

1 The Illocutionary Frames Principle (IFP) and the Austinian 2 Postulations: A Clause-Structure Investigative Discourse

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6

7 **Abstract**

8 Austin (1962) Austin (1962) is a theory of speech act; in this regard, it is essentially a theory
9 in pragmatics, which as a field of language study, studies how language is used according to
10 varied contextual nuances. In this paper, my arguments subtly engage semantics and those
11 pragmatic notions which constitute the communicative elements produced by clause structure.
12 I explore the System of Mood, the Abstract Performative Hypothesis and the Illocutionary
13 Frames Principle (IFP) to establish my positions. The findings include: the clause in which a
14 speech act verb occurs determines illocutionary acts performed in discourse, among other
15 things; linguistic issues abound, which reveal the strengths and weaknesses of Austinian
16 postulations; apart from determining what is communicated in discourse, clause structure also
17 has effects and implications on meaning and participants.

18

19 **Index terms**— pragmatics, semantics, mood, abstract performative hypothesis, illocutionary frames principle,
20 emergent context, clause structure, speech act, implica

21 **1 Introduction**

22 speech act study is essentially immersed in pragmatics. The major concerns of pragmatics include: speech acts
23 (when we speak, we perform various actions with our words); presuppositions (in communicative events, things
24 which participants take for granted are said to be presuppositions about the context); intentions (these are
25 participants' communicative goals); implicatures (implied issues in an utterance); contexts (the relevant aspects
26 of the physical or social setting of an utterance or discourse); inferences (making logical conclusions from available
27 contextual data); non-verbal communication (gestures, dressing and movements). These pragmatic concepts are
28 useful in this linguistic appraisal of Austinian postulations as they anchor my investigation of "speech acts around
29 the clause". Hymes (1972) observes "that language differs in terms of culture, structure and use.

30 **2 a) Austinian Postulations**

31 Austin's work, *How to Do Things with Words*, is a remarkable achievement in the study of speech acts in
32 particular and in the literature of pragmatics in general. See Acheoah (2013) for more insights on this theory.
33 For the purpose of this study, I pay close attention to Austin's distinction between "the act of doing x" or
34 "achieving x" and "the act of attempting to do x".

35 My argument will rely on certain speech actcarrying sentences, and this makes it necessary to briefly examine
36 Austin's speech act taxonomy. Austin's taxonomy has no doubt influenced posthumous speech act taxonomies.
37 The classification of speech act is intractable and critical in the literature of pragmatics. I strongly believe
38 that feasible categorization of illocutionary forces is a prerequisite for the investigation of illocutionary acts.
39 However, it has been difficult to evolve a workable taxonomy in this field of language study, as several scholarly
40 attempts have their loopholes. Adegbija (1982) cites that these attempts include the pioneering ones by Austin
41 (1962), Ohmann ??1972, ??earle (1973 ?? revised in Searle, 1979), Franser ??1974), Campbell (1975), ??atz
42 (1977), ??cCawley (1977), ??ancher (1979), Bach and Harnish (1979) as well as ??allmer and Brennenstuhl

43 (1981). Austin attempts a general preliminary classification (cf. 1962:150) which produced five speech act
44 categories: Verdictives, Exercitives, Commissives, Behabitives and Expositives.

45 He notes "that Verdictives is typified by the giving of a verdict by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire. They may be
46 an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal" (p.153). Examples include "acquit", "convict", "reckon", "diagnose", and
47 "analyze".

48 Exercitives contains acts which involve "the exercising of powers, rights, or influence" (p. 151). Examples are
49 "appointing", "advising", "warning" and "ordering".

50 Commissives, which is Austin's third class, is characterized by promising or undertaking. Austin submits
51 "that the whole point of Commissives is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action" (p. 157). Examples
52 include "promise", "undertake", "contract", "covenant", and so on.

53 Behabitives, he posits, concerns attitudes and social behaviors. They include "the notion of reaction to other
54 people's behaviors and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or
55 imminent conduct" (p.160). Verbs in this A category include "apologize", "thank", "condole" and "sympathize".

