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The Collective West Concept and Selected Western Actors (Germany, Norway, Estonia, NATO) in the Russian Media: Post-Crimea Dynamics

By Ekaterina Chimiris

Financial University

Annotation- The Post-Crimean period gave us a series of new concepts in international relations, and one of them is the Collective West Concept. Being invented in the academic sphere several years before the Crimean case, the concept intervened the Russian public and political discourse. In this article I argue that the Collective West concept has become an instrument of additional securitization of the West in the discourse of Russian media. To prove the hypothesis, I have used the discourse analysis and concept mining methodology. I have created a sample of Media messages and by means of concept mining soft have coded the sample. In this research project I was interested in finding correlations between the Collective West and separate Western countries and actors (NATO, Germany, Norway, Estonia). After creating a correlation model for these concepts, I have looked at the overall semantic and argumentation context of the concepts usage. The results of the research give me an opportunity to conclude, that the Collective West Concept is mostly used by Russian Media in negative context. Such big international actors as Germany is included in the Collective West Concept, when the context of speaking about it is also negative.

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The Collective West Concept and Selected Western Actors (Germany, Norway, Estonia, NATO) in the Russian Media: Post-Crimea Dynamics

Ekaterina Chimiris

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Annotation- The Post-Crimean period gave us a series of new concepts in international relations, and one of them is the Collective West Concept. Being invented in the academic sphere several years before the Crimean case, the concept intervened the Russian public and political discourse. In this article I argue that the Collective West concept has become an instrument of additional securitization of the West in the discourse of Russian media. To prove the hypothesis, I have used the discourse analysis and concept mining methodology. I have created a sample of Media messages and by means of concept mining soft have coded the sample. In this research project I was interested in finding correlations between the Collective West and separate Western countries and actors (NATO, Germany, Norway, Estonia). After creating a correlation model for these concepts, I have looked at the overall semantic and argumentation context of the concepts usage. The results of the research give me an opportunity to conclude, that the Collective West Concept is mostly used by Russian Media in negative context. Such big international actors as Germany is included in the Collective West Concept, when the context of speaking about it is also negative. At the same time NATO is depicted as an instrument for the Collective West anti-Russian strategy. Such small European countries as Norway and Estonia are not mentioned in correlation with the Collective West. The main trend in Russian Media towards the West is simplification and intense securitization.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the post-Crimean period the image of the Western countries in the leading Russian Media sources is becoming more and more negative. At the same time, the Western think tanks consider this trend in Russian media to be a result of a special information politics of propaganda and disinformation.¹ We can find the same approach towards Western media in some Russian research institutes, when most of the

argumentation about Russia and attitudes to Russian politics is perceived as propaganda.² Unfortunately, this kind of approach does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the situation. This research is developed in the frame of securitization theory, which assumes that the two political entities face each other as a threat and create a spiral of mutual confrontation.³ That is why we look at Russian securitization discourse towards the Western actors as an integral part of the overall securitization process, being developed in post-Crimean period.

Moreover, we can notice an anxious trend toward "simplification" of the Western actor by emerging the concept of "collective West" in the official Russian discourse. Using the media sphere analysis, we make the deconstruction of current Russian discourse towards the selected Western actors (Germany, Norway, Estonia, and NATO). The cognitive mapping approach (in classical Axelrod's methodology of text coding⁴) as well as concept mining methodology⁵ gives us an opportunity to create a model of securitization Russian media sphere discourse towards the Western actors.

The main hypothesis of this research is that the ongoing simplification of the Western actor in the Russian media strengthens the securitization effect. And on the contrary – the diversification of the opponent may lead to the de-escalation in the conflict situation.

In this paper I would like to focus on the following tasks. First, to define to what degree the mention of NATO, Germany, Norway, and Estonia are correlated to the mention of collective West in Russian Media. Second, I am going to define at what connotation – negative or positive the term collective West is used. Third, I will look at the context of using the term and to find the differences. Finally, I will define at

² For example, see the RISS papers URL: <https://en.riss.ru/>

³ Wilhelmsen J. (2020) Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 0(0), 1–19.; Bækken, H., & Enstad, J. D. (2020). Identity under Siege: Selective Securitization of History in Putin's Russia. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 98(2), 321–344. <https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveastorev2.98.2.0321>

⁴ Axelrod R. (1976) The Analysis of Cognitive Maps. *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*, Princeton University Press.

⁵ Shehata, S. (2009) Concept Mining: A Conceptual Understanding based Approach.

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¹ For example: Sukhankin S. (2019) The Western Alliance in the Face of the Russian (Dis)Information Machine: Where Does Canada Stand? / Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Vol. 12:26.

what degree the usage of term influences the securitization process between Russia and Western countries, or what discursive methods are used by Russian Media to securitize the Collective West concept. In the first part of the paper, we will look at the concept of Collective West, how it emerged and developed through the scientific and political discourse. Second, I will look at the methodology, which was used in this research for the evidence on how the Collective West Concept is used in Russian Media. Third, as soon as we use the concept mining method, we will look at the main regularities of codes distribution and finally we will make the conclusions.

II. THE CONCEPT OF THE WEST – WESTERN AND RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION

The concept appeared in the Russian political and media discourse not so long ago but has spread rather quickly. It is usually used when political actors or journalists would like to mention Western countries in general. On the one hand, it may seem rather convenient, as we can mention all the Western countries without naming each of them. On the other hand, such *simplification* and *generalization* lead to the misperception of the West. In this paper I suggest, that using this concept creates more intolerant atmosphere in Media and promotes further securitization and escalation in Russian – Western relations.

The West as a concept has never been as obvious, as one would like it to be. We use the concept to speak about the geography, geopolitics, culture, economy. The West concept is under discussion in the western scientific literature. M. Kimmage in his book “The Abandonment of the West” points out, that The West has several meanings: point of the Compass, “Zapad” (Falling)⁶, sunset, Abendland (the Land of the Evening).⁷ The Sun starts its movement in the East (the Orient) and finishes in Europe, in the West. According to Kimmage, the geopolitical meaning came slowly to the West. At the same time, The West – is a place, a value, and an idea.

Gradually formed several dichotomies such as Athens as the West vs. Persian East; Western Half of Roman Empire vs. the Eastern half; the Latin (Western) variant of Christianity vs. the Eastern Orthodox Church; the Christians in the whole vs. the Muslim World; Liberal Democratic Western World vs. Eastern Authoritarianism and Communism.

In 1914, the London Times pointed out that Russia is outside of the Western World. The first and the second World Wars as well as the Cold War were wars between the Western and Eastern Worlds. From the point of view of the Western political and scientific

discourse, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 means the victory of the Western Model. And the main task for the Western countries was – to export the model around the World. This plan was successful until the moment, when Russian political establishment decided to develop their own geopolitical interest and ideas.

The Putin’s Munich Speech in 2007 has started the radical turnout of Russian values from the Western variant towards the unique Russian standards and ideas. At the same time the NATO enlargement process was negatively perceived by the Russian political elite. Vladimir Putin pointed out: “I think it is obvious that the process of NATO enlargement has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it is a seriously provoking factor that reduces the level of mutual trust”.⁸ But what was the most remarkable in this speech – is that Putin commented negatively on the unipolar world: “separate norms, ..., in fact, almost the entire system of law of one state, first of all, of course, of the United States, has stepped over its national borders in all spheres: in the economy, and in politics, and in the humanitarian sphere - and is imposed on other states”.⁹ Since 2007 Russia, consider the messianic mission of the USA as the threat to international stability and security. That is why since 2007 we can speak about the securitization of the USA, and gradually of the West generally in Russian political discourse.

The West as “the other” is not a new idea for Russian public and political discourse. At the same time Russian affiliation with Europe and the West is still a ground for scientific and public discussions. As V. Baranovsky points out, “debates on Europe have been part of Russia’s history throughout a last thousand years”.¹⁰ If till the 2007 and especially the 2014 Russia considered to be a part of the Western values and civilization, since the 2015 a period of competition between Russia and the USA and EU has started.¹¹ According to D. Trenin, Russia will not be the part of Europe, but “will remain essentially European”.¹² The Economic Eurasian project replaced the European one and Russia makes all the efforts to carry the leading role on the post-Soviet space.¹³ In these changing

⁸ Выступление и дискуссия на Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности. Мюнхен, 10.02.2007. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Baranovsky, V. (2000). Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe? *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 76(3), 443–458. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2625948>

¹¹ Trenin, D. (2015). From Cooperation to Competition: Russia and the West. *Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, 2, 82–93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48573456>

¹² Trenin, D. (2018). *EUROPEAN SECURITY: FROM MANAGING ADVERSITY TO A NEW EQUILIBRIUM*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16976>

¹³ Silaev, N., & Sushentsov, A. (2017). Russia and the Geopolitics of Eurasia. *Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, 9, 120–135. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48573712>

⁶ On the contrary “Vostok” as Rising.

⁷ Kimmage M. (2000) *The Abandonment of the West*. Basic Books.

geopolitical conditions, the Russian political discourse needs a new concept to define the West in this new way of thinking. Important to note, that Russian official discourse did not come to the one term right away.

III. FROM "HISTORICAL WEST" TO "COLLECTIVE WEST" IN RUSSIAN PUBLIC POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Why the West concept was not enough for Russian public and political discourse to speak about the Western countries? The concept "collective West" was used before the Crimea case. For example, the Director of Carnegie Center Moscow Dmitry Trenin mentioned it in his monograph "Integration and Identity: Russia and "the new West""¹⁴ in 2006. The concept was used to name the USA and EU, when experts spoke about their common politics or interests.

As the tension between Russia and Western countries escalated (after the Putin's speech in Munich Conference in 2007), the use of the term changed. In one of the Carnegies' books, we can find the term "collective West" in quotes.¹⁵ Now this trend to use quotes remains in liberal Media as soon as collective West without quotes is used more and more widely.

The term "collective" has often been used by the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs, but mostly with such terms as "security", "decision", "efforts", "political will", etc. The concept "historical West" appears in 2014: *"Recently, the contradiction between the objectively strengthening multipolarity and the desire of the United States and the historical West to preserve their usual dominant positions has become increasingly clear"*.¹⁶ Apparently, Minister Lavrov was referring to the EU, but due to the fact that Russian relations with Western countries began to change for the worse, the public political Russian discourse needed a new term to designate a new status for the West. At the same time, it was an attempt to distinguish the USA and the EU from Russia, whereas the term West is quite vague and not fully defined. In the situation of international confrontation, it is crucially important to name the "other", the enemy and to distinguish it from others.

The term Collective West was incorporated by Maria Zakharova in 2016: "At the moment, after the statements of the Russian leadership, it is no longer about "how Russia does not get bogged down in Syria,"

but how the *collective West* does not get bogged down in the Middle East, as the United States once did in Vietnam".¹⁷ Since then the term has been used sporadically, in quotations as well as without them. At the same time the term, "historical West" was still used by Minister Lavrov in 2017 and 2018. But since May 2018 Minister Lavrov also uses the concept Collective West: "But this "common sense" implies the ability of the leaders of the collective West to act responsibly and predictably, to strictly abide by international law, relying on the UN Charter. In recent years, we have been increasingly compelled to doubt this ability".¹⁸

President Putin started to use the concept of Collective West in 2021. In the last speech of President Putin for the Russian Federal Assembly on April 21, 2021, the term Collective West has been used once.¹⁹ It's worth noting, that he also used the term with additional clarification – "so called". This means that the term is only acquiring its outlines in the Russian public discourse. It is used carefully and with reservations. Nevertheless, the fact of its usage in the speech of the Russian President tells us, that soon the concept will be used more widely.

When Putin mentioned the term Collective West for the first time, he spoke about the situation in Belarus. For the moment Belarus is the Russian ally in the Eastern Europe, frankly speaking, the last one. For the Russian President was very important to support the current political regime of Alexander Lukashenko and to draw this virtual line between Russia and its allies and the Collective West. *"But today this practice is degenerating into something much more dangerous - I mean the recently known facts of a direct attempt to organize a coup d'état in Belarus and the assassination of the President of this country. At the same time, it is a common place, that even such flagrant actions do not find condemnation of the so-called **collective West**. Nobody just seems to notice this. Everyone pretends that nothing is happening at all"*.

The West is depicted as untrustworthy actor that tries to influence the internal political process in Belarus. At the same time from the point of view of President Putin the Collective West use so called "double standards" when it pays no attention to the counter-state actions in Belarus. The conspiracy hints also take place in the Russian President speech: *"Apparently, it is not for nothing that Western colleagues stubbornly refuse*

¹⁴ Trenin D. Integration and Identity: Russia As the 'New West'. Moscow, 2006. URL: <http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books> (In Russian)

¹⁵ Shevtsova L. (2010) The Lonely Power. Why Russia Has Not Become the West and Why the West Is Difficult for Russia. Moscow. URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/shevtsova_power.pdf

¹⁶ Выступление Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова на встрече с членами Российского совета по международным делам, Москва, 4 июня 2014 года. URL: https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/57150

¹⁷ Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В. Захаровой, Москва, 17 марта 2016 года. URL: https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2157393

¹⁸ Интервью Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова итальянскому журналу «Панорама», Москва, 3 мая 2018 года URL: https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xlEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/3206154

¹⁹ Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию. Москва, 21.04.2021. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/65418>

numerous Russian proposals to establish an international dialogue in the field of information and cyber security”.

The Collective West is depicted as the actor, that has “crossed all the borders”. What borders were meant? Now no geographical or territorial physical borders were crossed by the Western countries. Apparently, the Russian President meant some symbolic or transcendental borders. At the same time in the Russian language, the collocation «to cross the border» also has the following synonyms – “to go to extremes”, “to go too far”. So here, President Putin means not the real or symbolic borders, but the behavior of the Collective West, which does not follow any rules. The actor, that interfere in the affairs of other countries – “The way no one thought about the fate of Ukraine when the coup was carried out in this country”.

Official Russian position towards the West is still rather radical: “We really don't want to burn bridges. But if someone perceives our good intentions as indifference or weakness and himself intends to finally burn or even blow up these bridges, he should know that Russia's response will be *asymmetric*, quick and harsh”. Here I would like to point the reader's attention to the word *asymmetric*. This is not only a warning, but already a kind of a threat. President Putin attempted to pose the conditions, under which Russia will not use the hard power: “But I hope that no one will think of crossing the so-called red line in relation to Russia. And where it will take place, we will determine in each specific case ourselves”. As we see for the Russian President, it is crucially important to show the power and strength of Russia.

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR CONCEPT ANALYSIS IN MEDIA SOURCES

The prerequisites for the development of the methodology originate in the research of the BRIC concept.²⁰ This approach is based on the perception, that the discourse by itself may influence the change of the real processes. The purpose of this research was to find out the context of the Collective West Concept usage in Russian Media sources. To manage the big amount of media recourses I had to decide whether to use the qualitative or quantitative methods. Since the task was to find the overall context of the concept usage in a vast amount of media resources and to describe and analyze the concept usage. That is why I decided to use the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

At the first stage I have created a sample of Media messages, where the concept Collective West

was used at least once. By means of machine way I have received a sample of 900 messages from the period from April 2020 till April 2021. At the second stage I have loaded the sample for analysis to a special concept mining software (this time it was QDA Miner).²¹ At the third stage of research, I have coded the sample, using the following system of codes (Tab 1). I would like to point out, that the research task was to check – how the Collective West concept is used in Russian Media. And specifically – how this concept is correlated with four Western actors (NATO, Germany, Norway, and Estonia), and with Russia. After coding the sample, I have made measurements and came to several conclusions.

V. THE COLLECTIVE WEST CONCEPT IN CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL RUSSIAN MEDIA

Since we have an opportunity to count the mentions of the Code (Collective West) in media Sources it will be useful for our purposes to show the whole distribution of the Code through the sample. As we can see on the chart (Tab 2), the concept collective West is mostly used by conservative and anti-Western Media as *Russia Today*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, *RIA Novosti* etc. Mostly these types of media cite or discuss the official speeches of Russian politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats. More often the term Collective West is used by Maria Zakharova,

‘Collective West is living in a fantasy land,’ Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman tells RT amid new wave of anti-Moscow hysteria. (RT, 25.04.2021)

At the same time liberal pro-Western Media, such as *Meduza*, *RBC*, *Dozhd'*, use the term less.

Why did the collective West escalate with Russia? Is it just because Russophobes have not read Dostoevsky? Dozhd' (04.05.2021)

It is important to mention, that the President Putin's' speech for the Federal Assembly took place in April 2021, so a vast sample of messages were devoted to this event. We can conclude that in the current Russian media sphere the leading meaning makers are the top political elite and especially the President. Since the President has mentioned the term Collective West to designate the EU and USA, the vast pull of Russian Media sources began to use it widely. At the same time for the so called “liberal” media the President's discourse is not the source of meaning, so we can observe that the term Collective West is used less intensive.

²⁰ Сергеев В.М. и др. (2010) БРИК - политическая реальность посткризисного мира? Новые возможности для России: Аналитический доклад. (2010) В.М. Сергеев, Е.С. Алексеенкова, К.Е. Коктыш, К.Е. Петров, Е.С. Чимириш, А.С. Орлова. М.: Институт международных исследований МГИМО (У) МИД России. Вып.1(24).

²¹ Provalis Research. URL: <https://provalisresearch.com/products/qualitative-data-analysis-software/>

VI. THE FREQUENCY OF THE CODES USAGE IN THE SAMPLE

One of our research tasks was to find to what extent the Russian media sources are interested in specific issues, connected with separate countries – Germany, Estonia, Norway, and in NATO. As we see on the chart, the most used term is Russia (Tab 3) Collective West is used 1000 times in 878 cases, and Russia – 6 685 times in 758 cases. Germany is also

rather popular in Russian Media – it was used 3514 times in 317 cases. NATO takes the middle position – 681 times in 196 cases. Estonia and Norway are the less interesting issues for Russian Media.

The second research task was to look at the correlations between codes (Fig 1). This stage brings us one step closer from classical content analysis to the cognitive mapping and more deep investigation. We have made a sample based on the mentions of the code in the same segment of the text.




Figure 1

This approach gives us an opportunity to combine the qualitative and quantitative methods. First let's look at the distribution of correlations between codes in the given sample. Collective West is closer to Russia (0.035), then goes NATO (0.023), Germany (0.011) and USA (0.005). Norway and Estonia have never been mentioned together with the Collective West concept within the given sample of texts. Now we propose to investigate the text itself to understand the context of the concept's usage.

VII. COLLECTIVE WEST – RUSSIA

The Collective West concept collects all the mainstream ideas about the West or Western Countries, which are widely spread in the Russian political discourse in the after Crimea period.

a) Traumatic experience of Russian-West negotiations

From the point of view of Russia Media the Collective West is an untrustworthy partner for Russia,

whereas during the hard period of 90s of the XX century the West acted in its own interests and has used the weakness of Russia in its own interests. "Russia has already "paid a heavy price" when it trusted the "collective West" in the 1990s. However, now the words of Western countries are not perceived as a guide to action, and Russia is acting independently".²² Now Russian political actors are proud of being independent from the Western will and interests. And the main problem for Russia in the Russian – Western relations now is the Western attempt to impose its model and system of values on the other countries. Such an attempt was also done towards Russia in the 90s, but as a vast political science literature point out, this attempt was unsuccessful.²³ Moreover the fast and radical

²² В России заявили о готовности «дать Западу по зубам», 11.04.2021. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2021/04/11/gdd/>

²³ Biryukov N. (2018) Russian Politics in Transition: Institutional Conflict in a Nascent Democracy/Nikolai Biryukov, Victor Sergeyev. 2nd ed. Abingdon, Oxfordshire; New York: Routledge, 2018

implementation of liberal rules in economy and democratic rules in political system resulted in the growth of "gray zones", mafia, unstable and corrupted political system, etc. That is why the Western programs now are perceived as "betrayal", but not the aid or anything else. "We have already heard a lot from the collective West or directly from each country, from the political leadership over the year, over the past years, even over decades," Zakharova said.²⁴

b) Expansion of Western Values

Generally, the current western politics is depicted in Russian Media as the expansion of western way of life and institutions: "One group of countries after the end of the Cold War declared a claim to world leadership, and any attempt to challenge it is presented as a threat to world security. Now much that China, Russia, the SCO countries offer, is interpreted by the United States and the collective West in this way - a threat to the world order".²⁵

And the leading role in this configuration is given to "Washington in the camp of the "collective West" and the emphasis on military force and barracks discipline inherent in the Americans ("everything is for our own, for the enemies - the law").²⁶ Some countries in European Union will argue, that the USA international politics does not reflect the position of the whole West. But from the point of view of Russian political officials and pro-power Media, USA and NATO are the core of the "collective West camp", so in this simplistic picture of the World everything is logic.

Moreover, the Collective West does not only promote its values and "invites Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to unite in an alliance to counter Russia",²⁷ but also "aims to repeat the Ukrainian scenario in Russia. (...) The West, ..., primarily pursues the goal of removing the President of Russia and his entourage".²⁸ "Another permanently unstable post-Soviet country, Kyrgyzstan, also reminded of itself. Can we talk about the growth of the "zone of disorder" in Central Asia? There is an opinion: if Russia loses its position in the region, competitors - the collective West and China - will

enter it."²⁹ So from the point of view of the geopolitical situation Russia remains the only protection for the post-Soviet space against the expansion of the Collective West.

c) Russia as the Only Fighter against Western Expansion

At the same time, Russia is depicted as "the only country in the world that categorically does not suit NATO centrism... Russia is in Europe, we are at the forefront, and we objectively have much less freedom of maneuver than, for example, our partners in the BRICS or SCO".³⁰ Here we are moving towards the unique Russian or Eurasian world or identity, which oppose the expansion of the Collective West towards the East. "Russia itself, judging by the rhetoric of our politicians, political scientists and other *fighters of the information war with the "collective West"*, is, as it were, not Europe, but a "special civilization".³¹

"Russia will remain "irrevocable, irreversible" "enemy forever" for the collective West"³² At the same time there is an understanding, that Europe and USA, as well as separate European countries have different attitudes towards the Russia and international affairs. But for the internal political discourse this concept is rather convenient.

