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\title{The Multi-Dimensional Impacts of Insurgency and Armed Conflicts on Nigeria}
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             \author[1]{Mike  Omilusi}

             \affil[1]{  Ekiti State University}

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\date{\small \em Received: 16 December 2015 Accepted: 5 January 2016 Published: 15 January 2016}

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\begin{abstract}
        


The failure of the state to contain the proliferation of foreign extremist groups and their links with domestic religious groups exacerbates the incidence of extremism and violence in the country. It has been noted that the costs of crime are tangible and intangible, economic or social, direct or indirect, physical or psychological, individual or community. In this essay, the effects of insurgency are discussed under four headings, namely: national security, socio-economic impact, collapse of infrastructure/humanitarian crisis and diplomatic relations.

\end{abstract}


\keywords{insurgency, armed conflict, extremist groups, multi-dimensional impacts.}

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\let\tabcellsep& 	 	 		 
\section[{Introduction}]{Introduction}\par
nsurgency has become a threat to global peace and security in the 21st century due to the fact that it constitutes the highest contributor to humanitarian crises in the form of rise in human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee debacles, food insecurity and the spread of various diseases (  {\ref van Creveld, 1996: 58)}.  {\ref Stewart (2004:4)} avers that some development costs are obvious. People who join the fighting forces, who are killed or flee, can no longer work productively; schools, power stations and/or roads that are destroyed reduce the productive capacity of the economy. There are also more complex interactions between events associated directly with war (fighting, movement of people, deaths, physical destruction, international embargoes, and military expenditures) and developments in the macro and micro economy which mostly lead to adverse changes in individual entitlements, both economic and social.\par
It has been noted that the costs of crime are tangible and intangible, economic or social, direct or indirect, physical or psychological, individual or community. In fact, it is from the cost that the consequences of crime are derived. The cost of crime can be incurred as a result of actual experience of criminal activities, when there is physical injury, when properties are stolen, damaged or destroyed. As a consequence of the prevalence of crime in society, the demographic composition may be altered through mass movement of people from crime-prone areas to areas perceived to be relatively crime-free. This can also lead to brain-drain and other socio-economic problems  {\ref (Adebayo, 2014:483)}.\par
For Nigeria, its current history is a combustible mix of violent extremism, and thriving home-grown insurgencies. The fabric of Nigeria's unity appears to be ripped by violent extremism  {\ref (Babalola, 2013:5)}. A country once well respected for its role in restoring stability in some conflict-torn states in West Africa, is now in need of the international community's assistance to guarantee peace and security in her own territory. The growing campaign of violence the Boko Haram insurgency, not only poses a serious threat to internal security in Nigeria, but may threaten regional stability in West Africa as a whole  {\ref (Onuoha, 2014:1)}.  {\ref Mohammed (2014:81)} opines that the failure of the state to contain this extremism, proliferation of foreign extremist groups and their links with domestic religious groups exacerbates the incidence of extremism and violence in the country. In this essay, the effects of insurgency are discussed under four headings, namely: national security, socio-economic impact, collapse of infrastructure/humanitarian crisis and diplomatic relations. 
