coup d'état.

g) *President R. G. Mugabe's Resignation Letter*

President Robert Mugabe's resignation letter was read out by Zimbabwe parliamentary Speaker Jacob Mudenda to lawmakers gathered at a conference centre in Harare to discuss an impeachment motion on Tuesday.

State House

Harare

Zimbabwe

21 November 2017

The Honourable Jacob Mudenda

Notice of resignation as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

In terms of the provisions of section 96 (1) of the constitution of Zimbabwe, amendment number 20, 2013. Following my verbal communication with the Speaker of the National Assembly, Advocate Jacob Mudenda at 13:53 hours, 21st November, 2017 intimating my intention to resign as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, I Robert Gabriel Mugabe in terms of section 96 (1) of the constitution of Zimbabwe hereby formally tender my resignation as the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe with immediate effect.

My decision to resign is voluntary on my part and arises from my concern for the welfare of the people of Zimbabwe and my desire to ensure a smooth, peaceful and non-violent transfer of power that underpins national security, peace and stability.

Kindly give public notice of my resignation as soon as possible as required by section 96 (1) of the constitution of Zimbabwe.

Yours faithfully,

Robert Gabriel Mugabe President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The holding of elections after a military intervention is a good indication of its effectiveness in dealing with dictatorship. A military intervention is seen as the last chance the citizens have in choosing their own representation that fully represents them as opposed to leaders appointed by the dictator. To add on, results presented indicate that dictators only succumb to pressure; hence a reputable liberation army can remove a dictator. A correlation between results and literature was shown, in that military interventions can be used to ensure that new representation is chosen by use of conduction of free and fair elections. The holding of elections and the transfer of power from military to civilian rule is outlined as a basis of the effectiveness of military interventions in dealing with dictatorship.

The holding of elections just after a military intervention is a clear indication that there is a link between democracy and coups. The new dispensation had democratic gains that were previously unheard of under Mugabe for instance, the call for international observers to observe elections, political tolerance in campaigning, and less violent elections in general. While traditional literature proposes that coups have a democratic backsliding effect on politics, the current wave of coups show that there is a possibility of a

democratic trajectory to be realised, if the coup plotters follow the attributes of a democratic coup 'd'état.

The fact that the military intervention was carried out against a dictator provides for its justification. The international community's endorsement of the military also serves as an indication that the intervention was justified. According to (Varol, 2012), If a coup is staged against a dictator, by a credible army with endorsement of the civilians, it is highly probable that the coup d'état will be justified. Hence, results and literature correlate on the justification of staging a coup d'état. The declining economy is one of the most important reasons why the military intervened. Coupled with rampant corruption and a growing opposition in the ZANU PF, Mugabe could no longer control the state. The rise of Grace Mugabe and the final dismissal of Mnangagwa was the push needed for the military to intervene in politics. The link between the reasons for a coup and a coup is brought up by the varied reasons of a coup that encompass, inflation, deteriorating economic conditions, and the abuse of human rights by the command. The march in significant places was deemed as a show of support for the military, thereby showing that the citizens and the army were one. However, results also indicated that there had since been a change of heart premised on the fact that the new dispensation and the old were just the same. Literature

studied showed that if citizens approve of a military coup by way of siding with the army, the international community cannot do anything but endorse such a development. This is due to the fact that the masses would have shown support for such actions.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. Boniface, E. (2007). *The OAS's mixed record in promoting democracy*. Florida: Johns Hopkins University Press
2. Bull, D. (2015). *What is a military regime?* Nottingham: Vintage news.
3. Collier, P. (2008). *Wars, guns and voters. Democracy in dangerous places*. New York: Harper Collins.
4. Elischer, S. (2015). Taking stock of 'good coups' in Africa. Democracy dies in darkness. *The Washington Post*. P 4.
5. European Union. (2013). A comparative European Union policy analysis on Zimbabwe and Egypt. Retrieved from www.eu.int
6. Farcau, B. (1994). *The coup. Tactics in the seizure of power*. Praeger: Praeger Publishers.
7. Freeman, S. (2012). How dictators work. *How stuff works*. Retrieved from www.howstuffworks.com
8. Head, T. (2017, November 8). The Zimbabwe opposition leader says citizens would back a military coup. *The Standard Times*, p. 2.
9. Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. Yale: Yale University Press.
10. Huntington, S. P. (1991). *The third wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
11. Jenkins, J. C. and Kposowa, A. (1993). Explaining military coups d'état: Black Africa, 1957-1984. *American Sociological Review* (55), pp861-875.
12. Kasza, A. (2013). *What is dictatorship, their aims*. Bournemouth: Support Printers.
13. Kemence, K. (2012). *Understanding the root causes of military coups and governmental instability in West Africa*. Kansas. Advanced institute of Management.
14. Khalil, Z. (2014). *A tough transition: The post-coup election and its prospects for democracy*. Michigan: University of Michigan.
15. Kunzru, G. (2017, November 23). Why are military coups so frequent in Africa? *WTD News*, p. 3.
16. Kwaramba, F., & Tafirenyika, M. (2017, November 14). Chiwenga warns Mugabe, ZANU PF. p. 1.
17. Larcom, S., Sarr, M., & Willems, T. (2014). *What shall we do with the bad dictator?* University of Oxford: Oxford.
18. Lukic, M., & Mannheinner, E. (2014). *Egypt. Military vs revolution. Why structures are stronger than individuals*. Sannerstedt: Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen.
19. Luzer, D. (2013 July 8). The success of the military coups. *Pacific Standard*, p. 4.
20. Lust, E. and Waldner, D. (2018). Theories of democratic change. Phase 1: Theories of democratic backsliding. Vermont: Institute of International Education.
21. Machivenyika, F. (2017, November 6). VP Mnangagwa fired from government. *The Herald*, p. 1.
22. Mackintosh, E. (2017). Zimbabwe's military takeover was the world's strangest coup. African Voices. CNN. 21 November 2017.
23. Marinov, N., & Geomans, H. (2014). Coups and democracy. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(1): 43-54.
24. Mashaya, B. (2017, November 10). Probe, arrest Mnangagwa. *Daily news*, p. 2.
25. Meijer, R. (2014). *The role of the military in political transitions. Egypt: A case study*. (Msc thesis: University of Egypt, Egypt). Retrieved from www.ue.ac.za
26. Miller, H. (2012). *Economic development, violent leader removal and democracy*. WileyOnline Library. 56(4), pp.1002-1020.
27. Makunike, E. (2017, 3 March) 'We must undo this disgrace', says Mugabe as he calls his ouster a 'coup d'état'. *Newsday*. P, 1.
28. Nordlinger, E. (1977). *Soldiers in politics. Military coups and governments*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
29. Powell, J. (2014). *An assessment of the democratic coup theory*. Routledge: African Security Review.
30. Szirmai, A. (2015). *Socio- economic Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31. Tayana, P. (2017, November 6). Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa fired, the finer details. *Pindula News*, p 1.
32. Taylor, A. (2017). Zimbabwe: When a coup is not a coup. *The Washington Post*, p. 3.
33. Varol, O. (2012). *The democratic coup d'état*. Harvard: Harvard International Law Journal.
34. Vereranda, L. (2017, November 15). Airforce bemoans low budgetary allocation. *Newsday*, p. 2.
35. Wobig, J. (2013). *Regional regimes for the defence of democracy and coup d'état*. (PHD thesis. The Graduate College of the University of Nebraska, United States of America). Retrieved from www.uneb.ac.za
36. Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute, (2017). *Was the army intervention constitutional?* Harare: African ILI.



