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Globalization and the Deviant Behavior

Loan Associations to Households Welfare

Discovering Thoughts, Inventing Future

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The Contribution of Village Savings and Loan Associations to Households Welfare in Rwanda

By Jean Bosco Harelimana

Abstract- This study is an attempt to analyze the contribution of Village Saving and Loan Association (VSLA), implemented in Ruhuha Sector of Bugesera District by Plan International (2012-2017) for poverty reduction. The general objective of this study is to assess the contribution of VSLAs to household welfare improvement in Bugesera District.

A 80 respondents sample were proportionately and randomly selected from 300 former beneficiaries, while other 5 stakeholders' category members responded to research questions all in a census. The questionnaire and an interview guide were used to collect primary data and were analyzed using Statistical Package for Social sciences (SPSS), descriptive and inferential statistics were adopted as research approach. Qualitative data was treated through sound content analysis. Although with local document gap, education reports, scholarly articles, books and existing relevant documents have provided secondary data.

Keywords: *village saving and loan associations (VSLA), household welfare.*

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The findings shown that VSLA has been positively impacting household welfare in Ruhuha sector. The deep change depicted in tables, are observable from members of the VSLA such as improvement in diet (73%), home assets provision increased at 12%, purchasing power, financial education (100% members),medical insurance provision increased at 53%, newly built or rehabilitated house (87%), education expenses between 20,001-35,000Frw (increased at 24%), etc., which are among others household welfare indicators. It therefore proposed that VSLAs groups should be promoted in different areas of the country. It is recommended to encourage VSLA in rural village for financial stability and household welfare in and outside rural villages.

Keywords: village saving and loan associations (VSLA), household welfare.

I. Introduction

According to UNDP (2014), the number of people in absolute poverty has been turning down for around 25 years, yet in Africa it is still increasing. The challenge of poverty reduction in Africa is of a different order from that elsewhere and will require different strategies (Berg E., 1981). During the present decade African growth has accelerated, although not sufficiently rapidly to prevent continuing divergence. This may mark a decisive turnaround in the region's economic performance (World Food Program, 2006).

On average over the period 1960-2000 Africa's population-weighted per capita annual growth of GDP was a mere 0.1% (Nuno, 2001). It stagnated while other regions experienced accelerating growth. Indeed, between 1980 and 2000 the annual rate of divergence was a surprising 5%. Africa's growth failure has attracted competing explanations. During the 1980s the World Bank diagnosed the problem as inappropriate economic policies, offering the first clear statement of this position. Because Africa is land-abundant yet low-income, natural resource endowments loom large (Berg, 2016).

Rwanda also has been following a fertile pathway towards poverty reduction. After independence, she received a significant amount of foreign aid which raised the GNP from 5% in 1973 to 22% in 1991 and accounted for more than three-quarters of capital expenditures (D. Malunda & S. Musana, 2012). Aid-financed health care improved and infant mortality was reduced. Aid also financed reforestation and land reclamation, and agricultural productivity increased. High world prices for coffee, tea, and tin, the three core Rwandan export products, created rising wealth.

It is paradoxical, noted Golooba M. (2009) for a short of natural resources, landlocked country, one of Africa's poorest and in a process of rapid change, and impossible to understand the reasons behind the rapid changes without considering its historical backdrop of extreme exclusionary politics based on the dissemination of ethnic hatred. During the years 1994-1998, the country was in shambles and trust had to be rebuilt helped with donors who mainly supplied emergency support channeling money through Non-Governmental Organizations.

To ensure a rapid growth of economy a series of policy were undertaken including working in associations and cooperatives for work effectiveness and fostering investment. The Financial Sector Development Strategy outlines in detail how the financial sector will be strengthened, improving access to financial services for firms of all sizes, MINECOFIN (2013). Low income population however were refrained from.

As reported by Rwanda Development Board (RDB), despite the contribution of Rwandan Government supported the establishment of Village Group Savings Cooperatives as a way of providing financial accessibility to rural Rwandans who cannot afford big loans from the banking institutions in order to support their micro business, performance of SME's in the rural areas is still low (RDB report, 2014). Low income people have got very limited access to financial loans. They are incapable to endure microfinance's loan standards,

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broader collaterals and increasing interest rates refrain from loan access.

According to Sibomana and Shukla(2016), VSLAs have proven to be very effective in accelerating growth and building local capacity. VSLA members have access to highly responsive and safe financial services, and this enables them to upscale economic activities, improve household health and welfare, acquire business skills, educate their children, and improve the qualityof their social lives both within the family and the surrounding community.

Non-governmental organizations engage in VSLA to organize low income generating communities to access money services. Plan International Rwanda has been supporting women and youth to enhance households' economy through the establishment of Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA). During afive years long period his organization has to some extent improved the socioeconomic status of house hold members and empowered the woman in its operation area of Bug sera District.

II. Objectives

The general objective of this study was to assess the contribution of VSLA's methodology on household welfare improvement of Bugesera District. Specifically,

1. To analyze the effectiveness of determinants of VSLA in Bugesera District.
2. To assess the level of indicators of household welfare improvement in Bugesera District.
3. To establish the relationship between households welfare and VSLA in Bugesera District.

III. Literature Review

Bradshaw (2006) opined that theories of poverty may originate from five sources including individual deficiencies, cultural belief systems that support subcultures in poverty, political-economic distortions, geographical disparities or cumulative and circumstantial origins. This has eventually resulted in a cyclical poverty.

The vicious cycle of poverty states that the poor man is poor because he is poor or a country is underdeveloped because it is underdeveloped. The theory states that there are circular relationships known as the "vicious cycle of poverty" that tend to perpetuate the low level of development in less developed countries (LDCs). The trajectory is that poverty is caused by low income. Low income engenders low savings and this in turn leads to low investment. The latter provokes low productivity and the cycle continues.

According to Jhingan (2003), the basic vicious cycle stems from the facts that in LDCs total productivity is low due to deficiency of capital, market perfections, economic backwardness and underdevelopment. Addressing capital deficiency, VSLAs interventions break the cycle of poverty at income phase for poor members.

According to the Canadian Fact Book on Poverty (1984) the most learned perspective equates poverty with the inability to participate in society with dignity. According to classical economist Adam Smith poverty is a lack of those necessities that the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without.

The Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen (2002) argues that the poor cannot participate adequately in communal activities, or be free of public shame from failure to satisfy conventions. VSLA's pro-poor background are designed to create a society within which low income people flourish and locally work to address financial deficiency and subsequently tackle household welfare and interpersonal rapports, (Ashe, 2002).

Robert Chambers (2006) in the paper named "Power, knowledge and policy influence: reflections on an experience" said that poverty is taken to mean depends on who asks the question, how it is understood, and who responds. Through this perspective, Robert C. divided it into different clusters:

a. *Income poverty:* This needs no elaboration. When many, especially economists, use the word poverty they are referring to these measures. Poverty is what can be and has been measured, and measurement and comparisons provide endless scope for debate.
b. *Material lack or want:* Besides income, this includes lack of or little wealth and lack or low quality of other assets such as shelter, clothing, and furniture, personal means of transport, radios or television, and so on. This also tends to include no or poor access to services.
c. *Capabilities deprivation:* Derives from Amartya Sen, referring to what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be. This includes but goes beyond material lack or want to include human capabilities, for example skills and physical abilities, and also self-respect in society. A fourth cluster takes a yet more broadly. Development thus can be seen as shifting from ill-being to wellbeing with equity, with interventions to enhance wellbeing possible at any of the five points as illustrated by Robert C.

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

Figure 1: Vulnerability – welfare shift

Ill-being and wellbeing are widely used in addition to poverty and wealth, which are only one part of them. It is for repeated participatory processes to enable local people, especially the poorest, most marginalized and most vulnerable, to analyze and monitor the quality of their lives, and for this to be fed back regularly to policy-makers. Sometimes poverty measurement uses monetary system, this make the capability approach consider money as an individual well-being instead focuses on indicators of freedom to live a value life.

In poverty also, we look the concept of social exclusion where describe the processes of marginalization and deprivation that can arise even in rich countries with comprehensive welfare provisions. The social exclusion focuses intrinsically on the process and dynamics that allow deprivation to arise and persist. Social exclusion points to excluders as well as excludes and this describe a contrast to a world without analyzing or attributing responsibility. Attributing responsibility are possible through the participatory approach (PA) which aims to get people themselves to participate in decision making about what it mean to be poor and the magnitude of poverty. And, the PA help to define an appropriate minimum basket of commodities for the monetary approach, a list of basic capabilities in the capability approach and the social exclusion can be applied.

Hiilamo (2012) depicts solidarity as a fellowship of responsibilities and interests. Solidarity is an act of individual virtue, but it can find expression at various institutional levels, family, neighborhood, voluntary organization, municipality, nation state or international entity.

According to Ashe (2002), VSLAS standards are inspired by and built on the idea of solidarity, which at least hypothetically, has brought neighboring residents together in groups to improve members' financial condition. Upon successful implementation, VSLA impacts household's safety.

IV. Research Design

To examine the contribution of VSLA to the household welfare and women empowerment in Rwanda, the researcher conducted a descriptive research where VSLA approaches was identified and analyzed in order to find their contribution to the household welfare.

The descriptive research describes characteristics of a population or phenomenon being studied. The study used descriptive method because the researcher based on answers from respondents to describe how VSLA is used as an approach for poverty alleviation leads to improved household welfare conditions.

The study based on information gathered from VSLA beneficiaries in Ruhuha sector, using questionnaires which was distributed to direct beneficiaries and staff including local leaders and non-Governmental Organizations staff, respondents were selected and administered sharp questionnaires and structured interview. Secondary data was collected from publications and reports statements and were analyzed to draw valid conclusion.

V. Target Population

The whole population who have been benefiting from VSLA Plan International Rwanda intervention was 300individuals,including 58males and 237females from 10 VSLAs group and 5 local leaders, staff and partners (2 males and 3 females)who had a close involvement in VSLA program as shown in the table below.

Table 1: Target population

Categories of respondents	Males	Females	Total population
Beneficiaries of VSLA	58	237	295
Staff, local leaders and partners	2	3	5
Total	60	240	300

Source: Primary data (February, 2018)

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a) Primary data

Primary data comprise the information that the researcher gathered directly from Ruhuha sector of Bugesera District through respondents as first-hand information collected using tools such questionnaires and interviews.

b) Secondary data

The researcher analyzed information from reports and other publications available from Bugesera District, internet, books and articles containing relevant data which provided reliable information to conduct properly this research. The researcher also considered previous researches and official statistics sources to support field data.

c) Sampling techniques

The researcher selected respondents from beneficiaries' lists, local leaders, stakeholders and staff members, using proportionate stratified random sampling for each number of populations to get equal chance of being selected.

d) Stratified sampling technique

The number of sampled was proportional to the number of members of VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector and staff, local leaders and partners in matter. To determine the ideal sample size from our population, we followed the Slovin's formula:

$$n = N / (1 + (N*e^2)) = 300 / (1+ (300*0.1^2)) = 75 \text{ respondents}$$

Where: n = samples size which is VSLA members 75 respondents

e = margin of error / the margin error estimated is 10% or 0.1.

N= total population which is 300 persons who received the loan from VSLAs and 5 local leaders, Plan staff and stakeholders were used as respondents

Table 2: Stratification of respondents

Categories of population under study	N population of strata(Np)	Sample of strata(npc)
Beneficiaries of VSLAs in Ruhuha sector	300	75
Staff,local leaders and partners	5	5
Total	305	80

Source: Primary data, February 2018

The sample size of the research representing 80 respondents distributed in all strata of respondents in close involvement of VSLAs in Bugesera District corresponding to 100% as N targeted population

e) Purposive sampling techniques

This research sample was determined based on the title role, size of respondents group and expected information significance they have, 75 respondents are direct beneficiaries who benefited the VSLA from the beginning up to date of research, 5 leaders and staff are day to day deal with the implementation of VSLA in Ruhuha Sector. Both respondents contribute to complete information provision.

VI. Data Collection Instruments

a) Questionnaire

The researcher established and used a questionnaire to collect data from VSLA beneficiaries on how they perceive its contribution, to poverty alleviation for a welfare conditions in Rwanda especially in Ruhuha Sector of Bugesera District, and regarding the profitability and sustainability of VSLA methodology.

b) Interview

The researcher designed a series of questions in a way that both qualitative and quantitative information got collected. Interview was given to key informants as Plan staff, stakeholders and local leaders.

c) Documentation

As a method, the researcher has analyzed evidences of social-economic indicators of improvement from Bugesera District reports, Plan International Rwanda and PAJER Project reports related to medical insurance cards, paying easily children school fees, access to food, newly built or rehabilitated house etc. The documentation guide was used for consistence purposes.

d) Validity

To ensure that the instrument measured what it was supposed to measure in this research, the questionnaire was checked by the researcher to ensure its validity. However, for further improvement, the questionnaire was presented to the supervisor of this work who is considered also as the research advisor.

e) Reliability

Pre-testing the questionnaire was done in order to ensure that it would really test what it was supposed to test: omission, irrelevance or ambiguities. Imperfection were corrected. Printed questionnaires was selected, issued and better responded quite concomitantly to avoid peer leverage or hierarchy influences while answering. The researcher practiced approachability to capture respondents' full trust and attention.

Hence, the pilot study to test the reliability of the instrument was conducted to some VSLA members and for this study 10 percent of the sample was taken for the pilot study. Ten respondents represented the sample and a questionnaire was administered to them to capture their views that helped to make the final friendly questionnaire.

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VII. Statistical Treatment of Data

The researcher used descriptive statistics to analyze quantitative and draw logical graphs. Primary data was also treated through appropriate software as Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS 18), confronted with interviews and secondary data and reported using tables and graphs for easy understanding and interpretation. Content analysis questions were used to analyze open-ended questions. Hypotheses were verified through data analysis using Spearman's correlation coefficient to determine relationship between variables denoted and constrained as:-1<=rs<=+1

In addition, we referred to Pearson's correlation coefficient using regression as statistical technique to determine the linear relationship between two or more variables. In its simplest (bivariate) form, regression has shown the relationship between one independent variable (X) and a dependent variable (Y), as explained in this formula: $\gamma = \beta_{o+\beta 1} X+u$

VIII. Ethical Considerations

For ethical considerations, the researcher communicated local leaders and particularly target people the intention, process, settings and preserved respondents' anonymity by not mentioning their names while answering questions. Respondents were ensured that the research was for academic purpose and their answers would remain confidential.

IX. Findings, Discussions & Results

This section relates the views, opinion and comment of the data collected from VSLAs' members as perinterview that was given to them on how to analyze the contribution of VSLA for Household welfare in Ruhuha Sector of Bugesera District.

a) Financial Capacity buildingof respondents on VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector

This subsection attempted to show trainings for VSLAs beneficiaries in Ruhuha Sector showed in the tables below:

Table 3: Types of trainings that respondents have received

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	VSLA's life cycle management	75	100
	Training on how to fill the passbooks	75	100
	On how to share out (dividends)	75	10
	Financial management	75	100
	Business planning	75	100
	Entrepreneurship	75	100

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

The table above showed that all respondents (100%) agree with trainings that they received namely about, VSLA's life cycle management, passbooks filling, dividends share out, Financial management, Business planning and Entrepreneurship. This means that VSLAs have strong impact on household welfare in Bugesera district.

Table 4: Perception of respondents on where they keep their savings before and after joining VSLAs

		Before joining VSLA		After joining VSLA	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Valid	In house	51	68	0	0
	Bank account	14	19	18	24
	SACCO	10	13	57	76
	Total	75	100%	100	100%

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

Based on the table 4 above the largest number of respondents put their savings in bank account representing 19 % of the total respondents; 68% of respondents conserved their money in house and 13% of respondents save their money in SACCO. After joining VSLA, none of respondents kept his savings at home.76% have joined SACCO and 24% are saving in commercial banks. This means that SACCO increased membership up to 63% and commercial bank increased by 5%. This evidenced that joining VSLAs has improved respondents' mindset for beneficiaries. They have learnt to save their money and avoid risks of mismanagement. In addition, a good number has now accessed higher level banking.

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Table 5: Perception of respondents on the most important uses of the share out

		Before VSLA		After VSLA	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Valid	Food	54	72%	75	100%
	Medical expenses/health	35	47%	75	100%
	Paid off debts	28	37%	75	100%
	Income generating Activities	15	20%	75	100%
	School fees	45	60%	75	100%
	Household asset	10	13%	75	100%
	Family celebration/ceremony	32	43%	75	100%
	Gave to spouse	15	20%	75	100%
	House construction/rehabilitation	10	13%	75	100%

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

Findings in the table above showed that all the respondents (100%) confirm that VSLA share out contribute to access Food, Medical expenses/health insurance, Paid off debts, Income generating activities, School fees, Household asset, Family celebration/ ceremony, Gave to spouse, House construction/ rehabilitation, Lending to another and Savings. Previously respondents' access to amenities was, 72% for food, Medical expenses/ medical insurance47%, Paid off debts37%, Income generating activities20%, School fees60%, Household asset13%, Family celebration/ceremony43%, Gave to spouse20%, House construction/rehabilitation13%, Lending to another and Savings. This means that VSLAs have strong impact on household welfare in Bugesera district.

Table 6: Type of IGA

	Frequency	Percent
Agriculture	30	40
Business (sales and Trade)	15	20
Transport	8	11
Carpentry and masonry	16	21
Tailoring	6	8
Total	75	100

Source : Primary data, February, 2018

Based from the table above, all respondents agree with type of IGA that they invested or are engaged in Agriculture (40%), Business (sales and trade) (20%), transport (11%), carpentry, masonry (21%) and tailoring (8%).This indicates that joining VSLAs was profitable for beneficiaries because these help them to invest loans acquired in income generating activities and hence improve their households.

b) Perception of respondents on impact on HH Welfare

HH ASSETS

The table below shows new household assets respondents have owned from VSLA payout and/ or loans in terms of livestock, transportation, electronics, agriculture and other goods.

Table 7: Household asset owned before and after VSLA payout and/or loans

	Before VSLA		After VSLA	
Assets household get from VSLAs	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Livestock				
Cows	18	24%	27	36%
Goats	2	2%	7	9%
Sheep	4	5%	6	8%
Chicken	9	12%	17	23%
Pig	9	12%	18	24%
Transportation				
Bicycle	27	36%	55	73%
Motorcycle	11	14%	20	27%

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Electronics				
Radio	10	13%	25	33%
Television	5	6%	6	8%
Mobile phone	20	26%	44	59%
Agriculture material				
Hoes	30	40%	32	43%
Irrigation pump	10	13%	19	25%
Pesticide displaying pump	16	17%	24	32%
Other goods				
Mattress	31	41%	41	55%
Water and electricity	28	37%	34	45%

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

As shown on this table, before VSLA introduction respondents owned, in terms of livestock, 24% for cows, 5% for goats, 2% for sheep, 12% for chicken and 24% for pig. In terms of transportation, respondents' household equipment was bicycles (36%) and motorcycles (14%).

Owned electronics assets were radios (13%), television (6%) and mobile phone (26%). In terms of agricultural materials there were, hoes (40%), irrigation pump (13%) and Pesticide displaying pump (17%).For other goods, beneficiaries of VSLAs possessed mattress (31%) and connection to water and electricity (28%).

The table show percentages of households after VSLA pay out and/ or loan expressed in terms of livestock, 36% for cows, 9% for goats, 8% for sheep, 23% for chicken and 24% for pig. Concerning transportation, household get from VSLAs are used to purchase bicycles (73%) and motorcycles (27%).About electronics, assets get from VSLAs help beneficiaries to buy radios (33%), television (8%) and mobile phone (59%).Concerning agricultural activities, assets get from VSLAs help the beneficiaries to purchase hoes (43%), irrigation pump (25%) and Pesticide displaying pump (32%).For other goods, beneficiaries of VSLAs purchase mattress (55%), water and electricity (45%).We note a positive change in every household asset. For each item of asset investigated there has been an observable growth in number. Findings above showed that pay out or loan got from VSLAS has help beneficiaries to purchase new asset and subsequently contribute to the improvement of living standard and household welfare.

c) The welfare improvement of beneficiaries of VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector

The figure below shows how respondents 'households have improved their welfare in terms of diet.

Table 8: Household diet improved since joining the VSLAs.

	Frequency	Percent
Improved	55	73
Stayed the same	20	27
Worsened	0	0
Total	75	100

Source: Primary data, February 2018

Before VSLA introduction, our respondents had different household welfare levels and living standards. Findings in the figure above have showed that the welfare of VSLA's beneficiary has changed in terms of diet as follows:73% of respondents have improved diet, 27% of respondents 'condition stayed the same and none worsened. This proves that assets get from VSLAs contribute significantly to the improvement of welfare of beneficiaries in Ruhuha Sector.

Table 9: Household education expenses (school fees, feeding, uniforms, books, or other materials)during the last 12 months from VSLA share out/ loan

		Before VSLA		After VSLA	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Valid	None	0	0	0	0%
	Below 5,000Frw	28	37%	6	8%
	5001-20,000Frw	25	33%	21	28%
	20,001-35,000Frw	12	16%	30	40%
	35,001-50,000Frw	5	7%	13	17%
	50,001 and above	5	7%	5	7%
	Total	75	100%	75	100%

Source: Primary data, February, 2018.