\section[{II.}]{II.} 
\section[{National Security}]{National Security}\par
It is a fundamental fact that Boko Haram has stepped up assaults in the northeast of Nigeria since it rejected government claims of a ceasefire, showing it remains the biggest security threat to Africa's biggest economy and top oil producer \hyperref[b31]{(Reuters, November 25, 2014)}. The series of deadly attacks across many states in the zone have made the Boko Haram rebellion the most widespread in Nigeria's post-independence history  {\ref (Onuoha, 2014:1)}.In fact, as noted in the Guardian Editorial (Nov 12,2014), the worry is not just about the debilitation the insurgency is steadily causing the country and its law-abiding citizens; it is even more so about the demystification of the Nigeria Army that before now has an enviable international reputation for valiance and war-time discipline. Certainly the army has been overstretched by the militancy, to the extent that its morale, collectively, has been seriously battered. According to Amaraegbu (2013:72):\par
It may be a truism that Nigeria is no stranger to violent sectarian uprisings. However, the particular distinction of Boko Haram does not lie simply in the fact that the group has humbled Nigeria's security and intelligence community. Its criminal genius lie in two areas: an open contempt for Nigeria and its constitution and, it covertly exposes vulnerable youths to extremist influences, recruits and deploys them as an essential part of the group's terror machine.\par
The preponderance of militia and violent groups with international linkages has constituted potent threats to national security and economy, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and its citizens  {\ref (Adams et al, 2014:25)}. In other words, this act of terrorism has threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria and has become a prominent source of concern for the hapless citizens, the government, and indeed the international community  {\ref (Ogunboyede, 2014:35)}. Since July 2009 when it provoked a short-lived anti-government uprising in northern Nigeria, the sect has mounted serial attacks that have placed it in media spotlight, both locally and internationally. The sect is now feared for its ability to mount both 'low-scale' and audacious attacks in Nigeria  {\ref (CLEEN Foundation, 2014: viii)}.The sect's operatives undoubtedly are imbued with the mind-set that it can defeat the Nigerian state notwithstanding the sophistication and quantity of weapons at the latter's disposal. Successful attacks on security formations across the north tend to bolster this feeling \hyperref[b2]{(Alozieuwa, 2012)}.\par
With the increased numbers of cadres, improved and sophisticated weaponry, suicide bombings and well-organised guerrilla tactics, Boko Haram's challenge to the Nigerian state now also stretches across the entire 36 states of Nigeria, thus affecting its economic and social-political growth  {\ref (Liolio, 2013)}.The escalating level of violence in Nigeria fits the description of a failed state, and the central authority's lack of control to quell the wave of bombings and indiscriminate killings by Boko Haram strongly confirms the underlying hypotheses of a failed state  {\ref (Babalola, 2013:18)}. In fact, Nigerians are beginning to lose faith in the ability of security agents to stop Boko Haram and other militant groups in the country. But the government has continued to assure the populace that it will win the war against terror.\par
The Islamic extremist group held, for some months, a couple of cities and towns along Nigeria's northeast border where it declared an Islamic caliphate. \hyperref[b30]{Pul (2014)} argues that the Boko Haram phenomenon surpasses the Biafra secession civil war; multiple military coup d'états; militia uprisings in the Niger Delta; and the numerous interethnic and communal conflicts in threatening the integrity of the State. As noted by \hyperref[b14]{Ikerionwu (2014)}, the very foundation and unity of Nigeria as a political entity has become threatened by the menace of Boko Haram. According to him, the match to nationhood which began since amalgamation in 1914 has become jeopardized and elusive with the threat of Boko Haram insurgency. Existing inter-ethnic and inter-regional relations between the North-eastern part of Nigeria and the rest of the country has been negatively affected. The result of this is the splintering of Nigeria along the contingent lines of mini-factional principalities, making the much desired national integration difficult, if not unachievable. 
\section[{a) Socio-Economic Impact}]{a) Socio-Economic Impact}\par
There is a strong association between armed violence and deteriorating public services. As a result, people have to spend their own resources to compensate for the lack of public services, reducing the investment capacities of the country (SAS 2003 cited in OECD, 2005). Armed violence, or even just the threat of armed violence, can lead to reduced foreign direct investment. This is particularly true where violence is politically motivated. Armed violence has a particularly important impact on tourism, whether it is political violence or criminality. According to one study, over the long run, tourism is reduced by 25\% when there are substantial increases in political violence, and in countries with small tourism industries the reduction tends to be substantially greater  {\ref (Neumayer, 2004} {\ref cited in OECD, 2005)}. For instance, Boko Haram violence has led to the destruction of health facilities in the North eastern states of Nigeria, forcing health workers to either flee or shut down clinics. This in turn has compelled residents to seek medical attention in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, thereby adding to the pressure on limited health facilities in the host communities  {\ref (Onuoha, 2014:8)}.\par
Education is a panacea for national development across the world. There is no society that does not give adequate attention to her educational growth and development. Apart from the paltry budgetary allocation by the government, the Boko Haram insurgency has been an obstacle to educational development in Nigeria  {\ref (Awortu, 2015:218)}. The Islamic militants have serially attacked students and facilities in educational institutions in different northern states of the country. Over time, a lot of schools have shut down their academic programmes. This has drastically impacted the teaming number of students seeking admission into academic institutions at all levels.\par
