

1 Institutional Collaboration as Essential Ingredient for Good
2 Governance, Efficient and Effective Service Delivery in a
3 Democracy: A Critical Discourse

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7

8 **Abstract**

9 Democracy, governance process and the accompanying politics in real sense largely consist of
10 the examination and maintenance of the ways in which constitutional, political and
11 administrative institutions, social forces and movementss in a particular society interact with
12 each other; of limits upon the extent to which stable constitutional modes of behavior can be
13 developed and; of the effects they can have on molding behavior for a productive and mutually
14 beneficial holistic existence of the state. This has been largely so and, still expected of the
15 state. This has been Largely so and, still expected to be so, in that under the (federal)
16 governmental system, each citizen is represented by at least three: federal; state and;local
17 governments as well as a myriad of other interests.

18

19 **Index terms**— Democracy, administrative, beneficial, interests

20 **1 Introduction**

21 emocracy, governance process and the accompanying politics in real sense largely consist of the examination
22 and maintenance of the ways in which constitutional, political and administrative institutions, social forces and
23 movements in a particular society interact with each other; of limits upon the extent to which stable constitutional
24 modes of behavior can be developed and; of the effects they can have on molding behavior for a productive and
25 mutually beneficial holistic existence of the state. This has been largely so and, still expected to be so, in that
26 under the (federal) governmental system, each citizen is represented by at least three: federal; state and; local
27 governments as well as a myriad of other interests. This, clearly, first puts into perspective the complexities of
28 most, if not all (federal) polities within the global political landscape. Second, it equally compels the need to
29 understand the complex reciprocities involved in the multidimensionality of politics concerning the governance
30 of people within any federal political system like Nigeria. These complexities have not been properly managed in
31 Nigeria up till now particularly as they affect functional performance of political office holders -[elected and/or
32 appointed], party officials, party structures, governmental structural processes, vertical -[federal, state and, local]
33 -and horizontal -[Executive, Legislative and Judicial organs of government]; the bureaucratic institutions and, the
34 expected friction-free relationship between and among them. The paucity of concrete management of these socio-
35 political complexities is not without its telling blows on effective governance and, efficient and effective service
36 delivery. This has variously contributed to debilitating buckpassing on issues of national importance between
37 and among these institutions and organs in manners injuriously conducive to inter and intra institution/organ
38 relatio-Author : Phd Department of Political Science, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. E-mail
39 : sxakindel@yahoo.com -nship. This, in itself, can be concretely traced to absence of willing collaboration
40 among these bodies as a mechanism for dealing with or rationally circumventing the rigidities of the formalized
41 process by evoking the criterion of public personnel's netherworld 1 This and its negative multiplier effects on the
42 governmental processes in Nigeria had been due to the fictive thinking on democracy and the negative imagery

43 given to it as a tool of governance. Its hollow practical application -[which can however, now be articulated to
44 have somehow diminished with the strong showing of opposition political parties in some states of the federation
45 during the 2011 general elections] -has equally contributed to this negativism. In fact, democracy which has
46 been shown as the best mechanism of governance in most polities of the world, has been variously endangered
47 in Nigeria even up till 2012 thanks to the rampaging attacks on innocent lives and people by the Boko Haram
48 or Boko Haramists as now being referred to or interchangeably used -[not minding the fact that the group has
49 lately stated that it name is not Boko Haram and, that it was a wrong identity given to them instead of its
50 real name which is synonymous with Jihadism (Focus Nigeria, January 24, 2012) and, other terroristic groups]
51 -which, as revealed by the State Security Service -[in spite of its helplessness] -enjoys the backing, patronage and
52 sponsorship of powerful political actors and gladiators as evidence by the prosecution of a serving Senator of
53 the Federal Republic of Nigeria who eventually secure a bail pending the commencement of trial even though
54 the spokesperson of Boko Haram who identified the Senator as his sponsor, political backer and god father has
55 been sentenced by an Abuja Magistrate Court to a . 1 Netherworld of Public (personnel) Administration is not
56 a physical thing but a concept used in discussing a set of activities. Netherworld is an informal structure. It is
57 a sort of invisible power or black market by which most of the criteria of Administration are circumvented. In
58 other words, Netherworld is the informal process through which Administrators fulfill their expectations, needs
59 or mandates which could have been otherwise impossible through compliance with the rules and regulations of
60 (public personnel) administration criteria and personal goals (or values) of the administrators (See J.M. . D term
61 of three years in prison for act of terrorism against the Nigerian state. It is left to be seen if the Senator will
62 suffer the same fate with his god-son, the Boko Haramist who is already in jail.

63 Democracy continues to be endangered in Nigeria in spite of its serving as a real mechanism for the sustenance
64 of "universal applicability of legitimate rule; pluralism; rule of law; accountability and; fair representation of
65 societal interests". The near acclamation through misgovernance -[in the past, and, even now, in Nigeria] -given
66 to democracy by ways of its dissemblance poses serious dangers, challenges and dilemmas to modern democratic
67 governance ant its mutually beneficial sustenance within the Nigerian state unless collaborative relationship can
68 be adopted by the super-bureaucracies of the state being the critical administrative engines and vehicle of the
69 state vis-à-vis policy formulation, implementation and evaluation.

70 In is clear from the foregoing that the state as a political entity continues to function as the macro and all
71 encompassing governance ecology irrespective of the multiple diversities created within it by the value preferences;
72 political orientations and philosophies of the people through the existence of the various operational mechanisms
73 serving as its foundational pillars. These operational mechanisms include the twinissues of democracy and
74 governance and; other concepts -institutionalism and public service -which on their own have been used as
75 conceptual instruments for the governing of men in terms of the determinism involved in the authoritative
76 allocation of the scarce critical societal values and resources and; the relationship of the political system with
77 its environmentprincipally the governed. The functionalism of these twin-issues and the other concepts under
78 reference visà-vis public policy making and responsive service delivery to the citizenry in most polities of the world,
79 Nigeria inclusive, has been made a continuous reality through appropriate political apparatuses and institutional
80 arrangements, all of which have deepseated historical roots in relations to the political existence of mankind and
81 nations all over the globe. These institutional arrangements and apparatuses of democratic governance include
82 the quasi-horizontal administrative organs of government -[Office of the Secretary to Government, Office of the
83 Head of Service and Civil Service Commission]. Without these organs, the raison d'être of democracy, governance
84 and responsive service delivery would be a mirage. It is through these institutions that most polities have become
85 models to the rest of the world today with all the nations that are desirous of peaceful, purposeful, meaningful,
86 stable political and policy environment and existence striving to be like them.

87 Against this background, this paper deals with the issue of institutional collaboration as ingredient for good
88 governance, efficient and effective service delivery to the citizenry in a democracy as well as the role of the tripodic
89 super-bureaucracies and their Practitioners in the processes involved. Its aims include attempts on how the
90 avoidable inter and intra institutional agencies and organs of government's wrangling, buck-passing on important
91 policy issues, legislative conflicts, paucity of constitutional provisions and their interpretations which had hitherto
92 caused problems in the absence of the envisaged collaboration we have in mind can be recognized and abandoned
93 for mutually beneficial behavioural inclinations, goals and agenda setting at work in the respective institutions
94 particularly in the course of putting effects the authoritative functions of government and its determinism of who
95 gets what, when, where, how and, why? vis-à-vis the scarce critical resources of the state.

96 The focus on these super-bureaucracies and their functionaries is deliberate. This deliberateness is catalyzed
97 by the conviction that this level of the administrative paraphernalia of the state clearly constitutes and forms the
98 apex and hub from where the nucleus of the state's administrative machinery derives its existence and continuous
99 sustenance vis-à-vis the day to day practical administration of the state and enhancement of peoples' realization
100 of their goals within the democratic society. This assertion finds a deepseated solace in the respective functions
101 of these tripodic institutions or administrative organs of the state which are later addressed in this paper.

102 **2 II.**

103 **3 Conceptual Analysis**

104 It is however, considered appropriate to commence the intellectual odyssey in this paper with concrete though,
105 synoptic elucidation of the concepts of institutionalism and public service. This analytical orientation which gives
106 the pride of place to conceptual analysis as the point of departure in this paper is compelled by the fact that
107 the explication of such concepts vis-à-vis the place of the administrative arm of the state and its functionaries
108 is critically germane to the focus of our thinking vis-à-vis the issue of collaboration for democratic governance,
109 efficient and effective service delivery processes within Nigeria's political space particularly within the state of our
110 case study analysis. This conceptual discussion is followed by that of the issue of institutional collaboration and
111 its enhancers or facilitators; the need or why the superbureaucracies and bureaucrats should or, must collaborate;
112 benefits and conditions associated with collaborations prior to the conclusion. a) Institutionalism This is the belief
113 that underlies the nature of institution. It is a "belief in the usefulness or sanctity of established institution"
114 (Webster Dictionary) hence, institutions have been described as "the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and
115 knowledge that support rules and routines" ??March and Olson, 1984). It is a concept that "sees organizations
116 as social construct of rules, roles, norms, and the expectations that constrain individual and group choice and
117 behavior" (Frederickson, 1999). According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), institutionalism includes core ideas of
118 contemporary public administration -[results, performance, outcomes, and purposefulness]concepts. Thus, it has
119 been contended that, institutionalism as a concept "could be said to account for both how institutions behave
120 and how they perform" (Lynn, 1996). As a matter of fact, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) and; Wilson (1989)
121 as Frederickson (Op.cit) clearly articulated that "institutionalism also combines the structural or organizational
122 elements of institutions and the managerial and leadership elements of institutions hence, as Kettl (1988;; Light
123 (1999) and; Salomon (1989) posited "institutionalism is not limited to formal governmental organizations as it
124 now includes empirical and theoretical considerations of the full range of the so-called "third sector" organization"
125 [e.g. the informal organizations, groups and interests].

126 Given the immediate foregoing, it is clear that some of the theorists on the concept while giving relevance to
127 "the limitations of economics and market logic as the theory that accounts for institutional behavior", have built
128 their theories on the subject on: "consideration of structure, particularly hierarchy, and individual and group
129 behavior in institutional contexts, on the interaction of individuals and organizations and their wider political,
130 social, and economic contexts, and on the influence of professional and cultural norms on institutional behavior
131 patterns and on institutional longevity and productivity (Wilson, Op.cit.; March and Olsen Op.cit).

132 It is now generally accepted within the boundaries of contemporary public administration in the twenty-first
133 century that all Public Administrators are "now intuitionists" to the extent that the "new public administration
134 hegemony" in this century has emerged based "on a broadly accepted institutionalism" (Frederickson, Op.cit).
135 In the process it has been clearly articulated that: Institutionalism is not a theory in the formal sense, but is,
136 instead, the framework, the language, and the set of assumptions that hold and guide empirical research and
137 theory building in public administration. It begins with an argument as to the salience of collective organizational
138 action as a basis for understanding political and social institutions?Institutions are affected by their social,
139 economic, and political context but also powerfully affect that context ??Ibid.; ??chattneider, 1960). This
140 explains the critical contention that "political democracy depends not only on economic and social contributions
141 but also on the design of political institutions" (March and Olsen, Op.cit). In line with these critical positions,
142 it has been asserted that institutionalism:

143 ? Assumes that policy preferences are neither exogenous nor stable but are molded through experience
144 and by institutions, by education, and, particularly by professions. ? Assumes the centrality of leadership,
145 management, and professionalism and comprehends theory development all the way from the supervision of
146 street-level bureaucrats to the transformational leadership of whole institutions. ? Recognizes the salience of
147 action or choice and defines choice as expressions of expectations of consequences. ? In the modern world of
148 productivity, performance, and outcomes measurement, reminds us that institutions and those associated with
149 them shape meanings, rely on symbols and seek an interpretive order that obscures the objectivity of outcomes.
150 ? Is particularly useful in the world of the disarticulated state because its assumptions do not rest primarily on
151 sovereignty and authority, but rest instead on the patterns of politics, order, and shared meaning found in both
152 governmental as well as nongovernmental institutions. ? Lends itself to forms of modeling based on simplifying
153 assumptions other than rational selfinterest or competitive markets (in that), some of the most advanced thinking
154 in contemporary public administration is being done by formal modelers using assumptions of cooperation, order,
155 hierarchy, institutional responses to contextual influences, networks, and governance-all essentially institutional
156 assumptions (Frederickson, Op.cit; March and Olsen, Op.cit; Hammond, 1993Hammond, , 1996;; ??nott, 1996,
157 1999; Lynn, Henrich, and Hilt 1999; O'Toole and Meier, 1999).