This page is intentionally left blank



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 20 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2020
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Studying Global Politics in the Post-Cold War Era: Possibilities for a Feminization

By Temitope Peter Ola

Bowen University

Abstract- This paper builds on previous research on gender in global politics, it engages with the epistemological issue of male dominance in the discourse of international relations and how that shapes international politics. The essay argues that explanations of inter-state relations that focus exclusively on the role of men are insufficient to explain global politics, as they fail to account for the impacts of wars and conflicts on women and misses the role of feminism in peace-building. The essay not only demonstrates that the propensity for wars and conflicts works differently for men than for women but also challenges the conventional wisdom that global politics is gender blind. The essay permits us to sharpen our understanding of the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of popular political theories while pointing to new interpretations of, and future avenues for, empirical research on global politics.

Keywords: *women; international politics; human rights; democracy; terrorism.*

GJHSS-F Classification: *FOR Code: 360199*



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Studying Global Politics in the Post-Cold War Era: Possibilities for a Feminization

Temitope Peter Ola

Abstract- This paper builds on previous research on gender in global politics, it engages with the epistemological issue of male dominance in the discourse of international relations and how that shapes international politics. The essay argues that explanations of inter-state relations that focus exclusively on the role of men are insufficient to explain global politics, as they fail to account for the impacts of wars and conflicts on women and misses the role of feminism in peace-building. The essay not only demonstrates that the propensity for wars and conflicts works differently for men than for women but also challenges the conventional wisdom that global politics is gender blind. The essay permits us to sharpen our understanding of the inefficiencies and insufficiencies of popular political theories while pointing to new interpretations of, and future avenues for, empirical research on global politics.

Keywords: women; international politics; human rights; democracy; terrorism.

I. INTRODUCTION

International politics, as managed by men, has been configured by antagonism, conflicts, and wars which have hindered worldwide cooperation and development. That is why most scholars of world politics agree on the imperative of global peace and inclusive development. Yet there is still disagreement on how to pursue it. At the same time, the literature of world politics enjoys well-developed theories on the consequences of the actions and inactions of men but has little to say about the impacts of women's roles. In other words, existing literature has paid insufficient attention to the role of gender in world peace.

In the aftermath of the Cold War the political will for a move away from antagonism to cooperation should gather momentum. And women can play a role in this regard. Though women's positions, worldwide, may vary according to race, class, and geographical location, they are disproportionately situated at the bottom of the sociopolitical scale in all societies (Tickner, 2001:7). Therefore, redefining women's relationship to global decision-making processes becomes an all-important in attaining sustainable solutions to the structural issues that lead to division and violence within the international society.

Exploring aspects of development such as human rights, democracy – shows that society has not been friendly towards women. World development has been tied to a system that is patriarchal and thus,

privileged men's interests over women's. For instance, scholarship in the area of democratization is biased against women in terms of the state institutions on which its analysis focuses. Since women have always had less access to formal political institutions, the focus of scholarship in democratization on political channels misses the means of women's participation in politics through non-formal political channels. It thus obscures the role of women.

The reasons for this are not farfetched. For instance, a widely held belief, according to Tickner (1992:3), is that

Military and foreign policy are arenas of policy-making least appropriate for women. Strength, power, autonomy, independence, and rationality, all typically associated with men and masculinity, are characteristics we most value in those to whom we trust the conduct of our foreign policy and national interest.

Consequently, the qualities traditionally required by international politics – power, military might, politics – are those assumed to be mainly associated with masculinity. In any case, constructions of masculinity are not independent of, but dependent upon, opposing constructions of femininity. In other words, higher value is attributed in the political sphere to idealized masculine characters, which again is depicted as reflecting objective laws rooted in human nature. By treating this idealization as if it were universal laws of behavior, international relations theories provide only a partial picture of international politics.

II. METHOD

The writings of classical and contemporary scholars of world politics, as well as feminists, serve as the data for the essay. These writings were source from the text, periodicals, and scholarly articles on the subject matter. The data were subjected to critical interpretative analysis to fit-in with the exploratory scheme of the essay.

III. GENDER AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The issue of gender in international relations is yet to receive the attention that is due to it. Instead, the issue of women has been subsumed in the battery of contending issues in the international arena. This

Author: Ph.D, Bowen University, Nigeria.
e-mail: olatemitope33@gmail.com

suppression of women issues is for at least two reasons. First, there is the methodological problem and the epistemological issue that are constantly raised about the limit and parameters of international relations as a discipline. The disciplinary hiatus has been the undoing of the conception of women as the hidden faces in international relations. This tendency has ensured that gender issues in international relations remain in obscurity because scholars believe that the issue of gender is an intra-national matter that has nothing to do with global politics. Second, it has been argued by those who hold this view that international relations are 'high politics' while the issue of women is 'low politics.' The problem has been due to the claim that the issue of gender is an inappropriate category in international relations since the discipline is gender-neutral as it cannot discriminate between men and women.

