

1 Impact of Fdi in India: State-Wise Analysis in an Econometric 2 Framework

3 Vani Archana

4 Received: 14 December 2013 Accepted: 1 January 2014 Published: 15 January 2014

5 **Abstract**

6 While there are many empirical studies on the impact of FDI in developing countries, few of
7 them have been carried out in India at the state level which gives a holistic as well as detailed
8 view of the spillover of FDI. This paper analyzes the impact of FDI on eight major states in
10 India during the post- reform period from 1991-2004 using three models, FE, RE and SUR
11 models. FE (Fixed Effects) and RE (Random Effects) give a holistic view whereas the SUR
12 (Seemingly Unrelated regression) model gives a more detailed picture of the eight states of
13 India. Results show that overall FDI has a positive impact on labour productivity and
14 employment for the period considered. However, across states FDI is more productive only
15 when the states have more absorptive power also labour productivity is growing only at the
16 expense of employment.

17
18 **Index terms**— labour productivity; employment; fe model; re model; sur model; overall impact; and state-
19 specific impact.

20 **1 Introduction**

21 The importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is not limited to the financial capital that flows. The
22 globalization of activities by multinational enterprises (MNEs), jointly with the efforts made by all kinds of
23 governments, has transformed the role of FDI not only as a development indicator but also its close linkages
24 with trade, technology transfer and financial flows ??UNCTC, 1991). Economic growth of the host country
25 increases due to increase in FDI by channelising foreign investors' managerial, technical, financial, accounting
26 or legal expertise into new infrastructure and other projects. Competition from foreign companies can lead to
27 productivity gains and greater efficiency in the host economy. Further application of foreign investor's policies
28 to a domestic subsidiary may improve corporate governance. The standard of living in the host country is also
29 improved and it can offset the volatility created by foreign institutional investment. In developing countries
30 especially, FDI can result in transfer of all types of scarcities-financial capital, technological know-how, efficient
31 managerial techniques, organizational skills and access to market abroad. The host country may be able to
32 benefit from the employment opportunities created by new investors. FDI is also seen as a source of producing
33 tangible and intangible assets in the host economy. It may provide rents (including high wages, benefits and
34 profits) and potential spillovers and externalities that are extremely favourable to the host country's economic
35 growth (Moran, 1998). Foreign firms seek not only domestic markets, but also provide access to external markets
36 by sourcing manufactured products from domestic market (Nagraj, 2003). In short, FDI inflows can be a tool
37 for bringing knowledge, managerial skills and capability, product design, quality up-gradation, brand names,
38 channels for international marketing of products, and consequent integration into global production chains, which
39 are the basis of a successful exports strategy (Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan, 1994; Borensztein, De Gregorio and
40 Lee, 1998; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1999; Organization for Economic
41 Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2002, Kokko, 1994).

42 Turning to India, a severe macro-economic and balance of payment crisis in 1991 led to an extensive and
43 complete break from insulation strategy and opened the economy to import competition and to foreign investment.
44 Foreign investment was introduced in 1991 under Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), by then finance
45 minister Manmohan Singh. Thereafter FDI inflows in India have undergone a significant improvement as

3 LITERATURE REVIEW

46 compared with FDI inflows into all developing economies ??RBI, 2008). High economic growth has resulted
47 in high growth in domestic market, which is prime engine for India's viability as an investment destination for
48 foreign investment. In addition, the FDI policy rationalization measures taken by the government have resulted
49 in increased FDI inflows over the years. According to UNCTAD World Investment Prospects Survey 2007-2009,
50 India emerged as second most favoured FDI destination after China. With India and China becoming important
51 players in the global economy; it is indeed a great value and learning experience to undertake the research on
52 the impact and incidence of FDI.

53 FDI inflows within India are quite uneven and is heavily concentrated around the relatively fast moving
54 reformers, with already advanced industrialization, such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra,
55 Delhi and Tamil Nadu whereas, Kerala, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and West Bengal are lagging
56 behind (see Appendix I and II). It is generally accepted that growth performance of the states has become more
57 skewed after the reforms. Economic and political weekly (EPW) Research Foundation ??2003) reports that the
58 coefficient of variation (CV) in growth rates of gross state domestic product (GSDP) rose from 30.52 % during
59 1980-81 to 1990-94 to 41.1% during 1993-94 to 2000-01 and that of per capita GSDP from 50.20 to 68.04 during
60 the same period. It also shows that Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, has been rising over the years.
61 Considering all the states together, it slowly moved up from 20.9 in 1980-81 to 22.8 in 1991-92 but has moved
62 sharply after the reform and reached 29.2 in 2000-01. This paper thus tries to explore whether the impact of FDI
63 inclined towards the skewed growth in India making rich states richer in relative terms and poor states lagging
64 behind.

65 What follows in the following section is the review of relevant literature in section 2. Section 3 deals with
66 model specification and econometric analysis. Section 4 discusses the result and section 5 concludes the paper.

67 2 II.

68 3 Literature Review

69 The studies on impact of FDI are very limited. These studies have identified impact of FDI inflows on number
70 of factors. However, many of these factors are either country-specific or industry-specific and would not apply
71 to state/provincial level of FDI flows. It is evident from the empirical literature that there is either a positive
72 or negative effect of FDI on economy and growth of the host country. A positive relationship between FDI and
73 economy growth in China's economy was found by Chen et al (1995) and Berthelemy and Demurger (2000). A
74 number of empirical studies have directly measured the spillover from foreign investment. For example, Caves
75 (1974) examined the impact of foreign presence on value added per worker in Australian domestically owned
76 manufacturing sectors and found that the disparity between foreign and domestic value added disappeared as
77 the foreign share increased in labourintensive sectors. Blomstrom and Persson (1983) also found that labour
78 productivity was significantly higher in sectors where foreign firms employed a higher share of labour force.
79 While Blomstrom and Edward (1989) found faster productivity growth and faster convergence of productivity
80 levels in sectors with higher level of foreign ownership.

81 Ramstetter (1993) developed a macroeconomic model analyzing macroeconomic effects of FDI in Thailand.
82 His model allowed simulations of effects of policy changes on enterprises for different ownerships. An examination
83 of the impact of foreign investment on firms in Morocco's manufacturing sectors by Haddad and Harrison, 1993
84 suggested that foreign firms showed higher total factor productivity but their rate of productivity growth was
85 lower than that of domestic firms.

86 On the other hand some of the negative spillover arising due to FDI was evident in the studies of Markusen
87 and Venables, 1997, Agosin and Mayer, 2000 which stated that the most immediate and evident externality of
88 MNE on domestic firms is that there will be some distortion in their market share. A rather neutral effect was
89 observed by Fry (1992) who examined the macroeconomic effects of FDI on 16 developing countries. His findings
90 suggested that: a) FDI inflow neither increased domestic investment nor did it provide additional balance of
91 payment (BOP) financing; b) an increase in FDI reduced national savings; c) FDI did not exert significantly
92 different effects on the rate of economic growth compared to domestic investment and d) FDI exerted both direct
93 and indirect effects on current account. Bos et al (1974) also found that FDI played a minor role in increasing
94 the income of the host country, while it posed a heavy burden on BOP. These effects were quite prominent in
95 countries like, India, Philippines, Ghana, Guatemala, Argentina and Zaire.