158 Institutionalism as herein explicated demands concrete involvement of all sectors of the polity and its economy
159 to be predicated on mutually beneficial foundation the type of which can only be found in concrete and positive
160 collaborations among agencies and relevant organs of government which are saddled with the responsibility of
161 dealing with the intricacies involved in the formulation of public policy and its interpretive implantations. This
162 clearly explains the need for collaboration which is discussed later in this paper.

163 4 b) Public Service

164 The institutional collaboration we have in mind here deals with the administrative institutions of the state which
165 are explicable within the parameters of the public has been to use interchangeably with the latter, a debate
166 which is not the issue of concern in this paper at this time. It is within the context of the public service that
167 we can actually talk about the super-bureaucracies and its practitioners which form the focus of our analysis.
168 However, the expected collaboration among the administrative organs can hardly be examined without analyzing
169 the subject-matter of public service itself and its development within the Nigerian state.

170 Impartial students of political science and, indeed public administration, will agree with a synopsis which
171 asserts that Public service has constantly played a significant role in shaping the making and implementation of
172 government policies and programmes. The role of the public service in public policy making and implementation
173 is so crucial that the first few working days of President Obasanjo were devoted to re-orienting the federal civil
174 servants towards the expected performance standards of the civil service during the term of his civilian regime
175 ??Nwankwo, 1996). This goes to show that "the effectiveness of the government is to a large extent determined
176 by the efficiency and competence of the public service. What remain disputable, however, are the proper limit of
177 the role of the public service in the affairs of the state and, the conditions under which the institution can more
178 effectively serve the larger interests of its society rather than its narrow corporate interests. In fact, without
179 much digression, this seems to be the focus of this work.

180 As to the origin of public service in Nigeria, it will be recalled that interest in public service grew out of
181 the growth and expansion in governmental institutions. As these institutions evolved and grew increasingly,
182 their functions became clearly differentiated, law -making and its implementation were no longer vested in the
183 same person and agencies. Consequent on this, as government expanded in size, functions and complexity, and
184 became urbanized and industrialized most especially after independence in Nigeria administrative processes also
185 expanded and became more specialized.

186 This development resulted in the emergence of councils, commissions, departments, bureau etc to attend to
187 clearly defined functions of government ??Omolayo and Arolaju, 1987). All these called for proper management
188 by people employed in a civil capacity and whose remunerations are paid out of money voted by the legislature.
189 These people are called the public servants. Generally, public service refers to all public employees, while civil
190 service is limited to government employees who are appointed on the basis of examination given by the civil
191 service commission and who acquire civil service status after the probationary period. Even though, this is the
192 traditional conception of the dichotomy between the two however, in recent times the interchangeable use of the
193 two as synonyms of the other has gained a wider currency. The seeming dichotomy or differences between the two
194 notwithstanding, public service or civil service as the case may be belongs to the landscape of the public sector
195 of any given political system Nigeria inclusive without any disputation. Although, the public service is today an
196 indispensable organ of government, especially with the emergence of modern states and independence and the
197 consequent complexities in government activities as earlier pointed out, it (public service) is not a creation of
198 modern times (Ibodje, 2000). However, its creation/origin could be traced to three (3) sources regarded as the
199 history of ancient civilization ??Ibodje, Ibid). First of these sources was the effort of Kung-Sun Hung (Chinese
200 Prime Minister) who around 120BC observed the need for examining men and women to be selected for the
201 implementation of the royal edicts and laws. His efforts marked the beginning of the civil service examination
202 system. It was also the ancient Chinese who had successfully worked out a system of classifying men into nine (9)
203 grades according to their ability, competence, knowledge, experience and character, the system which has gained
204 prominence world-wide. The second source was that of Pericles, an ancient Greek leader who in 462BC introduced
205 a scheme for the compensation of official, thus facilitating the continued participation in public administration
206 by citizens who had to work for their daily living by way of performing specific public assignments on day to
207 day basis. The third source was the Jewish people who, in a well organized system, moved from Egypt to their
208 country of birth. They moved as fully organized people accustomed to the system of organized governments and
209 public administration clearly featuring a system of well defined codes of law and regulations as can be found in
210 the present day civil service (Ibid.).

211 In Nigeria, the present form/status of civil service is a product of various changes it had undergone. These
212 changes are not only as a result of the need to strengthen its capacity for efficient and activities but because of
213 the seeming need to respond to the dynamic nature of the country's political, social and economic developments.
214 There is no doubt about the fact that the structure and nature of the country's civil service before independence
215 was patterned along the British model. This was essentially the same in all of Common-wealth Africa. This
216 notwithstanding however, the decade or so before independence could be regarded as transitional with the
217 introduction of some various administrative and social changes, including the elements of Nigerianisation of
218 the civil service, among other things (Ibid.).

219 Given the centrality of the public service particularly it Functionaries at the super levels of the state and how
220 critical their functions are to the state in terms of democratic dispensation, good governance, efficient and effective
221 service delivery, it is essential for the relevant arms particularly the office of the Secretary to the Government,
222 office of the Head of Service and, the Civil Service Commission to collaborate in the course of the performance
223 of their functions. In other words, there is without any doubt the need for the super-Bureaucracies -[office of the
224 SSG; office of the Head of Service and; CSC] -in the state to get out of their impediments (both systemic and
225 self-inflicted) and patriotically confront the challenges they face with a view to rationally performing the functions

226 for which they are appointed and meeting the democratic aspirations of Nigerians without the infusion of any
227 administrative selfishness and greediness. This is particularly so in that, the benefits, democratic self-fulfilment,
228 good governance and effective service delivery to the Nigerian masses are clearly locked in the existence of an
229 effective, non-corrupt public service and its inherent administrative process which are devoid of myriad of problems
230 and political decadence. One of the possible routes to administrative success by the tripodic superbureaucracies
231 is to ensure a healthy and positive collaboration among them. This now leads us to the discourses of the core
232 focus of this paper.

233 c) The Issue of Institutional Collaboration.

234 The issue of collaboration -[which literally means cooperation and harmonious working together for the
235 attainment of set goals] -among the institutions of the state is without doubt important to the end result -[good
236 governance, efficient and effective (responsive) service delivery to the citizenry] -of the existential wherewithal of
237 the state in terms of the multifarious and asymmetrical goals, aspirations and interests of the governed within a
238 diversified federal political system like Nigeria.

239 Even though, the compelling forces for collaboration among these administrative arms -[Ministries, Depart-
240 ments and Agencies-MDAs] -of government are wide, the real factors can actually be understood within the
241 boundaries of the character of Nigeria's intergovernmental relations and its federalism. As a matter of fact, the
242 factors that readily come to mind in this regard are as follows: In order for Nigeria and Nigerians to attain and
243 benefit from "politics of hope" and its usually accompanying provision of "effective public service delivery" and,
244 creation of workable road map to economic development there must be unity of purpose among the tripodic
245 super-Bureaucracies or quasihorizontal administrative organs of government [Office of the SSG; Office of the
246 Head of Service and, the Civil Service Commission]particularly in the areas of policy initiation, formulation,
247 implementation, interpretation and evaluation in the quest for responsiveness of service delivery. This unity,
248 calls for collaboration among them. This collaboration can be brought about through many means depending on
249 the nature of the political system and its exigencies from time to time. However, it should be stated at the onset
250 that the collaboration in mind here is the positive one since it is equally possible to have negative collaboration
251 for illicit ends. What we consider relevant for attaining this type of collaboration in Nigeria forms the subject
252 matter of discussion in this section.

253 **5 Enhancers/Facilitators of Collaboration**

254 Collaboration among the relevant arms of the administrative state which in this paper, are the tripodic super-
255 bureaucracies and their practitioners in Ekiti state can be attained through various means. However such
256 attainment is contingent on certain things that must or should be done in the quest for administrative efficiency
257 and effectiveness vis-a-vis meeting the needs and aspirations of the citizenry.

258 The first thing to be done in this regard is to truly understand and embrace the need for collaboration and,
259 where relevant actors both at the governmental/political and citizenry levels stand in the scheme of things
260 within the landscape of the political system. This is more so because, the indispensability of the criteria of
261 "good governance", "good economics", "sane budgetary process", "participatory budgeting", "professionalism of
262 the public bureaucracies and the practitioners within them", "cordiality of political actors and actions among
263 the three organs of government", to the attainment and sustenance of "effective public service delivery" and
264 "politics of hope" for the Nigerian people compels the need for collaboration. This collaboration among various
265 administrative and governmental units is in line with the imperatives of today's existential globalism which clearly
266 constrains unproductive and arrogant independence, individualism or isolationism in preference for collaborative
267 efforts. And, it can only be taken for granted at any nation's perils.

268 The issue of collaboration among the superbureaucracies and bureaucrats under reference is further compelled
269 by constant the squabbles among various competing interests in all polities of the world, Nigeria inclusive.
270 This is so in that these squabbles are constantly capable of creating avoidable ambivalence vis-à-vis the needed
271 harmony between political and economic objectives of any given nation as a mechanism for achieving balanced
272 resources mix for impeccable administrative process and its virtues of effective policy initiation, adoption,
273 formulation, implementation and evaluation amidst ever-increasing administrative constraints. Political and
274 Economic objectives as the signposts of national development which can be understood within the macro-
275 parameters of politics and economy as the twin-pillars of governmental actions and inactions on both political
276 and economic fronts can actually be effectively pursued and brought to bear through collaborative relationship
277 envisaged within the analytical parameters of this paper. Since collaboration among these agencies of government
278 for the pursuit of political and economic objectives means consolidated focus of governance and policy process
279 for national development, it is imperative in Nigeria in view of the constant paucity of adequate, focused and
280 well-implemented political and economic planning within her landscape.

281 This need is further compelled by the quest for efficient and effective public policies and the need to sustain
282 them for the benefits of the people in most polities of today's global village. In fact, the constant erosion of
283 the virtual monopoly of state powers and/or, the continuous shrinkage of such powers as a result of the thesis
284 of globalization and its subscription to public sector networks calls for collaboration that is geared towards
285 economic development and its mechanism of good governance which is clearly predicated on the four pillars of
286 "accountability"; "transparency"; "predictability" and; "participation".

287 Generally, the developments across international borders which are not without their impacts on individual

5 ENHANCERS/FACILITATORS OF COLLABORATION

288 states' internal governmental structures and processes further compel the kind of collaboration under discussion
289 here.

290 The collaboration needed among the administrative organs of government in Nigeria is expected to be positive
291 particularly in the interest of the citizenry.

292 Through such positive collaborations the hopes of the masses would not be dashed.

293 In order for the Public Bureaucracies and the Practitioners within them to be relevant and provide the requisite
294 guidance and technocratic road map for the political actors in the quest for effective public service delivery and
295 politics of hope for Nigeria and the Nigerian people in the context of real economic development, there must
296 be collaboration among the requisite administrative agencies or arms of the state particularly as it affects the
297 issues of public policy and its processes within the state particularly in terms of the needed respect for the fiscal
298 requirements of the budget. Through such collaboration the administrative agencies at the super-bureaucratic
299 level would be able to jointly foster a culture of policy implementation through which the political angle of the
300 state would be made to imbibe the etiquette of fiscal process as it relates to budget's implementation. It will aid
301 the state's economic survival by ensuring the avoidance of idiosyncratic tampering with the budgetary process
302 through the hitherto existing usual disregard for fiscal requirements. Such collaboration will make it possible for
303 the attainment of a conducive process through which the budget will serve its purposes as:

304 ? A planning device for translating present scarce fiscal and human resources in the public sector into future
305 government goals. ? An economic document.

