\documentclass[11pt,twoside]{article}\makeatletter

\IfFileExists{xcolor.sty}%
  {\RequirePackage{xcolor}}%
  {\RequirePackage{color}}
\usepackage{colortbl}
\usepackage{wrapfig}
\usepackage{ifxetex}
\ifxetex
  \usepackage{fontspec}
  \usepackage{xunicode}
  \catcode`⃥=\active \def⃥{\textbackslash}
  \catcode`❴=\active \def❴{\{}
  \catcode`❵=\active \def❵{\}}
  \def\textJapanese{\fontspec{Noto Sans CJK JP}}
  \def\textChinese{\fontspec{Noto Sans CJK SC}}
  \def\textKorean{\fontspec{Noto Sans CJK KR}}
  \setmonofont{DejaVu Sans Mono}
  
\else
  \IfFileExists{utf8x.def}%
   {\usepackage[utf8x]{inputenc}
      \PrerenderUnicode{–}
    }%
   {\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}}
  \usepackage[english]{babel}
  \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
  \usepackage{float}
  \usepackage[]{ucs}
  \uc@dclc{8421}{default}{\textbackslash }
  \uc@dclc{10100}{default}{\{}
  \uc@dclc{10101}{default}{\}}
  \uc@dclc{8491}{default}{\AA{}}
  \uc@dclc{8239}{default}{\,}
  \uc@dclc{20154}{default}{ }
  \uc@dclc{10148}{default}{>}
  \def\textschwa{\rotatebox{-90}{e}}
  \def\textJapanese{}
  \def\textChinese{}
  \IfFileExists{tipa.sty}{\usepackage{tipa}}{}
\fi
\def\exampleFont{\ttfamily\small}
\DeclareTextSymbol{\textpi}{OML}{25}
\usepackage{relsize}
\RequirePackage{array}
\def\@testpach{\@chclass
 \ifnum \@lastchclass=6 \@ne \@chnum \@ne \else
  \ifnum \@lastchclass=7 5 \else
   \ifnum \@lastchclass=8 \tw@ \else
    \ifnum \@lastchclass=9 \thr@@
   \else \z@
   \ifnum \@lastchclass = 10 \else
   \edef\@nextchar{\expandafter\string\@nextchar}%
   \@chnum
   \if \@nextchar c\z@ \else
    \if \@nextchar l\@ne \else
     \if \@nextchar r\tw@ \else
   \z@ \@chclass
   \if\@nextchar |\@ne \else
    \if \@nextchar !6 \else
     \if \@nextchar @7 \else
      \if \@nextchar (8 \else
       \if \@nextchar )9 \else
  10
  \@chnum
  \if \@nextchar m\thr@@\else
   \if \@nextchar p4 \else
    \if \@nextchar b5 \else
   \z@ \@chclass \z@ \@preamerr \z@ \fi \fi \fi \fi
   \fi \fi  \fi  \fi  \fi  \fi  \fi \fi \fi \fi \fi \fi}
\gdef\arraybackslash{\let\\=\@arraycr}
\def\@textsubscript#1{{\m@th\ensuremath{_{\mbox{\fontsize\sf@size\z@#1}}}}}
\def\Panel#1#2#3#4{\multicolumn{#3}{){\columncolor{#2}}#4}{#1}}
\def\abbr{}
\def\corr{}
\def\expan{}
\def\gap{}
\def\orig{}
\def\reg{}
\def\ref{}
\def\sic{}
\def\persName{}\def\name{}
\def\placeName{}
\def\orgName{}
\def\textcal#1{{\fontspec{Lucida Calligraphy}#1}}
\def\textgothic#1{{\fontspec{Lucida Blackletter}#1}}
\def\textlarge#1{{\large #1}}
\def\textoverbar#1{\ensuremath{\overline{#1}}}
\def\textquoted#1{‘#1’}
\def\textsmall#1{{\small #1}}
\def\textsubscript#1{\@textsubscript{\selectfont#1}}
\def\textxi{\ensuremath{\xi}}
\def\titlem{\itshape}
\newenvironment{biblfree}{}{\ifvmode\par\fi }
\newenvironment{bibl}{}{}
\newenvironment{byline}{\vskip6pt\itshape\fontsize{16pt}{18pt}\selectfont}{\par }
\newenvironment{citbibl}{}{\ifvmode\par\fi }
\newenvironment{docAuthor}{\ifvmode\vskip4pt\fontsize{16pt}{18pt}\selectfont\fi\itshape}{\ifvmode\par\fi }
\newenvironment{docDate}{}{\ifvmode\par\fi }
\newenvironment{docImprint}{\vskip 6pt}{\ifvmode\par\fi }
\newenvironment{docTitle}{\vskip6pt\bfseries\fontsize{22pt}{25pt}\selectfont}{\par }
\newenvironment{msHead}{\vskip 6pt}{\par}
\newenvironment{msItem}{\vskip 6pt}{\par}
\newenvironment{rubric}{}{}
\newenvironment{titlePart}{}{\par }

\newcolumntype{L}[1]{){\raggedright\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
\newcolumntype{C}[1]{){\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
\newcolumntype{R}[1]{){\raggedleft\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
\newcolumntype{P}[1]{){\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
\newcolumntype{B}[1]{){\arraybackslash}b{#1}}
\newcolumntype{M}[1]{){\arraybackslash}m{#1}}
\definecolor{label}{gray}{0.75}
\def\unusedattribute#1{\sout{\textcolor{label}{#1}}}
\DeclareRobustCommand*{\xref}{\hyper@normalise\xref@}
\def\xref@#1#2{\hyper@linkurl{#2}{#1}}
\begingroup
\catcode`\_=\active
\gdef_#1{\ensuremath{\sb{\mathrm{#1}}}}
\endgroup
\mathcode`\_=\string"8000
\catcode`\_=12\relax

\usepackage[a4paper,twoside,lmargin=1in,rmargin=1in,tmargin=1in,bmargin=1in,marginparwidth=0.75in]{geometry}
\usepackage{framed}

\definecolor{shadecolor}{gray}{0.95}
\usepackage{longtable}
\usepackage[normalem]{ulem}
\usepackage{fancyvrb}
\usepackage{fancyhdr}
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{marginnote}

\renewcommand{\@cite}[1]{#1}


\renewcommand*{\marginfont}{\itshape\footnotesize}

\def\Gin@extensions{.pdf,.png,.jpg,.mps,.tif}

  \pagestyle{fancy}

\usepackage[pdftitle={Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency},
 pdfauthor={}]{hyperref}
\hyperbaseurl{}

	 \paperwidth210mm
	 \paperheight297mm
              
\def\@pnumwidth{1.55em}
\def\@tocrmarg {2.55em}
\def\@dotsep{4.5}
\setcounter{tocdepth}{3}
\clubpenalty=8000
\emergencystretch 3em
\hbadness=4000
\hyphenpenalty=400
\pretolerance=750
\tolerance=2000
\vbadness=4000
\widowpenalty=10000

