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Arbitrary Truths: A Structural Analysis of the Philosophical Foundations of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism

By Jan Frauen
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Abstract- This article looks at the philosophical & discursive roots of the theoretical trinity of International Relations (IR). It identifies the outset of political realism at the beginning of the early modern period and goes through a structural analysis of Thomas Hobbes opus magnum *Leviathan*. The article displays that the liberal belief that is the foundation of the current human rights regime on the international stage stems from a reinterpretation of the Hobbesian picture relying on scriptural authority, not on rational argument. Finally, it identifies the current emergence of constructivism as a revival of Rousseauian thought. Ultimately, the present article raises the question if these different modes of knowledge production might be displaying different phases in political history rather than ultimate truths about the political world.

Keywords: social contract, hobbes, locke, rousseau, human rights, political theory.

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ARBITRARYTRUTHSASTRUCTURALANALYSISOF THEPHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONSOFREALISMLIBERALISMANDCONSTRUCTIVISM

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Jan Frauen

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Graphical abstract

	Hobbes	Locke	Rousseau
State of Nature	State of war	State of law	Not static
Human Nature	Individual	Individual	Constructed
Systemic evolution?	x	√	√
Internal evolution?	x	x	√
Natural Law?	x	√	x
Divine Entity?	x	√	x
Higher Purpose?	x	x	√
Social Contract?	√	√	x
Human Rights?	x	√	x
IR School	Realism	Liberalism	Constructivism
	Rationalism		Utopianism

I. INTRODUCTION

“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares loftily in the first sentence of its preamble (Assembly 1948). Ever since the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 at the very latest, there is not a single state left in the world that dares to challenge this peculiar statement openly. This fact in itself seems peculiar also though, as every member of the human family endowed with the ability to rational thinking should be able to notice the odd peculiarity of the Declaration's preamble instantly. If there really was such a thing as *inalienable rights* for every individual member of our human family, why should there be a need for the *recognition* of these rights? Sir Isaac Newton's famous apple did not need to formally recognize Newton's law of gravity before it started falling to the ground. Neither does a stone have to ask if gravity applies to it as well before it follows it. Should a

universal law, to say it in Kantian terms, not force its objects *categorically*, like a universal moral law would? Talking about *universal* laws, does not nature itself violate the individuals' inalienable right to life most shamelessly? If we have a natural, unalienable right to live, *why do we die?* It seems like nature either has not read or does not recognize the UDHR. However, who is to punish nature for this offense? If it is so easy and indeed logically compulsory to realize that there is a certain oddity, or even an analytical inconsistency attached to the UDHR's claim to universality, why does it seem that most people are almost epistemologically incapable of seeing this?

Of course, it is an overstatement to say that no one ever noticed this before, at least in theory. While the discourse, in other words, is unquestioned among common people and constantly reinforced through society's institutions and mainstream media's PC-dictates, it has indeed been quite fashionable among IR scholars for some time to call this cognitive implant into question, though the high times of human rights critique seem to have passed by now (e.g. Bielefeldt 2000; Donnelly 2007; Mc Neilly 2016; Mutua 2013). A very elaborate volume taking a sort of middle ground tracking

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somewhat relative and yet universal human rights back to their Roman, Western, Confucian, and Indian roots is to be found in *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Donnelly 2013). What this paper will argue, somewhat following and somewhat contradicting Donnelly, is that what we understand to be universal human rights indeed is a mere social construct historically enforced through scriptural doctrine. Furthermore, it will argue that the unquestioned belief by which the concept is met today is discursive and not coercive in nature. It will close with an outlook on political dynamics between the ideological poles of sense making.

II. FRAGMENTATION AND REUNIFICATION

That human rights are socially constructed does not mean that they do not exist in any form of existence whatsoever. As a social construct following the transcendental ideal of 'life' or 'liberty,' they do exist. Thus, they can be approached as a social function, building up a society. Hence, the universal inalienability of human rights can be detached from its definition and substituted for the claim of human rights' universal *social* utility. In this view, human rights keep their universality not as a natural given, but as a social end.

However, this definition loses its validity if it can be shown that individual well-living towards death and decay is not the only ideational end state to which the social can attempt to modify the natural. Of course, every possible ideational end as an immaterial object needs some sort of reasonable justification according to the most fundamental natural law of cause and effect. In other words, individual human rights could not be substituted for anything if there was no alternate social end according to which logic they could be substituted. Accordingly, it is not sufficient to show that human rights are void of substantial, universal validity. Also, this chapter will attempt to prove that there is an ideational alternative to strip them of their universal social validity. I admit, in other words, that both material nature and human nature strictly limit the set of possible social ends. Human rights regimes, generally speaking, indeed do have a strong claim in attempting to enforce the prerequisites to human happiness as a normative end, which is termed 'human dignity,' once again derived from an immaterial soul.

However, there is a natural shortcoming in the claim of human rights based social models. According to the intrinsic deficit of human rights' normative claim, a second stream of political thought can be identified by employing the Hobbesian, or more generally speaking realist, analogy of the individual and the state (Hobbes et al. 1996a; Mearsheimer 2001). While liberal and constructivist theorists have long anticipated the advent of a future world state, the citizens living under this state have invariably remained single and individual in theory

(Wendt 2004, 2003). Displaying rational empiricism's inherent contradictions, one can identify 'utopian collectivism' as its logical counter part analytically derived from the dynamic interplay of nature and human nature; the dichotomous all of perception and the basic conflict that constitutes consciousness or human existence.

The line of consciousness's stagnancy between the self and the world, here, is the ultimate element of ideational divergence. One could also say that progress, or the quest for freedom, can substitute individual happiness in revolutionary-thought based social models. This chapter, and indeed pretty much all following it, will discover both the philosophers of and the theorists of the *revolutionary* in intellectual history and attempt to account for the fact that the world seems to have forgotten about them in these high days of material conservatism. Ultimately, I will also venture to explain their compulsive failures. This thesis will argue that while rational materialism's logic is intrinsically flawed, utopian collectivism's approach fails practically. It is, so to say, practically flawed. Naturally, I realize that it is a very awkward thing to say, philosophically speaking, that something is practically flawed *on general terms*. The practical, it would seem, can only refer to particular situations. If the theory is sound, differently put, there must be a way to fix shortcomings in its practical application; no matter how screwed the current attempt might be.

However, what I will argue is that there is no method to *force* a leap of consciousness or a 'meta-system transition' to a higher order of organization (Heylighen 2014; Turchin 1977). Accordingly, the revolutionary collective is doomed to fail in its application every time it is attempted. Equally, it is doomed to re-appear in history due to the analytic lack of rational materialism resting on spiritual leftovers. On the other side of history, which is best understood as waves rolling over the ocean of time according to this picture, rational materialism grows as revolutionary spirit declines. However, I do not intend to stop here. While I admit that revolutionary collectivism must fail practically when consciously attempted, I also dare to suggest that the revolutionary collective is predicting something that it cannot accomplish but that might eventually materialize organically in the natural course of social events.

Tendency-orientated argumentation, it will turn out, is anything but trivial though. Considered in an epistemological way, every discipline of science after all derives its theories from empiricism. As a starting point into my main thesis, I will employ Alexander Wendt's argument about teleology in political thought to make matters more intelligible (Wendt 2003). The main observation I intend to display, however, is that matter and especially life display an undeniable tendency to move from simple structures to the formation of more complex structures, as already the Jesuit priest Pierre

Teilhard de Chard in observed in the mid 20th century (Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 2011). Thus, it is argued that the history of culture is ultimately a history of unification. Matter and spirit, as two sides of one bilaterally constitutive process, share this tendency in a dynamic manner. Ultimately, the natural and the cultural thus drive each other in a pre-determined way, despite their alleged opposition. What will be theorized is, therefore, the process of mankind's natural fragmentation to create complexity and of its cultural reunification to employ this complexity on an emergent, higher cybernetic level.

III. NATURAL LAWS AND CULTURAL CLAIMS

One of the most principle and fundamental contrastive pairs in philosophy is the distinction between 'nature' and 'culture' (e.g. Loy 1995). This distinction is analytically categorical in structure; meaning that there is not and cannot be anything left over that does not fall into either of the two basic categories. Also, there is nothing to be found that is in between or both. Everything that exists in the world is either to be found in it naturally or it is a product of human work and imagination. Culture, of course, refers to the uniquely human ability to shape the outer world according to the ideas of our mind about how it should be. Hence, we are not only talking about physical objects here. The objects of the world also include all of the abstracts that order social reality or ideas about the physical world; for instance social rules and regulations, ideological beliefs and norms, etc. Indeed, there is a certain hierarchical dynamic between these two types of immaterial, abstract objects to be noted here that will become important later on.

There are principles of social order and ideas about the physical world. If there was no abstract idea of a higher order, mankind would not be able to come up with social measures to modify the natural state of affairs. 'Ideology,' in other words, come first. For the purpose of the present study, it shall simply be defined as a normative idea of how the world is constituted. Therefore, it by needs entails a practical imperative of how society should be made. Simply put, one could say that it is the definition of 'good' and 'evil' according to an ontological assumption. Practically then, good has to be promoted in society while evil has to be prevented. Ideological beliefs, accordingly, analytically predate social rules, as the latter are utilitarian applications based on the former. Those beliefs, it follows, have to be seen as the starting point of the social or culture. Without them, mankind would simply stay in the natural state since all social change can only follow from a concept of a presumably superior state of affairs to be achieved through the application of cultural modifications. Anything else would be an effect without a cause, which is a physical impossibility within the

empirical realm, as nothing can contradict natural law, just as you cannot choose whether gravity applies to you or not.

A state without an ideology, hence, would not be able to act, as it were missing the mandatory maxim on which principles to base its actions on. It follows that all states have an ideology. According to this logic, to safeguard the human pursuit of happiness and to ensure the absence of suffering for the largest possible number of individuals would be only one possible ontological premise. Looking at medieval society for instance, divergent assumptions seem possible. However, a divergent concept on which to base the social on would have to function according to an ontological belief system that makes ultimate *sense* as well, since there cannot be an effect without a cause. At the present state of affairs, alternate belief systems are being regarded as outdated spiritual superstitions at best though.

However, the question that is finally at stake here of course is this one: are individual human rights a product of nature or are they a product of culture? To answer this question, let us first briefly elaborate on our excursion into basic philosophical theory to understand both its implications and its importance. The part of the 'cultural' that deals with the laws according to which human beings live together in a community is called the 'social.' The first and major point to understand here is that social laws are changeable. Hence, they are not to be treaded as a natural given. In contrast, nothing can change natural or physical laws: apart from revealed but doubtful examples of divine intervention—which should never be the object of science—all material objects must always follow the gravitational pull. Positive laws, to turn back to the object of interest, are socially constructed and founded on beliefs about the world though. These beliefs themselves, in extension, are products of culture as they touch what is beyond and hence not to be found in nature; i.e. in material/physical reality. In philosophy, this realm of ideas about the world that reaches beyond what can be proved rationally or empirically is called 'metaphysics.'

For now, let me conclude that the social does not force categorically. It only obligates under certain social, constructed circumstances. This point, however, is not to be taken lightly. Let us take the time to turn back to the UDHR for a moment here. It talks about "the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" (Assembly 1948). However, the cultural can never yield the "inherent" or the "inalienable." Only nature can endow objects with these qualities. For example, gravity also applies on a deserted island or when stately order breaks down. Human rights, if they are culturally constructed, would cease to exist in those contexts though. Wherever there was nobody to punish a human rights offender, nothing would be *ethically* wrong with violating human rights. As

we have seen, social laws are by definition potentially subject to change. If human rights are social, therefore, mankind *cannot* carry them intrinsically and/or inalienably. Norms like the equality of all (rational) individuals before the law or the right of all (rational) individuals to political representation, hence, would have to be seen as mere ordering principles. Moreover, the human individual rights to “life” and “liberty” would have to be seen as mere ordering principles in lack of substantial validity. Inconceivable as this claim seems at first sight, it does seem obvious that historically there have been plenty of alternate models to human rights regimes. A very elaborate discussion of divergent cultural and historical regimes can be found in Jack Donnelly’s piece on “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” for instance (e.g. Donnelly 2007, 2013).

However, the present work is not concerned with the particularities. Instead, let us turn from philosophical principles to theory proper at this point. To test the validity of the UDHR’s claim, we need to check how much of human rights are given naturally. Hence, we need to turn to what political philosophers have traditionally referred to as the ‘state of nature:’ the condition of being that has not been altered by culture or the social, and thus functions entirely according to the inherent and inalienable principles of natural laws. Once in this thought-experiment state of mind, one can test how much of human rights’ validity remains.

IV. HOBBS OF MALMESBURY: THE MIND, MATTER IN MECHANICAL MOTION

In traditional, mostly Early Modern, contractualism, the state of nature equals the state of anarchy; i.e. the state of affairs characterized by the absence of stately control. In other words, whenever there is no force to sanction the violation of social norms, we are *de facto* in the state of nature. Political realists hold this somewhat outdated picture until today. As a prelude to the following discussion, let us just briefly mention that a whole tradition of cultural criticism spanning the entire 20th century starting from Nietzsche and extending all the way to current IR constructivists has successfully challenged this view. Norbert Elias brilliant theory of the process of civilizing social mechanisms proves that the famous sword of justice becomes obsolete through the gradual indoctrination of cultural norms in a society (Elias 2005). To a degree, so does Michel Foucault’s work on social institutions, arguing that adult human beings would not fall back into the state of nature under the absence of stately control (Foucault 1975, ©1973). Also, Pierre Bourdieu’s work shows that adult individuals taken out of society would not even act interchangeably (Bourdieu 2010a, 2010b). Moreover, Alexander Wendt attacks the realist notion of the state of anarchy altogether by arguing that “threats are constructed, not natural” and that “society would be

impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case scenarios” (Wendt 1992, pp. 405; 404).

As for right now, we are only talking about the basic nature of individual human rights here in regard to whether they are social or natural though. This has nothing to do with whether and under which circumstances people would kill each other in the state of nature or in a state of anarchy. In other words, one can easily admit that life in the state of nature does not by needs have to be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short [spelling modernized by author],” as Hobbes famously put it (Hobbes et al. 1996a, p. 89). Still, this by no means proves the existence of universal human rights as well.

Let me provide a brief example here to illustrate this. Two individuals are having a heated discussion about universal (individual) human rights outside of the sphere of sanctioned punishment (i.e. state or society). In our laboratory situation, this could be a deserted village where nobody lives and no one would ever go. Individual A happens to be of significantly weaker physical condition than individual B. Individual A argues that she possesses inherent dignity tied to an inalienable human right to life. Individual B argues that she does not. Individual B, in the absence of any fear of punishment, makes the decision to prove individual A wrong once and for all. She kills individual A. Rationally speaking, individual B thereby indeed and unmistakably proved individual A wrong empirically. Obviously, individual A’s universal right to life failed to materialize. Now there might well be internalized social norms and morals that keep individual B from factually applying this practical proof. However, her ability to do so alone logically proves B right and A wrong.

This is what Thomas Hobbes’ thought experiment of a ‘state of nature’ proved in 1651 and the argument is still valid today. In the philosopher’s words, “covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all [spelling modernized by author]” (Hobbes et al. 1996a, p. 117). This quote encapsulates the very core of Hobbesian philosophy: *You have a right to do whatever you can do because you can do it.* And rationally speaking, how could matters be any different? Who is to prove you wrong if you can legitimize your actions by ability? When Hobbes speaks of the “fear of punishment,” hence, he does not mean that laws against murder, theft, etc. in the state of society magically start to exist in the ontological sense of (individual) universal human rights that the UDHR implies (Hobbes et al. 1996a, p. 98). What is meant is simply that there is a “power to keep them all in awe [spelling modernized by author]” (Hobbes et al. 1996a, p. 88). This, indeed, is the reason why Hobbes argues for a totalitarian state. In Hobbes’s logic, whenever a state is weak all hell will break loose again simply because people will regain the ability to disobedience. To prevent this state of nature at all costs, individuals

enter a “social contract.” However then, where does the awkward picture of universal human rights derive its philosophical legitimacy from? Let me turn to a more pleasant, but less convincing theory now.

V. LOCKE OF SOMERSET: A METAPHYSICAL DEUS EX MACHINA

In the year 1690 AD, the English gentleman, politician, and slave trader John Locke anonymously publishes his *Second Treatise on Government* to defend the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Locke, Laslett 1988b). While the now largely forgotten *First Treatise* had been a refutation of Robert Filmer’s vindication for absolute monarchical rule (Filmer 2017), the *Second Treatise*—even though initially ignored by the world for almost an entire century—should become the ultimate justification for both the American Revolution of 1776 and the current human rights regime as stated in the UDHR. The implied but never openly addressed adversary of the book is Thomas Hobbes, who had supported a monarch’s right to absolute rule just like Filmer, who is explicitly addressed especially in the first one of the *Treatises* (Filmer 2017). Unlike long-forgotten Filmer, the undeclared but obvious atheist Hobbes had argued on purely rational terms though.

As we have seen, it seems almost impossible to attack Hobbes’s strikingly convincing ‘ability-equals-right’ logic on rational terms. However, let us look at Locke’s attempt in a little more detail in the following. The most fundamental difference between Hobbes and Locke is that Locke’s state of nature knows a *natural* “law of nature” that dictates the “preservation of mankind” (Locke, Laslett 1988b, §§ 2.6). In other words, there is a law of nature protecting human rights even in the condition of being that has not been altered by culture and the social and thus functions entirely according to the inherent and inalienable principles of natural laws. For Locke therefore, the categories of ‘just’ and ‘unjust,’ or of ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ exist regardless of all external circumstances. Since justice, hence, exists as a natural absolute, human rights become universal in the sense of inalienable attributes analytically derived from every individual’s inherent dignity—just like the UDHR demands.

As Hobbes says, though, justice without the “sword of punishment” is no justice at all (Hobbes et al. 1996a). On the logical contrary, it is the very definition of injustice when the evil-doer gets away with his evil deed unpunished. In other words, who redeems the slain girl from the thought experiment displayed? Who is it that brings justice and sanctions the evil-doer? Locke’s answer is an idea that is nowhere to be found in the physical world. At the end of the day, his argument rests on metaphysical and therefore indemonstrable assumptions. The “preservation of mankind” follows from the fact that Locke defines human beings as God’s

property: “But though it is a state of liberty [the state of nature], yet it is not a state of license, [...], for men being all the workmanship of the omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker” (Locke, Laslett 1988b, §§ 2.6). If you violate somebody else’s natural rights, hence, you transgress God’s law of nature. If you transgress God’s “law of nature,” in turn, you are sure to get properly sanctioned for your offense. However, this does not by needs happen on this side of heaven: “Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven” (Locke, Laslett 1988b, §§ 3.2.1). However, even in those cases punishment is categorically implemented in the after-life, which makes Locke’s “law of nature” a proper example of a universal, individual human rights conception.

The same holds true for violations of other parts of an individual’s property. This, in extension, is defined as a person’s life, liberty, and estate (Locke, Laslett 1988b, § 2). As this list surely sounds familiar, let us briefly turn to the possibly most influential copy-and-paste work in the history of mankind (Smith 2018).¹ The *United States Declaration of Independence* from 1776 states in the first sentence of its introduction:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with inherent and inalienable Rights; that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness; [...]. (Jefferson 2002)

The sentence nicely encapsulates the very core and the very weakness of Lockean philosophy. If someone argues that a truth is “self-evident,” it actually means nothing else than that this person admits that she cannot prove her claim rationally. To make this point clear, Locke’s argument for the universality of human rights *only* works if you concomitantly accept the existence of God and the after-life, which cannot be proven scientifically or rationally. If you are not willing to accept the latter, you automatically fall back to Hobbes’s theory—at least as far as human rights are concerned. Locke’s premise, in other words, is extremely demanding and, actually, a no-go in science as it is generally understood today. However, it is important to learn from it that the rationalist dogma we live under today actually relies on spiritualist leftovers in its core convictions; not on scientific reasoning. Without these leftovers, I believe, today’s regime would actually not be stable at all due to the void in its philosophical center.