306 ? A tool for fiscal policy.

307 ? A tool for internal co-ordination and efficiency in public administration.

308 While not trying to be repetitive the need for collaboration cannot be underestimated within the ? Corruption
309 can ultimately formally undermine the legitimacy of any government and eventually lead to the collapse of any
310 government that fails to check its onslaught.

311 . Administrative corruption which has consistently wrecked the engine of good governance and true democracy
312 in Nigeria can also be escaped through the inculcation of values of accountability. In fact, these values can be
313 more vigorously pursued through collaboration among the various offices. This, in turn, will aid the avoidance
314 of corruption by the superbureaucracies and their functionaries within the state. Such avoidance of corruption
315 is critically important because, corruption is a threat to democratic culture. As Kukah (1995:96) once argued
316 "corruption remains the most invidious obstacle to stability in Nigeria both under the military and civilians
317 and, inimical to the systemic existence of any polity. It is a socio-political, economic and moral malaise that
318 may permeate and cripple, as a result of its contagiousness and malignancy, the nerves of any polity. It is
319 "an intolerable characteristic" (Fullerton, 2002) that should be discouraged in governance because once it sets
320 into any part; it automatically contaminates all the strata of that system's multidimensional hierarchy in ways
321 symmetrical to the spread of a bush fire (Akinede, 1995). Its effects on Africa are, to say the least, incalculable
322 given the following facts:

323 ? Corruption induces inefficiency and waste. It results in best use not being made of scarce opportunity. ?
324 Corruption contaminates the environments. It represents a rise in the price of administration (the tax payer must
325 submit to bribery as well, thereby having to pay several times over for the same services).

326 ? Through its kickback nature, corruption serves to diminish the total amount available for public purposes
327 and governance.

328 2 Political bankruptcy is an intermediate form of authority. It occurs when a government's overloading of
329 the economy is no longer confined to an issue of effectiveness, to be resolved within conventional electoral and
330 administrative institutions. It sets of "double trouble, undermining content while making citizens increasingly
331 indifferent to authority. A politically bankrupt government has not made citizens dissenters or rebels antagonizing
332 them. Its ineffectuality limits the antagonism it can engender. Citizens withdraw their support from established
333 authority without having confidence that any other regime would be better. Such a "broken backed regime" has
334 its authority crippled rather than destroyed. Citizens may prefer the weakness of a bankrupt regime to the power
335 of a coercive regime, but those who live under fully legitimate authority undoubtedly prefer government as they
336 have known it to a political system in which government is ineffectual.

337 ? It exerts a corruption and corrosive effects/influence on the administrative apparatus, eroding the courage
338 necessary to maintain and/or adhere to high standard of probity and transparency. It leads to decline in morality
339 (e.g. each person asking himself why he/she should be the moral crusader or the sole custodian of morality).

340 ? Corruption in government if and when perceived by the people, wipes out respect for constituted authority
341 and consequently the legitimacy of government. ? If and when elite politicians and senior civil servants/public
342 officials are widely believed to be corrupt, the public and/or the masses will see little reason why they, too, should
343 not help themselves through corruption/corrupt practices. ? Through corruption, corrupt officials, civil servants
344 or politicians remain self-centered individuals unwilling/unlikely to jeopardize their personal prospects for the
345 sake of prosperity for the whole country or his environment in the remote future. They are not always willing to
346 sacrifice their proclivities for corrupt practices for the betterment of the larger society.

347 ? Corruption results in a substantial loss of productive effort because time and energy are devoted to making
348 contacts to circumvent and outwit the system, rather than to enhancing credentials and strengthening one's
349 case objectively (fraudulent claims). ? Corruption as it represents unfairness, inevitably leads to litigation and
350 in most cases trumped -up charges with which even the honest official may be blackmailed while the culprits

351 remain free (Transparency International Source Book). ? It is damaging to the family system as it encourages
352 the misdirection of scarce national resources towards non-productive areas. In other words, corruption wastes
353 resources by distortion government policy against the interest of majority and away from its proper goal" (Kurata,
354 (1999); Transparency International, 1998; Akindele and Adeyemi 2011).

355 **6 a) Inculcation and enforcement of the values of Accountability**

356 The internalization of the values of accountability by our Public Administrators is a sinequa-non to administrative
357 efficiency and efficacy vis-à-vis the pursuit of good governance and responsive service delivery to the citizenry.
358 The essence of this is located within the parameters of the subject matter of accountability and its propeller
359 -[transparency]synoptically examined in this section.

360 Accountability connotes a way of being answerable or liable for one's actions and/or inactions and, conduct
361 in office or position. It is the process of(D D D D) C 2012

362 Year making elected officials and other office holders accountable and responsible to the people who elected or
363 appointed them for their actions while in the office. Thus, it is the "state or quality of being liable and required
364 by a specified person or group of people to report and justify the actions of people in office in relations to specific
365 matters or assigned duties. Accountability requires and/or involves faithful discharge of one's duty in ways that
366 fulfils the public interest or the interests of those who entrust such responsibility to the office or position holder(s).
367 It is an integral part of any organization be it business, political or household. It can be viewed as responsibility.
368 According to Gould and Kolb (1964) ??Gould, (1972), accountability "focuses attention upon the sanctions or
369 procedures by which public officials may be held to account for their actions (and /or inactions) (Emphasis mine)
370 (see ??rero, 2000: 52 and ??damolekun 1983:17). Within this same context, it has been conceived as a process
371 through which "the administrative state has to render an account of its performance to its sovereign, the people".
372 To be accountable to somebody means that, the person is superior and therefore in a position to exercise control
373 or sanctions on the subordinate (Wolf gang, 1991:7 and Erero, Ibid.).

374 Accountability as a concept or byproduct of transparency defines operational measures for multidimensional
375 performance. Thus, it means the recognition of and acceptance of the fact that people in public and/or any
376 office (public servants/political actors, in this case) own and hold their positions in trust for their masters, (i.e.
377 the people). The people that are expected to render accounts of their stewardship vis-à-vis the services they are
378 expected to provide to the people must do so in order to determine their successes and/or failures. They must
379 from time to time show the balance sheet of their activities and particularly, the ways and manners in which
380 they have used and exercised the responsibilities bestowed upon them.

381 Accountability can be in form of political accountability, fiscal accountability, legal accountability, programme
382 accountability, responsive accountability (covering the needs, problems and performances of the citizenry). It
383 exists whenever the people, (i.e. the citizenry) and their government or government officials can hold one another
384 for the discharge and/or performance of their respective responsibilities or duties to one another. Thus, failure
385 to be accountable connotes betrayal of trust. With accountability comes transparency which, on its own means
386 openness. It is a component of ethical values/practice expected to be demonstrated by the people in official
387 positions. It is expected to be demonstrated vis-à-vis government activities on issues of public accounts, budgets,
388 politics, programmes, legislations, contract awards all of which are expected to be made open. Transparency
389 includes freedom of access to information by the citizenry. It allows the government to carry along the citizens
390 and allow the latter to participate and contribute to day-to-day running and administration of Government.
391 It is through it that the policy actors (both formulators and implementers) can be made to be accountable to
392 the people. Thus, it is the propeller of accountability. It stifles corrupt practices through the shrinkage of its
393 existential space. Transparency enhances and sustains people's rights to know what is going on in government.
394 It brings about responsibility and responsiveness of leadership and the policy process. Transparency enhances
395 government ability to manage the scarce societal resources for development and sustainable democracy through
396 accountable process. Hence, no polity that is desirous of survival can or should take for granted the need for
397 transparency and accountability (See Akindele and Adeyemi, 2011, Ibid.). What to do to ensure accountability
398 and transparency within our polity and how to do them automatically become clearer within the purviews of the
399 discussion and analysis in the next section.

400 Put together, accountability is "the obligation of public office holders to account for or take responsibility for
401 their actions. Accountability exists when powerholders have to explain and justify their actions or face sanctions"
402 (Malena and McNeil, 2010, Op. cit). As a matter of fact, "accountability is the cornerstone of good governance.
403 Unless public officials can be held to account, critical benefits associated with good governance-such as social
404 justice, poverty reduction, and development-remain elusive"(Ibid.). It is clear from the foregoing that:

405 The accountability of state actors is a consequence of the implicit social compact between citizens and their
406 delegated representatives and agents in a democracy. The social compact, in turn, derives from notions of human
407 and citizen rights, as enshrined in the General Assembly of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human
408 Rights and in many national constitutions. A fundamental principle of democracy is that citizens have both the
409 right and the responsibility to demand accountability and to ensure that government acts in the best interests
410 of the people. Public actors can and should be held accountable for both their conduct and performance. In
411 other words, citizens have the right to ensure that public actors (a) obey the law and not abuse their powers, and
412 (b) serve the public interest in an efficient, effective, and fair manner. In an institutional environment for good

413 governance, certain conditions underpin the ability of governments to be accountable (supply-side conditions)
414 and the ability of citizens and civil society to hold governments accountable (demandside conditions). Supply-
415 side and demand-side mechanisms of accountability are complementary and mutually reinforcing (Melana and
416 McNeil, 2010). The problems of arrested development attributable to lack of accountability and transparency
417 in Nigeria can be understood within the matrix of taken for grantedness of the *raison d'être* of accountability
418 and transparency as herein articulated. As a matter of fact, the now obvious problems of corruption, lack of
419 accountability and arrested development which have become terminal to the healthy existence of Nigeria as a
420 nation must be dealt with. This is necessary and must and should be urgently done in view of the damage it has
421 unleashed on the nation's psyche.

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423 It is therefore, stating the obvious to observe that corruption and lack of accountability in governance have
424 thrown up issues that border on the development of Nigeria. Politics in the country has become for most of
425 the political actors an avenue for primitive accumulation of wealth. No wonder the do or die mentality that
426 has characterized the political processes in the country. Characters of all sorts of social and political plumage
427 have hijacked political activities and in the process shunted out genuine patriots who would have contributed
428 immensely to the development of the country. They have in the process manacled effective and efficient public
429 administration for the betterment of the citizenry

430 The nature, character and context of Nigerian politics have diminished an otherwise towering image of the
431 country. In spite of the assumed limitations of the founding fathers of Nigeria, the current realities put them as
432 men and women who struggled to leave some indelible marks in the National scheme of things. The Awolowos,
433 the Azikiwes, the Ahmadu Bellos and the Okotiebos left institutions and monuments that have stood the test of
434 time.

435 In all areas of life a large deficit can be noticed in the inability of the elite in power to address the needs
436 and aspirations of the people. One of the latest Human Development Indices paints a dismal picture of Nigeria
437 as it is ranked 158 out of the 182 nations that were assessed. The United Nations Development Programme
438 (UNDP) also ranked Nigeria, over 167th in life expectancy, 112th in adult literacy, 150th in combined GDP
439 (The Nation, October 10, 2009). Again, in its latest assessment of countries in the African continent, the M. O.
440 Ibrahim Foundation (2009) indicated that Nigeria fell below 20 other countries in terms of good governance on
441 the continent, with Mauritius, the Indian Ocean Island being chosen as the best as its government and private
442 sectors delivered the best practices and public goods to their people.

443 It bears repeating that in Nigeria the elite whether in political governance or the private sector have in
444 fundamental ways not discharged their historical responsibilities creditably well. In fact, it was the level of graft
445 and other socio-economic indiscretions prevalent in the country that led to the establishment of the Economic
446 and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2001 by the regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo.

447 However, we are not unaware of the fact that opinions are divided on the activities of the EFCC. Some
448 people are of the view that the era of Ribadu marked a golden period in the activities of the EFCC while others
449 are of the opinion that the former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo used the anti-graft body to fight his
450 political opponents thereby leaving other corrupt government officials who were close to him and his government
451 untouched. As a matter of fact, Ekiti State had its share of this expedient political brinkmanship through the
452 contestable impeachment of the State's Executive during the first phase of the fourth Republic ??1999) ??2000)
453 ??2001) ??2002) ??2003). This political brinkmanship made Ekiti State a theatre of 'one-day Governorship';
454 "double-Governorship"; "one-day-Secetryship"; "one-month or so Governorship" following the "state of emergency
455 period" which made "Sole Administratorship" the apex of the state's political institutions. Even though, this
456 paper does not want to dabble into this argument, it is worthy of note that the need to strengthen the EFCC
457 and its sister organization, ICPC cannot be over emphasized if the fight for the extirpation of corruption in our
458 land must be successful.