The Collective West concept is mostly effective for the internal politics, as it helps to create the besieged fortress regime inside Russia - "The next sanctions of the *collective West* against Russia will make our country only *stronger*".³³ As soon as the Collective West behave itself like this towards Russia, Russian politics towards the West will be symmetrical, or even asymmetrical (as we can see in Putin's speech) - "This is not only a call for the patriotic consolidation of Russian citizens and elites, but also a message for a foreign audience (primarily political and expert): Russia is putting forward a programmatic alternative to the trends that have captured the collective West, which do not find support from a significant part of the inhabitants of Europe and America".³⁴

d) Collective West as Untrustworthy Partner

Describing the strategy of the Collective West towards Russia the Russian politicians and Media depict it as an actor that has broken all the rules: "all these

²⁴ Захарова об угрозах Байдена: Чего мы только не слышали от США, 18.03.2021. URL: <https://ren.tv/news/politika/813522-zakharova-ob-ugrozakh-baidena-chego-my-tolko-ne-slyshali-ot-ssha>

²⁵ Косачев: в мире необходимо установить четкие правила взаимодействия между государствами, 15.06.2020. URL: <https://www.pnp.ru/politics/kosachev-v-mire-neobkhodimo-ustanovit-chyotkie-pravila-vzaimodeystviya-mezhdu-gosudarstvami.html>

²⁶ Косачев призвал принуждать "коллективный Запад" к соблюдению устава ООН. 01.04.2021. URL: <https://ria.ru/20210401/ustav-1603770828.html>

²⁷ Альянс Украины, Грузии и Молдавии против РФ. Вечер с Владимиром Соловьевым. 09.02.2021. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/video/2267294>

²⁸ Украинский сценарий для России. Вечер с Владимиром Соловьевым, 02.02.2021. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/video/2264568>

²⁹ Почему вокруг границ России возникла дуга беспорядка, 21.10.2020. URL: <https://vz.ru/politics/2020/10/21/1060013.html>

³⁰ Косачев призвал принуждать "коллективный Запад" к соблюдению устава ООН 01.04.2021. URL: <https://ria.ru/20210401/ustav-1603770828.html>

³¹ "В ссоре России с Евросоюзом виноваты обе стороны". 22.03.2021. URL: <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2021/03/22/v-ssore-rossii-s-evrosoyuzom-vinovaty-obe-storony.html>

³² Павловский назвал санкции действиями без конкретной цели. 18.03.2021. URL: <https://vz.ru/news/2021/3/18/1090050.html>

³³ Толстой: санкции Запада сделают Россию еще сильнее. 02.03.2021. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/article/2530984>

³⁴ По осени считают. 17.02.2021. URL: <https://iz.ru/1126117/dmitrii-orlov/ne-ostavliaia-na-potom>

principles have already been destroyed by the collective West"³⁵. In this information context Russia is a victim, but not the aggressor - "the collective West has been demonstrating a "hostile attitude towards Russia" for a thousand years, and many elites have changed during this time",³⁶ "various methods are used to contain Russia, including the imposition of sanctions, political pressure, disinformation campaigns and interference in internal affairs".³⁷

At the same time Russia is depicted as an actor, that is open to the dialogue and negotiations. But "the European Union and the United States continue to talk about sanctions with maniacal persistence. This is how the press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov assessed the current relations of Russia with the collective West".³⁸

e) *Collective West does not Understand Russia*

From the point of view of Russian politicians," the West does not understand our inner life, our grassroots life, not at the level of authorities, governments and so on, but at the level of ordinary people".³⁹ At the same time the European politics towards Russia is perceived in Russia as not very far-sighted - "What is important is that the collective West is in a hurry only to blame Russia for the danger and worries Moscow for the average person on the continent. This is necessary to "fork out" the country for security, but the Europeans frankly do not believe that Europe will be protected by the United States".⁴⁰

f) *Collective West Unite Against Russia*

One of the most dangerous from the point of view of securitization process is the fact, that Russian Media percept the Collective West as a real unity, which mobilizes and integrates against the supposed Russia aggression - "The topic «Russia as a Common Enemy» is very convenient. And anti-Russian rhetoric will be used to strengthen this unity".⁴¹ Another mainstream

idea, is that the Collective West "insists on one thing: the "unconditional and proven" guilt of Russia".⁴²

The Collective West is a kind of simulacra and creating of such is one of effective "weapons" in the Informational War. It is not quite clear, where the collective West is situated geographically, but its place is well defined in the information area. We have pro-Western Media (Meduza, Dozhd'), we have international (mostly pro-Western agents, among organizations, as well as among the individual persons), we have the pro-Western liberal discourse as a marker of so-called anti-Russian and anti-patriotic "propaganda". So, if geographically it will be difficult to define if any specific country belongs to the Collective West, on the level of information communication and Media such classification is done rather quickly and precisely.

VIII. COLLECTIVE WEST – NATO

NATO is the most frequent correlation code together with the Collective West in the given sample. But here once more is the question – is NATO a part of the Collective West, or something else? The qualitative analysis of the correlations between the codes gives several contexts of NATO concept usage together with the Collective West.

a) *NATO as a Part of Collective West*

NATO is included in the Collective West concept, as well as the European Union: "This is a political action that should be viewed as a link in a chain, in a chain of everything that this very collective West is - both the European Union and NATO",⁴³ "the collective West - both NATO and the EU - must maintain unity and security".⁴⁴

b) *NATO as an Instrument of the Collective West*

At the same time, NATO is also an instrument for Western expansion to the East: "Unfortunately, the collective West chose a different path - it chose the option of expanding NATO to the East,⁴⁵ "as experts note, after the collapse of the ATS, the promises of the collective West not to expand NATO were not fulfilled".⁴⁶

³⁵ Роскомнадзор допустил блокировку Twitter в России через месяц. 16.03.2021. URL: <https://iz.ru/1137838/2021-03-16/roskomna-dzor-dopustil-bloirovku-twitter-v-rossii-cherez-mesiatc>

³⁶ Депутат от Севастополя Белик оценил условия признания Крыма российским на Западе. 16.03.2021. URL: <https://argumenti.ru/politics/2021/03/713803>

³⁷ Захарова: санкции – часть политики сдерживания России. 04.03.2021. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/article/2531799>

³⁸ В Кремле все еще надеются на диалог с Западом, но готовы ко всему. 16.02.2021. URL: <https://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2021/02/16/1887778.html>

³⁹ Запад не способен понять простых россиян. Вечер с Владимиром Соловьевым. 16.02.2021. URL: <https://www.vesti.ru/video/2269236>

⁴⁰ Появление плана удара НАТО по РФ сочли попыткой "раскошелить" Европу. 31.01.2021. URL: <https://ren.tv/news/politika/797463-poiavlenie-plana-udara-nato-po-rf-sochli-popytkoi-raskoshelit-evropu>

⁴¹ Политологи ожидают более агрессивного отношения США к РФ при Байдене. 21.01.2021. URL: <https://ren.tv/news/v-mire/794244-politologi-ozhidaiut-bole-agressivnoe-otnoshenie-ssha-k-rf-pri-baidene>

⁴² Была с Навальным в Томске и вылетела с ним в Берлин: Почему молчит скрывшаяся в Европе Мария Певчих. 13.09.2020. URL: <http://www.kp.ru/daily/217181.5/4286824/?from=twall>

⁴³ Захарова отметила, что США создали фейк, заявляя о дистанционном запросе на суд Навального. 02.02.2021. URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/10608497>

⁴⁴ В плену искусственной объективности. Запад должен руководствоваться хельсинкскими принципами, а не стокгольмским синдромом. 15.05.2020. URL: <https://theins.ru/opinions/219415>

⁴⁵ Посол РФ напомнил, что именно Москва открыла путь к объединению Германии. 31.10.2020. URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/9619381>

⁴⁶ «Дестабилизация мировой безопасности»: к чему привёл роспуск военных структур Организации Варшавского договора. 31.03.2021. URL: https://russian.rt.com/world/article/847872-rosputsk-voennye-struktury-organizatsiya-varshavskogo-dogovora?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS

Here once more we can see the indication of untrustworthy West, which uses NATO as an instrument for the expansion to the East.

It will be also important to mention, that Russian Media sometimes use conspiracy theories: "Unexpectedly for the political elite of NATO countries, the development of events in relations between Moscow and the collective West since 2000 did not follow the scenario that was written for Russia even before the 90s of the last century".⁴⁷ It is interesting to mention, that the variety of conspiracy theories can still be found in the official and public political discourse in Russia.⁴⁸

Of course Russian Media and public politicians don't aspire the open arm conflict with NATO, so it is important, that "Russia's relations with the collective West, continued in the diplomatic service, did not undergo any changes for the better, but overall, the tension in interaction with NATO was partly smoothed out, which became possible thanks to the introduction of a unilateral moratorium by the Russian Federation on the deployment of ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe".⁴⁹

For Russian Media it is very important to underline the unity of the Western Countries and NATO. We can find the following explanation for this phenomenon in Russian Media - Western politicians are "in principle, forbidden to cooperate with Russia in the implementation of important projects". Several American politicians and experts perceive such cooperation as a betrayal of the interests of the collective West (which, of course, are determined only by the United States) and as a split in NATO".⁵⁰

In preliminary conclusion for this analysis – NATO is included in the Collective West Concept when Russian media use both of these terms. But NATO is mostly perceived as an instrument by which the Collective West implements its plans, especially plans against Russia and Eastern expansion.

IX. COLLECTIVE WEST – GERMANY

The main question, that arises when we analyze the mention of Germany in the sample, is what the relations between Germany and the Collective West are. In addition, what is the information context of speaking about Germany in the Russian Media in the period that is analyzed? To answer the first research question – yes, Germany is a part of Collective West: "Germany, the

United States and other countries of the "collective West" are scaring Russia with sanctions over Navalny's verdict".⁵¹

Further, the main news occasion to speak about the Collective West and Germany was the Navalny Case. As soon as Navalny himself is depicted as an enemy of Russia, Germany also is depicted as a country, that is somehow in conflict with Russia: "Thus, it turns out that behind the back of a weak, *dependent person stands the collective West* in the person of Germany, the United States and a number of other countries, and this weak person, for some reason, begins to vilify everything that is sacred and dear to the citizens of Russia".⁵² Moreover Navalny is depicted as "the agent of the Collective West" (once more we see the variant of a conspiracy theory).

The situation with Navalny is mostly called "an unreasonable irritant in interaction with Germany and a number of other countries of the collective West".⁵³ So after the incident is over Russian politicians are ready to return to more serious issues in Russian – West confrontation. So, the attitude of the German politicians regarding the Navalny case was surprising for Russia. It was an irrationally serious reaction from the German side, as the Russian media it has depicted: "After German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly called the incident with blogger Alexei Navalny "poisoning", the collective West demands an explanation from Russia".⁵⁴ And from the official Russian position it was just a dramatization of poisoning by Navalny and his allies.

In this example of German presence in Russian Media, we can see that the Collective West concept is used, when the information context is negative. Germany becomes a part of the Collective West, when it is in confrontation with Russia: "They (the neo-Nazis) received freedom of action in many respects from their governments - when Russophobia merges with Nazism, the European authorities do not see it point-blank, since for the collective West Russia is an enemy that needs to be surrounded from all sides and imposed with sanctions. How similar it is to attempts to "pacify" Hitler on the eve of World War II!"⁵⁵ Interesting to mention, that

⁴⁷ Кто лучше для России: Трамп или Байден? 15.03.2021. URL: <https://argumenti.ru/world/2021/03/713740>

⁴⁸ LIVERS, K. A. (2020). *Conspiracy Culture: Post-Soviet Paranoia and the Russian Imagination*. University of Toronto Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctv179h1hx>

⁴⁹ МИД подвел итоги года. 29.12.2020. URL: <https://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/200751>

⁵⁰ Соединённые Штаты будят Европу 17.07.2020. URL: https://russian.rt.com/opinion/765198-mirzayan-ssha-sankcii-severnyi-potok-2?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS

⁵¹ Слуцкий: угрозы Запада демонстрируют бенефициаров провокации с отравлением Навального. 04.02.2021. URL: <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2021/02/04/sluckiy-ugrozy-zapada-demonstriruyut-benefitsiary-provokatsii-sotravleniem-navalnogo.html>

⁵² «На фигу козе баян?» Кургинян рассказала, чего хотят хозяева Навального. 17.02.2021 URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3192939.html>

⁵³ Слуцкий о высылке европейских дипломатов: «никто не позволит раздавать печенки Госдепа на российских улицах». 05.02.2021. URL: <https://argumenti.ru/politics/2021/02/708595>

⁵⁴ SVT: сложилось впечатление, что Путина перестало беспокоить мнение Запада. 07.09.2020. URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3055583.html>

⁵⁵ Историк сравнил потворство Европы неонацистам с "умиротворением" Гитлера. 20.11.2020. URL: <https://ria.ru/20201120/neonatsizm-1585461762.html>

there are no significant correlations between the Collective West Concept and Estonia and Norway. Of course, there are mentions of these countries in the sample, but it is not very significant in comparison to NATO and Germany.

X. COLLECTIVE WEST – USA

Additionally, I have also looked at the correlation between the Collective West concept and the USA, which is depicted mostly as the leading country in the Collective West: "Under the Biden administration, the US and EU are consolidating on an anti-Russian basis. Sanctions are a way to show the ideological position and synchronization of actions with the EU, which is extremely important for the United States, to visually demonstrate the revival of the *collective West*, which weakened sharply during the presidency of Donald Trump, when the United States and the European Union acted asynchronously".⁵⁶ In the new circumstances after Donald Trump resignation the Collective West from the point of view of Russian Media experts will become more united and stronger. And their main task will be to struggle with Russia: "It is becoming increasingly clear that since the inauguration of the 46th US President Joseph Biden, the collective West has embarked on a course of confrontation with Moscow".⁵⁷

Thus, new Biden administration will obviously increase the confrontation together with the European partners: "Moreover, motives dictated by the spirit of the times, when relations with the European Union and the United States do not raise doubts that the "collective West" is waging a serious propaganda campaign against Russia"⁵⁸ – that is how the situation is presented in Russian Media.

XI. THE COLLECTIVE WEST CONCEPT AS IT IS USED IN RUSSIAN MEDIA

Some overall conclusions about the configuration of the Collective West Concept in Russian media. First, the concept is usually a way to name EU and USA together. But Collective West – is an active and powerful West. Not all the Western countries belong to the Collective West.

Second, the Collective West – as a group of Western countries, that are against Russia. If there are no evident conflict issues in relations with some Western country, the Collective West concept is dropped out from the media discourse.

⁵⁶ Эксперт объяснил ключевой смысл новых санкций США против России. 02.03.2021. URL: <https://vz.ru/news/2021/3/2/1087570.html>

⁵⁷ Чем заканчивается игра с фонариками. 10.02.2021. URL: <https://rg.ru/2021/02/10/komu-nuzhny-i-chem-zakanchivaiutsia-progulki-s-fonarikami.html>

⁵⁸ Без пафоса 23.02.2021. URL: <https://rg.ru/2021/02/23/shvydkoj-kulturnaia-deiatelnost-mozhet-byt-istolkovana-kak-prosvetitel'skaia.html>

Third, the Collective West has some negative characteristics such as: expansionism, untrustworthy, aggression, intervention into internal politics of other countries, double standards politics. All these features make the Collective West Concept rather suitable for securitization.

XII. THE COLLECTIVE WEST SECURITIZATION

As we see in the discourse and concept analysis above, the process of the Collective West securitization is grooving steadily. According to B. Buzan theory, securitization is a process where issues turn into matters of security⁵⁹. According to the theory there are several steps towards securitization, and we can observe, how the Collective West become more and more securitized in the Russian public and political discourse.

1. *The rise of an issue on the agenda.* First the Collective Wests concept was used by the academics, and gradually it was noticed by politicians and was incorporated into their discourse.
2. *Act as deterrence.* As the Collective West is depicted in Russian Media and political discourse as a threat and untrustworthy international agent, there should be special acts of deterrence, such as the Crimea Case, or Donbass confrontation.
3. *Legitimize the past acts and reproduce existing securitizations.* As soon as the Collective West reproduce more and more "unfriendly" acts, the Crimean decision was and remain legitimate from the point of view of Russian political establishment.
4. *Acquire more control.* The current securitizing discourse near the Collective West concept create for Russia a room for maneuver in the future. It helps to legitimate the future possible decisions and activities.

So, the Collective West concept steadily becomes more and more securitized and effectively used to explain and legitimize the past and future political decisions. It is interesting that when separate countries such as Germany, Norway or Estonia are discussed, we can notice less radical negative effect.

Therefore, the simplification and generalization of an actor leads to the increasing securitization effect. The Collective West is becoming a solid concept with the negative connotation. At the same time, it is not always obvious what concrete countries are included into the concept. The Collective West is a system of anti-Russian values. It acquires the unified features, which may be not the case.

⁵⁹ Albert, M. and Buzan, B. (2011). "Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation". *Security Dialogue*. Volume 42, Issue 4. pp. 413-425.

But at the same time there is also the West and separate Western countries, with which the dialogue is still possible. Moreover, is Russia being of course not the part of a Collective West; the conceptual dialogue is Russia a part of the West or not – is still on the public Russian agenda.

The Russian Mass Media played a crucial role in the securitization of the Collective West. As soon as B. Buzan argue – “the labeling of an issue as an existential threat for a specific referent object does not necessary constitute securitization. For the latter to happen, the audience must accept the security move, or at least tolerate it”⁶⁰. As we can see in the case of Putin speech in 2021 and the speed of Collective West concept propagation through the Mass Media, the concept is tolerated and recognized as a threat.

XIII. CONCLUSION

In the result of the analysis presented above I have come to several conclusions. In this paper we have shown the growth of a selected concept from the analytical term towards the securitization instrument for internal political discourse. Moreover, in this example I have shown how simplification goes to escalation of securitization of discourse.

The Collective West Concept appeared in academic literature in 2006 as an attempt to find a suitable term for all the Western countries. In the beginning, there was no special emotional stress on it. Moreover, it has appeared before the Putin's Munich Speech and the start of Russian – West confrontation. After 2014 the escalation of confrontation was so strong, that Russian diplomats and politicians needed a special term to name the European countries and the USA. Since the USA and EU in some cases made similar decisions towards Russia, the last needed to somehow oppose itself. Therefore, Minister Lavrov started to use the concept of “historical West”. And since 2018 he uses the Collective West concept in his speeches. In 2021 we were able to hear this term from the Russian President. In addition, since then the Collective West became popular in Russian Media. It is important to mention, that the Collective West concept is more used in so called conservative Media, and the Liberal ones use it less and even put in quotes.

The collective West concept is not very productive for real diplomatic work. If we really would like to discuss the current situation in relations between Russia and separate European countries and the USA, it will be of a little help. However, if the goal is to influence the public opinion and to create the atmosphere of Russian – Western confrontation, this concept appears to be rather useful. The Collective West is more of a kind

of simulacra, which may be used for informational confrontation and internal politics. By means of this concept Russian politicians and some experts explain the situation in international politics, legitimize the past and future Russian decisions. If we look at the most important risks that are depicted in the Russian way of speaking and thinking about the Russian – West confrontation, they will be the following.

Russia is a Strong Country. Current Russian President and political elites are afraid to appear weak. What does it mean for Russia to show weakness? – from the discourse analysis we can conclude that it means to make concessions, “lose face” at the international level. What are the signs of weakness for Russia on the international arena? First – to lose some part of sovereignty, to allow other countries to behave themselves without respect to Russian interests.

Above we have discussed the Russian understanding of the term “to cross the border”. It is important to mention, that Russia have some specific understanding of the problem of borders.

Vladimir Putin: Russia's border 'doesn't end anywhere'

Border problem. Due to the fact, that the topic of borders is still painful and unresolved for Russia at the existential level (there is no clear understanding of where these borders are, we live in a “matryoshka” situation*), Russia is building a defensive position and “red lines” to protect itself. The discourse reflects – “do not cross our boundaries, otherwise we will answer symmetrically/asymmetrically”.

It is important that there are several marginal concepts and projects of redefining boundaries from a historical perspective.

“I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiia back in the tsarist days – Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev and Odessa – were not part of Ukraine back then... The center of that territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiia. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained.” (Vladimir Putin, 2014)

*“*Matryoshka*” of Russian Borders - Russian borders are movable. There are internationally recognized borders, the zone of Russian interests that is post-Soviet space, and the so-called Russia World borders on the map, there are borders of residence of the population with a Russian passport. Which of these borders will Russia protect, and will it have enough resources for this? At one point, the idea of sovereign autonomous development prevailed over cooperation and dialogue.