\renewcommand\section{\@startsection {section}{1}{\z@}%
     {-1.75ex \@plus -0.5ex \@minus -.2ex}%
     {0.5ex \@plus .2ex}%
     {\reset@font\Large\bfseries}}
\renewcommand\subsection{\@startsection{subsection}{2}{\z@}%
     {-1.75ex\@plus -0.5ex \@minus- .2ex}%
     {0.5ex \@plus .2ex}%
     {\reset@font\Large}}
\renewcommand\subsubsection{\@startsection{subsubsection}{3}{\z@}%
     {-1.5ex\@plus -0.35ex \@minus -.2ex}%
     {0.5ex \@plus .2ex}%
     {\reset@font\large}}
\renewcommand\paragraph{\@startsection{paragraph}{4}{\z@}%
     {-1ex \@plus-0.35ex \@minus -0.2ex}%
     {0.5ex \@plus .2ex}%
     {\reset@font\normalsize}}
\renewcommand\subparagraph{\@startsection{subparagraph}{5}{\parindent}%
     {1.5ex \@plus1ex \@minus .2ex}%
     {-1em}%
     {\reset@font\normalsize\bfseries}}


\def\l@section#1#2{\addpenalty{\@secpenalty} \addvspace{1.0em plus 1pt}
 \@tempdima 1.5em \begingroup
 \parindent \z@ \rightskip \@pnumwidth 
 \parfillskip -\@pnumwidth 
 \bfseries \leavevmode #1\hfil \hbox to\@pnumwidth{\hss #2}\par
 \endgroup}
\def\l@subsection{\@dottedtocline{2}{1.5em}{2.3em}}
\def\l@subsubsection{\@dottedtocline{3}{3.8em}{3.2em}}
\def\l@paragraph{\@dottedtocline{4}{7.0em}{4.1em}}
\def\l@subparagraph{\@dottedtocline{5}{10em}{5em}}
\@ifundefined{c@section}{\newcounter{section}}{}
\@ifundefined{c@chapter}{\newcounter{chapter}}{}
\newif\if@mainmatter 
\@mainmattertrue
\def\chaptername{Chapter}
\def\frontmatter{%
  \pagenumbering{roman}
  \def\thechapter{\@roman\c@chapter}
  \def\theHchapter{\roman{chapter}}
  \def\thesection{\@roman\c@section}
  \def\theHsection{\roman{section}}
  \def\@chapapp{}%
}
\def\mainmatter{%
  \cleardoublepage
  \def\thechapter{\@arabic\c@chapter}
  \setcounter{chapter}{0}
  \setcounter{section}{0}
  \pagenumbering{arabic}
  \setcounter{secnumdepth}{6}
  \def\@chapapp{\chaptername}%
  \def\theHchapter{\arabic{chapter}}
  \def\thesection{\@arabic\c@section}
  \def\theHsection{\arabic{section}}
}
\def\backmatter{%
  \cleardoublepage
  \setcounter{chapter}{0}
  \setcounter{section}{0}
  \setcounter{secnumdepth}{2}
  \def\@chapapp{\appendixname}%
  \def\thechapter{\@Alph\c@chapter}
  \def\theHchapter{\Alph{chapter}}
  \appendix
}
\newenvironment{bibitemlist}[1]{%
   \list{\@biblabel{\@arabic\c@enumiv}}%
       {\settowidth\labelwidth{\@biblabel{#1}}%
        \leftmargin\labelwidth
        \advance\leftmargin\labelsep
        \@openbib@code
        \usecounter{enumiv}%
        \let\p@enumiv\@empty
        \renewcommand\theenumiv{\@arabic\c@enumiv}%
	}%
  \sloppy
  \clubpenalty4000
  \@clubpenalty \clubpenalty
  \widowpenalty4000%
  \sfcode`\.\@m}%
  {\def\@noitemerr
    {\@latex@warning{Empty `bibitemlist' environment}}%
    \endlist}

\def\tableofcontents{\section*{\contentsname}\@starttoc{toc}}
\parskip0pt
\parindent1em
\def\Panel#1#2#3#4{\multicolumn{#3}{){\columncolor{#2}}#4}{#1}}
\newenvironment{reflist}{%
  \begin{raggedright}\begin{list}{}
  {%
   \setlength{\topsep}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\rightmargin}{0.25in}%
   \setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\itemindent}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\parskip}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\parsep}{2pt}%
   \def\makelabel##1{\itshape ##1}}%
  }
  {\end{list}\end{raggedright}}
\newenvironment{sansreflist}{%
  \begin{raggedright}\begin{list}{}
  {%
   \setlength{\topsep}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\rightmargin}{0.25in}%
   \setlength{\itemindent}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\parskip}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\itemsep}{0pt}%
   \setlength{\parsep}{2pt}%
   \def\makelabel##1{\upshape ##1}}%
  }
  {\end{list}\end{raggedright}}
\newenvironment{specHead}[2]%
 {\vspace{20pt}\hrule\vspace{10pt}%
  \phantomsection\label{#1}\markright{#2}%

  \pdfbookmark[2]{#2}{#1}%
  \hspace{-0.75in}{\bfseries\fontsize{16pt}{18pt}\selectfont#2}%
  }{}
      \def\TheFullDate{2014-01-15 (revised: 15 January 2014)}
\def\TheID{\makeatother }
\def\TheDate{2014-01-15}
\title{Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency}
\author{}\makeatletter 
\makeatletter
\newcommand*{\cleartoleftpage}{%
  \clearpage
    \if@twoside
    \ifodd\c@page
      \hbox{}\newpage
      \if@twocolumn
        \hbox{}\newpage
      \fi
    \fi
  \fi
}
\makeatother
\makeatletter
\thispagestyle{empty}
\markright{\@title}\markboth{\@title}{\@author}
\renewcommand\small{\@setfontsize\small{9pt}{11pt}\abovedisplayskip 8.5\p@ plus3\p@ minus4\p@
\belowdisplayskip \abovedisplayskip
\abovedisplayshortskip \z@ plus2\p@
\belowdisplayshortskip 4\p@ plus2\p@ minus2\p@
\def\@listi{\leftmargin\leftmargini
               \topsep 2\p@ plus1\p@ minus1\p@
               \parsep 2\p@ plus\p@ minus\p@
               \itemsep 1pt}
}
\makeatother
\fvset{frame=single,numberblanklines=false,xleftmargin=5mm,xrightmargin=5mm}
\fancyhf{} 
\setlength{\headheight}{14pt}
\fancyhead[LE]{\bfseries\leftmark} 
\fancyhead[RO]{\bfseries\rightmark} 
\fancyfoot[RO]{}
\fancyfoot[CO]{\thepage}
\fancyfoot[LO]{\TheID}
\fancyfoot[LE]{}
\fancyfoot[CE]{\thepage}
\fancyfoot[RE]{\TheID}
\hypersetup{citebordercolor=0.75 0.75 0.75,linkbordercolor=0.75 0.75 0.75,urlbordercolor=0.75 0.75 0.75,bookmarksnumbered=true}
\fancypagestyle{plain}{\fancyhead{}\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}}

\date{}
\usepackage{authblk}

\providecommand{\keywords}[1]
{
\footnotesize
  \textbf{\textit{Index terms---}} #1
}

\usepackage{graphicx,xcolor}
\definecolor{GJBlue}{HTML}{273B81}
\definecolor{GJLightBlue}{HTML}{0A9DD9}
\definecolor{GJMediumGrey}{HTML}{6D6E70}
\definecolor{GJLightGrey}{HTML}{929497} 