Also, a survey shows that a lot of students have vowed never to participate in the compulsory one year National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) programme if posted to the northern part of the country. Those who were inadvertently posted to the north redeployed immediately after three weeks of mandatory camping. This development therefore defeats the core mandate of setting up the Act of NYSC in 1973 (see:http://www.myfinancialintelligence.com/professiona l-ser-vices/cost-and-effect-insecurity-nigeria). In a region in short of personnel in the education sector, many teachers have lost their lives to the insurgency. According to Olukoya (Quoted in The Nation,  {\ref October 8, 2015)}, "it is on record that over 600 teachers lost their lives to the terror attacks. These include 308 in Borno, 75 in Adamawa, 18 in Yobe, 25 in Kaduna, 120 in Plateau, 63 in Kano ad 2 in Gombe. This is in addition to 19,000 teachers displaced".\par
Beyond the Boko Haram attacks that sow fear and terror amongst the local population, girls' education is already facing many social and economic constraints in northern Nigeria, resulting in low attendance and high dropout rates. Overall, the number of children out of school in north-eastern Nigeria is 30 times higher than in the country's south-east. With the frequent attacks on schools by Boko Haram and this case of abduction of female pupils, there are rising fears of further deterioration of the already dire state of girls' education in the region  {\ref (Barna, 2014:16)}. In a country that is struggling with educational infrastructure and qualitative manpower to improve on the standard and quality of education, the Boko Haram insurgency is further compounding its challenges. Certainly, this is affecting adversely the present and future development of this country.\par
Indeed, terrorism and other forms of militia activities can impose costs on a targeted country through a number of avenues  {\ref (Joshua and Chidozie, 2014:359)}. As noted in The Punch (2012:13) editorial:\par
Investors are wary of coming to a country where their lives and investments are not safe: Nigeria has been on a steady decline in the Global Peace Index. A recurrent issue in the Boko Haram literature is the extent of relative poverty and inequality in the north which has led some analysts to argue that underdevelopment is the main reason why extremist groups like Boko Haram rebel \hyperref[b1]{(Agbiboa, 2014)}. Today the north of Nigeria is undoubtedly poorer than the south in almost every conceivable measure. Combined with limited resources and deteriorating environmental factors, such as a rapidly shrinking Lake Chad, parts of northern Nigeria are economically destitute environments. Poor leadership and corruption have contributed to the socio-economic situation, and generate an environment lacking viable job prospects for large numbers of youth (Mahmood, 2013:5).\par
The impact of terrorism on internal security in Nigeria cannot be over emphasized as citizens now live in fear of impending but unknown attacks (Venda, n.d). Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures, and escape from poverty. The huge governance deficit in the country has been one that people do not see as part of the state building project, under leadership that is unwilling to transform society and guarantee security for the people. Rather, emphasis is often placed on appropriation of power and regime security at the expense of good governance and human security \hyperref[b19]{(Kwaja, 2013)} It is observed by Hilker et al (2010) that states often fail to provide adequate security for citizens or undermine democratic governance through acts committed in the name of security calls into question top-down approaches to reducing violence. This ugly development has some implications. Governance in times of insurgency presents a challenge to economic progress where development is arrested because of the absence of peace  {\ref (Dasuki, 2013)}. The cost of insecurity in Nigeria could also be seen on the percentage of annual budget allocated to security agencies on a yearly basis. Infrastructure and human capital development are almost foregone alternatives; hence, capital expenditure is struggling from the rear. As observed by  {\ref Kantiok (2014:23)}:\par
The Multi-Dimensional Impacts of Insurgency and Armed Conflicts on Nigeria Volume XVI Issue II Version I 
\section[{( F )}]{( F )}\par
Many governments justify excessive expenditures on security as intent to secure the homeland. Many governors, particularly in the northern part Nigeria have justified their nonperformance and lack of development of their states to the fact that they are fighting terrorism in their various states. Huge sums of monies are designated security votes and have been embezzled by these governors while failing to secure their various states. More often than not, they justify the expenditure on equipping the police and the manning the various checkpoints in their states. The same thing can be said of the federal government in its huge expenditure on defense, yet not fully equipping the security forces with the needed equipment. That the insurgency sometimes outguns the security agents tells on the dilapidated equipment that they use in trying to contain the terrorism.\par
Also, the food industry in the north is under great strain over a number of reasons, with the main issue being human mobility. With the increase of Boko Haram attacks, those employed in the industry have decreased their movement outside protected areas over fears of attacks carried out by the insurgents. Many farmers in the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe now fear being attacked while many local processing companies have lost workers after families opted to leave the conflict area. Traders have also limited their movements as Boko Haram militants have increasingly targeted major markets across the region. The agricultural sector has effectively developed into a target for those militants in need of supplies, with many stealing food, equipment and money. The heightened attacks across northeastern Nigeria have also made transportation of food riskier and more expensive, which in turn has placed greater pressure on the economic output(http://www.msrisk.com/nigeria/boko-haramsthreat-northeast-nigeria-addressing-five-year-crisis/). 