Table above showed how much households spent on education expenses during these last 12 months from VSLA share out/ loan as compared to previous periodin Bugesera district. For our

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respondents, before VSLA households' expenditures on education were 37% for under 5000Frw, 33% for 5001-20000Frw, 16% for 20,001-35,000Frw, 7% for 35,001-50,000Frw and 7% for 50,001. Every household spent an amount of money on education.

After VSLA, these last 12 months, every household spent bigger amount as follows: 8% for under 5000Frw, 28% between 5001-20,000Frw, 40% between20,001-35,000Frw, 17% between 35,001 and 50.000Frw, and 7% for 50,001 and above. Every household has been spending an amount of money on education.

Not all the respondents' households have student, but have contributed to school construction and given school fees or valuable gift to family member's children attending school. The above table therefore authenticate that a bigger number of household have been spending bigger amount compared to previous period. This means that share out and/or loans acquired from VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector contributed to enabling beneficiaries to pay most probably, fees for quality schools, better uniforms, books, or other materials of their Children for better future living condition.

d) Challenges and limitations faced VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector

The table below showed challenges and limitations that face VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector of Bugesera District.

Table 10: Challenges and limitations faced VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector

	Frequency	Percent
Delay of loan payment	15	20
Difficult in paying back loan	22	29
Inadequate mobilization by local Leaders	6	8
No easy access to VSLA by individuals of the first category of Ubudehe	18	24
Dishonest of VSLA Managers	14	19
Total	75	100

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

The Table above showed challenges and limitations faced VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector expressed by the respondents in terms of following: Delay of loan payments (20%), Difficult in paying back loan (29%), Poor mobilization by local leaders (8%), No easy access to VSLAs by individuals of the first category of ubudehe (24%) and Dishonest of some managers of VSLAs (19%).This means that loans acquired from VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector, if non repaid at timely should discourage the VSLAs members and decline the sustainability of the approach which can be the barrier household welfare.

Table 11: Possible solutions to overcome challenges and limitations faced VSLAs in Ruhuha Sector

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Respect time of payments	15	20
	Manage effectively loan distribution	22	29
	Mobilize people on benefits of VSLAS	6	8
	Help individuals of the first category of ubudehe on access to VSLAs	18	24
	Training managers of VSLAs on integrity	14	19
	Total	75	100

Source: Primary data, February, 2018

Table above showed possible solutions to overcome challenges and limitations faced VSLAs in Bugesera district expressed by the respondents in terms of following: Respect time of payments (20%), Manage effectively loan distributed (29%), Mobilize people on benefits of VSLAS (8%), Help individuals of the first category of ubudehe on access to VSLAs (24%) and Training managers of VSLAs on integrity (19%).This means that solutions above as well implemented in Ruhuha Sector, assets of VSLAs should increase the life skills of beneficiaries and improve their household welfare.

e) Results from Local leaders, Plan staff and Partner's particular attitude on VSLA

For Plan staff, VSLA is made of individuals from neighboring families brought together for mutual support with the little money they gain and so make a pro-poor village bank version. They regularly contribute money which they lend to members at low interest rates

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and flexible deadline. The role of NGO was to initiate, promote, train and organize in early days.

Local leaders perceive VSLAs as a kind of bank decentralization vis-à-vis official and rigorous bank structures. It has financially educated and improved the community. Mutual trust holds members' contract. Gender is proportionately represented. The dominant number of women mobilizes to work in associations and speed up the whole family development. Local leaders have noted a remarkable role of Plan International and its partner implementer PAJER work in financial literacy, promoting entrepreneurship and small income generating activities, ensuring regular follow up and basic material provision to early VSLAs.

VSLA members manage to tackle internal conflicts before they escalate beyond the association. Group members have been safeguarding social cohesion through constant conflict resolution between group members or households and exerting influences on neighborhood.

f) Relationship between VSLA and Household welfare condition

Here below we establish the relationship between VSLA services and observed indicators of household welfare in Ruhuha Sector.

Table 11: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.868[a]	0.753	0.657	0.194

i. *Predictors: (Constant), VSLAs services such as savings, loans, financial literacy and IGAs.*

Adjusted R squared is coefficient of determination which tells us the variation in the dependent variable due to changes in the independent variable, from the findings in the above table the value of adjusted R squared was 0.753, an indication that there was variation of 75.3% on household welfare due to the VSLA methodology. This shows that 75.3% changes the VSLAs' members could be accounted by improving living conditions. A strong positive relationship between the study variables marked by R=0.868 is shown in table 14.

Table 13: ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.724	4	0.431	5.731	.023[b]
	Residual	0.526	12	0.044		
	Total	2.25	16			

a. Dependent Variable: Improved household welfare
b. Predictors: (Constant), VSLAs services such as savings loans, financial literacy and Income Generating Activities.

From the table above, ANOVA test shows a p-value of 0.023 less than alpha (5%), the significance level. This means the given data fit well with the multiple regression model. Decision may be based on the comparison of F-calculated (Fisher value) and F-tabulated. The calculated value was greater than the critical value (5.731 >3.26) an indication that VSLAs, savings loans, financial literacy significantly influence living standards of VSLAs' members. The significance value was less than 0.05, an indication that the model was statistically significant.

Table 14: Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.947	1.581		-1.232	0.258
	Saving	0.526	0.233	0.526	2.256	0.059
	Access to loan	0.421	0.196	0.421	2.144	0.069
	Job creation	0.105	0.209	0.122	0.505	0.629
	Business promotion	0.474	0.189	0.474	2.51	0.04

a. Dependent Variable: Improved household welfare

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From the data in the above table the established regression equation was:

$$Y = 1.947 + 0.526X_1 + 0.421X_2 + 0.105X_3 + 0.474X_4$$

From the above regression equation, it was revealed that holding financial literacy, saving, loans and Income Generating Activities for household welfare to a constant zero, the household welfare of VSLAs' members would be 1.947. Indeed, this constant called y-intercept is not realistic. But, it is a needed parameter in the model. Also, a unit increase in saving would lead to increase the household welfare of VSLAs' members by a factor of 0.526, a unit increase in access to loan would lead to increase household welfare of VSLAs' members by a factor of 0.421, and a unit increase in financial literacy and Income Generating Activities would lead to increase household welfare of VSLAs' members by a factor of 0.105. The study also found that all the p-values were less than 0.05, this indication that all the variables were statistically significant in influencing household welfare of VSLAs' members.

From research finding, the calculated value was greater than the critical value (5.731 >3.26) an indication that saving, loan, financial literacy and Income Generating Activities significantly influence welfare VSLAs' members. The significance value was of 0.023 which was less than 0.05. This is an indication that the model was statistically significant. The significance of the variables was supported by the t values whose significance values were less than 0.05 which indicates that the variables were statistically significant in influencing household welfare of VSLAs' members.

Our research aimed at assessing the indicators of household welfare, analyzing determinants of VSLA methodology and establishing the affinity between indicators of household welfare and determinants of VSLA methodology in Bugesera District. Therefore, we consider the six fundamentals of VSLA approach has shaped beneficiaries through participation in financial literacy and resulted with effective change of practices leading to a real household welfare.

Self-selection: Plan International which is a development organization introduces the concept of savings and loan services in Ruhuha sector and then facilitates the formation of VSLAs comprised by 15 to 30 persons basing on mutual trust between members. The organization trained and follow up to help members define the VSLA's full structure setup and run, to collect savings and make loans, record transactions, and hold weekly meetings.

VSLAs were self-governed, a chairperson, secretary, treasurer, and two money-counters who form its executive committee. In addition, members select three others and entrust each with a key to one of the three locks on the cashbox where the group's funds are kept. This governance structure serves as an internal control system. All transactions –the collection of member savings and the disbursement of loans – are carried out at weekly meetings in front of all members, ensuring transparency and accountability.

Financial Services as collecting weekly savings from members. Savings are accumulated in the form of shares at a price agreed upon by the group. The use of shares simplifies recordkeeping. The group determines if the emergency funds are distributed as grants or as interest-free loans with flexible repayment. Action audit was conducted to pay out savings and earnings from interest and fees, close its books, and disband processes. The action audit was usually timed to provide a lump sum to members at critical times as school fees or inputs at the start of the agricultural season. After the first year, the first VSLA group graduated and operated independently.

After this multiple data analysis, assorted indicators of household welfare have been verified. The researcher investigated among others, household financial improvements (table 6, 7 and figure 8), household payout and/or loans (table 8), education assets,), diet, IGA etc., have all proved strictly improved from the activity and outcome of VSLA work effect. They constitute a source of household welfare.

Trained VSLA members have acquired knowledge and skills in forming their level banking (saving and loan) system. They overcome a number of financial difficulties. With regular savings or/ and loans they can afford to buy or sell different goods and services they could not access otherwise and have consolidated social affinities. In so doing they contribute to their household welfare. The observance of rules and regulations of VSLA's mode has led to household welfare improvement. There is a cause-to-effect link between indicators of household welfare and determinants of VSLA approaches in Ruhuha sector.

X. Conclusion and Recommendations

VSLAs methodology has proven to be very effective in accelerating growth and building local capacity. VSLA's members have access to highly responsive and safe financial services, and this enables them to upscale economic activities, improve household health and welfare, acquire business skills, educate their children, and improve the quality of their social cohesion both within the family and the surrounding community.

Poor people have turned to Village savings and loans associations under NGO guidance. The underlying logic is that by providing microfinance services, poor people will be able to participate in the economic market through forming their small businesses. Consequently, they will be able to generate income and improve their households, self-esteem and worth. All members investigated affirmed that VSLAs play a vital role in improving their life skills and household welfare in Ruhuha Sector/Bugesera District.

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Changes were observed from members of the VSLA such as improvement in diet (73%), home assets provision increased at 12%, purchasing capacity, financial education (100% members),medical insurance provision increased at 53%, newly built or rehabilitated house (87%), education expenses between 20,001-35,000Frw (increased at 24%), etc., which are among others household welfare indicators.

From research finding, the calculated value was greater than the critical value (5.731 >3.26) an indication that saving, loans, financial literacy and Income generating activities significantly influence household welfare of VSLAs' members. The significance value was of 0.023 which was less than 0.05. This is an indication that the model was statistically significant. This is to prove that assets get from VSLAs contribute to the improvement of household welfare of its members.

XI. Recommendations

To RuhuhaSector: On the basis of the research findings, the following are suggestions to be implemented for enabling benefit from VSLAs to remain financially stable and competitive strong within the Sector while promoting the welfare of members. Concerning the service of saving, local leaders of Ruhuha Sector of Bugesera District and management of VSLAs groups should encourage all the members to save as a way of investment. This could be done through trainings and sensitization speeches after community work (umuganda).

As a way of better management of loan, the management of VSLAs needs to mobilize their members and advise them to always pay back the borrowed money as agreed to avoid credit or loan delinquency. This could be done by performing the internal rules and regulations including set punishments that would face those fail to refund when the payment date goes beyond.

To the Government of Rwanda: VSLAs should be promoted in different areas of the country to tackle financial difficulties particularly in rural areas where poor people cannot access bank conditionality to afford loans they need.

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A Thorn by any other Name: Definitions, Typologies, and Various Explanations for Terrorism

By Dr. John Maszka
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Abstract- An ancient Chinese parable tells of a poor young farmer who lost his only possession: The horse that he had inherited from his father. The members of the village visited the poor farmer and expressed their condolences for his loss.

"How do you know that losing my horse was a misfortune?"

Sure enough, about a week later the horse returned with a healthy young mare as its wife. The citizens of the village were shocked, and they all went to visit the farmer to congratulate him on his good fortune.

"How do you know that gaining the mare is good fortune?"

Again, the young farmer's words rang true. About two weeks later, as he was breaking the mare, she threw him and he broke his leg. All the people of the village gathered around his bed to console him for his tragedy. "How do you know that breaking my leg was a tragedy?.

Later that month, the Japanese invaded. The emperor sent emissaries to every village to find healthy young men. All the young men of the village were sent to the front except the young farmer whose leg had not yet healed. None of the young men returned…all were killed in battle.

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And so it is with terrorism. We see violence on the news and just accept that it is what the mainstream media and politicians tell us— never once considering that it may be something else entirely.

I. Introduction

This article addresses the many challenges faced by academics and policymakers alike when attempting to define terrorism, categorize it, and identify its causes. The article begins with a brief discussion of the problem. Next it evaluates Alex Schmid's attempt to arrive at a consensus on the various elements included in various definitions of terrorism. From there, the article examines the four main approaches to defining terrorism. While it is not possible to explicitly discuss every definition, typology and suggested cause of terrorism within the space allotted, the main theoretical constructs are represented. The article concludes that a great majority of the various efforts to define terrorism all largely share a common shortcoming—namely that they approach the definition of terrorism deductively rather than inductively. This approach creates several definitional problems because the lion's share of the suspected causes of terrorism focus on the actor, the ideology of the actor or the deed itself. As such, the definition of terrorism often becomes politicized.

In fact, Silke (2014) suggests that the concept of terrorism is so difficult to define precisely because the term is so politically charged. Thus, if terrorism is defined as violence committed by non-state actors, state terrorism is excluded by definition. Likewise, if terrorism is defined as violence committed against innocent noncombatants, who decides whether one is innocent and whether he or she is a noncombatant? Finally, when terrorism is associated with certain ideologies, such blatant politicization creates the opportunity for actors to justify their own violence as necessary (perhaps even heroic) while condemning their enemies as "terrorists."

Given the political climate created by the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), some basic international consensus concerning what constitutes terrorism versus other forms of violence would be extremely beneficial (Richards 2014). This sentiment is particularly true regarding the effort to distinguish between terrorism and the various categories of unconventional warfare.

By relegating irregular warfare to the ungoverned spaces outside the civilized realm of inter-state warfare, strategic theorists have clung to antiquated battle plans and outdated realities (Sitaraman 2009;Honig 2015). Meanwhile, terrorism scholars and policymakers alike have been busy creating a preserve for the irrational, the unpredictable and the inhuman…a jungle where only the most marginalized, debased and immoral creatures dwell. In the following section, I will examine this concept further.

a) Welcome to the Jungle

The title of this section refers to Upton Sinclair's classic 1906 novel depicting the harsh economic, cultural and institutional realities of life for immigrants in Chicago at the turn of the century. These same realities still exist on a global scale, and more often than not (particularly with the growing migrant crisis), they are cited as potential root causes of terrorism. The explosion of multidisciplinary literature in terrorism studies, while positive in many respects, has also

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contributed to what appears at face value to be a very disjointed and chaotic body of literature- what Ramsay (2015, p. 212) calls a "cacophony of competing definitions." For example, there are over 200 definitions of terrorism currently in existence in the broader terrorism literature (Jackson 2010).

A bit of etymology is in order. First of all, the word "terrorist" is not a noun. It is an adjective, but it does not describe any particular person or organization. Nor does it describe a certain type of violence. Any violence can constitute an act of terrorism. What defines terrorism is not the type of violence employed, but the strategic objective behind the violence. By strategic objective, I donot mean motive. A strategic goal is *what* an actor hopes to accomplish. Motive is *why* the actor wishes to accomplish it. It may seem like I am splitting hairs, but the distinction is an important one. It can be very difficult to establish motive with any degree of certainty. However, most violent actors tend to publicize their strategic goals. Finally, because terrorism is defined by the strategic objective of the actor (and not the actor, the actor's ideology or the violence itself), it can be employed by virtually anyone as well as against a variety of actors. This distinction makes it much harder to politicize the concept.

As a terrorism scholar, I employ strategic theory to better understand the goal(s) of those I study. Strategic theory, in turn, requires an in-depth understanding of the individuals or groups under examination. One side of this coin is comprised of objective fact such as the historical and political context in which the violence occurs as well as the perpetrator's socio-economic position within that context. Objective fact only paints half of the picture, however.

Often we can glean enough information from the historical and political context to determine what an actor's strategic goal is, but we're still left guessing as to other important considerations. The opposite side of the coin is subjective in nature, requiring insight concerning how an actor views itself and those around it. For example, al Qaeda and Islamic State share the same strategic goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate yet they employ very different tactics in pursuit of this goal. They also target different victims. Why?

To answer this question we require more subjective information to shed light in the shadows. It is only by attempting to view these actors and the world through their eyes rather than through our own that we can begin to see a more complete picture.

A component of this analysis is the theory of perception of the other. Strategy is the use of one's resources towards the attainment of one's goals. Therefore, how an actor perceives its own resources vis-a-vis the resources of another plays as large a role as the strategic goal itself. Perception also plays a huge role in both the decision to engage in violence and in the way targets and victims respond.

When defining terrorism, it is absolutely crucial to keep in mind that terrorism is a strategy to be countered, and not an enemy to be defeated (Crocker 2005; Neumann and Smith 2005). Terrorism is just one of several means employed to obtain a desired political end. As such, it can be carried out in a wide variety of ways and by a wide variety of actors—including states (Rummel 1998).[1] As Neumann and Smith (2005) aptly contest, terrorism is not always a weapon of the weak, nor is it always employed by illegitimate actors.

However, Washington's GWOT and the aid it offers those who join it has greatly exacerbated the misuse of the term to denounce one's political opponents. The obvious cure for this malady is to remove the stigma associated with the label "terrorist." This articles suggests that the best way to accomplish this goal is to eliminate those subjective elements of the definition that lend to the politicization of the term—namely those that focus on the actor, the ideology of the actor and the deed itself. This article also argues that it is imperative that we arrive at a uniform and objective definition of terrorism.

As Smith (2005 p.29) so aptly states, "if one cannot define and articulate precisely the object of one's inquiry, then plainly the effort to describe the essence of a particular kind of strategic practice is likely to be flawed." Speaking of terrorism, Stern (2000, pp. 12-13) states that the "definition inevitably determines the kind of data we collect and analyze, which in turn influences our understanding of trends and our prediction about the future…How we define it profoundly influences how we respond to it." Therefore, it behooves us, whenever possible, to distinguish between terrorism and other types of violence.

Sánchez-Cuenca (2014) laments that scholars have collected more concrete knowledge about interstate war, civil war, genocide and ethnic conflict than they have about terrorism and blames this shortcoming on the ambiguity of the concept. Similarly, Wilkinson (1974) contends that there is not even a theory of political instability or civil violence, much less a theory of terrorism. Laqueur (1977a) goes even further to suggest that there is no reason to assume a connection between instability, civil violence and terrorism.

Levitt (1986) compares the endeavor to arrive at a common definition of terrorism to the quest for the Holy Grail. The past four or five decades have witnessed an explosion of multidisciplinary literature in terrorism studies, spanning the fields of political science, criminology, sociology, media studies, history, psychology and many others.

Silke (2008) estimates that in the English language alone, a new book is published with terrorism

[1] When compared with the violence perpetrated by states (Stalin killed 42 million, Mao killed 37 million and Hitler killed 20 million), non-state actors pale in comparison(Rummel 1998).

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in the title every six hours. Likewise, Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 571) observe that, particularly since September 11, 2001 (9/11), there has been a "flood of (often forgettable) books" on the subject. In the following section, I will evaluate one particular response to this dilemma.

b) Consensus or Coincidence?

In 1983, Alex Schmid attempted to make sense of the deluge of data that, even back then, was inundating the field. He compiled 109 different definitions of terrorism employed by leading academics in the field between 1936 and 1980. From this survey data, Schmid (1983) identified 22 separate definitional elements of terrorism and observed that definitions vary regarding which of these 22 elements are incorporated and which are left out (see Table 1).

Table 1: 22: Definitional Elements of Terrorism

Element	% of responses
Violence, force	83.5
Political	65
Fear, terror emphasized	51
Threat	47
Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
Victim-target differentiation	37.5
Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
Method of combat	30.5
Extra-normality, breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
Publicity aspect	21.5
Arbitrariness	21
Civilians, non-combatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17.5
Intimidation	17
Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5
Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
Clandestine, covert nature	9
Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence	7
Criminal	6
Demands made on third parties	4

Schmid and Jongman (1988).

Based upon the results of this survey, Schmid proposed the following definition which incorporates 16 of the 22 elements identified above:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorists, (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. 28).[2]

Schmid's seminal work inspired a number of subsequent studies which attempted to arrive at a consensus (which of the 22 elements are most commonly included in various definitions of terrorism). One such study examined 73 definitions of terrorism extrapolated from 55 articles appearing in three major journals in the field of terrorism studies: *Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* and *Terrorism and Political Violence*(Weinburg, et. al., 2004).The authors found that the main difference between Schmid' soriginal survey and their own study was the comparative lack of the psychological element among the definitions appearing in the journals (5.5%) as opposed to Schmid's original 1985 survey (45.5%) even though a similar percentage of psychologists were represented in both samples.

[2] So many scholars have cited Jongman and Schmid's work that it has become both a scholarly necessity for any comprehensive literature review and redundant at the same time. See for example Badey (1998); Ganor (2002); Crenshaw (2010); Chesney et al. (2011).

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Criticism of the consensus approach is rather extensive (Sederberg, 1991; Badey, 1998; Ramsay, 2015). Schmid's basic reasoning supposes that consensus regarding the definition of terrorism can be reached by including as many of the 22 elements as possible. But there are some real problems with this approach. Of the 22 elements Schmidentified, only six appeared in more than 30% of the definitions and only three appeared in 50% or more. The remaining 14 elements appeared substantially less often. These numbers hardly comprise a consensus. The question that should concern any serious scholar is why? Were they simply neglected to be added, or were they deliberately left out of the definition. If the answer is the latter, then simply combining all 22 elements into a single definition is problematic at best.