\renewenvironment{abstract}{%
   \setlength{\parindent}{0pt}\raggedright
   \textcolor{GJMediumGrey}{\rule{\textwidth}{2pt}}
   \vskip16pt
   \textcolor{GJBlue}{\large\bfseries\abstractname\space}
}{%   
   \vskip8pt
   \textcolor{GJMediumGrey}{\rule{\textwidth}{2pt}}
   \vskip16pt
}

\usepackage[absolute,overlay]{textpos}

\makeatother 
      \usepackage{lineno}
      \linenumbers
      
\begin{document}

             \author[1]{Al  Chukwuma}

             \author[2]{  Iortyer}

             \affil[1]{  Federal University Lafia}

\renewcommand\Authands{ and }

\date{\small \em Received: 7 December 2013 Accepted: 4 January 2014 Published: 15 January 2014}

\maketitle


\begin{abstract}
        


This paper explores the humanitarian impact of terrorism in Nigeria from the standpoint of Boko Haram insurgency. This is against the backdrop of the rising spate of violent attacks orchestrated by members of the Islamic sect in the northern part of the country over the years. By way of scholarly exegesis and empirical evidence, predicated on secondary sources, the paper posits that the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in dire humanitarian situation as evident in human casualties, human right abuses, population displacement and refugee debacle, livelihood crisis, and public insecurity. The paper submits that this scenario portends negatively for the sustenance of national security in Nigeria. The paper recommends a strategic paradigm shift from anti-terrorism to counter-terrorism as a strategy for containing the crisis.

\end{abstract}


\keywords{terrorism; boko haram; insurgency; humanitarian crisis; counter terrorism; national security}

\begin{textblock*}{18cm}(1cm,1cm) % {block width} (coords) 
\textcolor{GJBlue}{\LARGE Global Journals \LaTeX\ JournalKaleidoscope\texttrademark}
\end{textblock*}

\begin{textblock*}{18cm}(1.4cm,1.5cm) % {block width} (coords) 
\textcolor{GJBlue}{\footnotesize \\ Artificial Intelligence formulated this projection for compatibility purposes from the original article published at Global Journals. However, this technology is currently in beta. \emph{Therefore, kindly ignore odd layouts, missed formulae, text, tables, or figures.}}
\end{textblock*}