Indeed, classical political thinkers like Socrates (c. 470 – 399 BCE), Plato (427– 347 BCE), Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE), Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778), and Karl Marx (1818 – 1883) have traditionally ignored women or at best consigned them with inferior roles. The writings of these *heavyweights* are the very tradition that installs man to male chauvinism and hegemony. Consequently, until very recently, western literature has often emphasized the comparative inferiority of women, not because of what they cannot do, but more because of their physiological features. It is this bias of western literature on women that has continually enforced the benign neglect of gender discourse. In contradistinction, traditional western literature has consistently presented men as role models, movers, and motivators of society. Patriarchy sets up the father as the epitome of all spheres. Therefore, Hans Morgenthau's (1948) famous classic 'Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace' referred to *statesmen*, and there is no entry for 'women' in the index. Continuing in that tradition, but with a slight shift, Kenneth Watz (1959) wrote 'Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,' with only one entry for women in the index – *Women, role in government*. Therefore, in international politics, while men are assessed on their merits as individuals, women have tended to be judged as female or as a group. However prevalent and interesting such descriptions of world politics might be they are of doubtful utility to a world in search of peace and inclusive development.

In the meantime, women have been represented as the 'weaker sex' or the 'second sex' and stereotyped with such qualities as sensitive, emotional, trivial, fragile, indecisive, submissive, sentimental, unthinking, uncritical and helpless (Sankar and Rajeshkannan, 2014; Ladele, 2009). Women are socialized to internalize these qualities so that they are conditioned to derogate their sex and cooperate in their subjugation. Thus, at adulthood, the woman is assumed

to have been properly schooled in servitude, muteness, invisibility, and dependence, with a natural acceptance of a corresponding male superiority and dominance (Uko, 2006). Though these uni-dimensional images of women were creatures of men without any reference to the complexity of women's experiences the milieu has for long helped to block women from participating in the public sphere, where policy is made, and are relegated to the realm of private.

But there have always been traditional differences between the public and the private arenas. The public associated with State administration is regarded as the realm of men, while the private, connected with the running of the household and the family, is the domain of women's roles as wives and mothers. Thus, the decision to go to war – the political decision; the conduct of it – the military opinion and more often the reconstruction of society after the war ends is usually left to men as decision-makers, while women are left with savoring the impacts. With the benefit of time, therefore, it can be said that one significant trend which runs through the works of Morgenthau and his disciples is its fixation with 'heroic' male protagonists, its treatment of women as non-existent, non-entity; its pretense that international politics is fix, and its cold shouldering of the effects of political decisions on men and women. This trend in scholarship leads to the worry as to whether the study of international relations should be limited to exploring the processes of decision making.

But then, the fact that the international system dominated by masculinity has until very recently been bedeviled by conflict and war challenges the justification for male dominance. As a matter of fact, governments, worldwide often garner support for the war by appealing to masculine characteristics to the extent that there evolved a nexus between masculinity and international conflicts. This practice is so commonplace to the extent that no attempt has been made by any of the protagonists of the male-dominated global system to excuse the nexuses. Somewhat behind Francis Fukuyama's (1992) 'End of History and the Last Man' is the thinking that if the termination of the ideological conflict signals the end of global war, militarism, competitiveness then the roles of men in world politics are ended and women can now take the central stage with their cooperative tendencies. In another word, by his submission, Fukuyama unwillingly acknowledged that wars and conflicts which have so far characterized the international system is due to the pervasive system of male dominance, assigned to the anatomical differences between the sexes and women's reproductive roles. This critique of Fukuyama's treatise minimizes the roles of both men and women in international relations.

However, the gender bias of international relations scholarship, the stereotypes, and assumptions

that swirled around international politics align with socially learned beliefs, behavior, and expectations (not genetic and anatomical characteristics) that men are warlike, aggressive, and competitive. But these are not made in all innocence. They are filtered through a lens of traditional values and beliefs which distort perception in international politics.

As a solution to the problem, there emerged feminists' perspective in International Relations. Although the fact that women have been active in working for causes about peace is not a new phenomenon, but the emergence of active feminist perspectives in International Relations is relatively recent. Its origins can be traced to the 1980s. However, contrary to Fukuyama's thinking, the focus of feminist scholarship of international relations is beyond 'peace as a women's issue' to a focus on the fact that all citizens have vital roles to play in issues of peace and conflict. Thus, focusing on feminization of international relations may reveal the reasons why wars have so far been perpetuated. It may help to reformulate key concepts – sovereignty, power, and security – in ways that allows for new possibilities for solving current global challenges. But how can this be?

For instance, while the works of traditional theorists of international relations focus on the causes and termination of wars, feminist theorists of international politics are interested in what happens during wars in addition to their beginnings and endings. With feminists' perspective, it becomes easier to understand military capability's failures to guarantee against outside threats to state as well as their perception at being antithetical to human security, particularly those of women and other vulnerable groups within the countries. Thus, the inclusion of feminist perspective in international relations scholarship is approximately the ultimate one step forward ever taken in the discipline, in its upward march to exclusiveness. Despite all, gender inequality persists. Gender inequality persists because modern society has continued to consolidate the patriarchal tendency that had traditionally neglected women.

IV. WOMEN PEACE HYPOTHESIS AND ITS LIMITS

The women and peace hypothesis posits a distinction between the orientations of men and women regarding issues of war and peace. It claims that 'women are more pacific than men in their approach to international relations, being more accepting of compromise to resolve interstate disputes and less likely than men to believe that war is necessary or appropriate in particular conflict situations.'¹ It associates competition, competence, dominance, violence, intransigence, and territoriality with men while ascribing

moderation, accommodation, compromise, tolerance, and pacifism with women.