96 The study in Indian context by Dua and Rashid (1998) shows a one-way causality from index of industrial
97 product (IIP) to FDI where, IIP is taken as a proxy for GDP. However, IIP cannot be a proper proxy of GDP
98 as industrial production contributes less than 30% of GDP. Chakravorty and Basu (2002) have tried to find out
99 the impact of FDI on growth in India using vector error correction method. The model reveals that GDP in
100 India was not caused by FDI and FDI in India tended to lower the unit of labour cost i.e. FDI was labour
101 displacing. Raut (1995) in his study for Indian manufacturing sectors examined the R&D spillover using panel
102 data over 1975-86. He observed the contribution of in-house R&D capital and industry-wise R&D capital to the
103 productivity growth of private firms in India and points out that spillover R&D is a highly significant determinant
104 of productivity growth. A statistically significant impact of imported disembodied technologies on productivity
105 in Indian industries was observed by Rana & Hasan (2001).

106 There is hardly any study to show the impact of FDI at state level in India. The literature on influences

107 of FDI within a country is relatively scarce. Most of the available studies relating to FDI flows impacting the
108 state/province level relate to developed countries. Thus the present study is an endeavour to explore the impact
109 of FDI inflows at the state level. The present study is expected to become the first of its kind where both overall
110 impact and across the state impact of FDI are analysed simultaneously in India. The present study have made
111 use of three models Fixed effect (FE), Random effect (RE) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model
112 to examine the impact of FDI at the state level. This is a new attempt in this area as rarely FE, RE and SUR
113 models are used in the studies related to the impact of FDI. This paper contributes to the growing strand of
114 literature by highlighting the role of advanced technology in introduction of productivity growth and employment
115 growth and the requirement of absorptive power in these processes.

116 4 III.

117 5 Model Specification and Econometric Analysis

118 While there are many empirical studies on the impact of FDI in developing countries, few of them have been
119 carried out in India in an econometric framework especially in the transient period of post-reform. This paper
120 which gives a holistic as well as detailed view of the spillover of FDI in different states in India has not been
121 applied so far. We tested the effect of FDI on productivity and employment across different states in India and
122 also investigated whether this impact of FDI in the post reform period depends on the absorptive capacity of the
123 recipient states and indicate policy implication there from.

124 We assume that the impact of FDI on the above dependent variables is different in each state during this
125 transient period. This is a more detailed study than assuming a common effect of FDI on these variables in
126 India as a whole. Three models appropriate for the study have been made use of. They are Fixed Effect (FE),
127 Random Effect (RE) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). Panel estimator is a standard where elasticity
128 coefficients are assumed to be constant, and the intercept varies over individual capturing the effects of those
129 omitted variables that are specific to individual cross-sectional units but stay constant over time. However, any
130 inference on the impact of FDI based on panel data model can be erroneous because of possible simultaneity
131 between dependent and independent variables. Since the direction of causality remains uncertain (whether FDI
132 is impacting higher labour productivity/employment or labour productivity/ employment is causing higher FDI
133 inflows) in the analysis, we tackled this problem using SUR model. In principle, the endogeneity problem can
134 be tackled by applying instrumental variable techniques but the fundamental problem is that there are no ideal
135 instruments available. A good instrument would be a variable which is highly correlated with FDI but not
136 with the error term in these regressions. The results of this instrumental variable estimation are reported in a
137 similar analysis by Borensztein et al (1998) wherein it is considered that the instrumental variable estimation
138 yields qualitatively similar result to those obtained by SUR estimation. Moreover in SUR model, the response
139 parameter are allowed to vary from one unit to another invariant over time (and the errors are allowed to be
140 contemporaneously correlated and heteroscedastic between individuals) since it is quite possible that different
141 attributes over the states will be reflected in different elasticity coefficients (Judge, et al. 1985). Hence the
142 present study uses SUR model proposed by Zellner (1962) The rationale behind the selection of these variables
143 and their possible relations with FDI are discussed below before the empirical model is specified and tested.

144 6 c) Labour Productivity

145 The literature is optimistic about the impact of multinationals on host-country's productivity. The studies which
146 find a positive correlation between average industry productivity and the presence of foreign firms in the industry
147 include Globerman (1979) for Canada in 1972, Blomstrom and Persson (1983), Blomstrom (1986), and Kokko
148 (1994) for Mexico in the 1970s, and Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) for Indonesia in 1991. The literature further
149 provides the evidence the benefits that the host economies acquire are quite uneven, both across and within
150 countries.

151 In the present study, net value added per worker has been taken as dependent variable to measure labour
152 productivity. Relative labour productivity has been used as a proxy for absorptive capacity. On the other
153 side, along with FDI, other independent variables include gross capital formation and wage rate. Gross capital
154 formation is taken as a proxy for the growth of domestic investment. It is hypothesised that both gross capital
155 formation and wage rate exert direct influence on labour productivity.