VI. NEW CONCLUSIONS

To conclude Hobbes’s theory and how Locke mixed his labor with it to make it his own theory, human

¹ It is certain that Jefferson had read the *Second Treatise* and that he was referring to it when drafting the *Declaration*. The *Norton Anthology of American Literature* even claims that he used the original Lockean definition of property in his original draft. However, responding to the doubts of several members of the revolutionary committee, he changed “estate” to “the pursuit of happiness” in the final version. See Levine et al. 2017.

rights are socially enforced and discursively constructed following a certain belief system resting on metaphysical assumptions. These convictions have no natural, objective reality ontologically predating their social enforcement. They are not a natural given. Hence, there can be ideological counter-models resting on alternative convictions following from alternate assumptions. However, there is still one more way in which universal individual human rights can be saved in theory. We can accept that human rights can only be proven to apply as analytical universals in a categorically imperative sense if we simultaneously accept the existence of an indemonstrable, metaphysical, transcendent assumption. True enough, we live in an age of reason and our commonly accepted understanding of science is that it should work scientifically. Accordingly, we have to give up on the claim to human rights' universality in the sense of a natural law as stated in the UDHR. Having detached the category of inevitability from the concept and deduced its underlying structure from its social practice, however, we can still work with what is left.

That human rights are socially constructed does not mean that they do not exist in any form of existence whatsoever. As a social construct they certainly do. We lost the Lockean-Jeffersonian claim that human rights exist as inalienable attributes analytically derived from every individual's inherent dignity. Still, we can yet make a point for their universality in a positivist sense (Donnelly 2007, 2013). If every society eventually comes up with some sort of metaphysical assumption in order to enforce human rights as a social ordering principle, human rights would exist in a way that is more than arbitrary. We still would not be able to prove the ontological existence of any of those transcendent assumptions, of course. However, we would be able to make a decently strong case for the existence of individual human rights as a universal idea. The metaphysical assumptions on which these are founded could be interpreted as merely functional then.

Indeed, according to Norbert Elias theory of the civilizing social these assumptions could even become obsolete eventually, after their norms have been internalized in a society (Elias 2005). And in fact, we see that some of the most outspoken human rights advocates, ironically, are atheists today. Admittedly, this would still not endow human rights with the ontological stability that John Locke and the UDHR call for. However, it would give them a sort of social substantial validity. It would show that human rights are a natural mechanism of the social. Like contracts, they still would not possess any objective validity in the state of nature, as they could be violated at all times. Like contracts, however, they would have to be regarded as a structural principle of society as such. In other words, it would not prove that human rights *have* to be enforced. Still, it would yield a strong argument that they *should* be

enforced. This way, human rights might not be a natural given. However, they would be a social must. Still, to prove human rights' universality this way, individual human rights would have to be the sole structural end to which societies are originally instituted.

Even Hobbes seems to suggest this in a way when he starts out by defining human beings as equal, desire and aversion driven individuals. As has been stated at the beginning of § 5, nature, at the end of the day, is the biggest human rights violator of them all. No serial killer, dictator, or mass murderer compares to nature. So let us say every state in the world ratifies the UDHR. Let us say discursive determination makes every individual in the world recognize the UDHR, as well. Is nature going to care? Is nature now also going to read and recognize the UDHR? Are individuals going to cease to die? A universal human rights regime that gets proven wrong every minute obviously has its structural deficits. Hence, there seem to be alternate ends to society, both in theory and in history. If these countercurrents are also universal ideas springing from the human head though, it is very unlikely that the current regime will endure in perpetuity.

VII. ROUSSEAU, CITIZEN OF GENEVA: A REVOLUTION IN THE MIND

For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hobbes's social contract is only part of the natural development of mankind in the state of nature. He addresses the situation Hobbes describes as the 'social contract' directly in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (Rousseau, Cress 2013). His fictional figures in the case of the natural corruption of mankind come to the point where they regard Hobbes's contract as necessary:

In short, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, let us gather them into one supreme power that governs us according to wise laws, that protects and defends all the members of the association, repulses common enemies, and maintains us in eternal concord. (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 69)

He therefore openly admits that Thomas Hobbes traced back human development to a point which "was, or should have been, the origin of society and laws" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 70). This comment, as a matter of fact, interestingly shows that Rousseau, contrary to Locke, seems to have been well aware of the fact that Hobbes never claimed that this is what *really* happened historically in the course of events. The difference between the two is that Rousseau believes that Hobbes only realized a fraction of the whole truth about human development—and therefore human nature. For Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke, just like humans at this stage of the state of nature, are two of the "crude, easily seduced men," who "ran to chain themselves, in the belief that they secured their liberty" but ultimately only "destroyed natural liberty" and

“established forever the law of property and of inequality”² without escaping the state of nature through doing so (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 70).

Mankind, for Rousseau, did not originate with the “idea” of possessions of any kind. He writes that the “idea of property, depending on many prior ideas which could not have arisen successively, was not formed all at once in the human mind” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 60). This statement already makes clear one of the basic differences between Rousseau and Locke or Hobbes. For Rousseau it does not matter how humans are born in the first place. What is important and the foundation of his theory is how humans originated. Deeply influenced by the description of the origin of evil in the world displayed in the Genesis of the Old Testament, Rousseau’s state of nature must not be understood as the state in which mankind would live according to their nature if they were not in an artificial state of being; i.e. in a state. It is the state of being from which the journey of mankind to consciousness began and continues in a natural development within the state of nature all the way to Rousseau’s social contract, which has not taken place yet. As a positive, or idealized, state his first state of nature is the state of being before self-realization, before the discovery or “idea” of individuality, before the “idea” of individual necessities and desires:

The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch and cried out to his men: “Do not listen to this impostor. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one!” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 60)

But there is no way to turn back self-realization. Wherever humans, great apes, dolphins, or octopus look into the mirror, they will recognize themselves. Wherever human beings can recognize themselves in the mirror they will demand that they have a natural right to their pursuit of happiness. Locke’s claim, that this right to property is one of the constituents of an individual’s freedom becomes the force, which destroys men’s freedom in Rousseau’s theory. The second striking feature to observe in this passage is that there is a founding and a founder of “civil society” without a contract. But how can there be society without a contract? And even more importantly, how can this civil society exist in the “final stage in the state of nature” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 60)? What would be an

impossible contradiction in Locke’s and Hobbes’s theories seems to be perfectly consistent in Rousseau’s conception of the state of nature. The reason for this is that in Rousseau’s theory the state of nature is the natural development of mankind, which precedes the social contract in which humans will get rid of the evils, which tear them apart. These evils are “the ideas” which develop over a long time “from one age to another” when humans make “great progress” and “acquire much industry and enlightenment” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 60). In Rousseau’s social contract, which accordingly refers to a concept entirely different from Hobbes’s and Locke’s understanding of the social contract, mankind abandons individuality and possessions, as he writes in *On the Social Contract*.

These clauses [the ends of the social contract], properly understood, are all reducible to one single one, namely the total alienation of each associate, together with all of his rights, to the entire community. (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 148)

Knowledge for Rousseau does not play a positive role in the development of mankind. It is what displaced us from the state of paradise in the first place. Different levels of self-awareness thus lead to different stages of corruption. These different stages are different mental states. The ‘original sin’ therefore for Rousseau is the moment of self-realization. From this moment, humans start to value their needs and wants higher than the needs of their fellow human beings. It is the discovery, the “idea,” of individual desires. This moment ultimately leads to the “final stage of nature.” This “final stage of nature” is called the stage of “civil society” and consists of “crimes, wars, murders, [...] miseries and horrors” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 60). It is crucial to notice the fundamental difference to Hobbes here, in whose theory life before the introduction of civil society is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes et al. 1996b, p. 76). This miserable state of being, which Hobbes calls the “state of nature,” is ended by the “social contract,” or more concisely, by the introduction of civil society. This basic line of argumentation is the same for Hobbes and Locke. Locke’s practical conclusions, however, have tendencies towards Rousseau’s state when he demands “the Consent of the Majority” for decisions or declares that “it is necessary that the Body [state] should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the *consent of the majority*” (Locke, Laslett 1988a, pp. 362; 332). Locke’s conception as a whole remains entirely different though.

For Rousseau civil society is the worst stage in the “state of nature.” In order to get out of this miserable state of being in a civil society, humans will form a “first convention” and join the “social contract” (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 147). Hobbes’s and Locke’s great “Leviathan” state is for Rousseau nothing but slavery, the worst stage of existence imaginable and part of the state of nature, since “there will always be a great

² It is interesting to observe here that Hobbes at times indeed might have lived in a situation which was not too different from the state of nature responsible for the founding of civil society described by Rousseau—the English Civil Wars of the 1640s. See Sorell 1996.

difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 147). Rousseau, it appears clearly, is calling for a revolution, a revolution in the *mind*, which will liberate human beings from their *internal* chains, which is the collectives, or ideas, that constitute their personality structures. To achieve this revolution in the mind that will regain human unity beyond the selfish I, which is the root of all transgression against the common good, however, there must first be an external, material revolution against the system that is constantly reinforcing mankind's internal chains through its institutions in every new generation anew. In the naive interpretation of Rousseau that led to the Great, or Jacobin, Terror that started when the revolution set out to devour its own children, the two revolutions were originally thought to happen simultaneously: the external liberation frees the internal mind as well. This work will go on to argue that this logic is always flawed, not merely in Rousseau, but equally in all revolutionaries of the mind. Like the French Revolution turned bloody in the Great Terror, Mao's revolution turned into a Cultural Revolution to liberate the mind, after people yet internally chained refused to be free.

Rousseau's "social contract," however, is thus not designed to change the conditions under which the individual lives. It is designed to "alienate" the individual from itself and thereby take back the alienation of human being's fragments among each other. Rousseau thus wants to take back original sin; i.e. the moment where human degeneration started or the moment of self-realization. He wants to change the individual's mental state, the state of mind, not only the conditions under which the individual lives, but the individual itself. His aim is to destroy individuality and thereby transform individuals into "citizens" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 149). Mankind's perception of its selves has to become the perception as one "indivisible part of the whole" unity of its pre-alienated self again (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 148). All their thoughts and considerations have to be made from the perspective of a part of the whole and therefore for the good of the whole. Thereby human being "resumes his natural liberty, while losing his conventional liberty, for which he renounced it" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 148). Individuals thus re-enter the state of being before the beginning of corruption. They free themselves from the illusion of individual needs and wants, the longing for which held them as slaves before. Thus they liberate the body of the portion of mankind involved in the contract, which was stuck in a terrible condition of war of its own parts with each other before. To make this strange way of thinking more reasonable it might be helpful to imagine Rousseau's "citizens" as beings who think of themselves as members of an assembly in whatever they think or enact:

At once, in the place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces

a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from the same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 148)

That Rousseau speaks not only of a "collective" but also of a "moral body" makes already clear where his theory of good and evil, of right and wrong lies. As mentioned before, there is no way to turn back self-realization. And so, although the contractors re-enter a state of being before the fall and become "citizens", they also stay aware of their individuality. They exist as "public and [as] private individuals" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 149). Problems, therefore, arise because a person's "private interest can speak to him in an entirely different manner than the common interest" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 150). But since the state is the "moral person," only acting and thinking as a "public individual"³ is moral acting and thinking. If somebody should insist on his individuality she therefore has to be "forced to be free" (Rousseau, Cress 2013, p. 150). In other words, 'good' is acting for the "moral and collective body," and 'evil' is to act as an individual.⁴

VIII. CONCLUSION

Since Rousseau's conceptions seem totally foreign to us it seems pretty obvious that, according to his theory, we still live in the "final stage of the state of nature."⁵ Society is a product of the state of nature. It is a product of the natural degeneration of mankind. The only way to get out of it is to change mankind itself. Locke and Hobbes look at humans in the artificial state of society and follow from human nature how life would be in a state where they could live accordingly to it without any limitations, i.e. in the "state of nature," and derive from this state of being why society originated and how an ideal society should look like in order to serve the natural needs and desires of the individuals this society consists of best. It is crucial in order to understand the contrast to Rousseau to understand that this self-perception is the outcome of a strain of modern philosophical thought. Thomas Hobbes, at the earliest beginnings of the Enlightenment, was the first to promote the view that all humans are individuals, who are equal in their desires and abilities and therefore also

³ This term must *not* be confused with what we understand as an 'individual' today.

⁴ The term 'mankind' is used here to show to which concept of self-perception Rousseau wants to get back to. This shift, however, includes only the participants of the social contract. Those, for practical reasons, might have been imagined by Rousseau as a rather small number.

⁵ It is a subject of endless discussion in how far small societies in which people can vote directly on propositions like, perhaps not accidentally, Switzerland today are similar to the society Rousseau imagined. Rousseau's Europe, as well as the vast majority of European states today, was certainly "the final stage of the state of nature" for him though. See Cohen, Fung 2004.

equally valuable.⁶ In other words, Hobbes came from a system that *did not share this belief yet*. John Locke mixed his labor with the concept by introducing a thought which should become central for our modern conception of morality—that this equality also entitles every individual to certain “inalienable” individual rights. Modernity was born. However, it relies philosophically on the social mode predating the enlightenment in its forgotten premises to its core convictions.

Rousseau’s theory is entirely different; as different as the foregoing form of being in the world. While Hobbes’s and Locke’s social contracts want to change the conditions under which humans live, Rousseau wants to change their nature itself by changing mankind’s state of mental being or being of mind. It is important to note here that Hobbes and Locke are part of an enlightened strain of thought and therefore much more familiar to us than Rousseau. While the Enlightenment largely shapes our perception today, Rousseau was part and indeed one of the earliest members of a different strain of thought which should ultimately fail in its attempt to change human self-perception and disappear, although neither without leaving any traces nor without reoccurring again and again in political and social movements at various instances in and before the 20th century. Humans for Locke and Hobbes are naturally individuals. For Rousseau individuality is only an “idea” which “arose” in the course of events. For Hobbes, humans are born as free individuals but that does not give them a right to their freedom. Neither does it give them a right to their lives or their estates—at least no more than everybody else has a right to take these away from them. If everyone has a right to everything, this obviously means the same as to say that nobody has a right to anything. These conceptions seem strange to us. When we hear Hobbes’s ideas without Locke’s additions to them, we automatically feel a natural desire to disagree with them. Rousseau is so far from our self-perception and our way of looking at the world that most people are not even able to fully grasp his ideas.

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⁶ How far his conception was removed from the traditional view taught at Universities at Hobbes's time becomes clear in his strong disagreement with Aristotle's idea that humans are naturally "political animals." This theory and Aristotle's fundamental view that humans are neither equal nor equally valuable display very well how far removed Hobbes's indeed was from earlier ways of looking at the world and philosophical theories. See Annas 1996.

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The Siren Song of Populism

By José Pinto

Abstract- Populism is not a fad or an epiphenomenon. As the election results prove, populism is increasing almost all over the world, and populists rule the four most crowded democracies. Populist parties are gaining ground in the majority of the EU countries and in the two latest American presidential elections two populists – Donald Trump and Bolsonaro – achieved the power stage of the USA and Brazil. In the European Union, after a long period, while populist parties assumed an anti-system position, most of the populists changed their strategy trying to reach the power, and they are already the third political force. This increase has been constant. However, the economic recession and the large flow of refugees and immigrants were at the roof of the most recent rise. The essay analyses the populist parties' strategic change and the reaction of the mainstream parties. It also explains that right-wing populism is using the nationalist rhetoric and some policies of social democracy into the service of nationalism, and it is increasing faster than the left-wing one. Moreover, the essay shows that populist governments stay in power longer than non-populists do. Finally, it proves that the populist discourse works as a new siren song because populist leaders say what the citizens are keen to hear.

Keywords: populism, nationalism, populist strategy, and democracy backlash.

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I. INTRODUCTION

According to Martinelli (2018, p. 13), populism is “a catch-all word that is applied to different empirical realities”. The wide variety of meanings confuses, but even those scholars who see populism as a political strategy, an ideology or a style, consider that is necessary to pay attention to the discourse of the leaders to identify the marks that one can see as populism. However, this analysis requires a previous task: building a dictionary of populism with the words connected with it. That was the mission of Adela Danaj, Kornélia Lazányi, and Svitlana Bilan (2018) before analyzing Orbán's discourses¹.

However, this proposes it was not born in Hungary. In fact, the code-book of populism had already been Teun Pauwels and Rooduijn's idea, in 2011. Later on, this code-book, as well as the code-book for sub-state nationalism, was “amended by

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¹ According to Populism – indicators of people-centric and elitism expression, and indicators of exclusionism and anti-immigration policy; Conservatism - indicators of Christian and Nationalistic values, and indicators of protectionism as economic policy; and Euro scepticism - indicators which are used to identify the occurrence of the European Union topic as such, and indicators which measures the existence of negative aspects and expression about The European Union and the European Integration process.

researchers based on their reading of the corpus: some words were added, while others were suppressed” (Pauwels, van Haute, and Sinardet, 2018)². Other scholars have followed the model, and, for example, Przyłęcki (2012) offered a “long list of prototypical indicators of contemporary Polish populism”, including “Poland's political and economic sovereignty, Euroskepticism, a negative attitude toward Germany, anti-communism, anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and a positive image of «the people»” (Stępińska et al, 2016).

Moreover, populism code-book is present in many studies about the true extent of the phenomenon in a specific country. It was the case of the research conducted by Nikos Nikisianis, Thomas Siomos, Yannis Stavrakakis, Titika Dimitroulia, and Grigoris Markou in Greece. However, Nikisianis et al (2019, p. 269) accept Laclau's original thought, as they consider that the populist discourse should include two elements. The first one consists of prominent references to the «the people» (or equivalent signifiers, e.g., the «underdog») and the «popular will», and to the need to truly represent it”. The second element is connected with an antagonist perception of the socio-political ground, divided “between «the people»/the underdog and «the elites»/the establishment”. Both right and left-populist leaders “build themselves up as an embodiment of the true people” (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018).

Quite apart from the meaning, we must recognize that populism is increasing almost all over the world, and it sets the current political agenda.

During many years, the populist parties presented themselves as anti-system³ because they considered that the existing system was unfair, and they wanted to destroy it. Then, the mainstream parties looked at the populists as a threat for democracy, and they refused any government coalition with them. In

² The code-book of populism included: anti-democratic, aristocra*, autocra*, buddies, capitalis*, cartel*, connection*, common sense, coopted, corrupt*, elit*, enslave, slave*, establishment, eurocra*, exploit*, fed up with, greed, guardianship, imperialis*, impose, loot, mainstream parties, governing parties, monopoly, oligarch*, plutocrat*, political class, political games, electoral games, power hungry, power enacles, power grip, propaganda, sold to, technocrat*, unelected, us (designating: the people), and them (designating: elite, establishment, mainstream parties).

³ Kyle & Gultchin (2018) identify three types of populism, “distinguished by how populist leaders frame the conflict between the ‘true people’ and outsiders”: cultural populism, socio-economic populism, and anti-establishment populism. Some years ago, Jagers & Walgrave (2005) identified four types of populism: empty populism, exclusionary populism, anti-elitism populism, and complete populism. Their criteria were the construction of the people, the anti-elitism, and the exclusion of outside groups.