The gendered division of power and violence to which the hypothesis calls attention is succinctly summarized in Global Gender Issues which notes that:

Throughout history there have been numerous examples of women warriors, and women fighters exist today. In spite of this, there is a pervasive gender dichotomy that divides women and men into 'life-givers' and 'life-takers' ... As life givers, women are not only prevented from engaging in combat, but are also expected to restore "life" after a death dealing war is over. Women are expected to mourn dutifully the loved ones who fell in war and then to produce new lives for the nation to replace its lost members. [Thus] in spite of their participation, women remain associated with war's opposite-peace (Peterson and Runyan, 1993:81-82).

Feminist theorists emphasize the unique motherhood experience of women, to establish the link between women and peace by celebrating the traditionally 'female' attributes of caring and nurturance.

When the *women peace hypothesis* is taken to global politics, the 'care-giving' perspective emphasizes the universal applicability of women's predisposition toward nurturance and a more tolerant attitude toward the resolution of international conflicts (Elshtain, 1985; Scaltsas, 1992). The hypothesis argues that moreover 'maternal thinking' and 'preservative love' derived from women's practice of mothering counterbalance theories of international relations that give priority to such concepts such as power, hegemony, and hierarchy (Dietz, 1985; Ruddick, 1989). Because of its acclaim committed to values of freedom and equality, feminism seeks to expose and undermine the social and political structures based on hierarchy, domination, and exploitation. The military is judged to embody the above characteristics which are rejected as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. This rejection, in turn, encourages anti-militarism and informs the argument that more women are more likely than men to have dovish views about global politics. Furthermore, it is argued that since women make up a disproportionate proportion of the economically disadvantaged, they are more sensitive to the disservice which the high cost of military/security centered foreign policy does.

But, there exist fundamental counters to the commonly held view of women as peacemakers and women as peaceful people. With the increase in civil wars and international terrorism in the aftermath of the Cold War, the violent side of women is being revealed. Women now act as suicide bombers, spies, snipers, leaders of rebellious groups, etc. Women made up the Palestinian 'army of roses'; the 'Black Widows' who fought in Chechnya; the 'Black Tiger' Tamil women fighting for a state against the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka,

are a few examples of cases whereby women have been prominent as terrorists. Thus, although the 'typical terrorist' was male several terrorist groups have a strong female presence (Ness, 2008: 13). For example, there is Fusako Shigenobu (founder and leader of the Japanese Red Army); Ulrike Meinhof (of the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany); and Leila Khaled (who was actively involved with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).

At this juncture, it is axiomatic to state that tolerance, empathy, and pacifism are not necessarily 'female' attributes but rather the norms of any population category that has traditionally had little opportunity to exercise power. Thus women's predisposition toward peace than men is, at least partly, because the exercise of public control has generally been a masculine activity.

V. WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF VIOLENCE

The need for a gendered perspective of international relations is more than ever before of utmost importance. In the civil wars and ethnic conflicts predicted by Fukuyama, and which has since proliferate since the end of the cold war, though women are generally excluded from the decisions leading to the wars, they are increasingly the victims of those strives. For instance, as more civilians are targeted, conflicts take toll on women. They are killed; displaced; violated physically, psychologically and emotionally; and their social structure disrupted. There are other impacts of war on women.

For instance, a correlation exists between intra-state or inter-state conflicts and domestic violence against women. As a consequence of militarized society, domestic violence increases even after wars (Cockburn, 1998; Kaufman and Williams, 2007).

Unfortunately, since domestic violence takes place at home – the private sphere – it has not been adequately captured as a consequence of conflicts and wars, again, perhaps because women are the central victims. Except for the attention given by Turpin (1992), Kaufman and Williams (2013) and NiAolain (2017), the relationship between conflict, and domestic violence is yet to receive it deserved attention.

It is not in many countries that women have equal access with men to resources such as education, employment opportunities, political participation, health services, nutrition, etc. It was in acknowledgment of the fact that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000 gave development attention to women. Goal 3: 'Promote Gender Equality and Women Empowerment' is explicit in its call for global action on behalf of women (UN, 2000). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 (but which came into force in January 2016) ask states to go further than was outlined in the MDGs. Specifically, Goal 5; 'Achieve Gender Equality and Empower Women and Girls' is explicit in its submission that 'gender equality is not only a fundamental human right but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world (UN, 2015). In other words, a true definition of progress must include peace, equality, and development. There is no doubt that several attempts have been made to address the human rights concern of women (see Table 1). But there exists no ground to believe those women's rights as human rights will be achieved as long as they depend on individual states, political systems, and the male-dominated worldwide decision-making mechanism to implement them. The reason they may not be achieved is because they would result in fundamental changes to the political, social, and cultural structures of many states that are skew in favor of men.

Table 1: Important Steps towards Human Rights and Gender Empowerment

Year	Conference	Key Issue
1968	United Nations International Conference on Human Rights (Teheran)	Parents have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children.
1974	World Population Conference (Bucharest)	The responsibility of couples and individuals [should take] into account the need of their living and future of their children and their responsibilities toward the community.
1975	International Women's Years Conference (Mexico City)	The human body, whether that of a woman or man, is inviolable, and respect for it is a fundamental element of human dignity and freedom.
1979	Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (New York)	Article 12 calls on countries to 'take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning.
1984	World Population Conference (Mexico City)	Governments can do more to assist people in making their reproductive decisions in a responsible way.

1992	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro)	Agenda 21 calls for 'women-centered, women-managed, safe and accessible, responsible planning of family size and services.
1993	United Nations World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna)	The Vienna Declaration includes nine paragraphs on 'The Equal Status and Human Rights of Women', and for the first time recognizes that 'violence against women is a human-rights abuse'.
1994	International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo)	Program of Action 'reaffirms the basic human rights of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of children and to have the information, education, and means to do so.
1995	United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing)	Sets a wide-ranging, ambitious agenda for promoting human development by addressing gender inequality and women's rights.
1999	United Nations Conference on World Population (The Hague)	Drafts recommendations on humane assistance for international family planning programs in the light of the possibility that the global population could start to decline in the late twenty-first century.
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg)	Drafts resolutions to combat abject and dehumanizing poverty, stressing the importance of reforms to encourage gender equality and the rights of women in order to stimulate sustainable economic growth.
2004	United Nations Conference on the Human Rights Obligations of Multinational Corporations (Geneva)	Opens debate to create a code of human rights and gender equality obligations for businesses.
2005	United Nations Conference on Children (New York)	Creates standards to protect children from exploitation.