156 The first hypothesis relates to the production effect proxied by net value added per worker, wherein it is said
157 that FDI may increase the labour productivity in states. The SUR model postulated for the impact study would
158 be:
$$\ln LP = s_0 + s_1 \ln FDI + s_2 \ln GCF + s_3 \ln W + s_4 \ln \ln 3 + s_5 \ln \ln 2 + s_6 \ln \ln 1 + s_7 \ln \ln 0 + s_8 \ln \ln 8 + s_9 \ln \ln 7 + s_{10} \ln \ln 6 + s_{11} \ln \ln 5 + s_{12} \ln \ln 4 + s_{13} \ln \ln 3 + s_{14} \ln \ln 2 + s_{15} \ln \ln 1 + s_{16} \ln \ln 0 + s_{17} \ln \ln 8 + s_{18} \ln \ln 7 + s_{19} \ln \ln 6 + s_{20} \ln \ln 5 + s_{21} \ln \ln 4 + s_{22} \ln \ln 3 + s_{23} \ln \ln 2 + s_{24} \ln \ln 1 + s_{25} \ln \ln 0 + s_{26} \ln \ln 8 + s_{27} \ln \ln 7 + s_{28} \ln \ln 6 + s_{29} \ln \ln 5 + s_{30} \ln \ln 4 + s_{31} \ln \ln 3 + s_{32} \ln \ln 2 + s_{33} \ln \ln 1 + s_{34} \ln \ln 0 + s_{35} \ln \ln 8 + s_{36} \ln \ln 7 + s_{37} \ln \ln 6 + s_{38} \ln \ln 5 + s_{39} \ln \ln 4 + s_{40} \ln \ln 3 + s_{41} \ln \ln 2 + s_{42} \ln \ln 1 + s_{43} \ln \ln 0 + s_{44} \ln \ln 8 + s_{45} \ln \ln 7 + s_{46} \ln \ln 6 + s_{47} \ln \ln 5 + s_{48} \ln \ln 4 + s_{49} \ln \ln 3 + s_{50} \ln \ln 2 + s_{51} \ln \ln 1 + s_{52} \ln \ln 0 + s_{53} \ln \ln 8 + s_{54} \ln \ln 7 + s_{55} \ln \ln 6 + s_{56} \ln \ln 5 + s_{57} \ln \ln 4 + s_{58} \ln \ln 3 + s_{59} \ln \ln 2 + s_{60} \ln \ln 1 + s_{61} \ln \ln 0 + s_{62} \ln \ln 8 + s_{63} \ln \ln 7 + s_{64} \ln \ln 6 + s_{65} \ln \ln 5 + s_{66} \ln \ln 4 + s_{67} \ln \ln 3 + s_{68} \ln \ln 2 + s_{69} \ln \ln 1 + s_{70} \ln \ln 0 + s_{71} \ln \ln 8 + s_{72} \ln \ln 7 + s_{73} \ln \ln 6 + s_{74} \ln \ln 5 + s_{75} \ln \ln 4 + s_{76} \ln \ln 3 + s_{77} \ln \ln 2 + s_{78} \ln \ln 1 + s_{79} \ln \ln 0 + s_{80} \ln \ln 8 + s_{81} \ln \ln 7 + s_{82} \ln \ln 6 + s_{83} \ln \ln 5 + s_{84} \ln \ln 4 + s_{85} \ln \ln 3 + s_{86} \ln \ln 2 + s_{87} \ln \ln 1 + s_{88} \ln \ln 0 + s_{89} \ln \ln 8 + s_{90} \ln \ln 7 + s_{91} \ln \ln 6 + s_{92} \ln \ln 5 + s_{93} \ln \ln 4 + s_{94} \ln \ln 3 + s_{95} \ln \ln 2 + s_{96} \ln \ln 1 + s_{97} \ln \ln 0 + s_{98} \ln \ln 8 + s_{99} \ln \ln 7 + s_{100} \ln \ln 6 + s_{101} \ln \ln 5 + s_{102} \ln \ln 4 + s_{103} \ln \ln 3 + s_{104} \ln \ln 2 + s_{105} \ln \ln 1 + s_{106} \ln \ln 0 + s_{107} \ln \ln 8 + s_{108} \ln \ln 7 + s_{109} \ln \ln 6 + s_{110} \ln \ln 5 + s_{111} \ln \ln 4 + s_{112} \ln \ln 3 + s_{113} \ln \ln 2 + s_{114} \ln \ln 1 + s_{115} \ln \ln 0 + s_{116} \ln \ln 8 + s_{117} \ln \ln 7 + s_{118} \ln \ln 6 + s_{119} \ln \ln 5 + s_{120} \ln \ln 4 + s_{121} \ln \ln 3 + s_{122} \ln \ln 2 + s_{123} \ln \ln 1 + s_{124} \ln \ln 0 + s_{125} \ln \ln 8 + s_{126} \ln \ln 7 + s_{127} \ln \ln 6 + s_{128} \ln \ln 5 + s_{129} \ln \ln 4 + s_{130} \ln \ln 3 + s_{131} \ln \ln 2 + s_{132} \ln \ln 1 + s_{133} \ln \ln 0 + s_{134} \ln \ln 8 + s_{135} \ln \ln 7 + s_{136} \ln \ln 6 + s_{137} \ln \ln 5 + s_{138} \ln \ln 4 + s_{139} \ln \ln 3 + s_{140} \ln \ln 2 + s_{141} \ln \ln 1 + s_{142} \ln \ln 0 + s_{143} \ln \ln 8 + s_{144} \ln \ln 7 + s_{145} \ln \ln 6 + s_{146} \ln \ln 5 + s_{147} \ln \ln 4 + s_{148} \ln \ln 3 + s_{149} \ln \ln 2 + s_{150} \ln \ln 1 + s_{151} \ln \ln 0 + s_{152} \ln \ln 8 + s_{153} \ln \ln 7 + s_{154} \ln \ln 6 + s_{155} \ln \ln 5 + s_{156} \ln \ln 4 + s_{157} \ln \ln 3 + s_{158} \ln \ln 2 + s_{159} \ln \ln 1 + s_{160} \ln \ln 0 + s_{161} \ln \ln 8 + s_{162} \ln \ln 7 + s_{163} \ln \ln 6 + s_{164} \ln \ln 5 + s_{165} \ln \ln 4 + s_{166} \ln \ln 3 + s_{167} \ln \ln 2 + s_{168} \ln \ln 1 + s_{169} \ln \ln 0 + s_{170} \ln \ln 8 + s_{171} \ln \ln 7 + s_{172} \ln \ln 6 + s_{173} \ln \ln 5 + s_{174} \ln \ln 4 + s_{175} \ln \ln 3 + s_{176} \ln \ln 2 + s_{177} \ln \ln 1 + s_{178} \ln \ln 0 + s_{179} \ln \ln 8 + s_{180} \ln \ln 7 + s_{181} \ln \ln 6 + s_{182} \ln \ln 5 + s_{183} \ln \ln 4 + s_{184} \ln \ln 3 + s_{185} \ln \ln 2 + s_{186} \ln \ln 1 + s_{187} \ln \ln 0 + s_{188} \ln \ln 8 + s_{189} \ln \ln 7 + s_{190} \ln \ln 6 + s_{191} \ln \ln 5 + s_{192} \ln \ln 4 + s_{193} \ln \ln 3 + s_{194} \ln \ln 2 + s_{195} \ln \ln 1 + s_{196} \ln \ln 0 + s_{197} \ln \ln 8 + s_{198} \ln \ln 7 + s_{199} \ln \ln 6 + s_{200} \ln \ln 5 + s_{201} \ln \ln 4 + s_{202} \ln \ln 3 + s_{203} \ln \ln 2 + s_{204} \ln \ln 1 + s_{205} \ln \ln 0 + s_{206} \ln \ln 8 + s_{207} \ln \ln 7 + s_{208} \ln \ln 6 + s_{209} \ln \ln 5 + s_{210} \ln \ln 4 + s_{211} \ln \ln 3 + s_{212} \ln \ln 2 + s_{213} \ln \ln 1 + s_{214} \ln \ln 0 + s_{215} \ln \ln 8 + s_{216} \ln \ln 7 + s_{217} \ln \ln 6 + s_{218} \ln \ln 5 + s_{219} \ln \ln 4 + s_{220} \ln \ln 3 + s_{221} \ln \ln 2 + s_{222} \ln \ln 1 + s_{223} \ln \ln 0 + s_{224} \ln \ln 8 + s_{225} \ln \ln 7 + s_{226} \ln \ln 6 + s_{227} \ln \ln 5 + s_{228} \ln \ln 4 + s_{229} \ln \ln 3 + s_{230} \ln \ln 2 + s_{231} \ln \ln 1 + s_{232} \ln \ln 0 + s_{233} \ln \ln 8 + s_{234} \ln \ln 7 + s_{235} \ln \ln 6 + s_{236} \ln \ln 5 + s_{237} \ln \ln 4 + s_{238} \ln \ln 3 + s_{239} \ln \ln 2 + s_{240} \ln \ln 1 + s_{241} \ln \ln 0 + s_{242} \ln \ln 8 + s_{243} \ln \ln 7 + s_{244} \ln \ln 6 + s_{245} \ln \ln 5 + s_{246} \ln \ln 4 + s_{247} \ln \ln 3 + s_{248} \ln \ln 2 + s_{249} \ln \ln 1 + s_{250} \ln \ln 0 + s_{251} \ln \ln 8 + s_{252} \ln \ln 7 + s_{253} \ln \ln 6 + s_{254} \ln \ln 5 + s_{255} \ln \ln 4 + s_{256} \ln \ln 3 + s_{257} \ln \ln 2 + s_{258} \ln \ln 1 + s_{259} \ln \ln 0 + s_{260} \ln \ln 8 + s_{261} \ln \ln 7 + s_{262} \ln \ln 6 + s_{263} \ln \ln 5 + s_{264} \ln \ln 4 + s_{265} \ln \ln 3 + s_{266} \ln \ln 2 + s_{267} \ln \ln 1 + s_{268} \ln \ln 0 + s_{269} \ln \ln 8 + s_{270} \ln \ln 7 + s_{271} \ln \ln 6 + s_{272} \ln \ln 5 + s_{273} \ln \ln 4 + s_{274} \ln \ln 3 + s_{275} \ln \ln 2 + s_{276} \ln \ln 1 + s_{277} \ln \ln 0 + s_{278} \ln \ln 8 + s_{279} \ln \ln 7 + s_{280} \ln \ln 6 + s_{281} \ln \ln 5 + s_{282} \ln \ln 4 + s_{283} \ln \ln 3 + s_{284} \ln \ln 2 + s_{285} \ln \ln 1 + s_{286} \ln \ln 0 + s_{287} \ln \ln 8 + s_{288} \ln \ln 7 + s_{289} \ln \ln 6 + s_{290} \ln \ln 5 + s_{291} \ln \ln 4 + s_{292} \ln \ln 3 + s_{293} \ln \ln 2 + s_{294} \ln \ln 1 + s_{295} \ln \ln 0 + s_{296} \ln \ln 8 + s_{297} \ln \ln 7 + s_{298} \ln \ln 6 + s_{299} \ln \ln 5 + s_{300} \ln \ln 4 + s_{301} \ln \ln 3 + s_{302} \ln \ln 2 + s_{303} \ln \ln 1 + s_{304} \ln \ln 0 + s_{305} \ln \ln 8 + s_{306} \ln \ln 7 + s_{307} \ln \ln 6 + s_{308} \ln \ln 5 + s_{309} \ln \ln 4 + s_{310} \ln \ln 3 + s_{311} \ln \ln 2 + s_{312} \ln \ln 1 + s_{313} \ln \ln 0 + s_{314} \ln \ln 8 + s_{315} \ln \ln 7 + s_{316} \ln \ln 6 + s_{317} \ln \ln 5 + s_{318} \ln \ln 4 + s_{319} \ln \ln 3 + s_{320} \ln \ln 2 + s_{321} \ln \ln 1 + s_{322} \ln \ln 0 + s_{323} \ln \ln 8 + s_{324} \ln \ln 7 + s_{325} \ln \ln 6 + s_{326} \ln \ln 5 + s_{327} \ln \ln 4 + s_{328} \ln \ln 3 + s_{329} \ln \ln 2 + s_{330} \ln \ln 1 + s_{331} \ln \ln 0 + s_{332} \ln \ln 8 + s_{333} \ln \ln 7 + s_{334} \ln \ln 6 + s_{335} \ln \ln 5 + s_{336} \ln \ln 4 + s_{337} \ln \ln 3 + s_{338} \ln \ln 2 + s_{339} \ln \ln 1 + s_{340} \ln \ln 0 + s_{341} \ln \ln 8 + s_{342} \ln \ln 7 + s_{343} \ln \ln 6 + s_{344} \ln \ln 5 + s_{345} \ln \ln 4 + s_{346} \ln \ln 3 + s_{347} \ln \ln 2 + s_{348} \ln \ln 1 + s_{349} \ln \ln 0 + s_{350} \ln \ln 8 + s_{351} \ln \ln 7 + s_{352} \ln \ln 6 + s_{353} \ln \ln 5 + s_{354} \ln \ln 4 + s_{355} \ln \ln 3 + s_{356} \ln \ln 2 + s_{357} \ln \ln 1 + s_{358} \ln \ln 0 + s_{359} \ln \ln 8 + s_{360} \ln \ln 7 + s_{361} \ln \ln 6 + s_{362} \ln \ln 5 + s_{363} \ln \ln 4 + s_{364} \ln \ln 3 + s_{365} \ln \ln 2 + s_{366} \ln \ln 1 + s_{367} \ln \ln 0 + s_{368} \ln \ln 8 + s_{369} \ln \ln 7 + s_{370} \ln \ln 6 + s_{371} \ln \ln 5 + s_{372} \ln \ln 4 + s_{373} \ln \ln 3 + s_{374} \ln \ln 2 + s_{375} \ln \ln 1 + s_{376} \ln \ln 0 + s_{377} \ln \ln 8 + s_{378} \ln \ln 7 + s_{379} \ln \ln 6 + s_{380} \ln \ln 5 + s_{381} \ln \ln 4 + s_{382} \ln \ln 3 + s_{383} \ln \ln 2 + s_{384} \ln \ln 1 + s_{385} \ln \ln 0 + s_{386} \ln \ln 8 + s_{387} \ln \ln 7 + s_{388} \ln \ln 6 + s_{389} \ln \ln 5 + s_{390} \ln \ln 4 + s_{391} \ln \ln 3 + s_{392} \ln \ln 2 + s_{393} \ln \ln 1 + s_{394} \ln \ln 0 + s_{395} \ln \ln 8 + s_{396} \ln \ln 7 + s_{397} \ln \ln 6 + s_{398} \ln \ln 5 + s_{399} \ln \ln 4 + s_{400} \ln \ln 3 + s_{401} \ln \ln 2 + s_{402} \ln \ln 1 + s_{403} \ln \ln 0 + s_{404} \ln \ln 8 + s_{405} \ln \ln 7 + s_{406} \ln \ln 6 + s_{407} \ln \ln 5 + s_{408} \ln \ln 4 + s_{409} \ln \ln 3 + s_{410} \ln \ln 2 + s_{411} \ln \ln 1 + s_{412} \ln \ln 0 + s_{413} \ln \ln 8 + s_{414} \ln \ln 7 + s_{415} \ln \ln 6 + s_{416} \ln \ln 5 + s_{417} \ln \ln 4 + s_{418} \ln \ln 3 + s_{419} \ln \ln 2 + s_{420} \ln \ln 1 + s_{421} \ln \ln 0 + s_{422} \ln \ln 8 + s_{423} \ln \ln 7 + s_{424} \ln \ln 6 + s_{425} \ln \ln 5 + s_{426} \ln \ln 4 + s_{427} \ln \ln 3 + s_{428} \ln \ln 2 + s_{429} \ln \ln 1 + s_{430} \ln \ln 0 + s_{431} \ln \ln 8 + s_{432} \ln \ln 7 + s_{433} \ln \ln 6 + s_{434} \ln \ln 5 + s_{435} \ln \ln 4 + s_{436} \ln \ln 3 + s_{437} \ln \ln 2 + s_{438} \ln \ln 1 + s_{439} \ln \ln 0 + s_{440} \ln \ln 8 + s_{441} \ln \ln 7 + s_{442} \ln \ln 6 + s_{443} \ln \ln 5 + s_{444} \ln \ln 4 + s_{445} \ln \ln 3 + s_{446} \ln \ln 2 + s_{447} \ln \ln 1 + s_{448} \ln \ln 0 + s_{449} \ln \ln 8 + s_{450} \ln \ln 7 + s_{451} \ln \ln 6 + s_{452} \ln \ln 5 + s_{453} \ln \ln 4 + s_{454} \ln \ln 3 + s_{455} \ln \ln 2 + s_{456} \ln \ln 1 + s_{457} \ln \ln 0 + s_{458} \ln \ln 8 + s_{459} \ln \ln 7 + s_{460} \ln \ln 6 + s_{461} \ln \ln 5 + s_{462} \ln \ln 4 + s_{463} \ln \ln 3 + s_{464} \ln \ln 2 + s_{465} \ln \ln 1 + s_{466} \ln \ln 0 + s_{467} \ln \ln 8 + s_{468} \ln \ln 7 + s_{469} \ln \ln 6 + s_{470} \ln \ln 5 + s_{471} \ln \ln 4 + s_{472} \ln \ln 3 + s_{473} \ln \ln 2 + s_{474} \ln \ln 1 + s_{475} \ln \ln 0 + s_{476} \ln \ln 8 + s_{477} \ln \ln 7 + s_{478} \ln \ln 6 + s_{479} \ln \ln 5 + s_{480} \ln \ln 4 + s_{481} \ln \ln 3 + s_{482} \ln \ln 2 + s_{483} \ln \ln 1 + s_{484} \ln \ln 0 + s_{485} \ln \ln 8 + s_{486} \ln \ln 7 + s_{487} \ln \ln 6 + s_{488} \ln \ln 5 + s_{489} \ln \ln 4 + s_{490} \ln \ln 3 + s_{491} \ln \ln 2 + s_{492} \ln \ln 1 + s_{493} \ln \ln 0 + s_{494} \ln \ln 8 + s_{495} \ln \ln 7 + s_{496} \ln \ln 6 + s_{497} \ln \ln 5 + s_{498} \ln \ln 4 + s_{499} \ln \ln 3 + s_{500} \ln \ln 2 + s_{501} \ln \ln 1 + s_{502} \ln \ln 0 + s_{503} \ln \ln 8 + s_{504} \ln \ln 7 + s_{505} \ln \ln 6 + s_{506} \ln \ln 5 + s_{507} \ln \ln 4 + s_{508} \ln \ln 3 + s_{509} \ln \ln 2 + s_{510} \ln \ln 1 + s_{511} \ln \ln 0 + s_{512} \ln \ln 8 + s_{513} \ln \ln 7 + s_{514} \ln \ln 6 + s_{515} \ln \ln 5 + s_{516} \ln \ln 4 + s_{517} \ln \ln 3 + s_{518} \ln \ln 2 + s_{519} \ln \ln 1 + s_{520} \ln \ln 0 + s_{521} \ln \ln 8 + s_{522} \ln \ln 7 + s_{523} \ln \ln 6 + s_{524} \ln \ln 5 + s_{525} \ln \ln 4 + s_{526} \ln \ln 3 + s_{527} \ln \ln 2 + s_{528} \ln \ln 1 + s_{529} \ln \ln 0 + s_{530} \ln \ln 8 + s_{531} \ln \ln 7 + s_{532} \ln \ln 6 + s_{533} \ln \ln 5 + s_{534} \ln \ln 4 + s_{535} \ln \ln 3 + s_{536} \ln \ln 2 + s_{537} \ln \ln 1 + s_{538} \ln \ln 0 + s_{539} \ln \ln 8 + s_{540} \ln \ln 7 + s_{541} \ln \ln 6 + s_{542} \ln \ln 5 + s_{543} \ln \ln 4 + s_{544} \ln \ln 3 + s_{545} \ln \ln 2 + s_{546} \ln \ln 1 + s_{547} \ln \ln 0 + s_{548} \ln \ln 8 + s_{549} \ln \ln 7 + s_{550} \ln \ln 6 + s_{551} \ln \ln 5 + s_{552} \ln \ln 4 + s_{553} \ln \ln 3 + s_{554} \ln \ln 2 + s_{555} \ln \ln 1 + s_{556} \ln \ln 0 + s_{557} \ln \ln 8 + s_{558} \ln \ln 7 + s_{559} \ln \ln 6 + s_{560} \ln \ln 5 + s_{561} \ln \ln 4 + s_{562} \ln \ln 3 + s_{563} \ln \ln 2 + s_{564} \ln \ln 1 + s_{565} \ln \ln 0 + s_{566} \ln \ln 8 + s_{567} \ln \ln 7 + s_{568} \ln \ln 6 + s_{569} \ln \ln 5 + s_{570} \ln \ln 4 + s_{571} \ln \ln 3 + s_{572} \ln \ln 2 + s_{573} \ln \ln 1 + s_{574} \ln \ln 0 + s_{575} \ln \ln 8 + s_{576} \ln \ln 7 + s_{577} \ln \ln 6 + s_{578} \ln \ln 5 + s_{579} \ln \ln 4 + s_{580} \ln \ln 3 + s_{581} \ln \ln 2 + s_{582} \ln \ln 1 + s_{583} \ln \ln 0 + s_{584} \ln \ln 8 + s_{585} \ln \ln 7 + s_{586} \ln \ln 6 + s_{587} \ln \ln 5 + s_{588} \ln \ln 4 + s_{589} \ln \ln 3 + s_{590} \ln \ln 2 + s_{591} \ln \ln 1 + s_{592} \ln \ln 0 + s_{593} \ln \ln 8 + s_{594} \ln \ln 7 + s_{595} \ln \ln 6 + s_{596} \ln \ln 5 + s_{597} \ln \ln 4 + s_{598} \ln \ln 3 + s_{599} \ln \ln 2 + s_{600} \ln \ln 1 + s_{601} \ln \ln 0 + s_{602} \ln \ln 8 + s_{603} \ln \ln 7 + s_{604} \ln \ln 6 + s_{605} \ln \ln 5 + s_{606} \ln \ln 4 + s_{607} \ln \ln 3 + s_{608} \ln \ln 2 + s_{609} \ln \ln 1 + s_{610} \ln \ln 0 + s_{611} \ln \ln 8 + s_{612} \ln \ln 7 + s_{613} \ln \ln 6 + s_{614} \ln \ln 5 + s_{615} \ln \ln 4 + s_{616} \ln \ln 3 + s_{617} \ln \ln 2 + s_{618} \ln \ln 1 + s_{619} \ln \ln 0 + s_{620} \ln \ln 8 + s_{621} \ln \ln 7 + s_{622} \ln \ln 6 + s_{623} \ln \ln 5 + s_{624} \ln \ln 4 + s_{625} \ln \ln 3 + s_{626} \ln \ln 2 + s_{627} \ln \ln 1 + s_{628} \ln \ln 0 + s_{629} \ln \ln 8 + s_{630} \ln \ln 7 + s_{631} \ln \ln 6 + s_{632} \ln \ln 5 + s_{633} \ln \ln 4 + s_{634} \ln \ln 3 + s_{635} \ln \ln 2 + s_{636} \ln \ln 1 + s_{637} \ln \ln 0 + s_{638} \ln \ln 8 + s_{639} \ln \ln 7 + s_{640} \ln \ln 6 + s_{641} \ln \ln 5 + s_{642} \ln \ln 4 + s_{643} \ln \ln 3 + s_{644} \ln \ln 2 + s_{645} \ln \ln 1 + s_{646} \ln \ln 0 + s_{647} \ln \ln 8 + s_{648} \ln \ln 7 + s_{649} \ln \ln 6 + s_{650} \ln \ln 5 + s_{651} \ln \ln 4 + s_{652} \ln \ln 3 + s_{653} \ln \ln 2 + s_{654} \ln \ln 1 + s_{655} \ln \ln 0 + s_{656} \ln \ln 8 + s_{657} \ln \ln 7 + s_{658} \ln \ln 6 + s_{659} \ln \ln 5 + s_{660} \ln \ln 4 + s_{661} \ln \ln 3 + s_{662} \ln \ln 2 + s_{663} \ln \ln 1 + s_{664} \ln \ln 0 + s_{665} \ln \ln 8 + s_{666} \ln \ln 7 + s_{667} \ln \ln 6 + s_{668} \ln \ln 5 + s_{669} \ln \ln 4 + s_{670} \ln \ln 3 + s_{671} \ln \ln 2 + s_{672} \ln \ln 1 + s_{673} \ln \ln 0 + s_{674} \ln \ln 8 + s_{675} \ln \ln 7 + s_{676} \ln \ln 6 + s_{677} \ln \ln 5 + s_{678} \ln \ln 4 + s_{679} \ln \ln 3 + s_{680} \ln \ln 2 + s_{681} \ln \ln 1 + s_{682} \ln \ln 0 + s_{683} \ln \ln 8 + s_{684} \ln \ln 7 + s_{685} \ln \ln 6 + s_{686} \ln \ln 5 + s_{687} \ln \ln 4 + s_{688} \ln \ln 3 + s_{689} \ln \ln 2 + s_{690} \ln \ln 1 + s_{691} \ln \ln 0 + s_{692} \ln \ln 8 + s_{693} \ln \ln 7 + s_{694} \ln \ln 6 + s_{695} \ln \ln 5 + s_{696} \ln \ln 4 + s_{697} \ln \ln 3 + s_{698} \ln \ln 2 + s_{699} \ln \ln 1 + s_{700} \ln \ln 0 + s_{701} \ln \ln 8 + s_{702} \ln \ln 7 + s_{703} \ln \ln 6 + s_{704} \ln \ln 5 + s_{705} \ln \ln 4 + s_{706} \ln \ln 3 + s_{707} \ln \ln 2 + s_{708} \ln \ln 1 + s_{709} \ln \ln 0 + s_{710} \ln \ln 8 + s_{711} \ln \ln 7 + s_{712} \ln \ln 6 + s_{713} \ln \ln 5 + s_{714} \ln \ln 4 + s_{715} \ln \ln 3 + s_{716} \ln \ln 2 + s_{717} \ln \ln 1 + s_{718} \ln \ln 0 + s_{719} \ln \ln 8 + s_{720} \ln \ln 7 + s_{721} \ln \ln 6 + s_{722} \ln \ln 5 + s_{723} \ln \ln 4 + s_{724} \ln \ln 3 + s_{725} \ln \ln 2 + s_{726} \ln \ln 1 + s_{727} \ln \ln 0 + s_{728} \ln \ln 8 + s_{729} \ln \ln 7 + s_{730} \ln \ln 6 + s_{731} \ln \ln 5 + s_{732} \ln \ln 4 + s_{733} \ln \ln 3 + s_{734} \ln \ln 2 + s_{735} \ln \ln 1 + s_{736} \ln \ln 0 + s_{737} \ln \ln 8 + s_{738} \ln \ln 7 + s_{739} \ln \ln 6 + s_{740} \ln \ln 5 + s_{741} \ln \ln 4 + s_{742} \ln \ln 3 + s_{743} \ln \ln 2 + s_{744} \ln \ln 1 + s_{745} \ln \ln 0 + s_{746} \ln \ln 8 + s_{747} \ln \ln 7 + s_{748} \ln \ln 6 + s_{749} \ln \ln 5 + s_{750} \ln \$$