Belgium, for example, the mainstream parties build a *cordon sanitaire* against Vlaams Blok (VB). In the same way, according to De Cleen & Van Aels (2001, p. 103), the mass media “have not treated the VB as an ordinary party” because in 2003 electoral act, the newspaper *De Standaard* “gave five potential reasons to vote for each political party, but explicitly mentioned that there were no reasons to vote for VB” (Pinto, 2017, p. 143).

Actually, the situation has undergone considerable transformations, except in Sweden, because the mainstream parties signed an agreement in 2014-15 to isolate the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats, and this agreement is still in effect, as “neither of the two main party blocs has been willing to work with SD” (Widfeldt, 2018, pp. 22-23).

According to Timbro’s Authoritarian Populism Index, among the 33 countries presented by the index, there are 11 where populist parties are in office, and there are four countries – Portugal, United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Czech Republic – in which populist parties support the Government while they do not participate in it.

This evolution requires knowing the behavior of populist parties both while in opposition, and when they rule over the country. Kyle & Mounk (2018) presented a paper which gives a response to the second point, as Kyle & Guldchin (2018) had previously analyzed “46 populist leaders or political parties⁴ that held executive office across 33 democratic countries between 1990 and 2018”. It was a paper prepared to measure “the impact that past populist governments have had on democracy”. This paper is also useful to find out the differences between right and left populism, despite the presence of a populism typology beyond that dichotomy. However, it also matters to identify the reasons explaining the change of populist parties’ strategy and the reaction of mainstream parties to this alteration.

Cas Mudde (2016, p. 3) affirms that we “can differentiate between three academically distinct waves of scholarship of far-right parties since 1945”, and he recognizes that scholars need to move towards a fourth wave. Mudde only mentions far-right parties, but the change can relate to populism as a whole.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF POPULISM IN EUROPE

As Margareth Canovan (1999, p. 16) says that populism “accompanies democracy like a shadow”, this common road has experienced peaks and troughs, even accepting that “until the beginning of the 21st century [...] there were only a handful of successful populist radical right parties in Europe” (Mudde, 2016, p. 14).

The actual phase is undoubtedly a peak. Timbro’s Index presents the evolution of populism in 33 European Countries – all the members of the European Union and five other countries: Switzerland, Norway, Montenegro, Iceland, and Serbia – comparing 2008 and 2018. The data show a stable increase in the majority of the states, mainly in Italy – from 15.3 to 56.7, in Hungary – from 45 to 68.9, in Latvian – from 8.4 to 25.5, in Sweden – from 8.9 to 25.8, in Spain – from 3.9 to 21.4, in France – from 13.1 to 28.1, in Finland – from 5.1 to 18.2, and in Denmark – from 16.1 to 28.9. Besides, in some countries, the populism average was already very high, and it still increased, as it was the case of Poland where populism rose from 35.9 to 46.4.

The data also show thirteen countries where populism came down, but it was a very little fall, except in Serbia – from 29.5 to 13.1, and in the Netherlands – from 33.6 to 26.

Concerning the relationship between right and left populism, during the 80s, in the initial year, left populism represented 9.6%, and it was higher than right-wing populism because the latter one only reached 1.1%. However, during the 90s, the situation has changed. After a period of slight advantage of left-wing populism, the average of right-wing populism became superior since 1998 until now.

Common sense usually states that the economic crisis and the arrival of immigrants and refugees are responsible for the rise of populism. However, it should be noted that after the financial crisis of 2011, left-wing populism increased but right-wing populist parties kept the dominant position, and, during the arrival of immigrants and refugees, they reached their uppermost position with an average of 15.1% while left-wing populism only represented 6.4%.

At the first moment, left-wing populism reached the power in Greece, through Syriza, and in the South of Europe, Podemos in Spain, and Left Block in Portugal got an increasing political influence. It was the phase of a socio-economic populism in which “big business, capital owners and actors [were] perceived as propping up an international capitalist system” (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). In the second phase, right-wing populism enhanced its position appealing to nationalism, and it increased both in the North and in the East of Europe, but also in the South M5S and the League got a clear election victory in Italy thanks to the hostility towards immigrants. This reality explains that Paolo Magri (2018,

⁴ The leaders are: Carlos Menem, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, Alexander Lukashenko, Evo Morales, Collor de Mello, Boyko Borisov, Milos Zeman, Andrej Babiš, Abdalá Bucaram, Lucio Gutiérrez, Rafael Correa, Mikheil Saakashvili, Viktor Orbán, Narendra Modi, Joko Widodo, Benjamin Netanyahu, Silvio Berlusconi, Junichiro Koizumi, Nikola Gruevski, Daniel Ortega, Fernando Lugo, Alberto Fujimori, Joseph Estrada, Rodrigo Duterte, Lech Walesa, Traian Basescu, Vladimir Putin, Aleksandar Vucic, Vladimír Mečiar, Robert Fico, Jacob Zuma, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Chen Shui-bian, Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck Shinawatra, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Donald Trump, Rafael Caldera, Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro, and Michael Sata. The political parties are Five Star Movement/League coalition, Syriza, and Law and Justice.

p. 7) mentions the “national-populist parties”. Although it should be said that populism is not an ideology⁵, populist parties use the ideology of nationalism when they consider that it can serve their interests. It is a strategy suitable for two moments: in opposition, and power.

In the first phase, it helps to ruin the public image of the mainstream parties, blaming the elite and its aliens for all the problems. Subsequently, this strategy is useful to gain support from the citizens when populist governments decide to take political and social measures against ethnic minorities. This situation is already occurring in the European countries ruled by populist parties and in some countries where populists are members of the governing coalition, but as a junior party.

Presently, in Europe, the populist parties can be placed in four levels. In the first one, they govern alone – Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, and Fidesz in Hungary – or in coalition with another populist party – M5S and League, in Italy, and Syriza and ANEL in Greece. In the second level, populist parties are part of the ruling coalition, but they do not run it – Freedom Party in Austria, Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland, Progress Party in Norway, Blue Reform in Finland⁶, Bulgarian National Movement and National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria in Bulgaria, National Alliance in Latvia, and Slovak National Party in Slovakia. The third level includes four countries – Portugal, United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Czech Republic – in which, at least, a populist party supports the government, but does not integrate it. The last level is composed of the countries in which exists at least a populist party in opposition.

There are still two situations requiring special attention. The first happens in Hungary because both the party in office, Fidesz, as the party leading the opposition, Jobbik, are populists. Hungary is a Frankenstate in point, according to Kim Scheppele (2013), despite the non-populist opposition attempt to organize itself as a whole. The second occurs in Spain because as Podemos, a left-wing populist party, falls, Vox, a new right-wing populist party, rises. Vox affirms that its goal is recovering Spain, keeping the national unit and the social values, and its program is a melting pot of patriotism, nationalism, and conservatism. In contrast to Germany where the populist AfD is increasing, but it does not participate in the Government, Vox is already part of the coalition ruling over Andalusia.

Given this, we can conclude that mainstream parties’ option is rather an accommodation or co-optation than isolation of the populist parties. This

option shows that they do not consider populist parties as an acute danger to democracy, as anti-establishment populism that “was once most prevalent” has been replaced by “cultural populism [...] the commonest form of populism across the globe” (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). The following points will prove if mainstream parties are right.

III. POPULISTS IN POWER: LEADING THE OFFICE

In Hungary, three years under Orbán were enough to approve a new Constitution, and “more than 400 new laws” (Scheppele, 2013b, p. 5). During his government, Orbán has taken a lot of populist and nationalist measures, and he is already preparing the road to capture the power because if the non-populist opposition wins the election “Orbán’s people will be dug into every office that must approve what a new government does next” (Scheppele, 2013b, p. 8). In an APSA conference, in 2013, Scheppele pointed an undoubted example, as Orbán created a budget council, “filled entirely with party loyalists”, and having the power “to veto any budget passed by the Parliament if that budget adds to the debt”. Besides, the Constitution specifies that “if the Parliament cannot reach agreement on a budget, the national President [...] can dissolve the Parliament and call new elections”.

As a way of controlling the mass media, Orbán signed a decree to shield the foundation from Hungary’s media and competition watchdogs, after the owners of 480 newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, and websites have announced they “donate” them to the Central European Press and Media Foundation, run by Gabor Liskay who is an oligarch, and, obviously, Orbán’s ally. This media empire will allow him to broadcast inside and outside a gilded image of his political and social measures, and this strategy will be dangerous for press freedom. It is an ongoing process since many critical media outlets had to close or lost their editorial independence because they depend on the funds provided by the oligarchs who support the Government.

Hungary ranks 73rd out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index, with a very weak global score – 29.11. In 2010, when Orbán returned to power, after the electoral defeat in 2002, following which he said that “we, here in this square, cannot and will not be in opposition, because the nation cannot be in opposition” (Bozóki, 2015, p. 19), Hungary ranked 23rd position, and this tumble also represents a democracy backlash.

In fact, in the Democracy Index by country 2018, Hungary ranks 57th out of 167 countries with a 6.63 score, and the political participation is its worst parameter – 5.00. The quality of democracy is constantly decreasing, as it was 7.04 in 2011 and 6.84 in 2015.

⁵ For example, Bonvicini (2019, p.2) says that M5S “is supported by a mixed left - and right- leaning electorate”.

⁶ Finland’s Government resigned in March 2019, over failed healthcare reforms.

Orbán said that Salvini was a hero for his anti-immigration stance and that the Warsaw-Rome axis will be one of the most wonderful developments. These two statements prove that a project linking the main European right-wing populist parties is already ongoing. At last, it must be recognized that Orbán takes some policies to please the people. For example, “both parents have the right to claim extra paid leave based on the number of children they have, which amounts to *two days for one child, four days for two children, and six days for three or more children*”⁷.

In Poland, Stępińska et al. (2016) questioned if the country was facing a fourth wave of populism, as populist actors became communicators. Three years later, the answer is positive. Besides, nobody must forget that “populism’s roots in Poland are embedded in the country’s history, culture, and economic and social structures”, and that the “moralizing discourse is bolstered by the strong institutional position of the Catholic Church and media organizations like Radio Maryja”. It is a conservative vision because “the Church and right-wing populists share a defense of the patriarchal family, a rigid moral order, and an ethnocentric concentration on the nation, including the roles that the people and their traditions play within it” (p. 4).

The prevalence of such model explains the social rejection of immigrants, mainly if they come from Africa. In Warsaw, during the demonstrations, people chanted a racist slogan: «Pure Poland. White Poland». That slogan shows the ambition of the right-wing populism: “it is crystal-clear who is «one of us» and who is not, there is no muddle and no cause for confusion” (Bauman, 2001, p. 12).

Poland, under the government of the populist PiS, ranks 54th in 2018 with a 6.67 score, and the political culture is negative – 4.38. Like Hungary, Poland lives a democracy backlash, as the index was 7.12 in 2011 and 7.09 in 2015. The evaluation made both by the Human Rights Watch report⁸ and by Freedom House are damning. In the first, PiS is charged of eroding checks and balances due to its interference “with the independence of the judiciary and the administration of justice”. Moreover, the report accuses PiS of undermining freedom of expression, as it controls “public media”. The title of the second report⁹ is «Hostile Takeover. How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts», and it proves the politicization of justice, as PiS “enjoys direct control over the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary (the body that

appoints Polish judges) and is set to take control of the Supreme Court”.

The name of the party is Law and Justice, but under PiS, Poland threats no longer be a state of law, and the justice is less and less independent of the executive.

In short: Poland and Hungary, PiS and Fidesz are reshaping state institutions in their own and particular interest.

In Greece, Tsipras leads the first ever governing coalition of a left-wing, Syriza, and a right-wing, Anel, populist parties in Europe. After an initial period, while the alliance seemed to challenge the supranational institutions and the international creditors, through a rhetoric discourse, the conjuncture tamed the left political verbosity. Syriza moderated its discourse, and this change has ruffled some of its ancient foreign allies, namely the Portuguese Left Block, and the Spanish Podemos. Mavrozacharakis, Kotroyannos, and Tzagkarakis (2017, p. 40) consider that Syriza “failed both ideologically and practically”.

In Italy, it is worth noting that the 2018 general election counted on four populist leaders: Berlusconi, Di Maio, Meloni, and Salvini, whose posts were analyzed by Bobba & Roncarolo (2018, p. 56). The findings proved that the two winners of the election took advantage of social media, as Salvini “published more posts (around 15 per day), and Di Maio received more likes (9.446)”.

After the election, and once in office, it is crucial to watch the unity and strength of the populist coalition because the League “can be interpreted as one of the first political entrepreneurs of xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment in the Italian arena”, while its partner, the M5S, “represents a perfect example of strategic investment in the topic of immigration, with its fluctuating position” (Bulli & Soare, 2018, p. 129). As Salvini became the interior minister, it did not take long to prepare a decree about the issue. He presented that document to the parliament, and this political body approved it with 396 votes in favor and 99 against, proving that a great majority of the deputies agreed with Salvini’s idea of abolishing humanitarian protection for immigrants who were not eligible for refugee status. Moreover, as it will easier to strip migrants of Italian citizenship, Italian Refugee Council is seriously concerned by the consequences of the new law.

These consequences are already responsible for a democracy backlash. The index was 7.85 in 2014, and 7.98 in 2015, and 2016. Now, according to the Index of Democracy 2018, Italy is a flawed democracy, as it ranks 33rd, with a 7.71 score, and the worst category is the functioning of government – 6.07.

These data give cause to believe that joining two populist parties as incumbents seems rather a problem than a solution, but this is not the Italians’ opinion, as the more recent polls for the next EP

⁷ Available in <https://wtsklient.hu/en/2019/03/05/familybenefits/>.

⁸ Available in <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/24/eroding-checks-and-balances/rule-law-and-human-rights-under-attack-poland>.

⁹ Available in <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/hostile-takeover-how-law-and-justice-captured-poland-s-courts>.

election suggest. In fact, Bonvicini (2019, p. 3) says that “Salvini’s chances of becoming the leader of the European right” are strong, and remembers that Luigi Di Maio “gathered [...] representatives of four small populist parties [from Croatia (Zivi Zid), Poland (Kukiz’15), Finland (Liike Nyt) and Greece (Akkel)] in Rome”, on 15th February, “in an effort to forge a more homogeneous parliamentary group in the next EP”.

IV. POPULIST CAPTURE OF THE POWER

In a report conducted by Kyle & Gultchin (2018), one of the findings points that “between 1990 and 2018, the number of populists in power around the world has increased a remarkable fivefold, from four to 20”. This phenomenon included “countries not only in Latin America and in Eastern and Central Europe – where populism has traditionally been most prevalent – but also in Asia and Western Europe”.

Some decades ago when populism assumed power over the governments across Latin America, the explanations emphasized the government system. According to some scholars, the presidential system explained the success of a charismatic leader when he was able to forge “direct connections with the people” (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018), and the economy led redistributive policies. Nowadays this explanation sounds flawed. In fact, in some countries of the European Union, despite their parliamentary systems, populist parties raised the power. Moreover, in several cases, even when they do not hold governing responsibilities, populist parties set the political agenda and the social life, as it happens in France where the electoral system does not allow the populist National Front to occupy the parliamentary seats corresponding to its increasing number of votes.

When populism started rising, Niall Ferguson said that populist governments are usually so incompetent that they prove short-lived. However, the second part of the statement is far from consensual because, some populist leaders seem(ed) glued to the chair of power, and they are – or were – resilient in holding governing responsibility.

In Argentina, Menen ruled for ten years, and Cristina Kirchner held the presidency for eight years. In Bolivia, Evo Moral arrived at the power eleven years ago, Rafael Correa was Ecuador President for ten years, and we could point other examples: Ortega, Fujimori, Putin, and Berlusconi.

These data prove that when populist leaders are in power they capture the state apparatus, and they organize it according to their interests. When their popularity falls, they use their efficiency. The opposition can consider populist incumbent parties incompetent to solve the problems of the people, but they prove that they are skilled at staying in power. We can say that their strategy is very similar to the model created by the

communist parties during the cold war. Then, the communist parties were totalitarian and populist because, despite being organic, they considered themselves as the vanguard of the people, and they transformed the intermediate social bodies aiming at controlling not only the state apparatus but also the civil society. That was why under a communist party government press freedom was replaced by the «freedom» to say what the government enjoyed hearing.

Many populist parties set aside their anti-system soul when they understood that they could reach power. They bet on topics like corruption to jeopardize the reputation of the political elite before posing as the saviors and defenders of the people.

Once in office, they transform the model they have found. They explain all their changes as a result of meeting people’ will. This fallacy becomes a threat for the democratic institutions and the state of law. In 2015, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner asked if democracy was in decline. Four years later the answer is worrying.

The scholar’s approach to populism requires a change of strategy. The research needs “a paradigmatic shift, in which populist radical right [and left] parties are no longer seen as new outsider-challenger parties, but also as institutionalized and integrated members of the political system” (Mudde, 2016, p. 16).

V. CONCLUSION

Populism is increasing around the world, and this evolution cannot be explained only by conjuncture factors. The economic crisis and the arrival of immigrants and refugees played a paramount role in the phenomenon, but we need to take into account other reasons. The mainstream parties forgot that democracy must be representative, and they changed it into a partitocracy. As Mounk (2018, p. 2) affirms, “party systems have long seemed frozen” because “it seemed, the future would not be much different from the past”. This perspective proved to be an enormous mistake.

The populist parties took advantage of the social discontent. They were able to delegitimize the political elite, and their proposals sounded like the siren song around the world. That’s why, according to Timbro, “the average voter support for authoritarian populists in the 33 countries included in TAP is 22 percent”. It is a high average, but “since populist parties are more successful in populous countries the total voter support is 26 percent”.

The data prove that mainstream parties failed to prevent the growth of populism. Moreover, democracy backlash in all the countries ruled by populist parties highlights a severe threat to the democratic system.

Some decades ago, there were parties which entered into the system committed with intent to transform or to destroy it. There was no need for watching the long-term effects mainly of populism on

domestic affairs. Populist parties pay attention to the advice given by Machiavelli to Lorenzo de Medici. When they rule a country, their strategy needs domestic and outside enemies to keep people's support. Meanwhile, they take measures in the name – but not always in the interest – of the people.

Mudde (2014, p. 217) affirmed that “populist radical right parties have not fundamentally changed party systems in Western Europe”. Five years later, this statement requires reflection and particular concerns, mainly in the European countries where populist parties are already in office.

To sum up, populist discourse is the new version of the siren song. Now as before, the results are worrying. , some social scientists believed that populism could represent a chance to improve the political system. Nowadays, the data prove that both right and left populism is a real threat to democracy..

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State Reforms in Response to Terrorism: A Case Study of the LTTE

By Tiara Biswas

Abstract- This paper is a case study of the state reforms put into place due to and after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is one of the most known organisations of recent times, indirectly but not solely responsible for the Tamil Diaspora witnessed during the 90s. This paper has reviewed and qualitatively analysed literature which examined the history of the LTTE, its structures, the reforms made by it and the aftermath of its defeat. The research question looks at the state reforms put into place during the reign of the LTTE, and after its defeat.

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State Reforms in Response to Terrorism: A Case Study of the LTTE

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Abstract- This paper is a case study of the state reforms put into place due to and after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is one of the most known organisations of recent times, indirectly but not solely responsible for the Tamil Diaspora witnessed during the 90s. This paper has reviewed and qualitatively analysed literature which examined the history of the LTTE, its structures, the reforms made by it and the aftermath of its defeat. The research question looks at the state reforms put into place during the reign of the LTTE, and after its defeat.