\section[{b) Collapse of Infrastructure/ Humanitarian Crisis}]{b) Collapse of Infrastructure/ Humanitarian Crisis}\par
Apart from the economic and monetary costs associated with terrorism, there are also social and psychological costs. Terrorism erodes inter-communal trust and destroys the reservoir of social capital that is so vital to building harmonious societies and pooling together community energies for national development. The attendant proliferation of small arms and the militarization of society results in a vicious cycle of violence which hampers national cohesion and stability. The long-term impact of such violence on cities and regions is best exemplified by the impoverishment that has affected Kaduna and Jos. Kaduna used to be one of the most prosperous cities in Nigeria. It was in many ways the industrial hub of the North, a cosmopolitan city with over a dozen textile firms and prosperous trading companies. The Kaduna of today is a tragically divided city in which Muslims live predominantly in the North and Christians predominantly in the South. All the textiles companies have shut down and most investors have packed up their businesses.\par
Inter-communal violence, which has plagued the Middle Belt states of Plateau and Kaduna for years, has also extended to other states in northern Nigeria, including Benue, Nasarawa, Taraba, Katsina, and Zamfara. Recurring violence in these states since 2010 has resulted in the death of more than 4,000 people and the displacement of more than 120,000 residents. The failure of federal and state authorities to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by all sides, including ethnic and economic groups in these five states, exacerbated the struggle for political power between ethnic groups and failed to resolve contested access to grazing land by both sedentary farmers and nomadic herdsmen (HRW, 2015).\par
The Jos Plateau is following a similar trend, as it loses its cosmopolitanism and local economies are destroyed. The tragedy is that the collapse of local economies and the erosion of social capital reinforce a downward spiral of further impoverishment, which in itself sows the seeds of further conflict. For most of the north, the ongoing insurgency has had a significant negative impact on the regional economy. Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have established businesses in Kano going back decades have relocated to Abuja and the south. A good number have left the country altogether. Hotels, banks and other business sectors have witnessed significant reductions in their activities  {\ref (Adebayo, 2014:484)}.\par
The pace and intensity of Boko Haram's attacks, especially against civilian targets, dramatically increased after the federal government imposed a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states in mid-2013. Since then, and even more intensely since January 2014, the group has perpetrated almost-daily attacks on villages and towns, and laid siege to highways. In the attacks, Boko Haram has killed civilians, pillaged property, and destroyed schools, homes, and businesses, which were often razed to the ground (Premium Times, February 2, 2014). Added to this is the problem of worsening food insecurity caused by the destruction of livelihoods and social support systems, bombing of infrastructures, displacement of farmers and pillaging of livestock and foodstuff. Owing to worsening insecurity, farmers are no longer able to cultivate their lands or harvest their products for fear of being attacked by Boko Haram members. Also cattle herders and households have lost their livestock to Boko Haram pillaging, further compounding the situation of severe food insecurity  {\ref (Onuoha, 2014:8)}.\par
Civilians in northern Nigeria are increasingly caught between two terrible alternatives: an abusive government incapable of protecting its citizens and an extortive insurgency with no governing institutions beyond those that sustain the group. These alternatives mirror each other. In the end, for the majority of the region's civilians, the real threat is not the creation of a new Islamic state but the persistence of abuses that resemble the old secular ones \hyperref[b32]{(Solomon, 2014)}.\par
Boko Haram insurgency has also created a refugee and internal displacement crisis. Nigerians are increasingly forced to seek refuge in neighbouring states to avoid Boko Haram attacks and military campaigns against these insurgents, which in-turn places added strain on the economies and humanitarian services of neighbouring states.\par
Operations by the Nigerian military in areas such as Gwoza and the Sambisa Forest reveal a humanitarian catastrophe for women, girls and children abducted by JAS. The military intervention that is isolating those who are rescued from the public, including humanitarian actors and the international community, adds additional complexity to their recovery and reintegration as independent verification of the information cannot be made. Also, the humanitarian situation in IDP camps worsens with reported abandonment of IDP camps by the government (NSRP, 2015).\par
The psychological impact of terrorism on the people in terms of displacement cannot be undermined. People living in areas affected by domestic terrorism are migrating to other relatively safe areas in the region. the activities of the Boko Haram sect, has increased the displacement of people from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states in the form of internally displaced persons(IDP's) fleeing to safer havens within the nation and refugees fleeing into neighbouring nations like Niger, Chad and Cameroun. It has been noted that majority of these persons constitute women and children (International Regional Information Networks, 14 March 2014).\par