Furthermore, several of Schmid's elements are highly subjective and therefore open to interpretation. For example, what is the definition of "noncombatant?" How does one determine "innocence?" Other elements are interrelated, and therefore difficult to parse out.The subjective nature of Schmid's elements combined with the fact that they are not mutually exclusive has gained almost as much scholarly attention as his study has. Finally, the consensus approach to defining terrorism is very general and vague—calling to mind Sartori's (1970) now classic observation that the more general and abstract a concept, the less clear its attributes and properties.

Therefore, while it is true that Schmid identified 22 elements that are commonly included in the definition of terrorism, one has to question the usefulness of such information. The simple fact of the matter is that we are still left with a diverse assortment of definitions—an example par excellence of the blind men's elephant (Silke, 1996). All contain elements of truth, however, they have not brought us any closer to a true consensus on the phenomenon. Definitions of terrorism range from the minimalist, but highly-regarded characterization, "terrorism is theater," offered by Jenkins (1985) to the convoluted amalgamation of the 109 definitions referred to above.

From just these two extreme examples, one can see how arduous the effort to define terrorism has become. The United States, for example, faced tremendous opposition from several European states for its labeling of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization primarily because they insist on a more precise definition (Norton 2007a). Clearly, a more uniform definition is desirable. However, to date such a definition remains beyond our reach.

Interestingly, Ramsay (2015) argues that the scholarly debate over a lack of consensus on the definition of terrorism is largely exaggerated. According to Ramsay, the debate is "premised on unrealistic assumptions about what level of scholarly agreement can be expected on any key social or political concept." Ramsay's point is certainly nothing new, however. Acknowledging that "a comprehensive definition of terrorism . . .does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future," Laqueur (1977b,p. 5) went on to insist that "To argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition is manifestly absurd."

Senechaldela Roche disagrees. "Without a useful definition of terrorism, a theory of the subject is not even possible" (Senechaldela Roche, 2004. p. 1). While conceding that any simple definition of terrorism is inconsistent with human nature itself, Gibbs nevertheless also insists that a comprehensive definition is necessary if we are to understand the phenomenon. "A definition of terrorism must promise empirical applicability and facilitate recognition of logical connections and possible empirical associations" (Gibbs, 1989, p. 339). To make his point, Gibbs asks whether JFK's assassination should be defined as an act of terrorism. Widespread disagreement over the answer to this question is enlightening.

Inconsistencies in the definition of terrorism continue to plague global governance. For example, the European Union (EU) has established a rather comprehensive definition of terrorism while the United Nations (UN) has not (Tiefenbrun 2002; Rosand 2003; Keohane 2005; Saul 2005).[3] Furthermore, while terrorism is not explicitly listed as an offence under International Criminal Court (ICC) statutes, Title 22 of the U.S. Code Section 2656f(d)very specifically defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents(Sampson and Onuoha 2011).

The lack of consensus over what constitutes terrorism also causes discrepancies regarding data collection and contradictions in the actual number of terrorist incidents that have occurred. A quick look at the Global Terrorism Database, for instance, lists Burkina Faso as having had five separate incidents of terrorism since independence with a total of three fatalities and two injuries (GTD 2016a), and Ghana as having 25 separate incidents of terrorism since independence with a total of 31 fatalities and 25 injuries (GTD 2016b). Meanwhile, Rand's Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and Maplecroft's Terrorism Index both record zero incidents for either country (RDWTI 2016; Maplecroft 2011). We cannot contribute this disparity to a simple distinction between global and domestic terrorism as the indices above report both.

Finally, this ambiguity leaves room for discrepancies when prosecuting acts of terrorism. Amnesty International (AI) has criticized the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005;

[3] A 20-year-old draft of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism defines terrorism but has not been adopted (Hmoud 2006).

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Terrorism Act 2006; and Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 on the basis that all allow for potential human rights violations. For instance, AI claims that the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 is too broad and potentially allows for the prosecution of individuals who are merely exercising their rights as protected under international law (AI 2010).

One response to these issues has been growing interest in the field of critical terrorism studies (e.g. Chomsky and Herman 1979; George 1991; Zulaika and Douglass 1996 & 2008; Jackson 2005b, 2007, 2008 & 2010; Blakeley 2007; Gunning 2007a; McDonald 2007; Booth 2008; Burke 2008; Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Jarvis 2009; Joseph 2009; Sluka 2009; Altheide 2010; Bryan 2012; Ramsay 2015; Solomon 2015) as well as reactions to it (e.g. Horgan& Boyle 2008; Weinberg and Eubank 2008; Egerton 2009; Jones and Smith 2009; Stokes 2009; Lutz 2011).[4]

Maintaining that terrorism is as much a social construct as it is a physical act, critical terrorism studies (CTS) embraces terrorism from a much broader sociological and historical perspective than most mainstream orthodox approaches. Focusing on the unequal distribution of power and resources and the hegemony of the West, CTS explores the multi-causality of terrorism in all its complexity (Hocking 1984; Jackson 2007; Walklate and Mythen 2014; Solomon 2015).

CTS also challenges the epistemological and ontological assumptions made by orthodox terrorism scholars. Namely CTS opposes the state-centric perspective of most mainstream approaches to terrorism studies and instead advocates the emancipation of people from both physical and social constraints.[5] McDonald (2007) argues that by focusing on emancipation, CTS invites dialogue that has the potential to both minimize non-state actor violence as well as violent state responses.[6]

Furthermore, CTS generally insists that any discussion of terrorism must be interdisciplinary in scope, considering specific relevant social, political, historical and ideological power structures in order to truly understand why actors choose violence over the status quo (Gunning 2007a; Booth 2008). CTS also acknowledges the subjective nature of knowledge and rejects the default to superficial quick fixes in lieu of more lasting solutions.

Africa offers a classic example. As Solomon (2015, p. 224) observes, "the legitimacy of the political elites in Abuja, Bamako or Mogadishu never comes under scrutiny in traditional terrorism studies—rather the focus is on Boko Haram, Ansar Dine and Al Shabab entirely." However quick fixes do not address the underlying issues, which often times have as much to do with the regime as they do the actors opposing it.

Finally, CTS opposes any definition of terrorism that empowers elites, marginalizes women and other vulnerable populations, neglects key areas of study (such as states) and perpetuates Eurocentric or masculinized constructions of knowledge. For instance, Jackson (2005a) notes that the term, 'war on terror' is value-laden and frames war as something desirable.

As Gunning (2007b) puts it, "a critical turn within terrorism studies is necessary" because the orthodox approach often produces an "a-historical, de-politicized, state-centric account of 'terrorism' that relies heavily on secondary sources and replicates knowledge that by and large reinforces the status quo." In other words, CTS scrutinizes orthodox terrorism literature, the discourse it generates and the institutions that produce it (Joseph 2009). On the other hand, Gunning (2007b, p.237) also insists that CTS needs to acknowledge the expertise of many traditional terrorism scholars and, to be inclusive, it needs to converge with the "more rigorous traditional, problem-solving perspectives."

Richard Jackson (2010) is highly critical of the current state of terrorism studies, and he advocates (among other things) a less subjective definition. Observing that many common definitions of terrorism include components such as illegitimate violence committed against innocent civilians intended to terrify a group of people toward the advancement of a political goal, Jackson argues that the subjective nature of terms such as illegitimate, innocent, intended, and political perpetuate the conceptual incoherence so common among definitions of terrorism.

For example, Rapoport and Alexander (1982) define terrorism as the threat or use of violence intended to coerce a group toward a political, religious or ideological end. This definition is one of the more objective descriptions of terrorism, but still it possesses ambiguous terminology.

The problem, as Jackson sees it, lays not in the definitions of terrorism but in the very nature of terrorism itself. Jackson argues that terrorism cannot be objectively defined as it is a socially constructed concept. To bolster his position, Jackson points to Nobel Peace Prize winners Nelson Mandela, Menachim Begin, Yassir Arafat, and Sean McBride—all once denounced as terrorists—as examples of the ontological instability of the phenomenon.

[4] Lutz (2011) offers a balanced discussion regarding the claims made by critical terrorism scholars concerning the narrow, ethnocentric, non-state actor focus of traditional terrorism studies. See also Jones and Smith (2009) who conclude that the critical approach is obscure and pedantic.

[5] See for example, Toros and Gunning (2009) who advocate a shift from focusing on the security of the state to the security of individuals, families and communities. See also Herring (2008) who in addition to advocating for a more emancipatory practice, calls for minimizing the use of knowledge to maintain the hegemony of powerful elites and therefore, the status quo.

[6] Buzan (2006) criticizes the Bush administration for its zero-sum approach to counterterrorism because it leaves no room for dialogue or positive-sum alternatives.

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A similar point can be made concerning the Afghan *mujahidin*, who were widely described as freedom fighters in the 1980s, but later became known as Islamic terrorists (Livingston 1994).[7] Clearly, no group considers itself a terrorist organization, which is perhaps the best example of the subjectivity of the term. In the words of Eqbal Ahmad (2011, pp. 12-13), "The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today." Of course, it is entirely possible to be both at the same time (Smith 2011).

c) Four Common Approaches to Defining Terrorism

Jackson (2010) identifies four common approaches used by scholars and policymakers when dealing with the conceptual quagmire known as terrorism. First, due to the negative connotation of the term, a growing number of scholars simply choose not to define terrorism at all. Second, it is popular among politicians and security professionals to refer to terrorism as an ideology. Third, terrorism is defined according to the parties that engage in it. And finally, a majority of scholars define terrorism by the deed itself. In the pages that follow, I will explore these concepts more fully.

d) To Define or Not to Define?

One issue that has emerged is whether to define terrorism or not. On the one hand, as noted earlier, a universal definition would aid in more accurate data collection, more consistent reporting and a more unified body of scholarship (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Coady 2004; Meisels 2006). More importantly, it would require more accountability on the part of those engaged in it as well as their supporters (Ganor 2005).

On the other hand, no actor views the violence that it commits as terrorism, but most actors are quick to label the violence committed by their enemies as terrorism (Jackson et. al. 2011; Bryan 2012; Ramsay 2015). Due to the subjectivity and political misuse of the term as well as close organizational and ideological ties between state institutions and prominent researchers- what Burnett and Whyte (2003) label 'embedded expertise'- others have elected not to seek a common definition.[8]

A classic example is the deliberate decision not to define terrorism by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to obtain consensus on Resolution 1373. Rather the UNSC opted to allow each member state to arrive at its own definition (Rosand 2003; Saul 2005).

Interestingly, arriving at a common definition has not been the main obstacle for the EU. What has proven to be insurmountable are various other challenges such as vastly different threat perceptions among EU member states, a resistance to true integration of national counterterrorism efforts in favor of cooperation between them, and ineffective implementation of policies (Monar 2007, Coolsaet 2010).

Finally, Ramsay (2015) suggests that terrorism should not be defined because such a definition could not be correctly applied to the many diverse instances of political violence which bear little, if any, resemblance to one another. Thus, a common definition would serve to blur rather than sharpen our understanding of the term. Furthermore, Ramsay insists that the opposite is also true. When states engage in tactical violence that is covert and non-conventional, it is called special operations. However, when non-state actors engage in the very same type of activity, it is called terrorism.

e) Terrorism as an Ideology

Terrorism has been around since antiquity. The Jewish Zealots employed terrorism against the Romans, the Thuggees engaged in acts of terrorism against the British in India, and it is a tactic that is still in use today. In this respect, one could say that terrorism changes little over time. However, scholars have noted an ideological cleavage in recent decades between what many refer to as "old terrorism" and "new terrorism." As with any definition of terrorism, however, this categorization is also debated (Lesser et al. 1999; Merari 1999; Juergensmeyer 2000; Laqueur 2000; Duyvesteyn 2004; Kurtulus 2011; Harmon 2013).

Old terrorism has taken several forms throughout history (anti-imperial, anti-colonial, etc...); however, it has typically been perpetrated toward the liberation of some group. Even between 1960 and 1980, transnational terrorism (which was primarily driven by Marxist ideology, nationalism, separatism, and nihilism) attempted to liberate oppressed peoples. Right-wing terrorism, on the other hand, is usually waged against ethnic minorities rather than on their behalf (Heitmeyer 2005). However with the emergence of religious extremist groups, some scholars contend that a "new face of terrorism" was born (Sampson and Onuoha 2011, p. 36). What is this new face, and what makes it so different from the terrorism that came before it?

A major facet of new terrorism is that it is fundamentally religious in nature (Roy 1994). Hoffman (2013) defines a religious terrorist group as one that has religiously motivated goals (as opposed to politically motivated ones). Hoffman (1997) also points out that by 1995, religious terrorism had increased from two out of

[7] Mujahidin (sometimes transliterated as mujahideen) is plural for mujahid, meaning one who struggles (Bassiouni 2007).

[8] Representative of Burnett and Whyte's (2003) concept of 'embedded expertise' is Huntington's clash of civilization theory. The phrase was originally coined by Bernard Lewis (1990), and the theory resonated so well among various high ranking officials within the Bush administration that Lewis became quite influential in Washington (Frum 2003). In a 2002 article entitled, *Time for Toppling*, Lewis advocates regime change in Iraq. His advice was obviously taken seriously.

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64 active groups to roughly 29 out of 58 active terrorist groups.

Moreover, Hoffman (1999) draws our attention to the connection between religious terrorism and increased lethality. For example, between 1982 and 1989 *Shia* Islamic terrorist groups perpetrated a mere eight percent of all international terrorist incidents. However, in that same period they accounted for 30 percent of the casualties.

White (2003) agrees that violence has substantially increased with religious terrorism. This marked increase in casualties associated with the rise of religious terrorism is evident in the fact that prior to 9/11 no single terrorist incident resulted in the death of more than 500 people.

How to explain this increase in casualties associated with the rise of religious terrorism? Hoffman (1995) argues that the apocalyptic conviction of religious terrorists makes them more focused on the life to come and, therefore, inclined to view human life in this world with relatively less importance.

Wilkinson (2014) argues that terrorists in the Marxist/nationalist/separatist vein maintained a constituency and hence, had a vested interest in keeping casualties to an acceptable level. However, religiously motivated terrorist groups such as al Qaeda view violence against apostates as a duty, and therefore they are motivated to increase casualties rather than to limit them. Wilkinson supports this line of reasoning with examples such as al Qaeda's Second Fatwa, issued on February 23, 1998, encouraging all Muslims to kill Americans wherever they can be found.

Wilkinson differs with Hoffman however, in that; in Wilkinson's view American lives can be sacrificed with little or no account while Hoffman suggests that the apocalyptic vision of religious terrorists casts all human life as expendable given the impending doom of the human race itself.

One problem with Hoffman's explanation is that not all so-called religious terrorists subscribe to an apocalyptic vision. Of those who do, many are more nationalist than apocalyptic which leads to contention over whether they are indeed fundamentally religious or secular (Juergensmeyer 1993).

A similar problem presents itself regarding Wilkinson's argument: not all scholars agree that groups such as al Qaeda are fundamentally religious in nature (Rapoport 1984; Benjamin and Simon 2002; Bergen 2002;Kepel 2006).[9]

However, the main problem as I see it, is the descriptive nature of the theories themselves. While both theories essentially describe the terrorism that they identify, each of them also ignores the strategic objective of the actors involved and focuses entirely on motive.

For instance, Wilkinson conflates al Qaeda's religious motivation with the duty to kill Americans. But, of course, the two have nothing to do with one another. Bin Laden's justification for killing Americans is not the *fatwa* he issued, but the fact that the United States government has killed so many Muslims. The *fatwa* just represents the authority behind the proclamation (much like Bush put the authority of the United States' government behind the military's mandate in the war on terror). To say that al Qaeda kills Americans because it is religiously motivated to do so is comparable to claiming that America kills "terrorists" because they are Muslim.

Likewise, Hoffman conflates apocalyptic vision with the fact that all life is expendable. However, a quick comparison of al Qaeda and Islamic State reveals otherwise. While both groups share the same religion and apocalyptic vision, al Qaeda demonstrates a basic concern for all Muslim lives (as demonstrated in bin Laden's concern over Zarqawi's slaughtering of them), and IS only demonstrates disdain for apostate Muslims. Neither group considers all life expendable. If they did, who would populate the Islamic *caliphate* that both groups share as a strategic objective?

Others, such as Kurtulus (2011) and Brown and Rassler(2013), argue that religion is just one of several factors to consider regarding new terrorism (e.g. horizontal organizational structure, the desire to use weapons of mass destruction, indiscriminate killing of civilians, etc.).

Sedgwick (2004) contends that the confusion over whether a group is fundamentally religious or secular derives from the fact that religious terrorists employ political tactics toward the attainment of a more far-reaching religious goal. While Sedgwick's approach purports to distinguish between a group's strategic objectives and its behavior, it still does not explain why some individuals and groups who subscribe to a particular ideology resort to violence to achieve their ends while others do not.

So is new terrorism new? Duyvesteyn (2004) argues that it is not. After discussing the supposedly new aspects of terrorism such as its transnational nature, religious ideology and indiscriminate targeting of victims, Duyvesteyn maintains that there are more similarities than differences between the old terrorism and the new.

Similarly, Juergensmeyer (2003) suggests that rather than representing something new, religious terrorism is just old terrorism wrapped in a new package. Furthermore, Juergensmeyer views religious terrorism as a public act performed out of desperation.

[9] A second problem with Wilkinson's explanation is the substantial popular support al Qaeda enjoyed as a result of the sheer unpopularity of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world. Furthermore, groups such as al Qaeda clearly engaged in a propaganda war in an effort to win popular support (Norton 2007b; Leuprecht et al. 2010). This suggests that the group is concerned with a constituency of sorts, even if it is not an electorate in the traditional sense of the word.

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Religion simply offers a framework that justifies such violence, and it provides the symbols that communities can rally around. Juergensmeyer offers a compelling argument that accounts for the rise of religious terrorism in predominantly desperate communities.

However, Juergensmeyer does not explain religious terrorism of the 9/11 variety. If religious terrorism is essentially a public outcry engaged in by the politically marginalized and disadvantaged poor, how does one explain the 19 educated, financially well-off young men who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks? Even more importantly, what explanation accounts for the numerous (and equally religious) desperate communities around the globe that do not engage in religious terrorism? Furthermore, Juergensmeyer's explanation does not consider the religious violence perpetrated by groups such as Islamic State, al Shabaab and Boko Haram that are clearly motivated by the *takfiri* doctrine, not inequality.

The debate surrounding old and new terrorism is largely symptomatic of the lack of cohesion in the field of terrorism studies as a whole, as well as the inclination to lump disparate groups together under a common label.

As becomes evident, the current lack of consensus within the field of terrorism studies makes the task of defining terrorism by ideology difficult. Even more difficult is the challenge of distinguishing between secular terrorism and religious terrorism, if such a distinction can in fact be made at all. The complex network of terrorist organizations with its diverse membership and cobwebs of alliances makes such an undertaking problematic (Arquilla et al. 1999).

f) Terrorism Defined by the Actor

This definition of terrorism is usually applied to national separatist groups and other non-state actors (Reinares 2005). The main justification for this approach is that focus on the actor results in less focus on the behavior- which tends to produce normative analyses (Lizardo 2015).

The most well-known defender of this definition is the U.S. State Department. Title 22 of the United States Code defines domestic terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Alternatively, the U.S. State Department defines international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country" (U.S. Department of State 2006). As is evident, both definitions exclude states.

One main problem with this approach is that it has led to considerable selection bias. The actor-based definition largely singles out non-state actors and ignores state terrorism altogether (Blakeley 2007; Jackson 2008). As Richardson (2005) argues, those who adhere to the actor-based definition (such as various U.S. administrations) largely only consider rogue states as culpable of acts of terrorism and even then, usually only through their terrorist clients such as with Iran and Hezbollah. Of course, this is completely absurd as many of the actions of the United States during the Cold War alone plainly demonstrate (Gareau 2004). In fact, the concept of nuclear deterrence was based entirely on the threat to annihilate mass numbers of non-combatant civilians in order to restrain the actions of the two superpowers.

While the exclusion of state terrorism from the definition naturally leads to the exclusion of states from the study of terrorism, other scholars (who recognize that states can and do commit acts of terrorism) still choose not to focus on states in their research. This decision may be for financial reasons as states may or may not be willing to finance research on their own atrocities (Hayner 2001), for theoretical reasons as states have considerably greater resources at their disposal (as well as greater accountability) and thus are difficult to compare with most non-state actors (Pape 2003), or for reasons of preference or academic interest (Laqueur 1977b; Ganor 1998; Carr 2003; Black 2004; Bergesen and Lizardo 2004).

Perhaps the most obvious reason for excluding states from the study of terrorism is the subjective nature of the term itself. No actor considers itself a "terrorist" or a "terrorist organization," nor do their supporters. For instance, a significant number of Palestinians do not consider attacks against Israeli citizens to be terrorism because they perceive Israel as their enemy (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002).