Perceptual errors. The transitional political regimes of the post-Soviet space hindered the effective development of the growth of the EU project and the American project of the worldwide triumph of democracy. At the same time, it is also necessary to consider the economic interests of the West. From this stems Russia's perception of assistance to the democratic development of the post-

⁶⁰ Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Press: Boulder, Colorado.

Soviet states as interference in sovereignty and violation of the boundaries of Russia's interests.

Therefore, the Collective West is a very useful Concept for Russian Media discourse – it has special characteristics (aggression, untrustworthy, double standards, expansion, etc.) and due to them becomes a clear enemy for Russia in the issues described above. First, the Collective West threatens different Russian borders (from real ones by means of NATO enlargement, to symbolic ones by cultural expansion); second, it adheres to double standards, as the Collective West protect its own borders, but intervene in other countries internal and external politics; finally, the Collective West is untrustworthy partner, as it has betrayed Russia in the 90s of XX cent and wanted to make Russia weak and unstable.

Considering other countries, and I have tested the sample with Norway and Estonia and concluded, that in the overall massive of news their role is not depicted as something important. Due to the trend to simplification of the “enemy” Russian Media discourse avoid any complexity and depict the international relations as a simple confrontation between Russia and the Collective West, which is mostly presented by NATO, USA, and some powerful European countries, such as Germany.

So, the Collective West is a clear and simple Concept for further securitization of Russian Media

discourse. And now the portrait of the West is more and more often reflected through the concept of collective West. Thus, we have the following trends, illustrated by the Collective West Concept usage in Russian Media.

1. If the counterparty is not clear, we do not trust. The spiral of mistrust is twisting, as we are increasingly broadcasting clichés and simplified verbal formulas, rather than a deeper analysis of the counterparty's motivation.
2. If we simplify it, we collapse to a certain collective image.
3. The stronger the escalation of the conflict, the stronger the control over public discourse within the country. There are fewer and fewer alternative discourses.

So, the complexity of Western actors moves on back side in Russian Media Discourse. They are more interested in discussing confrontation between Russia and Collective West. Local issues with separate European countries such as Norway or Estonia are not so interesting for Russian Media. Germany and NATO occupy a larger volume of information space, and they are more often associated with the concept Collective West (along with the USA). Therefore, the Collective West is a good instrument for securitization of Russian attitude towards West especially for internal political needs.

Table 1: The List of Codes for Analysis

Base Code	COLLECTIVE WEST
Codes	NATO
	GERMANY
	NORWAY
	RUSSIA
	ESTONIA

Table 2: Frequency distribution of all the cases in the Media Sample

Value	Frequency	Total Percent
Взгляд	203	22,70%
RT	53	5,90%
Российская газета	48	5,40%
Московский комсомолец	45	5,00%
РИА Новости	45	5,00%
Вести.ру	44	4,90%
ТАСС	44	4,90%
Правда.ру	43	4,80%
ИА Regnum	41	4,60%
Росбалт	37	4,10%
Парламентская газета	32	3,60%
Известия	30	3,30%
КР.RU	29	3,20%

АН Онлайн	27	3,00%
«Life.ru»	22	2,50%
РЕН ТВ	21	2,30%
Аргументы и факты	14	1,60%
Новости ТВ Центр	13	1,50%
Lenta.ru	12	1,30%
Интерфакс	10	1,10%
ZNAK.com	9	1,00%
Петербург 5 канал Новости	8	0,90%
Газета.ru	8	0,90%
Новые Известия	7	0,80%
Звезда	7	0,80%
ФедералПресс	5	0,60%
Meduza.io	5	0,60%
РБК	5	0,60%
Коммерсантъ	5	0,60%
The New Times	5	0,60%
Yandex-zen THE INSIDER	4	0,40%
fontanka.ru	3	0,30%
Телеканал Дождь	3	0,30%
МБХ Новости	3	0,30%
Новости	2	0,20%
URA.RU	1	0,10%
Новая газета	1	0,10%
Дни.ру	1	0,10%
Медиазона	1	0,10%

Table 3: Frequency of selected codes

Code	Number of mentions	% of mentions	Number of cases
RUSSIA	6685	3190,0%	758
GERMANY	3514	1680,0%	317
COLLECTIVE WEST	1000	480,0%	878
NATO	681	320,0%	196
ESTONIA	18	10,0%	8
NORWAY	6	0,0%	6



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Inclusão, Equidade, Seletividade: Que Justiça(S) Percorre (M) as Políticas Educativas e as Práticas Escolares?

By Aline Bernardes Seïça

Resumo- Tendo como horizonte de referência a Agenda 2030 para o desenvolvimento sustentável, recomendações da OCDE preconizam uma educação que forme “mão-de-obra competente e qualificada” pelo desenvolvimento de estratégias que articulem resultados da educação com necessidades das sociedades, visando “um crescimento inclusivo”. A ideia de que uma educação “de qualidade” e equitativa favorece a realização pessoal e promove o desenvolvimento económico sustenta essas recomendações. As políticas e a legislação educacionais portuguesas mais recentes denotam igualmente esta dupla finalidade e a ambivalência que a acompanha; a escola, dividida entre exigências de eficácia e sucesso e de inclusão de todos os alunos, de equidade e diversificação, enfrenta desafios de justiça que põem à prova diretores e professores quanto à capacidade de conjugação entre axiologias e éticas distintas, se não contraditórias. Integrando uma investigação de doutoramento sobre a problemática da justiça na escola, fundamentada em teorizações filosóficas e sociológicas de justiça, este artigo focaliza-se nos princípios e normas de justiça emergentes quer da legislação educacional quer dos documentos orientadores da escola.

Palavras-chave: teorias de justiça; justiça educativa; equidade; inclusão; dimensões de justiça das práticas escolares.

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Aline Bernardes Seica

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Palavras-chave: teorias de justiça; justiça educativa; equidade; inclusão; dimensões de justiça das práticas escolares.

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I. INTRODUÇÃO

O discurso internacional sobre educação tem vindo a insistir na necessidade de orientar as políticas e as práticas educativas para metas que conciliem a inclusão de todos, a equidade e a eficácia – metas que, apesar do progresso já realizado, continuam hoje, em vários lugares do mundo, longe de ser atingidas. Com efeito, aquando do lançamento do relatório *Olhares sobre a Educação 2016*, o secretário-geral da OCDE alertou para o facto de uma educação de qualidade constituir, ainda hoje, um desafio para todos os países do mundo e reafirmou a urgente necessidade de aumentar a eficiência dos sistemas educativos, tornando-os ao mesmo tempo mais igualitários e inclusivos, proporcionando a todos idênticas oportunidades de sucesso. Antes, a *Agenda para o Desenvolvimento 2030* (UNESCO, 2015) sublinhava o carácter fundacional duma educação inclusiva e equitativa e reiterava a esperança no seu potencial transformativo, quer da vida dos indivíduos quer das sociedades. Neste documento, a educação é considerada um “bem público”, simultaneamente um “direito humano fundamental” universal e uma condição da realização de outros direitos individuais e sociais; “essencial” para a construção de sociedades mais justas, pacíficas, tolerantes e sustentáveis e “chave para a conquista do pleno emprego e erradicação da pobreza”. Assim os sistemas educativos, que deverão ser desenhados segundo um modelo de eficiência, devem também ser universais, igualitários e inclusivos no seu âmbito, equitativos nos processos e eficazes nos resultados, isto é, capazes de preparar os jovens para a competitividade, incerteza e volatilidade dos mercados. Ao mesmo tempo, espera-se da educação escolar que concorra para a realização de aspirações pessoais dos indivíduos, para a consolidação da sua capacidade de autonomia e participação cidadã e, nessa medida, que promova a justiça social pela atenuação de desigualdades de partida. As vantagens económicas decorrentes de um nível superior de educação são sublinhadas, por exemplo, no relatório *Education at a glance 2020*, ao referir que os rendimentos do trabalho, na média dos países da OCDE, são superiores em cerca de um terço aos que são proporcionados por uma educação de nível

secundário, seja ela geral ou profissional. Contudo, também em 2020, o relatório *Eurydice* constata o facto de a condição sócio-económica dos estudantes continuar a ser um dos fatores que mais pesam na desigualdade das aprendizagens e das oportunidades de sucesso escolar, desigualdade que não deixará de produzir efeitos na empregabilidade e nas remunerações do trabalho, reproduzindo assim as desigualdades sociais para cuja diminuição se esperava que a educação contribuisse. E embora a ideia de equidade seja afirmada nos documentos oficiais de política educativa na maior parte dos países europeus, é legítimo questionar em que medida os diversos sistemas educativos promovem de facto a equidade e asseguram aos estudantes iguais oportunidades de aprendizagem e de sucesso. Acresce que, em tempo de pandemia e dos constrangimentos dela decorrentes, as desigualdades no acesso à educação escolar — posse ou não de computador com internet, usufruto ou não de acompanhamento familiar no estudo em casa e de ambiente adequado para estudar — se tornaram ainda mais notórias e, consequentemente, se acentuaram diferenças na participação, nos desempenhos e no sucesso dos estudantes. No que diz respeito à situação em Portugal, um estudo diagnóstico das aprendizagens dos alunos dos 3.º, 6.º e 9.º de escolaridade relativas às literacias da leitura, da matemática e das ciências, realizado pelo Instituto de Avaliação Educativa (IAVE, 2021), põe em relevo o impacto que têm no desempenho escolar e nas aprendizagens, quer a língua falada no contexto familiar, quer “as condições socioeconómicas” dos alunos (vol. II, p.5); e, em situações de confinamento devido à pandemia e consequente ensino a distância, as diferenças nos resultados escolares entre alunos que tiveram acesso aos meios tecnológicos necessários e os que deles não dispuseram. Em ambos os casos, os alunos cujos contextos familiares são mais desfavorecidos ou são imigrantes que não têm o português como língua habitual de comunicação apresentam sistematicamente desempenhos inferiores aos dos seus colegas.

Tendo em conta estes referenciais, a política educativa do anterior governo definiu o *Perfil dos alunos à saída da escolaridade obrigatória* (2017) e, em articulação com ele, elaborou legislação sobre autonomia e flexibilidade curricular (Despacho n.º 5908/2017, de 5 de Julho) e sobre alterações curriculares nos diversos ciclos da escolaridade obrigatória, procurando combater quer o abandono escolar precoce, quer o insucesso que, no entanto, continua hoje a pesar sobre cerca de 20% das raparigas e 30% dos rapazes no 9.º ano de escolaridade (IAVE, 2021). Nestes documentos legais, o princípio da inclusão é enunciado como fundamento duma educação equitativa e democrática, potenciadora de sociedades mais justas e mais respeitadoras da

dignidade humana; e o modelo de cidadão para o qual apontam é o da pessoa simultaneamente informada e interventiva, respeitadora da diversidade axiológica e assertiva na defesa de valores humanos fundamentais.

Ora, para que se realizem as finalidades enunciadas nos documentos orientadores das políticas educativas, nomeadamente as que se referem a competências de que seriam portadores os alunos no termo da escolaridade obrigatória, a escola deveria operar mudanças organizacionais, pedagógicas e relacionais. Estas mudanças requerem, como ideia norteadora, uma conceção de justiça que encoraje a criação de espaços de participação e de reconhecimento dos alunos enquanto sujeitos de voz activa, que os envolva e comprometa no próprio processo de formação que não deveria perder de vista a aquisição de relevantes conhecimentos científicos e humanísticos. O desenvolvimento da cidadania democrática e do interesse pela participação no espaço público reclama escolas democráticas, organizadas como espaços públicos de participação nos quais os jovens se sintam não apenas incluídos, mas onde também adquiram e cultivem os conhecimentos, as competências de argumentação e deliberação racionais, o compromisso com o trabalho escolar e com a normatividade que a vivência comum e institucional exige.

II. DIMENSÕES DE JUSTIÇA EDUCATIVA: DAS PERSPETIVAS TEÓRICAS ÀS CONCEÇÕES E PRÁTICAS DE JUSTIÇA ESCOLAR

A reflexão sobre a escola, sobre a multiplicidade das suas funções e sobre as expectativas sociais e políticas que sobre ela são criadas gera um contexto de problematização que remete para a justiça envolvida na educação escolar e para a compreensão desta como um complexo processo multidimensional no qual se cruzam discursos e práticas intrinsecamente plurais e controversos.

Sustentada pelos grandes paradigmas de justiça e respetivas teorizações — distributiva/retributiva (Rawls, 1994; Sandel, 2005, 2011; Sen, 2009) e justiça como reconhecimento (Young, 1990; Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Honneth, 2011) — a justiça educativa manifesta-se numa pluralidade de dimensões que convocam filósofos, sociólogos e políticos para a difícil tarefa de inferir da teoria as vias pragmáticas que realizem esta pluralidade de forma harmoniosa. Compete aos decisores políticos a instauração das vias de realização do direito à educação e a garantia da sua universalização, assim como assegurar que todos os que sejam abrangidos por esse direito tenham iguais oportunidades de dele usufruírem.

Ao nível da escola, os princípios reguladores da ação denotam uma justiça plural e complexa, reflexo da coexistência de diversos “mundos” (Derouet, 2000;

Estêvão, 2002), sustentados por distintas e dificilmente conciliáveis lógicas de justiça. Estas dimensões objetivam-se nas práticas e nas interações dos seus membros. Como distributiva, a justiça diz respeito à partilha dos bens educativos — a atenção e o tempo do professor, por exemplo — de acordo com princípios comumente aceites, sejam eles princípios de igualdade, de equidade, ou outros privilegiados pela escola. Como retributiva, a justiça manifesta-se na avaliação e classificação do desempenho académico, por um lado; por outro, na penalização das infrações à norma escolar ou na recompensa por boas práticas. Enquanto reconhecimento, a justiça significa o respeito devido à dignidade e aos direitos dos indivíduos, independentemente dos seus desempenhos escolares. No entanto, outra dimensão de justiça emerge e ganha relevância na escola, a que se manifesta na esfera das relações interpessoais, na convivialidade, na própria relação pedagógica, fundamentada nas éticas do cuidar (Noddings, 1997; Colnerud, 2006). A dimensão de justiça que é o cuidar requer dos professores a capacidade de atenção aos alunos, não tanto na sua qualidade de estudantes quanto na qualidade de pessoas, crianças ou jovens em formação.

Deste modo, a ambivalência dos mandatos da escola — o de inclusão e formação de todos como cidadãos para o mundo global e o de seleção meritocrática de alguns em função dos resultados, ainda que estes sejam obtidos em condições de igualdade de oportunidades —, apelando a lógicas de justificação enraizadas em “esferas” distintas de justiça (Walzer, 1999), não deixa de potenciar conflitos de difícil, se não impossível, resolução e de gerar nos alunos sentimentos de injustiça cujos efeitos se prolongam para além da vida escolar.

III. PROBLEMA DE INVESTIGAÇÃO E METODOLOGIA

Igualdade e equidade são princípios que nortearam a construção da escola pública portuguesa nascida da revolução de 25 de Abril de 1974. No entanto, nos anos 80 e 90 do século passado outros princípios de justiça foram convocados, mormente pelas políticas que visaram a universalização da educação escolar e, simultaneamente, o reforço do apoio a escolas situadas em meios social e economicamente desfavorecidos, onde o insucesso e o abandono precoce eram mais evidentes. Nestes casos, uma justiça menos igualitária e mais equitativa parecia impor-se, preconizando a diferenciação para combater a desigualdade, privilegiando a inclusão pela via da flexibilização das aprendizagens e de alternativas curriculares que permitissem manter os alunos na escola; e esta, não raramente, se viu chamada a satisfazer necessidades de natureza mais assistencial do que educativa, a ser mais cuidadora e menos

instrutora, objetivando assim outras dimensões de justiça em que a igualdade não era o princípio dominante.

As políticas e a legislação educacionais portuguesas mais recentes, consonantes com as orientações internacionais antes referidas, denotam pois a dualidade teleológica da educação escolar que as políticas educativas europeias transportam: por um lado, a inclusão de todos num sistema de ensino que se pretende universal; por outro, a seleção dos melhores em função dos resultados académicos. E assim a escola, mandatada para responder a exigências de eficácia e sucesso e à necessidade de inclusão de todos os alunos, obrigada aos deveres de equidade e diversificação para que a igualdade de oportunidades não seja (apenas) um ideal, enfrenta desafios de justiça que põem à prova diretores e professores quanto à capacidade de conjugação entre axiologias e éticas distintas, se não contraditórias.

Em que medida as escolas assumem este mandato, por que formas objetivam na estrutura organizacional e curricular e nas práticas pedagógicas as condições potenciadoras das finalidades referidas, é o que importa compreender. Assim, será pertinente questionar até que ponto usufruem todos os alunos de iguais possibilidades de aquisição, desenvolvimento e prática das competências esperadas, atendendo à diversidade cultural das populações escolares e às desigualdades sociais e económicas que condicionam a sua relação com a escola.

Neste artigo, que faz parte de um projeto mais vasto desenvolvido em torno da problemática da justiça educativa e escolar, procura-se, responder às seguintes questões: (1) que dimensões de justiça são privilegiadas na escola por alunos e professores; (2) que medidas de inclusão e de equidade são implementadas pelas escolas; (3) São notórias diferenças entre escolas?

Desenvolveu-se um estudo de natureza interpretativa, tendo como referencial epistemológico a hermenêutica e a fenomenologia. Metodologicamente, optou-se pelo estudo de caso múltiplo, situado em duas escolas urbanas (daqui em diante designadas Escola X e Escola Y) implantadas em territórios contrastantes do ponto de vista socioeconómico, com o intuito de compreender se, e em que medida, tais diferenças se repercutiam nas práticas e nas representações de justiça da escola e dos seus membros docentes e discentes.

A escola X é frequentada predominantemente por alunos de classe média e média alta, cujos pais investem na formação académica e valorizam o sucesso escolar como via de acesso a profissões bem remuneradas e socialmente prestigiantes. Todos os cursos desta escola se destinam a prosseguimento de estudos. A Escola Y, inserida num meio social em que predominam comunidades imigrantes, sobretudo

africanas, é sede de um agrupamento pertencente à rede TEIP (Territórios Educativos de Intervenção Prioritária) e recebe alunos oriundos destas comunidades multiétnicas, geralmente com baixos níveis de escolaridade, baixos rendimentos, e esperando pouco da escola como via de acesso a melhores condições de vida. A escola optou pela diversificação curricular, oferecendo currículos alternativos e cursos profissionalizantes.

A pesquisa recorreu a múltiplas fontes e procedimentos de recolha de dados, a saber: documentos orientadores das escolas e respectiva análise; entrevistas a professores e alunos; questionário para todos os alunos de ambas as escolas; observação não participante de aulas, de reuniões docentes e de interações ocorridas em espaços de convívio de alunos e professores. No presente artigo, privilegiam-se (1) dados documentais; pontos de vista dos diretores e de outros membros do governo das escolas recolhidos mediante entrevistas; (2) dados resultantes de questionário e entrevistas a alunos.

O questionário (N=69 itens) estrutura-se numa escala tipo Lickert dupla (realidade e idealidade/justiça), de “nunca acontece” a “acontece muitas vezes” (1 a 5 pontos); inclui as seguintes dimensões: justiça distributiva, definida em termos de igualdade e de equidade; justiça retributiva, contemplando recompensas e castigos associados ao comportamento e retribuição do mérito; justiça como reconhecimento, definida como inclusão, participação, respeito e discriminação / não discriminação; justiça como cuidar, entendida como apoio e afeto; justiça convivencial, definida como bem-estar e convivial. As questões abertas do questionário focalizam-se em situações escolares experienciadas pelos alunos como justas ou injustas (Seiça & Sanches, 2013). Todos os alunos de ambas as escolas responderam ao

questionário. Na escola X foram distribuídos 1090 questionários e devolvidos 890; na escola Y, dos 467 questionários distribuídos, foram devolvidos 342. As propriedades psicométricas do questionário foram avaliadas por ALPHA de Cronbach. A consistência interna de cada uma das dimensões de justiça foi igualmente testada. Os resultados, que podem ser lidos no Quadro 1, mostram que (1) relativamente à escala da realidade, o α é considerado adequado nas dimensões Igualdade, Inclusão, Discriminação, Convivialidade e Bem-estar; é considerado moderado nas dimensões Equidade, Retribuição e Respeito e baixo na dimensão Cuidar. (2) Em relação à escala da idealidade, o referido valor é tido como adequado em todas as dimensões excepto Participação e Cuidar, nas quais é considerado moderado. (3) Globalmente, o valor de α é considerado adequado nas dimensões Igualdade, Equidade, Retribuição, Respeito, Inclusão, Convivialidade e Bem-estar; moderado, nas dimensões Participação e Discriminação e baixo na dimensão Cuidar.

A fim de verificar se eram significativas as diferenças entre as médias da escala de realidade e as da idealidade na escola X e na escola Y, realizou-se o teste *T-Student com amostras emparelhadas*. Os resultados mostram que, em ambas as escolas, todas são significativamente diferentes ($p. < 0.05$), com excepção da dimensão equidade, que apresenta $p. > 0.05$. Calcularam-se ainda as correlações entre a escala de realidade e a de idealidade em cada escola: na escola Y, as correlações são moderadas, sendo elevadas nas dimensões *Justiça Retributiva* ($r=0,585$), *Inclusão* ($r=0,573$) e *Cuidar* ($r = 0,521$). Na escola X as escalas apresentam correlações moderadas, sendo os valores significativos para todas as dimensões ($p. < 0.05$), excepto na dimensão *Discriminação* ($p. > 0.05$) (Seiça, 2015).