Source: Kegley, Charles & Raymond, Gregory (2010), *The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics*, United States; Wadsworth

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979 is seen by many as the international bill of rights for women. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on 'Women, Peace and Security' of October 2000, was followed by Resolution 1820, 'Eliminating Violence against Women and Girls,' of June 2008. It is germane to note that Resolution 1325 stresses the importance of the full participation of women in every segment of society if peace and security must be attained in the international system. Furthermore, Resolution 1820 demands the 'immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians' (UN Dept. of Public Information, 2008). However, while most states support the goals of these Resolutions, there exists virtually no enforcement mechanism. Thus, among the challenges standing in the way of women rights are lack of political will; lack of awareness on the part of women about their secured rights; lack of financial resources to provide sufficient services to support women; a shortage of women decision makers; and the reluctance of men (decision-makers) in improving women's status in society.

At the same time, what might have previously been the protected domain of the home, which is seen as women's space, has become part of the battlefield

as suicide attacks and pilotless drones which kills its victims irrespective of whether they are civilians or combatants. This blurring of the battle lines has effectively transport the private space to the public sphere, but the people who are said to occupy the previous private space (the women) have not been given their rightful place in the in the discourse of international politics. Thus, despite Resolution 1325, conflicts have continued to be resolved with little or nil involvement of women. Again, despite Resolution 1820, there are countless examples of civil wars wherein women and children are violated, notwithstanding the protection offered by the Resolution.

VI. WOMEN AND THE FAULT LINES OF DEMOCRACY

The advantages inherent in a democracy have been well-publicized by the *democratic peace* put forward by Michael Doyle (1986), who built on Immanuel Kant's 1795 *Perpetual Peace*. According to Doyle, 'the predictions of liberal pacifists ... are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraints, and a separate peace exists among them (Doyle, 1998: 1156). Thus, because democracies depend on 'the consent of the governed' democratic governments have learned to be more hesitant to engage in war, which will be unpopular

at home, will require public support, and will result in loss of lives and strain national budget (Rasler and Thompson, 2005; Russett, 2001; Ray, 1995).

But, it is interesting that participation in most democracies is conditioned on citizenship. And citizenship is gendered. For instance, even the most liberal definitions of citizenship are grounded in the social contract of seventeenth–eighteenth century Europe, which is based on ‘male, property-owning heads-of-household ... [and] thus, democratic theory and practice have been built on the male-as-norm engaged in narrowly defined political activities’ (Tickner, 2002: 105). Thus, in theory, democracy promotes equality among all citizens. It offers every citizen an opportunity to influence. In reality, often democracies are patriarchal governmental structures, in which power in all its ramifications – be it political, economic, or social, etc. – is concentrated in the hands of wealthy men with the resources to gain access to high office. These officeholders are also known to mentor often and promote younger people of their kind who act like themselves. Therefore, democracy, as a system, may be construed to limit progress for women, rather than allowing them to advance (Tickner, 2002: 104-106). A clear case in point is the defeat of Hillary Clinton by Donald Trump in the 2015 United States presidential election. The foregoing suggests that no matter how sophisticated a democracy might appear to be, it can always find excuses to exclude women from the decision making process and positions of power. Moreover, there is a world of differences between rights secured and rights enjoyed.

Thus, since 1900 only about 15 percent of the states of the world have had one or more female heads of state; and many of them came to power as widows of male rulers (HDR, 2008: 343-346). They conclude Margaret Thatcher of Britain, Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia, Golda Meir of Israel, Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, Angela Merkel of Germany, Christiana Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina, and Michelle Bachelet of Chile. However, these *females-in-power* exceptions show that women have never been *absent* in world politics (Wilmer, 2000) they have only remained *invisible* within the discourse of world politics conducted by men. In other words, the practice of democracy worldwide suffers from gender myopia, the denial of the existence of the barriers that prevent women from really enjoying the same rights as men. Thus, it is not enough to romanticize democratic principles; we need to know the gender that has access to the system of governance and benefit the most from it.

VII. CONCLUSION

While not denying that most women's lives, roles, and experiences differ from those of men, who are traditionally the decision-makers, women must be

considered, as central to, and certainly as part of the search for a just world. Studies by Mary Caprioli (2005), Eric Melander (2005), Patrick Regan, and Aida Paksevicute (2003) and Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer (2001) have shown that high levels of gender equality within states result in low levels of interstate and intrastate conflicts. So that

The river of thought on human rights and development runs inexorably toward the emancipation of women everywhere and the equality of men and women (Worldwatch Institute, 2002).

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. Caprioli, Mary (2005), *Primed Violence: the Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting International Conflict*, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49 (June), pp. 161-178.
2. Caprioli, Mary and Boyer, Mark (2001), *Gender, Violence, and International Crisis*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 503-518.
3. Cockburn, Cynthia (1998), *The Space Between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*, London: Zed Books.
4. Dietz, M.G. (1985), *Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking*, *Political Theory*, vol. 13, pp. 19-38.
5. Doyle, Michael W. (1986), *Kant's Perpetual Peace*, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 4, p. 1156.
6. Elstain, J.B. (1985), *Reflections on War and Political Discourse*, *Political Theory*, vol. 13, pp. 39-57.
7. Fukuyama Francis (1992), *End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press.
8. HDR (2008), *Human Development Report*, New York: United Nations Development Programme.
9. Kaufman, Joyce & Williams, Kristen (2007), *Women, the State, and War*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
10. Ladele, Omolola (2009), *Reconstructing Identities through Resistance in Postcolonial Women's Writing: A Reading of Ezigbo's The Last of the Strong Ones*, *Nebula*, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 70-84.
11. Melander, Erik (2005), *Gender Equality and Interstate Armed Conflict*, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49 (December), pp. 695-714.
12. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf.
13. Ness, Cindy D. (2008), 'In the Name of Cause: Women's Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism', in Ness, Cindy D. (ed.), *Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Unity, and Organization*, New York: Routledge.
14. Peterson, V.S. & Runyan, A.S. (1993), *Global Gender Issues*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