Given that terrorism is often defined by one's enemies, Hülsse and Spencer (2008) suggest a discourse-centered perspective rather than an actor-centered approach. Zulaika and Douglass (1996), on the other hand, claim that society actually empowers those who engage in terrorism by its discourse. Similarly, Stokes (2009) argues that CTS actually places too much emphasis on discourse and tends to ignore other geopolitical factors such as the world's economic dependence on oil, the strategic value of military bases and the West's desire to maintain hegemony by controlling resource-rich areas of the planet. Hence actors are important.

Dalacoura (2009) takes a third path, suggesting that much of what is called state-terrorism is actually an emotive or polemic distortion of the facts. She advises us to build stronger links between area studies and terrorism studies to take advantage of the former's area-specific expertise and the latter's theoretical capacity. Likewise, English (2010) distinguishes between analytical shortcomings and real practical problems involving terrorism and observes that the latter are usually related to the former. Noting that our analytical shortcomings involve shortsightedness and an even

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shorter historical memory, English recommends that the West re-think its policies of ill-conceived legislative measures and overwhelming but counterproductive military solutions.

Finally, the perception of Western duplicity (condemning others for the very acts it does itself) and ethnocentrism shared by much of the rest of world is a credibility problem for those who would attempt to deny, ignore or otherwise downplay state terrorism in the current political climate of the Global War on Terror (Lewis 1990; Kagan 2004; Byman 2005; Kohut 2005; Carothers 2006).

Grosscup (2006) maintains that a problem with the actor-based definition is the perceived hypocrisy in labeling incidents such as the 9/11 attacks acts of terrorism while calling the intentional bombing of entire cities acts of war when the strategic objectives in both are clearly to coerce political concessions from a target government. Similar criticism has been raised against counterterrorism measures that fail to differentiate between the innocent and the guilty and are, in fact, intended to terrorize an entire population into submission (Goodin 2013). This is particularly relevant in Africa "where counter-terrorism policies would have us defend the predatory African state" (Solomon 2015, p. 221).

Still others criticize the tendency to ignore acts of terrorism committed by groups supported by Western states such as anti-Castro groups, the Contras, certain Afghan and Iraqi groups, and factions in Mozambique and Angola while focusing on acts of terrorism committed by groups that have not secured such support (Krasner 1999; Acharya 2007).

Of course, not all terrorism research ignores state actors. For instance, Stohl (2004) concludes that states resort to acts of terrorist violence when it is the most efficient and cost-effective means of governance at their disposal. Likewise, Neumann and Smith (2005) clearly contend that states have historically relied upon the tactic of terrorism when it served their purposes.

To sum it up, the main difficulty involved in defining terrorism by the actor is the fact that no group considers itself to be a terrorist organization, while most groups are quick to label their opponents as terrorists. States can be especially culpable in this regard. Because of this reality, definitions of terrorism based on the actor tend to lead to selection bias, discrepancies in data collection and controversies over whether a given event was an act of terrorism or a legitimate act of war.[10]

g) Terrorism Defined by the Deed

Jenkins (1974) points out that most terrorist activity involves six basic tactical operations: kidnappings; hostage-takings; bombings; hijackings; armed attacks and assassinations. But if this is the case, how to differentiate between terrorism and other acts of political violence and crime? Neumann and Smith (2007, p. 16) suggest that a differentiation of this sort can be "highly contentious," especially in times of insurgency or war. "Who defines what does or does not constitute political violence may itself be a deeply political act." And, indeed, it usually is. However, several scholars have considered this very distinction nonetheless (Dishman 2001; Ruby 2002; Shelley and Picarelli 2002; Jamieson 2005).

For instance, Dishman(2001) has taken an interesting look at the relationship between terrorist organizations and criminal organizations. Dishman concludes that while terrorists engage in illegal activities and may even collaborate with criminal organizations, terrorists are driven by a particular objective, not just the pursuit of profit. Ruby (2002) asserts a similar point when he distinguishes between criminal acts that are aimed at the achievement of a personal objective and acts of terrorism intended to induce a government to make political concessions.

Jamieson (2005) observes a somewhat clearer distinction between terrorism and organized crime. She argues that terrorists are revolutionaries bent on the overthrow of the existing political order, while organized crime tends to be conservative and seeks to maintain the status quo. However, Jamieson's definition flies in the face of Neumann and Smith's (2005) terrorism/insurgency dichotomy that suggests insurgents want to overthrow the existing regime whereas acts of terrorism are intended to coerce the regime into making certain concessions.

Beyond the academic interest in determining between criminal acts and acts of terrorism, there are practical advantages as well. Clearly distinguishing one from the other affords policy makers a more accurate perspective of the severity of the problem and allows them to properly prioritize security initiatives. For instance, between 1965 and 2001, 64,246 Americans were murdered by other Americans in New York alone (Disaster Center 2010). This constitutes an annual average of 2,471 deaths for the 26 year period leading up to and including 2001. When one compares this to the 3,031 people killed in the 9/11 attacks, it doesn't minimize the attacks; but it does demonstrate that crime is a statistically more persistent challenge than terrorism.

In addition to the body of scholarship attempting to differentiate between terrorism and crime, there is also an abundance of literature that focuses on the similarities between terrorism and war (Hyams 1975; Silke 1996; Scharf, 2004; Tilly 2004; Neumann & Smith 2005;Bergen 2006; Morag 2006).

For example, Tilly (2004) discusses the difficulty of distinguishing acts of terrorism from other types of military aggression, particularly when such aggression targets government security personnel and/or military

[10] Contentions surrounding Israel and the Intifadas are a classic example.

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actors as fundamentally part of a larger political/military struggle. Likewise, Silke(1996) defines terrorism as nothing more than a subset of guerrilla war, while Wilkinson (1974) categorizes terrorism as a tactic used by guerrillas. Bergen (2006) argues that the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center cost only a few thousand dollars while the 9/11 attacks cost roughly $200,000, making terrorism a very inexpensive class of warfare.

Morag (2006) agrees that, from a purely economic standpoint, terrorism is an extremely cost-effective variety of warfare for the terrorists. Morag adds that, in addition to fear, chaos and loss of human life, terrorism can also cause substantial economic damage to the target community. For example, WWII cost the United States roughly $296 billion (in 1941-1945 dollars). The attacks of September 11, however, cost the U.S. approximately $27.2 billion in direct losses and nearly $500 billion in indirect losses (lost income, increased insurance premiums, increased defense budgets, etc.). Even considering the difference between the value of money in 1941 and 2011, the fact that an organization could cause that much damage with such a minimal investment of resources (19 men and $200,000) is truly staggering.

Finally, Scharf (2004) defines terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes. Still, these perspectives offer no more of a consensus on the difference between terrorism and war than exists on the difference between terrorism and crime. Given the rapidly changing face of warfare today and the increasing number of non-state actors involved in warfare, it will only become increasingly more difficult to parse out acts of terrorism from acts of war. Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 572) make this very point, and they insist that any credible theoretical framework must address terrorism "as a bona fide method for distributing military means to fulfill the ends of policy."

Still others distinguish between terrorism as an incident and terrorism as a process. For instance, Rapoport (1971) defines assassination as an incident but terrorism as a process as it requires a lifetime of dedication and discipline. Of course, one could make the opposing argument that it takes a great deal more discipline to become a skilled marksman than it does to strap on some explosives and push a plunger.

In addition to the difficulties associated with defining terrorism by the deed and distinguishing it from other phenomena such as acts of war and crime, there are also challenges involved in analyzing acts of terrorism. For example, Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) contrast terrorism as a syndrome with terrorism as a tool. According to Kruglanski and Fishman, terrorism as a syndrome suggests that terrorists can be identified apart from non-terrorists. It views terrorism as the product of certain personality traits or predispositions of character. To be useful, however, this understanding of terrorism presupposes the ability to psychologically profile terrorists; which as stated above, is dubious.

Terrorism as a tool, on the other hand, views terrorism as a strategic means to a desired outcome. Kruglanski and Fishman suggest that approaching terrorism from this perspective allows experts to focus on countering the strategy of terrorism without having to *necessarily* understand the mindset of the terrorist. However, as Harris (2006) makes clear, the strategic approach requires an understanding of an actor's preferences and therefore, an understanding of their mindset.

II. Conclusion

This article has addressed the many challenges faced by academics and policymakers alike when attempting to define terrorism, categorize it, and identify its causes. When defining terrorism, it is absolutely crucial to keep in mind that terrorism is a strategy to be countered, and not an enemy to be defeated. Terrorism is just one of several means employed to obtain a desired political end. As such, it can be carried out in a wide variety of ways and by a wide variety of actors—including states (Rummel 1998). As Neumann and Smith (2005) aptly contest, terrorism is not always a weapon of the weak, nor is it always employed by illegitimate actors. However, Washington's GWOT and the aid it offers those who join it has greatly exacerbated the misuse of the term to denounce one's political opponents. The obvious cure for this malady is to remove the stigma associated with the label "terrorist" and to arrive at a common, objective definition. This article has argued that the best way to achieve this goal is to eliminate those subjective elements of the definition that lend to the politicization of the term—namely those that focus on the actor, the ideology of the actor and the deed itself.

"The dropping of bombs on people—isn't that terrorism?"

—Alice Walker The Poor Young Farmer

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Relationship of Early Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Regulation and Emotion Recognition in Adolescents

By Juneja, R. & Singh, D. C.
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Abstract- *Background:* Different patterns of childhood neglect and abuse are related with the level of seriousness of mental issue in adulthood. An investigation of this nature is essential to understand developmental trajectory of neglect and abuse and to base any intervention plan for affected individuals and to build up a risk alleviating techniques as primary prevention.

Aim: To examine relationship of Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Regulation and Emotional Recognition in adolescents.

Method: A purposive sample of 140 children studying in English and Hindi medium schools located in Delhi and NCR region (India) was taken to test the hypotheses. Willing individuals of age range from 16 to 18 years of either sex were administered a set of self-administered questionnaires, viz., General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and The Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA) for collecting the data.

Results: The analysis indicated that GHQ cut-off score did not differ significantly on any of the study variables; and the examined constructs (sexual abuse, physical abuse, parental loss with difficult in emotion regulation and neglect, physical abuse with alexithymia) were positively correlated with Difficulty as measured on Emotion Regulation Scale and Toronto Alexithymia Scale.

Keywords: *childhood neglect and abuse, emotion regulation, emotion recognition.*

GJHSS-H Classification: *FOR Code: 139999*

RELATIONSHIPOFEARLYCHILDHOODNEGLECTANDABUSEWITHEMOTIONREGULATIONANDEMOTIONRECOGNITIONINADOLESCENTS

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Conclusions: Deficits in emotion regulation and emotion recognition were ubiquitous in children reporting of adverse childhood experience such as neglect and abuse. Sexual and physical abuse emerged as significant variables, accounting for maximum variance in criterion variables viz. emotion regulation and recognition.

Keywords: childhood neglect and abuse, emotion regulation, emotion recognition.

I. Introduction

The World Health Organisation (W., & G., 1999) has defined 'Child Abuse' *as a violation of basic human rights of a child, constituting all forms of emotional ill treatment, physical, sexual harm, negligent treatment or neglect and other exploitation resulting in potential or actual harm to the child's survival, health, development and dignity, in the context of a relationship of trust, responsibility or power*. 'Child Neglect' is expressed to happen when there is failure of a parent/guardian to provide for the development of the child, when they are in a position to do so (where resources available to the family or care giver; distinguished from poverty). Mostly neglect occurs in one or more area such as: health, education, emotional development, nutrition and shelter. Child Neglect and Abuse are a worldwide public health and social problems which apply a multitude of short term and long term effects on children. The result of children's exposure to maltreatment incorporates elevated levels of aggression, post-traumatic stress disorder, emotional and mental health concerns, such as depression and anxiety.

One of the most common effects of childhood abuse is difficulty in understanding and regulating emotions in later life, which are prominent characteristics of personality disorders. The association between exposure to interpersonal trauma and personality disorders is one that has received substantial attention (Bornovalova et al, 2006; Shipman et al, 2007). Individuals with severe, disabling personality disorders, viz, borderline, schizotypal and paranoid report significantly more interpersonal trauma and childhood physical abuse than those with other types of personality disorders. Particularly, adults with borderline personality disorder and paranoid personality disorder have the highest rates of exposure to trauma (especially childhood sexual trauma), high rates of PTSD, and younger age at first exposure to trauma. There is also an association between childhood trauma by primary care giver and emotional dysregulation in adults with borderline personality disorder (Yen et al, 2000; Golier et al, 2003). Persisting physical health and mental health problems are a common consequence of child abuse and neglect in adults (Cohen et al, 2000; Springer et al, 2007; Wegman and Stetler, 2009; Cannon et al, 2010). Different patterns of childhood abuse and neglect are associated with the degree of severity of mental disorders in adulthood. However, relationship between childhood abuse and neglect, and the primary determinants of personality disorders such as emotional dysregulation and emotional recognition have not been

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studied in normal school going population. A study of this nature is important to understand developmental trajectory of abuse and neglect and to base any intervention plan for affected population and to develop a risk mitigating strategies as primary prevention. Thus, the present study was undertaken to see the relationship of Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Regulation and Emotion Recognition in school going individuals. It was thought that the findings of the study would help in understanding the causation of emotional dysregulation in children and primary intervention strategies, which may aid in reducing the prevalence of mental disorders of childhood as well adulthood.

II. Childhood Neglect and Abuse

As the greater part of adult psychological well-being and mental health starts in childhood and puberty. Childhood experiences lay the basis for what will be our general attachment style throughout our lives, how we bond with someone else, as well as how we respond or react emotionally. It is important to understand early experiences in order to make sense of why a child might be behaving in a certain way, having trouble managing his/her emotions, reacting to some things in a particular manner, seeming very sensitive, struggling with peer relationships, experiencing anxiety etc. Experiences can be positive or negative in nature and both contribute equally in making up personality of a child. Especially traumatic childhood experiences, like physical, emotional, or sexual abuse and neglect, have been identified as risk factors that increase the likelihood a personality disorder may develop (Johnson et al, 2005). Researches indicate that a history of child abuse is associated with greater risk for mental health problems in adulthood. Abuse and neglect cause a negative effect on emotional, social, behavioural, scholastic, and physical wellbeing all through life. Abused children are 300% more prone to abuse drugs, self-harm, and act brutally than their non-abuse peers. They additionally exhibit language and learning delays. Truth be told, the brain of an abused and/or neglected child can, now and again, be 20% smaller than his or her non-abused counterparts. Complex processes in the growing brain depend intensely on nurturing and supportive interactions with the primary caregiver. At the point when these procedures fail, any number of emotional, behavioural, learning and perception issues can emerge all through life (American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, 2002-2017).

III. Possible Causes of Neglect and Abuse

The most common causes of child maltreatment were family structure and size, poverty, alcohol and substance abuse, domestic violence, and community violence are contributing factors to child abuse and neglect (Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect, 1993). While these and different variables affect the probability of child abuse, they do not necessarily lead to abuse. Understanding the reasons for child abuse and the attributes of families in which child maltreatment happens are the only indicators. Most guardians, even in the most unpleasant and demanding circumstances, and even with a personal history may incline them to be more violent than guardians without such a history, do not abuse their children. Some of the most common causes for child neglect and abuse were found to be poverty, poor social skills and unloving relationships, substance abuse, depression, large family, lack of support for single-parent households and misconceptions about child development and lack of empathy. At the individual level, factors like age, sex, personal history and while at the level of society, factors leading to child maltreatment are encouraging harsh physical punishment, cultural norms, lack of social safety nets and economic inequality (WHO, 2007).

IV. Situations of Childhood Abuse and Neglect

Studies with the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse (CECA) show that maternal neglect and abuse identifying to internalizing disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression) and paternal neglect/abuse to externalizing disorder (e.g., conduct disorder, substance use disorder, antisocial personality disorder) (Bifulco et al, 2014). In a large prospective study of court-substantiated cases of abuse and neglect, 26% of abused and neglected adolescents were antisocial. Likewise, there is plentiful proof that conduct problems are related to hostile, critical, punitive and coercive child rearing (Rutter et al, 1998). In one long-term study, as many as 80% of young adults who had been abused met the diagnostic criteria for at least one psychiatric disorder at age 21 and these young adults exhibited many problems, including depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and suicide attempts (Silverman et al, 1996). In another research, neglect is the kind of child maltreatment most likely to re-occur in a family even after child protective services intervention. Study likewise finds that the more chronic or repeating neglect is in a family, the more probable that children in that family have been physically or sexually abused too. Researches propose that there are various characteristics of sexually and physically abusive encounters that are prescient of more noteworthy mental health, social and behavioural issues - more intrusive sexual behaviour particularly sexual penetration, concomitant physical injury, concomitant physical violence, cognitive appraisal of life threat or serious injury, psychological abuse, closer relationship to the offender, longer duration of abuse incidents, higher frequency of abuse incidents, less maternal support,

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less sibling support, less community support, gender (male victims seem to have greater difficulties), multiple perpetrators, disturbed family relationships and family conflict, ADHD, aggression, anxiety, cognitive/ intellectual impairments, conduct disorder, depression, negative parent-child interactions, neurological impairment, poor interpersonal relationships/social skills, self-injurious behaviour, social/interpersonal difficulties, substance-related disorders, suicidal thoughts/behaviours, trauma-related problems/PTSD, violent/criminal behaviour. Students may be at risk for developing a disorder or for having problematic interpersonal relationships (Shipman et al, 2007). For instance, problems in directing or regulating negative emotions or feelings related to internalizing disorders such as anxiety and/or depression, and difficulty with a negative emotion such as anger may be related to externalizing disorders or ''acting out'' (Gross, 1998). A child's initial home environment profoundly affects his wellbeing. Starting in early stages, a problematic home environment can disturb the brain's stress response system; decrease the nature of caregiving a child receives, and meddles with healthy development and advancement. Research has linked negative home environment amid children's initial three years with a large group of developmental problems, including 1. Poor language development by age three. 2. Later behaviour problems. 3. Deficits in school readiness. 4. Aggression, anxiety and depression. 5. Impaired cognitive development at age three.

Researches have provided extensive evidence for the association between self-harm and childhood sexual abuse, physical abuse, neglect and emotional abuse (Madge et al, 2011; Wan et al, 2015). If the impact of child abuse and neglect on emotion processing extends into adulthood, what may be some of components that prompt to these results? Researches progressively demonstrated that childhood abuse and neglect results over numerous spaces of working (Widom, 2000; Gilbert, 2009) that may clarify an expanded risk for deficiencies in feeling emotion processing abilities for people with histories of child abuse and/or neglect and it's not restricted to themselves but others' emotions too. Neglect was observed to have a negative effect on children's physical, social/behavioural, intellectual and emotional development. Studies have also found a negative relationship between child abuse and the ability to understand others' emotions, especially positive emotions (Koizumi and Takagishi, 2014). In particular, child abuse and neglect has been related with cognitive deficits in general and various forms of psychopathology that may lead to emotion processing deficits. The experience of child abuse shifts from person to person. Intensity, severity, and frequency, age of the child, connection between the child and culprit, level of support from non-affronting parents, level of affirmation by the culprit, nature of family working, functioning, degree of brutality, and particular nature of the abuse all influence the type and severity of impacts found in the child victim. Childhood abuse and neglect have been strongly involved as risk factors in the advancement of personality disorders as well. Amongst the well-known impacts of childhood abuse is trouble in understanding and regulating emotions in later life, which are noticeable characteristics of personality disorder (Bornovalova et al, 2006; Shipman et al, 2007). People with serious, impairing personality disorder including borderline, schizotypal, and paranoid report altogether more childhood physical abuse and trauma compared to other personality disorders, especially, individuals with borderline and paranoid personality disorder have the most elevated rates of exposure to abuse and trauma (specifically child sexual abuse).

a) Effects of Childhood Neglect and Abuse on Emotion Regulation and Recognition

Evidence for a significant relationship between the ability to effectively regulate undesired affective states and mental health has been found crosswise over every single mental disorder incorporated into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (APA, 2013). Problem of regulating emotions is found in various psychiatric disorders like depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and generalized anxiety disorder. Whereas research on clinical samples also indicates that individuals meeting criteria for panic disorder, social anxiety, PTSD, borderline personality and eating disorder report difficulties identifying, labelling, accepting, and tolerating unwanted emotions (Baker et al, 2004; Turk et al, 2009). Multiple longitudinal studies, negative affect predicted desire to drink future (Berking et al, 2011). Most of the early on BPD reported deficits in emotion recognition, particularly in the identification of negative emotions (Fenske et al, 2015). Researches have also that there is an interlinked relationship between child abuse and borderline personality disorder (BPD). Individuals with BPD report high rates of childhood sexual, emotional and/or physical abuse (Bornovalova et al, 2006). Studies of maltreating parents indicate less positive emotions and more negative emotions than non-abusive parents (Kavanagh, 1988). Theories in regards to the aetiology and treatment of neglect accentuate the significance of the connections between the individual, family, and community. A child who gets conflicting or unforgiving caregiving experiences face issues anticipating the results of his/her behaviour (Dadds and Salmon, 2003) and this might be show in shortfalls in processing emotional information. Child abuse and neglect can have a huge number of long term consequences for physical wellbeing, Psychological Consequences, Behavioural Consequences and Societal Consequences which includes impaired brain development, abusive

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head trauma, poor physical health, poor mental and emotional health, cognitive difficulties, social difficulties, difficulties during adolescents, juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, abusive behaviours, direct and indirect costs, prevention strategies, support system and taboo (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2013). Numerous childhood disorders involve troubles with emotion regulation. Emotional dysregulation is a significant marker for both externalizing and internalizing disorders. The idea of externalizing disorders alludes to conduct or disruptive disorders, whereas internalizing disorders alludes to mood disorders or emotional problems (Gjone and Stevenson, 1997; Martin, 2003). Unintentionally, Deborde et al (2015) found a relationship between emotional neglect in childhood and the conduct disorder severity. However, what type of neglect lead to these results was not investigated.