56 Expositives, Austin's final class, is that which "makes plain how our utterances fit into the course of an
57 argument ?" (p.152). Examples of verbs in this category are "reply", "argue", "concede" and "illustrate". I
58 present (i) and (ii) which are postulations in Austin (ibid.) for a clause structure investigative discourse: 1.
59 Performing a speech act involves "doing x" or "attempting to do x", and there is perlocutionary object, uptake
60 and sequel in the act; 2. The difference between performatives and constatives is in the areas of "doing" and
61 "saying".

62 3 II.

63 Theoretical Framework I hinge on the System of Mood, the Abstract Performative Hypothesis (cf. Saddock 1974),
64 the Emergent Context and the Illocutionary Frames Principle (cf. Acheoah 2011) to give this investigation a
65 sound theoretical base, and make it a more illuminating discourse.

66 a) The System of Mood See Osisanwo (2003) for more insights on the system of mood in the English sentence.
67 The system of mood, among other things, accounts for the choices made by the speaker with regard to the
68 presence or absence of a subject in a linguistic stretch; where a subject is present, whether it is positioned before
69 or within the predicate; where the subject is absent, whether or not the speaker is one of the participants of the
70 action in the speech act. Consider: (a1) Ada writes (indicative mood with present subject in a statement);

71 (a2) Stand (Imperative mood without subject in a command/order). Allan (1986) submits "that only explicit
72 performative verbs occur in utterances using indicative mood. Utterance act has to do with who carries out the
73 action. Examples:

74 (a3) Get out! (Jussive that is when the listener is the performer);
75 (a4) Let him come here! (Non-jussive that is when neither the speaker nor the listener is the performer).

76 The jussive mood can include the speaker or exclude him e.g.:

77 (a5) Go out! (Jussive-exclusive); (a6) Let us go out! (Jussive-inclusive).

78 I contend through IFP, that even the non-jussive imperative can be used in such a way that the speaker
79 becomes the performer that is, by using an utterance in the frame of "Talking about doing x" as an illocutionary
80 strategy to request something from the addressee. The connection between the system of mood and illocutionary
81 act is not explained in Austin (ibid.); Questions and Requestives (see ??ach I do not want to expatiiate on the
82 system of mood in this paper, so I shall proceed to examine Saddock's linguistic theory.

83 b) The Abstract Performative Hypothesis Saddock (1974) contends "that explicit performatives make it clear
84 that illocutionary forces cannot be ruled out of Speech Act Theories" (ibid. p.12). He proposes the Abstract
85 Performative Analysis which states "that in the deep structure semantic representations of certain sentences, the
86 subject refers to the speaker of the sentence, the indirect object refers to the addressee and illocutionary force is
87 that part of the meaning of a sentence which corresponds to the highest clause in its semantic representation".
88 He contends that sentential ambiguity is informed by illocutionary force, and that a single sentence can be a
89 conjunction of two or more clauses, each with its illocutionary force; I explore the IFP to explain that not all
90 illocutionary forces in clause constituents impinge on meaning, implicatures and perlocutionary sequel.

91 c) The Illocutionary Frames Principle (IFP) IFP presents my break-away position in the discussion of
92 participant-concept in pragmatics in general and Austin's. Theory in particular. I opine through the devised
93 theoretical concept, IFP, that participants' utterance acts can be understood in terms of whether they are
94 "performers" or "conveyers" of the illocutionary acts therein. I observe that discourse often begins with a speaker-
95 hearer based context (context of speech). This facilitates the inferential process and generation of implicatures
96 and presuppositions. But there are sometimes Emergent contexts subsumed in an ongoing discourse. The arrows
97 in the diagram below indicate the interaction between the context of speech and the Emergent Context; in its
98 speaker-hearer based capacity, the "context of speech" is a macro (broad) context whereas the Emergent Context
99 is a micro context in a given discourse. To show that an Emergent Context hinders perlocutionary sequel, I have
100 used minus signs. Thus, the plus signs show the points where perlocutionary sequel occurs; when no context is
101 emergent in the context of speech or when the Emergent Context has become shared knowledge to the participants
102 of discourse. The triangle which represents the Emergent Context is drawn upside down to communicate the
103 unexpected nature of an Emergent Context in an on-going discourse; we do not expect an equilateral triangle to
104 be upside down.