Quadro 1: Consistência Interna dos Itens Referentes à Realidade e Idealidade das Dimensões de Justiça

Dimensão de justiça	Sub-dimensões	Itens	α de Cronbach		
			Realidade	Idealidade	Global
Justiça distributiva	Igualdade	1, 2, 3, 6, 7	0,828	0,842	0,818
	Equidade	8,10, 12, 13,14, 25, 28, 56	0,652	0,721	0,767
Justiça retributiva	Retribuição	11, 15, 27, 44, 50, 52, 55, 57	0,652	0,740	0,820
Justiça como reconhecimento	Respeito	22, 23, 29,39, 45, 59,65	0,700	0,780	0,791
	Participação	4, 5, 33, 48	0,567	0,697	0,639
	Inclusão	46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 60, 66, 68	0,756	0,853	0,849
	Discriminação	9, 16, 18, 19,24, 43, 58	0,714	0,734	0,692
Justiça como cuidar	Cuidar	22, 26, 61, 64	0,612	0,666	0,680
Justiça convivencial	Convivialidade	17, 20,21, 38, 40, 41 42, 54, 62, 69	0,763	0,845	0,833
	Bem-estar	30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36,37, 63, 67	0,769	0,896	0,857

Fonte: Seiça, A. B (2015). *Labirintos da justiça na escola. Representações e práticas de alunos e professores. Tese de Doutoramento, Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Educação.*

IV. PRINCÍPIOS DE JUSTIÇA NA ORGANIZAÇÃO DAS PRÁTICAS ESCOLARES E NA DISTRIBUIÇÃO DOS BENS EDUCATIVOS

a) *Justiça da escola: seleção ou inclusão?*

As políticas organizacionais da Escola X e da Escola Y parecem guiar-se por justiças distintas, como os excertos das declarações dos respectivos directores permitem constatar. Afirma o director da Escola X que pretende cumprir escrupulosamente a legislação relativa ao limite de idade para frequência da escolaridade obrigatória; por isso, qualquer aluno que, tendo 18 anos, queira inscrever-se no 10.º ano, verá recusada a sua inscrição. Justifica a sua decisão nos seguintes termos:

Porque eu entendo que têm o direito e a obrigação e o dever de criar condições para que aqueles que querem aprender aprendam. (...) Nós temos que rentabilizar ao máximo os poucos recursos que temos. E nós não podemos continuar a desperdiçar coisas que andámos a fazer ao longo de toda essa vida ... Nós começamos todos a ter que pensar na forma de tornar menos pesado o encargo que cada escola tem.

É, pois, em nome da eficiência da escola e da escassez de recursos financeiros que se justificam medidas seletivas, reservando aos alunos interessados no sucesso académico os recursos educativos e os bens educacionais.

O director da escola Y, por outro lado, afirma o seu compromisso com uma política de inclusão:

Entendemos que um aluno, mesmo que falte um mês para terminar as aulas, deve ser integrado (...) por vários motivos: primeiro, pela aprendizagem; segundo, pela inclusão social; terceiro, para evitar que esse miúdo cresça na rua e faça as piores asneiras. Que os nossos políticos não são inteligentes, porque miúdo na rua é mais perigoso e mais caro do que miúdo na escola; e é mais barato pagar professores do que pagar polícias e é mais barato pagar professores do que pagar cidadãos na prisão e é mais barato pagar professores do que pagar tribunais.

Curiosamente, a justificação para este procedimento que, de forma assumida, contorna por vezes a legislação em vigor, recorre também a argumentos de natureza económica, realçando os ganhos sociais que a inclusão escolar proporcionará, em sintonia aliás com orientações da OCDE para a educação.

V. PONTO DE VISTA DOS PROFESSORES

A partir da análise de conteúdo de entrevistas em profundidade, da análise documental incidente sobre documentos orientadores das Escolas e de dados de observação de reuniões docentes, foram elaboradas as perspetivas dos professores sobre dimensões de justiça dominantes na escola e os princípios e valores de justiça envolvidos nas deliberações e práticas escolares.

a) *Igualdade e equidade ou igualdade versus equidade?*

Em ambas as escolas são vários os princípios de justiça que presidem à distribuição dos bens educativos e à organização das práticas docentes. Solicitados a pronunciarem-se sobre as práticas que consideram mais justas, os professores da Escola X dividem-se entre práticas igualitárias e práticas diferenciadoras, numa perspectiva de equidade, enquanto os da Escola Y privilegiam práticas de cuidar conducentes à inclusão de todos.

Igualdade. Adotando o princípio da igualdade como orientador dos seus procedimentos, afirma um professor da Escola X: “A escola deve tratar os alunos de forma igualitária; não deve tolerar situações que não apontem para a igualdade”. Fiel à ideia de escola pública como garantia da igualdade de oportunidades, este docente privilegia a igualdade formal de todos os alunos perante a instituição e mostra-se convicto de que será esta a melhor forma de combater a discriminação e promover a inclusão.

Equidade. Ponto de vista diferente apresenta outra docente da mesma escola, que afirma preferir a equidade à igualdade: “Eu acho que a equidade é aquilo que me guia. A igualdade só existe em termos de oportunidades. Nós somos todos diferentes e é como diferentes que devemos ser considerados”. A perspectiva da docente indica atenção às diferenças individuais e, nessa medida, a preocupação com os percursos distintos de cada aluno, uma vez assegurada a igualdade de oportunidades em face da escola.

b) *Inclusão e cuidar*

Na escola Y são outros os princípios de justiça convocados, como se constata nas afirmações de uma docente, que refere os princípios de inclusão e de cuidar: “Se não formos nós a cuidar, quem é que vai cuidar? Nós aqui somos pais, somos mães, nós somos tudo!”. Com efeito, os docentes desta escola são muitas vezes chamados a cuidar dos alunos num sentido mais assistencial do que formativo: alimentação, cuidados de saúde, vestuário, acompanhamento. Embora reconhecendo a pertinência desta dimensão do cuidar na escola Y, alguns docentes mantêm um olhar crítico sobre tais práticas, admitindo a possibilidade de efeitos contraproducentes, como a criação de dependências que não deixarão de adiar a autonomização dos alunos, ou a criação de situações que poderão ser sentidas e interpretadas por eles como discriminatórias.

Diferenciar para reduzir desigualdades de partida. Na perspectiva de outra docente, a diferenciação equitativa é a resposta necessária à diversidade dos alunos: “Nesta escola nós temos de dar uma resposta à diversidade (...) porque eles estão a níveis muito diferentes na mesma turma”. Isto é, perante a diversidade cultural dos alunos e os

diferentes níveis cognitivos que apresentam, a diferenciação é o procedimento que se impõe, fundamentada no princípio de equidade como forma de aproximação a uma maior igualdade de resultados. No entanto, pensam alguns professores que o recurso frequente a percursos curriculares alternativos, associado à opção de agrupamento dos alunos por níveis de desempenho, pode contribuir para o crescimento de desigualdades que, supostamente, à escola caberia minimizar.


VI. PONTO DE VISTA DOS ALUNOS

As perspetivas dos alunos acerca da justiça da e na escola foram elaboradas a partir de entrevistas semiestruturadas e de dados do questionário intitulado *A minha ideia de justiça na escola* (referido e

caracterizado em III), organizado em duas escalas: uma de realidade, relativa às percepções de justiça na escola; a outra de idealidade, relativa aos ideais de justiça dos alunos. Foram contempladas as dimensões de justiça distributiva (Grisay, 1984; Demeuse, Crahay & Monseur, 2001; Crahay et al., 2003; Dubet & Duru-Bellat, 2004), retributiva, reconhecimento (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1998; Fraser, 1997, 2003) e cuidar (Noddings, 1997).

a) Dimensões de justiça na escola: realidade e idealidade

Como avaliam os alunos a justiça da escola e quais as dimensões que, do seu ponto de vista, mais se manifestam no quotidiano escolar é o que as Figuras 1 e 2 permitem ler.




Fonte: Seixá (2016). *Labirintos da justiça na escola: perspetivas de alunos e professores*

Figura 1: Percepções de Justiça dos Alunos na Escola X

Assim, aos olhos dos alunos de ambas as escolas, a igualdade será a dimensão de justiça mais cultivada, logo seguida da justiça retributiva. Estas percepções revelam alguma discrepância relativamente aos princípios de justiça enunciados pelos professores, sobretudo na Escola Y, onde estes atribuem maior relevância ao cuidar e à diferenciação equitativa. Em ambas as escolas, também, a retribuição pelos desempenhos académicos e pelo comportamento é avaliada globalmente como justa e parece ser a segunda grande dimensão da justiça escolar. Já a dimensão reconhecimento, que envolve respeito, inclusão e participação, é avaliada pelos alunos sobretudo os da Escola X, como menos justa do que as dimensões anteriormente referidas.

Quanto ao cuidar, os alunos da escola X não lhe fazem referência, em sintonia, aliás, com o facto de tal dimensão de justiça, nesta escola, ser

entendida pelos professores, essencialmente, como acompanhamento e estímulo do desenvolvimento global, no sentido da autonomização. Deste modo, compreende-se que as práticas de cuidar não sejam percecionadas pelos alunos como manifestações duma justiça distinta da que está envolvida na relação pedagógica, seja ela distributiva, retributiva ou de reconhecimento. Para os alunos da Escola Y, pelo contrário, a dimensão de cuidar é percebida como autónoma, dadas as formas que assume nesta escola, claramente distintas das práticas de ensino.




Fonte: Seiya (2016). *Labirintos da justiça na escola: perspectivas de alunos e professores*

Figura 2: Percepções de Justiça dos Alunos na Escola Y

Olhando agora os ideais de justiça dos alunos, representados nas Figuras 3 e 4, os alunos da Escola X privilegiam a igualdade e o reconhecimento. A justiça


idealizada é também retributiva e de cuidar; a dimensão equitativa parece ser a menos valorizada, como se houvesse nela uma sugestão discriminatória.



Fonte: Seiya (2016). *Labirintos da justiça na escola: perspectivas de alunos e professores*

Figura 3: Ideais de Justiça dos Alunos da Escola X

A relevância atribuída ao ideal de cuidar parece sugerir que os alunos gostariam de usufruir de maior atenção dos professores às suas necessidades ou dificuldades pessoais, num sentido que ultrapassaria o âmbito das aprendizagens académicas. Aparentemente, este entendimento do cuidar articula-se com a dimensão de reconhecimento, que envolve o respeito e o tomar do aluno como sujeito da sua formação, ao qual devem ser garantidos os direitos de manifestação, de participação, de iniciativa pessoal.




Fonte: Seiya (2016). *Labirintos da justiça na escola: perspectivas de alunos e professores*

Figura 4: Ideais de Justiça dos Alunos da Escola Y

Por sua vez, os alunos da *Escola Y* parecem não destacar nenhum ideal de justiça, e apenas a dimensão do cuidar ganha um maior relevo, como mostra a *Figura 4*. Idealizam uma escola globalmente justa, que cuide, que valorize o empenhamento e o bom comportamento e penalize as manifestações de indisciplina, que reduza as situações sentidas como discriminatórias. O ideal de escola justa é igualitário e, ao mesmo tempo, equitativo, como se os alunos não vissem incompatibilidade entre estes ideais.

Globalmente avaliadas como justas, as duas escolas parecem no entanto ser pouco justas no que se refere à participação enquanto dimensão de justiça como reconhecimento, distanciando-se claramente do ideal de justiça. A *Figura 5* mostra que esta distância é mais acentuada na *Escola X*, em particular para as médias relativas à participação na escola. De resto, é nesta escola que são maiores as diferenças entre as médias da realidade e as da idealidade também no que se refere à inclusão e ao respeito.



Fonte: Seiya, A. B (2015). *Labirintos da justiça na escola. Representações e práticas de alunos e professores. Tese de Doutoramento, Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Educação.*

Figura 5: Comparação entre a Realidade e a Idealidade da Justiça como Reconhecimento

Os alunos da *Escola Y* avaliam de forma mais positiva do que os da *Escola X* a realidade da inclusão e da participação; estes, por sua vez, consideram-se mais respeitados e mais respeitadores da escola e dos professores do que os primeiros e o seu ideal de respeito é também mais elevado. A inclusão é o ideal de justiça que os alunos de ambas as escolas mais valorizam; em segundo lugar, os alunos da *Escola X* prezam o respeito, enquanto os da *Escola Y* consideram prioritária a participação nas aulas. Todas as médias relativas à idealidade da justiça como reconhecimento são mais elevadas na *Escola X*, ao mesmo tempo que todas as médias da realidade, com a exceção já referida do sentimento de respeito, são inferiores às registadas na *Escola Y*.

Em suma: entre os alunos das duas escolas são notórios diferentes interesses e concepções de justiça; na *Escola X*, o ideal de justiça é a igualdade, ideal que se harmoniza com a concepção de práticas justas dos professores, preferencialmente igualitárias. Na *Escola Y*, o primeiro interesse de justiça dos alunos é o cuidar, coincidente com a prioridade de justiça dos professores. No entanto, os alunos atribuem idêntico valor de justiça à igualdade e à equidade, enquanto os professores privilegiam práticas de diferenciação e, nessa medida, a justiça como equidade. O facto de, em ambas as escolas, os alunos avaliarem algumas práticas e situações como discriminatórias poderá não ser alheio a esta concepção de justiça como igualdade e, consequentemente, ao entendimento da diferenciação como injusta.

VII. NOTAS FINAIS

Pretende-se, neste artigo, lançar um olhar questionador, reflexivo e crítico sobre as dimensões de justiça envolvidas na educação escolar. A identificação das dimensões de justiça que caracterizam uma determinada escola e das perspectivas de alunos e professores sobre a justiça da e na escola afigura-se da maior relevância para que a educação possa promover uma maior igualdade social, para que a escola possa ser mais inclusiva, mais democrática, mais participada, mais emancipadora. As políticas de discriminação positiva de que foram alvo escolas implantadas em territórios de intervenção prioritária (TEIP) produziram efeitos positivos na redução do abandono escolar e na melhoria de comportamentos disruptivos. Contribuíram, portanto, para a inclusão dos alunos, para uma maior valorização da escola e das aprendizagens que proporciona. No entanto, os efeitos não têm sido tão notórios no que diz respeito ao sucesso académico e são reais os riscos de esta limitação ser geradora de discriminação social. Parece, pois, que a esta forma de inclusão é limitada já que, ao não assegurar iguais oportunidades de sucesso, ao orientar muitos jovens precocemente para percursos curriculares profissionalizantes ou para o mercado de trabalho sem

formação especializada, perpetuará desigualdades que, supostamente, pretendia combater.

Afigura-se, por isso, urgente repensar a escola, as suas finalidades e possibilidades, para que se procure uma consciência mais crítica sobre os significados da justiça em educação, fazendo ouvir as diversas vozes dos que vivem e fazem a escola.

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Network Indignation: Changes and Continuities in Juvenile Political Socialization from June 2013

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Abstract- The article presents results of comparative longitudinal investigations of youth political socialization between the years 2012 and 2015, having as reference the network movements of June 2013 in a city far from the major centers of political mobilization. Analyzes are made about the relationship between the new organizational arrangements of social movements, the insertion and growth of the use of social networks in the political and cultural mediation of youth with the political arena and its possible consequences on changes and continuities in the process of political socialization of teenagers and young people from public high school. Through the application of a survey in the city of Cascavel, State of Paraná, a gradual trend towards the paradigmatic opening of traditional social institutions in the social participation of young people was evidenced, in line with the multimodal characteristics that encourage political participation through social networks.

Keywords: network movements; youth; june 2013.

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 160699



NETWORK INDIGNATION CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES IN JUVENILE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION FROM JUNE 2013

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Network Indignation: Changes and Continuities in Juvenile Political Socialization from June 2013

Indignação Em Rede: Mudanças e Continuidades na Socialização Política Juvenil a Partir de Junho de 2013

Conrado Pereda Minucelli ^α & Rosana Katia Nazzari ^ο

Resumo- O artigo apresenta resultados de investigações longitudinais comparadas de socialização política juvenil entre os anos de 2012 e 2015, tendo como referencial os movimentos em rede de Junho de 2013 em uma cidade distante dos grandes centros de mobilização política. Tece-se análises acerca da relação entre os novos arranjos de organização dos movimentos sociais, a inserção e crescimento do uso das redes sociais na mediação política e cultural da juventude com a arena política e suas possíveis consequências nas mudanças e continuidades no processo de socialização política de adolescentes e jovens do Ensino Médio público. Por meio da aplicação de *survey* no município de Cascavel, Estado do Paraná, evidenciou-se uma gradual tendência de abertura paradigmática das instituições sociais tradicionais na participação social dos jovens, em consonância com as características multimodais que incentivam a participação política por meio das redes sociais.

Palavras-chave: movimentos em rede; juventudes; junho de 2013.

Abstract- The article presents results of comparative longitudinal investigations of youth political socialization between the years 2012 and 2015, having as reference the network movements of June 2013 in a city far from the major centers of political mobilization. Analyzes are made about the relationship between the new organizational arrangements of social movements, the insertion and growth of the use of social networks in the political and cultural mediation of youth with the political arena and its possible consequences on changes and continuities in the process of political socialization of teenagers and young people from public high school. Through the application of a survey in the city of Cascavel, State of Paraná, a gradual trend towards the paradigmatic opening of traditional social institutions in the social participation of young people was evidenced, in line with the multimodal characteristics that encourage political participation through social networks.

Keywords: network movements; youth; june 2013.

I. INTRODUÇÃO

Este artigo nasce da necessidade de reflexão sobre as formas atuais de interseção entre as juventudes e a arena política brasileira, expressas principalmente pelo advento e crescente consolidação dos ambientes virtuais na vida social dos indivíduos¹. Neste bojo, os conhecidos ciclos de protestos de Junho de 2013 evidenciaram um profícuo lócus de análise dos diversos fatores que possam influenciar nas mudanças e continuidades dos processos de socialização política das juventudes no contexto brasileiro e, especialmente, nas cidades do interior do país.

O Democracy Index 2014 (Índice de Democracia 2014), elaborado pela Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)², que avalia a evolução de processos eleitorais latino-americanos e mundiais, mostra que o Brasil é o quinto país da amostra com maior grau de participação popular nas eleições, liberdades civis, pluralismo no âmbito partidário e transparência no processo eleitoral na América Latina, atrás de países como Uruguai, Costa Rica, Chile e Jamaica, ganhando apenas a 44^a posição nos países considerados democráticos, dentre os 165 considerados livres. Apesar de subir uma posição em relação ao relatório de 2006, o Brasil ainda é considerado pelo índice como uma “democracia falha”, situação idêntica a de outros 51 países ou regimes políticos que governam 35,5% da população mundial.

Em conjunto com a teoria culturalista desenvolvida no país, os índices e a literatura especializada indicam que a Cultura Política brasileira e latino-americana se cristalizou na baixa participação dos cidadãos nos assuntos comunitários e da esfera pública. Porém, e para além da participação meramente eleitoral, nada abalou mais as análises sociais e políticas latino-americanas e brasileiras que as

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¹ Os dados aqui apresentados são fruto da dissertação de Mestrado defendida no Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais da Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Paraná (Unioeste), orientada pela Prof^a. Dr^a. Rosana Katia Nazzari e avaliada pelos membros da banca Prof. Dr. Marcelo Baquero e Prof. Dr. Geraldo Magella Neres.

² O Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index é compilado pela revista inglesa The Economist.

mobilizações populares de Junho de 2013, momento em que, dotada de uma organização política nova, multifacetada, descentralizada e de diversas pautas, uma camada significativa da população brasileira engendrou protestos de rua massificados.

No âmbito da reflexão científica, pela proximidade dos eventos e suas rápidas dinâmicas, este fenômeno ainda não ganhou uma ou mais publicações de peso e tampouco se espera, no mais curto espaço de tempo, compreender quais serão os caminhos que tomará, porém, caminha a largos passos para ser compreendido por meio das múltiplas características que o formaram e dos discursos e práticas que lhe conferiram inventividade e autenticidade.

Percebeu-se na literatura que tem se debruçado sobre isso, que estas mobilizações, chamadas por Castells (2013) de movimentos em rede, definiram e abriram caminhos para se pensar os movimentos sociais a partir de uma característica específica: a conectividade cidadã. A conexão cibernética e, portanto tecnológica, de ambições, indignações e esperanças com intuítos e vertentes ideológicas variadas, desde a derrubada do regime político à exigência de novas formas de democracia e participação cidadã fizeram parte das reivindicações em rede.

Neste sentido, como afirma Lévy (1999), o ciberespaço em si, se tornou uma ferramenta essencial para a democracia e para o aprimoramento de uma inteligência coletiva³ dos cidadãos. Além de poderem ser colocadas a serviço de regiões e cidades com vulnerabilidade social e servir como um instrumento de desenvolvimento social, como forma de se constituir cidades e democracias eletrônicas, ele facilitou a troca de experiência, de saberes, a ajuda mútua, um acréscimo na participação dos cidadãos nas decisões políticas e, por fim, uma conjugação de forças para o avanço da cidadania.

Junho de 2013 mostrou-se avesso à hierarquização política e à verticalização da organização dos movimentos sociais experimentadas até então como exemplos clássicos de mobilização política. Seguindo o mote político do Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), sufocou o Poder Executivo, protagonizando um grande número de atos públicos em um curto espaço de tempo, parando as cidades, para enfim, os indivíduos terem sua parcela de protagonismo político em detrimento a qualquer tipo de poder institucionalizado (TATAGIBA, 2014).