\let\tabcellsep& 	 	 		 
\section[{Introduction}]{Introduction}\par
errorism, arguably, is the biggest threat to global peace and stability in the contemporary times. Since the dawn of this millennium, the incidence of the terrorism has been on a steady rise worldwide. Hitherto, terrorism was more or less a national or regional affair. This trend, however, has since changed as brilliantly observed by Awake:\par
Just few years ago, terrorism seemed to be restricted to a few isolated places, such as Northern Ireland, the Basque Country in Northern Spain, and some areas of the Middle East. Now -especially since  {\ref September 11, 2001}, with the destruction of the Twin Towers in New Yorkworldwide phenomenon  {\ref (June, 2006:4)}.\par
Indeed, the worldwide manifestation of terrorism has been evident in Africa, but also in Nigeria. With particular reference to Nigeria, the phenomenon has found expression in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency (2001-date). Since its advent, the sectarian insurgency has wrecked immense havoc in the country, especially by "using explosives and firearms with gruesome, fatal" consequences  {\ref (Awake June, 2006:6)}. A critical corollary of this violence is dire humanitarian crisis that threatens human security in Nigeria. It is the need to examine this development that has informed this paper.\par
II. Aim, Scope, Rationale, Methodology and Structure of the Paper\par
This paper aims at exploring the relationships between terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria from the standpoint of the Boko Haram insurgency. This is against the backdrop of the prevalence of campaign of terror by members of the Boko Haram sect, which has so far defied all remedies.\par
The significance of the paper derives from the fact that it is expected to proffer newer insights into the on-going discourse on the Boko Haram problematique. Most recent studies on the subject matter have not adequately addressed the humanitarian consequences of the sectarian phenomenon \hyperref[b4]{(Eze, 2013;}\hyperref[b12]{Nchi, 2013;} {\ref Sani, 2013)}. In effect, there appears to be little or no conscious attempts to situate the humanitarian effects of the raging insurgency with a view to underscoring their implications for national security in Nigeria. Among other things, this paper seeks to fill this apparent gap in the literature in order to add to the extant knowledge on the subject matter. Besides, it is expected that the study would make valuable policy recommendations on how to reposition the fight against terrorism in Nigeria for better results.\par
The paper considers its subject matter within the purview of the on-going campaign of terror by members of the Boko Haram Islamic sect since the early 2000s. In this context, the paper applies itself to analyzing the nature, bases, dimensions, and humanitarian consequences of the sectarian insurgency with a view to emphasizing its implications for Nigeria's national security.\par
The method of the paper is qualitative and exploratory in nature. By way of descriptive analysis of secondary sources, the paper draws insights from scholarly exegesis and empirical historical evidence. The outcome of this forms the substance of the analysis the paper. For convenience of systematic organization of thought, the thrust of analysis in this paper is schematically presented under a number of select themes and sub-themes carefully formulated to prosecute the paper's derived assumption to wit: terrorism as exemplified in the Boko Haram insurgency is a threat to Nigeria's national security.\par
In addition to the foregoing introductory sections, the balance of the paper is structured as follows: conceptualizing terrorism and insurgency, analytical/conceptual framework, terrorism in Nigeria, humanitarian effects of terrorism in Nigeria, implications of terrorism for Nigeria's national security, and conclusion and recommendations. 
\section[{III. Conceptual/Analytical Framework}]{III. Conceptual/Analytical Framework}\par
This paper adopts the concept of humanitarian crisis as its principal frame of reference. A humanitarian crisis is an event or series of events that represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area (Humanitarian Coalition, 2013, para 2). Humanitarian crisis can be classified as follows: 1. Natural disasters: earthquakes, floods, storms and volcanic eruptions 2. Man-made disasters: conflicts, plane and train crashes, fires and industrial accidents 3. Complex emergences: when the effects of a series of events or factors prevent a community from accessing their basic needs, such as water, food, shelter, security or healthcare; e.g. war, terrorism (Humanitarian Coalition, 2013, Para 3).\par
According to the Humanitarian Coalition (2013, Para 4), complex emergencies are typically characterized by: 1. extensive violence and loss of life; 2. displacement of populations; 3. widespread damage on societies and economies; 4. the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; 5. the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; 6. significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas.\par
With reference to the subject matter of the present discourse, it is to be observed that terrorism typifies a complex emergency. In effect, it necessarily involves and/or leads to dire humanitarian crisis with farreaching implications for national sustainability of Nigeria. It is in the light of this that this paper posits that terrorism, as exemplified in the Boko Haram insurgency, constitutes a threat to Nigeria's national security. 
\section[{IV. Understanding Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency}]{IV. Understanding Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency}\par
The phenomenon of terrorism has been widely interrogated in the literature. According to Schmid (1998), terrorism is:\par
An anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons?(Cited in Barga, 2012:1).\par
Apart from its idiosyncratic or criminal motivation, terrorism is essentially political. In this regard, Hoffman (1998) argues that terrorism in its most contemporary understanding is inherently political. Indeed, it is the political essence and characterization of terrorism that distinguishes it from other forms of violence (Barga, 2012).\par
To say that terrorism is political, among other things, implies that it is related to power and influence. In this regard, Barga (2012:2) opines that terrorism:\par
Is also ineluctably about power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change at all cost. Terrorism is thus the actual or threatened use of violence in an attempt to advance a politically motivated end.\par
The A-B-C of terrorism is to use force (coercion) to instill popular fear (anxiety) in a bid to cause a desired behavioural stance among the target. In this respect, the United States Department of Defence defines terrorism as "unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce end intimidate government to accept political, religious or ideological objectives" (cited in  {\ref Eze, 2013:90)}.\par
In contemporary social discourse, the concept of terrorism has been used to denote forms of unconventional, illegitimate violence targeted by a group at the state or society, or any section of the population thereof. In this direction, Sani (2012:93) observes:\par
Terrorism is the aggression unjustly carried out by individuals, groups or states against human beings. It includes forms of unjustly terrifying, harming, threatening, and killing of people and banditry. It also includes any violent act or threat carried out as part of individual or collective criminal plan aimed at terrifying or harming people or endangering their lives, freedom or security (corroborating Saudi Arabia stance on terrorism, 2004).\par
Terrorism is essentially sectarian in nature \hyperref[b12]{(Nchi, 2013)}. It is usually associated with the activities of a fringe and ideologically misguided sub-group of a larger religious or political movement. In this regard, Shabayany (2012:33) observes that it "is a fanatical war waged by a puritan few against the massive army of innocent people of different religions, class and gender".\par
Terrorism thrives on what this paper may designate as 'hit-and-run combatancy'. This is typified by surprised aggression, brutal militancy and clandestinism. In terms of specific strategies, terrorists globally have adopted the following as means of executing their diabolical designs:\par
1. arson 2. mass killing by gunfire 3. suicide bombing 4. use of improvised explosives 5. high-jacking of aircraft, ship, etc 6. hostage-taking (kidnapping) 7. media propaganda and advocacy 8. piracy 9. jail break 10. forced enlistment/recruitment of combatant, etc.\par
To underscore the crux of our conception of terrorism in this paper, it suffices to note that terrorism consists in "the unlawful use of threatened use of force or violence by a person (at an instance of a group agenda) or organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons" (cited in  {\ref Awake, June 2006:4)}. This definition of terrorism is germane, plausible, and best suits the purpose of the foregoing discourse.\par
Terrorism is a veritable instance of collective violence. In effect, it is perpetrated by groups who believe in the use of such tactic as a means of advancing a group cause. Based on insights from extant literature and historical evidence, the following types of terrorist organization can be identified: Terrorism could be said to be an unconventional method of political militancy. It is an antithetical phenomenon whose means, more often than not contradicts and therefore negates its end. When directed to the state, it often takes the posture of anarchro-nihilism. It is employed by disgruntled subnational movements or clandestine, criminal groups as a means of furthering nefarious agenda. In this light, the Boko Haram (inappropriately interpreted by transliteration as Western Education is sinful), insurgency has been referred "as the violent assertion of a fringe sectarian identity based on the dogma of a subgroup of a larger national confessional group"  {\ref (Nchi, 2013:200)}. In this regard, the "larger national group" refers to the wider Islamic community of Nigeria. The sub-group in question is the Yusufiya sect (more formally known as Jama'atu Ahlus-sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal Jihad). The sect's mode of terrorism thrives on antistate offensive wherein 'soft-targets', namely the civilians and non-combatant populations, have been massively targeted. Their activities have been decried as insurgency because they are tantamount to a rebellion against Nigeria's avowed secularity and sovereignty. 
\section[{V. Nigeria's Global Terrorism Profile}]{V. Nigeria's Global Terrorism Profile}\par
According to the latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Nigeria currently ranks the 7th most terrorized country in the world (Osundefender, 2013, Para 1\&2). This ranking makes Nigeria the most terrorism stricken country in African alongside Somalia. The table below provides useful insight. The aforementioned indicators are used to create a weighted five year average for each country, taking into cognizance the lasting effects of terrorism in that context. The score given to each country in essence "indicates the impact of a terrorist attack on a society in terms of the fear and subsequent security response" (Osundefender, 2013, para 7). It was in the light of the above indices that Nigeria was rated the 7th most terrorized country of the world for the past decade of 2002 to 2011. Some of the specifics of Nigeria's record in this regard can be rendered thus: FCT Abuja Sporadic Source:\par
In addition to the above, States such as Sokoto and Katsina have been associated with a few isolated instances of Boko Haram activities. In Sokoto State, for example, there have been cases of counter-terrorism raids whereby government forces attacked Boko Haram hideouts with a view to dislodging the insurgents. Suffice it to note, however, that these States have not witnessed any major Boko Haram attacks. 
\section[{VI. Contextualizing Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria}]{VI. Contextualizing Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria}\par
Terrorism and human security crises go hand in hand.  {\ref Ogwu (2003:7-9)} observes that these realities typify new trends in the global security agenda that have assumed greater urgency in the 21st century. The emergence of terrorism on the global scene is a dangerous trajectory because it poses a serious threat to human existence, collective peace and global society. In view of the enormous threats posed by global terrorism, the international community has been faced with the challenge of bringing the phenomenon under control, since its activities transcend national boundaries.\par
Terrorism  Nigeria broke from the shackles of British colonial rule in 1960. Since then, she has increasingly found it difficult to surmount her basic security challenges. Security and stability appear to have been the major challenge in the nation's chequered political history. Fwatshak and Ayuba (2007: 255-272) clearly posit that since independence, not a single decade has passed without at least one major cataclysmic crises in Nigeria. Nigeria experienced the Western region political crises in 1960's, incessant military coups, and a fratricidal civil war between 1967 and 1970. The last three to four decades also witnessed some of the worst civil and sectarian crises. Cases in point include the Maitasine riots, starting in Kano and spreading to most parts of Northern Nigeria in the 1980s, ethno-religious crises in Kafanchan and Zango Kataf both in Southern Kaduna in 1987 and 1992, and the June 12, 1993 post election crises. These forms of violence have variously created humanitarian problems and have threatened Nigeria's desire towards achieving sustainable political and economic development.\par
Since the 1970s oil has become the mainstay of Nigeria's political economy. The popular expectation was that this development would stimulate rapid socioeconomic transformation for Nigeria. Unfortunately however, Nigeria has continued to grapple with sapping and multi-dimensional security challenges, the worst of which has been terrorism. The emergence of terrorism in Nigeria marked a threshold in the dramatic reign of public insecurity, which has generated widespread anxiety in the country. Added to the threats of ransom kidnapping, politically motivated killings, armed robbery, and other acts of criminality, the nation's image abroad has been at stake.\par
In Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect, started the movement as an itinerant preacher and gradually won the hearts of people mostly youth through his radical Islamic ideology. A Salafast by training (a subscriber to the school of thought often associated with Jihadism) he is reported to have been deeply influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, a 14 th century legal scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism. He has been a major influence on radical Islamic groups in the Middle East (see "Nigeria's Boko Haram and Ansaru", Wikipedia, 2013). There are several attribute that identify the Boko Haram sect and distinguishes it from the rest of its contemporaries. First, the group holds no territory neither does it provides social services to the local population to win support unlike the Taliban of Afghanistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia. It remains largely faceless and mysterious to many Nigerians; yet the sect attracts a large following.\par
As an emerging sect, the Yusufiyya movement based its teachings on works of Ibn Taymiyyah who emphasised the strict adherence to the Koran of the Prophet Mohammed and was also devoted to the concept of religious (Islamic) war. (Daily Trust, May 24. 2012:56). The Boko Haram violence has been in the main motivated by the sect's dichotomization between secularism and Islamic values. For instance, adherents of the sect reason that the elements of modern Western education system conflict with the fundamentals of Islam; hence his movement's sobriquet: Boko Haram meaning 'Western Education is forbidden".\par
Xan (2012:56) posits that in line with strict Islamic practices, Boko Haram opts for policy and curriculum reforms on the present education system. This position is represented in the following citation:\par
He did not want mixed schools, or the teaching of evolution in schools. He wanted children to have more time to study their religion. Democracy is also alien to him because he succinctly stated that he will not support a government whose constitution was not based on the Koran (Xan, 2012:56).\par