105 4 f) Critical Perspectives on Austinian Postulations

106 Austin's idea of a perlocutionary sequel as in (i) may not operate when a Directive such as "Student, stay here!"
107 is performed with the expected felicity conditions; a Lecturer utters it to a student in a lecture-room. My
108 view in this theoretical attempt is to state that the hearer-based level of an illocutionary act does not yield a
109 perlocutionary sequel until the speaker (Lecturer) is made to know why it is logical to disobey his supposed
110 felicitous Directive. A micro context, the Emergent Context is a constituent of the context of speech. It is
111 hidden because none of the participants envisaged it. This concept does not hold when there is no existing
112 discourse. It is simply an attempt to capture superimposed contextual nuances in discourse. Whenever there
113 is an Emergent Context, participants' world knowledge and mutual contextual beliefs are on the alert. These
114 discourse tools facilitate the generation of implicatures in Emergent Contexts. For example, since the student
115 disobeys his lecturer's Directive due to the Emergent Context, the perlocutionary effect of the student's action on
116 this Lecturer (after the Lecturer had known that the student's reason for disobeying his directive is reasonable)
117 can neither be "disgrace" nor "annoyance".

118 5 Hearer-based

119 Speaker-hearer based I 'have maintained that "Doing x" (performing an illocutionary act) has to be understood
120 to have propositional contents that should be clear to hearers. But there are sentences that are too problematic
121 for Austinian stance with regards uptake, because of their in-built multiple interpretive potentials (numerous
122 layers of meaning). Different layers of meaning can be attributed to S's utterance by H. This means that even
123 the literal meaning of utterances cannot take care of Consider: 1. Ade is in the hospital; 2. Ade is in the house;
124 3. I went to the toilet and forced myself; 4. I went to the market and forced myself. S: Do you have toilet here?
125 H: The nearest toilet here is in the market, and it is a public one. S: Let me hurry there. Even if it is dirty, I
126 shall force myself. H: How far? (after some minutes that S was back). S: I went to the toilet and forced myself.
127 H: Poor you! I align with Saddock's submission "that a clear distinction between performatives and constatives
128 proves difficult to establish". There are explicit performative as argued by Saddock (*ibid.*) which shows that a
129 verb used in a certain way makes explicit the action being performed. In the sentence, "I insist that snow is
130 not white", the same act can be performed implicitly if the sentence is reframed as "Snow is not white" (where
131 felicity and truth/falsity are predicated). There is the common knowledge in pragmatics, that an encoder can use
132 constatives as performatives (to perform actions rather than their usual truth/falsity attributes assigned to them
133 in Austin's theoretical framework). I assign this role to "Talking about doing x" relying on the devised concept,
134 Illocutionary Frames Principle (IFP). For example, a child can persuade his mother to buy him a wrist-watch by
135 simply "talking about how his friend's mother bought the friend a wrist-watch"; he utters the utterance, expects
136 the mother to understand it as an indirect Requestive different from "Doing x"; in "Talking about doing x" the
137 child has used a constative as a performative so that both a performative and a constative do not differ in "doing
138 and saying" as Austin posits. I also note that an encoder can request and get something from the decoder by
139 merely making a participant who though is in the setting, is not the speaker's interlocutor, hear the utterance
140 which conveys the Requestive illocutionary act. In natural illocutionary forces, whereas mutual contextual beliefs
141 Consider:

142 whereas mutual contextual beliefs and world knowledge can do so. If H has mutual contextual knowledge
143 with S, (4)...becomes meaningful, for example: speech situations, there are cases where a speaker does not speak
144 directly.

145 In (1), the speaker means "Ade is there as a patient or as a visitor of a patient". In (2), we are not made
146 to attach any adverbial of reason to the sentence, because of its clarity. Figure 2 shows the different layers of
147 meaning for (1) -(??). Apart from processing (4), H can pretend to be addressing.

148 Pretends to be addressing his interlocutor whereas he is addressing another hearer in the context of speech and
149 situation. I therefore propose the concept, H2 (Hearer2), in the literature of pragmatics. The concept refers to
150 a speaker's "targeted-hearer" rather than his interlocutor. I use the concept to argue "that there are other acts
151 performed in discourse, besides "Doing x" "myself". In (3), it is implied that "forced myself" means "struggling
152 to pass out waste product (defecate or urinate)". But (??) is meaningless, because S needs to process the speech
153 if H does not share with him, background knowledge that facilitates understanding. Figure 2: It is clear that
154 "Doing x" means "Doing x unconditionally". For example, if a speaker tells the hearer, "I will give you some
155 money" the speaker promises the hearer unconditionally, and this is the case when a marker of the conditional
156 clause, such as "if", is not introduced into the sentence. In other words, when the markers of other adverbial
157 clauses e.g. the adverbial clause of reason (because) concession (although), and so on, are the initiators of the
158 subordinate clause, "Doing x" counts as "Doing x". But this is not the case when the initiator of the subordinate
159 clause is a marker of the conditional clause (unless, if, among others). I examine the exchange below: (a17) Son:
160 I passed the exam.