Children who have suffered abuse often have difficulty identifying and labelling the emotions they are experiencing beyond 'mad, sad, bad', have difficulties managing their emotions, particularly de-escalating from distress, have difficulty expressing their emotions in appropriate ways, e.g., fear or anxiety expressed as aggressive outbursts, fear speaking about or even showing their emotions. Their life experiences may have taught them it is unsafe to do so, e.g., they may have been told by a parent / carer when upset 'I'll give you something to cry about'. Children can be triggered into reliving these overwhelming experiences by any number of sensory cues; smell of cologne, tone of voice, a type of touch. Reactions to triggers can be unpredictable and difficult to manage. Common reactions may include aggressive outbursts or verbal or physical aggression towards self or others, fleeing the situation and withdrawal and dissociation. Therefore, exposure to traumatic events and interpersonal trauma in childhood appears to be related with a wide range of psychosocial, developmental, and therapeutic impedances in children, adolescents and adults, with emotional dysregulation being a centre element that may help to account for this heightened risk. With a specific end goal to understand how childhood neglect and abuse contribute to emotional dysregulation and recognition. Hence, present research has been envisaged to understand "Early childhood neglect and abuse and their relationship with emotion regulation and recognition in children".

V. Method

Aim: To examine the relationship of Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Regulation and Emotional Recognition in adolescents between 16 and 18 years of age of either sex.

Hypotheses: H1: There will be significant correlation of variables of Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Regulation in adolescents of 16-18 yr. of age.

H2: There will be significant correlation of variables of Childhood Neglect and Abuse with Emotion Recognition in adolescents of 16-18 yr. of age.

Research design: Single group design.

Sample and Sampling: Children studying in English and Hindi medium schools located in Delhi and NCR regions comprised the study sample. A total of 140 children of either sex, meeting the study criteria were recruited for the study. Purposive sampling method was employed in the present study.

Inclusion criteria:

- Age 16 – 18 years of either sex,
- Able to read and write in English, and
- Consented (through school authorities) to take part in the research.

Exclusion criteria:

- Current or past history of any psychiatric illness and treatment for the same, and
- History of intellectual impairment or any other disabling conditions such as sensory or motor impairments.

Measures:

1. *General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) (Goldberg & Williams, 1988):* GHQ was originally developed by Goldberg (1978) and has been widely used as a screening tool to determine whether an individual is at risk of developing a psychiatric disorder (Goldberg & Williams, 1988). The GHQ was originally designed to be used in adult populations. However, later the scale has been used with adolescents (Goldberg & Williams, 1988). A total of 82 papers reviewed have been found to utilize the GHQ with adolescents. There are four versions of GHQ (include GHQ-60, GHQ-30, GHQ-28 and GHQ-12). The original version of the GHQ contains 60 items and is known for its multi-dimensional aspects. The GHQ-12 is the shortest version and commonly used as a screening tool which was used in the current study. It focuses on breaks in normal functioning rather than on life-long traits. It only covers disorders or patterns of adjustment associated with distress. Conventional method of scoring (0-0-1-1) was chosen over the simple Likert scale (0-1-2-3). As conventional method is believed to help eliminate any biases which might result from the respondents who tend to choose responses 1 and 4 or 2 and 3, respectively (Goldberg & Williams, 1988). The scores were summed up by adding all the items on the scale ranging from 0 to 12. Due to the various thresholds of the GHQ-12, the mean GHQ score for a population of respondents was suggested as a rough indicator for the best cut-off point (Goldberg, Oldehinkel & Ormel, 1998). Therefore, based on the mean GHQ score for this sample, the cut-off point 6 was used to determine the respondents' level of psychological well-being.

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2. *Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) (Bagby et al, 1986):* The TAS is a 20-item instrument that is one of the most commonly used measures of alexithymia. It has 3 subscales:

a. Difficulty Describing Feelings subscale is used to measure difficulty describing emotions.
b. Difficulty Identifying Feeling subscale is used to measure difficulty identifying emotions.
c. Externally-Oriented Thinking subscale is used to measure the tendency of individuals to focus their attention externally.

TAS has been used in number of studies with adolescents to see the effect of alexithymia on various disorders like substance abuse (Gatta et al. 2014), dissociation (Craparo et al, 2014) etc. Studies have also reported that there is association between childhood abuse, alexithymia, and personality disorder (Berlin Alexithymia Conference, 2010). To study whether alexithymia shares an association with any type of abuse, TAS is used as a measure in the current study. On TAS, items are rated using a 5-point Likert scale whereby 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. There are 5 items that are negatively keyed (items 4, 5, 10, 18 and 19). The TAS-20 uses cut-off scoring: equal to or less than 51 = non-alexithymia, equal to or greater than 61 = alexithymia. Scores of 52 to 60 = possible alexithymia. Scale demonstrates good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .81) and test-retest reliability (0.77). Research using the TAS-20 demonstrates adequate levels of convergent and concurrent validity.

3. *Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) (Gratz & Roemer, 2004):* The DERS represents the most comprehensive measure of the construct to date and exhibits good reliability and validity in adults. In a study examined the psychometric properties of the DERS in a community sample of 428 adolescents. Internal consistencies for the subscales were good to excellent (alphas ranged from .76 to .89). Construct validity exhibited robust correlations with psychological problems reflecting emotion dysregulation, specifically depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, eating disorders, alcohol use, and drug use. Inter correlations among the DERS subscales ranged from negligible to high (0.04 to 0.68). In general, results support the reliability and validity of the DERS as a measure of emotion dysregulation in adolescents (Weinberg and Klonsky, 2009). DERS has been used in wide range of researches with clinical sample to see the relationship of childhood abuse on Emotion Regulation (Martin, 2003). The scale focuses on emotion regulation, an extremely important domain for the field of child trauma and appears to be related to behaviors of self-harm in women with a history of childhood sexual or physical abuse (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). So the present study focuses on assessing the relationship between Childhood Abuse and Emotion Dysregulation in school going children. DERS self-report questionnaire designed to assess multiple aspects of emotion dys-regulation. The measure yields a total score as well as scores on six scales derived through factor analysis:

a. Non-acceptance of emotional responses (NON-ACCEPTANCE)
b. Difficulties engaging in goal directed behavior (GOALS)
c. Impulse control difficulties (IMPULSE)
d. Lack of emotional awareness (AWARENESS)
e. Limited access to emotion regulation strategies (STRATEGIES)
f. Lack of emotional clarity (CLARITY)

1. The Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA.Q) (Bifulco, Brown et al., 1994): The CECA.Q is a questionnaire version of the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse interview (Bifulco, Brown et al., 1994). It covers parental loss, neglect, antipathy (hostile or cold parenting), support, physical and sexual abuse before age 17 in adolescents or adults. It is validated against the interview measure (Bifulco, Bernazzani et al. 2005). Reliability of CECA.Q - Alpha scores were assessed for the two CECA.Q dimensions of antipathy and neglect and found to be .80 and .81, respectively, suggesting high internal consistency. Test–retest showed high levels of agreement for the summed scores: neglect (r: 0.84 neglect mother, 0.53 neglect father), antipathy (r: 0.74 antipathy from mother and 0.71 father), physical abuse (0.52 mother physical abuse and 0.51 father and 0.61 for the screen item) and sexual abuse (r: 0.70 for screening items and 0.61 for severity of first abuse) all at p = 00:0001 significance levels. CECA.Q aims for both a broader assessment of childhood adversity (covering care and abuse) and has items with convey a more factual description of parental behaviour. The present study use CECA as it a tool that is constructed to measure various aspects of childhood abuse.

Procedure: Principals of various schools in Delhi and NCR were approached and brief about the study was given to them and only those schools which agreed were selected. Selected schools were given a request letter from the Amity University assuring them, that study would not cause any kind of harm to participants and their confidentiality would be maintained. Once the authorities had approved the study, they assured that consent from every student / parent would be taken before considering them as a part of the study. Followed by this, the students were approached in the provided classrooms and were explained about the aim of the

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study. Total 30 children were administered the scales at one time. Consent was taken from each of the participant before administering the tools. Participants were given one tool at a time and a particular sequence was followed in administering the tools throughout all the schools. Firstly, GHQ was given to the participants and instructions were given to them regarding how fill the questionnaire. TAS was given next followed by DERS and lastly CECA. All the tools were administered in the same manner. Participants were assured that their confidentiality will be maintained. After the completion of the administration participants and school authorities were thanked for their support and corporation in the study.

Statistical Analysis: SPSS 21 version was used for the analysis. Participants were divided into two groups based on GHQ cut-off score ($\leq$ 6 and $\geq$ 7). Data followed normal distribution in all the study variables, hence, parametric tests were employed in all analysis. Pearson's correlation was used to assess whether Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse (Parental Loss, Support, Sexual Abuse, Antipathy, Neglect and Physical Abuse) share any relationship with Difficulty in Emotion Regulation and Alexithymia. Linear Regression with entry method was used to examine the change in criterion variables (DERS and TAS20).

VI. Results

There was preponderance of female in the study (62.1%). Individuals' age ranged from 16 to 18 years (*Mean* = 16.69, *SD* = 0.66) years; 47.9% was studying in government and 52.1% in private schools of Delhi and NCR regions (Table 1). The sample was divided into two groups on the basis on their GHQ scores. A cut off of 6 was used divide the group individuals. The groups were compared on the measures Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse, Difficulty in Emotion Regulation and on variable Alexithymia. The results indicated no significant difference between the groups with high and low GHQ scores (Table 2).

Table 1: Socio-demographic and other characteristics of the sample (N=140).

Variables	Mean (SD)	n (%)
Sex		
Female	87	(62.1)
Male	- 53	(37.91)
Age (Yr.)	16.69	(0.66)
School		
Government	- 67	(47.9)
Private	- 73	(52.1)
Medical Illness		
Migraine	- 4	(2.9)
Cervical	-2	(1.4)
Asthma	-2	(1.4)
Tuberculosis	-1	(0.7)
Hypertension	-1	(0.7)
Diabetes	-1	(0.7)

Table 2: Mean (SD) score on subscales of Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA), Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale and Toronto Alexithymia Scale with respect to children below and above GHQ cut-off (N = 140).

Variables	Below Cut-off (< 6)	Above Cut-off (> 7)	t-value	"p"
CECA				
Parental Loss	00.23 (0.66)	00.07 (0.37)	1.29	0.08
Support	00.93 (0.26)	00.90 (0.31)	0.55	0.61
Sexual Abuse	00.63 (1.10)	00.62 (1.11)	.04	0.96
Antipathy	30.54 (7.66)	32.41 (9.92)	1.09	0.27
Neglect	27.88 (8.51)	25.86 (9.18)	1.11	0.26
Physical Abuse	01.16 (1.76)	01.24 (1.86)	0.21	0.83
Difficulty in Emotion Regulation	46.93 (27.13)	50.48 (30.99)	.61	0.54
Alexithymia	52.51 (14.56)	56.14 (13.68)	.20	0.22

Correlation analysis between Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse, Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale and Toronto Alexithymia Scale are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Correlations among variables studied

	Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire					
	Parental Los	Support Abuse	Sexual	Antipathy	Neglect	Physical Abuse
Difficulty in Emotion Regulation	.23*	-0.21*	0.57*	0.09	0.13	0.38*
Alexithymia	.13	-0.06	0.59*	0.09	0.14*	0.32*

* = $p < 0.05$

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A linear regression (entry method) was performed on Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale by Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse. The model accounted for 38% of the variance in Emotion Regulation. However, Beta value of Sexual and Physical Abuse were only significant as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Regression output for Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale (Criterion Variable) andChildhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA) (Predictors).

CECA	Beta	"p"
Parental Loss	0.16	0.23
Support	-0.12	0.10
Sexual Abuse	0.46	0.00
Antipathy	-0.01	0.86
Neglect	-0.07	0.35
Physical Abuse	.17	0.02

Overall model fit - $R^2 = 0.38$, F= 14.03, p= 0.01

Similar was regression was performed Alexithymia Scale by Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse. The model accounted for 35% of the variance in Alexithymia. However, Beta value of Sexual Abuse was only significant as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Regression output for Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Criterion Variable) and Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA) (Predictors).

CECA	Beta	"p"
Parental Loss	0.04	0.51
Support	-0.07	0.34
Sexual Abuse	0.56	0.01
Antipathy	.02	0.72
Neglect	-0.01	0.88
Physical Abuse	.06	0.40

Overall model fit - $R^2 = 0.35$, F= 12.34, p= 0.01

VII. Discussion

It is hard to assess the effect of childhood experiences on the psychiatric problems and disorders in adulthood as neither experimental approaches nor prospective researches are possible. In any case, an expanding number of review reports suggest that psychiatric issues might be identified with childhood experiences, such as physical, sexual, emotional abuse and neglect. Specifically, critical significant correlations between the severity of psychiatric symptoms and that of stressful and traumatic experiences during childhood were found. Reports of sexual and physical abuse in childhood are more regular in psychiatric patients than in the healthy population; among these are patients determined to have problems in somatization disorders, regulating emotions which is most commonly seen in borderline personality disorder, substance use (Herman et al. 1989). So focus of the present study was on how early childhood neglect and abuse had impact on regulation and recognition of emotion in children. Presently the majority of the studies have been done on clinical population to find where emotion dysregulation and problem in recognition occurs. But the present study focused on general school going adolescent and in what way childhood neglect and abuse affected them. All the children belonged to 16 – 18 years of age range and came from both the government and private school (see Table 1). Once the demographic information and consent was taken the sample was administered General Health Questionnaire – 12 (GHQ – 12), Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CACE.Q), Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS20). The sample was divided into two groups on the basis on their GHQ scores. A cut off of 6 was used divide the group individuals. The groups were compared on the measures Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse, Difficulty in Emotion Regulation and on variable Alexithymia. The results indicated no significant difference between the groups with high and low GHQ scores (Table 2).

Correlation analysis was conducted between all the variables of the study, including CACE.Q, DERS and TAS20. Results indicated that emotion regulation was positively correlated with parental loss, sexual abuse and physical abuse. The findings are supported with by the earlier research findings where childhood abuse is associated with difficulty in emotion regulation (Kent et al. 1999). Researches also demonstrated an association between childhood neglect and emotion dysregulation (Deborde et al, 2015) which didn't come out to be significant in the present study. Support was found to be negatively associated with emotion dysregulation. In a previous study, it was found that support was a mediating factor between childhood traumatic experiences and adult mental health problems. Alexithymia or problem in emotion recognition shared a positive correlation with sexual abuse, neglect and physical abuse. Researches have shown that children who get conflicting or unforgiving caregiving experiences face difficulty in emotion processing, understanding emotions of self and others and expressing emotions (Dadds and Salmon, 2003; Gaensbauer, 1982).

Linear Regression was performed on Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) by Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse (CECA). The overall model accounted for 38% of the variance in Emotion

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Regulation which means 38% of the change in DERS is caused by CECA, where Sexual abuse and Physical abuse responsible for 46% and 17% of the change, respectively, in DERS. Studies have also shown that traumatic childhood experiences, such as sexual, emotional, or physical abuse and neglect, have been recognized as risk factors that increase the probability a personality disorder may develop (Johnson et al, 2005). There are a number of studies that have supported the finding that sexual abuse significantly contributes to emotion dysregulation. A study found that different forms of childhood abuse and found that the incidence of sexual abuse on its own was associated with suicidal thoughts and attempts, promiscuity and internalizing symptoms (Arata et al., 2005). A study has identified that child sexual abuse is a significant predictor of emotion dysregulation (Messman-Moore et al., 2010) and substance use (Simpson & Miller, 2002; Hayatbakhsh et al., 2007) and is also significantly correlated with emotion regulation and subsequent substance (Ballon, Courbasson, & Smith, 2001). Children who have been physically abused demonstrate a variety of problem behaviours and responses including aggression, ADHD, anxiety, intellectual and cognitive impairment, depression, conduct disorder, neurological problems, negative parent-child interactions, poor interpersonal and social abilities, self-harm, substance-related disorders, violent and criminal behavior (Kaplan et al., 1998). A study proposed a hypothesis in which social support acts as a buffer, protecting the individual from the negative emotions caused by potentially stressful events (Cohen and Wills, 1985). But in the current study didn't show to have any significant effect on either DERS or TAS.

Children who have suffered abuse often experience difficulty identifying and labelling the emotions they are experiencing and have difficulties managing their emotions, particularly deescalating from distress, have difficulty expressing their emotions in appropriate ways. So when linear regression was performed on Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) by Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse (CECA), similar results were found. The overall model accounted for 35% of the variance in Emotion Regulation which means 35% of the change in TAS is caused by CECA, where Sexual Abuse alone is responsible for 56% of the change in TAS. Alexithymia was fundamentally higher when the sexual abuse first happened after the casualty had achieved the age of 12 yr., when a perpetrator of the sexual abuse was a father or stepfather, and when the abuse included oral, vaginal, and additionally anal entrance. Results were interpreted as demonstrating that the development of alexithymic may represent another defense victims may employ to insulate themselves from painful affect, alongside dissociative manifestations and substance abuse (Scher and Twaite, 1999).

In summary the findings of the present study suggested that physical and sexual abuse in the childhood impacts individual's ability to understand, label and regulate his emotions. And as per literature these deficits in emotion regulation and recognition can lead to development of various psychiatric disorders (Silverman et al. 1996).

Although literature on psychiatric population with history of neglect and abuse is abundant, however, similar studies on normal school going population were scarce. The present study highlights the need for mental health professionals to also focus on the needs of children in general population. As the results on the current study have showed that childhood neglect and abuse significantly affect emotion regulation and recognition. Therefore, providing intervention at the earliest stage possible will facilitate resolution of emotional conflict and build up resilience, thereby preventing occurrence of any mental health issues.

VIII. Conclusions

In conclusion, current study showed that children who scored below and above the GHQ cut-off did not differ significantly on any of the study variable. Analysis indicated deficits in emotion regulation and emotion recognition in children reporting of adverse childhood experience such as neglect and abuse. Sexual and physical abuse emerged as significant variables, accounting for maximum variance in criterion variables, viz, emotion regulation and recognition.

a) Limitations of the study and implications of the findings

In the current study, age band was very narrow. For fear of further reducing group size thereby compromising on the power, the subjects of different age band were grouped and their responses were analyzed in totality. This, and relatively smaller sample size, could have contributed to observed variance in emotion recognition and regulation which is known to vary depending upon developmental maturity. Further, present study lacked any objective measure of subjects' control and recognition of emotion. May be objective report by the caregivers or teachers could have improved the validity of results, along with self-report measures. Self-report measures are known for social desirability bias. Future research in this area should take these precautions. Notwithstanding these caveats, the clinicians working in child mental health area should be sensitive to possible adverse negative experiences in children with emotional and behavioural disorders, and should be skilled in eliciting these experiences as it would have a significant implication in treatment. From a general well-being point of view, the present findings highlight the prevention of childhood adverse/negative experiences as main agenda of mental health care. Success in preventing adverse child experiences is

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related, in a linear way, to reducing the prevalence of mental disorders of childhood and adulthood.

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The Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism

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Introduction- What "causes" terrorism? Myriad attempts have been made to categorize and explain the various causes of terrorism. Countless books and journal articles in every academic discipline imaginable have been published, associating terrorism with a litany of variables including poverty, illiteracy, inequality, democracy, authoritarianism and mental illness— to name just a few.

This article addresses many of the so-called "causes' of terrorism to debunk the myth that structural, cultural or institutional factors operate as independent variables to generate terrorist violence. There are no "causes" of terrorism. Like most violence, terrorist violence is merely a tactic— employed by virtually anyone— as part of an overall strategy to obtain a particular goal.

The causes of terrorist violence can be categorized various ways. For example, Taylor (1988) suggests a 3-part typology based on legal, moral and behavioral factors. Others argue that terrorism occurs in waves.

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The Usual Suspects: Debunking the Myth about the "Causes" of Terrorism

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I. Introduction

What "causes" terrorism? Myriad attempts have been made to categorize and explain the various causes of terrorism. Countless books and journal articles in every academic discipline imaginable have been published, associating terrorism with a litany of variables including poverty, illiteracy, inequality, democracy, authoritarianism and mental illness— to name just a few.

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The wave analogy is common among social scientists. For instance, scholars refer to democratic transition as occurring in waves (Huntington 1993; McFaul 2002). Economic cycles are also often referred to as waves (Goldstein 1985). Scholars have used the wave analogy to categorize periods of terrorist activity as well (Rapoport 2004; Shughart 2006). The most famous use of the wave analogy in reference to terrorism is Rapoport's (2004) four waves of modern terrorism typology, which breaks the periods of terrorism into four categories: (1) anarchist, (2) national liberation and ethnic separatism, (3) left-wing, and (4) religious.