Scholars and analysts have raised several fundamental questions as to whether Boko Haram was founded on strict Islamic ideology. This is in view of the sect's preference to violence as a means of proselytization and societal change. It is equally important to note that Sharia Law was already in place in some Northern Nigeria before Boko Haram was launched in 2002. It could have been thought that all that the sect needed to do was to call for internal reforms to entrench a proper Islamic order rather than resorting to violence.\par
Forest (2012) contend that that Boko Haram is largely a product of wide spread social -economic and religious insecurity whose repercussions resonate among certain communities in the North. But this begs the question: if the region for several decades has coexisted with these ills without conflict, why are the ills (pervasive poverty, endemic corruption, inequality, injustice, youth unemployment and absence of good governance) now serving as a catalyst for the emergence and spread of the Boko Haram insurgency. Nonetheless, it could be argued that the basis of the Boko Haram insurgency is more socio-economic than it is political or ideological. As aptly observed by Nchi:\par
Poverty and ignorance are fertilizers for insurgency anywhere and in any age. When they combine and cloak themselves in religious, ethnic, or other partisan robes, they become ready incendiary for the most brutal and reckless of violence (2013:210).\par
In addition to the afore-mentioned are the factors, such as youth employment, social inequality, social and economic exclusion, as well as the practice of itinerant Islamic catechism known in Arabic as the Almajiri system. All these factors combine to explain the rise and prevalence the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.\par
The Boko Haram sect made an unobtrusive entry into Nigeria's political landscape between 2002 and 2009. Forest (2012) avers that the membership of Boko Haram sect cut across ethnic divide with greater membership primarily drawn from the Kanuri ethnic group. Beginning as an itinerant preachment in early 2000 at Maiduguri, Borno State, Mohammed Yusuf's radical ideology gained a following among disaffected young men who became susceptible to recruits. The largest following came from semi-illiterate, unemployed youths, who were forced to make a living between the twin divide of creativity and criminality. The sect leader roundly condemned the prevailing social economic and political system of the Nigerian state which he believed is in conflict with his interpretation of Islam.\par
Boko Haram insurgency according to Brock (2012:16) came to lime light in 2009 when security agencies clamped down on the sect's members, who had resisted a law requiring motor cyclist to wear helmets. This sparked a furious backlash. Police stations and government offices in Bornu were burned to the ground while hundreds of criminals were released in a Jail-break in the aftermath of the violent confrontation between the sect and the government forces. This marked the beginning of the sectarian violence that spread in some northern parts of Nigeria in 2009. The security challenges became enormous and demanded that a quick action was desirable. The arrest and detention of several sect members including their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, by the state security was a response to restore break down of law and order in the North East. The eventual ex-judicial killing of Yusuf was the major impetus for Boko Haram insurgency and the spate of violence that followed.\par
Following the clamp-down on members of the, those who survived arrest and trial went underground telling their stories of injustice and nursing their grievances in exile. It is believed that the contact the group had with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in Somalia must have been achieved during this period (Wikipedia, 2012). The change in ideology from being merely a Salafist to being a Salafist Jihadist group is understood against the backdrop of the sect contact with afore-mentioned international terrorist groups.\par
In 2011, Boko Haram initiated a campaign of suicide bombing, a phenomenon witnessed for the first time in Nigeria's history. The Federal Government responded to these security threats by declaring an antiterror war on the sect. The escalation of the insurgency in between 2012 and 2013 led to the declaration of state of emergency on three North Eastern States of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa. In spite of this development, the activities of Boko Haram have tended to have continued unabated. The outcome of these activities has created unprecedented humanitarian crises for the country with colossal effect on public safety and human security.\par
Since the last five years the Boko Haram sect has continued to wage a vicious campaign of terror against the Nigerian state, as well as the civil population of the country. The sect started with sporadic attacks on security formations. With time, they graduated to offensives on Christian churches, schools and other public places. The use of improvised explosives and suicide bombing has since added to the ever degenerating complexion of insurgency. So far, no lasting remedy is in sight as the faceless leadership of the sect has remained rather intransigent and malignant. 
\section[{VII. Humanitarian Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency}]{VII. Humanitarian Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency}\par
Apart from the Nigerian Civil War  {\ref (1967 -1970)}, no other single event of complex emergency in the country has been as debilitating as the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of humanitarian impacts. Granted, the Niger Delta crisis (1999 -2009) occasioned dire outcomes that threaten the national security of Nigeria (Okoli 2013). Nonetheless, its humanitarian consequences could not compare that of the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of scope, degree and diversity. In effect, the humanitarian impacts and implications of the Boko Haram insurgency have been historically remarkable and unprecedented. In the subsections that follow, an attempt is made to highlight the humanitarian consequences of the insurgency with a view to underscoring their implications for Nigeria's national security. a) Public insecurity: Since the escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east Nigeria in 2009, life in the region has been characteristically 'nasty', 'brutish and, in most cases, 'short' (to apply Hobbe's analogy). According to Salkida:\par
Since the outbreak of sectarian violence in 2009, the north-east, Borno and Yobe States in particular, has ceased to know civil normalcy. Intermittent suicide and car bombings have become the part of their daily lives. Hate-filled adherents of the extremist sect called Boko Haram and other criminals assuming their identity wielding semi-automatic riffles speed through streets at intervals to shoot down, randomly at their ever widening targets (2012: para 5).\par
The above scenario has created an atmosphere of civil siege and volatility. The implication, of this for public peace, safety and security has been critically dire.\par
b) Livelihood crisis: The repercussions of the sectarian violence as well as government's counter-violence on the livelihood conditions of the affected States have been disastrous. Owing to public security volatility in these states, normal productive, agricultural and commercial activities have often been constrained. The enforcement of curfews and emergency rule has restricted movement and communications in a manner that hampered economic activities. In addition, the fear of attacks by the insurgents has often driven communities into hiding. Furthermore, counter-insurgency measures, such as the ban on the use of motorcycles have resulted in loss of means of livelihood and subsistence for some households. In effect, the whole trend points to debilitating livelihood cum human security crises. This trend has been put in perspective thus:\par
It is of course a truism that the north has had a devastating effect on families and livelihood of many economic groups. The massive destruction of infrastructure, the destruction of telecommunication facilities, frequent attacks on markets and businesses, short business hours, have made many relocate to other safer parts of the country, bringing down incomes and increasing poverty levels (Salkida, 2012: para 10). c) Human right abuses: According to the Human Rights Watch (2012), Boko Haram insurgency has led to violation of human rights and commission of war crimes by both the insurgents and the government forces. The military and police, for instance, have committed human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings. A prominent case in point is the killing of the pioneer leader of the Boko Haram sect, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009 by the Nigerian Police \hyperref[b13]{(Ngare, 2012)}. On the side of the insurgents, heinous human rights abuses and war crimes have also been committed. Relevant instances include: 1. forced conversion of people of other faiths to Islam; 2. wanton attacks on churches and mosques 3. murder, torture and persecution of members of other religions; 4. killing of women, children and civilian (noncombatant) populations (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The high-handedness and arbitrariness exhibited by the Joint Task Force (JTF) in dealing with the insurgents have been decried by many as a crime against humanity. These excesses of the government forces have been documented thus:\par
During raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, members of the security forces have executed men in front of their families; arbitrarily arrested or beaten members of the community; burned houses, shops, and cars; stolen money while searching homes; and in, at least one case documented by Human Rights Watch, raped a woman. Government security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado without charge or trial in secret detention facilities or have subjected detainees to torture or other physical abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2012:9).\par
On the whole, both the insurgents and the government forces (the JTF) have had records of human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. The terrorist impunity of the insurgents has often been greeted with immense crudity. The scenario that plays out in this regard is unjustifiable reign of terror, wherein the insurgents and the security forces are equally culpable. d) Population displacement and refugee debacle:\par
Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of huge human population in the affected States. Available information suggests that the number of internally displaced persons and refugees associated with the insurgency has been enormous. Based on a recent United Nations Humanitarian Commission on Refugee (UNHCR) report, no fewer than 5,000 people have been displaced in the North East region of Nigeria as a result of the raging insurgency  {\ref (Adebowale, 2013: para 6)}. The UNHCR further reveals: Some 10,000 Nigerians have also crossed into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger in recent months. Most -around 8, 100 -have sought refuge in Cameroon according to local authorities who say that Nigerians are containing to arrive. The number of Nigerian refugees in Niger is 2,700 and in Chad 150  {\ref (Adebowale, 2013: para 7)}.\par
The plight of these displaced people in their various places of refuge can be best described as critically threatening. This is more so considering the fact that they have been dislocated from their family and social capital bases. Recent figures from the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) indicate that 16, 470 Nigerian are displaced with "conflicts and ethnoreligious crises and emerging terrorism" constituting the main sources  {\ref (Alkassim, 2013:10)}. In effect, the rising wave of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria has been largely responsible for the spate of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the country in the recent times. e) Human Casualties/Fatalities: By far, the worst humanitarian consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency have been its tolls on human life and safety. As the table hereunder vividly indicates, the insurgency has led to loss of many lives, in addition to various degrees and dimension of human injury. terrorism has resulted in dire humanitarian consequences in Nigeria. These consequences include human casualties/ fatalities, population displacement and refugee debacle, human rights abuses, livelihood crisis, as well as public insecurity. In the light of the foregoing, the paper submitted that terrorism constitutes a veritable threat to national security in Nigeria, hence the need to devise a means of ensuring a pragmatic solution to it. In this regard, the paper recommends a paradigm shift from anti-terrorism to strategic counterterrorism as the way forward. 
\section[{Strategic}]{Strategic}\par
counter-terrorism presupposes combating terrorism through preventive and mitigative measures. This emphasizes the use of strategic intelligence, pragmatic policies and proactive strategies to counter the terrorists' designs in an attempt to forestall and/or mitigate terror. This approach to dealing with terrorism defers from the traditional anti-terrorism campaign, whereby terror is confronted by way of reactive and hyper-defensive combatancy. Effective counter-insurgency must be predicated on strategic intelligence and reconnaissance. It is not enough to deploy troops to combat the insurgents on the field; it is much more expedient to engage the insurgents proactively by way of systematic surveillance and reconnoitering in an attempt to stop them before they strike.\par
Unlike the anti-terrorism approach that is largely based on 'brutal and extrajudicial response to the insurgency' Nchi (2013), counter-terrorism strategy is characterized by the following:\par
1. Effective network for intelligence gathering and analysis; 2. Strategic surveillance aimed at dictating membership, motivation, and operational modalities of the sect; 3. Clinical investigation and prognostication of the socio-psychological and socio-economic currents that underlie the emergence, growth and sustenance of the sect and its activities; 4. Identifying and foreclosing sources of inspiration, funding and recruitment to the sect; 5. Proactive engagement of civil society stakeholders in the fight against the sect; and 6. Tactical exploration of the diplomatic option in an attempt to come to terms with legitimate (if any) grievances of the sect.\par
It is the candid position of this paper that the adoption of counter-terrorism strategy would go a long way in making the current efforts at containing the Boko Haram insurgency more worthwhile and more fruitful. It therefore behooves the Nigerian government, through its relevant agencies, to put measures in place towards actualizing this motion in the interest of national security.\begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{}\includegraphics[]{image-2.png}
\caption{\label{fig_0}}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{1} \par 
\begin{longtable}{P{0.2851791530944625\textwidth}P{0.47622149837133554\textwidth}P{0.03876221498371336\textwidth}P{0.016612377850162865\textwidth}P{0.03322475570032573\textwidth}}
Type\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Examples}\tabcellsep \\
Rebel/Militia Groups\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{The Lord's Resistance Army}\\
\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{(LRA); The M23 in Congo,}\\
\tabcellsep DRC\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
Islamist Insurgents\tabcellsep Al\tabcellsep Qaeda;\tabcellsep Al\tabcellsep Shabaab\\
\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{(Somalia);}\tabcellsep Boko\tabcellsep Haram\\
\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{(Nigeria)}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
Political Movements\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Taliban (Afghanistan); Hamas}\\
\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{(Palestine)}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
Government Agents\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Janjaweed of Sudan}\tabcellsep \\
Clandestine\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Violent cults and underworld}\\
Organizations\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{organizations}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \end{longtable} \par
 