De modo geral, podemos compreender Junho de 2013, assim como as Diretas Já e os Caras Pintados, como manifestações amplas da cidadania e/ou dos “indignados”. Isto significa dizer que as características de ambos os ciclos de protestos envolvem:

agregados de múltiplos coletivos no espaço público com reivindicações conjunturais, mas frequentemente com protestos politicamente heterogêneos, diversificados, e podendo conter antagonismos políticos explicitados ou não, e mobilizados especialmente através das redes sociais e/ou virtuais (SCHERER-WARREN, 2014, p. 14).

Além da autonomia, da horizontalidade, das múltiplas formas de mobilização, da mescla de luta política territorial local-global de suas presenças e de suas pautas, da espontaneidade e da cooperação e solidariedade entre os manifestantes e com as variadas causas sociais que se apresentaram em diferentes contextos, a capacidade de autorreflexão dos movimentos em rede os fizeram se caracterizar como padrões emergentes de possíveis ações políticas aos movimentos sociais.

Por meio de toda esta realidade que concerne a democracia brasileira, os movimentos em rede emergentes, as novas experimentações democráticas e a cultura e socialização política da juventude, mostrou-se interessante para este estudo selecionar a cidade de Cascavel, Estado do Paraná, que reuniu mais de 10 mil pessoas no primeiro maior protesto em 13 de Junho e 5 mil pessoas no segundo, no dia 15 de Junho. Escolheu-se este recorte territorial para, acima de tudo, adequar a viabilidade da pesquisa, porém, é certo que se, analisados outros contextos semelhantes (cidades do interior do país com características sociais parecidas), os mesmos resultados podem se apresentar.

No caso que aqui se apresenta, a participação política da juventude foi expressiva e consolidou uma categoria de experimentação democrática histórica no município, nunca antes vista nos mais de 60 anos de história emancipada da cidade.

O eixo em que orbita o problema desta pesquisa, portanto, é: “A experimentação democrática dos protestos massificados, a criação de comunidades virtuais democráticas e outras características dos Movimentos Sociais na era da internet fizeram variar, em curto prazo, os modos de Socialização e a Cultura Política juvenil em Cascavel/PR?”.

Se objetiva demonstrar os elementos de cultura e socialização política juvenil em Cascavel entre os anos de 2012 e 2015, para, utilizando-se das experimentações democráticas vivenciadas em 2013, compreender o comportamento das atitudes políticas da juventude em relação aos movimentos em rede.

Propôs-se então para este estudo um desenho de pesquisa que levou em conta os seguintes aspectos: 1) a caracterização geral do público de pesquisa: a juventude do município de Cascavel e, em

³ O conceito de Inteligência Coletiva é utilizado por Pierre Lévy para designar formas de os seres humanos pensarem e compartilharem conhecimentos, por meio de ferramentas mecânicas, como por exemplo, a internet. Com ela, os próprios usuários geram seu conteúdo e seu próprio tipo de interatividade.

especial, os estudantes do Ensino Médio público e suas percepções e relações com os movimentos em rede e os protestos de Junho de 2013 e; 2) a análise de dados clássicos e específicos da Cultura e Socialização política do público do estudo; demonstradas no que se segue.

II. FORMAÇÃO E POSSIBILIDADES DAS COMUNIDADES VIRTUAIS DE MOBILIZAÇÃO POLÍTICA

Quando objetos de reflexão, as reuniões e mobilizações virtuais por pautas diversas são importantes problemáticas quando se pensa sua posterior ação política na realidade. A possibilidade de transformação das reuniões virtuais se transformarem em reuniões físicas foi respaldada por teóricos como Howard Rheingold, William Mitchell e Sherry Turkle, que viam nas comunidades virtuais novas formas de vida urbana e de sociabilidade, permitindo novas construções e expressões identitárias e desempenhos diferenciados de papéis sociais.

A construção do conceito de comunidade virtual é facilmente confundida com uma realidade social idealizada ou ilusória, visto que o acesso às condições reais da vida social seria limitado pela pequena gama de sensibilidade social que as redes comportam, dadas e vividas em condições reais diferentes das colocadas no mundo virtual. Porém, como comunidades virtuais e comunidades físicas não precisam, necessariamente, serem consideradas opostas, Castells (1999) afirma que a constituição e consolidação de comunidades virtuais são apenas outra forma possível do conceito de comunidade, com dinâmicas e leis singulares, que podem interagir com outras formas.

Desta forma, os vínculos e práticas sociais que se formam nas redes virtuais são dimensões possíveis, especializadas e diversificadas de satisfação de interesses sociais também específicos e diversos, em que

tanto *off-line* quanto *on-line*, os laços fracos (da modernidade) facilitam a ligação das pessoas com diversas características sociais, expandindo assim a sociabilidade para além dos limites socialmente definidos do auto-reconhecimento. Nesse sentido, a Internet pode contribuir para a expansão dos vínculos sociais numa sociedade que parece estar passando por uma rápida individualização e uma ruptura cívica. (CASTELLS, 1999, p. 445)

Esta desvinculação social crescente teria nos vínculos virtuais um refúgio ou uma possibilidade de vínculos sociais mínimos para as pessoas que, ao contrário disto, viveriam apenas vidas sociais limitadas se, apenas na vida física, sobrevivessem somente com os vínculos cada vez mais espacialmente e temporalmente dispersos da sociedade contemporânea.

De todo modo, caberia às Ciências Sociais estudar o fenômeno da virtualização das comunidades como uma produção e reprodução cultural. Partindo deste pressuposto, este novo tipo emergente de comunidade não seria apenas uma espécie de indução à realidade virtual, mas a construção de uma *realidade virtual*, pois toda realidade cultural advém da formação, assimilação e reprodução de símbolos formadores daquela realidade. Em outras palavras, “a realidade, como é vivida, sempre foi virtual porque sempre é percebida por intermédio de símbolos formadores da prática com algum sentido que escapa à sua rigorosa definição semântica” (CASTELLS, 1999, p. 459).

O novo sistema de comunicação humana que se coloca, portanto, proporciona além da reprodução cultural da vida física nas comunidades virtuais, a inclusão e uma maior abrangência das expressões culturais, sejam individuais ou coletivas. Dentre os fatores que as caracterizam, tem-se que a diversificação, a multimodalidade e a versatilidade deste sistema são capazes de lidar com valores, com a moral, com o imaginário e também com os conflitos sociais, gerando uma queda de importância do poder simbólico de instituições tradicionais presentes fora das comunidades virtuais como a religião, a autoridade, os valores tradicionais, as ideologias políticas e a autoridade carismática.

Esta correlação de forças entre o tradicional e o emergente gera, portanto, uma espécie de disputa social não mais inédita na história da humanidade, que se expressa na tentativa de adaptação da liderança carismática, da moralidade e dos valores ao novo contexto social da informação, podendo inverter a lógica de que, por exemplo, são os fluxos de poder que movem a política ou qualquer outro âmbito da vida social, mas sim onde é o poder dos fluxos da informação que exercem força maior na determinação da realidade social.

Assim, a virtualidade das relações sociais, além de não ser um produto artificial, criado apenas para atender demandas isoladas do sistema social, é igualmente geradora de práticas reais, justamente por ser reflexo destas. Desta forma, a geração de comunidades virtuais de exercício da democracia ou da participação, geram os laços de solidariedade necessários para a ação política concreta na medida em que esta é necessária, debatida e decidida pelos indivíduos e grupos *online*.

Elas estão, enfim, diretamente relacionadas ao modo como a socialização política e a sociabilidade contemporâneas existem e se expressam nas atitudes, comportamentos e orientações gerais dos indivíduos. São expressões de uma sociedade em rede que, agora organizadas no espaço democrático, deram nascimento aos movimentos sociais contemporâneos e sua interlocução com a tecnologia e à conectividade cidadã.

III. CARACTERIZAÇÃO E MÉTODOS

Para a observação da variação ou não da Cultura Política juvenil em Cascavel/PR, fez-se teste quantitativo com aplicação de questionários compostos de entrevistas semi-estruturadas para a população juvenil de 13 a 19 anos de idade - faixa etária selecionada para melhor apreensão dos modos de socialização política - de estudantes de escolas públicas estaduais do município, em uma amostra selecionada definitiva de 503 entrevistados.

Utilizou-se como fundamento para coleta destes tipos de perguntas alguns modelos de questões aplicadas por instituições como o Latinobarômetro, uma pesquisa de captação de percepções, satisfações e análises de opinião pública com referência mundial na produção de pesquisas na área de Ciência Política⁴.

Já para testar as questões relativas à opinião pública sobre os protestos, seguiram-se as pesquisas realizadas durante os movimentos em rede que ficaram conhecidos por *Occupy Wall Street*, nos Estados Unidos da América, colhidas por órgãos como o Ipsos/Reuters, pesquisa CBS/New York Times, pesquisa NBC News/Wall Street Journal e Instituto Gallup, todas utilizadas por Castells (2013).

A escolha do número de questionários aplicados por conglomerados regionais levou em consideração a distribuição populacional do município, juntamente com o número de escolas disponíveis para aplicação, conforme autorização do Núcleo Regional de Educação. Foram participantes desta pesquisa 12 escolas e 24 turmas de Ensino Médio (1^{os}, 2^{os} e 3^{os} anos), onde se realizaram, com apoio das direções e equipes pedagógicas, sorteios aleatórios para a participação dos estudantes, objetivando retirar a amostra mais fiel do público da pesquisa.

De acordo com o sistema oficial de consulta às escolas paranaenses⁵, 7.800 estudantes constituíram o universo da população escolhida. Este sistema eletrônico é conectado em tempo real com a situação de matrícula dos estudantes nos estabelecimentos de ensino, o que permite fidedignidade com o número de estudantes. Os números utilizados para a montagem dos dados foi acessada em Setembro de 2013, pelo próprio sítio do sistema.

Para a amostra, o cálculo originou-se na pré-determinação proporcional de um número de questionários semelhante às pesquisas anteriores de Socialização e Cultura Política juvenil em Cascavel/PR, realizadas em 2006 e 2012, respectivamente pelas Professoras Dr^a. Rosana Katia Nazzari e Me. Thaís Damaris da Rocha Thomazini. Este número se aproxima do utilizado como primeira aproximação do tamanho da

amostra, para o cálculo do erro amostral, ou seja, 500 unidades. A pesquisa conta com um erro amostral de 5% e confiança de 95%, calculada sobre os parâmetros estatísticos expostos por Barbetta (2002).

No que concerne a dimensão qualitativa, consideraram-se os conceitos clássicos da Ciência Política como Cultura Política, Socialização Política, Participação democrática e Movimentos sociais em suas características contemporâneas de rede, como conceitos em que orbitam as lógicas das atitudes políticas do público da pesquisa.

As variáveis são as mesmas já consagradas pela Ciência Política clássica brasileira e mundial: escolaridade dos jovens e de seus genitores, renda familiar, participação em eventos e atividades, participação em eleições, grau de informação política, confiança nas instituições sociais e confiança no sistema político (ALMOND & VERBA, 1965; ALMOND & POWELL JR., 1972; SARTORI, 1994; MOISÉS, 2010).

Para uma avaliação longitudinal numa perspectiva histórica, entre a pesquisa culminada em 2012 e esta, culminada em 2015, o método comparativo buscou semelhanças e diferenças entre os fatos, abordando duas séries de natureza análoga tomadas dos meios sociais pesquisados, a fim de verificar o que é e o que não é comum em ambos (ALMOND & POWELL JR., 1972; BILL & HARDGRAVE JR., 1973 *apud* SCHMIDT, 2000).

O intuito da conjugação destas duas dimensões da pesquisa é estabelecer uma análise de algumas variáveis da Cultura e Socialização Política e da percepção, informação, opinião e participação dos adolescentes e jovens nos movimentos em rede de Junho de 2013 na cidade. São elas: a) perfil socioeconômico dos estudantes de Ensino Médio público da cidade de Cascavel/PR; b) percepção e satisfação com a democracia e suas nuances na cidade de Cascavel e no Brasil; c) participação social e política em suas dimensões comunitárias e/ou institucionais representativas; d) percepção em relação à confiança política⁶ interpessoal e institucional; e) participação, informação e sentimentos em relação às características dos movimentos em rede e sobre os protestos de Junho de 2013.

No desenvolvimento de cada um destes subitens do estudo, realiza-se uma análise em separado dos casos de questionários respondidos por estudantes que participaram dos protestos na cidade de Cascavel/PR, tendo como objetivo evidenciar as possíveis diferenças entre este subgrupo e a amostra geral da pesquisa e, compreender quem são os jovens que saíram às ruas neste contexto em rede.

⁴ Disponível em: <http://www.latinobarometro.org>

⁵ Disponível em www.consultaescolas.pr.gov.br, sítio oficial do Governo do Estado do Paraná.

⁶ O conceito de Confiança Política é entendido aqui como um dos mecanismos de geração de solidariedade entre os indivíduos de uma sociedade, que promove a cooperação e a legitimação das decisões coletivas e das estruturas democráticas de poder (MISZTAL, 1998).



Além de se abordar estes resultados inéditos, objetiva-se também estabelecer uma análise comparativa com pesquisa de Socialização e Cultura Política imediatamente anterior a Junho de 2013, realizada por Thomazini (2012), a fim de verificar se a

experimentação democrática dos protestos de rua e o contexto social dos movimentos em rede fizeram oscilar ou não as variáveis de Socialização e Cultura Política no município.

IV. MUDANÇAS E CONTINUIDADES NO PROCESSO DE SOCIALIZAÇÃO POLÍTICA JUVENIL

O primeiro bloco de questões disponível para resposta dos entrevistados contemplou um delineamento do perfil socioeconômico dos jovens estudados.

Tabela 01: Cruzamento Idade X Sexo do público da pesquisa (em %).

		Idade						
		13 anos	14 anos	15 anos	16 anos	17 anos	18 anos	19 anos
Sexo	Fem	0,0%	1,2%	5,4%	23,9%	22,9%	3,0%	2,4%
	Mas	0,4%	1,0%	6,4%	16,3%	11,2%	3,6%	2,4%

Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K. n= 503.

Observa-se pela Tabela 01 que o maior número de entrevistados concentra-se entre a faixa etária entre 16 e 17 anos, com uma predominância de pessoas do sexo feminino (58,8%), destacando que 23,9% dos entrevistados são compostos por jovens mulheres de 16 anos de idade. Na pesquisa realizada por Thomazini (2012), o número de mulheres somava 56,6% e também possuíam em sua maioria 16 anos. As pessoas do sexo masculino somam 41,2% e estão concentrados também entre 16 e 17 anos.

Quanto à escolaridade dos pais, notou-se uma relevante semelhança de formação entre as mulheres e os homens. As mães e pais predominantemente frequentaram a escola até o Ensino Fundamental (31,81% das mães e 32,01% dos pais), com números consideráveis também de concluintes do Ensino Médio (27,44% das mães e 26,44% dos pais).

De acordo com Nazzari (2006), os estudos de socialização e cultura política da juventude têm demonstrado uma contradição entre a baixa escolaridade dos pais e mães e a expansão crescente das instituições de ensino superior no Brasil. Tal variável é fundamental para estes estudos, pois permitem associações de proporcionalidade com os níveis de informação política, participação, adesão e legitimação do sistema democrático, além de se constituir como elemento necessário para a elevação dos índices de capital social nas comunidades.

No tocante à preferência por formas determinadas de governo, a pesquisa mostrou que 47,12% dos entrevistados preferem a democracia a qualquer outra forma de governo, 19,68% acham que em alguns casos um governo autoritário pode ser preferível, 16,1% deixaram a questão sem resposta, 14,51% afirmaram não saber responder e 2,58% dizem que tanto faz ser ou não um governo democrático.

Destacou-se nesta questão o elevado percentual de jovens que afirmam não saber responder à questão ou a deixaram sem marcação de resposta, evidenciando que o conhecimento sobre as formas de governo e suas características ainda é frágil entre os jovens estudados. A preferência por governos autoritários em determinados casos também não pode ser desconsiderada: dos 503 entrevistados, 99 assinalaram esta afirmação.

Explicativo disto, como afirma Baquero (2004), a cultura política autoritária desenvolvida historicamente no Brasil e na América Latina, contribuiu significativamente para que houvesse uma reprodução longitudinal de traços autoritários na forma como os jovens encaram a política, ou seja, a forma autoritária de conduzir as mudanças ou permanências de aspectos do sistema político cristalizou este traço e permite que ele se reproduza.

Contudo, a maioria ainda se constitui de jovens que preferem formas de governo democráticos em detrimento de qualquer outra possibilidade, o que mostra a disposição majoritária da juventude em fomentar a construção de formas de visibilidade que percorram caminhos democráticos, índices que coincidem longitudinalmente com as pesquisas realizadas por Baquero, Nazzari, Schmidt, Thomazini e outros.

Por sua vez, no subgrupo de participantes dos protestos de Junho de 2013 na cidade, os números seguiram praticamente a mesma média dos outros respondentes: 51,9% preferem as formas democráticas de governo, 20,8% preferem governos autoritários em determinados casos e 2,8% dizem que tanto faz ser ou não um governo democrático. Os que não souberam responder ou não assinalaram a questão somam 24,5%.

Percebe-se que há um aumento da preferência por governos autoritários e também no número de entrevistados que não responderam neste subgrupo de análise, o que caracteriza que metade dos participantes dos protestos possuem uma definição frágil do que seja o processo político autoritário e democrático, também reproduzindo as formas autoritárias de pensar da cultura política brasileira.

Perguntados acerca de sua participação social e comunitária, os resultados mostraram um acréscimo

importante nos índices, demonstrados pela Tabela 02 a seguir, que já conta com a porcentagem de aparições positivas ou não de cada evento e, uma comparação com os dados coletados em 2012, no intento de verificar mudanças ou manutenções nos padrões atitudinais em relação à participação, com destaque em negrito para as mais relevantes:

Tabela 02: Porcentagem de participação em atividades ou instituições comunitárias, comparativo a 2012.

Eventos/Atividades	2012 (n=456)		2015 (n=503)	
	Sim	Não	Sim	Não
Conselho de Classe na escola	14%	86%	22,5%	77,5%
Grêmio Estudantil	9,4%	90,6%	18,7%	81,3%
Associações de moradores do bairro	4,2%	95,8%	9,3%	90,7%
Grupo de jovens religioso	37,7%	62,3%	56,7%	43,3%
Protestos e passeatas	12,3%	87,7%	34%	66%
Partidos Políticos	2,6%	97,4%	3,6%	96,4%
Sindicatos	1,8%	98,2%	3,8%	96,2%

Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K.

Os números apresentam aumento de participação em todas as atividades ou instituições de 2012 para 2015, com destaque para o aumento de participação em protestos e passeatas, grupo de jovens religioso – que é o único item que ultrapassou 50% de participação – e em conselhos de classe na escola. Os aumentos assinalam um fomento na participação política e comunitária dos jovens de Cascavel/PR e também um maior incentivo à participação ou relativização de paradigmas pelas instituições sociais tradicionais como a religião e a escola.

Apesar de os números ainda indicarem um descrédito considerável nas instituições e grupos sociais para a participação, o aumento nos índices parecem apontar um crescimento dos estoques de capital social entre os estudantes do Ensino Médio público de Cascavel. São estes níveis de participação que permitem que a organização global da sociedade coopere no sentido de desenvolver ou ampliar projetos de crescimento dos bens públicos e de felicidade

coletiva, além de pertencimento, legitimação e adesão à democracia (PUTNAM, 2006).

Destaca-se também que, no contexto dos movimentos em rede, a onda globalizante das TIC's funciona como facilitadora, mesmo que de forma temporária e inconstante, promovendo a discussão *online* e a criação de fóruns públicos de debate e decisão, que constituem um importante instrumento de incentivo à participação em protestos e, na medida em que enxergam expressão popular, crescem de maneira virtuosa até terminarem em suas próprias práticas. Isto, pois, conforme Castells (2013), o interesse do público dos protestos parece estar na mensagem causada pelas mobilizações e não necessariamente pelos seus resultados imediatos, ou, em outras palavras, na esperança da mudança do sistema político e econômico.

Quanto a atividades desenvolvidas entre 2013 e 2014, fora do espectro eleitoral, temos um quadro relativamente semelhante:

Tabela 03: Porcentagem de participação em atividades referentes a política entre 2013 e 2014, comparativo a 2012.

Eventos/Atividades	2015 (n=503)		2012 (n=456)	
	Sim	Não	Sim	Não
Li reportagens em jornais ou revistas sobre assuntos relacionados à política	50,9%	49,1%	46,9%	53,1%
Participei de associações ou grupos para resolver problemas do bairro ou da cidade	7,4%	92,6%	6,8%	93,2%
Fiz pedidos para políticos	7,6%	92,4%	8,8%	91,2%
Acompanhei notícias sobre política pela internet e nas redes sociais	55,3%	44,7%	15,5%	84,5%
Conversei com algum vereador sobre problemas da minha comunidade	8,9%	91,1%	9,6%	90,4%
Conversei com professores, coordenadores ou diretores sobre os problemas da escola	41,4%	58,6%	34,4%	65,6%

Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K.