According to Rapoport, the terrorist organization known as Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) sparked the first wave of terrorism in 1878. This "Anarchist Wave" spread outward from Russia to Western Europe, Asia, the Balkans, and even America. Also known as the "Golden Age of Assassination," the first wave peaked in the 1890s but extended well into the 1920s. Rapoport includes the assassination of the American president, William McKinley, in September 1901 in this wave.

Rapoport's second wave lasted from the 1920s to the end of WWII as anti-colonial sentiment fueled the resentment of ethnic and religious groups suffering political marginalization due to the creation of purely artificial nation-states. The terrorism in this wave was marked by Arbitrary borders were drawn by the victors of WWI as they carved up the former Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires, and also the African continent and elsewhere. Ironically, Wilson's doctrine of self-determination ultimately only applied to "hitherto sovereign countries conquered by Germany, Italy, and Japan" and therefore excluded colonies such as Algeria, Cyprus, Cochin China, Ireland and others(Hoffman 2013, p.47).As a result, nationalist and ethnic separatists in these regions resorted to terrorist tactics, demanding the self-determination denied them by the great powers.
Rapoport defines the third wave of terrorism as new left terrorism, which spanned from the end of WWII to 1979. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and PLO-affiliated groups drove international terrorism to its heyday. Opposition to the war in Vietnam created strong anti-American and anti-establishment sentiment, causing left-wing terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction in Europe, and the Weathermen in America, to wage terrorist campaigns consisting of bombings, hijackings, and political assassinations.

Finally, the fourth wave in Rapoport's typology consists of religious terrorism. This wave begins with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and continues to this day. The pan-Islamic vision of the late Osama bin Laden defined this final wave. More accurately, however, while bin Laden's international franchise has contributed to the terrorism of this period, local and regional groups such as those in Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, and Chechnya commit the lion's share of terrorist attacks. Given that these groups are local in purpose and vision, international terrorism comprises only a tiny percentage of total terrorist activity in the fourth wave.

Siddique's (2009) analysis is useful here. Dividing terrorist extremism in Pakistan according to the target of an attack, Siddique creates a four-part typology of terrorist organizations in Pakistan. Type I organizations mainly target the West, Type II target Afghanistan and India, Type III target the government and security forces of Pakistan itself, and Type IV organizations are sectarian. Siddique found that groups operating in Pakistan focus primarily on local and regional targets.

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Tinnes (2010) observes a similar focus on domestic targets in her study of contemporary terrorist organizations throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Tinnes notes that while the presence of American troops in this region has brought the far enemy much closer to home, it has also brought to light the many doctrinal and strategic differences between the various local *jihadist* groups that have assembled to fight that enemy. Since most groups' tactical and strategic goals are localized, these clashes have resulted in minimal cooperation between groups, if any. Thus, according to Tinnes, the threat of a unitary, pan-Islamic breed of terrorism is not as dire as was perhaps once believed.

Hegghammer (2010) agrees with Tinnes. He compares and contrasts Saudi Islamist militant groups with a variety of other *jihadist* movements and concludes that most are locally focused and share little in common with one another. *Salafist* groups such as Islamic State (IS) view the purging of Islam as the first step in global *jihad*. Therefore, the elimination of apostate groups is a priority (Wood 2015).

The ongoing differences between IS and al-Qaeda demonstrate the local and territorial nature of these groups. Hegghammer supports his argument by pointing out thatal Shabaab and Boko Haram, though claiming to be loyal to either (or both) al Qaeda and IS, have demonstrated no practical relationship with either of them. Furthermore, both al Shabaab and Boko Haram continue to experience infighting and division over issues of power and control of territory and resources.

Sedgwick (2007) builds upon Rapoport's typology by proposing that the diffusion effect explains increases in certain types of terrorism at certain times (Rapoport's waves). Simply put, the perception that terrorism is successful leads other rational individual utility maximizers to engage in it toward the achievement of their own goals.

The diffusion effect offers a round-about explanation as to why both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have pledged allegiance to groups such as al Qaeda and Boko Haram yet appear to have little or no real working ties to either. The perception of affiliation may serve to translate a success for one as a success for the other. This phenomenon, of course, is not the copycat effect that Sedgwick refers to, but it is related to it.

The obvious question that Sedgwick's assertion creates is if the perception that terrorism is successful leads rational individual utility maximizers to engage in it, why have such a relatively few chosen such a path?

Both Rapoport and Sedgwick offer useful descriptive analyses of the history of terrorism. However, neither provides much in the way of explanatory or predictive insight regarding why such a relatively small number of terrorists choose to break with the status quo while the majority of the population does not.

While the question of *why* an actor engages in violence (i.e., motive) is not as crucial to the strategic theorist as *what* that actor hopes to achieve (strategic objective), a potential bridge between the two is the Machiavellian concept that the ends justify the means. No doubt, in addition to Rapoport's waves and Sedgwick's diffusion effect, the majority of actors also condoned their violence by the ends that they ultimately pursued (Bassiouni 1975). Again, while strategic theory bypasses the need to legitimize violence altogether, it suggests that scholars address the question of how well the means serve the ends on a case by case basis rather than as a generalization.

Another well-known typology is the grievance typology, which loosely structures the causes of terrorism into broadly defined categories such as socio-economic marginalization, social-identity marginalization, religious fanaticism, and political grievance (Leuprecht et al. 2010).

Piazza's (2011) work, which explores the link between minority economic discrimination and domestic terrorism, is a prime example of the body of scholarship on socio-economic marginalization. Piazza concludes that poverty per se is not the critical factor, but economic discrimination against minority groups that sparks them to choose terrorism over the status quo. The terrorist violence in the Niger Delta fits within this category.

A representative piece of social-identity marginalization literature is Brinkerhoff's (2008) study investigating the potential for violence in socially marginalized diaspora groups. Brinkerhoff concludes that there is a potential risk among the most socially marginalized members of diaspora groups to join terrorist organizations. Bryden (2014) suggests that al Shabaab was particularly successful in attracting young Somalis from the diaspora for this reason.

Hoffman (1995)delivers a compelling discussion of religious fanaticism and terrorism, concluding that religion affords us a much more palatable justification of violence than any political position ever could. Mere justification aside, however, Hoffman also points to the apocalyptic vision that drives some religious fanatics to commit violence because they prioritize eternal life over temporal human life here on earth.

In the case of Islamic terrorism, however, scholars and policy makers need to acknowledge the difference between *Islamists* who seek the return of the caliphate (often through the democratic process) and *jihadists* who reject the idea of separation between religion and politics (Turner 2012; McCants 2015). A proper understanding of the religious ideology that drives al Shabaab and Boko Haram reveals much more about their respective political objectives (as well as why these two groups have chosen to employ violence to obtain them) than a mere political analysis alone.

Religion does not explain everything, however. As Heck (2007, p.8) asks, "is it fair to blame 1.4 billion

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and more than 200 million Arabs for the malevolent handiwork of an ideologically deviant few?" The answer is, of course not. Not only is it unfair, but it also makes for poor scholarship as well.

For example, it was political grievances that sparked Boko Haram's terrorist violence in the first place. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) conclude that political radicalization stems more from the perceived political grievances of groups than from individual political dissatisfaction.

There is an abundance of literature linking a myriad of grievances to acts of violence and terrorism. Stern (2003), for example, explores the various grievances that induce individuals to choose terrorism over the status quo such as poverty, unemployment, lack of better opportunities, exploitation, etc. Stern also reveals the disillusionment faced by many young recruits as they become aware of the practical realities of militant organizations such as ambition, corruption and the criminal activities that fund them and allow them to thrive.

The benefit of the grievance typology is that it attempts to identify a reason for discontent. In this respect, it is a bit more explanatory than Rapoport's wave typology which descriptively divides terrorist violence into four dispensations. However, one would naturally assume that most individuals who choose to engage in acts of violence have compelling reasons to do so. Critical to any analysis of terrorism is not necessarily the perpetrators' grievance, but identifying the strategic objective and assessing whether violence offers a sound strategy to address it.

The main problem with the typologies listed above is that they employ theoretical models that artificially separate terrorist violence into classifications that are highly oversimplified. The real world is never so neatly compartmentalized. Therefore, pinpointing specific causes of terrorism remains an elusive endeavor.

As Richardson (2007) puts it, there are two reasons why terrorism is so difficult to explain. One, there are so many terrorists, and two, there are so few terrorists. On the one hand, individuals who engage in terrorism come from such diverse backgrounds that it is difficult to generalize about them with any assurance of accuracy.

Scholars maintain that those who engage in terrorist violence tend to be younger (Russell and Miller 1977; Combs and Hall 2003), poorer (Kepel 1985), and less educated (Bergen and Pandey 2005) today than they were in the 1960s. However, even demographic generalizations such as these require agreement on what constitutes an act of terrorism.

In the next section, I will slice the data somewhat differently to look at four broad categories of factors that experts often cite as causes of terrorism: structural, cultural, institutional and rational.

a) Structural Explanations of Terrorism

Viewing individuals as embedded in socio-economic realities, structuralists look for causal mechanisms in large socio-economic forces rather than in the preferences of individual actors (Hay and Wincott 1998). By far, the most common alleged structural cause of terrorism is poverty. And while this claim resonates intuitively with most reasonable individuals, it does not hold up empirically.

For instance, Krueger and Malečková (2003) explore poverty and poor education as causes of terrorism among Palestinian suicide bombers and find that, not only were the bombers themselves from diverse socio-economic and educational backgrounds, but those who expressed support for suicide bombings as a response to Israeli occupation were as well.

Ahmed (2005) supports this conclusion by observing that the overall sense of humiliation, bitterness, and anger among Palestinians transcends income, education and social class. Ahmed contends that suicide bombings are commonly viewed by the Palestinian public as justified given the barbaric Israeli occupation.

Krueger and Laitin(2008) consider poverty and civil liberties as causes of terrorism. They conclude that among states providing equal protection from the law, developing states do not experience higher rates of terrorism than wealthy countries. Instead they suggest that political repression generates terrorists who then, in the case of suicide bombers, often target more developed and more democratic nations.

Abadie (2004) argues that poverty is not a statistically significant variable but the level of political freedom is. Abadie also points out that domestic terrorism continues to account for the lion's share of attacks. For example, in 2003 international terrorism constituted only 240 out of a total of 1,536 terrorist attacks. Of course, how one defines terrorism is critical in this type of data collection.

Piazza (2006) looks at ninety-six countries between 1986 and 2002 and finds that, rather than low economic development, "social cleavage theory" offers a better explanation of terrorism.[1] Piazza uses the theory to measure the level of social division in society. Greater numbers of political parties equate to increased social division and hence, aa more probable likelihood of political violence.

In another study, while conceding that there is no evidence of a direct causal relationship between structural factors and individual acts of terrorism, Piazza (2010) notes a correlation between an overall reduction in global poverty and a corresponding decline in global terrorism. Piazza, therefore, suggests that there is a direct correlation between low economic performance

[1] Social Cleavage Theory proposes that political parties emerge out of social cleavages in society (Lipset and Rokkan1967).

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and terrorism at the systemic level even if no evidence can be found to consistently link individual acts of terrorism to poverty at the sub-systemic level. Similarly, Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006)identify a positive correlation between increased foreign direct investment and a long-term overall reduction in terrorism.

Berman's model (2003) also suggests that systemic poverty and economic inefficiency indirectly aid terrorist organizations by allowing them to win the allegiance and loyalty of their members through the provision of public goods and services that would not otherwise be available. The fewer the market opportunities and government provision of public goods, the easier it is for terrorist organizations to secure such loyalty.

According to Berman, individual and collective loyalty to such groups in exchange for economic benefits is rational. And while groups that benefit from such loyalty may then attract other members who are not desperate for economic benefits (e.g., the nineteen hijackers in the 9/11 attacks), these latter members constitute the elite among the group rather than the rank and file. They constitute the exception not the rule. As Berman points out, al Qaeda would hardly send illiterate members to flight school in America when it had more qualified individuals at its disposal. Therefore, according to Berman's model, the single most effective way to eliminate support for terrorism is to improve the economic opportunities of local populations to reduce their dependence on the benefits provided by terrorist organizations.

Berman's model is also applicable to wealthier states with rapid population growth such as Saudi Arabia. Though wealthy now, the population in Saudi Arabia is projected to increase from its current level of approximately 27 million to over 41 million in 2025 and 60 million in 2050, making its abundant resources increasingly scarce (Ehrlich and Liu 2002).

Both al Shabaab and Boko Haram have benefitted from lagging economic conditions by recruiting from among the desperate and unemployed. Still, neither group would likely elect to lay down their arms should economic realities improve in their respective regions as their strategic focus is the implementation of *sharia* rather than a larger slice of the economic pie.

Utilizing a more localized group level of analysis, other scholars have noted a correlation between economic downturns and increases in terrorism (Angrist 1995;Honaker 2004; Blomberg et al. 2004). For example, Angrist (1995) notes that the early 1980s witnessed a rise in education among Palestinians. However, economic downturns also caused a significant increase in unemployment across socio-economic levels. High levels of unemployment led to dissatisfaction and social unrest. Is it a mere coincidence that this economic downturn coincided with the First Intifada? Honaker (2004) draws a similar connection between unemployment and terrorism in Northern Ireland. Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and Urdal (2006) find a positive correlation between population growth and terrorism, especially when increasing numbers of unemployed youth are involved. Finally, Bowman (2008) reports that the U.S. military paid former al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) detainees roughly $200 per month after their release to deter them from returning to AQI. Most were young, unemployed males who accepted jobs with AQI purely for the money rather than for political ideology or religious conviction.

Bueno de Mesquita(2005) utilizes an individual level of analysis to parse out the various causal factors involved in this phenomenon. While agreeing that economic factors play a significant role, Bueno de Mesquita argues a more complex relationship than the standard linear correlation. Acknowledging that individuals on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder are more inclined to volunteer for terrorist missions—particularly those individuals harboring discontent towards the government—Bueno de Mesquita argues that terrorist organizations only want to recruit the most qualified individuals. When economic contractions increase unemployment, terrorist organizations have a more qualified pool of volunteers from which to choose.

This inexpensive pool of highly-qualified candidates leads to an increased number of attacks because harsh government crackdowns often generate popular support which offsets the cost of future operations through a surplus of donations and recruits, and the cycle continues.

Hence according to Bueno de Mesquita, it is not poverty per se that drives terrorism, or even economic inequality, but economic downturns that create a surplus of highly qualified individuals who are angry enough and desperate enough to view terrorism as a viable alternative to the status quo. The question remains, however, how does one explain terrorism during periods of economic boom?

As this section demonstrates, the structural approach to explaining terrorism focuses on economic conditions that are beyond the control of individuals. These conditions escalate frustration and desperation for the multitudes they affect. Economic conditions also directly affect the choices individuals make by limiting the alternatives available to them. Finally, those who engage in terrorism may use economic realities to justify their actions or take advantage of desperate economic conditions to further their agenda as otherwise law-abiding citizens may be tempted to pursue illicit alternatives during cycles of economic downturn. However, the economic conditions alone do not explain why some choose terrorism over the status quo while

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others do not. I will now examine the cultural approach to comprehending terrorism.

b) Cultural Explanations of Terrorism

Culturalists strive to understand the social context from which values, norms, and identities that govern human behavior emerge. Therefore, culturalists argue that an understanding of political processes first requires an understanding of cultural factors (Almond and Coleman 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Pye and Verba 1965; Dawson et al. 1969).

Culturally speaking, the two most common denominators shared by people are language and religion. Language has been a source of conflict in isolated incidents (such as the war between East and West Pakistan where Urdu was proclaimed as the national tongue despite the prevalence of Bengali in the East). Still, religious doctrine has played a more vital (if not a central) role in armed conflict throughout history (Fox and Sandler 2005; Silberman et al. 2005: McCormick 2006)

Culturalists suggest that religion can sometimes be absolute and unyielding, and it is often in these occasions that religious convictions (particularly those associated with monotheistic faiths) can spark violence when confronted with contrary belief systems or practices.[2]

When dealing with terrorism, culturalists search for social conventions that might serve to institute violence as a culturally viable option (e.g. Silverman 2002; Juergensmeyer 2003; Arena and Arrigo 2006). With the increasing prevalence of Islamic terrorism over the past several decades, there has been a surge of interest in Islamic culture in the search for cultural explanations of the phenomena (e.g., Omar 2003; Milton-Edwards 2006; Etienne 2007).

Since September 11, 2001, the body of literature on religion's relationship to terrorism has grown exponentially (e.g., Bergen 2002; Kulwicki 2002; Armanios 2003; Juergensmeyer 2003; Stern 2003; Kepel 2004; Roy 2004; Kalu et al 2005; McCormack 2005; Bergen and Pandey 2006; Ahmed 2006; Haynes 2007& 2009; Venkatraman 2007; Yates 2007; Selengut 2008; Hegghammer 2010; Kean 2011; Sageman 2011).[3]

Fukuyama (2001), for example, suggests that the Muslim world experiences terrorism than other regions due to the immense disappointment of falling so far behind the Western world.

Taylor (1988) asserts that as far back as the sixteenth century, Muslims faced two choices: either embrace those aspects of the West that made it so successful or return to the pure faith of the past. According to Taylor, adherents of the two alternatives have been at odds ever since. In more contemporary times, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of secular nationalism and the neo-fundamentalist ideology that opposed it.[4]

Payne (1989, p. 121) insists that "violence has been a central, accepted element, both in Muslim teaching and in the historical conduct of the religion. For over a thousand years, the religious bias in the Middle Eastern Culture has not been to discourage the use of force, but to encourage it."

Unfortunately, moral majority leaders such as Jerry Falwell, Franklin Graham, and Pat Robertson advance this misguided view of Islam by asserting that Islam is inherently evil, and therefore, the source of modern-day *jihadist* violence. However, anyone who wishes to look at the facts objectivelycan easily discredit this assertion.

Like all religions, Islam can be a unifying force. But of course, not all variants of Islam are the same, so Islam can also be a dividing force as well. However, this doesn't make it evil. Nor is mainstream Islam behind so-called "Islamic terrorism" (Esposito 2003).

Kepel (2004) contends that this phenomenon is divided between the nationalist Islamist political parties in predominantly Muslim countries and the internationally-oriented Islamists living elsewhere. According to Kepel, most Islamist movements in predominantly Muslim states have adopted a more nationalist agenda in the post-cold war era, and therefore religiously-motivated violence in these regions has increasingly been replaced by more politically-motivated violence. In contrast, Kepel insists that religiously-motivated Islamist violence has increased over the same period in the Diaspora, and particularly in the West, where some ten million Muslims reside in Western Europe alone.

Roy (2004) attributes this increase in politically-motivated violence in predominantly Muslim states to the highly politicized terrorism of al Qaeda, whose interpretation of *jihad*as a personal duty breaks with the more traditional notion of *jihad* as a collective, and primarily defensive, duty.[5] Roy also points to the increasingly individual nature of Islam in the West. Roy maintains that while the West may not politicize Islam as much as its Middle-Eastern counterpart, its increasing focus on individualism lends itself to radical views.

Venkatraman (2007) argues that according to the *Quranic* principle of *ijtihad*, Muslims are free to interpret Islam individually and choose their Islamic

[2] In the cases of al Shabaab and Boko Haram (and indeed, many other *jihadist* groups), one obvious explanation for the increase in violence is the belief that democratic forms of government are haram (prohibited) under *sharia* (Schacht 1959). Thus, they rebelwhen outsiders impose this foreign and (in their eyes) unlawful institution upon them,.

[3] For an excellent bibliography see, Haynes (2005).

[4] (Ajami, 1978) offers an excellent discussion of secular nationalism and pan-Arabism in the wake of the Six Day War.

[5] For more on the individual conception of *jihad*, see Lahoud (2010a; 2010b).

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practices as they wish provided they seek the will of God within an Islamic community. So whether it is due to the politicization of Islam in predominantly Muslim regions or the influence of individualism in the West, many scholars agree that there has been both an increase in politically-motivated conflict in Muslim states and an increase in religiously-motivated Islamist violence in the West.[6]

An excellent example is al Shabaab which initially opposed the Ethiopian military, the Somali forces Ethiopia propped up, and any outside militants that assisted them. While the group espouses a religious ideology, al Shabaab's fight was at one time primarily a nationalist cause- though it has successfully drawn Muslims from other states around the world to fight the "infidel crusaders" who have invaded Muslim soil (Vidino, et al. 2010).

Others consider the practice of honor killing as a culturally-specific social convention that institutes brutality(Kulwicki 2002). While this practice is horrific, it in no way represents an exclusively Muslim disposition towards violence as domestic violence against women is a global problem (Watts and Zimmerman 2002).

Examples of religiously motivated violence abound from the Christian Crusades to Muslim/Hindu conflicts and even Buddhist/Hindu conflicts. Scholars can hardly claim any one religion as the exclusive domain of violence, nor can they conclusively demonstrate that any religion causes violence (Martin 1997). Furthermore, religious violence in any society is almost always accompanied by some level of ethno political tension and struggle over limited resources, making this type of analysis particularly problematic (Barber 2001).

Despite the increase in Islamic terrorism, it is extremely challenging to demonstrate a direct correlation between the religion of Islam and extremist violence. Pearce (2005) concludes that no religion displays a significantly higher or lower propensity to violence than the others. Rather than attribute terrorism to any one religion, Wade and Reiter (2007) find a positive correlation between the number of religious minority groups in a given state and its overall level of terrorist activity. Thus, the search for culturally-specific causes of terrorism remains elusive.