459 It is in recognition of this that one acknowledges the efforts of the EFCC which brought to book former
460 Managing Directors of banks in Nigeria who used their positions either to enrich themselves or their cronies. The
461 EFCC must add more vigour in its fight against corruption and ensure that no corrupt official no matter how
462 highly placed is allowed to go scot free.

463 However, the ability of EFCC to do his with be enhanced through its restructured merger with the ICPC.
464 In other words, The EFCC and ICPC must be restructured and consequently merged for effective performance.
465 These can be done by making the revamped ICPC the investigative component of a new and revitalized EFCC
466 with the latter serving as a prosecutorial and enforcement component of the new EFCC that will emerged from the
467 merger. In the same vein, those who obtained loans from the banks and have refused to pay back should be made
468 to honour their obligations as allowing them to treat their loans as their own share of the national cake has dire
469 economic and legal implications for the country and its National Development. Thus, there is need for concrete
470 accountability. As a matter of fact, the nation's policy makers and those saddled with policy implementation
471 most especially the Public Servants/Administrators must It is worthy of mention here that these mechanism or
472 their variations -(e.g., the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission -[EFCC] and, The Independent Corrupt
473 Practices and other Related Offences Commission -[ICPC]) exist in Nigeria to some degree. However, these
474 agencies have not really worked or been put into effective utilization or enforcement because of the nation's

475 geo-political, ethnic and primordial sentiments and considerations coupled with judicial bottlenecks, governance
476 decadence, apolitical considerations, retrogressive thinking and, above all, poverty of decisive and determined
477 leadership and noncollaborative public service. It is left to be seen if the breakup at the apex of both agencies
478 that led to the exit of Faridal Waziri as the head of the EFCC will bring about the desired reform of the agencies.

479 **8 a) Professionalism of the Practitioners within the Public**

480 Service as a facilitator of collaboration

481 The collaboration in focus here will be more attainable if our public service and its functionaries are professional
482 or become professional in their conduct and performance of their functions vis-à-vis the raison d'être of the state.
483 As a matter of fact, it is our contention that the only way out of the apparent entrapment of today's public service
484 is for the practitioners within it to become professional in their own rights. This and other factors underscore
485 the need for professionalism in the public service by the public servants/administrators. b) Professionalism in
486 the Civil Service: The Particularistic Perspective

487 It is our contention here that there is a need for professionalism in the civil service. However, such
488 professionalism is particularistic rather than institutional or systemically universalistic. Thus, it will be impolitic
489 not to stress the fact at this juncture that the professionalization or professionalism of the public administrators
490 in mind here is absolutely different from that embarked upon by the military in 1988. The professionalism
491 we have in mind is not systemic or systemically particularistic but individualistic. It is one which is based on
492 particularistic criteria. The reason for this distinction between our thinking here and the reform of the military of
493 1988 finds a deep-seated solace in the fact that the 1988 professionalization of the civil service -[if it can actually
494 be taken to mean so in the real sense of the term]professionalized the institution but not the careerists.

495 The essence of this claim is supported by the fact that the military professionalization gave undue credence
496 to office and/or nomenclature to the detriment of the careerists or occupants of such offices or institutions.
497 It destroyed the foundation of the credibility of the service and, in the process opened it to ridicule through
498 destructive political patronage which preferred mediocrity to meritocracy. In other words, the so-called military
499 reform or professionalization of the civil service substituted meritocracy with mediocrity and, in the process
500 removed the values which at that time served as the magnetizing factors pulling capable, well educated, prepared,
501 knowledgeable and competent materials to the service. Due to its preference for mediocrity and incompetence, it
502 completely destroyed the administrative cadre which, even though difficult to join by all and sundry, -[thanks to
503 the difficult and competitive entrance examination conducted by ASCON, Topo, Badagry] -remains the dreams
504 of a preponderant majority of people seeking positions in the civil service.

505 It was a reform/professionalization agenda that crippled the civil service. It imported and/or transported
506 dubious nomenclature of "Director-General" to the civil service. The dubiousness of this disturbing nomenclature
507 is clearly explainable in what subsequently followed the political interference.

508 Through it the civil service became the preserves of all comers and rejects -(with or without the necessary
509 competence).

510 The interference in the guise of the so-called reform was clearly humiliation which can be traced to its
511 predecessor that took place in 1975 during which the Civil Servants were severely humiliated. It was a period
512 political power was used through the military fiat to deflate the ascendancy of the Public Administrators as a
513 potent social force whose perceptions, interests and actions were determinant in shaping policies and strategies of
514 government. The 1975 civil service purge which indisputably laid the chassis for the 1988 Babangida's reform of
515 the same institution clearly gave credence to the detestation which the military had for the Public Administrators
516 in that:

517 It gave a lie to the "commonality of characteristics and interests" explanation of military-civil service coalition
518 government. What perhaps was significant about the massive purge of the Civil Service is the inference that the
519 service was politically responsible for what General Murtala Muhammed characterised Put differently, the Civil
520 Service was no longer considered neutral in political decision-making. If political bosses fall, then, their civil
521 service advisers must equally fall. In this regard, the requirement of the civil service reforms that permanent
522 secretaries should retire along with the regime which appointed them would appear to have laid its precursor in
523 raison d'être of the 1975 purge (Omoruyi, 1993). [It is interesting to know that the stipulation that permanent
524 secretaries should retire along with the regime that appointed them has been abandoned]-(Emphasis mine).

525 This political interference which had its roots in the military arrogance and its attendant bankruptcy of
526 knowledge as to what constitutes the cornerstones of public administration or the civil service, actually led to
527 the unfortunate situation through Officers who were not in the mainstream -[Administrative Cadre] -of the civil
528 service were smuggled and/or imported into the administrative arm of the service. Some of the beneficiaries of
529 this administrative calamity and policy blindness who may still be in service would find it difficult to discern
530 the rationality of this argument given human proclivities for self benefits and demands of the flesh but, this is
531 a reality however bitter it may be. While the intention here is not a call for retroactive reversion of the status
532 of such beneficiaries, it is aimed at evoking the need for policy guidelines to keep afloat the relevance of the
533 administrative cadre and its professionalism for the futuristic sustenance of the credibility and attractiveness of
534 the civil service and, the need to resist such policy madness and blindness in future. As a matter of fact, a critical
535 example that readily comes to mind here was the appointment of Officers in the Local Government Service as
536 Permanent Secretaries against the existing "position-classification" requirements and the enabling Civil Service

8 A) PROFESSIONALISM OF THE PRACTITIONERS WITHIN THE PUBLIC

537 Regulations. In fact, through such interference some of such Officers eventually became Head of Service to the
538 detriment of real Professionals who traditionally belonged to the Administrative cadre and, who actually went
539 through the requisite competitive examinations prior to their engagement/recruitment into the civil service.

540 It is innocuous to articulate the fact that prior to 1988 military's tinkering with the Nigerian civil service,
541 the Administrative Cadre of the civil service was the dream of every civil servant including those already in the
542 service -[in different career lines] -and those seeking to join it. This class of civil servants enjoyed benefits of
543 good and prioritized postings to critical sections, offices and; sectors of the service. The level of their career
544 advancement and rapidity of promotions was indeed, telegraphic and enviable. To a significant extent, at that
545 time so many people in other career lines usually strived to cross-over to the administrative cadre and, were even
546 very much willing to go through makeup competitive examinations which, probably they could not pass initially
547 prior to joining different cadres of the service. All these went with the wind of the 1988 socalled military reform
548 of the civil service.

549 As a matter of fact, and, without meaning to be flagrantly immodest or, trying to slur and attack anybody's
550 image, I wish to emphatically state at this point that entry into the Administrative Cadre at that time was so
551 competitive and rigorous due to the entrance examination. To some extent, most or some people seeking positions
552 in the civil service were afraid and, knew that they were not competent as human resources or materials for the
553 cadre. In fact, such people voluntarily preferred and/or opted to join the civil service through other career lines.
554 It is however, sad to note that some of such incompetent materials or rejects later found their ways into the
555 service courtesy of the socalled reform which crippled that critical cadre of the civil service to the extent that
556 they later found themselves at the apex of the service at certain points in time. This is a bitter reality of what
557 actually happened to the civil service within our polity at certain point in the annals of its history.

558 Without any doubt whatsoever, the 1988 reform or professionalization of the civil service marked the beginning
559 of the end of "Permanent Secretaryship" in the civil service before its belated reincarnation with the abolition
560 of the same reform by the Abacha military oligarchy in 1995. The 1988 reform was the beginning of the practice
561 whereby nothing was again permanent about permanent secretaryship in the civil service in Nigeria. Even now
562 that a semblance of sanity seems to be coming back to the service in terms of competitive examinations for
563 promotions and appointment as Permanent Secretary or Head of Service, the fact that such positions are in most
564 cases no longer tenure tracked in the real sence of it but, in stead tied to specific terms of office of two or more
565 years and, the dependency of renewability of such appointments on political exigencies -[which are always open
566 to political manipulations] -makes it worrisome and absolutely disturbing.

567 As a matter of fact, this aspect of the Nigerian civil service calls for serious concerns the discussion of which
568 is better left for some other days. It is however referred to in passing here to give credence to the fact that
569 the professionalism or professionalization of the Public Administrators (Civil Servants) we have in mind in this
570 paper is quite different from that of the systemic or institutional professionalization that once took place in
571 Nigeria through the military fiat and, which clearly slaughtered the pillars of the service on the altar of political
572 expediency and military arrogance.

573 It is different in the sence that, unlike the military reform, which gave ascendancy to mediocrity to the
574 detriment of meritocracy and its accompanying technical(D D D D) C 2012

575 Year competence in the Nigerian civil service, the professionalism in focus here is a tool for professional
576 handling of the administrative affairs of the state by our Public Administrators as they affect good governance,
577 efficient and effective service delivery and sustenance of democratic principles for the betterment of the citizenry.
578 It is therefore, the contention here that the particularistic professionalization or professionalism of the careerists
579 -(the Public Administrators/Civil Servants) -will add more values and vitality to the service better than the
580 institutional one that serves as a mechanism for the erosion of the centrality of the service as the true vehicle
581 for the sustenance of governance and policy initiation, formulation, implementation and evaluation within the
582 Nigerian state. Through the former -[professionalism of the public administrators] -the careerists themselves
583 will see the need for collaboration among them through inter and intra agencies or institution relationships at
584 all levels. Such resultant collaboration will end in-fighting which hitherto had made them willing preys of the
585 political predators. And, true such productive and forward looking relationships the constant "Darwinism" -[i.e.,
586 survival of the fittest]to which they sometimes subject themselves in the course of unhealthy rivalries and lobbying
587 -[of the political angles of the state] -for what truly and by all standard belong to them will hardly exist as they
588 will automatically become impeccable and/or unassailable.

589 The essence of the claim here is revealed by the fallouts from the 1988 military reform of the civil service.
590 This is particularly so in that such in-fighting or struggles among the civil servants following the 1988 military's
591 tinkering with the foundational pillars of the civil service cannot be fatally denied. As a matter of fact, such
592 infighting and parasitic struggles led to situations whereby Grade level 12 officers and, in most cases lower grade
593 levels officers were made Directors-General over and above their superiors. Such appointments were made based
594 on the untenable excuse that those so appointed would leave office with the government/regimes that appointed
595 them. This in most cases led to the premature career sunset of those so appointed which, to this author, they
596 thoroughly deserved due to their career covetousness.

597 With career pro fessionalism and its propensity for willing collaborative relationship vis-à-vis the governance
598 and policy processes, such policy madnes s -[explainable in the dubiousness of the 1988 civil service reform]and

599 its accompanying destruction of the public administrators' spirit de corps will diminish if not totally abated.
600 This will once again make the civil service the cynosure of all eyes it traditionally used to be.