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the violence or threat of violence against soft targets perpetrated by non-state actors in pursuit of political goals. Regardless of ideology or political alignment, acts of terrorism have always been conducted with political goals in mind. When identifying ideologies in relation to terror attacks, four groups have been identified - right wing, left wing, nationalist/separatist and single issue terrorism. Nationalist/separatist groups are ones that are driven by a pursuit for independence or greater autonomy from an existing territory. They usually conduct attacks which limit civilians casualties as their goal is to attract people to their cause. Attacks from these kinds of groups are usually more focused on targeting those with power in an attempt to make them withdraw or make concessions. For my paper, I want to focus on one such separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil being a separatist group, instead stating themselves as "fighting for self-determination and restoration of sovereignty in what it recognized as its homeland". While the LTTE does not identify as a separatist group, it has the characteristics of one as it clearly wanted to set up a separate state for the Tamils. This paper focuses on how the LTTE used means of terrorism to spread their political agenda and the state response they elicited during and after their reign.

The study is important as it seeks to examine the responses from a state when faced with terrorism. Terrorism is not a new concept, most of us are familiar with the reasons as to why and how it happens regardless of the variety of types of terrorisms. The paper studies the direct response to terrorism not only on a country's government, but on the citizens and international community as well. For the case chosen, the threat of terrorism comes from within the nation

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itself. Acts of terrorism are perpetrated from actors within the nation, not an external threat. This study, by focusing on the single case of the LTTE, aims to highlight the governmental response by looking at actors and outcomes of this particular case.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The empirical study conducted by Sarvanathan (2018) distinguishes the semantics between terrorism and liberation, using LTTE as a case study. The argument made by this paper is that the LTTE may have initially been a liberation movement, but due to the tactics and methods adopted by it, it soon escalated into a terrorist movement. Some of the characteristics that marks it as a terrorist movement are (i) armed struggle was based overwhelmingly on acts of violence, devoid of mass mobilisation, political agitations and popular participation, (ii) support of the masses was sought out through persecution rather than persuasion, (iii) deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians, (iv) reliance on suicidal armed attacks, (v) recruitment and employment of children in combat and (vi) internecine war against members of its own community. After Prabhakaran assumed sole leadership of the LTTE in the early 1980s, he wanted to be the sole representative for the Tamil struggle and began prosecuting other Tamil Liberation groups. This caused a rapid decrease in the public support towards the LTTE. The central argument of this paper is that, based on the six criteria above, LTTE was a terrorist organisation, that initially started as a liberation movement. This study helps support my claims that the LTTE was indeed a terrorist organization, even though they did not choose to call themselves one.

In this paper (De Votta, 2009), the author studies the history and tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka, the birth of the LTTE and the Sinhalese government indirect role in the radicalisation of the Tamil youth. Up till the independence of Sri Lanka, Tamil elites had always viewed themselves ethnically equal to the Sinhalese. Due to their small numbers as well, the Tamils called for equal political representation between themselves and the Sinhalese. This unity was rocked in 1956 when Bandaranaike asked to make Sinhalese and Tamil the national languages of the country but instead embraced only Sinhalese last minute to win the elections. This was the beginning of the ethnic outbidding the Tamilian minorities would face.



Incidents which would rule out the Tamil minorities became a trend, thus making the quest for a separate eelam (state) inevitable. The LTTE was established initially as the the Tamil New Tigers in 1972 but later on changing its name to the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam by 1976. Under President Jayawardene's government, the Tamil diaspora began. Tamil homes had been looted and destroyed and many Tamil women raped. Tamilians began seeking refuge in India and other countries. This diaspora further strengthened the need for an eelam. Rebel groups grew stronger in numbers. The LTTE, in particular, went from being the Tamilian's saviour to their cause of distress. The LTTE's need for control over all rebel groups was the start of their downfall. Along with this, they began enlisting children and women for their cause due to the quick decline of trust in them by the Tamilian minority.

The paper (Stokke, 2006) examines LTTE's idealized state structure and their political plans for reorganising the state. This paper was published before the downfall of the LTTE, thus putting issues in a different context. The eelam state planned to focus on three key areas : security, welfare and economic development. The Tamil Eelam judicial system had included district courts for civil and criminal cases as well as two high courts in Killinochi and Mullaitivu. The penalties were strict, from fines to jail terms but also including capital punishment in rare cases. The other institution for maintaining law and order was the Tamil Eelam Police, formed in 1991. LTTE representatives said that the Tamil Eelam Police were responsible for the low crime rates in the northeast, however, it is argued that the low crime rate was a result of the authoritarian methods adopted by the LTTE. These authoritarian methods were the reason LTTE quickly began to lose support amongst the tamil population as they were extremely hard handed in nature. These methods were not well received by the tamilian population, and the tamils began questioning whether the LTTE's vision for an eelam was worth all the trouble.

The LTTE began to enlist women and children once they began losing the confidence of the masses. Many women were enlisted as suicide bombers, it was considered a position of honour as one was dying for their country and a great cause. This "elite squad" of suicide bombers were called the Black Tigers. It cannot, however be denied that the LTTE did propagate female empowerment and uplifting of the woman's status (Dissanayake, 2017) regardless of the agenda behind it. Prabhakaran regularly attributed the success of the movement to the women. Prabhakaran's pro-women comments also served strategic purposes, it encouraged existing female members to be more proactive and dedicated towards the cause and secondly, it allowed the LTTE to recruit more women while propagating gender equality.

The defeat of the LTTE has been the only relief the Sinhalese citizens have experienced in a long time. Even then, they struggle to relish it. Sri Lankan citizens who took part in the war still seem to be disappearing (Candela & Aldama, 2016). The following is one such incident, Thaya Malar's son returned home after the war ended. But one night, he disappeared. The mother believes that the Sri Lankan Army had something to do with it. She even wrote a letter to then President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, but received no response. After the war ended, nearly 300,000 Tamils who had been enlisted in the fighting by the LTTE, were detained by the state (Ganguly, 2016). As non-militant families began to return to their villages, many found that their homes had been destroyed or were part of military zones. Many became refugees due to this. Post war, signs of progress were everywhere. New roads were paved, bridges rebuilt. However, people despaired over the Sinhalese triumphalism that followed the defeat of the LTTE. Rather than aiming for national reconciliation, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his government behaved as if it was not the LTTE that was defeated, but the entire Tamil population (Ganguly, 2016).

"The army set up numerous checkpoints in Tamil areas and instituted intrusive surveillance. Tamils lived with the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and abuse. They spoke of the ubiquitous white vans, civilian vehicles used by security forces to abduct suspected LTTE supporters, who were then brutally tortured in custody. Memorials to fallen LTTE fighters were reduced to rubble and commemorations were banned." Sri Lanka After the Tigers, (Ganguly, 2016).

The current President, Sirisena, has reversed a lot of these abusive practices. The once dominant culture of surveillance and censorship is being done away with, the violation of human rights have been acknowledged. Some constitutional reforms initiated by the new government is the establishment of constitutional council and restoring the independence of the judiciary, police and human right commissions. Sirisena's government is trying to be more accountable and proactive towards both sides of the parties who have suffered losses, that is, the Tamil minorities and the Sinhalese. However, there is still a lot of work to be done. Sirisena's government has taken a lot of strides towards state reform, but it has just touched the tip of the iceberg. (Ganguly, 2016).

The Sri Lankan government used various strategies to win the civil war. Some of the successful strategies are as follows. First of all, the strategy adopted had to be appropriate towards the cause. For the initial 22 years of the civil war, the government made use of military strategies. This strategy was not as successful as anticipated because the LTTE was at its peak. Negotiations were made with the LTTE five times,

but no progress was made, leaving the LTTE in an even better position to defeat government forces. To succeed, the Sri Lankan government had to enlist a strategy well suited towards its adversary. This strategy had the following characteristics - (i) it combined diplomacy, economics, military actions and information operations, (ii) it considers the development of the capabilities the nation needs to succeed. The new government agreed upon discontinuing previous strategies that had failed their predecessors, adopting a whole - of - nation grand strategy to guide lower level activities. LTTE's principal problem was its limited manpower base. Along with this, by 2005, LTTE's legitimacy was declining because of its heavy handed methods such as the use of suicide bombers and attacking of soft targets. Keeping this all in mind, the government aimed to isolate the LTTE. The LTTE used to get 60% of its funding and military equipment from offshore. This succeeded over time and the group was banned in over 32 countries. Internally, the government set out to gain public support. By 2006, majority of the civilians were war weary and doubtful of the LTTE's vision. The government promoted this sentiment, along with gaining favour of the public. This was done through continuing development activities alongside financing for the war. Doing both simultaneously was difficult and the government enlisted a lot of foreign financial help. By continuing developmental activities, the government gave a sort of hope to the civilians that there was more to look forward to beyond the war. These activities addressed the poverty rampant in the nation through national schemes, for example, the poor farmer fertilizer subsidy scheme. These measures proved quite favourable. The increased budgets and popular support allowed the Sri Lankan forces to grow dramatically. Earlier, the army had difficulty recruiting 3,000 soldiers annually; by late 2008, the Army was recruiting 3,000 soldiers a month. (Layton, 2015)

These operations also proved successful because of the personnel used. These operations enlisted small, well-trained, highly mobile groups. These groups infiltrated behind the front lines attacking high-value targets, providing real-time intelligence and disrupting LTTE lines of resupply and communication. The combination of the government's direct offensives and this infiltration proved a deadly combination for the LTTE. The LTTE forces lost their freedom of maneuver, were pinned down and could be defeated in detail.

This small group of trained peoples was called the Special Infantry Operations Team (SIOT) operating closer. The SIOT was capable of attacking LTTE military leadership targets, removing experienced commander where they were most needed and causing considerable disruption to the inflexible hierarchical command system. When the Eelam War IV had begun there 1,500 trained SIOT troops, by 2008 there were more than 30,000. The army began training in complex

jungle fighting operations, making the soldiers more capable and professional. The LTTE was one of the few insurgency groups that had a capable army. During Eelam IV, the Navy with the help of India and the U.S, used intelligence and innovative tactics to strike at the LTTE's transport ships. These ships were responsible for most of their military equipment. The adoption of the above mentioned strategies allowed the government to successfully overthrow the LTTE. These strategies mostly focused on having an optimised military, focusing on boosting morale of the civilians and going for the offence rather than waiting for the LTTE to. The government also succeeded as they began to change their strategies in response to what the LTTE was doing, whereas the LTTE stuck to their old tactics and methods. (Layton, 2015)

There was a mixed response to the LTTE's defeat in 2009 from the international community. Countries such as India, U.S, Japan, Germany and Britain were initially skeptical about the war's outcome when it peaked in 2006 (Uyangoda, 2010). Unlike the aforementioned countries, China, Pakistan and Iran were more consistent and reliable in terms of economic, political and military support towards Sri Lanka and its efforts against the LTTE. Besides defeating the LTTE, which was looking more and more possible with Sri Lanka's military offensive, the international actors were concerned with three issues they thought to be crucial. Firstly, early resettlement of displaced Tamilians in and outside of refugee camps. Secondly, provisions for speedy humanitarian aid to civilians with international assistance, participation, and monitoring. Thirdly, implementation of devolution. The defeat of LTTE however, did not cease to put an end to the ethnic differences in Sri Lanka. The government is reluctant to relocate displaced Tamilians, and this disappointed the international community. The Sri Lankan government, rather than focusing on long term ethnic conflict resolution, is turning its eye towards concerns over national security. This is causing tensions between the West and Sri Lanka, as their priorities differ. While it is understandable as to why Sri Lanka would be excessively concerned over national security, ethnic tensions were one of the leading factors for the civil war. To prevent such a tragedy again, ethnic conflict resolution must be given a fair deal of attention.

III. ANALYSIS

From the literature above, insight has been given as to how and why the LTTE did what they did and the government's response to it. For the longest period of time, the LTTE was just another insurgency group. However, they soon began indulging in characteristics which would label it as a terrorist organisation, such as the attacking of soft targets and enlistment of women and children in their ranks. The government has

responded to the threat in various manners, during the various Eelam phases. Some have been successful, while some have drastically failed. Ultimately, with the defeat of the LTTE, government tactics and strategies alone cannot be given all the credit. By the end of Eelam IV, the legitimacy of the LTTE as a body had completely begun to be questioned. Once loyal supporters of the movement now did not agree with the LTTE's methods as they had strayed from the original vision. The LTTE's loss of support and the improvement of government tactics, is what, ultimately led to the victory of the Sri Lankan government.

LTTE considered itself a government and tried to operate as one. However, at the end of the day it was what it was, an illicit power structure in Sri Lanka. Its reign can be grouped into four phases., Eelam I (1983-87), Eelam II (1990-95), Eelam III (1995-2000) and Eelam IV (2006-09). Each Eelam phase involved a particular conflict and negotiation in response to the conflict. All phases of the Eelam also witnessed foreign involvement. LTTE's end, when it finally came after three decades of involvement could be attributed to a lot of variables. One of the causes was the LTTE being deserted and losing the favour of its foreign supports, in particular India (Marks and Pratap Singh Brar, 2016). What sets the LTTE case apart from other terrorists acts and organisations is the complexity of the case. Many countries and governments labelled the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. However, it initially started out as an insurgency and liberation movement rather than a terrorist one. Only when it began to use terrorism as it's main element rather than just a tool for recruitment, it duly earned the tag of being a terrorist organisation. At each phase of the Eelam, the Sri Lankan government failed to fully comprehend what it was involved in and thus couldn't counter strike effectively. Initially, it treated the movement as emerging terrorism, thus emphasizing on the response, rather than getting to the roots of the conflict. Later, having mastered counterinsurgency martial facets, it neglected the necessity of a holistic response, resulting in India's intervention. In the post-Indian context, the emergence of hybrid war—the blending of irregular and regular warfare with criminality and even (in its attempts to use chlorine gas in shells at one point) “WMD (weapons of mass destruction) warfare”—was mistaken for conventional conflict, resulting in devastating government defeats and LTTE's temporary victory. Finally, in the renewed 2006-9 fighting, a new civil-military team engaged in the functional equivalent of national mobilization and delivered a virtuoso display of integrating strategic, operational, and tactical levels of combat to deliver a knockout punch. This paper highlights how the government failed to see the LTTE for what it was, in some phases by overestimating it (such as in Eelam I) or underestimating it.

After two decades of fighting and four failed peace talks, a ceasefire was declared in December 2001. However, hostilities remounted by 2005, and war broke out again. The government wanted a permanent solution to the LTTE problem. They decided to take the offensive. However, the government did not always opt for this tactic. To understand how it ended up at this point, we will examine it's response towards the LTTE during all its Eelam phases.

Eelam War I (1983 - 1987)

Eelam war I was the initial stage of conflict between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militant groups. The war officially started on July 23, 1983 when the LTTE launched a full blown attack on the Sri Lankan army in Jaffna. The Sri Lankan army fought back and this fighting continued till 1985. During 1985, the government tried to initiate talks of peace with the LTTE but they proved futile, and the fighting resumed. Due to Indian intervention, the Sri Lankan government was asked to put a halt on the offensive. India was supporting the LTTE at this point of time and was also responsible for shipping of materials. The Indian and Sri Lankan government convened to resolve this dispute. As a result of the negotiations, Sri Lankan troops withdrew from Jaffna and handed over the north of the country to Indian troops for peacekeeping. This brought an end to Eelam War I.

Eelam War II (1990 - 1995)

One of the indistinguishable characteristic of this phase was that it was incredibly brutal. In June 1990, the LTTE massacred 600 policemen after they had surrendered on promises of safe conduct. The government retaliated by bombing LTTE targets in the area. They also began to train and arm Home Guard Muslims units. The largest battle of the war happened in the following year, June 1991, when the LTTE surrounded the army's Elephant Pass base which gave them access to the Jaffna Peninsula. Both sides faced a lot of casualties and death, till the government arrived with more troops. This Eelam Phase wasn't a victory for the government. The LTTE managed to take out the Sri Lankan President, Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. This, adding on to the various other soldier deaths deeply affected the morale of the Sri Lankan Army.

Eelam War III (1995 - 2002)

A new government was elected and Chandrika Kumaratunga became the President. The government, once again, tried for a cease fire which was violated by the LTTE. This led to the next phase of war, dubbed as Eelam War III. The new government then issued a “war for peace”, determined to take control of the rebel Jaffna holdings. A lot of civilians were also caught in the crossfire during this phase.

Violence continued in the north of Sri Lanka, LTTE suicide bombing were becoming more and more regular. The bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo, the bombing of the Sri Lankan World Trade center and the damaging of the Temple of the Tooth all led to the Sri Lankan government outlawing the LTTE. Governments over the world soon followed suit, and the LTTE was now considered a terrorist organisation rather than just an insurgent group. This law highly interfered with the LTTE's funding activities

Eelam War IV (2006 - 2009)

During this phase, the Sri Lankan government decided to pull of the cease fire with Tamil rebel groups, namely the LTTE. In the previous Eelam wars, the government attacked only when attacked, mostly striving for peace negotiations or a cease fire. During this phase the government decided to take the offensive, rather than waiting for the LTTE to attack. This phase would ultimately see the defeat of the LTTE and the long desired wait for peace.

All the phases, up until Eelam War IV had a recurring pattern, the government would only respond to attacks. They only attack when provoked. After the end of Eelam III, the LTTE was quickly losing support amongst masses due to the prevalence of violence and suicide bombing. This is when the government began to better their strategies and use the LTTE's weaknesses against them. They devised new tactics and focused on equipping their military with better training. Besides this, the government was also focusing on boosting the morale of it's civilians by focusing not only on the war, but also developmental activities.

Some of the successful strategies the Sri Lankan government shifted to are mentioned below. For the strategy to work, it had to be appropriate towards the cause. For the initial 22 years of the civil wars, the government heavily relied upon military strategies. However, this strategy was not as successful as one anticipated it to be. The Sri Lankan government followed this failure by trying to negotiate with the LTTE, but no progress was made on this front either. To succeed, the Sri Lankan government had to enlist a strategy well suited towards it adversary. For the first 22 years of the civil war, this was not the case. Eventually, by late 2005, a new government was elected which used strategies which played LTTE's weakness against them. LTTE's principal problem was it's limited manpower base. Along with this, by 2005, LTTE's legitimacy was declining. Keeping this all in mind, the government aimed to isolate the LTTE. This was done by controlling its funding which was done 60% from offshore. This succeeded over time and the group was banned in over 32 countries. Internally, the government set out to gain public support. By 2006, majority of the civilians were war weary and doubtful of the LTTE's vision. The government promoted this sentiments, along with

gaining favour of the public. This was done through continuing development activities alongside financing for the war. Doing both simultaneously was difficult and the government enlisted a lot of foreign financial help. By continuing developmental activities, the government gave a sort of hope to the civilians that there was more to look forward to beyond the war. These measures proved quite favourable. Earlier, the army had difficulty recruiting 3,000 soldiers annually; by late 2008, the Army was recruiting 3,000 soldiers a month.

To carry out the strategy even further, the focus was on the weakness of the LTTE while negating its strengths. The LTTE's manpower was ever so limited, and could easily be overwhelmed with astute tactics. In this regard, the government had already won a major victory before the start of Eelam War IV which started in the mid 2006. In 2004, a senior military commander, Colonel Karuna, defected, bringing with him 6,000 LTTE cadres. The defectors provided intelligence which offered insights into the LTTE as a fighting organisation. For the first time, the government agencies had Lankan Tamilians willing to return to LTTE held areas, collect information and report back. This defection from the LTTE also highlighted that its legitimacy was being questioned.

At the start of Eelam War IV, the LTTE had access to operate throughout the country. This access was minimised by the government. The Sri Lankan government made use of its enlarged armed forces and police on internal tasks, and developed a Civil Defense Force of armed villagers. Operations were also conducted to discover and destroy LTTE operating cells within the capital and some large towns. This in depth defense neutralised the LTTE's leadership decapitation strikes and it's attacks on defenseless civilians.