9 A) IMPACT ON LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY I. OVERALL IMPACT

166 (b) panel data model with constant slope and heterogeneous intercept, and (c) SUR model with heterogeneous
 167 intercept and slope.

168 The null hypotheses postulated for the study are as follows: Under the assumption that u st are independently
 169 and normally distributed over s and t with mean zero and variance σ^2 , F-tests are used to test the null
 170 hypotheses H_{11} , H_{12} , and H_{13} . Under H_{11} , the F-statistic carried out would be: ??
$$(S_{11} - S_{12}) / [(N-1)(k+1)] F_1 = -S_{11} / [NT - N(k+1)]$$

 171

172 Where, S 3 is the residual sum of squares of common intercept and slope; S 1 is residual sum of squares of
173 within group with heterogeneous intercept and slope.

If F1 is not significant, we pool the data and estimate a single equation. If the F ratio is significant, a further attempt is made to find out if the nonhomogeneity is due to heterogeneous slopes or intercept.

Under the null hypothesis of heterogeneous intercept and homogeneous slope (H12),

$$\text{S2} - \text{S1} \sim \text{F}_{(N-1, k)} \quad \text{where } \text{S2} = \text{S1} + \text{S}_{\text{res}} \quad \text{and } \text{S}_{\text{res}} \sim \text{F}_{(N-1, k-1)}$$

If F_2 with $(N-1)K$ and $NT-N(K+1)$ degrees of freedom is significant, then the null hypothesis of heterogeneous intercept but homogeneous slope is rejected. However, if F_2 is not significant, we can then determine the extent to which non-homogeneity can arise in the intercepts (Hsiao, 2003). If H_2 is accepted, we can apply a conditional test for homogeneous intercepts, as $H_3 : ?_1 = ?_2 = \dots = ?_N$, given $?_1 = ?_2 = \dots = ?_N$

183 The F 1 -test carried out on the residual sums of squares for SUR and pooled data model rejects the hypothesis
 184 for homogeneous intercepts and elasticity coefficients. Further, to find out whether nonhomogeneity is due to
 185 heterogeneous slopes or intercepts, F 2 -test has been carried out on the residual sums of squares for FE and SUR
 186 data and has been found to be significant at 1 percent level. This rejects the second hypothesis that regression
 187 elasticity coefficients are homogeneous and intercepts are not. These two Ftests suggest that the model $y_i = a$
 188 $i + \beta_k x_i + u_i$ is treated as maintained hypothesis (Hsiao, 2003).

¹⁸⁹ 7 d) Impact on Employment

190 The recent rise in unemployment in a number of countries in the context of the growing globalization has focused
191 the attention on issues related to FDI and its potential employment effects in the host countries. Conversely
192 MNEs can play an important role in generating employment directly as well as indirectly through backward and
193 forward linkages. In general inflows of FDI are not necessarily associated with a net generation or displacement
194 of employment to such an extent as to have an insignificant influence on the aggregate level of employment.
195 Employment creation is one of the many aspects which are related to inward FDI.

196 Empirical studies supported by the recent evidence suggest that MNEs can help in development process in the
197 host countries by facilitating employment of local labour, transferring technology to the host countries as well as
198 expanding trade and integration into global markets. However, the view of most economists seems to be that no
199 firm conclusion is acceptable about the net employment effects of FDI.

205 Where, E is employment; PI and GCF are per capita income and gross capital formation respectively.

To find whether the response parameters vary significantly from one state to another, which is invariant over time, we performed the same tests as above using the three models: (a) pooled with common intercept and slope, (b) panel data model with constant slope and heterogeneous intercept, and (c) SUR model with heterogeneous intercept and slope. The F 1 -test carried out on the residual sums of squares for SUR and pooled data model rejects the hypothesis for homogeneous intercepts and elasticity coefficients. Further, F 2 -test carried out on the residual sums of squares for FE and SUR data has been found to be significant at 1 percent level. This rejects the second hypothesis that regression elasticity coefficients are homogeneous and intercepts are not. These two F-tests suggest that the model $y_{it} = a_i + \beta_{ki} x_{it} + u_{it}$ is treated as maintained hypothesis.

214 IV.

215 8 Discussion of Results

216 9 a) Impact on Labour Productivity i. Overall Impact

217 The Pooled, FE and RE result of impact of FDI on labour productivity concludes that overall benefit to the states
218 is encouraging (see table 1). Hausman test statistics shows RE model to be superior to FE model. RE model
219 captures the state-specific time-invariant effects on its intercept. The elasticity estimate of labour productivity
220 due to FDI is positive and significant at one per cent. This result reveals that the states have benefited in general
221 as labour productivity increases due to spillover effect of foreign direct investment through the introduction of
222 capital, technology and managerial skill.

223 ii. State-Specific Impact It should be emphasized here that the panel data methodologies focused on the
224 different responses controlling the individual-specific time-invariant effects.

Allowing for the possibility of the slope coefficients to vary across states as well and the error term to contemporaneously correlate across industries, Table 2 summarizes the results based on SUR model. The result from the SUR model reveals a significant positive impact of FDI on labour productivity in West Bengal, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, while the elasticity estimate of labour productivity with respect to FDI is positive and insignificant in Delhi and Haryana. However the elasticity estimate of labour productivity with respect to FDI is negative and significant in Orissa and Rajasthan which are relatively less developed states. The effect of FDI on labour productivity is found to be significant and positive in the group of catching-up and/or more developed states. If the technology gap between the foreign and domestic set up is low it may lead to assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment. On the other hand the impact of FDI on the receiving states, for instance Orissa and Rajasthan, will fail to materialise if there is lack of sufficient abilities to adopt superior technologies used by foreign firms. This shows that the level of growth is positively associated with the beneficial impact of FDI. Borensztein et al. (1998) and ??alasubramanyan et al. (1999) also confirm the relation between the impact of FDI and the quality of human capital. The potential for positive spillovers depend on absorptive capacity and the presence of innovation capabilities in the host regions. The impact of FDI on productivity critically depends on the capacity to absorb technology in the host country ??Nelson and Phelps, 1966; ??enhabib & Speigel, 1994). FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology also suggested that the application of this advanced technology requires the presence of human capital in the host country.