15. Rasler, Bruce (2001), 'How Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations Create a System for Peace', in Kegley, Charles W. and Wittkopf, Eugene (eds.), *The Global Agenda* 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
16. Ray, James Lee (1995), *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
17. Regan, Patrick M. and Paskeviciute, Aida (2003), Women's Access to Politics and Peaceful States, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40 (March), pp. 287-302.
18. Ruddick, S. (1989), *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace*, Boston: Beaco.
19. Sankar, T. and Rajeshkannan, T. (2014), Representing the African Culture in Buchi Emecheta's *The Bride Price – A Study*, *International Journal of English and Literature*, vol. 5, no.8, pp.194-198.
20. Scaltsas, P.W. (1992), 'Do Feminist Ethics Counter Feminist Aims?' in Cole, E.B. & Coultrap-McQuin, S. (eds.), *Explorations in Feminist Ethics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
21. Tickner, Ann J. (1992), *Gender in International Relations*, New York: Columbia University Press.
22. Tickner, Ann J. (2001), *Gendering World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
23. Uko, Iniobong I. (2006), 'Transcending the Margins: New Directions in Women's Writing', *African Literature Today*, vol. 25, pp. 82-93.
24. United Nations (2000), Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_3_fs.pdf.
25. United Nations (2000), 'Goal 5: Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls', <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality>.
26. United Nations Department of Public Information (2008), 'Security Council Demands Immediate and Complete Halt to Acts of Sexual Violence against Civilians in Conflict Zones' <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9364.doc.htm>.
27. Waltz, Kenneth (1959), *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press.
28. Worldwatch Institute (2002), *State of the World*, New York: Norton.
29. Wilmer, Franke (2000), 'Women, the State and War: Feminist Incursions into World Politics' in Mansbach, Richard W. and Rhodes, Edward (eds.), *Global Politics in a Changing World*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.



GLOBAL JOURNALS GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 2020

WWW.GLOBALJOURNALS.ORG

MEMBERSHIPS

FELLOWS/ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

FSSRC/ASSRC MEMBERSHIPS

INTRODUCTION



FSSRC/ASSRC is the most prestigious membership of Global Journals accredited by Open Association of Research Society, U.S.A (OARS). The credentials of Fellow and Associate designations signify that the researcher has gained the knowledge of the fundamental and high-level concepts, and is a subject matter expert, proficient in an expertise course covering the professional code of conduct, and follows recognized standards of practice. The credentials are designated only to the researchers, scientists, and professionals that have been selected by a rigorous process by our Editorial Board and Management Board.

Associates of FSSRC/ASSRC are scientists and researchers from around the world are working on projects/researches that have huge potentials. Members support Global Journals' mission to advance technology for humanity and the profession.

FSSRC

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL is the most prestigious membership of Global Journals. It is an award and membership granted to individuals that the Open Association of Research Society judges to have made a 'substantial contribution to the improvement of computer science, technology, and electronics engineering.

The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Fellows are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Fellow Members.



BENEFIT

TO THE INSTITUTION

GET LETTER OF APPRECIATION

Global Journals sends a letter of appreciation of author to the Dean or CEO of the University or Company of which author is a part, signed by editor in chief or chief author.



EXCLUSIVE NETWORK

GET ACCESS TO A CLOSED NETWORK

A FSSRC member gets access to a closed network of Tier 1 researchers and scientists with direct communication channel through our website. Fellows can reach out to other members or researchers directly. They should also be open to reaching out by other.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



CERTIFICATE

CERTIFICATE, LOR AND LASER-MOMENTO

Fellows receive a printed copy of a certificate signed by our Chief Author that may be used for academic purposes and a personal recommendation letter to the dean of member's university.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



DESIGNATION

GET HONORED TITLE OF MEMBERSHIP

Fellows can use the honored title of membership. The "FSSRC" is an honored title which is accorded to a person's name viz. Dr. John E. Hall, Ph.D., FSSRC or William Walldroff, M.S., FSSRC.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

RECOGNITION ON THE PLATFORM

BETTER VISIBILITY AND CITATION

All the Fellow members of FSSRC get a badge of "Leading Member of Global Journals" on the Research Community that distinguishes them from others. Additionally, the profile is also partially maintained by our team for better visibility and citation. All fellows get a dedicated page on the website with their biography.

Career

Credibility

Reputation

FUTURE WORK

GET DISCOUNTS ON THE FUTURE PUBLICATIONS

Fellows receive discounts on future publications with Global Journals up to 60%. Through our recommendation programs, members also receive discounts on publications made with OARS affiliated organizations.

Career

Financial



GJ ACCOUNT

UNLIMITED FORWARD OF EMAILS

Fellows get secure and fast GJ work emails with unlimited forward of emails that they may use them as their primary email. For example, john [AT] globaljournals [DOT] org.

Career

Credibility

Reputation



PREMIUM TOOLS

ACCESS TO ALL THE PREMIUM TOOLS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Financial

CONFERENCES & EVENTS

ORGANIZE SEMINAR/CONFERENCE

Fellows are authorized to organize symposium/seminar/conference on behalf of Global Journal Incorporation (USA). They can also participate in the same organized by another institution as representative of Global Journal. In both the cases, it is mandatory for him to discuss with us and obtain our consent. Additionally, they get free research conferences (and others) alerts.

Career

Credibility

Financial

EARLY INVITATIONS

EARLY INVITATIONS TO ALL THE SYMPOSIUMS, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES

All fellows receive the early invitations to all the symposiums, seminars, conferences and webinars hosted by Global Journals in their subject.

Exclusive



PUBLISHING ARTICLES & BOOKS

EARN 60% OF SALES PROCEEDS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Exclusive

Financial

REVIEWERS

GET A REMUNERATION OF 15% OF AUTHOR FEES

Fellow members are eligible to join as a paid peer reviewer at Global Journals Incorporation (USA) and can get a remuneration of 15% of author fees, taken from the author of a respective paper.