The defensive measures taken in the south and west of the country enabled the Sri Lankan military strategy in the northern and eastern parts of the country to be more enemy-focused. The primary aim of this strategy was to attack the LTTE and force them onto the defensive rather than try to protect the population from the LTTE. The areas under LTTE control were accordingly attacked in multiple simultaneous operations to confuse, overload, tie down and thin out the defenders.

These operations also proved successful because of the personnel used. These operations enlisted small, well-trained, highly mobile groups. These groups infiltrated behind the front lines attacking high-value targets, providing real-time intelligence and disrupting LTTE lines of resupply and communication. The combination of the government's direct offensives and this infiltration proved a deadly combination for the LTTE. The LTTE forces lost their freedom of maneuver, were pinned down and could be defeated in detail.

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The Sri Lankan army was also trained in such a way that the end goal was the defeat of the LTTE. The army began training in complex jungle fighting operations, making the soldiers more capable and professional. The LTTE was one of the few insurgency groups that had a capable army. During Eelam IV, the Navy with the help of India and the U.S, used intelligence and innovative tactics to strike at the LTTE's transport ships. These ships were responsible for most of their military equipment. The adoption of the above mentioned strategies allowed the government to successfully overthrow the LTTE. These strategies mostly focused on having an optimised military, focusing on boosting morale of the civilians and going for the offence rather than waiting for the LTTE to. The government also succeeded as they began to change their strategies in response to what the LTTE was doing, whereas the LTTE stuck to their old tactics and methods. Thus, we can see, that by altering its strategies, the Sri Lankan government was able to defeat the LTTE. The LTTE stubborn approach to their once successful tactics also gave an edge to the Sri Lankan government.

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Civil Society in Development: How Platform Groups Politicized EPA Negotiation between EU and West Africa

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Abstract- The core trajectory of this essay is to explore further the transformative power of civil society as advanced in by neo-Gramscian scholars by looking closely at how platform civil society groups organized in transnational networks politicized the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiation process between the EU and West Africa. The paper argued that platform groups politicized the EPA negotiation process by drawing attention to the potential development implications of concluding EPA with the EU for West Africa in particular and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) regions in general. Two questions are raised in the paper, the first of which addressed why platform civil society groups in West Africa contested the EPA. The second question engaged with how platform groups organized and mobilized action across national borders and regional divide for this purpose. The paper argued that platform groups in West Africa became resistant to EPA and organized mainly to block its ratification because EPAs are generally perceived to have a neoliberal undertone that potentially challenges African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries' prospects for socioeconomic development.

Keywords: *civil society, EPA, transnational civil society, agency, counter-hegemony.*

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Civil Society in Development: How Platform Groups Politicized EPA Negotiation between EU and West Africa

David Ibukun David

Abstract- The core trajectory of this essay is to explore further the transformative power of civil society as advanced in by neo-Gramscian scholars by looking closely at how platform civil society groups organized in transnational networks politicized the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiation process between the EU and West Africa. The paper argued that platform groups politicized the EPA negotiation process by drawing attention to the potential development implications of concluding EPA with the EU for West Africa in particular and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) regions in general. Two questions are raised in the paper, the first of which addressed why platform civil society groups in West Africa contested the EPA. The second question engaged with how platform groups organized and mobilized action across national borders and regional divide for this purpose. The paper argued that platform groups in West Africa became resistant to EPA and organized mainly to block its ratification because EPAs are generally perceived to have a neoliberal undertone that potentially challenges African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries' prospects for socioeconomic development. This counter-hegemony posture is an expression of the agency that challenged mainstream development view of civil society as an agent of neoliberal development. Although platform groups were unable to stop the conclusion of EPA between EU and West Africa, they nevertheless succeeded at bringing the EPA debate to public discourse for the first time to score what could be termed the most important achievement of the civil society in the negotiation of EPAs between EU and ACP regions.

Keywords: *civil society, EPA, transnational civil society, agency, counter-hegemony.*

I. UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE AND ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEVELOPMENT AND THE PITFALLS

Theorizing about world politics is traditionally pitched between realists and liberals. On the one hand, realists posit a world dominated by state actors who are engaged in an endless struggle for power (see Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Little wonder, therefore the realist preoccupation with government-to-government relations has been criticized for ignoring the complex network of transborder exchanges (see Keohane and Nye, 1971; 1977). Liberals, on the other hand, conceive of international

relations in terms of a plurality of actors such that states no longer dominate international relations as previously postulated. Some factors have been used to explain the multiplicity of actors that the liberals claim now characterizes international relations. Chief among the numerous explanations is the increasing globalization of the world and the trans-border nature of the challenges that accompany the interdependence imposed by globalization (see Patman, 2006; Scholte, 2002). Liberals have argued that states are becoming increasingly powerless against the challenges of contemporary international relations. As part of this growing awareness of the powerlessness of state actors in the context of a globalizing world, non-state actors (NSA), including civil society (CS) organized in transnational networks, have emerged as major players in contemporary international relations under what has come to be known as the participation twist in development thinking.

The involvement of civil society in European Union partnership with the African Caribbean and Pacific countries (EU-ACP partnership) must be understood within the context of the participation twist and the consequent pervasiveness of civil society in development, where civil society is viewed as a valuable mechanism for implementing participation. Some authors have therefore rightly pointed out that civil society provides the needed space for participation, either as invited or invented space (see Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Mifratat, 2004). Expectedly, its (participation) inclusion as a core principle in negotiating and executing EU-ACP partnership, in general, has been premised on some developmental arguments. One of such being that this will allow the involvement of a cross section of civil society and other non-state actors in the partnership agreement. This will ensure that other actors, apart from state actors, can contribute to the partnership process. The inclusion of participation as a negotiating principle of Cotonou could also be viewed as part of the overall efforts to strengthen the general governance framework of the partnership agreement. In addition, it can create a sense of ownership in a way that legitimize the entire agreement process and outcomes (see Norad, 2013).

For both optimists and skeptics, therefore, CS is important for its transformative potentials (Korzeniewicz

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and Smith, 2001). Kean (2009), for instance, termed civil society as power scrutinizing mechanisms capable of holding the state accountable. These transformative potentials are also not lacking at the transnational stage of organizing. To underline the transformative powers of civil society at the transnational level, Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 2-3) argued that:

Transnational advocacy networks affect state behavior by acting simultaneously as principled and strategic actors that frame' issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to 'fit' with favorable institutional venues. Network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates and serve as sources of information and testimony. They also promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards. They seek to maximize their influence or leverage over the target of their actions. In doing so, they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 2-3).

In spite of its appeal, civil society has its pitfalls that become even more pronounced when organizing transnationally across national boundaries (see Clark, 2006; Batliwala, 2002; Florini, 2001). For instance, it is plausible to want to question the transnational in transnational civil society from representativeness and accessibility. Specifically, Smith (2005, p. 622) argued that "there are strong reasons to be skeptical that this 'global civil society' is 'global' in the sense that it is broadly representative of and accessible to all the world's citizens". Particularly questioned here are the limits of its global-ness and the weakness of the actual transnational interactions it incorporates. Expectedly, critics of global civil society have argued that domestic considerations and ideologies have continued to dominate much of the discourse and thinking of transnational activists, who continue to organize around state preferences and nationally defined aims (see Smith, 2005).

One other major challenge of CS in the transnational network is the varied opportunities it offers for participation to citizens of different countries. Just as states vary in abilities to affect conditions beyond their borders, so also are citizens of different countries confronted by varied opportunities to participate in transnational networks. Unequal opportunities for participation could manifest in the form of lopsided selection and support for CS actors in the development process. In this instance, Crawford (2006, p. 148) accounted for the skewed selection and support for CS

actors in EU development policy, arguing that such selection and support stem

...from donor interest in a neo-liberal conception of civil society in which its key role is perceived as anti-state and to hold the state to account. Thus, rather than widespread support to the range of CSOs that are potentially relevant to democratization processes, only modest financial assistance (in donor terms) is required to strengthen and consolidate that narrow range of Accra-based NGOs and think-tanks that can exert influence on policymaking processes and government decision-taking.

A similar argument was raised in Hurt (2006, p. 119) concerning the selective nature of the EU's participatory approach to development:

What appears to be common to the EU's relations with all parts of the developing world is that when civil society is included, it is mainly those non-state actors that are broadly supportive of the EU's approach, usually the private sector, that are included. The most significant aspect of the EU's current development policy is its emphasis on free trade, and the inclusion of civil society is designed to help cement the hegemony of this development model.

The result is the concentration of support on a section of the CS in what Carothers and Ottaway (2000, p. 11) have termed 'advocacy and civic education NGOs' to the exclusion of membership organizations like trade unions (cited in Crawford: 2006, p. 149). The issue of unequal opportunity for participation could become a bigger issue where transnational civil society networks may sometimes involve collaboration between north and south civil society groups.

While it is clear that civil society has its challenges, this realization does not in any way foreclose the potentials of civil society to make meaningful contributions to development. Not oblivion of the multitude of problems that confront civil society particularly at the transnational realm, civil society groups in West Africa organized in a transnational network under a platform known as POSCAO (West African Platform for Civil Society in the Cotonou Agreement) to resist what could be termed the neoliberal tendencies of EPAs. In this sense, civil society could be seen as constituting itself into a counter-hegemony force to oppose the ratification of EPA by governments of West African states

II. CIVIL SOCIETY AS A FORCE FOR TRANSFORMATION

The democracy-promotion capacity of civil society (CS) has never been in doubt, as this theme runs through the heart of both advocates and critics of civil society (Putnam, 1993; 1995; Foley and Edwards,

1996; Krznaric, 1999; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Fukuyama, 2001; Newton, 2001; Cox and Schechter, 2002; Scholte, 2002; Kean, 2009). Nevertheless, the civil society literature is fragmented and divided, lacking consensus on what precisely is meant by the term civil society. This conceptual difficulty has been premised on the fluidity of the concept, which has prompted Chandhoke (2007, p. 607) to describe it as very elusive, escaping conceptual grasps and every sure-footed negotiation. Cox and Schechter (2002, p. 97) have also labeled civil society as an “elastic concept” with different connotations, while Krznaric (1999, p. 3) termed it an ambiguous concept used in literature as a “catch-all” term. One core contestation in the literature is that the lack of precision on what exactly is meant by civil society has implied that just anybody or group could use the concept for any purpose, thereby resulting in overuse and flattening out (Shefner, 2007; also Chandhoke, 2007). What this implies is that theorists have conceptualized CS from different philosophical/ideological positions, thereby presenting civil society as a contested concept (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Armstrong, 2002; Kumar, 2007). Consistent with the preceding, Scholte (2002, p. 3) notes that the meanings of civil society have varied enormously across time, place, theoretical perspective, and political persuasion. The conceptual divide in the CS literature, therefore, finds expression in the different conceptual approaches to civil society.

In this instance, Cox and Schechter (2002) identify two conceptual traditions in the CS debate. First, is the neo-Gramscian dualistic approach where CS is either an arena for hegemonic consensus through co-option or a sphere for counter-hegemony forces (2002, pp. 100-101). In the neo-Gramscian sense, CS has a transformative or emancipatory role, albeit it could also be co-opted by into the mainstream hegemony. The other conceptual approach is rooted in Tocquevillian conception of CS as a realm for the assemblage of actors as autonomous self-organizing social groups (ibid). Like Cox and Schechter, most theorists agree with the Gramscian/Tocquevillian conceptual divide in the civil society literature, and this divide is often expressed in terms of activism version versus associational version, where the Gramscian approach is the activism version (Kumar, 2007; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Krznaric, 1999; Chandhoke, 2007; Foley and Edwards, 1996). As a realm of associational life, civil society is usually presented as an agent of neoliberal development (Kumar, 2007).

Understanding civil society as an emancipator fits better into the role played by platform civil society groups in EU-West Africa EPA negotiations in contesting the negotiation process and in resisting ratification of the agreement by ECOWAS member states when eventually negotiations were concluded. Robert Cox (1996), amongst other neo-Gramscian theorists, provides an

analytic basis for presenting CS in Gramsci's thought. Often civil society in the Gramscian sense appears as a function of the state as in the frequently quoted equation: 'State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion' (PN, p. 263, cited in Cox and Schechter, 2002, p. 97).

Reading of CS in Gramscian sense by Cox and Schechter (2002) show that there is an inherent contradiction in the concept of CS. On the one hand, CS is the social order, educational and ideological agencies that are sustained by the coercive power of the state, while on the other hand it is an autonomous agent of transformation that also serves as the basis for the state (ibid). It can stabilize, reproduce and transform the social order, all at the same time. As an agency sustained by the state, CS stabilizes and reproduces the existing social order. But as an autonomous agency, it provides the basis for the transformation of the state. In a sense, it emanated from the state, being shaped by it. In another sense, it shapes the state, providing the basis for its existence. To put it in the expression of Cox and Schechter, CS is “both shaper and shaped” (ibid). Overall, the Coxian reading depicts Gramsci's conception of CS in an emancipatory sense, in which CS is conceptualized as the basis for the foundation of a new state, social order or hegemony.

Fowler (2012, p. 5) also captures this emancipatory rendering of CS, noting that “civil society is a site of agency which resists class-based hegemonic predilection of states towards its territory and citizens in the Gramscian sense”. Fowler would further posit that the “Gramscian version of CS is also a ‘location’ for agency which counters the extractive and accumulative logic and monopolistic predispositions of capital”. It is within the context of Gramsci understanding of civil society as captured in Cox (1996) and Cox and Schechter (2002) that the role civil society played in resisting the ratification of EPA with the EU by ECOWAS member states is understood in this essay as an expression of agency against the neoliberal structures of EPAs. Civil society is in this sense a counter-hegemony force contesting the EPA negotiation process and resisting the ratification of the agreement.

III. WHY PLATFORM CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS CONTESTED AND RESISTED THE EPA

Concerns with potential developmental implications are the main reasons civil society groups in West Africa, organized in a transnational platform, wanted EPA negotiations with the EU stopped, at least until all such concerns have been sufficiently addressed. EPAs are essentially free trade agreements that have their roots in the Cotonou Agreements. The Cotonou Agreement is a trade-driven development agreement between the European Union and a group of developing



countries collectively known as the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific). This agreement signed on 23 June 2000 was meant to recast trade relations between the EU and (ACP) states, which were majorly former colonies of some EU member states. It is instructive to note that, in response to the global environment that frames EU-ACP trade relations, the Cotonou Agreement is subject to review every 5 years over its 20-year span. Fundamentally, Cotonou aims at facilitating a gradual shift from the non-reciprocal trade relations between the EU and ACP under the Lomé Convention.

Unlike Lomé, which allowed ACP non-reciprocal trade preference and access to the EU, Cotonou aims at gestating new trade relations based on reciprocity in compliance with WTO rules. Two primary reasons have been adduced for proposed reciprocal trade relations under Cotonou. The first reason is that non-reciprocity has not benefited the ACP as their share of the global market as a whole and total EU import has continued to fall despite the non-reciprocal agreements of Lomé. The general perception within the EU is therefore that the impact of non-reciprocal trade preferences under Lomé had proven disappointing, with the increasing rise in poverty in most ACP countries. Bilal and Stevens (2009, p. 14) elaborated on the reasons for the shift.

A key reason for this is that the trade provisions of Cotonou's predecessor (the Lomé Convention) were the subject of adverse rulings during the 1990s, first in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is because they involve the EU discriminating in favor of some developing countries (the ACP) and against others in ways that cannot be justified under WTO rules. After two years of negotiations, and in the context of the Doha Ministerial summit, the EU obtained support from WTO members for a waiver that would allow this discrimination to continue – but only to the end of 2007.

Karl (2002, p. 21) illuminated on claims of falling ACP share on global trade that prompted the shift from Lomé to Cotonou.

The overall share of the ACP countries in total EU imports has systematically fallen from 6.7 per cent in 1976 to 2.8 per cent in 1999. Although they are at the top of the pyramid of advantages offered by the EU to its development partners, paradoxically, the ACP countries are bottom of the list when it comes to exports to European markets. Furthermore, a significant part of ACP exports to the EU, approximately 60 per cent, consists of only nine products. Already regarded as minimal, the ACP countries' share in world trade fell from 3.4 percent to 1.1 percent over the same period (Karl, 2002, p. 21).

Against this backdrop, Cotonou proposes to recast trade relations between the EU and ACP in ways that would expectedly address both the WTO-compatibility problem and the problem of falling ACP share of EU trade particularly inherent in the non-reciprocal deal of Lomé. Overall, the Cotonou Agreement is built on three pillars of cooperation.

- Political dialogue;
- Development cooperation;
- And trade relations (see Cotonou Agreement, 2000).

Fundamentally, the Cotonou Agreement and the new trade relations it proposes between the EU and ACP aims at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy for the overall socioeconomic development of the ACP (see also Arts. 34; 1; 36 and 37, Cotonou Agreement 2000). This integration is intended, in the spirit of Cotonou, to be pursued and achieved with due regard for their (ACP states) political choices and development priorities. Viewed this way, Cotonou is more than just a trade relation. It is a trade relation supposedly driven by the developmental goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development of ACP countries.

The trade-recasting imperative of Cotonou would mean that it is ultimately expected to lead to the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP regions. However, the Cotonou Agreement, and especially the EPAs it aims at, has been the subject of serious debate from a development implication perspective. Kuhnhardt (2016, pp. 16-7) describes the EPA as the most debated issue within the framework of EU-ACP Partnership Agreement, noting in particular that the debate surrounding EPAs consumed most of the first decade of EU-ACP Partnership Agreement, which is otherwise known as the Cotonou Agreement. EPA negotiation between the EU and West Africa was eventually concluded in July 2014 with the endorsement of the partnership deal by ECOWAS Head of States. It is however instructive to note that this (conclusion of negotiation) is coming after more than a decade of negotiation.

While the EU asserts that the concluded EPA would lead to win-win, there are fears about the developmental backlash of the EPA on the West African side and within civil society. It is in this context that Kohnert (2014) noted that the win-win assertion of the EU about EPA in its present form is open to debate. Although Cotonou-EPAs aim at creating win-win situations based on a partnership of equals, Kohnert argues that these expectations were dashed in the face of mounting oppositions to EPAs and increasing calls for renegotiation of already concluded EPAs. Civil society groups organized in transnational networks have been at the forefront of such demands (see Kohnert,

2015; 2014; Hurt et al., 2013). Notable in this sense is the Stop EPA Campaign that started in 2005.

A central contestation in EU-ACP relations concerns the issue of power inequality and bargaining asymmetry between the parties, which has made some authors to conceive Cotonou as an unequal partnership or even a relationship of coercion (see Onah, 2010; Osita, 2010; Nunn and Price, 2004; Solignac Lecomte, 2001; Ravenhill, 1985) between resource-rich ACP and technology-rich EU (Stevens, 2006). This perception is not helped by the colonial root of the relations. Solignac Lecomte (2001, p. 26) was very clear on this point in arguing that the signing of the reciprocal trade-oriented Cotonou Agreement by the ACP was borne largely out of “fatalistic pragmatism” rather than out of a firm conviction about expected gains from the EPA process that was set in motion (*ibid*). One or all of the following three pragmatic considerations might explain why the ACP accepted Cotonou’s EPAs, according to Solignac Lecomte (2001, p. 26).

- i. because they gave priority to their political links with the EU and its member states, over their own sovereignty in trade policy matters;
- ii. or because they feared that the refusal of economic partnership proposed by EU would imply indirect sanctions (less aid);
- iii. or in the hope of facilitating the preservation of other privileges (such as benefits of the product protocols), a particularly profitable calculation for countries that do little trade with Europe.