A partir dos dados apresentados na Tabela 03, pode-se perceber igualmente um relativo acréscimo nos estoques de capital social da juventude entrevistada. Por um lado, o aumento de atividades como ler reportagens sobre política e conversar com professores, coordenadores e diretores sobre os problemas da escola aponta o mesmo verificado anteriormente, ou seja: as instituições tradicionais tendem, neste contexto, a investir na abertura democrática para participação dos jovens e, do mesmo modo, a mídia parece atrair mais o olhar dos estudantes sobre o mundo político, relatando com frequência a sua importância e, além disso, buscando traduzir informações antes inacessíveis ao público jovem.

Por outro lado, verifica-se que os canais de comunicação com a institucionalidade democrática de fato perdem cada vez mais relevância e eficácia. Isto é evidenciado no fato de as duas únicas alternativas com baixa no número de realizações serem, justamente, duas dimensões da mediação entre os cidadãos e o sistema representativo: a conversa com vereadores e o pedido para políticos. Evidencia-se assim, que a desconfiança nos procedimentos do sistema democrático, através dos representantes políticos, forma uma considerável barreira para o acesso e a disposição em acessar os mecanismos democráticos de controle de mandatos e de controle social por parte dos jovens entrevistados.

Afora estas constatações, o relevante destaque continua sendo o crescente uso das redes sociais e da

internet para a informação política dos jovens. Na pesquisa de 2012, percebeu-se que quando perguntados especificamente sobre a época de eleições, mais jovens responderam que se informavam pela internet, em comparação com os números de informação com uso das redes fora do espectro eleitoral.

Na pesquisa de 2015, verifica-se que os números se repetem precisamente nos dois momentos, o que demonstra que a tendente consolidação das redes sociais e da internet na arena política não atinge agora apenas os períodos eleitorais e nem somente aqueles jovens que querem usar a internet apenas para se informar sobre o voto, mas sim todas as dimensões cotidianas da política, que envolvem as situações políticas e suas influências na vida de cada indivíduo ou grupo social.

Paralelo a isto e, em relação às variáveis específicas para verificação da confiança política e interpessoal, se estimulou os entrevistados a dizerem se confiavam totalmente, até certo ponto, não confiavam ou se não sabiam responder se confiavam nas instituições, pessoas e representantes políticos abaixo. A Tabela 04 que segue demonstra os graus de confiança e desconfiança de forma comparativa entre 2012 e 2015, indicando também os dados relativos ao subgrupo de participantes dos protestos nos itens "Governo Federal", "Governo Municipal", "Partidos Políticos", "Igreja", "Família", "Escola", "Mídia" e "Amigos", em negrito:

Tabela 04: Confiança institucional e interpessoal comparada no tempo.

Você confia?	CONFIO TOTALMENTE		CONFIO ATÉ CERTO PONTO		NÃO CONFIO		NÃO SEI RESPONDER	
	2012	2015	2012	2015	2012	2015	2012	2015
Governo Federal	1,8%	5,2% 5,7%	53,3%	47,3% 54,7%	34,2%	35% 34%	10,7%	12,5% 5,7%
Governo Estadual	2,6%	4,2%	53,1%	45,1%	33,3%	39,2%	11%	11,5%
Governo Municipal	4,2%	2,8% 2,8%	52,6%	44,1% 48,1%	32,7%	41,6% 42,5%	10,5%	11,5% 6,6%
Deputados Estaduais	1,5%	1,8%	43,4%	39,6%	43,2%	48,3%	11,8%	10,3%
Vereadores	2%	0,6%	42,5%	35,8%	45,2%	53,3%	10,3%	10,3%
Partidos Políticos	2%	1% 1,9%	38,2%	36,4% 44,3%	48,9%	52,5% 49,1%	11%	10,1% 4,7%
Igreja	47,1%	33,8% 29,2%	37,1%	42,9% 49,1%	11,6%	14,9% 17,9%	4,2%	8,4% 3,8%
Família	79,4%	72,8% 76,4%	16,4%	17,9% 19,8%	2,9%	2,8% 0%	1,3%	6,6% 3,8%
Escola	33,8%	27,4% 25,5%	52,2%	55,5% 62,3%	11,2%	9,9% 6,6%	2,9%	7,2% 5,7%
Mídia – TV, jornais	--	2,4% 1,9%	--	45,1% 48,1%	--	45,1% 45,3%	--	7,4% 4,7%
Professores	30%	23,5%	54,6%	61%	12,1%	9,3%	3,3%	6,2%
Amigos	41,7%	27,2% 33%	49,3%	59% 60,4%	7,2%	7,4% 2,8%	1,8%	6,4% 3,8%
Pessoas	4,8%	3,2%	58,1%	54,3%	30,3%	33,6%	6,8%	8,9%

Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K. n=456(2012); n=503(2015).

Os índices de confiança política apresentados demonstram continuidades no processo de desconfiança institucional e interpessoal, historicamente tidos na juventude. Porém, como explica Baquero (2004), a desconfiança não pode ser vista apenas pelo viés negativo da falta de integração com o sistema político, mas sim compreendendo que a confiança em excesso é indicador de que a apatia política pode predominar, reduzindo o controle social por parte dos cidadãos sobre o Estado e, por consequência, a eficiência da democracia.

Percebeu-se que, no tocante à confiança nas instituições políticas, os governos e representantes políticos continuam sendo objeto de maior desconfiança por parte dos jovens, com destaque para a desconfiança completa nos vereadores, que atingiu o índice de 53,3% na categoria “Não confio” e decresceu nas categorias “Confio totalmente” e “Confio até certo ponto”. A proximidade dos vereadores com a esfera política local poderia ser fator para ter um quadro diferente de confiança, porém, os dados revelaram que é, ao contrário, objeto de desconfiança cada vez maior.

Quando se gira a análise para as instituições sociais tradicionais como a família, a escola e a igreja, se percebe que todas, mas em especial a igreja e a escola, tiveram quedas nos índices de confiança total e aumento de confiança até certo ponto, o que indica que a secularidade ou condição paradigmática destas instituições estão sendo gradativamente questionadas, pois confiar até certo ponto se pode considerar como uma confiança com certas restrições, sem uma certeza de que todas as ações que nelas são praticadas são de fato objetos de confiança absoluta.

Ainda assim, a família permanece sendo majoritariamente a instituição mais confiável pelos respondentes, pois 90,7% demonstraram confiança total ou até certo ponto. Em contraponto, a confiança na igreja passou a ser a menor entre esse tipo de instituição (76,7%). Mesmo considerando que os níveis são elevados, a confiança na escola foi elevada e na pesquisa de 2015 aparece com 82,9% de confiança total ou até certo ponto.

Um elemento que se adicionou ao questionário aplicado nesta pesquisa é a confiança na mídia impressa, televisiva ou virtual, que não aparecia em 2012. Segundo os dados, 47,5% dos entrevistados confiam totalmente ou até certo ponto nas informações, formas ou abordagens da mídia e 45,1% disseram que não confiam nada.

A grande desconfiança dos jovens na mídia passa muito pelo nível e intensidade de informação a que estão submetidos os indivíduos e, hoje principalmente, pela substituição gradual do conteúdo televisivo, que era hegemônico, pelo da internet, que questiona e coloca em xeque os conteúdos da mídia clássica.

Como afirma Postman (1999), a televisão redefiniu o que se entende por um consistente juízo político, seja dos jovens ou dos adultos, modificando-o em uma questão estética antes que uma questão lógica, o que provoca a desinformação ou, quando analisada mais a fundo, um rebaixamento intelectual e desconfiança.

Já quando perguntados sobre confiança interpessoal, as quais colaboram também para os níveis de estoque de capital social e cooperação comunitária, constatou-se que os amigos recebem as maiores confianças totais, seguido dos professores e das pessoas no geral. Quando analisados pelo prisma da não confiança, as pessoas recebem o maior descrédito e os professores aparecem em seguida, à frente dos amigos. Ainda de acordo com a Tabela 04, entre o subgrupo de participantes dos protestos de Junho de 2013, pode-se perceber que os mesmos se posicionam mais em relação o número de respondentes que não souberam responder na pesquisa global.

Este dado indica que os níveis de confiança interpessoal possuem grande influência nos níveis de informação, participação e debate político da juventude, tendo nas figuras do professor, da escola em si e dos amigos, diferentes níveis de comunicação, dados os papéis sociais desempenhados por cada pessoa ou instituição no estímulo à participação cidadã.

Objetivando complementar os dados até aqui apresentados, perguntou-se por qual meio os entrevistados mais tinham ouvido falar dos protestos de Junho de 2013. Esses meios foram escolhidos considerando os agentes de socialização como os amigos, família, mídia, escola e as redes sociais ou, enfim, os meios pelos quais a comunicação sobre as manifestações aconteceu.

A Tabela 05 a seguir mostra por quais meios o público da pesquisa se informou sobre os protestos de Junho de 2013 em Cascavel/PR, dividido entre o total de entrevistados e os que participaram das manifestações:

Tabela 05: Comparativo de meios utilizados para se informar dos protestos.

Por qual meio mais ouviu falar ou se informou?	Total (n=503)		Participantes (n=106)	
	Sim	Não	Sim	Não
Pelas redes sociais na Internet	35%	65%	70,8%	29,2%
Conversando com amigos	16,1%	83,9%	19,8%	80,2%
Conversando com a família	7,8%	92,2%	8,5%	91,5%
Assistindo à TV e pelos jornais	51,3%	48,7%	34%	66%
Na escola	13,1%	86,9%	17%	83%


Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K.

Neste ponto, mais uma situação se evidencia: a maioria dos jovens que não participou dos protestos se informou pelos meios de comunicação clássicos, ou seja, assistindo à TV e pelos jornais e, em menor medida, se informando nas redes sociais, com amigos e na escola, enquanto os participantes dos protestos utilizaram de forma significativa (70,8%) as redes sociais na internet e, em menor medida, a TV, os jornais e conversando com amigos.

Indica-se assim, que a participação nos protestos está diretamente relacionada à informação pelas redes sociais e à internet, que passam a se constituir no principal instrumento de mediação entre a organização em rede e a presença física nos protestos. A possibilidade de uma comunicação autônoma, de ser virtual sem filtragem ou seleção; da organização e avaliação dos movimentos de forma horizontal, sem julgamentos de valor ou críticas jornalísticas, formam as bases para que as redes sociais, neste caso, substituíssem os meios de comunicação clássicos na preferência dos manifestantes.

Quando perguntados sobre o quanto ouviram falar dos protestos, a resposta que mais aparece é em primeiro lugar a opção “Muito”, com 56,6% das respostas, seguida de “Um pouco” com 23,66%, “Não muito” com 8,35% e “Nada” com 1,19%; considerando assim, que a maioria dos estudantes do Ensino Médio público de Cascavel conheceu ou ao menos ouviu falar dos protestos. Possibilita-se dessa forma, que mesmo no imaginário dos jovens, tais protestos causaram ou ainda causam avaliações, reavaliações e mudanças na forma de perceber a participação política, a organização em rede e nas redes e o papel da juventude em processos de transformação política.

Já a disputa pela informação, na guerra simbólica produzida pelos meios de comunicação de massa de forma intensa, provocou também a necessidade de posicionamento dos indivíduos em escalas favoráveis e não favoráveis aos protestos. A pergunta a seguir pretendeu captar essa informação entre o público da pesquisa e também entre o subgrupo dos participantes das manifestações:



Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K.

Gráfico 01: Posição favorável ou contrária aos protestos.

Percebe-se que, em sua maioria, os jovens mais favoráveis aos protestos são aqueles que participaram das manifestações (73,6%), enquanto que os não participantes também em sua maioria são favoráveis (51,09%), mas com outras opiniões mais distribuídas no gráfico.

Neste sentido, buscou-se também analisar quais os sentimentos dos entrevistados sobre os protestos. Entre o público total da pesquisa, a maioria classifica seus sentimentos como neutros (46,5%), enquanto outros 27,2% classificam-nos como muito positivos ou relativamente positivos; 6,2% dizem que são negativos ou relativamente negativos, 15,7% não tem certeza ou não sabe responder e 4,4% deixaram a questão sem resposta.

Entre o subgrupo de participantes, o quadro mostra mudança. Estes, em sua maioria, disseram que seus sentimentos são muito positivos ou relativamente positivos (55,7%), contrastando com 34,9% de sentimentos neutros, 3,8% negativos ou relativamente negativos e 5,7% não souberam responder ou não tem certeza.


Desta forma, perguntou-se se os entrevistados aprovavam ou desaprovavam as formas pelas quais as manifestações foram conduzidas. A maioria do público de pesquisa disse que aprova (36%), porém o número de respondentes que desaprovam também é elevado: 30,8%.

Destaca-se que, neste caso, 29% dos respondentes não souberam responder, indicando que a dimensão organizativa das mobilizações, a disputa pelos rumos dos movimentos em rede e a disputa simbólica e física pela violência e não violência nos protestos, ainda são variáveis que não foram totalmente processadas no imaginário juvenil.

No entanto, entre os participantes das manifestações, a opinião pela aprovação das formas de condução foi mais heterogênea, ou seja, 59,4% aprovam, 26,4% desaprovam e 14,2% ainda não sabiam responder, apontando novamente certo grau de influência que a experimentação democrática dos protestos de rua e da organização em rede pode propiciar na tomada de decisões e posicionamentos dos entrevistados.

Compreendendo que uma das novas características dos movimentos sociais na era da internet é a organização pelas redes sociais e, que esta organização pode ser vista de diferentes formas e com diferentes opiniões acerca de sua eficácia, investigou-se se os entrevistados acreditavam que organizar protestos pelas redes sociais ou pela internet poderia ser melhor.

O Gráfico 02 a seguir demonstra os resultados dessa pergunta, numa comparação entre a pesquisa global e as respostas dos participantes dos protestos:



Elaboração: MINUCELLI, C. P.; NAZZARI, R. K.

Gráfico 02: Organizar protestos pelas redes sociais ou pela Internet pode ser melhor?

Inferi-se, novamente, assim como na questão do posicionamento favorável ou contrário às mobilizações, que o subgrupo de participantes dos protestos possui uma avaliação mais positiva em

relação à influência das redes sociais no processo democrático, com uma diferença de 29,3% de respondentes que acreditam ser melhor organizar protestos de forma virtual.

Destaca-se que 30% dos entrevistados, considerando a pesquisa global, não sabem responder se é melhor ou não, o que indica que o nível de informação sobre os protestos e a experiência democrática proporcionada por eles, além de uma opinião acerca da organização, são diretamente relacionadas.

A dimensão teórica da organização, formação e possibilidades das comunidades virtuais de protestos, em conjunto com os resultados dos questionários, permite inferir que do mesmo modo como a internet parece se constituir gradualmente como meio de informação, comunicação e participação social, ela também se consolida como possibilidade de organização dos movimentos sociais e, especialmente, dos movimentos juvenis, que encontram caminhos ainda não totalmente descobertos para a superação da apatia política e dos índices ainda elevados de não participação na política.

V. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

Com destaque, pode-se afirmar que se vivenciou com os movimentos em rede de Junho de 2013 no Brasil a primeira experiência democrática de protestos, após o início do processo de globalização mundial, que utiliza de forma majoritária as redes sociais e a internet como principal meio de organização de protestos de rua, reivindicando pautas políticas, desde a derrubada de governos, em contraposição a ideias autoritárias, até o pedido por melhorias nos serviços sociais básicos.

Essa nova possibilidade de integração e diversidade evidenciou que os padrões nos comportamentos políticos dos cidadãos podem ser minimamente alterados em função da intensa disputa pelos rumos dos movimentos e, também, pela experimentação da noção de negociação pública do espaço político coletivo, estabelecendo os momentos dos protestos como momentos ricos de aprendizagem democrática e exercício dos direitos civis e da liberdade de expressão.

Pode-se apontar, portanto, que outra noção de democracia passa a ser concebida, por meio de algumas hipóteses como a substituição da relevância da representatividade institucional pela democracia direta e real e da tecnologia como facilitadora da construção, elaboração e avaliação das condições reais de mobilização cidadã para este objetivo.

Esta ocasião aparenta proporcionar aos jovens novas formas de se interferir na arena política e de, por meio dos canais usuais de comunicação da juventude contemporânea, imprimir no espaço público suas inquietações e esperanças em relação à política, fazendo oscilar positivamente seus estoques de capital social e seus níveis de participação política, configurando um momento de novas possibilidades para a cultura e socialização política juvenil.

Em meio a essas nuances, este estudo buscou analisar, com base na literatura clássica sobre o assunto e, na aplicação de questionários quantitativos, as continuidades e descontinuidades dos processos de socialização, cultura e participação política da juventude e, especialmente, da juventude que frequenta estruturas de socialização como a escola pública, tendo como ponto de partida os movimentos em rede.

Evidenciou-se, inicialmente, que as mudanças nestes processos passam pela forma que a atuação política para as mudanças sociais toma, pois ao verificar o significativo aumento de acompanhamento de notícias sobre política e sobre eleições pela internet e pelas redes sociais, percebe-se que após a experimentação democrática dos protestos, o interesse por esse tipo de informações nos meios que são veiculadas torna-se, em conjunto com o ciberespaço, um dos principais canais de comunicação dos jovens com o sistema político, seja para construir demandas ou para recepcionar ações de governos e do Estado.

Somado a isto, nota-se que as informações políticas nas redes sociais aparentam não ser relevantes apenas quando o jogo político democrático impõe a obrigação do voto, ou seja, apenas quando os procedimentos formais da democracia são analisados. Ela se espalha cada vez mais nos caminhos virtuais e no tempo, estabelecendo uma relação cotidiana do jovem com a comunicação virtual dos acontecimentos e dos debates políticos.

Essa relação encontra na avaliação dos jovens sobre a situação política do país e do município, um elevado descontentamento e uma continuidade nos significantes índices de desconfiança política e, especialmente, da desconfiança sobre as instituições políticas representativas. Dessa forma, a percepção aferida do público da pesquisa é a de que o descontentamento caminha em paralelo a uma avaliação regular, ruim ou péssima das formas atuais da democracia.

Os traços autoritários encontrados nesta pesquisa possivelmente possuem, de igual forma, uma relação com os níveis de confiança política e confiança interpessoal dos jovens, visto que de toda forma, as múltiplas variáveis que influenciam as formas de se pensar a vida social e política passam pelas instituições sociais tradicionais, que admitem linhas de autoridade bem definidas e um poder tradicional e carismático marcantes na trajetória dos indivíduos. Tal associação pode se dar pelo fato de a família, a escola e a religião contribuírem para que estas linhas de autoridade se reproduzam no tempo e influenciem as orientações políticas.

No que se refere a estas instituições, percebeu-se que há uma progressiva abertura democrática, relativamente maior que as anteriores, para a relativização de conceitos e práticas anteriormente tratadas como paradigmáticas, como a incapacidade

dos jovens em participarem de decisões no seio familiar, na gestão das escolas e na construção dos conceitos religiosos contemporâneos.

Em contraponto, este aumento nos níveis de confiança interpessoal e institucional não encontra nos diferentes governos o mesmo acréscimo, pelo contrário, eles foram decrescidos em relação à pesquisas anteriores, o que indica que a indignação pelos recorrentes casos de deturpação dos fins de um governo é destacada e expressada por meio dos ainda altos índices de desconfiança e, ainda, possivelmente explica a elevada recusa das formas tradicionais da institucionalidade, como os partidos, no interior das manifestações em rede.

No entanto, a experimentação democrática dos protestos possibilitou que se mudasse em curto prazo alguns dos elementos que constituem as bases para o investimento de mais capital social pelos jovens estudados. Percebeu-se, por exemplo, que os sentimentos em relação à eficácia da participação política dos jovens aumentaram em relação a menos de cinco anos anteriores à pesquisa, indicando que em conjunto com outros fatores, os protestos colaboraram, mesmo que de forma ainda não definitiva, para que houvesse um redimensionamento das visões de mundo que constroem os jovens sobre suas próprias ações nos espaços públicos democráticos.

A participação nos protestos, além de se configurar como um momento de relevante reflexão política, consolida gradualmente neste contexto as redes sociais e a internet como fomentadoras do debate político, da discussão de ideias e posições na arena política e, acima de tudo, como demonstrou a pesquisa, colaborou consideravelmente na mudança de algumas formas de pensar a política e no aumento do interesse em participar entre os que vivenciaram este processo.

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Egypt towards an Islamic State

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Egypt towards an Islamic State

Omar Gomaa ^α, Sivamurugan Pandian ^ο & Nur Hafeeza Binti Ahmad Pazil ^ρ

Abstract- Albeit the ridiculous claim on the implementation of the *Hudud* in Egyptian society, the history of this demand failed due to several reasons. Crucially, the unqualified community. Besides that, the Islamist movements translated the understanding of the Islamic State prejudicially. In the meantime, the demand for implementations of the Islamic State in Egypt has been a demand for a very long time, yet it never occurred. The failure of establishing the Islamic State instigated an unstable political spectrum. However, the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring in 2011 was an ample sign for establishing the Islamic State. In a paradox, the Muslim Brotherhood failed in several political and economic fields, which hastened the topple of the movement in 2013. This study analyses the incidents that occurred in Egypt towards the Islamic State implementation. By looking profoundly into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, this paper ascertained that the failure of democracy in Egypt instigated the emergence of ISIS in Sinai and besmirched the January Revolution reputation in Egypt and worldwide. This paper answers an arguable question: why Egypt fail to establish an Islamic State, albeit it is recognised as one of the leaders of Islamic countries and Arabs?