Bamidele (2015:132) observes that the North-East has seen the largest internal displacement and migration since the beginning of Boko Haram insurgence in 2009. This influx of people into new areas and their rehabilitation and provision is an economic burden for federal and state governments. Unemployment is already prevalent, and now the need to provide employment and productive engagement to these migrants has also become a serious concern. This displaced portion of population is contributing little or nothing worthwhile to the national economy, yet they have to be provided for from it.\par
Not only has Boko Haram wreaked havoc on Nigeria's northeast quadrant and parts of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, but the group's attacks have also precipitated a veritable humanitarian crisis spanning the region. Between victims of raids by the militants and those killed by its campaign of terrorist bombings, more than 10,000 people lost their lives in 2014 to violence connected to Boko Haram, according the widely-respected Nigeria Security Tracker maintained by the Council on Foreign Relations \hyperref[b29]{(Pham, 2015)}.\par
According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA cited in Imasuen, 2015: 288) 2014 report, there have been steady rise in internally displaced persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. From 2009 to 2010 IDP's rose to 100,000 and from 2010 to 2011 it increased to 130,000. From 2011 to 2012, the number of IDP's rose to 200, 000. From 2012 to 2013 IDP's grew to 290,000 and from May 2013 to March 2014 it decreased slightly to 250,000. From May-June 2014, it rose again to 436,608 and from August to December IDP's drastically rose to over 600,000 persons (UN OCHA, 2014 cited in Imasuen, 2015:289). By 2015, in northern Nigeria alone, UNICEF (September 18, 2015) reports that 1.2 million children, more than half of them younger than 5, were forced to flee their homes, while an additional 265,000 were uprooted in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.\par
The increased activities of the Boko Haram sect have increased the influx of Nigerian refugees into neighbouring nations over the years. It has been estimated that there are over 30,000 Nigerian refugees in Northern Cameroun, 1,000 Nigerian refugees in Chad (on Lake Chads Choua Island) and more than 50,000 Nigerian refugees in the Diffa region of South East Niger (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 2014). Citing Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) describes the ripple effect of Boko Haram's violence in a recent briefing in which it has identified three emerging patterns of displacement:\par
The first is of internally displaced people (IDPs) fleeing to the south of the country in the footsteps of economic migrants. The second is of people fleeing from rural to urban areas within their states, and the third is of the secondary displacement of both IDPs and host communities who move once again when their resources have been depleted. From another reports, the total number of Nigerians who have been removed from their homes or those referred to as internally displaced persons, IDP, has risen to three million. The Nigerians affected are mainly from Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba State as a result of insurgency and farmers versus herdsmen clashes. This finding came from a group called Internally Displacement Monitoring Centre, IDMC, which made public its research findings recently. The IDMC is part of the Norwegian Refugees Council launched into Global Overview at the United Nations at Geneva (Nigerian \hyperref[b21]{Pilot, 2015)}. For a country like Nigeria that is struggling to build a virile democratic and socioeconomic foundation, this development raises grave concerns. It is a signpost to chaos for three million citizens to be rendered homeless, hungry, oppressed and denied their fundamental human rights in terms of social security in their country, driven away from their ancestral homes.\par
As the National Commission for Refugees has found, the Nigerian government has made few attempts to resettle IDPs or to respond in any way. The commission has identified the key constraints to resettlements: lack of experience in dealing with IDP issues, inadequate funding, and competing mandates between institutions. Also, government agencies have only been able to support IDPs in the emergency phase of a crisis but have not had the resources for their longterm reintegration.\par
The vast majority of the IDPs live with host families and friends while other stay in camps and camp-like sites. There is one official camp in Gombe state, eleven camps in Adamawa state and nine camps in Taraba state. Within these camps major social problems have emerged. First, there is the challenge of proper documentation of IDPs. This challenge has led to the difficulty of ascertaining who is displaced and who is not, causing diversion of relief materials. People who are not necessarily IDPs come to the camps on daily basis to take humanitarian aid. Second, IDPs live in appalling conditions within the camps. The increasing number of IDPs arriving the camps everyday indicates that more camps need to be created. The existing camps have no facilities and structures such as rooms, toilets and beddings (Global Initiative Analysis, 2015). The displacement highlights the level of destruction suffered by social institutions like schools, hospitals and care centers for children and the aged. The destruction of over 900 schools as well as some hospitals since 2011 also led to the exodus of teachers, medical doctors and other health personnel (ibid). 