Ravenhill (1985) has in this context called EU-ACP relations a patron-client relationship to underscore the unequal nature of the partnership. The patron in this sense has a history of economic prosperity as a former colonial master. It has the economic advantage as a major player in the global market, is technologically advanced, and thus went into the negotiation from a position of strength that positioned it (EU) to dictate the terms. No doubt literature abounds on the economic advantage of the EU over its ACP counterparts in the EPA negotiation (Solignac Lecomte, 2001; Stevens, 2006; Onah, 2010). For instance, recent data shows that the Euro area which makes up 4.7% of world population accounts for 25.6% of global exports and 12.0% of global GDP as of October 2016 (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2016). On the converse, Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), which makes up 12.8% of world population, accounts a mere 3.1% of world GDP and 1.7% of world trade respectively (*ibid*).

This picture of inequality becomes more obvious when it is taken into consideration that the Euro area represents mere 19 economies as compared to 45 represented by SSA (*ibid*). Perhaps, it is even more intriguing to note that SSA is also poorly positioned within the emerging economies, thereby making it the most marginalized on the margin or the southernmost in

the South! Specifically, SSA economies represent a mere 5.4% of the total share of emerging economies and 4.5% of total trade, even when it has a 15.0% share of the total population of the emerging economies (IMF World Economic Outlook, 2016). As Godfrey (2006) pointed out, it is in this sense not hard to see where the power lies as far as EU-ACP relations and EPAs are concerned.

It is worth noting that in spite of conspicuous development gap between the parties, EPA negotiations were based on trade principles that acknowledge no basis for discrimination (see Byron and Lewis, 2007). For instance, insistence on the free trade doctrine of reciprocity as a condition for negotiation of EPAs implies negotiations took place between the EU and ACP regions without due consideration for any form of developmental disparities between the partners. This approach to negotiation is against the significant developmental differences noted to exist between the EU and ACP parties to the EPA negotiation (Fontagné, et al. 2008). It is in this context that Hurt (2010) compared Cotonou with its immediate predecessor and then concluded that Lomé was more favorable to the ACP in that it took account of the development gulf and disparity between the EU and ACP regions. Accordingly, Hurt analyzed the shift from Lomé to Cotonou EPA as the triumph of the neo-liberal hegemony. Specifically, Hurt (2010, p. 162) explains the shift thus.

As neoliberalism has assumed a position of hegemony in the international political economy, the development of North–South relations has altered predictably from a belief in the view that the South should be protected from the excesses of the market to achieve development, to a position where the market and assumptions of development through liberalization have held sway.

However, as part of the overall EU’s efforts to cast a developmental outlook for EPAs, David O’Sullivan, DG External Trade at the European Commission had been quoted to have argued that:

I am a trade negotiator – normally, a mercantilist profession! But DG Trade does not approach these negotiations in the usual way, where we seek to gain economic advantage from each other. This is clearly not the objective with the ACP. Our objective with you is to build on our privileged relationship and to secure and improve your market access into the EU, in order to serve a wider development goal (see Weinhardt, 2015, p. 37).

Arguments of this nature are nothing but a positive external imaging of EPAs that may not correspond with the realities of how the EU has gone about negotiating trade deals with the ACP. In effect, the EU has been criticized for adopting negotiating strategies that often reflect a deep-rooted concern with

its (EU) commercial interest than with the development of the ACP. The use of deadlines and threats of market access withdrawal to force the hands of ACP states into signing EPAs has been criticized in this context. Weinhardt (2015) has pointed to how the negotiating style of the EU reinforced a lack of trust deeply rooted in the colonial histories of the Cotonou-EPA negotiations with ACP regions. The EU's approach to negotiating EPAs with ACP has been particularly singled out for criticism for its failure to articulate an understanding of trade as an instrument of development (see Kuhnhardt, 2016). Without this form of understanding, it will be difficult for Cotonou and the EPAs it proposes to address core development concerns of ACP stakeholders.

Accordingly, the EPA between the EU and West Africa could be said to have raised more development questions than it answers. Concerns have therefore been raised about potential development implications of EPAs for the ACP (Bilal and Stevens, 2009; Bilal, 2009; Stevens, 2009; Bilal and Rampa, 2006). In light of the attendant development concerns, doubts have therefore been cast on the prospect of EPAs delivering on the intended development objectives for the ACP regions, and indeed West African states. The Economic Justice Network (EJN), a group of organized civil society, summed up some of these fears as follows.

The EPA could turn Africa into nothing more than a perpetual supplier of raw materials by hindering Africa's ability to industrialize and move up the value chain (as cited in Bridges Africa, 2012).

The contention is that rather than promote the development of ACP states, EPAs would further stunt it. The general concern within civil society is that EPAs will undermine rather than deliver the stated and envisaged development objectives (see Bridges Africa, May 2012; Toornstra, 2012; Bridges Weekly, March 2010). Concerns with the potential development implications of an EPA with the EU resulted for example in the "Stop EPAs" campaign that was started by a coalition of civil society organizations in April 2004.

The Cotonou-EPA was also criticized for balkanizing the ACP and weakening regional integration by implication. In West Africa for instance, this balkanization is noted to have manifested in the form of five (5) different trade regimes for the region. While Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire traded with the EU under an interim EPA that was initiated by the two West African countries but signed only by Cote d'Ivoire, some 11 West African states traded with the EU under the EBA regime as LDCs. The remaining two (2) states trade with the EU as non-LDCs. Among the non-LDCs, Nigeria traded with the EU under the GSP regime, while Cape Verde traded under the GSP+ trade regime.

In providing insight into how the EU deployed its strategy of co-option/divide-and-rule, the interviewee at TWN-Africa noted that.

In Ghana for instance, the EU came and look for CEPA (Centre for Policy Analysis)one of the think-tanks in Ghana. They gave them money to do a study on EPA and how it is going to affect the private sector and all that. They came out with a position in line with the EU's intention. And then all of a sudden exporters started saying if the government was not going to sign this, they were going to lose market access. At that point, they (government) had to take a political decision, and that is how they initialed the I-EPA (Interview at TWN-Africa, October 2016).

Field study yields even further insights into the EU's strategy of co-option, revealing that.

When the EC realized that Senegal was very powerful against the EPA, and also Nigeria. What they did is to divide these two countries to give them (EU) the chance to bulldoze their way to get the EPA through. In effect, Senegal was made the chair of the EPA. Once they became the chair, they couldn't talk again. Senegal became silent. So the EU at every stage you can see their politics, strategy, you can seethey bring everything to bear. That is the problem (Interview at TWN-Africa, October 2016).

It is in this context that the interviewee maintained that 'the EU is very treacherous in terms of their approach to issuesthey divide and rule' (ibid).

In this context, EPAs are seen to have divided Africa more than ever. Calls for development-friendly partnership between EU and the ACP through the involvement of civil society in the Cotonou Partnership process have therefore built around developmental concerns with EPAs. Accordingly, there have been increasing demands for mechanisms like civil society to monitor the developmental impacts of EPAs (see Bilal, Rampa, Jerosch and Makhan, 2007; Dur and De Bievre, 2007; Bilal and Rampa, 2006). These calls for participatory EPAs have continued to grow louder (see Montoute, 2011; Slocum-Bradley and Bradley, 2010; Thornburn, Rapley, King and Campbell, 2010; Dur and De Bievre, 2007; Bossuyt, 2006; Hurt, 2006).

IV. HOW CIVIL SOCIETY CONTESTED EU-WEST AFRICA EPA NEGOTIATION

Primarily, civil society contested the EPA by trying to frame the partnership discourse within a broader development debate in the public sphere that takes it (EPA) beyond just trade matter to one with potential development implications for ACP countries. Part of the strategy in this direction is to go beyond highlighting how EPAs potentially challenge the prospect of ACP countries for socioeconomic development to proposing what they view as

development-friendly alternatives like the EPA Development program (EPA-DP).

Also, in response to the ample provisions for participation in the Cotonou Agreement (see Articles 4, 8, 10, 18, 33), civil society groups across national and regional divides have organized in transnational networks around issues in the Cotonou Agreement. The West African Platform for Civil Society in the Cotonou Agreement or la Plateforme des Organizations de la Societe Civile de l'Afrique de l'Ouest! Accord de Cotonou, better known as POSCAO, provides the platform through which civil society groups across West Africa participated in the EPA. As the regional platform for civil society groups in West Africa working on the EPA, POSCAO is composed of representatives of civil society from the various West African states. An interview with the President of the National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTs) reveals that POSCAO was formed by CS entities across West Africa; it refers to CSOs that have been working on the Cotonou Agreement. It (POSCAO) is like an umbrella or a network, or even a coalition, which houses CS entities working on the Cotonou Agreement. NANTs is a national civil society umbrella for traders and Small and Medium Scale Entrepreneurs (SMEs) in Nigeria under POSCAO. Like other platform civil society groups within POSCAO, NANTs engages in the EPA because it perceives the outcome of EPA negotiations as something that could potentially harm the small scale sectors it represents in Nigeria (Interview at NANTs, January 2014).

While it is true that the Cotonou Agreement made provisions for involving CS in the EPA in what could be viewed as invited space of participation, it is also true that civil society invented for itself a space of participation in the EPA through its development-focused activism as regards the EPA. It gained more recognition as a result of its activism than as a result of the participatory provisions of the Cotonou Agreement and other documents for negotiating EPAs. This position was well captured in an interaction with a representative of civil society.

'I would say our involvement in the EPA was not recognized initially. It was a battle for recognition; a concerted battle to make the government cave-in or yield to our official recognition. West Africa has made history as the only region that has a clear recognition of civil society in the EPA negotiation process. And this recognition was achieved through persistent pressure from CS' (Interview at NANTs, January 2014).

To further emphasize the impact civil society had on the EPA and how this enhanced official recognition of civil society in EU-West Africa EPA, the source also maintained that.

'The issue of negotiation started seriously with the entrance of civil society. Many countries were docile about the negotiations. Nigeria, for instance, was not taking it seriously; it went into negotiations without understanding the impacts on our economy. The same could be said about all countries in West Africa, until CS started raising the alarm. Secondly, it was also the CS that started looking deeply into the analysis of the thematic issues in the negotiation. And they started revealing lop-sidedness in the negotiation. We furthered our stake even before the state could come in. So officially today, whatever government wants to say, they also want to hear from CS' (Interview at NANTs, January 2014).

In this sense, civil society can be viewed as having gained a foothold in EU-West Africa EPA as a result of its activism of keeping a close tab on the EPA negotiation, especially with regards to raising awareness on potential development impacts for West African countries. While it is true that civil society has contributed immensely to the EPA negotiations through its activism, it is also true that being involved in the EPA process has also benefited civil society participants. Importantly, civil society organizations and participants involved in the EPA have been able to increase their knowledge of the partnership and its development dimensions.

'The involvement of CS has opened our eyes as CSour depth of knowledge has increased, because the more we conduct analysis, the more our eyes are opened to the deeper things and further implications that we have not envisaged. Some of us have therefore acquired more knowledge in the process of researching on the negotiation and analyzing the conduct and technical issues in the negotiations' (Interview at NANTs, January 2014).

The refusal of Nigeria, and indeed ECOWAS, to sign the EPA was attributed to civil society activism (Interview at NANTs, January 2014). More so, civil society was credited with drawing attention to the development side of the EPA. Findings from a study conducted at the NANTs secretariat in Nigeria show that unlike the government, CS looks at the EPA from the developmental perspective of poverty reduction. In this context, the NANTs source noted that.

It was the civil society that coined the idea of EPA-DP. We said if we are going to open up our market, let us tie it to development. This (the idea of tying market access to development) gave birth to the EPA development program. The EPA-DP has the motive of tying market access to development, so that we just don't open our market and leave development out (Interview at NANTs, January 2014).

As documented in EP (2014, p. 19), Stop EPA Campaign, which was launched April 2004 in London at

the instance of the Accra based Africa Trade Network (ATN) together with some of European NGOs, is a reference for NGO participation in the EPA negotiation process. The Stop EPA Campaign provided opportunities for civil society to collaborate trans nationally across the EU-AU regional divide against the EPA, and its activities were premised on the argument that EPAs are driven by the interests of European business and a small economic elite in the ACP states. In response, civil society under the Stop EPA campaign expressed fears that EPAs would significantly harm the ACP producers. Like other stakeholders that have expressed concerns about the development implications of EPAs, they also pointed out that the scope of the new agreements was broader than what is required under WTO rules and that the EPAs EU is advancing contained issues that were rejected by developing countries in the WTO negotiations (see EP, 2014, p. 19).

V. CONCLUSION

In drawing attention to how EPAs can potentially stunt growth and development in the ACP, platform civil society groups have succeeded at transforming understanding of EPA negotiations between EU and ACP regions into a highly politicized and contested process from an otherwise depoliticized understanding. While it is true that Platform groups were unable to stop the conclusion of EU-West Africa EPA negotiation, it is also true that civil society succeeded in bringing EPA to public discourse through its counter-hegemony posture. Overall, civil society displayed counter-hegemonic inclinations in the EPA by bringing to public sphere salient development concerns inherent in the EPA that were hitherto neither available nor understood in the public domain. Consistent with Keck and Sikkink (1998), this counter-hegemony role was facilitated through strategies that include (Interview at TWN-Africa, October 2016).

- Framing the EPA discourse as one that potentially poses development challenges to the ACP as a whole and West Africa in particular. It in this context that emphasis was placed on making EPA development-friendly EPA, if at all West Africa must go ahead to enter into EPA with the EU.
- Networking across the national and regional divide, as the idea of POSCAO itself suggests
- Keeping a close tab on the EPA process and raising public awareness to specific development challenges posed by the EPA
- Demonstration and protest to raise awareness about the development side to the EPA
- Policy briefs and publications
- Pressuring and lobbying both state and non-state stakeholders involved in the partnership negotiation process to either stop negotiation or to ensure that

the strong concerns of civil society are taken into consideration while negotiating and finalizing negotiations on EPAs

It is worth noting that in playing its counter-hegemony role in the EPA, platform civil society groups in West Africa had to withstand concerted efforts of the EU to break its rank. In providing insight into how the EU deployed its strategy of co-option/divide-and-rule, the interviewee at TWN-Africa noted that.

In Ghana, for instance, the EU came and looked for CEPA [Centre for Policy Analysis]one of the think-tanks in Ghana. They gave them money to do a study on EPA and how it is going to affect the private sector and all that. They came out with a position in line with the EU's intention. And then all of a sudden exporters started saying if the government was not going to sign this, they were going to lose market access. At that point, they (government) had to take a political decision, and that is how they initiated the I-EPA (Interview at TWN-Africa, October 2016).

The counter-hegemony role of civil society in the EPA, in spite of the EU's efforts to break its rank through strategies of "co-option" and "divide-and-rule", must pass as an expression of agency in the typical Gramsci sense. Such articulation of agency is necessary if civil society must play the role of an emancipator and shaper of state-led policy in development. If EPA and similar state-led development cooperation/initiatives must answer to the call of development, it is imperative that civil society lends itself to the emancipatory cause.

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2019 General Elections in Nigeria and the New Dimension of Youth Involvement in Osun State

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Abstract- The study examined the extent to which the Nigerian youths were able to participate in the 2019 general elections compared to the previous ones from 1999. It also examined the fate of the Nigerian youths with the passage of the Not Too Young to Rule (NTYTR) Act. The study also assessed the effect of the NTYTR Act on the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. The study adopted quantitative method of research with the use of a self-structured questionnaire that was administered on 200 youth respondents between the ages of 18 and 35 years in Osun State. Data were analyzed quantitatively and presented in bar charts, tables and chi square statistics. The study found that the Nigerian youths did not participate fully in previous general elections compared to 2019 after the passage of the NTYTR Act in the country. The study showed that the NTYTR Act made the outcomes of the 2019 general elections to be better than previous elections because youths are now more encouraged to take part in the electoral contest unlike what it used to be.

Keywords: election, youths, not too young to rule act, new dimension, fourth republic.

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2019 General Elections in Nigeria and the New Dimension of Youth Involvement in Osun State

Aliyu M. Kolawole Ph. D

Abstract- The study examined the extent to which the Nigerian youths were able to participate in the 2019 general elections compared to the previous ones from 1999. It also examined the fate of the Nigerian youths with the passage of the Not Too Young to Rule (NTYTR) Act. The study also assessed the effect of the NTYTR Act on the 2019 general elections in Nigeria. The study adopted quantitative method of research with the use of a self-structured questionnaire that was administered on 200 youth respondents between the ages of 18 and 35 years in Osun State. Data were analyzed quantitatively and presented in bar charts, tables and chi square statistics. The study found that the Nigerian youths did not participate fully in previous general elections compared to 2019 after the passage of the NTYTR Act in the country. The study showed that the NTYTR Act made the outcomes of the 2019 general elections to be better than previous elections because youths are now more encouraged to take part in the electoral contest unlike what it used to be. The study concluded that NTYTR Act significant influenced the participation of youths in the 2019 general election and that more youths are likely to be more involved in future elections in the country, if the trend is sustained.

Keywords: *election, youths, not too young to rule act, new dimension, fourth republic.*

I. INTRODUCTION

After the return of democratic rule in May 29th 1999, Nigeria has witnessed four different general elections into various political offices within an interval of four years. They include the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections respectively. The Nigerian citizens have also exercised their civic rights and duties through the formation of political parties, electoral contest and voting during the various election periods. Since the independence of Nigeria till date, the aged have virtually occupied most electoral positions including the presidency with the average age of past heads of state (president) being 50.3 years old starting from the first president Nnamdi Azikiwe; who was 59 years of age when he became the head of state in 1960 during the Nigerian first republic till the current president Mohammed Buhari who was 73 years old when he came into power in 2015 (2015 Nigerian General Election). The youngest; being Yakubu Gowon, who came into power at the age of 32 years and the oldest

being current President Mohammed Buhari who came into power at the age of 73 years (Ugwueze, 2010).

The young ones have not been allowed enough participation in the political space of the country, hence agitations for more of their involvement in the governance of Nigeria. Various individuals, groups and institutions supported the movement. One of such groups is YIAGA Africa that started a movement called the Not Too Young to Run (Wikipedia, 2018). The group is headed by Samson Itodo, a human right activist and good governance campaigner, who is also the Executive Director of YIAGA Africa. Thus, Not Too Young to Run is a campaign that sought to reduce the age limit for elective offices globally and in Nigeria. The campaign started at the National Assembly in Nigeria with the sponsor of a bill by Tony Nwulu in the House of Representatives and Abdul Aziz Nyako in the Senate (Wikipedia, 2018). The bill sought alteration in sections 65, 106, 131, 177 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution, which was to reduce the age for elective positions for House of Assembly and House of Representatives from 30 years to 25 years, Senate and Governorship from 35 years to 30 years and office of the president from 40 to 30 years and independent candidature in Nigeria (Wikipedia, 2018)

In April 2018, the Nigeria's senate resolved to transmit the Not Too Young to Run bill to the President of Nigeria. On May 21, 2018, 55 youth-led organizations gave President Buhari 8-day ultimatum to give his assent to the bill. On 29 May, 2018, Nigeria's President, Muhammed Buhari announced in his 'democracy day' address to the nation that he planned to sign the bill into law. True to his promise, he signed the bill on 31st May, 2018. Prior to the signing of the NTYTR Bill by President Muhammed Buhari, the level of participation of Nigerian youths in the political administration of Nigerian has been very low and particularly disappointing due to the age restriction. But, upon the signing of the NTYTR Bill, it is important to find out the influence of the "act" on the outcome of the 2019 general elections. Also, studies on youth perceptions and participation in electoral matters in Nigeria are rarely prioritized when scrutinizing voting patterns, campaign outcomes, and electoral processes in the political administration of Nigeria. In view of the above, this study finds out the new dimension that the Not Too Young to Rule Act has on the 2019 general elections in Nigeria.