161 (a18) Dad: Expect N2000 from me tomorrow (promising unconditionally).

162 The second unit in this conversation is informed by the first. Thus, there is a covert marker of the adverb of
163 reason in Dad's utterance; that is, Dad's reason for promising Son is that Son passed his exam.

164 In (a18), the act is performed whether or not the reason for it is stated. However, "Doing x" could occur in
165 different types of clauses (paraphrases):

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166 (a19) Expect N2000 from me tomorrow for passing the exam; (a20) I am promising you N2000 for passing the
167 exam; (a21) I am to give you N2000 for passing the exam; (a22) You are entitled to N2000 for passing the exam;
168 (a23) N2000 is yours for passing the exam.

169 IFP explains that a given speech act can be conveyed or performed with or without the use of the conventional
170 operative words such as the use of the verb "order" or "command" in a sentence whose communicative function
171 is "command", the use of the verb "state" to make a statement or the use of the verb "promise" in a sentence
172 which promises. Therefore, In (a24), the speaker uses "Doing x" as a reference or topic. This can be illustrated
173 using the adjacency pairs below: (a24) Omone: I passed the exam. (a25) Dad: Why telling me? I was not the
174 one, but Mum, who promised you, "Expect #2000 from me tomorrow for passing the exam." Dad is "Talking
175 about doing x" (talking about an act of promise uttered by Mum) rather than promising Omone. "Talking about
176 doing x" occurs in a direct (quoted) or an indirect clause.

177 6 UTTERANCE

178 The implication of my arguments for speech act theories in general, is that in (a25), "Mum", not "Dad", performs
179 "the act of promise". IFP aligns with Sadock's submission 'that the clause in which an NP occurs, determines
180 whether or not acts are performed by the NP. I observe that (a25) is synonymous with (a26) in which "so"
181 replaces "Expect #2000 from me for passing the exam": (a26) It was not me but Otun who said so Referentialism
182 postulates that indexicals, names and demonstratives determine what is said, rather than other descriptive words
183 used in saying. IFP is germane to this claim. Illocutionary contents in declarative clauses (Austin's famous
184 examples in the discussion of felicity conditions for acts include declaratives) that are in "conveyer-clauses"
185 neither concern felicity nor infelicity conditions since the speaker is quoting another person's declarative. If a
186 student says to a young man and woman, "I was there when the leader said, 'As a Priest, I proclaim both of you
187 husband and wife', " the people at which the Priest's quoted declarative is directed, cannot be joined as husband
188 and wife through the "direct, declarative speech act clause". To join them as husband and wife, the utterance,
189 "A priest, I declare you husband and wife" (all things being equal) will yield perlocutionary sequel of making the
190 "world" to match the Priest's "words" (see Searle 1969 for insights on "direction of fit").