\section[{c) Diplomatic Relations}]{c) Diplomatic Relations}\par
Some of the most troublesome features of societal conflicts in the modern, globalizing world are their systemic effects. We can no longer afford to think of societal conflicts as localized and isolated problems requiring negotiated settlements by the leaders of the warring parties; we must see them as "nested" problems that substantially affect and, in turn, are significantly affected by their surrounding environment (Marshall and Gurr, 2005:14). For instance, prior to the onset of Boko Haram, many foreign partners of Nigeria were mainly interested in governance issues, as it relates to corruption, followed by concern about the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. However, currently, the pressure on Nigeria and the main focus of foreign intervention, especially from foreign governments is how to tackle insurgency. Assistance from donor countries is slowly shifting from economic issues to security issues which necessitates that the relationship between Nigeria and many countries, including her neighbors, which used to be dominated by trade and technical cooperation have been replaced by security considerations \hyperref[b10]{(Dasuki, 2014)}.\par
The insurgency of Boko Haram has negatively affected the relationship between Nigeria and other nations of the world because of bombing, kidnapping and hostage taking of foreigners. The United States of America and other European countries regularly warn their citizens to stay clear of volatile zones in Nigeria. UN also black listed and later delisted Nigeria as a terrorist country (Omankihalen and Babajide, 2012 cited in  {\ref Awortu, 2015:218)}. The insurgency has re-shaped and redefined the classification of Nigeria in many peoples' minds all over the world. The country's name is now being mentioned along with those of other countries that have had long standing terrorism challenges. Ordinary Nigerians have also redefined their views of the security situation in the country. Issues that used to agitate the minds of the people, in the immediate past, such as armed robbery and kidnapping have been downgraded given the scale of destruction and devastation caused by Boko Haram's indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Taking a wider perspective, Persson (2014:45) opines that:\par
The unrest in Mali and the crises in the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, together with the ongoing violence in Northern Nigeria, all have implications for the broader sub-Saharan region. Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Niger and Cameroon, all of which are already worried about the spread of Islamist militancy from North East Nigeria, are among the countries affected by the larger patterns of conflict and insecurity. With its powerful position, large economy and leading role in regional organisations, Nigeria plays a key part in the security challenges in West and Central Africa. This role is further accentuated by the centrality of Nigeria to tackle the challenge of piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. The ability of Nigeria to manage its security threats will thus have a great impact on the entire region and will also set the conditions for more effective regional measures. The bulk of Boko Haram's membership, the indiscriminate and cruel characteristic of its attacks, the complexity of the Nigerian religious and ethnic context, the sheer weight of the Nigerian state in an instable neighborhood -Cameroun, Niger, Chad, Mali -and its proximity to the jihadist battle front in the Sahel convert it into an immediate and infectious regional threat \hyperref[b17]{(Karmon, 2014)}. However, the biggest concern to the international community is the large number of violations of human rights and international law that the military has perpetrated in its fight against Boko Haram and which have largely been denied. The military is accused of massive retaliations and brutality, including burning down villages and conducting extrajudicial killings. In the case of the 2014 attack on the Maiduguri barracks, Amnesty International reported over 600 detainees killed. Due to the lack of intelligence, the military tends to enter hide-outs 'all guns blazing', killing civilians in crossfire. Other allegations include torture, extortion and corruption  {\ref (Barna, 2014:13)}. 
\section[{III.}]{III.} 
\section[{Conclusion}]{Conclusion}\par
The ability of Boko Haram to defy the power of the Nigerian state and survive to prosecute its war sets up a model that may repeat itself in countries with enclaved religious populations that have a collective sense of marginalization and victimhood  {\ref (Pul, 2014:13)}. While Boko Haram's mode of assertion of its voice and views in the public space has turned extremely violent, it nonetheless reflects the failure of the state to be more accommodative, attentive, and responsive to the issues it purported to have represented from its initiation. That failure means that the State of Nigeria lost the opportunity to create the needed platform for constructive engagement with the voice of faith in matters of public interest. Replication of this failure in other settings can only reproduce the Boko Haram model to perpetuate Africa's image as the continent of interminable violent conflicts.			\footnote{© 2016 Global Journals Inc. (US)} 		 		\backmatter  			  				\begin{bibitemlist}{1}
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\end{document}