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Research Questions

The following questions will guide this research:

- (i) What is the level of participation of the Nigerian youths in the previous elections before the passage of the NTYTR Act in 2018?
- (ii) What is the fate of the Nigerian youths in the 2019 general elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act?
- (iii) What effect does the NTYTR Act have on the 2019 and future general elections in the country?

Research Objectives

The objectives of this study are as to:

- (i) examine the level of participation of the Nigerian youths in the previous general elections from 1999 till 2015 before the passage of NTYTR Act;
- (ii) examine the fate of the Nigerian youths in the 2019 general elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act; and
- (iii) assess the effect of the NTYTR Act on the 2019 and future general elections in Nigeria

Research Hypotheses

The following research hypotheses were tested in this study:

- (i) Nigerian youths have participated excellently in previous general elections from 1999 till 2015 before the NTYTR Act;
- (ii) Nigerian youths have better opportunities to contest positions in the 2019 general elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act; and
- (iii) NTYTR Act allows more participation of Nigerian youths in future general elections.

II. METHODOLOGY

This study was a survey research one, where a self structured questionnaire was used to collect data from respondents. Young Nigerians which made up about 50.35% of the total population of the country, according to Index Mundi (2018) constitutes the population of this study from which a sample of 200 youths (18 years of age and above) were randomly selected in Osun state, Nigeria. The breakdown are: Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife (10 respondents); Osun State University, Osogbo (10 respondents); The Federal Polytechnic, Ede (10 respondents); Osun State College of Education, Ilesa (10 respondents); Osun State College of Education, Ila (10 respondents); College of Technology, Esa Oke (10 respondents); Osun State Polytechnic, Ire (10 respondents); Redeemer's University, Ede (10 respondents) and Fountain University, Osogbo (10 respondents). Others are 10 members from major political parties (All Progressive Congress and Peoples Democratic Party) who were selected purposively from major towns. The towns are Osogbo, Ikire /Apomu, Ile-Ife, Ede, Iwo,

Iragbiji, Ejigbo, Esa-Oke, Ikirun, Ila and Ilesa. The study made use of a self-designed 5-scale likert questionnaire to give respondents who would not want their voice, name or images recorded the opportunity to express their views without any form of fear, bias or restrictions. The instrument was made up of four sections. Section A addressed personal data of the respondent such as Age, Sex, Religion and Educational background. Other sections involved statements that were related to the researched topic variables. The researcher personally administered the questionnaires to the respondents at the study areas. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of all the information given. The data collected were later analyzed using the simple percentage and chi-square statistics to determine the extent of the relationship between/among the variables.

a) *The Extent of Youth Preparation and Involvement in the 2019 General Election*

The 2019 presidential election was closely contested between two aged personalities, the incumbent president Mohammed Buhari of the All Progressive Congress (APC) and his strongest rival from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP); in person of former vice president Atiku Abubakar. On the part of the youth, about four young Nigerians between the ages of 35 and 40 years contested the presidential seat (VenturesArica.com). They were Mathias Tsado (40 years), Ahmed Buhari (40 years), Enyinnaya Nwosu (40 years) and 39-year old Eniola Ojajuni. The signing of the NTYTR bill by President Muhammed Buhari on the 31st May 2018 was more or less the primary influencing factor that awoke the political consciousness of the Nigerian youths. Another notable influencing factor is the visit of one of the world's youngest and most powerful head of government of France to Nigeria. It should be recalled that in July 2018, the 40-year old French president, Emmanuel Macron visited Nigeria. Speaking on Tuesday, 3rd July, 2018 when he visited the Afrika Shrine, Agidingbi, Ikeja, home of the late Afrobeat legend, Fela Anikulapo Kuti, during an event tagged 'Celebration of African Culture' to inaugurate the African Cultural Season 2020 (Adebayo, 2018). Another notably event worth mentioning is the European Union's position on low participation of Nigerian youths in politics. European Union (EU) on Thursday 3rd May 2018 decried the shortage of Nigerian youths participating in partisan politics. Mr Ketil Karlsen, Ambassador and Head of the EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, decried the poor level of youth participation when he visited the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Continuous Voter Campus Outreach at University of Abuja. According to Karlsen, for democracy to be representative, it must represent all the demographic population of a country, and the youths are an important reference point. According to him "there is a shortage of

youth's participation in politics in many countries including Nigeria. He then urged electoral stakeholders in the country to ensure that Nigeria's politics was not necessarily about the person with biggest pockets. He advised that politics in Nigeria should be about the person with the biggest ideas coming into power (Urowayino, 2018).

One of the impacts of the above mentioned series of events on youth involvement in the 2019 general elections is that it made the youths to be more determined than ever to get involved in jostling for power in the country. Ahead of the 2019 elections, some youths formed political parties. For example, Alliance for New Nigeria (ANN) was formed in March, 2017 by some politically concerned Nigerians, adopting "Technicianism" as its ideology - an ideology which they explained was aimed at replacing the old breed politicians (Wikipedia, 2018). Some youth organizations such as YIAGA Africa also suddenly demanded for the reduction in the prices of the nomination forms to enable them affordable by the youths. The youths also engaged the social media platforms (facebook, whatsapp, instagram and twitter) to sensitize colleagues on the latest happenings in the political realm. Many youth organizations conducted door to door sensitizations to encourage one another to collect their Permanent Voters Card (PVC) ahead of the 2019 general elections.

In addition, youths also engaged aspirants/candidates in robust debates which also

revealed that it was not business as usual. Some young Nigerians such as Senator Ben Bruce, Pastor Poju Oyemade, Fela Durotoye and so on also gave their support. For youth to also advance their cause, a movie titled "power of one" was launched on Saturday 20th October, 2018 at the Eko Convention Centre, Victoria Island, Lagos. According to the director, Izu Ojukwu, "Power of one" is a movie which is a phenomenal work of art aimed at entrenching in the hearts of Nigerians, the acceptance of the power of an individual and making a significant difference in the society. According to the producers, one of the foremost purposes of the movie is to reawaken civic responsibility in young Nigerians. The movie had an impressive stars on ground which included Ramsey Nouah, Annie Idibia, Jide Kosoko, Alexx Ekubo while the likes of legendary music icon 2Baba, popular actor Falz, comedian Kenny Blaq, singer Timi Dakolo and other actors in entertainment industry gathered for a press conference put together by Buckwyld Media Network to provide valuable insight about the movie (Onikoyi, 2018)

b) Hindrances and Challenges against the Participation and Involvement of the Youths

The involvement of youths in the political contests of the country during the 2019 general elections faced myriad of obstacles. According to Yiaga.org (2019), the NTYTR movement engaged political parties and made the following three demands to strengthen their involvement with enormous funds:

1. That Political parties reserve party tickets for young men and women with character, capacity and competence disaggregated as follows:

State House of Assembly Election

S/N	Geo-Political Zone	No. of State Constituencies	Requested No. of Party Tickets for Youths
1.	South West	176	53
2.	South East	129	39
3.	South South	160	48
4.	North West	216	65
5.	North East	156	47
6.	North Central	153	46
	TOTAL	990	298

Also for the House of Representatives Election, the following demands were made by the youth movement

Geo-political Zone	No. of Fed. Constituencies tickets for Youths	Requested No. of
South West	71	21
South East	43	13
South South	55	17
North West	92	28
North East	48	15
North Central	49	15
TOTAL	360	109

2. That Political parties should prescribe and enforce spending limits for party nomination fees and charges and that the cost of nomination of candidates should not exceed the followings:

House of Assembly Aspirant – N200, 000
 House of Representatives Aspirant – N400, 000
 Senatorial Aspirant – N600, 000
 Governorship Aspirant – N1, 000,000
 Presidential Aspirant – N2, 000,000

3. That Political parties should adopt open, transparent and direct party primaries in the selection process of candidates for the 2019 elections.

Aside of the challenge of funds that most youths faced, the demands of the NTYTR movement were not followed by most political parties. According to Vanguard (2018), at the last nationwide vote in 2015, the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P) of the then-president Good luck Jonathan charged 22 million naira per nomination form, the All Progressive Congress (APC) where President Muhammed Buhari contested levied 27.5 million naira (Vanguard,2018). But following persistent youth pressure, the PDP reduced the cost of its presidential nomination to 12million naira and the governorship from 11million naira to 6million naira. Yet, the sums were on the high side in a country where about 87million of its 180million are still in extreme poverty (World Poverty Clock, 2018).

Another challenge that posed a serious threat to youth involvement in the 2019 general elections is youth nonchalant attitude. In a recent interactive session with Dr. Jay Osi Samuels, the national coordinator of Alliance for New Nigeria, ANN, the nation has been held back by years of recycled leadership to the extent that one could even predict who the regular front runners would be during every election. According to him, the percentage of those who actively involved in politics, both as contestants and voters are less than 35% of the total population of Nigerians who are above the age of 18 years. The remaining 65% are made up of young professionals, both male and female, who hardly get

involved in the political process as contestants (This Day, 2017). Samuels lamented that for long, the nation has left its political destiny in the hands of few career politicians who only think of the next election and nothing more.

Another hindrance was the socio-economic factors such as poverty and unemployment. In Nigeria, the federal government in 2008 acknowledged that about 80% of Nigeria's youth are unemployed and 10% underemployed (Daily Trust, 2008). In 2011, the Minister of Youth Development, Bolaji Abdullahi reported that 42.2 per cent of Nigeria's youth population is out of job. Depo Oyedokun, the Chairman of the House Committee on Youth and Social Development revealed that of the over 40 million unemployed youths in the country, 23 million are unemployable. These statistics are grim for a nation whose children and youths of age 0 - 35 constitute about 77per cent or 105 million of its over 180 million population. Various studies in the past revealed that youths form bulk of the perpetrators of election related violence in Nigeria and around the world. This is in congruence with the view of Akinboye (1987), McAllister (2004), Nweke (2005), Bazza (2008), that youths have been repeatedly used as instruments of violence. Answers to why youths are ever available and vulnerable instruments in the hands of unscrupulous politicians to perpetrate electoral violence have also been advanced to the unskilled, uneducated or ill-educated, or unemployment of youths parents or their poor socio-economic status. This view tallies with Nweke's (2005) postulations who posited that factors responsible for youth's poor involvement or use for electoral violence include economically poor homesteads; poor education or being school drop-outs, high rate of unemployment and underemployment and psycho-cultural dispositions by political elites. This largely explains why some politicians explore the weakness of youths to involve them in destructive anti-social behaviours.

III. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1: Extent to which Nigerian Youths have participated in Previous Elections from 1999 till 2015 before the passage of NTYTR Act

With the use of six statements with 5-likert options, the following represent the findings from respondents on the questionnaires administered on them.

Statements	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Youths have satisfactorily contested elections since 1999 in Nigeria	63	31.3	76	37.8	9	4.5	34	16.9	19	9.5
The Nigerian electoral system long ago gave opportunity to the youths to contest elections	64	32.0	69	34.5	2	1.0	48	24.0	17	8.5

Youths have been the front-runners in Nigerian politics since 1999	95	47.5	64	32.0	2	1.0	20	10.0	19	9.5
The youths have being the main beneficiaries of Nigeria's democracy	88	44.0	68	34.0	2	1.0	30	15.0	12	6.0
Most political parties in Nigeria are youth-oriented	89	44.9	68	34.3	0	.0	22	11.1	19	9.6
There have been more young Nigerians in government than older politicians	97	48.5	62	31.0	1	.5	24	12.0	16	8.0

Source: Researcher's Field Survey, 2018

Table 1 above examined the respondents view on the level of youth participation in previous elections since 1999 up till 2015 before the passage of Not Too Young to Rule Act. The results revealed that only few of the respondents (26.4%) agreed that youth have satisfactorily contested in elections since 1999 while majority of (69.2%) disagreed. Also, 66.5% of the respondents disagreed that Nigerian electoral system gives the youths the opportunity to take part in

governance. About 80% of the respondents disagreed that youths have been the front-runners in Nigeria politics while 78% of the respondents believed that youths are not beneficial of Nigeria's democracy. Also 79.3% of the respondents disagreed that most political parties in Nigeria are youth oriented while 80% of the respondents disagreed that Nigeria have more young leaders in government since 1999.

Table 2: Fate of Nigerian Youths in the 2019 General Elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act

With the use of six statements with 5-likert options, the following represent the findings from respondents on the questionnaires administered on them.

Statements	Strongly Disagree		Disagreed		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
The NTYTR Act has given more youths the opportunity to contest 2019 election	33	16.6	40	20.1	12	6.0	80	40.2	34	17.1
Most political parties now sell their nomination forms at affordable prices to enable youth more participation	68	34.0	50	25.0	14	7.0	51	25.5	17	8.5
The NTYTR Act has given the youths equal chances with the older politicians in the forthcoming election	42	21.1	41	20.6	9	4.5	81	40.7	26	13.1
The NTYTR Act has closed the gap between the youths and the older politicians in Nigeria's electoral process	47	23.6	32	16.1	10	5.0	78	39.2	32	16.1
The NTYTR Act has awakened the political consciousness of most Nigerian youths	25	12.6	24	12.1	6	3.0	95	47.7	49	24.6
The 2019 election will mark the beginning of youth engagement in Nigeria's partisan politics	42	21.1	34	17.1	35	17.6	55	27.6	33	16.6

Source: Researcher's Field Survey, 2018

Table 2 showed that 57.3% of the respondents agreed that more youths were given the opportunity to contest 2019 general elections with the new Act passed while 36.7% disagreed. Also, only 34% of the respondents agreed that most political parties in Nigeria now sell their nomination forms at affordable prices to enable more youth's participation, while 59% of the respondents disagreed. Moreover, 53.8% of the respondents agreed that the new Act has given the youth equal chances with the older politicians while 41.7% disagreed. 55.3% of the respondents also agreed that the new Act has closed the gap between the youths and the older politicians in Nigeria while 39.7% disagreed. About 72% of the respondents agreed that

the new Act has awakened the political consciousness of most Nigerian youths while 24.7% say otherwise. Also, about 44% of the respondents agreed that the 2019 general election will mark the beginning of youth engagement in Nigeria's partisan politics.

Table 3: Effect of the NTYTR Act on Future General Elections in Nigeria.

This section presents the respondents' opinions on the effect of the Not Too Young To Run Act on future elections in Nigeria.

Statements	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
More youths will take part in future elections as contestants	38	19.5	45	23.1	10	5.1	67	34.4	35	17.9
After 2019 elections, good governance would emerge as outcome of more youth involvement	38	19.4	33	16.8	32	16.3	68	34.7	25	12.8
More young ladies would contest alongside their male counterparts	65	33.2	34	17.3	18	9.2	50	25.5	29	14.8
Vote rigging would be almost difficult	61	31.1	43	21.9	22	11.2	33	16.8	37	18.9
Electoral violence would not be witnessed anymore	47	24.0	39	19.9	37	18.9	40	20.4	33	16.8
As a youth, I can never sell my vote again	20	10.2	11	5.6	11	5.6	37	18.9	117	59.7

Source: Researcher's Field Survey, 2018

The results in Table 3 shows that majority of the respondents agreed that more youths will contest future elections (52.3%) after 2019, good governance would emerge as outcome of more youth involvement (47.5%); and that as a youth, and they can no longer sell their votes again (78.6%). On the other hand, most respondents disagreed that more young ladies would contest alongside their male counterparts (50.5%), vote rigging would be almost difficult in 2019 elections (53.0%); or that electoral violence would not be witnessed in the forthcoming elections (43.9%).

Test of Hypotheses

This section presents the results of the tested three hypotheses using chi-square test of association at 0.05 level of significance. The result is shown in the following tables.

Hypothesis One

The first hypothesis stated that 'The Nigerian youths have partaken excellently in previous elections from 1999 till date without the NTYTR Act'

Table 4: Nigerian Youths have partaken excellently in Previous Elections from 1999 till 2015 without the NTYTR Act

		Youths have partaken excellently in previous elections from 1999 up to 2015 in Nigeria									
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree	
		Fre q.	%	Fre q.	%	Fre q.	%	Fre q.	%	Fre q.	%
More youths will take part in 2019 elections as contestants	strongly disagree	18	29	11	14.9	2	22.2	5	15.2	2	11.8
	Disagree	12	19.4	23	31.1	1	11.1	6	18.2	3	17.6
	Undecided	3	4.8	3	4.1	1	11.1	2	6.1	1	5.9
	Agree	21	33.9	20	27	5	55.6	16	48.5	5	29.4
	strongly agree	8	12.9	17	23	0	0	4	12.1	6	35.3

Chi-sq. = 20.39; df = 16;; p = 0.203

The result showed that there was no significant association between the respondents' opinion on whether more youths have taken part in the previous elections as contestants and whether the youths have satisfactorily contested in previous elections since 1999 in Nigeria ($\chi^2 = 20.39$; $df = 16$; $p > 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is rejected and the null hypothesis that Nigerian youths have not partaken

excellently in previous elections from 1999 till 2015 without the NTYTR Act is accepted.

Hypothesis Two

The second hypothesis stated that 'The Nigerian youths have better opportunities to contest positions in the 2019 General Elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act'

Table 5: Nigerian Youths have Better Opportunities to Contest Positions in the 2019 General Elections with the Passage of the NTYTR Act

		Youths have satisfactorily contested the 2019 General Elections with the passage of NTYTR Act									
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Undecided		Agree		Strongly Agree	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
The NTYTR Act has given more youths the opportunity to contest in the upcoming election	strongly disagree	16	25.8	7	9.3	2	22.2	5	14.7	3	15.8
	Disagree	6	9.7	26	34.7	2	22.2	3	8.8	3	15.8
	undecided	5	8.1	4	5.3	2	22.2	1	2.9	0	0
	Agree	27	43.5	27	36	2	22.2	18	52.9	6	31.6
	strongly agree	8	12.9	11	14.7	1	11.1	7	20.6	7	36.8

Chi-sq. = 34.12; df = 16; p = 0.005

The results showed that there was a significant association between respondents' opinions on whether the NTYTR Act will give more youths the opportunity to contest the 2019 general elections and whether the youths have satisfactorily contested in previous elections since 1999 in Nigeria ($\chi^2 = 34.12$; $df = 16$; $p < 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is accepted that the Nigerian youths had better opportunities to

contest positions in the 2019 elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act.

Hypothesis Three

The third hypothesis stated that 'NTYTR Act allows more participation of Nigerian youths in future general elections'

Table 6: NTYTR Act allows more Participation of Nigerian Youths in Future Elections

		NTYTR Act allow more participation of Nigerian youths in future elections									
		strongly disagree		disagree		undecided		Agree		strongly agree	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
The NTYTR Act has awoken the political consciousness of most Nigerian youths	strongly disagree	9	14.8	7	9.2	1	11.1	5	14.7	3	15.8
	disagree	9	14.8	8	10.5	2	22.2	4	11.8	1	5.3
	undecided	2	3.3	2	2.6	2	22.2	0	0	0	0
	Agree	24	39.3	43	56.6	3	33.3	16	47.1	9	47.4
	strongly agree	17	27.9	16	21.1	1	11.1	9	26.5	6	31.6

Chi-sq. = 20.169; df = 16; p = 0.213

The results showed that there was no significant association between respondents' opinions on whether the NTYTR Act would give more youths the opportunity to contest in future elections and whether The NTYTR Act has awoken the political consciousness of most Nigerian youths ($\chi^2 = 20.169$; $df = 16$; $p > 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is accepted that NTYTR

Act will enhance more participation of Nigerian youths in future elections.