601 It is our contention that the issue of professional public administration, its development or determination
602 of who is a professional public Administrator can be addressed and/or done through the dichotomy of "self-
603 seeking bureaucrats" and "dedicated civil Servants". The former usually called "the empire-building bureaucrats",
604 according to Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) "seek to maximize their power and/or income as determined by the
605 size of their bureaus" while the latter "seek to contribute to an efficient operation of the public sector and to the
606 public",

607 The self-serving bureaucrats (i.e. non professional public administrators) will:

- 608 ? Ask for more funds than needed to perform a given function.
- 609 ? Overstate the benefits to be derived from a given level of services.
- 610 ? Inflate the total budget in anticipation of expected cutbacks (Ibid).

611 Conversely, the dedicated (professional) civil servants will :

- 612 ? Provide technical expertise in the designing of programs so as to enable decision -makers (elected government
613 officials) to make intelligent choices. ? Implement and operate programmes once they are enacted.

614 ? Provide an element of continuity to the governmental process introduce a sense of rationality with the
615 operation (of the governmental process).

616 Gerth and Wright Mills (1972) once opined that the services of the "dedicated civil servants" or "civil service
617 perspective civil servants" are very crucial to the functioning of the modern state and, to the designing and
618 implementation of public policy". The need for the development of professional public Administrators in Nigeria
619 can be understood within the context of their instrumentality for the attainment of democratic benefits by ways
620 of policy orientation that can address the inadequacy of our current democratic dispensation. Through the
621 attainment of professionalism our public bureaucrats will clearly be aware of the constant basic misconceptions
622 of democracy, which may have hitherto, been negatively affecting the performance of their duties.

623 It can be reasonably, to some extent, deduced from the foregoing, that the issue of the development of
624 professional Public Administrators for coping with the values of governance and/or democracy is not alien to
625 the Nigerian polity. Even though, its pedigree and, abrogation/deflation can hardly be examined in isolation
626 from the policy initiatives of the military Regime of General Yakubu Gowon's Udoji Commission Report and,
627 the Civil Service Reform of 1975 and Babangida's 1988 civil service reform already alluded to above, it held
628 sway during the ill-fated third Republic which was It is however, interesting to note that the pride of the public
629 service or civil service dismantled by the military reform of 1988, can be taken to have been reincarnated if
630 the reintroduction of promotion through competitive examination which started with the President Goodluck
631 Jonathan Administration's promotion of the Federal civil servants including the Head of Service is allowed to
632 continue. This new philosophy has been adopted by some States of the Federation particularly Ekiti State.

633 The development of professional public Administrators for the new democratic culture or democratic culture
634 in Nigeria can only be understood and/or appraised within the context of the political character of the public
635 service progenized by the new thinking that "politics is synonymous with public administration" or "public
636 administration as politics". There is no gainsaying the fact that Nigeria's public Administration (or public
637 Service) needs transformation into one that will be most efficient, competent, selfconfident, knowledgeable and
638 Professional in the real sense of it to earn the the confidence and respect of the political class in that "career civil
639 servants who are selfconfident, highly competent, knowledgeable, dedicated and results-oriented professionals
640 normally enjoy the respect of the political class regardless of the regime type" (Adamolekun, 2012).

641 They have to be professional in that they possess the "instruments of Public Administration" which are "the
642 main agents of change that preconceives, designs, implements and coordinates the process of change in the society.
643 More importantly they are involved in "social engineering" that deals with "the action part of government, the
644 means by which the purposes and goals of government are achieved. Such "social engineering" deals with:

645 ? Designing the process of the change from old to new (ideal) society ? Creation of new institutions ? The
646 planning and regulation of the economic system. ? Rendering advice to and guiding the leaders of the political
647 system and, ? Above all, the setting of new norms and standard of morality to guide the society.

648 The needs elucidated in the foregoing section can only be harnessed subject to certain conditions which must
649 be fulfilled. The extent to which these are fulfilled will determine the hope of the public service as we come
650 to know of it in Nigeria today for the future. Since, the core of their environmental expectations occurs within
651 the new democratic culture, it is, in our view, appropriate to start the discussion of the expectations from the
652 "would-be professional Public Administrators" from the point of democracy and its relevance and indispensability
653 in today's world of public administration.

654 To begin with our Public Administrators must understand what the challenges of democracy are today, in
655 Africa and, indeed, in Nigeria. As Kaunda (2003:1; 2,) once opined:

656 The challenges of democracy in Africa are great because of the nature of the continent, its people, and its
657 history. Africa is a complex continent requiring complex solutions in order to enable a democratic and fruitful
658 life for its citizens to develop. Africa is not only the big continent it is, but has diverse cultures and experiences.
659 At the same time, Africa has similarities. Democracy and developments are closely linked. We find that the ideal
660 components of democracy, development, and peace are common in all these terms. Indeed, one is in the other.

661 To be able to meet the challenges of democracy our public Administrators must consider many factors. These

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662 challenges according to Kaunda (*ibid*:3) include: "physical geography of the place", "population and density" 663 "ethnic diversity" "Religion and spirituality" "culture", "language", "colonial links", "economic situation", 664 "political system", and "people on the margins". As a matter of fact, the issue of the "people on the margins" which 665 is one of the factors identified in the immediate paragraph above is very important and relevant to the Nigerian 666 political space and its administrative landscape. The essence of this position is that our Public Administrators, 667 to be called and regarded as real Professional, must, in the performance of their duties, recognize that democratic 668 culture calls for the protection of the minority rights and, the understanding recognition of the asymmetrical 669 aspirations of the people in the democratic environment.

670 More importantly, our public Administrators, to be professional in our new democratic culture must understand 671 that "the application of standards embodying the values of only one culture over the other cultures is indeed an 672 affront to the latter" (*Buendia, Ibid.*). Thus, they should have at the back of their minds, the need to redress some 673 of the pitfalls of the fundamental assumptions of democracy in the performance of their official duties because, 674 as Clark (1999:2) contends "democracies around the world are being swept by a new form of politics guided 675 more by issues than by traditional distinction between liberal and conservative positions". Concretely, their own 676 interpretation of democracy must understand the need, due to the increasing complexities of our societies, to 677 redefine the fundamental assumptions of mass democracy. They should and must understand that democracy:(678 D D D D) C 2012 Year

679 Must not only guarantee the democratic rights of the majority but assure the minority of their rights to differ 680 from the majority. These are without any obligation on the part of the former to yield their rights and abide 681 by the he erosion of identity and survival of ethnic groups. Otherwise, the minority would simply be persecuted 682 by the majority. The persistence of a mosaic of ethnic groups who operate in accordance with their own rules 683 and perseveres in their legitimate rights to selfgovernance either outside or within the realm of the State is 684 slowly giving rise to "mosaic democracy" as distinguished from mass democracy. Mosaic democracy appears to 685 correspond to the mosaics in the economy and diversified or "de-massified" peoples needs and political demands. 686 (*Ibid*: 382).

687 There is no gainsaying the fact the complexities of administration and governance in contemporary time, have 688 created "contours of modern management and a spectre of problems quite beyond the capacity of nonprofessional 689 public servants. Nigeria's public service to be relevant for today and survive for the future must first of all become 690 totally professional and knowledgeable about the problems associated with corruption as earlier highlighted in 691 this paper. They must be particularly abreast of "new institutionalism" "network theory" and "governance 692 theory" as mechanisms specifically designed to solve, ameliorate or "at least address the issues associated with 693 the complexities of today's administrative world.

694 Generally and specifically, the public service in Nigeria at this time of the new millennium, must be 695 knowledgeable about the current trends and the position of Public Administration in the 21 st Century (Schiaovo- 696 Campo and Sundaram, 2001) particularly within the context of globalization and its "impact on most dimensions 697 of government administration in most countries and constraints or the ability of national governments and their 698 bureaucracies to act independently without collaboration. Above all, the future of the public service in Nigeria, 699 even though, specifically and concretely dependent to a significant extent, on compliance with the dictates 700 and complexities of the technologically based villagized world and its thesis and/or constitution, can actually 701 be guaranteed by the collaboration and adherence of the practitioners (to the ethical obligations and codes 702 of conducts" which from our perspective remain the indispensable pillars of the public service. These ethical 703 obligations include: loyalty, accountability, courtesy and respect, discipline and integrity, honesty and impartiality 704 and, confidentiality" (*Shellukindo and Baguma op cit*: 26).

705 It is through respect for these obligations, that the degeneration and/or erosion of public service ethics which 706 has been variously contextualized in terms of the ascendancy of corruption and proclivities for Kleptocracy 707 by public officials in the course of performing their official duties can be reversed for the sustainability of the 708 Nation's public service for today and the future. The sustainability is equally dependent on the provision of 709 enabling environment by the State for the realization of what has been termed practical agenda for promoting 710 ethics and accountability in contemporary African public service ??Rasheed, 1993:289). These include: fostering 711 and promoting enabling conditions of service to enhance professional and ethical standards; advancing and 712 affirming sound policies on recruitment, training and public personnel management. encouraging public service 713 occupational associations to play a leading role in institutionalizing professional values and defending occupational 714 interests; promoting a psychology of service in political and public life; upholding the integrity and effectiveness 715 of public institutions of accountability; fostering popular participation to ensure the accountability of governance 716 (*Ibid*). It is also dependent on good leadership. c) Good Leadership as enhancer of effective collaboration 717 Leadership is "the ability to get men do what they don't want to do and like it" (Cohen et al, 1984). It is "the 718 process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a 719 common task. It is ultimately about creating a way for people to contribute to making something extraordinary 720 happen" (*Ibid*.). Leadership is "the process of using power to obtain interpersonal influence" (Schermerhon Jr., 721 Hunt and Osborn, 1985).

722 In other words, leadership involves influence and its evocation to alter the behaviours of others in groups and 723 organizational settings to attain desired goals based on proper agenda setting. Leadership is: about capacity: the 724 capacity of leaders to listen and observe, to use their expertise as a starting point to encourage dialogue between

725 all levels of decision making, to establish processes and transparency in decision making, to articulate their own
726 value and visions clearly but not imposes them. Leadership is about setting and not just reacting to agendas,
727 identifying problems, and initiating change that makes for sustainable improvement rather than managing change
728 (Wikipedia). Thus, in today's organizations and to some extent political systems, the understanding of the
729 concept of leadership is critical to the attainment of organizational goals. This is more so in that: Leaders
730 today work in socially intricate organizations where they need the assistance not only of subordinates but also of
731 peers, superiors, and external parties to accomplish their goals. Accomplishing goals that positively impact the
732 organization requires effective leadership linked to strong power bases and workable influence strategies. Building
733 a strong power base and

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736 Year developing effective influence strategies to produce power dynamic is an important leadership challenge.
737 ??Michelson, nd.

738 The essence of the immediate preceding quotation vis-à-vis the subject matter of focus in this paper can be
739 clearly located within the parameters of the conceptualization of leadership as:

740 A reciprocal relationship between those who choose to lead and those who decide to follow. Strategies, tactics,
741 skills and practices are empty unless we understand the fundamental human aspirations that connect leaders and
742 their constituents. If there is no underlying need for the relationship, then there is no need for leaders" (Obande,
743 2009).

744 The need for effective leadership is compelled by the fact that "everything rises and falls on leadership" and,
745 the "success or failure of every human endeavour depends solely on the kind of leadership available for such
746 endeavours" (YHDC, Leadership training, 2009). Thus, as Denga (1986) and, Esere (The Nigerian Journal,
747 Unilorin) once articulated "a leader in an organization or political setting is an embodiment of a force that
748 directs the entire organization towards the realization of the organizational goals". Concretely put, leadership
749 connotes "ability to inspire, direct, motivate and encourage others positively to targeted end. It is the ability to
750 lead others" (Olusoji, 2002). It "represents authority and the pinnacle of the organization. It is the form that
751 authority assumes when it enters into process" Rieley, 1931 and.