\caption{\label{tab_0}Table 1 :}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{2} \par 
\begin{longtable}{}
\end{longtable} \par
 
\caption{\label{tab_1}Table 2 :}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{3} \par 
\begin{longtable}{P{0.6878160919540229\textwidth}P{0.06448275862068965\textwidth}P{0.07620689655172413\textwidth}P{0.021494252873563217\textwidth}}
Country Iraq Pakistan Afghanistan\tabcellsep Gti Scale 9.56 9.05 8.67\tabcellsep World's Ranking 1 st 2 nd 3 rd\tabcellsep Year 2014\\
India Yemen\tabcellsep 8.15 7.30\tabcellsep 4 th 5 th\tabcellsep 41\\
\multicolumn{4}{l}{Fact Number of incidents Worlds position Number of Deaths Number of Injuries Number of property damaged Nigeria's terrorism Somalia 7.24 degenerated in view Volume XIV Issue I Version I Figure(S) 7 th of 158 168 437 614 33 profile has since ( F ) Global Journal of Human Social Science 6 th Nigeria 7.24 7 th}\end{longtable} \par
  {\small\itshape [Note: © 2014 Global Journals Inc. (US)]} 
\caption{\label{tab_2}Table 3 :}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{4} \par 
\begin{longtable}{P{0.09257425742574257\textwidth}P{0.20478547854785478\textwidth}P{0.5526402640264027\textwidth}}
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep Nigerian States\\
S/N\tabcellsep States\tabcellsep Nature Of Terrorist Incident\\
1.\tabcellsep Borno\tabcellsep Pervasive\\
2.\tabcellsep Yobe\tabcellsep Pervasive\\
3.\tabcellsep Kano\tabcellsep Appreciably prevalent\\
4.\tabcellsep Adamawa\tabcellsep Appreciably prevalent\\
5.\tabcellsep Bauchi\tabcellsep Sporadic\\
6.\tabcellsep Kaduna\tabcellsep Sporadic\\
7.\tabcellsep Plateau\tabcellsep Sporadic\\
8.\tabcellsep Gombe\tabcellsep Sporadic\\
9.\tabcellsep Niger\tabcellsep Sporadic\\
10.\tabcellsep Taraba\tabcellsep Scarcely occurring\\
11.\tabcellsep Kogi\tabcellsep Scarcely occurring\\
12.\tabcellsep Nasarawa\tabcellsep Scarcely occurring\\
13.\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \end{longtable} \par
 