The more the economy is better developed, the more the state is ready to benefit from FDI. The policy implication of this result is that the favourable impact of FDI on productivity can be strengthened by improving the absorptive capacity of the recipient states. b) Impact on Employment i. Overall-Impact Following the similar methodology as in the preceding section, the Hausman test shows RE model to be superior to FE models. The elasticity coefficient of employment with respect to FDI in RE model is positive and significant (table 3). The result is thus encouraging showing an overall expansion in employment in the states.

ii. State-Specific Impact F-tests carried out between pooled, FE and SUR model reject the null hypotheses that regression elasticity coefficients are identical, and intercepts are not. After controlling for the size, FDI has uneven impact on employment in the states. There is a clear trade-off between labour productivity and employment. There is a significant negative impact of FDI on employment in the cases of West Bengal, Delhi, Kerala and Maharashtra. The more developed states, where the labour productivity has increased due to FDI inflows there is a reduction in the number of employed. On the other hand, FDI has a positive and significant impact on employment in Rajasthan, Orissa, Haryana and Karnataka (table 4). Thus less developed states show employment expansion with hardly any productivity improvement. This is probably due to labour intensive nature of the industries in these states where labour cost is already low.

Developed states on the other hand both labour cost is high and technology intensive industries are dominant labour productivity has taken place in a more pronounced manner. While SDP growth rate has not been at the same pace as the rate of improvement in labour productivity, employment contraction has taken place. Since our data is from 1991-2004, this clearly is the transient state where growth rate lags labour productivity improvement. The same is not true in the case for underdeveloped states such as Rajasthan and Orissa, as there has been hardly any labour productivity improvement with economic growth which is showing in expansion of employment in such states. However, in states such as Haryana and Karnataka there are few exceptions to these two trends where expansion of economy has inched passed the labour productivity improvement, it clearly shows that these states have already taken off in economic growth.

V.

10 Summary and Conclusions

We tried to analyse the spillover effects of FDI on eight different states in India in the post reform period between 1991 and 2004. We used FE and RE models to study the overall effect of FDI and SUR model for more holistic picture. The FE and the RE model result revealed that the overall impact of FDI on productivity and employment is quite encouraging for the period considered. However the SUR model which gave a detailed picture of the impact of FDI showed that across regions the impacts are quite uneven. For example FDI has a significant positive impact on labour productivity in West Bengal, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra, whereas, in Orissa and Rajasthan labour productivity was negative and significant. The effect of FDI on employment was significant and negative in West Bengal, Delhi, Kerala, and Maharashtra; while other states exhibited a significant positive impact. Thus, those states where the labour productivity is rising due to FDI inflows generally revealed a significantly negative impact on employment except for Karnataka and Haryana, where the impact of FDI on both labour productivity and employment are positive and significant.

The above findings show that the impact of FDI on labour productivity is negative in less developed states, while it has significant and positive effect in catching-up and/or more developed states where technology intensive sectors are predominantly prevailing. For underdeveloped states there has hardly been any labour productivity improvement which showed in expansion of employment. Thus it can be concluded that the impact of FDI on productivity significantly depends on the absorptive capacity of the recipient states which may enhance the spillover effect and thereby strengthen the impact of FDI on productivity growth. That is, it is likely that at very low levels of absorptive capacity the potentially positive impact of FDI may fail to materialize. In Karnataka and

10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

286 Haryana where SDP growth has surpassed the labour productivity improvement there are exceptions to these
287 two trends. It showed that these states have already taken off.

288 This poses a big question as to whether liberalisation is making the rich states richer in relative terms and
289 leaving the poor states lagging behind or will it lead to any convergence across states. However, creating favourable
290 conditions for FDI is likely to support productivity convergence. The favourable impact of FDI on productivity
can be strengthened by improving the absorptive capacity of the recipient states.



11

Figure 1: H 11 :

a) Hypotheses

Based on the analytical framework and literature we derive some hypotheses regarding the impact of FDI, on labour productivity and employment growth across the regions in India.

H 11 : FDI would have a positive impact on labour productivity across all the states of India.

H 12 : Impact of FDI on labour productivity would be different in each state.

H 21 : FDI would have a positive impact on domestic employment across all the states of India.

H 22 : Impact of FDI on domestic employment would be different in each state.

b) Data, Variables and Methodology

Approved FDI data over the post reform period 1991-2004 for the eight selected states have been collected from the Secretariat of Industrial Assistance (SIA) newsletter, a publications of the Ministry of Industries and Commerce, Government of India. The data for the other variables are compiled from Handbook of statistics on the Indian economy (Reserve Bank of India), Indian statistical abstract, various issues, labour bureau, Ministry of Labour, Annual Survey of Industries, India all at state level. Several missing values for some observations were extrapolated.

Figure 2:

291

1

Variable	Pooled	Fixed effects	Random effects
ln(fdi)	0.043(2.981)*	0.013(1.734)*	0.014(1.777)*
ln(gcf)	0.000(0.073)	0.004(0.827)	0.004(0.783)
ln(wage)	1.037(5.909)*	1.347(9.483)*	1.326(9.089)***
Constant	6.444(21.561)***		6.856(26.789)***
R 2	0.43	0.60	0.58
Adj. R 2	0.41	0.59	0.57
Nobs, Nvar	112,4	112,4	112,4

Note: Against each variable, the first row represents the elasticity coefficient and t-statistics in the parentheses.

* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

Hausman Test: Ho: Random Effects; Ha: Fixed Effects

Statistic = -0.486; Probability = 0.999

Figure 3: Table 1 :

2

Variable	Rajasthan	W.B.	Delhi	Haryana	Karnataka	Kerala	Maharashtra	Odisha
ln(fdi)	- 0.041	0.007	0.001	0.025		0.039	0.051	-0.008
(-5.081)***	0.042	(7.194)***	(0.575)	(0.224)	(4.749)***	(8.633)***	(17.225)***	2.742
ln(gcf)	- 0.181	-0.016	0.008	0.062		0.125	-0.041	0.051
(-5.235)***	0.018	(3.281)***	(-	(3.940)***	(0.860)	(2.980)***	(-	(1.480)
ln(wage)	3.4662.257	1.873	2.261	0.486		0.833	1.702	0.882
(18.515)***	(18.515)***	(9.907)***	(7.432)***	(10.813)***	(3.429)***	(7.589)***	(9.788)***	(8.538)
Constant	10.478.523	8.212	8.386	5.248		5.135	7.690	5.835
(34.203)***	(34.203)***	(21.510)***	(20.044)***	(25.373)***	(7.757)***	(21.020)***	(22.667)***	(17.86)
R 2	0.61	0.85	0.67	0.84	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.67
Adj. R 2	0.41	0.77	0.50	0.77	0.79	0.83	0.85	0.48

Note: Against each variable, the first row represents the elasticity coefficient and the second row gives the t-statistics.

*significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

Figure 4: Table 2 :

10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

3

Variable	Pooled	Fixed effects	Random effects
ln(fdi)	-0.0134(-1.141)	0.010(2.427) ^{0.111}	0.009(1.821)*
ln(pci)	0.564(14.366) ^{0.077}	(2.291) ^{0.127}	(3.329)***
ln(gcf)	-0.011(-1.269)	0.003(0.967)	0.002(0.527)
Constant	3.353(13.029)***		6.104(23.964)***
R 2	0.75	0.18	0.21
Adj. R 2	0.74	0.16	0.18
Nobs, Nvar	112,4	112,4	112,4

Note: Against each variable, the first row represents the elasticity coefficient and t-statistics in the parentheses

*significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

Hausman Test: Ho: Random Effects; Ha: Fixed Effects

Statistic = -7.826; Probability = 0.999

Figure 5: Table 3 :

4

Variable	Rajasthan	W.B.	Delhi	Haryana	Karnataka	Kerala	Maharashtra	Odisha
ln(fdi)	0.022 (20.636)***	-0.005 (-)	-0.040 (-)	0.006 (11.302)*	0.027 (12.344)***	-0.027 (-)	-0.004 (4.614)	0.003 (4.45)***
				2.655)**	5.770)***			
ln(pci)	0.030 (20.609)***	-0.057 (6.442)***	-0.179 (5.592)**	0.127 (30.577)*	0.462 (7.728)***	0.814 (12.986)***	0.145 (9.201)***	-0.002 (0.27)
				3.066)**				
ln(gcf)	0.006 (20.609)***	-0.025 (-)	0.461 (18.945)*	0.000 (0.712)	-0.124 (-)	-0.129 (-)	0.051 (6.476)***	0.073 (5.551)
				1.325)	3.412)*			
Constant	6.154 (230.244)***	7.467 (35.236)*	5.998 (25.126)*	6.528 (208.21)*	4.701 (10.755)***	2.659 (6.972)***	5.933 (106.831)***	5.784 (32.4)
R 2	0.74	0.27	0.81	0.83	0.58	0.82	0.80	0.15
Adj. R 2	0.62	0.09	0.71	0.75	0.38	0.74	0.75	-0.27

Note: (1) Against each variable, the first row represents the elasticity coefficient and the second row gives the t-statistics in the parentheses.

* significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent

Figure 6: Table 4 :

292 [Zellner ()] 'An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for aggregation bias'. A
293 Zellner . *Journal of American Statistical Association* 1962. 57 (298) p. .

294 [Haddad and Harrison ()] 'Are positive spillovers from direct foreign investment? Evidence from panel data for
295 Morocco'. M Haddad , A Harrison . *Journal of Development Economics* 1993. 42 p. .

296 [Bos et al. ()] 'Causes of Direct Investment: Foreign Firms, Shares in Canadian and United Kingdom Manufac-
297 turing Industries'. H C Bos , M Sanders , C Secchi . *Review of Economics and Statistics* 1974. 1974. 10 p. .
298 (Caves, R.E.)

299 [Domestic Product of States of India ()] *Domestic Product of States of India*, 2003. 1960-61 to 2000-01. Mumbai:
300 EPW Research Foundation.

301 [Berthelemy and Demurger ()] 'Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Theory and Application to
302 China'. J Berthelemy , S Demurger . *Review of Development Economics* 2000. 4 (2) p. .

303 [Chakraborty and Basu ()] 'Foreign Direct Investment and Growth in India: A Cointegration Approach'. C
304 Chakraborty , P Basu . *Applied Economics* 2002. 34 p. .

305 [Globerman ()] 'Foreign direct investment and spillover efficiency benefits in Canadian manufacturing industries'.
306 S Globerman . *Canadian Journal of Economics* 1979. 12 p. .

307 [Balasubramanyam et al. ()] 'Foreign Direct Investment as an Engine of Growth'. V N Balasubramanyam , M
308 Salisu , D Dapsoford . *Journal of International Trade and Economic Development* 1999. 8 (1) p. .

309 [James et al. ()] 'Foreign Direct Investment as Catalyst for Industrial Development, NBER Working Papers
310 6241'. R James , A J Markusen , Venables . *National Bureau of Economic Research* 1997.

311 [Fry ()] *Foreign Direct Investment in a Macroeconomic Framework: Finance, Efficiency, Incentives and
312 distortion, PRE working paper*, M J Fry . 1992. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

313 [Blomstrom ()] 'Foreign Investment and Productive Efficiency: The Case of Mexico'. M Blomstrom . *Journal of
314 Industrial Economics* 1986. 15 p. .

315 [Blomstrom and Persson ()] 'Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in an Underdeveloped Economy:
316 Evidence from the Manufacturing Industry'. M Blomstrom , H Persson . *World Development* 1983. 11 p.
317 .

318 [Borensztein et al. ()] 'How does foreign investment affect economic growth?'. E Borensztein , J De Gregorio , J
319 W Lee . *Journal of International Economics* 1998. 45 p. .

320 [Hsiao ()] C Hsiao . *Analysis of Panel Data*, 2003. Cambridge University Press.

321 [Judge et al. ()] G Judge , W E Griffith , R Hills , T Lee . *the Theory and Practice of Econometrics*, (New York)
322 1985. John Wiley and Sons. 2. (nd ed.)

323 [Kokko ()] A Kokko . *Technology, Market Characteristics and Spillovers*, 1994. 43 p. .

324 [Manuel et al. ()] R Manuel , R Agosin , Mayer . *Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, Does it
325 Crowd in Domestic Investment?*, UNCTAD Discussion Papers 146, United Nation Conference on Trade and
326 Development, 2000.

327 [Moran ()] T H Moran . *Foreign Direct Investment and Development*, (Washington, DC) 1998. Institute for
328 International Economics

329 [Blomstrom and Edward ()] *Multinational Corporations and Productivity Convergence in Mexico*, M Blomstrom
330 , W Edward . 1989. Cambridge, Massachusetts. (NBER Working Paper 3141)

331 [Nagraj (2003)] Nagraj . *Foreign Direct Investment in India in 1990s: Trends and Issues*, 2003. April 26, 2003.
332 p. .

333 [Raut ()] 'R&D spillover and productivity growth: evidence from Indian private firms'. L K Raut . *Journal of
334 Development Economics* 1995. 48 p. .

335 [Dua et al. ()] 'Ramstetter (1993), Macroeconomics Trends, Foreign Firms, and Economic Policy in Thailand'.
336 Pami Dua , & Aneesa , I Rashid . *Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Activity in India*, Mitsuru
337 Toida, Daisuka Hiratsuka (ed.) (Tokyo) 1998. 33 p. . Institute of Developing Economics (Projection for
338 Industrializing Region II)

339 [Government Of] 'Secretariat of Industrial Assistance, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry
340 of Industry'. India Government Of . *SIA Newsletter*, (New Delhi) (Different issues)

341 [Blomstrom and Sjoholm ()] 'Technological Transfer and Spillover: Does Local Participation with Multinationals
342 Matter?'. M Blomstrom , F Sjoholm . *European Economic Review* 1999. 43 (4-6) p. .

343 [Rana ()] 'The Impact of trade and labour market regulations on employment and wages: evidence from
344 developing countries, East-West Centre Working papers'. Hasan Rana . *economics Series* 2001. (32) .

345 [Chen et al. ()] 'The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China's Post-1978 Economic Development'. C Chen ,
346 L Chang , Y Zhang . *World Development* 1995. 23 (24) p. .

10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

347 [United Nations The Impact of Trade-related Investment Measures on Trade and Development: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications]
348 'United Nations'. *The Impact of Trade-related Investment Measures on Trade and Development: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications*, (New York) 1991.
349

350 [Blomstrom et al. ()] 'What Explains Developing Country Growth?'. M Blomstrom , R E Lipsey , Mario Zejan
351 . *NBER Working Paper 4132*, (Inc) 1994.