In addition to citing specific cultures as prone to terrorist violence, others maintain that cultural differences produce conflict. The most famous of these is Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory which maintains that, since the end of the Cold War, intrastate war along cultural lines has replaced interstate aggression. While his general observation concerning the rise of intrastate war is accurate, scholars have attacked Huntington's theory for several reasons. Of primary concern to most critics is Huntington's focus on cultural factors over other considerations such as socio-economic and geopolitical realities (e.g.,Appleby 1999; Gopin 2000; Laue 2000; Perry 2002; Haynes 2003; Juergensmeyer 2003).

Turner (1993, p. 412) warned that by attempting to equate culture with clearly delineated boundaries, scholars "risk essentializing the idea of culture as the property of an ethnic group or race." Similarly, Benhabib (2002, p.5) warns against such a reductionist approach to understanding culture. She reasons that the attempt to conceive of culture as a "clearly delineable whole" is derived from the desire to understand and control outgroups. Benhabib contrasts this approach with how most people view their own culture, not as an undisputed reality, but more as "a horizon that recedes each time one approaches it." From this perspective, culture is an elusive concept. We must not attempt to apply iten masse to rigidly defined groups of people.

Huntington's concept of "cleft" countries is particularly salient to a cultural analysis of conflict in states such as Nigeria and Sudan (during its civil war years). Huntington defines cleft countries as states divided between civilizations. Conflict occurs when those belonging to one civilization attempt to impose their norms, mores, and laws upon those belonging to another. Huntington attributes the civil war in Sudan between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South to Sudan's status as a cleft state. Likewise, conflict in Nigeria could arguably be viewed as a result of tensions between its Christian South and Muslim North.

However, even in religiously dichotomous regions such as Nigeria and the former state of Sudan, such simplistic explanations prove insufficient. Closer analysis reveals that in both states the North/South divide is just the tip of the iceberg. Each state has also witnessed various struggles between groups of very similar cultural and religious identities.

In Nigeria for example, local groups have clashed with each other over control of resources for decades. Also during the civil war in Sudan, Southerners battled each other just as fiercely as they fought the Northern forces over the question of unification or independence. Therefore, cultural differentiation and ethnoreligious fragmentation are not always the cause of conflict.

Nor does the absence of such diversity guarantee peace. For example, conflict has plagued Somalia- a largely ethnically and religiously homogenous state.[7] One would be hard-pressed to explain Somalia's inter-clan conflict and interstate disputes via Huntington's Clash of Civilizations Theory (or via Wade and Reiter's findings for that matter).

[6] Selengut (2008) offers a comprehensive treatment of the rise of religious violence.

[7] There are, of course, linguistic and other differences that diversify the Somali population. For example, see Solomon (2015).

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In fact, there is increasing skepticism concerning whether we can even consider discrete ethnic groups as the basic building blocks of society (Lieberman and Singh 2010 & 2012). A more satisfactory explanation suggests that stable, effective governance has more to do with peace than an absence of cultural diversity (Zubaida, 1989).

If ethnic or religious fragmentation were a significant cause of conflict, one could expect to see more consistent results. But the fact is, many countries in Africa score high for either ethnic fragmentation, religious fragmentation or both (Lane and Ersson 1994).[8] All have experienced very mixed results concerning violence within their borders.

There has always been–and there continues to be–conflict and violence in every culture (both across cultural lines and within them). Therefore, cultural explanations alone offer limited understanding as to why acts of terrorism occur in one place and not in another.

Finally, any discussion of a correlation between cultural factors and terrorism needs to address the hegemony of discourse contested by critical thinkers such as Said (1976, 1978, 1985, 1997), who argue that Orientalism was devised to establish European imperial domination, and despite its claims of neutrality, the Academy continues to perpetuate a mere caricature of the East as inferior to the West rather than a representation of the East as different from the West (see also Derrida 1974; Deleuze and Guattari 1977; Foucault 1980; Bhabha 1983; Fairclough 2013).[9]

I have lived, studied and taught in North America, Europe, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. I can attest from my own experience that many university students in these regions have been fed a steady diet of neo-Orientalism from their youth. Thus, many readily accept an international hierarchy that places them at the very bottom. Western scholars are no less susceptible. Indeed, like fish in water, Westerners are often so immersed in neo-Orientalism that many hardly notice its existence. Given this vulnerability, scholars need to be particularly careful when applying cultural explanations to terrorism as they are often laden with stereotypes on the one hand and a slew of unanswered questions on the other. In the next section, I will discuss institutional explanations of terrorism.

c) Institutional Explanations of Terrorism

Institutionalism asserts that institutions shape both the preferences of individuals as well as the acceptable means for attaining those preferences (Wildavsky 1987; Koelble 1995; Bowles 1998; 1999; Persson 2002). Institutions can be formal such as a state's laws, regulations, educational systems, economic policies and government (Stiglitz 2000; Bratton 2007). Institutions can also be informal arrangements of all kinds to include corruption, clientelism or something as simple as people allowing pregnant women and the elderly to go to the front of the line at the bank (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2010). As is the case with other systemic factors, institutional explanations for terrorism abound.

d) Political Explanations for Terrorism

There is broad disagreement concerning which type of political regime is more likely to experience terrorism. Some studies link terrorism to democracies while others tie it to authoritarian regimes. One view is that due to increased political representation and participation, democratic societies are less likely to spawn terrorism than authoritarian regimes (Schmid 1992; Gurr 2003).

Others conclude just the opposite, however, positively correlating political rights and civil liberties with terrorism (Ross 1993; Eubank and Weinberg 2001). Drakos and Gofas (2006) contend that non-democracies likely only appear to experience fewer terrorist incidents due to underreporting.

Eyerman (1998) finds that new democracies are especially prone to terrorism because they reduce both the cost and risk. Li (2005) claims that democracies with proportional representation experience fewer incidents of terrorism than democracies with majoritarian or mixed electoral systems because proportional representation generally creates more political space for new parties. Li's conclusion contradicts Piazza's (2008) findings (mentioned above) that tie terrorism to social cleavages.

Data from empirical studies also suggest an inverted U-shaped correlation between terrorism and both authoritarian states and democracies (Abadie 2004). Terrorism scholars refer to this correlation as the democracy curve. It is premised upon the idea that while authoritarian states are able to crush internal threats, democracies tend to experience fewer contingencies. The democracy curve in no way asserts that autocratic states deal with all forms of terrorism or that democracies never face the scourge of terrorism. One would have to ignore a myriad of realities to make such an assumption (e.g., the Chechen Wars, the Uighurs, 9/11 and the resulting decade-plus GWOT).

The democracy curve notes fewer incidents of terrorism inboth democratic and authoritarian societies. This observation leads some to conclude a positive correlation between semi-democracies and terrorism due to a lack of civil liberties such as freedom of the press (Sawyer 2005) and transparent legal systems (Kreimer 2007).

[8] Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côted'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

[9] Consider Said's academic (and what appeared to be personal) tit for tat with Bernard Lewis (e.g., Said 1976; Lewis 1982).

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Beyond regime type, other institutional phenomena that are purported to open the door for terrorist influences are poorly integrated party systems and endemic corruption. In Lebanon, for example, Hezbollah has been able to take advantage of the fact that there are few established political parties in the country (Norton 2007). In contrast, the endemic corruption of Fatah opened political space for Hamas in Gaza (Milton-Edwards 2007). But again, poorly organized party systems and malfeasance merely represent opportunities for terrorists to exploit (Shelley 2004; Shinn 2004). Neither demonstrates a consistent correlation with terrorism. In fact, many developing states possess both phenomena without experiencing a high incidence of terrorism (Diamond 2002).

Mohammad (2005) looks instead at a regime's overall legitimacy as the primary factor for terrorism among Arab states in the Middle East. After testing for other factors such as literacy rates, socio-economic development, regime type and support for Islamic extremism, Mohammad concludes that none contribute to violence as consistently as the perception that a regime is propped up by the West and that it is supportive of American foreign policy. Similarly, Savun and Phillips (2009) maintain that states are more likely to experience terrorism depending upon the type of foreign policy they pursue. The more isolationist the foreign policy, the lower the probability that a state will experience terrorist violence.

e) The Mass Media as an Explanation for Terrorism

The mass media is another institution that has been linked to terrorism as it sometimes serves the interests of terrorists (Nacos 2016). Exposure to the mass media is perhaps the most critical asset terrorists enjoy when it comes to generating popular support and attempting to propagate their ideology (Hoffman 2013). Without media coverage, terrorists fail to publicize their actions beyond the immediate victims. The lack of an audience reduces terrorism to acts of random violence (Nacos 2007).

Take the recent media coverage of the Islamic State (IS) for instance. The group is, without doubt, a threat. However, IS has been active since 1999 under a variety of names with little global attention since the death of al-Zarqawi(Zelin 2014). The recent events concerning IS are newsworthy. However, one also has to take into account the tremendous benefit that IS garners from publicity (Giroux 2016).

Wilkinson (1997) asserts that in democracies, where freedom of the press is supposed to be upheld, a symbiotic relationship often develops between the terrorist organizations seeking publicity and the media outlets that profit from sensational news stories. This relationship is offered as one reason why terrorism thrives in democracies more so than in authoritarian states.

Wieviorka (1988) denies the existence of such a simplistic, straightforward relationship, pointing to instances where terrorist organizations have targeted journalists and news outlets.[10] And while democratic governments are usually slow to resort to censorship, many have enacted anti-complicity statutes that prohibit media organizations from lending support to terrorist organizations through publicity.

Others point out that such publicity has a mixed record regarding the amount of popular support it generates (Murphy et al. 2004). Not only do mass media outlets publicize the terrorists' cause, but they also expose the atrocities committed by the group and such "publicity" often backfires. For instance, Funes (1998) examines how media coverage of the attacks perpetrated by the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* "Basque Homeland and Liberty" caused a significant loss of popular support for the group.

Some scholars argue that terrorists do not need their actions to be publicized as government reactions to terrorist attacks are often enough to incite public outrage. For instance, Bloom (2004) discusses how the media coverage of the harsh retaliatory crack-downs initiated by the Israeli government and military forces has served to outrage the Palestinian public, thus generating widespread support for Palestinian terrorist activity.

So while terrorist organizations attempt to use the mass media to raise awareness and support, regimes publicize the criminality of terrorism and thereby delegitimize the group in the eyes of the public. Both, however, run the risk of losing public support for their use of violence.

f) Madaris as an Explanation for Terrorism

Another debatable issue surrounding institutions is that of *madaris* (plural for *madrasa*) and the radicalization of school-age children. For example, the 9-11 Commission describes *madaris* as "incubators of violent extremism" (Commission 2004, p. 367). However, this depiction is inflammatory and not entirely accurate. In Arabic, "*madrasa*" means "school." Many *madaris* serve the impoverished, and as charitable organizations, prove to be harmless. In Somalia, for example, the formal education system ceased to function after 1991. Privately funded *madaris* were the only option available for low-income Somali children (Botha and Abdile 2014).

Much of the concern over the perceived link between *madaris* and Islamic terrorism stems from the fact that as many as 10,000 *madaris* in Pakistan, and thousands more around the world, are funded by Saudi *Wahhabi* groups (Armanios 2003; Benoliel 2003). However, the quality of education should also be considered (Botha and Abdile 2014).

[10] Interestingly enough, IS has recently threatened Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, and Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey, for their efforts to deny the group and its affiliates space on their respective social media sites (Moore 2016).

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Since the 9/11 attacks, *madaris* have received a disproportionate amount of attention among Westerners as training centers for radical *jihadists*. However, Siddique (2009) argues against this conception. While it is true that *madaris* are known to offer religious education, by and large, according to Siddique, *militantmadaris* are the exception rather than the rule. Siddique concludes that to the extent that *madaris* are militant at all; they are much more likely to support local and regional extremism rather than international. Interestingly, none of the nineteen perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were educated at *madaris*.

Similarly, Bergen and Pandey (2006) examine the profiles of 79 terrorists involved in the five worst anti-West terrorist attacks in recent history (the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks against the two U.S. embassies in Africa, 9/11, the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, and the 2005 London bombings). They conclude that, unlike the average terrorist engaged in attacks against domestic/cross-border targets, the average global terrorist is highly educated. Bergen and Pandey further determine that the level of technological sophistication required to orchestrate a terror attack against a Western target is not provided in most *madaris*.

Puri(2010) also concludes that militant *madaris* in Pakistan play a relatively minor role in the overall equation of cause and effect. Not only are a very tiny proportion of Pakistani students exposed to such *madaris*, those who do attend militant *madaris*lack the necessary skills to engage in high-tech terrorist attacks.

Stern (2000) insists, however, that the relatively few militant *madaris* in Pakistan encouraged their students to engage in *jihad* and sent them to *jihad* training camps. Likewise, Magouirk et al. (2008) report that *madaris* proved an integral part of the equation in securing recruits for Jemaah Islamiyyah.

While many *madaris* around the world are funded by Saudi sources, Coulson (2004) argues that the real blame for the existence of militant *madaris* in Afghanistan is to be laid at the feet of the Reagan administration which invested some $51 million towards textbooks that incite *jihad* against Soviet troops. These textbooks depicted extremely violent "lessons" such as math problems asking students to calculate the length of time it will take a *mujahid's* bullet to reach a Russian's head. This covert plan to indoctrinate, fund, and arm the *mujahidin* was part of the larger $3.2 billion Operation Cyclone (Davis 2002). After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the Taliban movement emerged and was mainly comprised of students (the word "*taliban*" is Pashto for "students") influenced and trained by the very *mujahidin* the U.S. backed in the 1980s.

Mazzetti et al. (2010) also suggest that the Pakistani government, which continues to receive over $1 billion per year from Washington for its part in the GWOT, also funds certain *madaris* toward similar ends. But here again, the focus is on local and regional rather than international terrorism.

The perception of *madaris* as training centers for radical *jihadists*, while meriting consideration, is at best misguided and incomplete, and at worst blatant propaganda. The alarm generated over *madaris* stems from the funding they receive by *Wahhabi* groups in Saudi Arabia. However, as noted above, U.S. funding has been linked to militant *madaris* as well. While some *madaris* may incite hatred, very few students who attend such *madaris* will ever obtain the technical ability and financial means necessary to orchestrate a terrorist attack against the West.

One can see that, as with structural and cultural factors, institutional explanations alone prove incomplete. While institutions may shape both the preferences of terrorists and the opportunities available for them to exploit, they do not explain why only a tiny percentage of the population within a given institutional design choose to engage in or support acts of terrorism. Nor do they further our understanding of whether such actors are likely to achieve their strategic objectives through violence.

Finally, scholarsalso cite systemic causes as the culprits behind terrorism. However, the sheer randomness of terrorism suggests that something much more specific also needs to be considered. Hence, I will now explore the role of rational explanations as a potential key to understanding this phenomenon.

g) Rational Explanations of Terrorism

Scholars in this camp analyze individual strategic interactions as the primary causal factors of political outcomes (Fiorina 1995; Kiser 1996; Levi 1997). Thus, it is possible to distinguish rational choice scholars from structuralists, culturalists, and institutionnalists by the level of analysis that they employ. Rationalists tend to approach problems deductively rather than inductively. They are more interested in broad generalization than deep understanding. The deductive method is evident by the three fundamental assumptions of the rational-choice approach. First, all individuals have fixed and ranked preferences. Second, all individuals are self-interested and strive to maximize their goals. Third, all individuals are interdependent and therefore act strategically based upon their expectations of what others will do. Rational choice scholars apply these three assumptions to all cases regardless of individual circumstances.

The rationalist camp in the body of terrorism literature attempts to understand terrorism via the preferences, incentives, and choices of individual utility maximizers who act deliberately toward the most efficient means to an end based upon their perception of what other actors will do (Enders and Sandler 2000; Berman 2003: Frey 2004).

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For example, kidnapping is a rational act provided there is reasonable cause to believe that someone will comply with the perpetrator's demands. While this crime is sometimes used to raise awareness or to negotiate the release of political prisoners, it would not be employed for these purposes if there were zero expectation that the media outlets or governments involved would comply.

Kidnapping also raises a substantial amount of money. It is estimated that the 409 international incidents perpetrated between 1968 and 1982 yielded some $350 million (roughly $850,000 per victim), generating significant revenue for the perpetrators and therefore constituting a rational act (Rapoport 2004).

Still, no one kidnaps homeless children in Manila. Nor does anyone make demands in exchange for the safe return of a hostage possessing insufficient political or emotional value to those negotiating. Kidnappers only target victims likely to generate a ransom. Thus, it is an example of a purely rational act-engaged in only when the perpetrator(s) perceive it to be the most expedient means to a desired end. Likewise, acts of terrorism can be understood more clearly when one adds the rationalist lens to the looking glass.

One could argue that terrorism is not entirely rational in that the fruits of terrorism are also a public good because any political concessions achieved are shared by all regardless of whether they participate in the act or not. While this is true, it in no way precludes terrorism from being rational.

Berman (2003) argues that terrorist organizations gain tremendous popularity despite the destruction they cause if the public goods they provide exceed those provided by the government. In this respect, even the provision of public goods is rational as it benefits the organization.

Even in the extreme case of suicide terrorism, any potential benefits are almost entirely in the public realm, making the rationality of suicide terrorism for the individual a particularly challenging idea. Still, suicide terrorism is rational if the bomber believes that there are rewards to be had in the next life. What is more, the bomber's family also often benefits from the support of the group sponsoring the act (Zakaria 2007).

Petter(2004) elaborates on the rationality argument by identifying four distinct terrorist profiles in a typical *jihadist* cell—each with their rationale for membership: (1) the entrepreneur, (2) the protégé, (3) misfits, and (4) drifters. The entrepreneur is carving out a niche and making a name for him or herself. For the entrepreneur, terrorism is a business. The protégé sees an opportunity to utilize his or her ability. Finally, misfits find a place to belong while drifters obtain a convenient, albeit temporary, economic opportunity.[11]

Unsurprisingly, Rosendorff and Sandler (2010) find that supporters will join terrorist organizations if they stand to gain more from their participation in the cell than from other economic opportunities available to them. Therefore, as real earnings from wages rise, so do the opportunity costs for engaging in terrorist activities. This point is so intuitive that it hardly merits mention.

However, Rosendorff and Sandler also suggest that in addition to fewer acts of terrorism, policymakers can also expect more egregious types of terrorism in times of economic prosperity. The reason there are often more suicide bombings and other particularly lethal attacks during times of economic prosperity is that terrorist leaders hope to provoke the government into overreacting. Harsh retaliation by the government generates support for the terrorists' cause and therefore lowers the group's cost of engaging in terrorism through increased financial support, approval, and volunteers.

This tactic works particularly well against liberal democracies since elected officials respond to political pressure to do something. Harsh retaliation on the part of the state, in turn, generates support which then allows the terrorist organization to continue to operate even in times of economic prosperity (Bloom 2004, Rosendorff and Sandler 2010).

Enders and Sandler (2005) propose that individuals can choose how they respond to systemic factors such as the economy and the political structure, thus specifying their models with the individual's choice as the independent variable. This distinction is particularly salient in the post 9/11 era.

The United States and its allies targeted al-Qaeda and its affiliates, captured or killed roughly two-thirds of the leadership (along with some 3,400 operatives), and froze more than $135 million in assets. Al Qaeda responded by decentralizing its network and thereby adapting to the new economic and political realities.

Decentralization renders the larger organization more resilient against infiltration and attacks as each local cell is much more independent than before the GWOT. If one cell is infiltrated and the leadership is captured or killed, the entire organization is no longer compromised. Likewise, the nature of the new design makes it exponentially harder to track and freeze the organization's financial assets as (ideally) each cell is financially independent of the other.

This resilience on the part of al Qaeda demonstrates that it is a rational actor. It does more than simply react to systemic forces. It strategically adapts and responds according to its preferences. Rosendorff and Sandler (2010) further contend that terrorists can

[11] Horgan (2005) makes a somewhat related point in his discussion of the complexity of human behavior, stating the need to understand that the reason(s) an individual initially engages in terrorist activity is not necessarily the same as the reason(s) that person continues. Nor is it always relevant to the decision to cease terrorist activity.

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choose to manipulate the government's response.[12] This is different from the many approaches that specify the terrorists themselves as the dependent variable.

For example, in addition to the ideas mentioned earlier, Gurr(1970) advances relative deprivation, and Tilly (1978) promotes his theory of political opportunity. While Gurr investigates the link between economic distribution and political violence, Tilly considers the level of state oppression as the factor in determining how much conflict will be tolerated. Both theories offer compelling arguments and have spawned large bodies of literature, yet neither views the terrorists themselves as the independent variable.

Likewise, Lichbach (1987) introduced a rational actor model with three propositions: (1) Government repression of nonviolent opposition will result in more violent resistance. (2) The factor that determines whether an opposition group will increase or decrease all resistance activities is the government's accommodation policy toward that particular group. (3) It is not repression per se that increases violent resistance, but inconsistency in government policy toward opposition. While offering a rational explanation of sorts, Lichbach essentially sidesteps the human agency of the terrorists altogether by specifying the state as the independent variable.

II. Conclusion

This article has considered many of the so-called "causes' of terrorism to debunk the myth that structural, cultural or institutional factors operate as independent variables to generate terrorist violence. There are no "causes" of terrorism. Like most violence, terrorist violence is merely a tactic— employed by virtually anyone— as part of an overall strategy to obtain a particular goal. In this sense, it is entirely rational.