\caption{\label{tab_3}Table 4 :}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{} \par 
\begin{longtable}{}
\end{longtable} \par
 
\caption{\label{tab_4}}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{} \par 
\begin{longtable}{}
\end{longtable} \par
  {\small\itshape [Note: According toHigazi (2013:1)  the Jihadist officially prefer to be called "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad" meaning "people committed to the propagation of the prophets Teaching and Jihad. Boko Haram colloquially translates 'Western education is forbidden". Boko Haram as the name suggests is adamantly opposed to what it sees as Western-based incursions that threaten the orthodox values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria.]} 
\caption{\label{tab_5}}\end{figure}
 \begin{figure}[htbp]
\noindent\textbf{5} \par 
\begin{longtable}{P{0.01643646408839779\textwidth}P{0.11916436464088397\textwidth}P{0.09040055248618785\textwidth}P{0.3648308011049724\textwidth}P{0.0005870165745856354\textwidth}P{0.0023480662983425414\textwidth}P{0.001761049723756906\textwidth}P{0.24684046961325967\textwidth}P{0.004696132596685083\textwidth}P{0.002641574585635359\textwidth}P{0.0002935082872928177\textwidth}}
S/N\tabcellsep Dates\tabcellsep Location\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Nature Of Attacks}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep Remark(S)\\
1\tabcellsep July 26, 2009\tabcellsep Bauchi\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{5 days uprising and attack on the police}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Over 800 people killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{station that spread to Maiduguri, Borno,}\tabcellsep \\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Yobe, and Kano}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
2\tabcellsep July 27, 2009\tabcellsep Yobe\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{3 Police men and 1 fire service}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Police Headquarters}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{officer died}\\
3\tabcellsep March 13, 2010\tabcellsep Plateau State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Churches and markets}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{300 people killed}\\
4\tabcellsep Sept. 7, 2010\tabcellsep Bauchi\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Attacked Prisons}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Killed 5 guards and freed 700}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{inmates, including former sect}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{members}\\
5\tabcellsep Oct. 1, 2010\tabcellsep Abuja\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Explosions near the Eagles Square}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{12 people killed and many}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured}\\
6\tabcellsep Oct. 11, 2010\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Bombing/gun attack on a police station}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Destroys the station and}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured three}\\
7\tabcellsep Dec. 24, 2010\tabcellsep Barkin Ladi, Jos\tabcellsep Bomb attack\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{8 people killed}\\
8\tabcellsep Dec. 28, 2010\tabcellsep Jos\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Christmas eve bomb attack on church}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{38 people killed}\\
9\tabcellsep Dec. 31, 2010\tabcellsep Abuja\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{The group attack a Mammy market at}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{11 people killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Army Mogadishu Barracks}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
10\tabcellsep Jan. 21, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Attack on politicians}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{8 persons killed including}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{ANPP governorship candidate}\\
11\tabcellsep March 2, 2011\tabcellsep Kaduna\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Three residence of the Divisional Police}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{2 policemen killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Officer, Mustapha Sandamu}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
12\tabcellsep March 30, 2011\tabcellsep Damaturu, Yobe\tabcellsep Bomb attack\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Injured a police officer}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep State\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
13\tabcellsep April 8, 2011\tabcellsep Niger State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Bombing of INEC office in Suleja}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Killed 8 Corps members}\\
14\tabcellsep April 9, 2011\tabcellsep Unguwar Doki\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Bom explosion occurred at a polling unit}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Killed 17 people and many}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured}\\
15\tabcellsep April 29, 2011\tabcellsep Bauchi State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{No death}\\
16\tabcellsep May 29, 2011\tabcellsep Bauchi State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Explosion at Mammy market of}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Claimed 18 lives and left many}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Shandawanka barracks}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured}\\
17\tabcellsep May 30, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Bombs exploded early morning on Baga}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{13 persons died and 40}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{road in Borno State}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured}\\
18\tabcellsep June 7, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Series of bomb blasts}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Claimed five lives and injured}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{many others}\\
19\tabcellsep June 16, 2011\tabcellsep Abuja\tabcellsep Bombing\tabcellsep of\tabcellsep Nigerian\tabcellsep Police\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{3 killed and many vehicles}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep Headquarters\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{damaged}\\
20\tabcellsep June 16, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Bomb blast at Damboa town}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{4 children killed}\\
21\tabcellsep June20, 2011\tabcellsep Katsina State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Boko Haram stormed Kankara Police}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{9 policemen killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep Station\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
22\tabcellsep July 9, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{A clash between Boko Haram and the}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{31 persons killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep military\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
23\tabcellsep July 11, 2011\tabcellsep Kaduna State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Many people killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Fokados street}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
24\tabcellsep July 12, 2011\tabcellsep Borno State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Book Haram threw an explosive device}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{5 persons killed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{on a moving military patrol vehicle}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
25\tabcellsep July 15, 2011\tabcellsep Borno State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Explosion in Maiduguri}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Injured five people}\\
26\tabcellsep July 23, 2011\tabcellsep Borno State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{An explosion close to the palace of the}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Injured three soldiers}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai}\tabcellsep \\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep Elkanem\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
27\tabcellsep July 25, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Bomb explosion near the palace of}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{8 persons died}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{traditional ruler}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \\
28\tabcellsep Aug. 25, 2011\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep Bank robbery\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Killed 4 policemen, 1 soldier}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{and 7 civilians and removed}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{undisclosed sum of money}\\
29\tabcellsep Aug. 26, 2011\tabcellsep Abuja\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{A Suicide Bomber Drove into The United}\tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{25 persons killed and 60}\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Nations building}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{injured}\\
30\tabcellsep Sept. 12, 201\tabcellsep Bauchi State\tabcellsep \multicolumn{4}{l}{Bomb attack on a police station in Misau}\tabcellsep 7\tabcellsep people,\tabcellsep including\tabcellsep 4\\
\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{policemen}\\
31\tabcellsep Sept. 13, 2012\tabcellsep Maiduguri\tabcellsep \multicolumn{3}{l}{Armed attack on military vehicle}\tabcellsep \tabcellsep \multicolumn{2}{l}{Injured 4 soldiers}\end{longtable} \par
 