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I. INTRODUCTION

Islam is the religion of more than one billion inhabitants. Islam was sent from God to his Prophet Mohamed SAW. Since that time hitherto, and Islam has been disseminated throughout the world. For instance, Islam has entered Egypt in the year 641. However, Egyptians did not initially embrace Islam, but it took approximately two hundred years to alter the bulk of Egyptians to become Muslims, contrary to Christians. Islam had affected Egyptians culturally, linguistically and – of course – politically. Egypt had been ruled by the *Hudud* for hundreds of years. Still, the last two centuries observed a tangible transformation in the Egyptian political culture. The *Hudud* was ceased due to social reasons. Crucially, the uprising of liberals' voices. On the other side, the collapse of Khalifah in Turkey had undoubtedly influenced Egyptian politics. The political scene in Egypt witnessed no religious rule in the government. Islam was solely placed at Mosques. Ironically, several Islamic clerics demanded the uprising

of Islam to encompass all aspects of lives, particularly political culture. This political motivation had conclusively conducted various Islamist movements into the political scene, significantly Ikhwanul Muslimin the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The Islamist organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded by Hassan Al-Banna, the schoolteacher. Al-Banna pursued to implement Islamic law in Egyptian society. Alas, he failed to attend the success of his effort as he was assassinated in 1949. But the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood has posthumously reached the globe after his death. Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood governed Egypt for a year from 2012 until 2013. Therefore, as the title of this paper insinuates, this study examines the challenges that faced the Muslim Brotherhood by two methods, religious and sociological scopes, to look in-depth at Egypt Towards an Islamic State.

II. ISLAMIC STATE

The theory of understanding the meaning of the Islamic state revolves around Islamic teaching – and – how Islam regulations should be affected. Strategically, for Islamic rules to occur in such a society as Egypt, there should be a shred of awareness in society. This indisputably includes the role of the family to socialise the children based on Islamic teachings (Ahmed, Clauss &, Salvaterra, 2013). Faruqi (2005) argues that schools conjointly play such a crucial role in this process of development in the Islamic State. Beneath the Islamic State, the pupils will be subjugated to learn the Islamic curriculum to become prepared for ruling the Islamic State. Profoundly, the investigation of the Islamic State focuses on constrain. The constrain of political behaviours, religious fatwa, schools, and media. Correspondingly, the new concept of entrenching the Islamic State had effectively failed. It sociologically failed for the vacuum of experience and misunderstanding of the crucial steps that develop the Islamic State. For instance, the Caliphates of Abbasid, Umayyad and Ayyubid had historically indicated the veridical concept of the Islamic State. They produced clerics, scientists, and even new theories in the wars (Mukatel, n.d.) Moreover, main understanding of the Islamic State was not the focus solely on the *Hudud*. This is particularly indicating that implementing the *Hudud* had constantly taken place in their rules. Yet, they established schools, hospitals and developed the state economically and politically. Initially, this is undoubtedly the evidence that those Caliphates existed for more than centuries.

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Furthermore, the Islamic State at that period witnessed the tolerance between the Muslims and non-Muslims (Kennedy, 1998). Egypt, however, constrained by Umayyad and Ayyubid dynasty, had remarked the tolerance between the Muslims and Christians. The rulers did not force the Christians to embrace Islam. Conclusively, those Caliphates established the most crucial constituent of politics, which is political stability. However, the current understanding of the Islamic State had completely morphed from a theory to another. This massive change in understanding the meaning of the Islamic State occurred palpably after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. Since then, the Islamic world impacted by unlimited scholars who produced a meaning of the Islamic State. Some of them had mutually pursued to establish a theoretical framework that could be implemented on the ground. At the same time, those scholars faced several challenges that sapped their ideology and physically dispatched them behind bars. Yet, hitherto, the Islamic world had never witnessed an actual implementation of the Islamic State. Undoubtedly, this eloquently dereliction is due to several internal and external reason.

The internal failure of the Islamic State had recently revolved around the unprepared individuals who took the lead. The preparation at this juncture highlights each aspect of lives. The individuals, for instance, in Al-Qaeda are not politically and socially socialised to establish a state as it is recognised in the country dictionary (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2021). Hence, Al-Qaeda members are not socialised to become teachers, doctors, and engineers. They, however, are socialised and trained to become combatants (Torok, 2010). With this, Al-Qaeda failed to establish the Islamic State. Furthermore, ISIS had been in a rigorous war in the Middle East in Syria and Iraq to establish an Islamic State. ISIS had seized half land of Iraq and Syria. It had cajoled the Muslims in Europe, Middle East, and Asia to come to Syria and Iraq to the Caliphate land (Fernandez, 2015). Accordingly, it was extremely vivid that ISIS had a coherent political state that seems unbreakable. However, ISIS had accordingly followed the same trajectory as Al-Qaeda (Wood, 2015). The focus was on recruitment without prior acknowledge of the individual background. ISIS had also shifted the children into combatants instead of students. In fact, shifting the whole community to combatants is the first step of dereliction. The community cannot succeed without education, health and political discourse. On the other side, the external reason behind the dereliction of establishing the Islamic State had been in the West's accounts. The West had rebuffed the concept of establishing the Islamic State. Of course, the West did not seek to fight the ideology of the Islamic State individually. The Arabian Regimes had assiduously juxtaposed fought the idea of establishing the Islamic

State. Hitherto, the idea of establishing the Islamic State is a theory that arduously can occur.

Indeed, Iran, for instance, considered itself as an Islamic State. It had profoundly established a coherent Islamic system that abjectly in the hand control of Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has been the forehead of the Iranian Islamic state since 1989 hitherto. His political ascendancy had reached Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Bahrain. As a Shiite Revolution, Khamenei and his doctrine Wilayat Al-Faqih believe in exporting the Iranian Revolution behind the country's borders. Henceforward, Iran had been involved in the Civil War in Syria and Hizbul Allah in Lebanon. Besides, the Support of Houthis in Yemen. However, Iran as Islamic State failed in several social factors. It fails to establish an environment for political dissenters (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2021). As a result, the political dissenters of the Islamic Iranian Revolutions are victimised to marginalisation. They are reckoned as quislings. Islamically, the meaning of political opposition took place in Islam During the Prophet Mohamed period. The Companions had different perspective contrary to the Prophet in many incidents. It is, of course, known as the differences were not regarding the credo but political differences (Islamstory, 2016). Still, there was respect and mutual understanding between the two parts. At this juncture, it is peculiar how the Iranian Regime executes its political dissenter. This rationale led Islamists and sociologist to abnegate the abomination of the Iranian Regime against its political dissenters. This abomination does not lead to prosperity and democracy but dictatorship.

In referring to democracy, several countries pursued to establish Islamic State but in a different meaning. For instance, Aceh state in Indonesia implements the *Hudud* since 2006 hitherto. The government of Aceh is responsible for the *Hudud* and its formal implementation. On the other side, the Indonesian government does not implement the *Hudud* in each diameter in the country (Saâ, 2016), but solely Aceh.

III. THE STORY OF EGYPT

Islam in Egypt had been presented through different accounts. Profoundly, it is critical to state that Islam is embraced by secularists, liberalists, modern Muslims, and terrorists. Critically, not all – Muslims – serve Islam as a whole. Yet, there are Muslims who rebuff to follow Islamic instruction. Still, there are Muslims who bear peremptory to their clerics. Vividly, the issue is not regarding Islam, but Muslims and their understanding of Islam.

The story of the Islamic State in Egypt shifted on several occasions. Historically, Egypt ruled by different rulers such as, Umayyad Ottomans, Mohamed Ali Pasha, and his family. Furthermore, in 1952, the Free

Officers toppled King Farouk and declared Egypt a republic nor kingdom (Gordon, 1992). Those rulers produced a different understanding of Islamic State – and – crucially Islamic Sharia. For instance, the existence of the Umayyad caliphate witnessed the expansion of Islam in Morocco and ‘Al-Andalus’ Spain. At that juncture, the negotiation over the *Hudud* played no part. It was compulsory to implement the *Hudud*. The Egyptian Muslims lived juxtaposed the Egyptian Christians under the *Hudud*. Yet, history did not investigate the negative response from Christians towards the *Hudud*. In the meantime, the political discourse over the *Hudud* had developed and became physical violence. The argument over reckoning Egypt as an Islamic State or Liberalist State is discursive. It has no sufficient answer to both sides, who assume Egypt is an Islamic State and those who consider Egypt as a Liberalist State.

According to Shaukrallah (1994), Islamists are predominantly stemming from rejecting all political discourse. Shaukrallah assumes that Islamists utilise physical actions (violence) to attain their political agenda. Islamist movements assassinated Sadat, the third Egyptian President in, 1981. However, this assumption is erroneously proved. Islamist movements participate in political discourses since their foundations. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, sought to win the People’s Assembly on various instances. This fact scotched the assumption that Islamist movements reject democracy. So far, the struggle to prove that Islamist movements are politically prepared for democracy is inaccurate. Islamist movements are atomised into several organisations. There are moderate Islamist movements, emissary Islamist movements and ultimately terrorist Islamist movements. Each category of those Islamist movements represents an Islamic ideology. For instance, emissary Islamist movements, such as Tablighi Jamaat, eschews the political discourse. The movements believe that politics is the main reason for the dispute among Muslims. Hence, they do not include politics in their programs (Alexiev, 2005). Whilst terrorist movements, such as ISIS, believes in physical violence to associate with the *Hudud*. It abnegates all political discourse. Besides, it declares *Jihad* as the sole method of bringing Islam on the right trajectory (Styszynsk, 2014). Conclusively, intermediate Islamist movements presume democracy and political discourse is merely a method of prosperity and renaissance. However, Egypt contains all varieties of Islamist movements. The imagination of Islamic Unity under one banner in Egypt seems elusive. There are no mutual interests among all Islamist movements. On the other side, intermediate Islamist movements are victimised to the abomination of Islam as a whole. The dissenters of Islam - and – political Islam do not differentiate between the sort of the Islamist movements. For them, violence and

terrorism occur because of the existence of the Islamist movements. In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood have been struggling to represent political Islam in a good image. Alas, the movement faced several tribulations, such as incarcerations and ostracisation (Trager, 2011). Albeit the Muslim Brotherhood adopts the intermediate ideology of political Islam. Although the movement’s dissidents had not ceased to promulgate rumours to besmirch the Muslim Brotherhood’s reputation. Prior to the Muslim Brotherhood rise in 2012, the movement had historically reckoned as a nationalist movement. Of course, it had placed in vortex situations on different occasions. Yet, the movement had never been linked to any violence, particularly during the Mubarak Presidency. Nowadays, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a terrorist movement in Egypt (Dalacoura, 2018). It is, banned from practising politics and appearing in any social activity.

To understand the Story of Egypt towards the Islamic State in-depth: this paper examines a current issue that still uninvestigated. How historically is Egypt prepared for the Islamic State? Genuinely, the de facto history regarding this issue had never been placed on the negotiation table. Since Mohamed Ali Pasha hitherto, the pursuance to establish Islamic State had never occurred in favour of all governments. It is obscure whether Egypt does not consider this issue due to the minority of Copts rather preferring Egypt as a Liberalist State. In addition, beneath the Ottoman Caliphate and the British occupation, the *Hudud* had evanesced. However, Egyptian history witnessed various abortive attempts to revitalise the *Hudud*. The Muslim Brotherhood, alongside political elites Mostafa Kamel and Sayyid Qutb to establish the *Hudud* again. At this juncture, the Muslims, Christians, and Jews maintained their religious affairs. Egypt did not struggle with this political issue (Berger & Sonneveld, 2010). The differences between the current situation now and the Companions era is revolving around internal and external factors. The Companions learned the Koran to know the new teachings and guidance from God. There was no cultural influence on Muslims. The Persian and Roman Empires had not played a religious and cultural influence role on Arabs. Thus, the current situation of Muslims and Egyptians differentiate from the past (Qutb, 1964). Muslims nowadays are impacted by various external factors. For instance, the Western influence on Egyptians had led the country to utilise the English and French language as a compulsory language to work in the government. Learning a new language is a stimulus to learn new culture and adopt new habits as well. Egyptians who studied in France had been influenced by the Western culture: they pursued to bring it to Egypt. Yet, Mohamed Abdu, the Egyptian scholar who went to France for an academic purpose, returned to Egypt to normalise Egyptians

based on the Islamic teachings: he criticised the Western culture that in paradox with Islam (Hadoor, 2017). Undeniably, Al-Azhar did not declare such a rigorous stance to cease this Western influence. It had solely enjoyed an ethos by Egyptians and Saad Zaghloul (Hatina, 2000). Al-Azhar is historically known as the pulpit for Muslims worldwide. Yet, its role is lacuna during serious circumstances. One of the external factors that influenced Egyptians is the media. The Western media had not solely played a salient role in Egyptian society, but it morphed the identity of Egyptians. The discourse over Egyptians is Pharaohs or Arabs had complicatedly accentuated a profound social problem in Egypt. Egyptian secularists declare themselves Pharaohs. On the contrary, Islamists declare themselves Arabs. This dispute is probably not leading to physical abuse. Yet, it leads to a transformation in identity. The identity, however, shapes the personality and develop the individual's thoughts. An instance of Egyptian Islamists, considering them as Pharaohs, will marginalise the Islamic side, which encompasses the Islamic teachings and Arabic language. As a result, the Islamic State will play no role in the Egyptian political scene. Egypt will manifestly shift to a Secular State.

The comparative analysis of the differences between the Companion's period and the current situation highlights the collapse of the identity. All Islamist movements in Egypt inveigle their cohorts to establish an Islamic State and envisage reviving the Caliphate. Notwithstanding, those Islamist movements had left a gap among its members to have an in-depth understanding of the movement's identity, objectives, and ideology. Thus, the continuum of most of those Islamist movements collapsed and evaporated. One of those movements is Takfir Wal Hijrah. According to Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil (2021), this movement instigated chaos and harmed the political stability in Egypt. Hence, the Egyptian government made a pragmatic decision to remove this Islamist movement. It was palpable for Egyptians that Takfir Wal Hijrah is causing troubles instead of developing society. As such, Egypt, at this juncture, was in an ideological battle against the communists and socialists who seized the social activities and universities during Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second Egyptians President. In addition, Takfir Wal Hijrah declared Egypt as Islamic State without considering all ramification of their declaration. The de facto is a preposterous idea to propagate for the Islamic State whilst the cohorts of the movements are not well prepared. Egypt was simultaneously teetering on the brink of collapse due to its war against Israel. Besides, the members of Takfir Wal Hijrah were mostly released from the incarcerations. They have not been socialised socially, politically and even religiously to establish this alleged Islamic State. Arguably, the miss understanding of the movement's identity is, unquestionably, the main culprit of the dereliction of the Islamist movements.

IV. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD A CASE STUDY

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the world. It was founded in 1928 by the schoolteacher Hassan Al-Banna. As a founder of the movement, Al-Banna emphasised Islam and politics are inseparable (Farahat, 2017). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood has been struggling to establish the Islamic Laws in the legitimate rules. The pursuit has been ambling on the trajectory of democracy, rebuffing all extremist ideologies. Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood eschewed extremism and the language of violence. This has valorised the movement's stance against its dissenters. On the contrary, extremist movements have an abject denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood. They assume the intermediate ideology adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood is the main culprit of the Muslims ignorance. Of course, this seemed plausible in the Muslim Brotherhood dissenters' accounts. Particularly after the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 by a military coup committed by the Minister of Defense Abdul Fattah Assisi.

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood did not witness prosperity and sophistication. As the movement played the role of the main dissenter in the face of dictatorship: it had faced dissolution, incarceration, and confiscation of its properties (Munson, 2001). For critics, this had occurred because of the movement's motto that emphasises 'Allah is their destiny, the Prophet is their leader, Koran is their constitution, and the death for the sake of Allah is their destination' (Khalid, Hassan & Sajid, 2020). This motto, of course, stands against several ideologies. It does not coexist with the principle of Secularism that believes religion and politics must be bifurcated. It accordingly does not concur with the interest of the Egyptian military. Arguably, these discrepancies between the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military headed to a recondite situation. The relationship between the two sides has been sapped in various political incidents. The constant grapple over the political ascendancy indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood had lost in many political battles. Since 1954 until the collapse of Mohamed Morsi the first civilian President of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood hurled in incarcerations and faced executions. Antithesis from the oppression and political deprivation, the Muslim Brotherhood won most of the Egyptian elections, particularly after the January Revolution in 2011. Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood believed in democracy to attain its political agenda. Its political agenda is the fulcrum of the argument to establish the Islamic State. However, the distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements to establish the Islamic State is extremely non-

comparative. It argues that the Muslim Brotherhood took the political ascendancy not only in Egypt, but Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (al-Anani, 2020).

To establish an Islamic State, Hassan Al-Banna pursued and cracked to ascertain answers for all disputable issues. This encompasses social issues, religious issues, even sportive issues. He inculcated to his cohorts that to establish an Islamic State that implements Islamic teachings in its society, the Muslim must unite beneath one banner. However, the challenges faced by the Muslim Brotherhood have been recurring in each decade. With a vituperative attack on the movement's structure, the Muslim Brotherhood had not challenged external crisis in Egypt, but its members subjugated to an internal crisis that successfully bifurcated the movement into two sides in different periods. Ironically, the oppression towards the Muslim Brotherhood did not cease its expansion on Egypt's soil. Even the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 had remarkably witnessed the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology worldwide. Several scholars have attributed to the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's society and worldwide (Munson, 2001; Zollner, 2009 al-Anani, 2016). Sociologically, the Muslim Brotherhood sufficiently has an epiphany towards the hazard committed by the Egyptian government. Therefore, it entrenched a coherent sociological network in Egypt by having more than 100 branches in all Egyptian diameters. Those branches were juxtaposed with schools, social clubs, and clinics. The domination of the Muslim Brotherhood over Egyptian society did not favour the movement itself. Yet, it had intriguingly favoured Mubarak's regime economy. According to Leiken & Brooke (2007), the Muslim Brotherhood is not a revolutionary movement; it inveigled Egyptians to win their hearts for a gradual Islamisation. The whole ideology and structure of the Muslim Brotherhood are built on the Islamic ideology. Besides, the movement focused on socialising its members on Islamic teachings, nationalism, and Islamic globalisation. According to (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2020), the Muslim Brotherhood main ideology is *Ustaziatul Alam* which means to govern the world by Islamic perspective. The Muslim Brotherhood focuses on shaping individuals to become stalwart members to promulgate the concept of the movement in all Egyptian diameters. The members sought to procure social dominance prior to political ascendancy. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in physical violence as a solution to establish the Islamic State; it believes in the democratic trajectory as the sole and crucial method for a developed state. This developed state will uprise by individuals. Crucially, the internal system of the Muslim Brotherhood is reflexively producing the image of political Islam. This political Islam was not grappled by the military to cease the envision of establishing the Islamic State. The Islamist

movements that argued with the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the movement concept: had disowned the movement strategy to seek political ascendancy. Those movements had likewise considered the Muslim Brotherhood as the pursuers of power. Arguably, after the collapse of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, those Islamist movements established their political parties to become other pivotal roles for political Islam in Egypt. Certainly, those movements such as Salafi and Jamaat Islamiyah were far from the Muslim Brotherhood experience. However, the political environment in Egypt was felicitous for all social and political movements to practise their agenda. Alas, Islamist movements failed to become united beneath one banner. Accordingly, the demand for political Islam had rumbustiously concealed. The prevailing environment in Egyptian politics focused on the procurement of more seats in the Parliament. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood obtained the majority of the Parliament Election: it also won the Presidential Election in 2012 (Aknur, 2013).

Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood acquisitively encountered the political and social domination in Egypt: it has hankered down due to other Islamist movements inclinations. Crucially, those Islamist movements perturbed the Muslim Brotherhood to implement Sharia Law. Salafis and even Tablighi Jamaat that abjure politics beseeched Morsi to proceed with the *Hudud*. This, paradoxically, produced nuisances to the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt, politically, economically and socially, was not prepared to morph from the applied legitimacy to the *Hudud*. The linearity of the Muslim Brotherhood was to subject Mubarak's regime on trial. Morsi, the Egyptian President, faced several political challenges that – regrettably – hastened his collapse in 2013. According to critics, the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected to bear political pressures from all Egyptian sides; hence, the movement did not apportion its account to establish an Islamic State. At the political level, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood were not in the stage of accepting the *Hudud*. Vitally, the essential key player in the Egyptian political scene, the military. It had its stance against that decision. Egyptians themselves were not prepared to socialise based on Islamic teachings and considering Egypt as an Islamic State. Contrarily, the Muslim Brotherhood never pursued to morph the Egyptian constitution and resort to Koran as the legitimate law. Despite this, the Muslim Brotherhood faced several scandals that undoubtedly besmirched the Muslim Brotherhood reputation. One of those political calumny was the inclination of the Muslim Brotherhood to turn Egypt into another Kandahar (Al-Hadad, 2021). Towards the end, the internal political and economic crisis were ample to accentuate the instability of the Muslim Brotherhood government. This government had also failed to palliate the abomination that propagated on social media and talk shows. Thus, this political

dereliction highlights that the State of Apparatus was fiercer than the Muslim Brotherhood – and – the Muslim Brotherhood did not govern Egypt. It had solely won the Presidential seat; thus, the government collapsed after a year. The military coup that toppled the Muslim Brotherhood government occurred with the assistance of Al-Azhar, Mohamed ElBaradei, Assisi, Pope Tawadros II, and ultimately Salafis, who betrayed the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis, who placed the Muslim Brotherhood in a vortex situation several times due to their Islamic demand, emerged in the military coup and declared their rebuff to the Muslim Brotherhood government and demanded Morsi to step down (Delibas, 2019). Conclusively, the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood failed the January Revolution. It brought the military again to power. The consequence of the military coup did not lead Morsi's supporters to face the music. It resulted in thousands of martyrs in Rabba Sit-in in 2013. Hitherto, there are more than 60000 political detainees behind bars (Oxford Analytica, 2021). This military coup had successfully devastated the objectives of Egyptian to end up the military rule that took place in 1952 until 2011.