191 The "performer" of an act may not be a "participant" but a "referent" in the on-going communication whereas
192 the "conveyer" is always a participant. In the sentence, "I was there when the leader said, 'As a Priest I declare
193 both of you husband and wife' " the conveyer (the student) is a "participatory participant" whereas the performer
194 (the Priest) is a "sentential participant" In conveying another person's act, the conveyer is "Talking about doing
195 x" (talking about another person's promising, ordering, informing, as the case may be). The conveyer may
196 present the referent's act in direct or indirect speeches. Thus, I propose the notions, "conveyer of speech acts"
197 and "performer of speech acts", using IFP as a theoretical framework, to argue that in the referential clause,
198 conventional implicatures or illocutionary contents do not concern sentential participants (nouns or indexical)
199 since they are mentioned in referential clauses which may be quoted or not; thus, just as the clause that encloses
200 the illocutionary content of a sentence, the referential clause has its subject, and may also have an object. Indeed
201 part of the argument IFP presents is that the idea of "uptake" contained in (i) may not operate in discourse as
202 "Talking about doing x" may not be understood by a decoder as his encoder's indirect illocutionary strategy. For
203 instance, it takes a father to know his son for "always being indirect in the use of illocutionary act (idiosyncrasy),
204 before the father can generate uptake as expected by the son when the son is "Talking about doing x" to achieve
205 an illocutionary goal. On the issue of perlocutionary object, I note that the son can use an act of Promise to
206 persuade or an act of Greeting to warn. The fact remains that the common pre-knowledge which the decoder has
207 makes it easy for him to identify the illocutionary contents that are actually speaker-based. If I use the utterance
208 "Hi!" to warn my little baby (I am strongly indebted to Adegbija 1982 in the use of this example), and achieve
209 my illocutionary goal, can I say there was uptake on the part of the baby or perlocutionary object on my part?
210 In Austin's view, "uptake" has to do with how the hearer understands a particular speech act performed in a
211 given context, whereas perlocutionary object has to do with using the formal properties or linguistic conventions
212 of natural languages to achieve illocutionary acts. For example, it negates linguistic convention, for a speaker
213 to use "Hi" to warn his interlocutor rather than using it as a Greeting. All this boils back to the fact that the
214 encoder of "Hi" relies on world knowledge in the selection of communication elements.

215 IFP is not evolved to state the conditions for perlocutionary acts, but to state the various forms uptake has in
216 communication. If a decoder understands that the encoder is not insulting, promising, commanding, informing;
217 but merely talking about these acts, then implicatures and perlocutionary sequel become predictable. Figure
218 ??: "A to do x", "T about Doing x" and "Doing x c" represent "Attempting to do x", "Talking about doing x"
219 and "Doing x conditionally" respectively. Frame 1 of Figure ?? is a cross-like shape because other illocutionary
220 frames are aspects of it. I use circular caps for Frames 2-4 because they are context-enclosed choices in their
221 indirect speech act potency. The vertical arrows penetrating each circular cap and the horizontal ones beside
222 each illocutionary act type show that each of the frames is interpreted accordingly by participants; their literal
223 and non-literal propositional contents are of speaker-hearer knowledge. The participants understand frames 1-4,
224 that is, there is "uptake" with regards the frame of each of the illocutionary acts; the hearer understands an
225 utterance in different frames: "Doing x (which is essentially doing x unconditionally)", "Attempting to do x",
226 "Talking about doing x" or "doing x conditionally." I have used the upward arrows in Frame 1 because "Doing
227 x" is clearly understood by decoders as a dominant non-literal illocutionary strategy in every day discourse. To

228 create a difference between a superordinate illocutionary frame, which Frame 1 represents, I choose to place an
229 "headless" arrow beside it.

230 **7 III.**

231 **8 Results**

232 Thus, based on the clause in which a performative formula occurs, it may either be "doing or saying x", and this
233 negates Austin's claim in (ii). In other words, when a constative is used as an indirect speech act in the frame
234 of "Talking about doing x" it can be categorized as being in the domain of "doing" not "saying" (which is the
235 dominant domain of constatives). The IFP therefore shows that there is indeed some forms of clause-structure
236 patterning and selection that conveys speakers' illocutionary goals and the propositional contents of sentences.
237 An encoder may choose a suitable illocutionary frame such as "Doing x conditionally", expecting his decoder to
238 interpret the utterance alongside the context to be able to focus on speaker's emphatic linguistic stretch. The
239 potency of IFP theory is clear when one considers the fact that in natural languages, speakers do not always
240 speak directly.

241 Although it takes the illocutionary act potential for a sentence to "mean", such a meaning is bedeviled. The
242 clause-structure investigation established in this study, declares that the speaker-meaning remains clear when
243 the same illocutionary verb is positioned in different parts of a sentence.

244 **9 IV.**

245 **10 Discussion**

246 I have engaged a critical overview of Austin's speech act theory basically from a clause-structure perspective. The
247 theory defines "appropriateness" in the use of words or speech acts to do things in terms of how speakers abide by
248 the norms of the language (linguistic acceptability). It is of semantic relevance, to investigate the relationships
249 which illocutionary acts have with the grammatical agencies that convey them. This will help ascertain whether
250 or not or better still, the extent at which structural or grammatical patterns have to comply with illocutionary
251 act performance. After an extensive study of the popular taxonomies of illocutionary acts in the literature of
252 pragmatics, Saddock submits that arbitrary criteria and irregularities characterize illocutionary act classification.