However unlike pure cost-benefit analyses, actors who engage in terrorism often do so as more than mere utility maximizers. Structural, cultural, and institutional factors, no doubt, affect actors' circumstances and influence the resources available to them. These, in turn, affect the decision whether to utilize violence as a tactic or not. At the heart of the matter is not what is causing terrorist violence, but the strategic objective(s) behind the violence—what do the actorsinvolved hope to accomplish through the violence? There are no cookie-cutter formulas that we can apply en-masse. Every incident is distinct and demandsan in-depth strategic analysis.

[12] (See also Celestino and Gleditsch2013) who conclude that nonviolent opposition to authoritarian governments substantially improve the chances for a democratic transition while violent resistance increases the likelihood of another dictatorship.

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Postmodern Country, Globalization and the Deviant Behavior of Youthg People

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Abstract- With this analysis, the author attempts to highlight the destabilizing influence of globalization processes on the legal framework in the state and more specifically on those norms codifying the behavior of minors. The idea is for students to reflect the role of globalization on the legal construction of the state and its refiection on the behavior of minors.

Of course, the author presents only part of his vision of the catastrophic impact of this important factor on our country's legal framework regarding children and the protection of their rights.

Keywords: globalization, deviant behavior, minors, law, legal.

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I. Introduction

Legal concepts defined at different times and by different generations of scholars referring to the definition state are based on the existing real and evolving historical social structure and community. The state of modernity, its legal structure, its model, its functioning and its organization impose a legal order, which is why it can be defined as a historical, authoritative and legal form of self-organization. In the course of the historical development of the knowledge of the state, various theories have formed, which can be divided into three main directions:

- Socially explaining the state as a kind of social community;
- Power, which presents the state as a governmental structure;
- Jury, seeking an explanation of the state as a legal model.

The emergence of the state is that historical beginning, that historical moment in which the result of the progressive development of a certain ethno-social model has arisen, the reliance of which relies on cohesion, as a necessity to maintain the newly emerging social, political and geostrategic environment of the ethno- . The governmental character of the state stems from the realization of those economic, political, social and legal mechanisms which it itself defines as priorities for itself and which in practice maintain its structure and its functions as such.

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The notion of a state in today's modern version introduces Machiavelli into his "The Master". But long before it talks about the functions of the state and formulates its notion of its ideal option, Plato convinces us that it should be based not on: "... to make a very happy part of the people, but if possible to be happy all citizens. "

Of course, many would now determine Plato's views, and not only his, utopian state functions, but how much better than everyone in a state to be happy thanks to the efforts and order that they themselves they impose it because, from the modern point of view, as a voters, they model it.According to him, the state should impose the same for all its laws and order and the "guards" in the same way to take care of the action and their observance. These views are, inherently, a sufficient basis to build up a number of scientific schools that affect the structure of the state, the society and the divisions in it, as well as the creation of the many existing education systems that influence the education of children. There may also be a question as to why Plato is quoted and why it needs to be related to the topic of development. The answer is not at all complex. Plato is a beginning, a philosopher whose central issues are the theses and questions of state, law, order, and education at all ages and levels. Still, being born in a family of high social status, having the best time for your time, and among your teachers being Socrates, who is himself a victim of the restored democracy in Athens, are circumstances that do not happen to everyone.

With the millennial development of philosophical views after Plato, his ideas have been the subject of detailed research and analysis by many scientists who have established Pythagoras close to Philosophical themes and views. Moreover, there are scientists, including Bertrand Russell, claiming that: "... what is apparent Platonism, after being analyzed, is Pythagorean in its essence." Ultimately, the divergent views do not make the author of the State, and especially his thesis of the order in which the "ideal state" is created, unimportant and loved.

From a democratic point of view, what distinguishes modern state and state power from domination in the negative sense is the legitimacy of freedom, because today there is the freedom of citizens who are active participants in the constitution of all power. On the issue of the public, about the power of

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the freedom of the people in defining and legitimizing the state, Z. Rousseau has made a special contribution to "The Public Contract or Principles of Political Law" written in 1762, maintaining his basic idea that the people must be identified with the state through the so-called A "public contract", in the sense and meaning of which it can influence the legal processes in it, and in the public contract the law is a pillar and everyone should obey the laws. Rousseau states that "The unfair contract, in which the strong enslave the weak, must be replaced by a new social treaty that provides each citizen with protection from the community and will benefit it with freedom and equality."

A system thinker, thinking and analyzing in his turn, he imposes as a next and no less important problem for the normal functioning of a state, that of the functions of the executive power, which, according to Rousseau, must derive from laws born of willpower and protecting interests of the people, while being applied under the control of the sovereign. He accepts that the source of statehood is the people, and its essence is its common will, as part of the individual will that is directed at the common good, which means that what must be done by all, to fulfill the common will expressed in a universal law applicable to all or universal subordination of the laws in force.

Friedrich August von Hayek argues that "... a state in which many elements of a different kind are so interconnected that we can, based on our knowledge of a spatial or temporal distinct part of the whole, form faithful assumptions about the rest, or at least predictions that are likely to be true. "

The attempt to clarify the notion of "order" in its legal nature is useful because it gives an idea of the realities in which a state, its legislation and its society as a whole are developing.

Many years will pass from Plato's time to the first time that the term "rule of law" is introduced by the German law professor Robert von Mol, who in the “Die deutsche Polizeiwissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates” analyzes the work of the German police and the circumstance , that it complies and applies the basic provisions of the local legislation. Of course, Mol is not alone in the essence of interpreting and applying this thesis.

Wilhelm von Humboldt's thesis, which states in an attempt to establish the boundaries of the state's activity, is that "if human development is a fundamental goal," it is the duty of the state to adapt its organism to the guarantee of human rights , thus protecting the security and freedom of the people, which is why it is necessary to determine the extent of the powers of the state, which should be limited mainly to ensuring human integrity. For Humboldt, however, the state is always associated with a "limitation of freedom," so it can not be seen as "evil, though necessary." Even before him, Kant wrote: "... the state is a union of a multitude of people subject to legal laws," while at the same time specifying the criteria to be met by the law, which makes it clear that it attaches mainly to the relationship between the law and other phenomena with which he should be bound.

There are many definitions and theories on the concept of the state in the legal space, but the traditional and most common definition is related to the theory of Prof. Georg Jelinek for its constitutive legal elements, which consists of three essential elements defining the state as: ".. territory, people and ruler ".

Legality and rule of law in one country can be achieved through an effective regulatory system, harmonized with the international law, stemming from the perspective of the population, because it should reflect individual and mass interests without being contradicted. There is no question that the basic objectives and tasks that the government has to establish must be legally justified and set out in a legitimate legal, moral and moral framework that aims at their realization. In fact, the rule of law, acting and subordinate to the relevant legal, moral and moral framework, is the result of the difficult and long pathway that human consciousness has undergone since the spontaneous, the primary fulfillment of established rituals, traditions and norms of conduct to the conscious subordination of power and the coercion resulting from the law. The peculiarities of the relationship between law and morality are also related to the fact that the latter is a valuational valuation phenomenon, which, as right, has a normative expression. Moral norms contain and impose negative obligations and the main means of ensuring that they are complied with in the absence of their own conviction, with the positive assessment, as for ethical norms, of mental coercion. In this sense validation, legislative writing, the legalization of moral principles and norms through their reflection in law can be taken as an expression of their participation in the formation of its characteristics. This is the form through which morality penetrates into law as the only ready norm of public behavior. The law has the special purpose of guaranteeing the status of society, its homeostasis, its pulse, reflecting the interests of all social strata and making them common goals.

Equally important, however, for each state are its institutions, because the understanding of the rule of law would be incomplete if it is not about the activities of the institutions in it. This is necessary due to the fact that the right to construct and its ubiquitous influence in the state is indeed crucial, but we must not forget the fact that not the law itself, but law enforcement is much more important for prosperity, so and for the stability of the state. In this sense, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that there is no state, and therefore legal, sphere of influence in which there is no institution and institution

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that can practically enforce in its own power and professional environment. In order to realize the state doctrine and to develop the law enforcement in it, there can hardly be anything more important and more valuable than to realize the ways to overcome and overcome the processes related to the presence and development of criminal and deviant behavior of minors. Stability, social reality in one country must be saturated with norms in force in the widest sense, with norms that bring real and positive results on the economy, health, education and morality of society in it, which is why the law is no less value and meaningful of lawmaking, the principle of which should strengthen the state's stances.

The question that is the subject of this analysis is when and under what circumstances today's state, the postmodern state of a model that emits democracy, law and order, becomes a model that allows young people to deviantly behave.

In dictatorial regimes and in societies involved in hostilities and conflicts, the environment seems familiar. It is impossible to talk about respecting the democratic legal norms of children's rights, which leads to subordination and human deprivation, hunger, disease and exploitation, high growth of child mortality and miserable existence. According to a UNICEF report, "Children in poverty live in an environment that is detrimental to their mental, physical, emotional and spiritual development." They become a victim of military doctrine, and the state is unable to intercept this process.

The subject of analysis in this paper is the thesis of the crackdown on the legal system in established and functioning democratic societies and state constructions, influenced by the globalizing world of militant views shaken by financial and economic crises, crises of moral values, crises, following the increasing migratory flows, lead to deviance in the behavior of minors.

In modern times, established democracies have shown that statehood is powerless, it is legally baffled and socially helpless when faced with the crisis of morality and the marginalization of ethnic groups in it. The globalizing state is in a profound institutional and moral crisis that deprives it and the legal norms placed in its space are unsustainable because of the social and moral decay of the identity of the generations. The perpetrators of the state model admit the existence of multiple risky social groups of uneducated, marginalized, inexperienced and inactive young people, from an increasing number of juvenile offenders subjected to their physical survival alone.

When the moral and legal norms (as a common social regulator, created and perfected in human communities, unique and unique) are not a priority in the process of educating and training minors when they are overwhelmed or ignored when they have not become part of educational norms, moral personality and do not become a way of behavior, create conditions for the development of children, giving rise to deviant behavior. The crisis of personal and family moral values brought about by the deteriorating financial and economic performance of a family adds to the reasons why the state is not able to control the processes of marginalization of large groups in it, leading to deviant behavior of minors. In these circumstances, deviation goes beyond legal norms, but in order for a society to function within the normal legal boundaries, the level of deviation must be within certain limits or, as E. Durkheim says: "... provided that it reaches but does not exceed the level characteristic of a society of a particular kind ", otherwise society is in a state of anomie, the legal framework of the state is not capable of strengthening its essence.

Minors and minors, as the most vulnerable part of our society, succumb to the temptations and misunderstood values offered today. As Mareva notes, social inequality is a complex problem, driven by the overlapping of a number of factors, including discriminatory practices, social inequality, etc., which to some extent deter the social development of adolescents.

In this sense, it can be argued that the overall social system and the social environment itself become deviant, creating conditions in which the growing and developing generations suffer from its essence.

When there are permanent and inconsistent changes in the overall legal, economic, socio-cultural and educational system, the opportunities and circumstances for developing deviant behavior are increased. The essence of the behavior of all of us is determined by the relationship of dependence between each of us as an individual and the environment in which we develop and the lack of social experience of minors and the social environment consisting of many norms, imperative, presses them, placing them in the conditions of its performers without being able to rethink it. Even trying to interpret the definition of their behavior called "associal" or "deviant" means breaking the norms that are placed and valid for the social environment that defines the path of society outlined by the legislator. These are actions and actions that lead to violation of the norm, without any thought of the possibility of the consequences and sanctions that would follow. By "interacting with the norm" in this aspect we should understand its rationale, as well as the consequences that would result from its overcoming. And once it does not interact with the environment, there are not many chances to implement it, because interaction implies some degree of compliance with it, some respect for and respect for it.

Socio-cultural environment in society has a huge impact on globalization processes. This factor has

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a detrimental effect on the moral and ethical values created and imposed in the social environment. It may seem at first glance that this process does not seem to be particularly significant as an impact on the deviant behavior of children, it may be perceived as too unambiguous and realizing influence only in the sphere of finance and the economy, may be available and accepted that this process has no direct impact on children's behavior and therefore its consideration in such an aspect is unnecessary, but the reality shows that this factor is one of the great challenges for international law specialists are asking to create international rules that will divide and unify legislative mechanisms, applying them identically throughout the world, and are particularly burdensome in the field of social and criminal law. Many professionals view it as an objective, inevitable and irreversible process without trying to look for a definition that is fully and equally valid for everyone, and usually associate globalization with economic and financial aspects. Undoubtedly, globalization has a significant impact on the movement of financial and legislative initiatives at regional, continental and intercontinental levels, undoubtedly leading to market integration of goods and services, influencing factors of production such as capital, financial flows, labor (or its crisis) , technologies and information.

The features of globalization, as an idea and direction, include the reduction of natural barriers and political constraints that, on the one hand, distribute national and regional markets and, on the other, rearrange social and moral-ethical values in society. On the other hand, these processes lead to the struggle to preserve the customary and the applicable law because they are seen as a threat to the preservation of national and social identity. They are seen as an encroachment on the traditions and even the way people live.

From the historical point of view, the roots of this powerful factor of influence on societies and the individual, such as globalization, can be found in the early 1600s and the late 19th century when it was really just about trade and economic relations when they were born and sought their place in the economic and political space. Since then, the territory of transformation and reformation of the public sector, the functioning of moral and moral values, the functioning of communicative mechanisms and legal norms has been widening, and the process is continuous.

In the face of the constantly arising conflicts brought about by the processes of globalization, influencing the individual states and their legal constructs, Jürgen Habermas writes: "The constitutionalization of international law has long been directed not only at that pacification, which also stood at the beginning of development in towards the European Union. The bursting of the bubble of neo-liberal illusions stimulates the view that financial markets, and even the functional systems of global society penetrating national borders in general, bring problems to a state that states or coalitions of states are no longer able to master" more "As early as the days of the French Revolution, the tension between the rights of the citizen and of man has implicitly conjured up the claim to a global imposition of equal rights for everyone. This cosmopolitan claim means that the role of human rights should not be exhausted by a moral critique of the unfair relations of a still highly stratified global society. Human rights are adapted to institutional incarnation in a politically constituted global society. "

Again, he says, "States have no rights, only people have, and therefore people, not states, are the main historical figures, it should depend on how politics is being conducted. In fact, they are turned into unloving viewers. " This Habermas thesis does not find a decisive reflection and influence in the legislation of the post-totalitarian societies of the countries in united Europe, relevant to the social and crisis issues that affect the rights of the children as a whole and, in particular, those with deviant behavior. When analyzing the processes in our country, the location of the political authorities, the political legitimacy in it (and this is necessary due to the fact that the imposed, emerging and developing political subjects and ideologies, competing, express claims to the sovereign, influence it and legislation), we come to the conclusion that social legal regulation among the countries of united Europe is more than necessary and we especially need it when it comes to formulating a common legal framework in the " in-society "and" state (social environment) - child ".

In this sense, the process of globalization makes the achievements of human intelligence, its theoretical and practical developments and market realization rapidly available to the majority of people, while at the same time the associal phenomena and the wrongful conduct of the underage and minors accompanying humanity are at the edge, and too often outside the legislative control again for the same reasons.

There are polarly different views on this factor, which inevitably influences the destinies of the people. Professionals who consider themselves neo-liberal, embrace globalization and support it. In their view, the globalized economy is more efficient because removing market constraints - such as trade liberalization and deregulation of capital markets and labor markets - are seen as the only way to boost economic growth, trade balancing, and lower unemployment. Others believe that the idea of a global market without national borders is impossible, and the globalizing economy needs them, in their view, to be governed and regulated by the respective national governments, who have to coordinate their policies to deal with this process,

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because one of the most important aspects of globalization is economic.

Globalization is a process of integrating national farms into an interconnected and interdependent world in the world or the Community economy (as is the case with the European community), the creation of global markets for goods, services, technology, capital and labor and this process is uneven, overcoming certain shocks and difficulties and generating a number of conflicts with particular emphasis in the social spaces of the countries. Together with freedom in its global sense, the development of democratic processes and formal respect for human rights have globalized and expanded the characteristics of such elements of human beings as poverty, violence, environmental pollution, terrorism, and almost without interruption. military invasions, political corruption, moral deformations, age and student immaturity, as well as intellectual backwardness.

Unfortunately, the transition to democratization of societies has made people feel a sense of social insecurity, of social anxiety. At such times and in situations as the ongoing transition of democratization of the processes of development into a society like ours, to sudden and profound changes in it, the mechanisms of personality to identify, to counteract and to personal stability weaken to a great extent.

Very often the processes of influence on the personality are extremely strong and they either downplay or totally ignore the opportunities of children to protect themselves in social or intellectual terms and sometimes even purely physical. In a very direct and negative way, one of the important features of modern globalization, linked to the decreasing value and volume of direct human labor, is influenced by the increased automation in production, and the inability to realize in the labor process is a factor that damages and sometimes destroys human dignity, because man unrecognized through his labor is not considered useful in both personal and family contexts.

The possibility of his being degraded, his thoughts and actions being rearranged in negative terms, unlock processes of deviant behavior are increasing because the goals, ideas and the superiority of his spirit are already reduced to his physical survival. The inability of the state to create new jobs, finance and implement not global but sectoral policies leads to the closure of social frameworks and the impossibility of assisting the unemployed and uninsured by them, which leads to the emergence of strong migratory waves. For many countries, the migration process has become a vital and widely accepted economic strategy, and for many to get into the huge migratory flow and work abroad is not just a quest for economic prosperity and social status but a way of survival.

Globalization, democratic processes and the unification of Community law have led to the fall of visa regimes, and this process has opened the flow of migrants, which has an irreversible effect on families, children, their psyche, and their development. Migration involves the transfer of the most valuable economic resource, such as human beings from poor to wealthy countries, and family, local communities and the home of migrants suffer from this process. The migrant community is becoming a new kind of life, with new rules, laws and problems. In these circles, the negative impact on children is inevitable because they are detached from their roots, their mother tongue degrades, the grammar is influenced, the vocabulary is mixed, and the difficulties in the communicative aspect are increasing, and hence their overall emigration as a whole unexpectedly negative dimensions. It is noted that there is no sector of the manufacturing and especially social sphere for the country that sent the migrants, which will not negatively affect these processes, although on the other hand there are constantly increasing legal restrictions on their restriction in the host countries.

The well-known Polish postmodernism researcher, globalist and sociologist Bowman, analyzing globalization and its implications for man in his book of the same name, says: "For some," globalization "is what we are obliged to do if we want to be happy; for others "globalization" is the cause of our misery. For everyone, however, "globalization" is the indestructible part of the world, an irreversible process; it is also a process that affects us all to the same degree and in the same way. We are all in a process of "globalization" - to be "globalized" means roughly the same for all "globalized".

Modern thinking and contemporary lifestyles imply that the factor globalization affects the family, the life, the individual, his or her soul and life, his or her identity and identity. In our country, this process is even more dynamic because it is coupled with a prolonged post-communist transition, coupled with a prolonged period of political fluctuations and collaborations in our society that form a multitude of elements that violate boundaries and norms, especially morally, as laws are increasingly being violated.

The most disadvantaged of all these negative processes and phenomena that are essential for globalizing societies are children because they reflect in a particularly aggressive way the many problems that accompany the existence of the elderly due to the social, economic and social conditions, the strong dependence on the precarious labor market at the expense of family reunification and consolidation and the strengthening of its moral value, its intellectual, social and legal development.

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

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- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.

Format Structure

It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, “What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?” Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.

Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

Preparation of Eletronic Figures for Publication

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

Tips for writing a good quality Social Science Research Paper

Techniques for writing a good quality homan social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of homan social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow here.

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6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.
Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.

20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium though which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

.

Informal Guidelines of Research Paper Writing

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.

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Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.

The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.

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Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."

Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

The Administration Rules

Administration Rules to Be Strictly Followed before Submitting Your Research Paper to Global Journals Inc.

Please read the following rules and regulations carefully before submitting your research paper to Global Journals Inc. to avoid rejection.

Segment draft and final research paper: You have to strictly follow the template of a research paper, failing which your paper may get rejected. You are expected to write each part of the paper wholly on your own. The peer reviewers need to identify your own perspective of the concepts in your own terms. Please do not extract straight from any other source, and do not rephrase someone else's analysis. Do not allow anyone else to proofread your manuscript.

Written material: You may discuss this with your guides and key sources. Do not copy anyone else's paper, even if this is only imitation, otherwise it will be rejected on the grounds of plagiarism, which is illegal. Various methods to avoid plagiarism are strictly applied by us to every paper, and, if found guilty, you may be blacklisted, which could affect your career adversely. To guard yourself and others from possible illegal use, please do not permit anyone to use or even read your paper and file.

Criterion for Grading a Research Paper (Compilation) by Global Journals

Please note that following table is only a Grading of "Paper Compilation" and not on "Performed/Stated Research" whose grading solely depends on Individual Assigned Peer Reviewer and Editorial Board Member. These can be available only on request and after decision of Paper. This report will be the property of Global Journals

Topics	Grades		
	A-B	**C-D**	**E-F**
Abstract	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
Introduction	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
Methods and Procedures	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
Result	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
Discussion	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring

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