\caption{\label{tab_6}Table 5 :}\end{figure}
 		 		\backmatter  			 \par
If has been problematic to establish the actual death tolls of the Boko Haram insurgency in terms of absolute numbers. Sources place the figures at between 1,500 and 2,000 (Salkida, 2012; Eze, 2012). However, it is contended that the death tolls so far would stand in the region of 3,000 (see for instance the suggestion of the Human Rights Watch, 2012). Note however, that this figure includes those killed by the government forces. 
\subsection[{VIII. Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications for National Security}]{VIII. Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications for National Security}\par
To say that terrorism threatens Nigeria's national security is to state the obvious. This observation is a truism considering the destructive and destabilizing impacts of terrorism in Nigeria over the recent years. As we have established in the preceding sub-sections, the activities of the Boko Haram sect have created an atmosphere of siege and desolation in most parts of Northern Nigeria. The resultant public security volatility in the region has been an impediment to trade and investment, peaceful co-existence and stability, as well as sustainable livelihood and development. This scenario has since complicated and accentuated the plight of the region as a developmentally challenged section of Nigeria.\par
In respect of the implications of terrorism for the wider polity of Nigeria, it is to be noted that the Boko Haram insurgency has led to negative perception of Nigeria as an unsafe country by the wider world. This has damaged Nigeria's profile as a favourable international destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, and migration. The implication of this is that Nigeria is gradually drifting into the status of an ostracized nation. This does not augur well for the sustenance of the country's national security.\par
Furthermore, the extent of violence and destruction that has been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been horrific. The advent of suicide bombing as a strategy for prosecuting terrorism by members of the sect has since signaled a new dimension to the national security challenge in Nigeria. To say the least, the rising incidence and prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nigeria have exposed the country to serious levels of humanitarian and territorial vulnerabilities. In the face of this situation, the sustenance of Nigeria national security is at best problematic. 
\subsection[{IX.}]{IX.} 
\subsection[{Conclusion}]{Conclusion}\par
This paper set out to explore the nexus between terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria. The essence of the paper is to situate the humanitarian consequences of the phenomenon of terrorism in Nigeria. From the standpoint of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, the paper observed that Amnesty period". Global Journal of human Social Sciences: F (Political Sciences), Vol 13  {\ref (} Forced and freewill donations iv.\par
Financial aids from international terrorist groups 12.\par
Area of operation (by country) i. Northern Nigeria ii.\par
Northern Cameroon iii.\par
Niger Republic iv. Chad 13.\par
Opponents i.\par
The Nigeria state ii.\par
The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) iii.\par
The military and para-military outfits (police, the state security service -SSS -etc. 14.\par
Major battles i.\par
The Sharia riots (2001) ii.\par
Sectarian violence 2009 15. 
\subsection[{Membership and command system}]{Membership and command system}\par
Cult-like membership, and leadership characterized by marked absolutism\par
Volume XIV Issue I Version I 49 (			 			  				\begin{bibitemlist}{1}
\bibitem[A Report of the Human Rights Watch Human Right Watch (2013)]{b9}\label{b9} 	 		‘A Report of the Human Rights Watch’.  		 \url{http://humanitariancoalition.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/what-is-ahumanitarian-crisis-english.pdf}  	 	 		\textit{Human Right Watch}  		2013. October 2013. 2013. 2013. p. 6.  	 	 (What is humanitarian crisis) 
\bibitem[Ogwu (2003)]{b14}\label{b14} 	 		\textit{Abuja 2003 -Nigeria's Expectations. A Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit Briefing},  		 			J Ogwu 		.  		2003. November.  	 
\bibitem[Eze ()]{b4}\label{b4} 	 		‘Boko Haram Insurgency: A northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization of Nigeria’.  		 			C M Eze 		.  	 	 		\textit{Global Journal of Human Social Sciences: F (Political Science)}  		2013. 13 p. .  	 	 (Vol. 5:1.0)) 
\bibitem[Adebowale (2013)]{b0}\label{b0} 	 		\textit{Boko Haram: securety, humanitarian conditions deteriorating UNHCR},  		 			S Adebowale 		.  		 \url{http://theeagleonline.com.ng/news/boko-haramsecurtity-humanitarian-conditions-deterioratingunhrc/(accessed}  		2013. November 20. 2013.  	 
\bibitem[Brock (2012)]{b3}\label{b3} 	 		‘Boko Haram; Between Rebellion and Jihad’.  		 			J Brock 		.  	 	 		\textit{Daily Trust Newspaper}  		2012. Wednesday February 1, 2012.  	 
\bibitem[
			GT
		 ()]{b7}\label{b7} 	 		\textit{Global Terrorism Index. A Publication of Institute for Economics and Peace},  		 			GT 		.  		2013.  	 
\bibitem[Livingstone et al. ()]{b11}\label{b11} 	 		\textit{International Terrorism in the Contemporary World},  		 			M Livingstone 		,  		 			L Bruce 		,  		 			M Wanek 		.  		1978. London: Green Press.  	 
\bibitem[Ibrahim ()]{b10}\label{b10} 	 		‘Islamic stance on terrorism: The accusation and the truth’.  		 			S Ibrahim 		.  	 	 		\textit{KASU Journal of Social Sciences}  		2012. 4  (1)  p. .  	 
\bibitem[Alkassim (2013)]{b1}\label{b1} 	 		\textit{NEMA: 16, 470 Nigerians in displaced persons camps},  		 			B Alkassim 		.  		2013. December 17. p. 10.  	 	 (Daily Trust) 
\bibitem[Higazi (2013)]{b8}\label{b8} 	 		\textit{Nigeria: Boko Haram's Evolving Terror. (All Africa},  		 			A Higazi 		.  		2013. Dec.  	 
\bibitem[Fwatshak and Larab ()]{b6}\label{b6} 	 		‘Political Assassinations and Nigeria's Political Quagmire: A Historical Anthology in Sapha’.  		 			S U Fwatshak 		,  		 			A Larab 		.  	 	 		\textit{A Journal of Historical Studies}  		2004. 1  (2 \& 3) .  	 
\bibitem[Ngare ()]{b13}\label{b13} 	 		\textit{Politics of Ethnic and Religious Alignments in Nigeria: A Philosophy of Liberation for Mutual Coexistence},  		 			L Ngare 		.  		2012. Jos: Fab Annieh Nigeria Ltd.  	 
\bibitem[Nchi ()]{b12}\label{b12} 	 		\textit{Religion and Politics in Nigeria: The Constitutional Issues},  		 			S Nchi 		.  		2013. Jos: Green-world Publishing Co. Ltd.  	 
\bibitem[Finemann (2001)]{b5}\label{b5} 	 		‘The Challenges Bush Faces’.  		 			H Finemann 		.  	 	 		\textit{Newsweek Magazine. Tuesday}  		2001. 25 September.  	 
\bibitem[Okeh ()]{b15}\label{b15} 	 		\textit{The Political Ecology of the Niger Delta crisis and the prospect of peace in the post},  		 			; A Okeh 		.  		2013.  	 
\bibitem[Awake ()]{b2}\label{b2} 	 		‘Towards a theology of peace: A panacea to terrorism and violence’.  		 			Awake 		.  	 	 		\textit{Jos Studies}  		2008. 2012. 20 p. .  	 	 (When terrorism will end) 
\end{bibitemlist}
 			 		 	 
\end{document}