752 Nigeria as a nation needs a determined leadership for it to get out of her political woes part of which are
753 explainable within the parameters of the administrative lawlessness, greed and avarice foisted on her and her
754 people by a preponderant majority who have been constantly elected and/or appointed or, who have through
755 one way or the other always found their ways into the nation's high level administrative structures or institutions
756 both at the national and state levels.. For such a leader to be effective and truly serve and meet the needs of
757 Nigeria and Nigerians through impeccable administrative process, he must be a change leader with beneficial
758 focus and determination in his quest for sustainable democratic governance process, efficient and effective service
759 delivery to the people.

760 A change leader is a key to large-scale, sustainable reform. It is a leader that is committed to sustained and
761 sustainable innovation in his quest for organizational effectiveness. A change leader is a focused leader who is
762 committed to the development of knowledge and skill within his organization particularly in terms of programme
763 coherence and technical resources (Newmann et. al, 2000). Change leaders are critically concerned with and,
764 committed to the achievement of large-scale organizational turnaround in the course of their leadership role and
765 management of human and natural resources within a given political economy and its accompanying multiple
766 variables and/or other societal landscapes and their terrains.

767 A change leader is one who seeks deep and lasting reforms through the establishment of conditions aimed at
768 the attainment of "enduring greatness". In other words, a change leader is a leader who "catalyzes commitment
769 to a compelling vision and higher performance" by going beyond "performance standard" and building "enduring
770 greatness" (Collins, 2001).

771 Generally, a change leader is one whose goal is "sustainable change in society" (Fullan 2002). He is a leader of
772 the future who is "attuned to the big picture" of his environment and, he is a leader regarded as "a sophisticated
773 conceptual thinker who transforms the organization through people and teams" (Ibid.). A change leader is one
774 who displays "palpable energy, enthusiasm and hope" (Ibid.). He is a leader who performs change leadership
775 roles that are critical to the organization's stability, goal attainment and durable sustainability.

776 Through this type of leadership the Nigerian nation will benefit and the kleptocracy that has been foisted on the
777 Nigerian state by administrative ineptitudes, morbid inter and intra agencies struggles and squables and, political
778 avarice and covetousness will be reduced. This is more so in that a change leader "values the tensions inherent in
779 addressing hard to solve problems because that is where the greatest (organizational/systemic) accomplishments
780 lie" (Fullan, 2002).

781 V.

782 **10 Why the Super-Bureaucracies and Their Bureaucrats Must 783 Collaborate**

784 Through Inter and Intra Agency/Institutional Relationship in Ekiti State, Nigeria

785 The choice and use of the word of adjective "Tripodic" in describing the three critical superbureaucracies of
786 the state and their functionaries is deliberate. It is deliberate in the sense that these institutions are constantly
787 adjustable through reorganization, modification, removal, redeployment using the sometimes unassailable
788 instrumentalities of office and/or powers of the Executive. This is clearly put into perspective by the history of
789 the tripodic bureaucracies in Nigeria which details how they have been tinkered with over the years based on
790 regime turnovers and political expediency amongst other factors:

791the history of the Civil Service Commission has all along been rather steady, those of the offices Secretary
792 to Government and Head of Service have been rather zig-zag.

793 11 These super-bureaucratic institutions of

794 governance -[which even though, debatable or contestable within the parameters of "coordinatesubordinate
795 partnership continuum" or "coordinatesubordinate authority dichotomy"] -are to some extent quasi-pyramidal or
796 hierarchical in terms of relevant state's Organogram are very critical to the state vis-à-vis the governance process
797 and its accompanying expected manifest responsive service delivery through efficient and effective bureaucratic
798 process devoid of red-tapism and injurious extra-systemic official conducts. The extent to which these tripodic
799 institutions can sustain themselves amidst the almost constant political onslaught of the Executive by means
800 of readjustment, reorganizations, disruptions which may sometimes be debilitating to the career aspirations of
801 the functionaries will be determined by their ability and willingness to collaborate in the performance of their
802 respective functions.

803 VI.

804 12 Functions of the Tripodic Bureaucracies

805 The functions of the tripodic bureaucracies in focus here -with a moderate or contestable exception of the Civil
806 Service Commission -are to some extent determined by political considerations as they can be altered from time
807 to time depending on the political agenda of the government in place. Thus it can be argued to some extent,
808 such functions are products of both political and constitutional delegations. Some of such functions delegated
809 to these high calibre administrative arms of the state as articulated by Omiyale (2012) In terms of functional
810 performance the Secretary to the Government (SSG) depending on the position, thinking or orientation of the
811 political leadership or government in place, is in most cases, responsible for superintending or overseeing the
812 affairs of the under listed critical areas or segments of the state. The functions of the Head of Service amongst
813 others include responsibility over the affairs of the following administrative duties of the state.

814 ? Implementations of government decisions by the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).
815 ? Coordination of all service matters generally.
816 ? Handling matters of recruitment, appointments, promotion and discipline of career officers in conjunction
817 with Civil Service Commission.
818 ? Protecting or guarding the integrity of service rules and regulations, ethics and norms.
819 ? Training and staff development.
820 ? Grading and Pay, and Establishment matters generally such as personnel records.
821 ? Deployment of staff to different areas of the service as may be called for from time to time.
822 ? Pensions and service welfare matters. ? Allocation of vehicle and other logistics to enhance the performance
823 of MDAs and their staff and, any other duties that may be assigned by the political leadership of the state.

824 13 c) Functions of the Civil Service Commission -[CSC]

825 The functions or roles of the Civil Service Commission which can be contended to have remained clear and
826 steady over the years within the administrative landscape and terrains of the Nigerian state without the constant
827 alterations and political determinism which have characterized those of the SSG and HOS include amongst others
828 the following:

829 ? Recruitment and appointment of staff and,
830 ? Promotion and discipline of staff.

831 It is important to note the fact that, the seeming pyramidal or hierarchical nature of these three critical
832 super-bureaucracies -[Office of the Secretary to Government; Office of the Head of Service and; the Civil Service
833 Commission] notwithstanding, the strength of one -(Office of the SSG) -of them through political leverage over
834 the others -(Office of the HOS and, the CSC) -constitutes the latter's' advantage over the former -(i.e., the office
835 of the SSG). The HOS enjoys a semblance of permanence in office over the SSG to some extent in that the latter
836 is more political than administrative. While the tenure of the SSG is actually tied to that of a given Executive
837 and, may hardly in some cases continue beyond the first term in case the Executive gets a second term in office
838 the other institutional super-bureaucracies -[HOS and CSC] -are not usually or always a victim of this political
839 exigency due to certain statutory stipulations. In other words, the latter do and usually in most cases, (though
840 not in all) survive such expedient political considerations due to statutory requirements. However, out of the
841 three institutions only the CSC to some extent enjoys a fixed term of office which may not always be easily
842 slaughtered on the altar of political exigency despite the fact that their appointments are made in most cases,
843 on the basis of political consideration. This notwithstanding, we have seen cases where the Executives tampered

844 with such appointments prior to the completion of the stipulated tenure and, such actions subsequently led to
845 litigations.

846 Given these variations in the conditions of services of these tripodic super-bureaucracies, the only way to
847 constantly avoid and/or survive the premature political onslaught or annihilation of the Executives in most cases
848 is for them to collaborate so as to positively move governance forward through efficient, effective and responsive
849 service delivery. This is more so in the sense that: While emphasizing the need for this collaboration among these
850 tripodic bureaucracies, we are however, not unmindful of the difference in the expectation tied to their functional
851 purviews. This is more so in view of the fact that the Office of the SSG is both political and administrative
852 and does not fully fall within the parameters of the traditional values/criteria of public administration as it is
853 both heard and seen unlike the Office of the HOS and its functionaries who are only heard and not seen in line
854 with the orthodoxy of public administration 3 not minding the currency given to the political character of public
855 administration. While the Office of the HOS and its practitioners are only seen but not heard in line with the
856 dictates of orthodox public administration, the CSC is the gatekeeper which determines who enters or does not
857 enter the public service (civil service). It has the same pedigree in terms of political appointment into office
858 like the SSG. Even though the determinism involved in the emergence of the HOS is to some extent political its
859 political consideration is guided by civil service rules and regulations which are not really applicable to the other
860 two. However, it should be stated that the political consideration involved in the emergence of the HOS seemed
861 to have been diminished by the introduction of competitive examination as one of the critical requirements for
862 the appointment of Permanent Secretaries and the HOS.

863 Hoffman,L.W., 1986. The three offices we are dealing with are in coordinate partnership and not in subordinate
864 partnership. Maintenance of smooth relationship is easier to handle in subordinate partnership where one
865 authority necessarily has to defer to a higher authority in the chain of command. But where authorities are
866 at par as in coordinate partnership, greater care is ever needed not to rock the boat unnecessarily or rub the
867 other partner on the wrong side. Situations had occurred where the office of the Head of Service clashed with
868 the Civil Service Commission in unnecessary tussle. This should never have been so if all parties were sufficiently
869 conscious of the ethics of their relationship. They are cooperating and not competing offices(Ibid.).

870 **14 VII. The Contemporary Trend in Ekiti State**

871 Competitive examinations as one of the critical requirements for appointments and promotions of the staff in the
872 Civil Service were actually evoked in Ekiti State in 2010 in respect of the appointment of the state's HOS and
873 Permanent Secretaries. The requirement was extended to the education sector in the course of the state's quest
874 for a more robust and sound education of its people.

875 This was done through competitive examinations for the old and new School Principals in the state prior
876 to appropriate placement, deployment and, redeployment. Thus, Ekiti State offers a good example in the
877 revamping of the civil service as a critical engine of the state in line with the orthodoxy of rational bureaucracy
878 and its imperatives of hierarchy of authority, impersonality, technical competence, specialization, discipline and,
879 meritocracy which were swept away by inglorious previous reforms.

880 With its contemporary focus which has a perfect symmetry with the currents of public administration in the
881 21 st century, the political and extra-systemic considerations which have fatally crippled the public service have
882 diminished or been completely dismantled in the state. As a matter of fact, in its quest for efficient, effective,
883 results-oriented, professional, dedicated, knowledgeable, competent, accountable and financially prudent civil
884 service and servants, the Ekiti State government in addition to its reincarnation of the critical criteria of orthodox
885 bureaucracy in its civil services, introduced in 2010 measures for achieving "strong implementation capacity" of
886 the state's civil service "through the Civil Service Transformation Strategy (CSTS)" (Adamolekun, 2012).

887 The rationality of the state's philosophy and thinking along this line was predicated on the belief that the
888 major instruments for achieving its 8-Point Agenda -[of participatory and accountable "governance, infrastructural
889 development, modernizing agriculture, education and human capital development, health care services, industrial
890 development, tourism and, gender equality and empowerment" (See the Road Map to Ekiti Recovery: 8-Point
891 Agenda)] -is to do away with a "civil service characterized by intense politicisation, limited efficiency and
892 effectiveness and low morale' (Adamolekun, 2012). While the requirements and task associated with this new
893 thinking remain largely daunting, "it is not an insurmountable challenge" from the perspective of the political
894 leadership of the state (See Fayemi, 2010).

895 The main goal of the CSTS in Ekiti State is "to transform the civil service through critical institutional changes,
896 re-engineering of management systems and processes, and restoring merit, professionalism, and competence, into a
897 value-based and results-oriented institution within eight to ten years" (Adamolekun, 2012) hence, it is predicated
898 on the following key result areas:

- 899 ? Effective governance of the civil service;
- 900 ? Organizational efficiency and effectiveness; ? Professional and results-oriented civil servants;
- 901 ? Ethical and accountable workforce with a changed work culture;
- 902 ? Improved competence of civil servants; and
- 903 ? Improved public financial management (CSTS, Ekiti State *-Point Agenda, 2010; also cited in Adamolekun,
904 2012).