253 I contend that the IFP explains part of the weaknesses of the Truth Conditional Theory. For example, the
254 sentence, "The woman who was never pregnant, gave birth to a bouncing baby boy" becomes "logical" if said in
255 a "conveyer clause" in which Andrew reports Phil's statement in the frame of "Talking about doing

256 x". World knowledge, besides linguistic competence, helps hearers to interpret illocutionary acts as either
257 "conveying illocutionary forces" or "performing same" in the context of speech; Holdcroft (1978:20) posits "that
258 the whole idea of a perlocutionary act is of an act which when performed by saying something can be redescribed
259 as the performance of an illocutionary act with certain consequences". One of the reasons why many illocutionary
260 acts do not have consequences in certain speech situations is that they are understood by hearers as not being in
261 the performative clause structure. I observe that in natural languages, sentences are often expanded to generate
262 different clause structures, of which not all the clauses have potent illocutionary acts that seriously affect, concern,
263 implicate or engage the on-going discourse and the participants therein. Sperber and Wilson (1988) contend "that
264 expansions and completions are not implicatures, but are explicit contents of utterances". In addition, Bach and
265 Harnish (1979: 219-28) note that explanations can be given why certain locutions do not fit into the category of
266 "what is said"; such locutions abound in constructions with which they have syntactic but not semantic relations.
267 Therefore, in this study I have used linguistic context-sensitive sentences (for analysis) which make easy, coherent
268 and clear presentation of arguments.

269 The trio: syntax, semantics and pragmatics have to be properly understood in order to comprehend how
270 language and speech acts operate; an act of promise performed in the frame of "Talking about doing x (talking
271 about someone else's promising)" does not make a hearer expect something (the object) from the speaker.
272 Waismann (1951) notes that predication mostly requires a context due to the open texture of most empirical
273 concepts. In spite of the fact that I mainly present linguistic arguments towards the critique of Austinian
274 theoretical positions, I note that external factors (world knowledge, presuppositions and mutual contextual
275 beliefs) influence the interpretation of meaning within clause structures, and the consequences (sequel) of linguistic
276 elements on the participants of discourse (which are also beyond the sentence) can be determined by a speaker's
277 placement of speech act verbs in the clauses of a sentence. David Harrah, cited in ??avas (1994:375) cites "that
278 most speech acts seem to be focused and directed. They are intended as coming from the agent and going to
279 the receivers or audience. They are intended to have a certain point, and they are intended to be construed as
280 having a certain point"; this claim captures Austinian postulation in (i) "that performing a speech act involves a
281 perlocutionary object, an uptake and a sequel". I posit that a Directive performed in an illocutionary frame other
282 than that of "Doing x" will not yield a sequel unless the encoder uses it as an indirect illocutionary strategy. David
283 Harrah explains that speech acts that are focused or directed at receivers are said to be "vectored". Vectoring
284 makes the encoder's intentions known to the decoder. I rely more on statements, questions and orders in the
285 presentation of this linguistic critique, noting "that most languages have non-propositional distinctions among
286 at least three basic types, clustering around the central features of statement making, question asking and order

11 CONCLUSION

287 giving” ??Saddock and Zwicky 1985). The clause-structure approach to the study of meaning and illocutionary
288 act therefore has significant implications on speech act theory in modern perspectives.

289 V.

290 11 Conclusion

291 Sentences have their in-built meanings (normative or linguistic meanings) despite the possibility of speaker-
292 meanings. Levinson (1983) argues that it is a tremendous thing for hearers to work out speakers’ intentions in
293 uttering certain utterances, bearing in mind the dynamics of contexts. In a similar vein, Bronislaw and Archibald
294 (2004) opine that there are usually constraints which inform the different components of speech. Thus, clause
295 structure patterning is neither arbitrary nor insignificant. He corroborates other scholars who hold the view that
296 certain linguistic forms do not have to correlate with certain illocutionary forces. The different illocutionary
297 frames in IFP explain that a single illocutionary act can be performed in different frames. However, a good
298 mastery of linguistic and extralinguistic variables enables participants of discourse to use different frames of a
single speech act to achieve illocutionary goals. ¹ ²



Figure 1:

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