Financial

ACCESS TO EDITORIAL BOARD

BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Fellows may join as a member of the Editorial Board of Global Journals Incorporation (USA) after successful completion of three years as Fellow and as Peer Reviewer. Additionally, Fellows get a chance to nominate other members for Editorial Board.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

AND MUCH MORE

GET ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC MUSEUMS AND OBSERVATORIES ACROSS THE GLOBE

All members get access to 5 selected scientific museums and observatories across the globe. All researches published with Global Journals will be kept under deep archival facilities across regions for future protections and disaster recovery. They get 10 GB free secure cloud access for storing research files.

ASSOCIATE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

ASSOCIATE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL is the membership of Global Journals awarded to individuals that the Open Association of Research Society judges to have made a 'substantial contribution to the improvement of computer science, technology, and electronics engineering.

The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Associate membership can later be promoted to Fellow Membership. Associates are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Associate Members.



BENEFIT

TO THE INSTITUTION

GET LETTER OF APPRECIATION

Global Journals sends a letter of appreciation of author to the Dean or CEO of the University or Company of which author is a part, signed by editor in chief or chief author.



EXCLUSIVE NETWORK

GET ACCESS TO A CLOSED NETWORK

A ASSRC member gets access to a closed network of Tier 2 researchers and scientists with direct communication channel through our website. Associates can reach out to other members or researchers directly. They should also be open to reaching out by other.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



CERTIFICATE

CERTIFICATE, LOR AND LASER-MOMENTO

Associates receive a printed copy of a certificate signed by our Chief Author that may be used for academic purposes and a personal recommendation letter to the dean of member's university.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



DESIGNATION

GET HONORED TITLE OF MEMBERSHIP

Associates can use the honored title of membership. The "ASSRC" is an honored title which is accorded to a person's name viz. Dr. John E. Hall, Ph.D., ASSRC or William Walldroff, M.S., ASSRC.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

RECOGNITION ON THE PLATFORM

BETTER VISIBILITY AND CITATION

All the Associate members of ASSRC get a badge of "Leading Member of Global Journals" on the Research Community that distinguishes them from others. Additionally, the profile is also partially maintained by our team for better visibility and citation.

Career

Credibility

Reputation

FUTURE WORK

GET DISCOUNTS ON THE FUTURE PUBLICATIONS

Associates receive discounts on future publications with Global Journals up to 30%. Through our recommendation programs, members also receive discounts on publications made with OARS affiliated organizations.

Career

Financial



GJ ACCOUNT

UNLIMITED FORWARD OF EMAILS

Associates get secure and fast GJ work emails with 5GB forward of emails that they may use them as their primary email. For example, john [AT] globaljournals [DOT] org.

Career

Credibility

Reputation



PREMIUM TOOLS

ACCESS TO ALL THE PREMIUM TOOLS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to almost all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Financial

CONFERENCES & EVENTS

ORGANIZE SEMINAR/CONFERENCE

Associates are authorized to organize symposium/seminar/conference on behalf of Global Journal Incorporation (USA). They can also participate in the same organized by another institution as representative of Global Journal. In both the cases, it is mandatory for him to discuss with us and obtain our consent. Additionally, they get free research conferences (and others) alerts.

Career

Credibility

Financial

EARLY INVITATIONS

EARLY INVITATIONS TO ALL THE SYMPOSIUMS, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES

All associates receive the early invitations to all the symposiums, seminars, conferences and webinars hosted by Global Journals in their subject.

Exclusive



PUBLISHING ARTICLES & BOOKS

EARN 60% OF SALES PROCEEDS

Associates can publish articles (limited) without any fees. Also, they can earn up to 30-40% of sales proceeds from the sale of reference/review books/literature/publishing of research paper.

Exclusive

Financial

REVIEWERS

GET A REMUNERATION OF 15% OF AUTHOR FEES

Associate members are eligible to join as a paid peer reviewer at Global Journals Incorporation (USA) and can get a remuneration of 15% of author fees, taken from the author of a respective paper.

Financial

AND MUCH MORE

GET ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC MUSEUMS AND OBSERVATORIES ACROSS THE GLOBE

All members get access to 2 selected scientific museums and observatories across the globe. All researches published with Global Journals will be kept under deep archival facilities across regions for future protections and disaster recovery. They get 5 GB free secure cloud access for storing research files.



ASSOCIATE	FELLOW	RESEARCH GROUP	BASIC
\$4800 lifetime designation	\$6800 lifetime designation	\$12500.00 organizational	APC per article
Certificate , LoR and Momento 2 discounted publishing/year Gradation of Research 10 research contacts/day 1 GB Cloud Storage GJ Community Access	Certificate , LoR and Momento Unlimited discounted publishing/year Gradation of Research Unlimited research contacts/day 5 GB Cloud Storage Online Presense Assistance GJ Community Access	Certificates , LoRs and Momentos Unlimited free publishing/year Gradation of Research Unlimited research contacts/day Unlimited Cloud Storage Online Presense Assistance GJ Community Access	GJ Community Access



PREFERRED AUTHOR GUIDELINES

We accept the manuscript submissions in any standard (generic) format.

We typeset manuscripts using advanced typesetting tools like Adobe In Design, CorelDraw, TeXnicCenter, and TeXStudio. We usually recommend authors submit their research using any standard format they are comfortable with, and let Global Journals do the rest.

Alternatively, you can download our basic template from <https://globaljournals.org/Template.zip>

Authors should submit their complete paper/article, including text illustrations, graphics, conclusions, artwork, and tables. Authors who are not able to submit manuscript using the form above can email the manuscript department at submit@globaljournals.org or get in touch with chiefeditor@globaljournals.org if they wish to send the abstract before submission.