IV. DISCUSSION

Based on the first objective, it was observed that the Nigerian youths have not participated well in previous elections since 1999 up to 2015. They have not

allowed also exercised their civic rights to contest political positions other than voting. Instead, they were used as political thugs and agents for rigging and causing violence during election periods in the country. Reasons for this low level of participation by the Nigerian youths in previous elections include: the corrupt nature of the Nigerian electoral system, the win-at-all cost mentality of most Nigerian politicians, the lack of orientation and political awareness on the path of the youths as well as unfavorable economic conditions prevalent in the country like unemployment, poverty and hunger that pushed the youths to do whatever they were asked to do just to earn enough money to cater for their immediate needs. The youths cannot be blamed for their previous failure because of numerous challenges earlier discussed in this paper. This finding is supported by Omoede and Ojibara (2017) who found that youths in Kwara State were used as an instrument of electoral violence by the political elites because of unemployment and inadequate political education, among other factors.

Findings on objectives two showed that the passage of the NTYTR Act has allowed more youth participation in the 2019 general elections. It also revealed that the political consciousness and awareness of the Nigerian youths have increased. The youths are now setting up talk-shows, robust debates and seminars to educate and scrutinize aspirants/candidates on what they have to offer if voted into power. The youths also used the social media to attack or commend aspirants' actions or inactions during the 2019 general elections campaign period via face book and twitter platforms, all of which were due to the passage of the NTYTR Act. Thus, more young people such as Fela Durotoye of Alliance for New Nigeria (ANN) and Omoyele Sowore of African Action Congress (AAC) contested for the Presidency and popular musician Banky W contested for the Federal House of Representatives, Eti-Osa in Lagos state, among many others across Nigeria. Most incumbent politicians are on their toes and all pointing to the fact that the youths are no longer prepared to continue to sit on the back seat.

Lastly, findings from the respondents based on the third objective showed the Not Too Young to Run Act will encourage more youth participation in future elections. It is evident that youths are now prepared to take part in the political administration of the country. This is because, most political parties have reviewed their ideologies in favour of the youths with more dialogues, debates, seminars to sensitize them. The effect this will have on future elections is that more youths are now encouraged with minimal or no electoral violence. Election rigging and vote buying will also be reduced since the youths are not likely to sell their votes again. The implication of all this is that after the 2019 general elections, the governance of Nigeria will witness

a new era, an era where more youths will become more refined ().

The results on hypothesis one showed that there was no significant association between the respondents' opinion on whether more youths will take part in the 2019 general elections as contestants and whether youth have satisfactorily contested in elections since 1999 in Nigeria ($\chi^2 = 20.39$; $df = 16$; $p > 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is rejected and the null hypothesis that Nigerian youths have not partaken excellently in previous elections from 1999 till date without the NTYTR Act is accepted. Also, the results on hypothesis two showed that there was a significant association between respondents' opinions on whether the NTYTR Act has given more youths the opportunity to contest the 2019 elections and whether the youths have satisfactorily contested in previous elections since 1999 in Nigeria ($\chi^2 = 34.12$; $df = 16$; $p < 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is accepted that the Nigerian youths have better opportunities to contest positions in the 2019 general elections with the passage of the NTYTR Act. While the result on hypothesis three showed that there was no significant association between respondents' opinions on whether the NTYTR Act have effect on future elections ($\chi^2 = 20.169$; $df = 16$; $p > 0.05$). Based on the above, the hypothesis is accepted that NTYTR Act will enhance more participation of Nigerian youths in future elections.

In summary, the results of the data showed that most youth in Nigeria, according to the respondents, have not satisfactorily participated in previous elections in Nigeria. However, the NTYTR Act provided better opportunity for the youth during the 2019 general elections and significantly marked the beginning of such involvement. The Act will see more youths participating in future Nigeria's electoral process. This finding is however contrary to the position of Fidelis (2018) who noted that the trend will not last for long.

V. CONCLUSION

It is apt to say that the time for the youth is now. Everything is pointing towards the direction of the youths, more or less; for the first time in the political history of Nigeria. The youths are determined more than ever to get involved and eventually take over the governance of the country. The NTYTR Act increased level of participation and political awareness in the country with political consciousness and civic responsibility on the increase and more inactive political parties presenting candidates for election to meet the ambitions of the youths as well as serving as a bridge in actualizing their dreams.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the researcher's findings, the following recommendations are hereby offered:

Equipping the Nigerian youths through education or enlightenment is needful. Nigerian youths have a role to play in the nation's political process. Equipping the youths by educating them is predicated on the explicit relationship between knowledge and development and in the conviction that it is the key element in the development of a nation and its people. It is also necessary that youth advocates and change agents should concentrate on young graduates to enhance their political participation.

Also, the youths should be given the opportunity to be committed to the future of the country through constructive engagement as opposed to the win at all cost mentality that is prevalent in the electioneering process. Civil societies and Electoral umpire (INEC) should organize more workshops and seminars to engage the youths in meaningful dialogue, especially where the ethnic divide is deep.

In addition, the youths should learn and acquire the necessary skills for campaign management, fund raising and recruitment. There should be focused effort on assisting young party members to develop and implement coordinated strategies on important issues facing their communities. As the nation continues to grow, the need for diverse participation in the electoral process by young folds becomes compelling. Voter's registration and participation should not merely be encouraged but stressed as a necessity for all citizens especially the youth. They should also engage in exchange of knowledge and expertise that would strengthen their participation in building democratic processes.

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Democracy of Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding and Analysing the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

By Zainab Khorakiwala

Introduction – The Indian Constitution upholds the right to social, economic and political justice to all the citizens. Democratic institutions and elected representatives collectively engage in ensuring the exercise of fundamental rights without infringement. However, to say that a democratic society is free of social perils, is preposterous. Among social conflicts, incidents revolving around communal or religious disharmony often result in subjugation and repression. Although law takes its course, the prolonged delay in investigation and justice leads to the perpetuation of heinous atrocities against the socially disadvantaged.

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Democracy of Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding and Analysing the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Zainab Khorakiwala

I. INTRODUCTION

The Indian Constitution upholds the right to social, economic and political justice to all the citizens. Democratic institutions and elected representatives collectively engage in ensuring the exercise of fundamental rights without infringement. However, to say that a democratic society is free of social perils, is preposterous. Among social conflicts, incidents revolving around communal or religious disharmony often result in subjugation and repression. Although law takes its course, the prolonged delay in investigation and justice leads to the perpetuation of heinous atrocities against the socially disadvantaged.

Besides Hindu supremacists, the communities that often find a hotspot in political debates are the Dalits and lower-castes who have been constitutionally categorized as Scheduled Castes (SCs) due to their historic social isolation and marginalization. As affirmative action, the Indian Constitution confers reservation in government jobs and educational institutes on these caste groups. Being at the lowest rung of caste hierarchy, these groups have often been subject to caste-based tyranny, further intensifying their marginalization. In response, the Indian government enacted the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act in 1989 as a remedy to stringently regulate and address caste-based atrocities. Moreover, with changing times, the Act has been amended twice (2016 and 2018) to accelerate the delivery of justice. However, the question that remains unanswered is the effectiveness of the law in setting a precedent for the offenders and guaranteeing the right to life (as enshrined in the constitution) to the victims.

The following paper gives a brief overview of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, highlights the nature and intensity of offences committed under the Act, and comments on the effectiveness of the Act in the long-run. Although the name of the Act bears the terms Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (STs), the scope of the paper is confined to the former.

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II. THE SCHEDULED CASTES AND THE SCHEDULED TRIBES (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989

a) *Background*

The need for the Act arises from the long-standing four-fold caste system which is based on the two most important principles-birth (caste is ascribed at birth) and endogamy (marrying within one's own caste group). The institution of caste took an extreme form with the emergence of untouchability, which came to be associated with certain practices that were seen as polluting. These practices include handling of dead bodies, skinning of dead animals, manual scavenging, agricultural labour and leather tanning. The people performing these tasks came to be known as Dalits (untouchables) (Thorat and Joshi, 2015). As a result, the Dalits were denied land ownership, residence in village, temple entry, and access to public goods such as water from the common tank or well (Chandra et al., 2008). Despite various protests and movements, Dalits still continue to perform these tasks and face grave consequences.

In the background of this discrimination, the Indian constitution has granted the Dalits and lower castes the status of Scheduled Castes and the government has enacted the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act to ensure justice to the lower castes and Dalits.

b) *Overview of the Act*

The Act was enacted in 1989 to establish Special Courts as fast track courts at the district level to try offences under the Act and ensure speedy trial. Following is a list of major offences under the purview of the Act:

- Forcing a member of the Scheduled Caste to consume substance that is inedible and obnoxious;
- Acting with the intention to humiliate or injure a member of the Scheduled Caste by dumping faecal matter, waste or carcasses in the neighbourhood or premises;

- Forcefully stripping off a member of Scheduled Caste naked and making him/her parade with a painted face or body;
- Illegally occupying or dispossessing a member of the Scheduled Caste from the land allotted to him/her;
- Assaulting or causing harm to any woman belonging to the Scheduled Caste with the intention to outrage her modesty; and
- Denying access to public goods to a member of the Scheduled Caste.

The offender having committed any of the above-mentioned offences is punishable for a period of time ranging between six months to five years along with a fine. The Act also specifies a number of duties to be performed by the government to ensure effective implementation. Some of these include the provision of legal aid, travelling and maintenance expenses, social and economic rehabilitation, and identification of areas where members of the Scheduled Caste are prone to atrocities (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989).

III. SNAPSHOT OF OFFENCES

Although the Act has been in place since the 1900s, the effectiveness of its implementation can be inferred from the crime data and the nature of offences.

a) Examining Crime Data

According to the latest report released by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) (2016), over 40,000 cases of atrocities were reported against Dalits. The report presents data regarding the incidence of crime under various crime heads as mentioned in the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Around 1,500 cases of murder; 1,071 cases of grievous hurt (including acid attack cases); over 3,500 cases of assault on women; over 800 cases of kidnapping; around 2,500 cases of rape; and approximately 1,700 cases of rioting had been reported. Of the total cases reported, over 3,000 of the accused were convicted and over 10,000 of them were acquitted by the Special Courts. Over 1,20,000 cases remained pending with the courts. To summarize the plight of the people whose population exceeds 200 million in India (Census, 2011), everyday four Dalit women are raped, two Dalits are murdered, two Dalit houses are burnt and eleven Dalits are beaten up (Nawsagaray, 2018).

b) History of Offences

The reason for offences against Dalits is primarily grounded in land dispute, robbery, rape, and bonded labour amongst others. An overview of the nature and outcomes of these issues signifies the use of violence in ensuring marginalization of Dalits.

The names of Dalit families have not been disclosed in the following section to maintain their dignity.

- *The Khairlanji Massacre, 2006:* The massacre involves a Dalit family that had moved to Khairlanji, a village in the state of Maharashtra, to cultivate five acres of their newly purchased land. This piece of land, being a common passage for the villagers, became a bone of contention. Although the matter was taken to court, the Dalit family remained unscathed. This spurred tension between the family and the upper caste Hindus, leading to a series of unpleasant events. The latter inflicted torture on the family and this resulted in parading the women of the house naked to the centre of the village, crushing the genitals of the two sons with stones, gang raping the women, and dumping the corpses in the canal (Teltumbde, 2015).
- *The Mirchpur Carnage, 2010:* The carnage involves a trivial issue escalating into a massive inhumane act of violence in Mirchpur, a village in the state of Haryana. The issue started with a dog, belonging to a Dalit family, barking at a member of the Jat community (a dominant upper caste). The latter attacked the dog with a brick, leading to protest by a young boy from the Dalit family. Sensing trouble, two Dalits went to apologize to the Jats in the village. However, they were thrashed and later agreed to an out of court settlement, giving an opportunity to the Jats to suppress the community. Over 300 Jat men and women set fire to eighteen Dalit homes and stole their personal belongings such as jewellery, cash, clothes, gas cylinders and so on (International Dalit Solidarity Network, 2012).
- *The Dangawas Violence, 2015:* The violence against Dalits spurred over a land dispute in Dangawas, situated in the state of Rajasthan. The Jats claimed ownership to a piece of land that had been legally transferred to a Dalit family. However, the dispute turned violent when the family began constructing a house on the land. A mob of around 200 Jat men gathered around the land, leading to Dalits firing at the crowd and killing one of the Jat members. In retaliation, the crowd drove tractors over three men from the Dalit family. Women alleged of being sexually harassed and receiving threats of brutal attacks on their genitals (Meghwanshi, 2015).
- *The Dankaur Atrocity, 2015:* The atrocity involves an assertive Dalit man who had repeatedly sought legal remedy, but suffered defeat while seeking remedy against caste-based insult. He filed a complaint at the local police station in Dankaur, a town located in the state of Uttar Pradesh, accusing three members of the Gurjar community (a dominant upper caste) for dispossessing him of money, two cell phones and a motorbike. However, the police took no heed of the complaint, resulting in protest by the Dalit family and physical abuse by the police. The protest

turned fervent with the family stripping themselves naked in response to the torture. The protest has been termed as an act of obscenity and the family has been labelled as lunatic (NDMJ-NCDHR, 2015).

- *The Una Flogging, 2016:* The incident involves a Dalit family that was mercilessly beaten up with iron rods and sticks by cow vigilantes for skinning the carcass of a cow in Una, a town located in the state of Gujarat. Three of the male family members were then made to march in the town while they were being ruthlessly flogged (Kateshiya, 2016).
- *The Kurara rape case, 2018:* The horrific rape incident took place in Kurara, located in the state of Uttar Pradesh. A Dalit woman was initially gang raped by a group of four upper caste men and warned not to mention the incident to anybody. However, on informing her family, she was attacked, her private parts were brutalized with sticks, and she was made to march naked in the village (Verma, 2018).

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACT

The SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was enacted with the idea that fear of criminal law would effectively bring about a change in people's social attitude towards caste discrimination, thereby, alleviating caste-based violence and suppression. Therefore, to ensure its effective implementation with the passage of time, the Act has been amended twice.

Amendment, 2015

Despite the existence of deterrent provisions, adequate and timely justice remained a big obstacle. On the implementation side, there had been procedural hurdles such as non-registration of cases; delays in investigation, arrest, filing of charge-sheets and trial; and a low-conviction rate. Furthermore, it was observed that several atrocities caused against the SC community had not been covered under the Act (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Bill, 2014). Therefore, the Act has been amended to include uncovered atrocities such as putting garlands of footwear on SC members; stripping off their clothes; forceful tonsuring of head; shaving off their moustache; painting their face or body causing human indignity; and dedicating an SC woman to a deity, object of worship, temple or any other religious institution. In addition to Special Courts, the Act also establishes Exclusive Special Courts at the district level to try offences under the Act (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015).

Amendment, 2018

The amendment was a result of the Supreme Court's judgement in 2018, which received severe

criticism. Firstly, the amendment states that a preliminary inquiry for registration of First Information Report (FIR) shall not be required (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018). The Supreme Court's judgement in 2018 supported that a preliminary enquiry shall be conducted before the registration of FIR to avoid false cases. However, this is most likely to delay the entire process of investigation which can lead to injustice (Nawsagaray, 2018). Secondly, the investigating officer would not require prior approval for the arrest of the accused (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018). Earlier, the Supreme Court laid down that the investigating officer would require the approval of the Superintendent of Police before the arrest of a non-public servant and the approval of the appointing authority prior to the arrest of a public servant. However, such a provision is likely to make it impossible for the police to ever arrest the accused, especially given the low conviction rate (Nawsagaray, 2018). Lastly, even though in its judgement in 2018, the Supreme Court makes the granting of anticipatory bail mandatory, the amendment disallows the same with the view to prevent further perpetuation of atrocities against the victims (The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018).

A Brief Analysis

The amendments to the Act are a move in the right direction as they make it a stronger piece of legislation. However, the effectiveness of the legislation would depend on the implementation which involves the coordination within the administrative apparatus that includes the police, investigating agencies and the judiciary. Past experiences have shown that police officials refuse to file FIR or invoke the provisions of the Act in the FIR. In addition to this, perpetrators file false cases or counter-cases in collusion with police officials. Furthermore, officials do not arrest the accused immediately, cause delay in investigation, fail to interview or cross-examine the victims and witnesses, and have been inefficient in providing adequate protection to the victims and their families during and post investigation. In fact, it has been observed that investigation is often faster in counter-cases compared with cases under the Act (Nawsagaray, 2018).

Quite often, statements of victims and witnesses are not corroborated with the contents of the charge-sheet. Moreover, there have been deliberate efforts to leave vital information out of the charge-sheet to strengthen the case in favour of the accused (usually the upper caste members). An important aspect of police investigation that does not receive much attention in the debate regarding the effectiveness of the Act is the Final Report. The Final Report (FR) is prepared by the police upon completion of the investigation. In other

words, it carries the verdict of the police, indicating whether or not the case deserves to go to the court. Given the time constraint, FRs are not usually scrutinized by higher authorities. However, in case of dissatisfaction with the investigation, a remedy available to the complainant is to file a protest petition. Despite remedy, the function of the investigation solely lies with the police who would eventually generate the FR, deciding the fate of the case (Khora, 2014).

In 2012, more than 40% of the cases across seven Indian states were categorised as 'False' in the FR. Although cases under the 'False' category invoke Sections 182 and 211 (punishment for filing false charges with the intent to cause injury) of the IPC, police officials are selective about invoking them. In both situations, the SC community members are likely to become the victims. Therefore, this lacuna is reflective of the police's hostility towards the SC victims and their service to the upper castes (Khora, 2014).

Another major hurdle in the way of implementation is the weak judiciary system. There is a shortage of Special Courts and public prosecutors; delay in trials due to the absence of the accused, victims and witnesses in the court; problem of lengthy hearings; and the issue of courts being overburdened with cases, and so on (Nawsagaray, 2018). Moreover, courts consider delay in reporting of cases as lack of veracity with regard to the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, while the same situation does not arise in offences outside the purview of the Act. This seems bizarre because the victims have to constantly fight to prove the veracity of atrocities faced by them. Furthermore, the court barely ever takes notice of the fact that the delay in reporting may have been caused due to victims fearing threats to their social lives and the risk of being antagonised by the upper castes (Khora, 2014).

In most cases, courts do not apply the Act on the pretext that the crime was not committed because of caste. For instance, in the Khairlanji massacre (2006) (as previously mentioned), the court declined to take notice of any caste angle. In another case where five Dalits were lynched by a Hindu group, the Act was not applied on the grounds that the group did not know the caste of the victims. This reasoning of the court seeks to neutralize the Act (Teltumbde, 2018).

The Act has remained a good piece of legislation, but has been largely ineffective in its implementation. The administrative apparatus has been distorted and unaligned with the sole objective of the Act. The police have, time and again, favoured the upper castes and the system of justice has remained unjust. This has further increased marginalization and victimization of the weaker sections in the Indian society.

V. CONCLUSION

Laws and legal processes are not self-executing; they depend on and are reflective of human agency and institutions. The egalitarian nature of the Indian Constitution has led to the drafting of a plethora of legislations that appear flawless and sincere on paper. However, the implementation on the part of state agencies has perpetuated casteism, bearing an adverse impact on the integration of the society, thereby, further intensifying the vulnerability of the SC community to caste-based violence.

It is deeply saddening that India is approaching the 75th year of Independence, yet a substantial chunk of its population faces discrimination and injustice. The subjugation of Dalits is not only an issue of ineffective implementation, but it largely stems from the ignorance of the society, which has failed to hold those in power accountable. In other words, oppression, violence, victimization, marginalization, subjugation and repression cannot be eradicated unless the society exercises its will to transform. The law will continue to be amended with passing time, but a fragmented and ignorant society would be the biggest reason for its ineffective implementation.

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
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
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
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Acknowledgments

Contributors to the research other than authors credited should be mentioned in Acknowledgments. The source of funding for the research can be included. Suppliers of resources may be mentioned along with their addresses.

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Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

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The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

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The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

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Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

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Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

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TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of human social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



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7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

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Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources. Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:


This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
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- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
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Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

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Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
<i>Abstract</i>	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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