905 The evocation of the competitive examination as one of the requirements for recruitment and promotions in

906 Ekiti State is in perfect conformity with the traditionalism of the civil service which was jettisoned in Nigeria
907 through the policy blindness of the military reformers in exchange for a civil service characterized by mediocrity
908 and limited efficiency and effectiveness, low morale and productivity. This traditionalism which takes civil servants
909 as "administrators paid for implementing the policies of national governments" (McLean and McMillan, 2003)
910 was predicated on "the implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms in the second half of the nineteenth
911 century" (Ibid.) which signalled the origin of the civil service as a modern bureaucracy. These reforms at that
912 time and beyond ensured that:

913 ? Entrance to the civil service was by competitive examination, both for the administrative (highest) and
914 executive (intermediate) classes. Promotion was also on merit.

915 ? The civil service became a life career and hence a profession for the educated to enter into

916 ? The tasks of civil servants were divided into intellectual and routine. This meant that departments developed
917 as hierarchic: those drawn from the administrative class filled senior policy advice positions; those from the
918 executive class filled positions defined by their superiors; and those on clerical grades-the least intellectual-carried
919 out routine work.

920 ? The civil service as a permanent institution of government developed an ethos of political neutrality, willing
921 and able to advise and serve elected government of any party programme (Ibid.)

922 The foregoing clearly and closely mirrors Weber's ideal type bureaucracy. Max Weber, the German Sociological
923 writer, was the foremost exponent of the bureaucratic theory of organization. As a matter of fact, his theory
924 has definitely become the blue print for the analytical consideration of the organizational landscapes both in
925 the public and private sectors of almost all polities or political economies of the world. Contemporary thinking
926 on the subject matter of bureaucracy and its place in organizations is without any doubt predicated on the
927 classical work of Max Weber in that his "analysis of bureaucracy which was first published in 1922" remains
928 the "most influential statement or pronouncement and point of departure for all analyses on the subject" up till
929 today (Shafritz and Whitbeck, 1981). Henry (1975) identified the "bureaucratic theory" school of thought as the
930 first within the "close model organizational theory". The core of Weberian bureaucratic theory deals with the
931 explanation of bureaucratic (formal) organizations. Thus, according to ??hafritz and Whitbeck (1981:3):

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933 Weber used an "ideal-type" approach to extrapolate from the real world the central core of features characteristic
934 of the most fully developed bureaucratic form of organization.

935 Weber's "characteristic of Bureaucracy" is neither a description of reality nor a statement of normative
936 preference. It is merely an identification of the major variables or features that characterize bureaucracies.

937 16 According

938 to this theory, the features/characteristics of bureaucracy include "hierarchy, promotion based on professional
939 merit and skill, the development of a career service in the bureaucracy, reliance on and use of rules and regulations,
940 and impersonality of relationships among career-professionals in the bureaucracy and with their clientele" (Henry,
941 op. cit.). This scholar asserts that the Weberian bureaucratic theory has been the most influential of all the
942 schools (of thought) in the close model and, it most clearly represents the values of the close model (Ibid.). As
943 a matter of fact:

944 Bureaucracy has emerged as a dominant feature of the contemporary world. Virtually everywhere one looks
945 in both developed and developing nations, economic, social, and political life are extensively influenced by
946 bureaucratic organizations. "Bureaucracy" is generally used to refer to a specific set of structural arrangements.
947 It is also used to refer to specific patterns of behavior-patterns which are not restricted to formal bureaucracies. It
948 is widely assumed that the structural characteristics or organization properly defined as "bureaucratic" influence
949 the behavior of individuals-whether clients or bureaucrats-who interact with them (Shafritz and Whitbeck, op.
950 cit.).

951 The predominant and prominence of the bureaucratic theory of organization notwithstanding, the theorists
952 within the open model stream (along the evolutionary trend of organizational theory) have been very critical of
953 the Weberian bureaucratic theory. The open model criticism of this theory has been summed up thus: "open
954 model theorist dislike the rigidity, the inflexibility, the emphasis on means rather than ends, and the manipulative
955 and anti-humanist overtones of Weberian bureaucratic theory" (Ibid.). However, the criticisms of the Weberian
956 theory have on their own been criticized in turn, because they "often have been overdrawn and certainly have
957 not been leveled with Weber's own social context in mind" (See Akindele, 2010(b)).

958 The need for the continuous applicative sustenance of these imperatives of Weberian bureaucracy in ways
959 conducive to the pursuit of good governance and its attendant provision of efficient, effective and responsive
960 services to the citizenry makes the type of collaboration in perspective here indispensable within the landscape
961 of any state's civil service. The positive multiplier effects of such collaboration on the policy and governance
962 processes of a nation like Nigeria can only be taken for granted at the perils of the state.

963 17 VIII. The Benefits of Collaboration

964 Through collaboration the state and the citizenry will benefit immensely in that the super-Bureaucrats will be
965 able to save the state from the clutches of some problems which can completely wreck her engine of development
966 and they will be able to call for urgent actions by ways of solutions and policy redirection. This is particularly so
967 in that in dealing with policy initiation, formulation and implementation, the super bureaucrats in the tripod
968 super-institutions will increasingly and jointly become aware of the three major alternatives or grounds -[provision
969 of a policy; best known alternative and; absence of a policy] -for policy evaluation. They will also become
970 soundly knowledgeable about the applicative utility of the criteria -[efficiency, effectiveness, equity, adequacy,
971 feasibility, ethics and technology] -against which public policy can be evaluated. Thus, becoming equipped with
972 the competence to constantly distinguish policy input (PI) from policy output (PO) within the framework of
973 policy analysis and public policy hierarchy and, the quadrupled categories -[political policy, executive policy,
974 administrative policy and technical policy] -involved (Akinede et. al, 2000). By so doing they will be able to
975 constantly rescue the state from the deep waters of economic mismanagement and wastage and, in the process
976 enhance national development and the pursuit of national aspirations and responsive and responsible deliverance
977 of public good to the people.

978 Through the same collaboration our super-Bureaucrats will be equally able to shed the leaves of the cancerous
979 factors associated with disruptive or conflict ridden administrative landscape of a disorganized bureaucratic
980 ecology. From the collaboration avoidance of the abuses in the public and financial sector of the nation's economy
981 and adoption of optimal strategy for effective management of the economy will automatically become part of the
982 values of(D D D D) C 2012

983 Year the public service. As a matter of fact, the collaboration will confer on the bureaucrats the capacity to:
984 ? Identify the causes of government's fiscal problems and development a multi year forecast of revenueyielding
985 capacity as well as that of the demand for it services.

986 ? Develop a "list of priority rankings for all government programmes, projects, services and benefits so that
987 high-priority items could be retained or augmented and low-priority items could be reduced or terminated.

988 ? Design an integrated strategy to generate new resources, improve productivity, and ration services so that
989 both revenue and expenditure sides of the budget could be neatly balanced (Akinede and Adeyemi, 2010).

990 The Super-Bureaucrats through the benefits of collaboration will be able to deal with questions like the
991 under-listed ones and provide answers to them in their quest for fiscal solvency of the state:

992 ? What activities are mandated? That is, what services and benefits are required by law? This question is
993 intended to sort out activities that are "musts" from activities engaged in by habit or custom.

994 ? What activities can be terminated? This question focuses on activities that are not mandated and may have
995 low public support.

996 ? What additional revenues can be raised? Where can user charges and fees be instituted and raised? Where
997 can uncollected taxes be collected? What services can be sold to other government units? What grants can be
998 obtained from the federal government, the state, or private sources?

999 ? What activities can be assigned to other service providers? This question helps identify services that can
1000 be shifted to other units of government, contracted out at lower cost, shared with other governments, provided
1001 by the private sector, or "coproduced" with client participation at lower cost.

1002 ? What things can be done more effectively? This question addressed the broad area of productivity improvement.
1003 It should help generate alternative approaches to delivering existing services, changing organizations and
1004 using technological improvements to reduce costs. ? Where can low-cost or no-cost labour be used?

1005 Where can positions be reclassified and downgraded? Where can tasks be simplified, paramilitary jobs be
1006 manned by civilians, and paraprofessionals and volunteers be utilized?

1007 ? Where can capital investments be substituted for labour expenses? At a time when labour expenses comprise
1008 70 to 80 percent of many agencies' budgets, labour-saving technologies can yield substantial savings; this question
1009 seeks to identify opportunities for such savings.

1010 ? Where can information gathering methods be installed and improved? Good information can improve
1011 financial forecasts and account for the direct and indirect cost and the benefits of service alternatives.

1012 ? Where can demand be reduced and services rationed? Because many public services are free, they are often
1013 squandered. This question addresses the possibility of using fees and other means (e.g., eliminating low-usage
1014 hours in some public services and smoothing out peak hours in others) to reduce demand and pare down the
1015 availability of some services.

1016 ? What policies can help strengthen the economic base and promote economic development? This question
1017 addresses the link between economic development and government policies and underscores the importance of
1018 private-sector investment decisions for public-sector fiscal solvency.

1019 ? What arrangements can be made to identify and strengthen the leadership of this process? This final question
1020 underlies all others. Without able leadership the process of guiding a government through a fiscal squeeze may
1021 turn out to be haphazard and self-defeating. Decision-making structures that facilitate interest aggregation and
1022 build consensus are likely to reinforce leadership and help ease the adjustment to constrained budgets (Ibid.).

1023 Through the inter and intra agency/institutional collaboration "the poor economic performance that led to the
1024 "worsening of the poverty level in Nigeria, (which) has been traced to various factors" can be properly addressed

17 VIII. THE BENEFITS OF COLLABORATION

1025 with concrete solutions. Not only this, through such collaboration the effectiveness or otherwise of public policy
1026 and its formulation can be explored for improvement. Through it, distinct policy objectives can be set to include:

1027 ? The provision for social goods, or the process by which total resource use is divided between private and
1028 social goods and by which the mix of social goods is chosen. This provision may be termed the allocation function
1029 of budget policy. Regulatory policies, which may also be considered a part of the allocation function of budget
1030 policy. Regulatory policies, which may also be considered a part of the allocation function, are not included here
1031 because they are not primarily a problem of budget policy.

1032 ? Adjustment of the distribution of income and wealth ? The use of budget policy as a means of maintaining
1033 high employment, a reasonable degree of price level stability, and an appropriate rate of economic growth, with
1034 allowance for effects on trade and on the balance of payments. We refer to all these objectives as the stabilization
1035 function.

1036 The need for unity of objective in the governance and policy processes through collaboration in the quest for
1037 balanced resources mix and effective curtailment of administrative constraints is decipherable from the context
1038 of today's complex international political system and its economy:

1039 The international political economy has become incommensurably more complex than it was forty years ago.
1040 In those days, international relations could focus centrally on inter-state relations in a highly stylised world where
1041 security, not international trade, was the dominant trade, was the dominant force, international financial flows
1042 were modest and it was presumed that governments were still regarded as the main brokers of international
1043 affairs. It is no longer credible to work on the basis of such premises. There are numerous new actors on the
1044 scene, and many new dynamics. Together, their power and authority have outstripped the power of nation-states
1045 and their interactions are becoming ever more complex. The internationalisation of production, the proliferation
1046 of transnational corporations, the burgeoning of alliances, partnerships and other collaborative linkages -not only
1047 between firms but between communities and governments -all are casual evidence of these trends. These new
1048 complex realities have not yet generated a commensurately complex conceptual framework that is capable of
1049 guiding the analysis or explanation of the evolution of our new complex world. This is, in part, ascribable to the
1050 denial of the fact that these new realities have transformed the world economic game. But it is mainly due to
1051 our poor stylisation of our global -national -local hierarchical system (Mothe and Paquet, 1996).

1052 Given the foregoing, and, the "need to accelerate development" and, and achieve a wider distribution" of the
1053 gains of government (Meier: 1984:1), such a collaboration must be striven for. It is equally imperative in view
1054 of the challenges of the expected and usual authoritative allocation of the scarce and critical societal values or,
1055 the determination of who gets what? when? Where? How? and Why? among the various competing groups or
1056 interests within the polity. Within the context of this collaboration "the choice of policy instruments, methods
1057 of implementation" will be improved. Thus, it is important to pursue it given how economic and non-economic
1058 forces interact in the process of a nation's quest for balanced policy orientation vis-à-vis economic and political
1059 development in the context of National objectives.