The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood did not outright the demand of the Islamic State. Alas, it instigated a new key challenger in the political scene in the Middle East, which is ISIS. The new key challenger annexed half Syria and Iraq. They declared their land as the awaiting Caliphate – The Islamic State. The propaganda of ISIS cajoled Muslims in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to agglutinate them. At this juncture, ISIS recruited tens of thousands of children, women, and youths. The declared Islamic State did not focus on educating the children and providing a felicitous role for women in society. Antithesis from this, ISIS socialised its new members as combatants. Crucially, ISIS brainwashed them on the abomination of the West and the Arab Regimes. Besides, the physical socialisation that shaped their identity as *Mujahideen*. However, the neglect of society and its demand caused the collapse of Syria and Iraq. The awaiting Caliphate failed to attain its objectives due to the extremism of ISIS. The continuation of ISIS was an intimidation not merely for the Middle Easters but for the world (Gross, 2017). Genuinely, ISIS promulgated in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Uganda, Egypt, Nigeria and the Philippines. So far, NATO battled ISIS and defeated it in Syria and Iraq. Yet, the existence of ISIS still in the continuum in Egypt. Sinai contains an obscure number of ISIS combatants. Those combatants were previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood who joined ISIS after the collapse of the movement. Furthermore, ISIS in Egypt has antecedent police and military officers who stripped off their accustomed lives to shift into extremists. Only the emergence of ISIS occurred after the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that the failure of democratisation in Egypt was one reason why ISIS

cajoled the previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood and adjoined them. This path of ISIS caused the lives of Egyptian officers and augmented inescapable chaos in Sinai.

V. DISCUSSION

The interpretive analysis of the literature review shows that the failure of political Islam in Egypt caused the emergence of ISIS in Egypt. Of course, the Muslim Brotherhood is an indisputable fact with ISIS, but the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood was a sign for Muslim youths that political Islam leads to no destination but to retrograde. In contrast, the denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood for the emergence of ISIS is extremely unreasonable. Egyptian history had witnessed the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a democratic state. Yet, it failed because of the military intervention in politics. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in society indicates a pertinent relationship between the movement and Egyptians. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood grappled with the British occupation, dispatched its members for jihad against the Zionists in 1948; it also participated in the January Revolution. However, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood considered the movement as an antagonist of democracy because of its demand to establish an Islamic State. Nevertheless, the political vicissitude in Egypt indicates that it is elusive to turn Egypt into Islamic State. The steps to entrench a coherent Islamic State in Egypt requires the community to be fully educated Islamically. For instance, the change of school curriculum: as such, teaches that Egypt is a civilian country. Without going into much detail regarding the Islamic State, the alleged Islamic State by ISIS was not profoundly a State. It argues that ISIS did not build school, hospitals, authorities. Their faked Islamic State was such propaganda to recruit more members and instigate chaos in the Middle East.

During the Muslim Brotherhood government, the faced challenges were hugely more than expected. The movement struggled politically to unite all the revolutionists of the January Revolution into one hand against Mubarak's regime. Alas, it failed due to the discrepancy of thoughts. Ironically, the revolutionists were against the Islamic project led by the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the Islamists adjured the Muslim Brotherhood to proceed with the *Hudud*. This, of course, requires the Muslim Brotherhood to change the Egyptian culture and the constitution. At least nominally, the Egyptian economy was teetering on the brink of collapse. Furthermore, the Egyptian streets had witnessed a weekly demonstration demanding Morsi to step down. Conclusively, proceeding with the *Hudud* and considering Egypt as Islamic State is a very reckless political movement. It would be, undoubtedly, an ambush to incite the Egyptian streets against the Muslim Brotherhood. Towards the end, according to the

literature review, the Muslim Brotherhood had practised politics since 1928, but the movement was not prepared politically and socially to govern Egypt. Thus, the movement did not predict the military coup and lost in the second political battle against the military after the first battle in 1954.

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The Aetiology of Political Leadership Conflicts in the ANC and Implications for South Africa's Democracy

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THE AETIOLOGY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CONFLICTS IN THE ANC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRACY

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



The Aetiology of Political Leadership Conflicts in the ANC and Implications for South Africa's Democracy

Kwandiwe Kondlo

Abstract The internal conflicts within the ANC are to a large extent about leadership contestation for power, given the possibilities that ANC Presidency carries in relation to becoming President of the country. In fact politics within the ruling party and ANC led government has become a 'new economy' in the South Africa. The aetiology of political conflict in the ANC needs more careful analysis since it serves as a magnifying glass of underlying possibilities for the country's young democracy. This paper traces the evolution of conflicts within the ANC. It proceeds to cover the post 1994 period to show how internal conflicts are eroding the power and legitimacy of the democratic state. The paper will reflect on the challenge of political leadership transition, a problem in the entire African continent, and a problem which has become prominent in South Africa, post the Nelson Mandela leadership period. The politics of fracture in the governing party are in fact 'a politics of precarity' and have inaugurated uncertainty, instability, and moral decline in the country's democracy as whole. It's difficult to foresee the end point and return of inclusive democratic 'reason'.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

That there is conflict and serious internal divisions in the ANC, South Africa's governing party, which Nelson Mandela led to victory during the first democratic elections in 1994, is now a fact which is hard to deny. Turbulences within the ruling party which South Africa's democracy has had to endure tend to intensify during periods of leadership transition, eg. transition from Mbeki period to Zuma and from Zuma period to Ramaphosa. The internal leadership wrangles within the ANC, even though rationalised and explained as a sign of maturation of democracy by commentators and apologists, do pose serious threats to the future and fate of South Africa's democracy. Conflict in the ANC, signifies, as is argued in this article, the failure of political leadership to live up to the burden of ethical example in service of a much higher cause, the cause of emancipation and restoration of human dignity. Of course, the story about conflict in the ANC is being analysed and commented upon from a variety of perspectives but is sometimes not carefully related to the country's democracy. The story of ANC internal leadership conflicts is replete with varied strata of meanings, interpretations and contestations. One must also indicate that internal organizational conflicts are not uniquely an ANC thing – many former liberation movements that are now governing parties have had

similar experiences at one point or the other. Some have survived albeit the deep reconfigurations of internal power.

Perhaps one could argue that the failure of the ANC to use the period of heightened conflict between former Presidents Mbeki and Zuma, (2004-2009) to cultivate reproachment between the two important leaders and their supporters, marked a turning point in the history of the organization. The proof of the turning point is in widespread negative perceptions about the ANC hence decline in its electoral support in 2019 national and provincial elections and November local government elections in 2021. The ANC is seen as a huge and old organization which lacks ethical grounding hence the breakaway which occurred in 2009 to form Congress of the People (COPE) and later the expulsion of ANC Youth League leader, Julius Malema who then formed a new party, the Economic Freedom Fighters, which is giving the ANC a serious challenge in getting youth support.

So, it is perhaps correct to argue that the turning point is marked by the ANC's progressive losses in the arena of 'politics of support' (Gamble 1974; Dobell 2000) – this arena is about the degree of popular support by the mass of the electorate. The failure to cultivate reproachment has favoured a situation of perpetuity of internal conflict and organizational semi-paralysis which confronts both revolutionary and moderate forces within the ANC with serious tactical and strategic challenges. The challenges include how to forge unity and organizational coherence to advance the ideals of the organization's national democratic 'revolution'. The disunity which reached immense proportions from the time of the Polokwane conference continues to haunt the ANC. The 'conflict' has far deep and complex permutations as it includes access to power and money as well as underlying contestations about the direction of change in the country – the competition between a pro Anglo-American development path versus the new versus the emerging path forged out of alliances between new and emerging global powers – especially Russia-China – continues to be an issue. The former is supported within the ANC by moderate and 'enlightened' majority led by the current President Cyril Ramaphosa and the latter, is articulated by the radical transformation faction in ANC and is largely associated with the former President Jacob Zuma who was recalled as President just a year before the end of his term. It is during his term that corruption in

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state procurement took centre stage leading to the establishment of a national Commission on State Capture. Former President was required to appear several times as witness and accused person during the Commission enquiry sessions. He appeared a few times and then defied the Commission and summons which were sent to him. The former President was then charged and arrested. His incarceration on charges of contempt of court triggered uprisings in some parts of KwaZulu-Natal province and Gauteng province and these uprisings were hijacked by criminal elements and community activists, not loyal to Zuma, but using the space to loot and fulfil personal financial interests. This nearly plunged the country's democracy and governance into chaos with early estimates showing a repercussion of approximately R50 billion on the national economy.

The problem is that on the surface, the ANC always appears to be singing the same song from the same hymn, but deep down, the rhythms and dances to the song are different (Kondlo 2011). This is a simplified analogy of complexity of the ANC's crisis. Another underlying dynamic in the ANC's crisis is the new "political power elite" (Chipkin 2019) which has emerged and continues to grow and its political base is to a large extent in the ANC. The challenge it faces is finding a working strategy of capital formation to create the material base for its reproduction. Dealing with this challenge has led to numerous ethical lapses hence the incidence of state capture and rampant corruption which now erodes confidence in the arena of 'politics of power' (Gamble, 1974; Dobell 2000). The state and government, as an arena of 'politics of power' cannot be unaffected by what is happening in the ANC. The "double-speak" (Gumede 20120) you hear among ANC leaders, is basically an attempt to manage numerous internal fractures and this of course creates, even though inadvertently, spaces for the 'unethical' to continue to survive. That is why political leadership conflicts will take long to end in the ANC. It's the severity of losses incurred in the arena of "politics of support" which could probably awaken ANC's moral self.

II. ISSUES RAISED IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Prominent scholars around the globe have made important reflections on the aetiology of conflict in the ANC and most importantly, the fate of South Africa's democracy. I still find the works of the 'older', generation of South African scholars very useful in providing insights to understand what is happening in the ANC today. One is reminded here of the works of Hugh MacMillan; Colin Bundy, Archie Mafeje; Dani Nabudere, Kwesi Prah; Steven Ellis; Raymond Suttner, Tom Lodge etc. It could be useful to refer to some of the issues raised by these scholars in order to focus the points

made in this article. One is also fully aware of the fact that the younger generation of scholars, has reviewed and challenged some of the positions made in the works of the earlier generation of scholars. For instance, some more recent and relevant works on internal issues in the ANC have been produced by scholars like Janet Cherry, Xolela Mangcu, William Gumede, Mcebisi Ndletyana, Lungisile Ntsebeza; Hebert Maserumule; Ivor Chipkin etc but this article will mention where appropriate but will not delve into works produced by this generation.

What emerges from existing scholarship is that there are three broad phases in the history of the ANC within which political leadership conflicts have to be located. The first phase was that of the ANC as a non-violent civil rights organization. Towards the end of this phase the organization grappled with its ideological identity as was shown during the conflicts which started before and after the ANC's 1930 conference in Bloemfontein. The competition between Josai Gumede, a Communist who wanted to be re-elected President of the ANC and Prielley ka Isaka Seme, an ANC moderate eventually led to a split in the ANC of the now Western Cape. The Independent ANC was formed in November 1930 led by Elliot Thonjeni and Bransby Ndobe (Kono, 1982). But this structure was short-lived. Besides this the ANC grappled with radical ideas from various fronts and also from its youth leading up to the adoption of the 1949 Program of Action which was later abandoned. This and other unresolved ideological issues precipitated a split which led to the formation of the PAC under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe in 1959.

The phase which follows, starts from 1960 to 1990 and is about the ANC's transition from a legal civil rights organization to an exile national liberation movement; the third phase, 1990 to date is about the ANC unbanned and its about the ANC as a governing political party, since 1994 national and provincial elections. The common thread in all the phases is that the governing ANC came into power and continued to be in power without a nuanced concept of the kind of democratic state it can realistically build. Its ideas of democracy and democratic state have always been broadly framed and the detail has always been due to effective opposition within the country's parliament. The character of leadership during the various moments of transition (from one phase to the other) and the impact the transitions had on the character and political culture of ANC need more careful study. Each phase that I have indicated in this paper also has its own 'sub-phases; eg. the second phase which is the exile period had formative years stretching from 1960 to 1965 and thereafter the 1967-1969 period of serious internal tensions following the Wankie debacle, the Hani Memorandum and Morogoro conference. In fact the 1970s had challenging periods for the ANC and these included the 'Africanist' challenge which re-emerged

within the ANC and was led by Tennyson Makhiwane. The "group of eight", as it was called in the ANC, was expelled from the ANC and Tennyson Makhiwane returned to the Transkei where it is alleged he was gunned down by MK operatives in Umtata. Again in 1986, an ideological storm swept the leadership corridors of the organization but the storm was short-lived. This time the ANC was confronted by the rise of the Marxist Workers Tendency within the organization. The MWT underlined the lack of clear ideological choices in the ANC. The Tendency was also suppressed, some members expelled from the ANC. When the ANC was unbanned, its only strength deriving from years of exile, was dog loyalty to the party. It also brought back into the country structures of the ANC expanded in exile "on a scale which is unprecedented in the history of any other exiled liberation movement". By the time the ANC and its allies returned home in the early 1990s, they had developed a bureaucratic machinery of huge proportions" (Lissoni 2008) This brought with new challenges - institutional robustness and internal disarticulations. These were exploited by a rising subaltern tendency in the ANC – the tendency of 'comrade criminals' always looking for any loophole in the system to support their financial and business schemes. It has taken time for the ANC to see the importance of strengthening 'integrity management systems' even though this is still fragile.

Raymond Suttner (2010) has examined the ANC after it was unbanned in 1990 in his article titled '*Culture(s) of the African National Congress of South Africa: Imprint of Exile Experiences*'. He looks into the various ideological, intergenerational and organisational strands that came together to be part of one ANC. As he put it, "these in turn comprised a variety of tendencies and organizational formations" and unsurprisingly there were complexities attached to the post 1994 integration of these various elements since the organizations that now were 'one' had distinct styles of work and historical experiences informing their practice".

Post 1994 we see the rise of political leadership conflicts, of a different character and the growing lack of honour and civility is so glaring. The question is why? There is still a lot we have not uncovered about the character of exile and its stamp on the psyche of the ANC as an organization. But there is also still a lot to uncover about primitive accumulation to create the material base of a new political power elite. The character of the period of exile, the exile environment and the impact it has had on the ANC is excellently examined by Colin Bundy (2015) in his article titled 'Cooking the rice outside the pot'. His analysis concurs with that of Tom Lodge (1986). They both refer to the fact that the exile environment has left an indelible mark on the character of the ANC. As Bundy (2015) puts it, "in exile the ANC leadership was secretive, conspiratorial, and paranoid and decidedly non-

democratic" a point which is supported by Xolela Mangcu (2009) in his book, "The democratic moment: South Africa's Prospects under Jacob Zuma'. So the legacy of exile in political leadership culture of the ANC is what you cannot deny. This legacy overpowers the creative role of insile leadership and exile leadership was put ahead of insiles in the 1991 ANC conference inside South Africa. The brief reprieve represented by the choice of Ramaphosa is likely to short-lived as it is literally born undersiege. I believe it was a grave mistake to promote the view that liberation movements were governments in waiting. Once in power what we have seen is that liberation movements do not have a transformed view of power nor do they have a model of 'humanhood' which differs from or surpasses what we have known in our daily experiences of the white dominated world.

The perpetuation of leadership conflicts in the ANC is as a result of two things; first, the kind of leadership culture and values which the organization embraced as it navigated the exile environment. Second, once in power the ANC realised there is a huge white national bourgeoisie capable of buying over members of the emerging political power elite. The ANC leadership has not principled position which is also practically sustainable, on how to respond to the overtures and temptations of both local and international capital. Because they don't have a principled position, they deal with it inconsistently and this generates conflict of positions and conflict of interests.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRACY

The implications the ANC conflicts have for South Africa's democracy are deep and dangerous. The country is now a deeply fractured polity characterised by growing spaces of lawlessness. The unhealthy hierarchies of power in the ruling party tend to be replicated in government and society. This has implications for democracy. Democracy needs, as indicate by Anthony Giddens (1994), the creation of public spaces, which he calls 'a public arena', in which controversial issues are at least handled through dialogue rather than through pre-established forms of power. This helps avoid growing the spaces of lawlessness in a country, the challenge South Africa is confronted with. The present form of democracy in South Africa has a challenge of linking the 'shifting character of the South African State' with the creation of 'discursive spaces' which could allow for the 'ordering of relations in political society', through dialogue rather than through embedded power.

As a result of internal leadership conflicts, the ruling party (ANC) is failing to provide the kind of 'centre which matters' in a fragile democracy; a centre around which things find integration and therefore 'hold

together' the entire nation. Conflicts in the ANC got to prominence from the time of ascendancy of former President Jacob Zuma and the recall of former President Mbeki and has continued to the current period of President Cyril Ramaphosa. The internal political "coups", which saw former President Thabo Mbeki, first and later former President Zuma recalled by the ANC from the position of power (Presidency). With the recall of Mbeki as President, the country was nearly plunged into deep a crisis, as Mbeki was very popular and widely respected by citizens and business people but less by members of his party. Almost the entire cabinet resigned in his support. The recall of former President Zuma was indeed less dramatic and was in fact applauded by many citizens as Zuma was becoming more and more not just an embarrassment to the country but also a liability. For instance, it was hardly a year after Jacob Zuma came to power that 'the Zuma family business empire' made news headlines in 2010 (*Mail & Guardian*, 19-25 March 2010). The *City Press* (11March 2010) provided statistics which indicated that "almost half of President Jacob Zuma's Cabinet (42%) own companies. The Auditor-General has found that one in two members of parliament holds directorship in private companies and that between 33% and 50% of all members of provincial legislatures also moonlight". Two years later, Adrian Basson (2012) released a hard-hitting publication titled '*Zuma Exposed*'. The book provides a comprehensive list and discussion of instances involving the President's "bad decisions, bad judgment and bad leadership" (Basson, 2012: ix). The Zuma period was dotted with numerous scandals up to the end; hence his recall heralded the Ramaphosa led 'new dawn' in South Africa.

Of course, South Africa's democracy may survive, with or without the ANC. This is because, besides the ANC, there are deeply entrenched powerful international interests in South Africa which could outlive the ANC. The country also has functioning institutions of law and administration. But the impact of ANC influence in many corners of South African society remains a threat to any meaningful change. The influence of ANC networks on the public institutions such as the public service and administration is actually corrupting civil servants, the motivation to excel and operate on strictly ethical grounds. A shallow democracy is most likely the most noticeable impact of political leadership conflicts in the ANC as the conflicts spill over to the 'arena of politics of power'. But a shallow democracy doesn't deal with the most urgent issue of the day – how to correct the injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority, first, by colonial capitalism and second, by the redrawing of frontiers of power in the form of re-concentration of wealth & power among a few global players.

IV. CONCLUSION

The future of South Africa's democracy under ANC led government has very limited prospects. The conflict in the ANC continues even to date and it affects the country in a big way given the continued conflation of party and state. At the present moment, internal squabbles within the ANC are affecting the stability of the country's democracy as they affect delivery of services to citizens. The growing theft of state asserts leading to electric power shortages and blackouts continue to haunt the country's democracy. The ruling party is deeply divided and factionalized. There is clearly a pro-Ramaphosa faction now dominant and a receding pro-Jacob Zuma faction. The Ramaphosa faction integrates around the notion of 'the new dawn' which entails clean governance and inclusive economy whereas the Zuma faction coalesces around 'radical economic transformation' and openly defends the maleficence which occurred during the Zuma administration.

There is a dominant view in public discourses that the radical economic transformation groups within the ANC, following the arrest of Mr Zuma in 31 June 2021, campaigned and influenced 'release Zuma' riots which developed into an 'insurrection' kind of mass looting of businesses. This was intended to subvert the economy and weaken the state. What appeared like an aborted 'insurrection' on the 2nd and 3rd July 2021 when scores of largely unemployed township and slum dwellers invaded malls and businesses in their vicinity, was huge dent on the integrity of democracy and the state.

The establishment of a healthy or balanced relationship between the government, the state and ruling party, economy and a united non-racial society is at stake. It requires the deepening of democracy in order to generate meaningful development. The widespread reference to the deficit in our democracy refers to deficiencies in the delivery of material improvements to the majority of citizens. These include, inadequacies in responding to grassroots citizen preferences, the gap that has developed between those who can make their voices heard and those who cannot, except under situations of noticeable mass protests. The improvement of degree of interaction between the government and independent citizens, the improvement of levels of access to decision makers and decision making, by grassroots citizens, especially those outside urban centres, is what could save the country's democracy.

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The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Fellows are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Fellow Members.



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Acknowledgments

Contributors to the research other than authors credited should be mentioned in Acknowledgments. The source of funding for the research can be included. Suppliers of resources may be mentioned along with their addresses.

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Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.



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It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

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Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of human social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

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11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

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- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
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Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

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This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

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Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

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- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

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Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

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	A-B	C-D	E-F
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<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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