BEFORE AND DURING SUBMISSION

Authors must ensure the information provided during the submission of a paper is authentic. Please go through the following checklist before submitting:

1. Authors must go through the complete author guideline and understand and *agree to Global Journals' ethics and code of conduct*, along with author responsibilities.
2. Authors must accept the privacy policy, terms, and conditions of Global Journals.
3. Ensure corresponding author's email address and postal address are accurate and reachable.
4. Manuscript to be submitted must include keywords, an abstract, a paper title, co-author(s) names and details (email address, name, phone number, and institution), figures and illustrations in vector format including appropriate captions, tables, including titles and footnotes, a conclusion, results, acknowledgments and references.
5. Authors should submit paper in a ZIP archive if any supplementary files are required along with the paper.
6. Proper permissions must be acquired for the use of any copyrighted material.
7. Manuscript submitted *must not have been submitted or published elsewhere* and all authors must be aware of the submission.

Declaration of Conflicts of Interest

It is required for authors to declare all financial, institutional, and personal relationships with other individuals and organizations that could influence (bias) their research.

POLICY ON PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism is not acceptable in Global Journals submissions at all.

Plagiarized content will not be considered for publication. We reserve the right to inform authors' institutions about plagiarism detected either before or after publication. If plagiarism is identified, we will follow COPE guidelines:

Authors are solely responsible for all the plagiarism that is found. The author must not fabricate, falsify or plagiarize existing research data. The following, if copied, will be considered plagiarism:

- Words (language)
- Ideas
- Findings
- Writings
- Diagrams
- Graphs
- Illustrations
- Lectures



- Printed material
- Graphic representations
- Computer programs
- Electronic material
- Any other original work

AUTHORSHIP POLICIES

Global Journals follows the definition of authorship set up by the Open Association of Research Society, USA. According to its guidelines, authorship criteria must be based on:

1. Substantial contributions to the conception and acquisition of data, analysis, and interpretation of findings.
2. Drafting the paper and revising it critically regarding important academic content.
3. Final approval of the version of the paper to be published.

Changes in Authorship

The corresponding author should mention the name and complete details of all co-authors during submission and in manuscript. We support addition, rearrangement, manipulation, and deletions in authors list till the early view publication of the journal. We expect that corresponding author will notify all co-authors of submission. We follow COPE guidelines for changes in authorship.

Copyright

During submission of the manuscript, the author is confirming an exclusive license agreement with Global Journals which gives Global Journals the authority to reproduce, reuse, and republish authors' research. We also believe in flexible copyright terms where copyright may remain with authors/employers/institutions as well. Contact your editor after acceptance to choose your copyright policy. You may follow this form for copyright transfers.

Appealing Decisions

Unless specified in the notification, the Editorial Board's decision on publication of the paper is final and cannot be appealed before making the major change in the manuscript.

Acknowledgments

Contributors to the research other than authors credited should be mentioned in Acknowledgments. The source of funding for the research can be included. Suppliers of resources may be mentioned along with their addresses.

Declaration of funding sources

Global Journals is in partnership with various universities, laboratories, and other institutions worldwide in the research domain. Authors are requested to disclose their source of funding during every stage of their research, such as making analysis, performing laboratory operations, computing data, and using institutional resources, from writing an article to its submission. This will also help authors to get reimbursements by requesting an open access publication letter from Global Journals and submitting to the respective funding source.

PREPARING YOUR MANUSCRIPT

Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.



FORMAT STRUCTURE

It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

PREPARATION OF ELETRONIC FIGURES FOR PUBLICATION

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of human social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

THE ADMINISTRATION RULES

Administration Rules to Be Strictly Followed before Submitting Your Research Paper to Global Journals Inc.

Please read the following rules and regulations carefully before submitting your research paper to Global Journals Inc. to avoid rejection.

Segment draft and final research paper: You have to strictly follow the template of a research paper, failing which your paper may get rejected. You are expected to write each part of the paper wholly on your own. The peer reviewers need to identify your own perspective of the concepts in your own terms. Please do not extract straight from any other source, and do not rephrase someone else's analysis. Do not allow anyone else to proofread your manuscript.

Written material: You may discuss this with your guides and key sources. Do not copy anyone else's paper, even if this is only imitation, otherwise it will be rejected on the grounds of plagiarism, which is illegal. Various methods to avoid plagiarism are strictly applied by us to every paper, and, if found guilty, you may be blacklisted, which could affect your career adversely. To guard yourself and others from possible illegal use, please do not permit anyone to use or even read your paper and file.



CRITERION FOR GRADING A RESEARCH PAPER (COMPILATION)
BY GLOBAL JOURNALS

Please note that following table is only a Grading of "Paper Compilation" and not on "Performed/Stated Research" whose grading solely depends on Individual Assigned Peer Reviewer and Editorial Board Member. These can be available only on request and after decision of Paper. This report will be the property of Global Journals

Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
Abstract	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
Introduction	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
Methods and Procedures	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
Result	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
Discussion	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



INDEX

A	N
Antecedence · 20, 22	Noteworthy · 14, 33
Axiomatic · 45	
C	O
Cessation · 4, 48	Oscillate · 4
Cleavages · 17	
Coherent · 3	P
Controversial · 8, 36	Patriarchal · 43, 44, 48
Cultivation · 21	Peculiar · 1, 2, 13
	Pervasive · 44, 45
D	Pleaded · 7
Deliberation · 13, 33	Plenary · 16
Depicted · 20, 43	Precautionary · 37
Dictatorial · 31, 32, 33, 34, 38	Proliferation · 9, 22
Dragging · 2	Promulgation · 2, 3
E	R
Emancipation · 49	Referendum · 3, 35
Emergence · 3, 44	Relegate · 44
Exaggeration · 19, 20	Reluctance · 48
Expropriation · 8	
	T
F	Tolerance · 36, 41, 45
Fragile · 20, 21, 44	Trajectory · 31, 36, 41
Fragmentation · 13	Tyrannies · 31
I	V
Imperative · 1, 12, 13, 19, 42	Vigilantism · 19, 20, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30
Insidious · 21	
Integral · 1, 7	W
	Wider · 19, 22
M	
Menace · 20, 22	



save our planet



Global Journal of Human Social Science

Visit us on the Web at www.GlobalJournals.org | www.SocialScienceResearch.org
or email us at helpdesk@globaljournals.org



ISSN 975587

© Global Journals