1060 As a matter of fact the attainment of the collaboration in focus here would make it possible for a flawless
1061 determination of "how socio-cultural and political development contribute to economic development and, are,
1062 in turn, determined by it" thus, allowing for a unifocal though, mutually useful pursuit of multidimensionally
1063 beneficial public policy for the citizenry. Thus, the absence of such collaborative relationship can lead to decline
1064 in the nation's economic growth rates. It can also lead to politically painful and sensitive trade-offs -["inherent
1065 in mixed economic systems"] -like:

1066 A cursory look at Nigeria's budgetary policies in recent times would reveal to liberated minds the state of the
1067 Nation's economy vis-à-vis the foregoing trade-offs, The collusion of political realities with economic necessities
1068 in most polities constitutes compelling forces on leaders to face these trade-offs through the kind of collaboration
1069 we have in mind, irrespective of the consequences.

1070 These aside, the "gap between the needs and expectations of citizens and government employees for government
1071 services and benefits and, the inability of the economy" to meet these demands which have been described as
1072 "fiscal "stress (Ibid.4), further necessitate the need for the unity of political and economic objectives which
1073 will be attainable through inter and intra agency/institutional relationship/collaboration in most polities of the
1074 world. The necessity to avoid both macropolitical and macro-economic policy conflicts that are likely to arise
1075 from the multiplicity of goals and objectives further compels the collaboration among these policy players of the
1076 government in terms of the pursuit of a nation's political and economic objectives.

1077 With the collaboration policy, objectives would be streamlined to enable government and its bureaucrats to
1078 recognize and make available needed legal and institutional framework for nationally beneficial Institutional
1079 Collaborat?on as Essent?al Ingredient for Good Governance, Eff?cient and Effective Service Delivery in a
1080 Democracy: A Critical Discourse

1081 ? The choice between inflation or unsatisfied public demands for goods and services.

1082 ? The choice between providing services through taxsupported bureaucracies or through market arrangements.

1083 ? The choice between attempting to provide equal health, housing, and educational opportunities to all citizens
1084 or (in effect) rationing opportunities to those who can afford to pay for them.

1085 ? The choice between spending for national defence or spending to alleviate the hardship of the poor, the
1086 sick and the underprivileged (i.e. the dilemma of "guns vs. butter") . to assure conformance with what society
1087 considers goals which ??hehu (1999:11), referred to as impetuses. These impetuses according to him include:

1088 ? Provision of a range of public goods and services, especially infrastructure, which will enable the economy
1089 to run smoothly.

1090 ? Establishment of clear and consistent economic policies which, in addition to eliminating bureaucratic
1091 inefficiencies, will also build private sector confidence. The greater the level of private sector's trust and confidence
1092 in public policies, the greater the likelihood that the rules of economic behaviour will be honoured.

1093 ? Establishment of public confidence through properly adhered guidelines, accountability and probity in the
1094 public and private sectors. The absence of public confidence in the government and its policies will lead to
1095 legitimacy and acceptability crises.

1096 ? Provision of a framework from which the intended and unintended outcomes of economic policies are backed
1097 up by welfare safety nets for the not-soprivileged members of the society.

1098 The richness of Nigeria's endowment in terms of physical and natural resources necessitates her ability to cope
1099 with administrative constraints, and, achieve a hybrid of economic and political objectives because the tapping
1100 and utilization of such resources need the kind of symmetry that is usually associated with such collaborative
1101 relationship among the public bureaucrats at the super-institutional levels like the ones under reference here.
1102 With effective collaboration the defects which have constantly crippled the governance and policy processes in
1103 Nigeria will be removed: Some of the defects include:

1104 ? Target setting based on educated guesswork without detailed project studies.

1105 ? Violation of planning rules by those who made them.

1106 ? Inadequate/incomplete studies on plans.

1107 ? Erratic and non-coherent policies on the needed directive or policy focus of each plan.

1108 ? Payment of lip-service to plan discipline i.e. fiscal indiscipline, violation of sectoral allocations, Father
1109 Christmas spending philosophy.

1110 ? Corruption and its attendant capital flight which, combined, has consistently aided the truncation of the
1111 nation's development of a self-reliant economy.

1112 ? Non-recognition of higher-level management as an indispensable skill.

1113 ? Expansion of the public service without corresponding expansion of skills.

1114 ? Paucity of statistical values that is, non recognition of statistical data as the indispensable basis of planning.

1115 ? Neglect of true Academics in the scheme of things based on their erroneous categorization as theorists. ?

1116 Constant disarticulation in the progress reports of yearly or periodic national Development plans and, the need
1117 to constantly review existing plans.

1118 ? Planning beginning and ending only on papers.

1119 ? Lack of real commitment to free Nigeria from its status of a "trading-post economy" which former President
1120 Obasanjo, as a Military Head of State, called it in 1977 during the launching of the first International Trade Fair
1121 in the country.

1122 Additional Necessary Conditions for Genuine and Productive Collaboration in Ekiti State.

1123 The benefits attributable to collaboration among the super-bureaucracies and their functionaries can be better
1124 harnessed if certain reorganization can take place within the state's civil service. What to do in this regard at
1125 least as part of other concrete measures forms the core our synoptic analysis in this section.

1126 Without any negation intended it is our contention here that the attractiveness of collaboration as an ingredient
1127 of good governance, efficient and effective service delivery within our democracy notwithstanding, its workability;
1128 sustainability and; productivity in terms of responsive policy inputs and outputs; institutional viability and
1129 stability is dependent on certain tradeoffs and compromises. These on their own, are contingent on the ability
1130 of the state to reorganize its various agencies and institutions vis-à-vis the expected fine-tuning and reduction of
1131 apparent areas of economic and administrative wastages associated with the avoidable crippling overlaps among
1132 several of the State's Parastatals. This is necessary in view of the existence of a plethora of such overlapping
1133 Parastatals performing almost the same functions within the state (Ekiti) public sector thereby serving as tunnels
1134 for economic wastage and plundering of critical resources.

1135 Specifically it is recommended that the civil service should be transformed such that overlapping functions are
1136 reduced to the barest minimum to allow for genuine cooperation/collaboration. Through this reorganization
1137 the financial management system will be improved with its attendant positive consequences for developed
1138 and improved revenue generation since the revenue generation agencies will equally be strengthened through
1139 transparency; healthy budgetary process; accountability; prudent management of resources; reduction of fiscal
1140 stress and fiscal crises; integrity in bureaucratic conducts and its accompanying reduction of bureau-pathologies;
1141 and changed leadership. This reorganization will not be problematic if the willingness required for it is not
1142 idiosyncratically ostracized by the relevant actors of the state. More importantly, the blue print for such
1143 reorganization -[which, in the case of Ekiti State, is explainable within the matrix of the 8-Point Agenda of
1144 the government that came into office in October, 2010] -should be the brainchild of all and sundry including the
1145 superbureaucracies and their functionaries serving as the technocrats.

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1147 Without any doubt, the ball is in the courts of the super-bureaucrats within the super-bureaucracies in Ekiti
1148 State particularly the tripodic ones. Once these levels of the administrative machinery of the state inculcate
1149 the values of dedication to duties; resultsorientated professionalism and, collaborative relationship irrespective

1150 of the trade-offs and costly compromises they require, the civil service in the state and, indeed, in Nigeria will
1151 regain its loss glory and enviable position in the scheme of things vis-à-vis the administrative landscape and its
1152 constantly slippery topographic terrains. Through such dedicated professionalism, self-confidence, knowledgeable
1153 and results-oriented dispositions our civil service and servants of today -[as institutions and people saddled with
1154 "heavy and multifarious burdens"] -can be equally described, appreciated and praised the way Chief Obafemi
1155 ??wolowo (1960. 293; also cited in Adamolekun, 2012) described appreciated and glowingly described the Western
1156 Region Civil Service and Servants of the 1950s when he stated thus: Our Civil Service is exceedingly efficient,
1157 absolutely incorruptible in its upper stratum, and utterly devoted and unstinting in the discharge of its many
1158 onerous duties. For our civil servants, government workers and labourers to bear, uncomplainingly and without
1159 breaking down, the heavy and multifarious burdens with which we have in the interest of the public saddled them,
1160 is an epic of loyalty and devotion, of physical and mental endurance, and of a sense of mission, on their par.
1161 From the bottom of my heart I salute all of them. This, in itself, will propel the civil service and its practitioners
1162 as critical actors and players of the state to prominence and relevance in line with the thesis of today's global
1163 village and its "mondialization" of the governance process in our democracies. This, in addition to other issues
1164 already articulated in this paper constitutes an invaluable benefit of collaboration like the other ones analyzed
1165 above.

1166 19 X.

1167 20 Conclusion

1168 The issue of collaboration with reference to good governance, efficient and effective service delivery to the people
1169 within a democratic setting has been examined in this paper. In the process, relevant concepts of democracy,
1170 governance, institutionalism and public service were elucidated in line with core theoretical constructs.

1171 The analytical consideration of these concepts as the applicative mechanisms for the practical pursuit of the
1172 agenda of the state was deemed appropriate as the take-off point for the realization of the goals set attainment in
1173 this paper. In the course of our analysis, these concepts and their understanding were revealed as the appropriate
1174 mechanisms for dealing with the complex relational threads among the various competing interests and groups
1175 within the state -as the macro political organism within which the citizens continue to search or struggle for
1176 self-fulfillment.

1177 Against this analytical background or orientation, the issue of collaboration among the administrative
1178 institutions of government in the quest for efficient and effective service delivery within the boundaries of
1179 good governance and democracy was critically discussed. The discourse in this regard, zeroed in on the
1180 super-bureaucracies and their functionaries. The need for such collaboration; its benefits; what the Public
1181 Administrators should do to collaborate and sustain such collaboration, as well as the relevance of technocracy
1182 and other bureaucratic principles to the process were analyzed.

1183 The reincarnation of the orthodoxy of the civil service and what it actually entails as exemplified by the
1184 wider currency lately given to competitive examination as the major prerequisite for recruitment and promotions
1185 in the civil service in Nigeria and, particularly in Ekiti State has been identified in the paper as a healthy
1186 development. This analytical thinking in itself was predicated on the fact that the unhealthy tinkering with the
1187 administrative arm of the state in the past starting with the 1975 purge and its disturbing repeat in 1988 through
1188 uncharitable military arrogance was a disaster to the administrative landscape in Nigeria. It was contended that
1189 this development made mediocrity rather than meritocracy and technical competence the operational catechism
1190 of the civil service until the recent bold step which attempts to bring back the glorious days of the civil service.
1191 The extent to which this can be sustained is a matter of conjecture which is better left for the future and
1192 developments within the Nigerian administrative and political terrains. ^{1 2 3 4}

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⁴"public administration (lower case) needs to be distinguished from Public Administration (upper case). Public administration denotes the institutions of public bureaucracy within the state: the organizational structures which for the basis of public decision-making and implementation; and the arrangements by which public services are delivered. Public Administration, as a subdiscipline of political science, is the study of public administration by means of institutional description, policy analysis and evaluation, and intergovernmental relations analysis"(McLean and McMillan, 2003).




Figure 1: Volume

Figure 2:

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[Note: C 2012 Year Nigerian body-politic and its other tiers of government.]

Figure 3:

Figure 4:

at the "Central Secretariat" in Lagos; Major
Moorhouse as Secretary Southern Provinces; and
Mr.
2012
Year
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[Note: The first well known Secretaries to government in Nigeria in the colonial era were Donald Cameron who was styled "Chief Secretary"]

Figure 5:

- ? Directing the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) regarding government policies and decisions.
- ? Maintaining contacts with Political Executives in the various departments.
- ? Protocol Affairs.
- ? Intergovernmental Relations.
- ? National Honours and Related Matters and, any other duties that may be assigned by the ultimate political leadership.

b) Functions of the Office of the Head of Service - [HOS]

Figure 6: ?

a "fair" or "just" state distribution, here referred to as the distribution.

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Year

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Figure 7:

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