

# 1 Religion in the Political Economy of Democratization in the 2 South Eastern Nigeria: The Anambra State Experience

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## 7 **Abstract**

8 This paper provides an overview of the dynamics of religion, political godfatherism [i.e. the  
9 act of mentoring people into political office for purposes of indirect control of appointments  
10 and public funds] and democratization in the South Eastern Nigeria with a special focus on  
11 Anambra state since 1999 when the country returned to civilian rule after sixteen years of  
12 military rule. Methodologically, this paper adopted public choice theory and survey methods  
13 of inquiry with 1800 questionnaires distributed. With the aid of tables and arithmetic  
14 percentage formula, this paper observes that political elites hijacked party structures using  
15 party financing and impose candidates after reaching agreements with them on the party and  
16 the state for purposes of rent seeking and political dominance. Religious oaths using African  
17 Traditional Religious rituals were used to safeguard these pre-electoral agreements, and by the  
18 application of existing political schisms between Catholic and Anglican churches, they seek  
19 support for their candidates. Tussle for political power between these two churches, and  
20 between them and individual godfathers, which ended in the triumph of institutional  
21 godfathers followed. This opened sources of resources for churches through the appointment of  
22 their members into political positions. This paper therefore concludes that religious belief and  
23 affiliation fundamentally decide electoral choice and political appointments in Anambra state.

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25 **Index terms**— Patronage, Individual godfather, institutional godfather, democratization, electoral choice,  
26 and African Traditional Religion.

## 27 **1 Introduction**

28 In Nigeria, there is coexistence between animistic religions, ancestor worship, Islam and Christianity. These  
29 religions have been dominant in particular areas of different regions in the country and have been a veritable  
30 instrument for political struggle among various Nigerians in the never ending intra class struggle among the  
31 elites for political domination that operates within the propaganda machine of tribalism ??Kalu, 2003:6]. Of  
32 all, Islam through the Emirate system of administration has been a spectacular unifying religio-political force  
33 among the Hausa/Fulani, which stimulated limited Christian unity in political matters. Down in the South  
34 Eastern Nigeria, Christians are characteristically disunited Author : Department of Political Science, Nnamdi  
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36 politically to their own disadvantage due to denominational antagonism that exists in a tripartite form between  
37 the Catholics, Anglicans and Pentecostal churches. On the other hand, many Nigerians retain their indigenous  
38 religions though their level of political consciousness is inconsequential.

39 The intertwined connection between religion and politics in the history of Nigeria since independence was  
40 described by Kalu [2003] in the following manner;

41 Religion is intricately woven into the fabric of politics and provides the compelling touchstone of legitimacy  
42 or the love of the ruler by the ruled; the motive for exercising power; reason to be obeyed; the determinant of

### 3 MATERIALS AND METHODS

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43 the moral standards and style of power and the engine that moves governance. In such contexts, the structure of  
44 governance had tremendous impact on the modes of religious expression and religion could not be conjured out  
45 of politics.

46 Corroborating this, Obianyo (2008) notes; One of the intriguing aspects of Nigerian politics is the ease with  
47 which the political class capitalise on any form of identity to capture state power or public office. At one time  
48 ethnicity is used, where the ethnic card is not catching on, the religious card is flown.

49 This precisely seems to be the case in Anambra state. It is widely held that the struggle for the acquisition of  
50 state power has been predominantly between the Anglican Church (AC) and Roman Catholic Church (RCC).  
51 In addition, politicians have not only employed the religious and individual godfather powers in their struggle for  
52 state power but have also resorted to spiritualism as an instrument to seek victory both in the primaries and the  
53 general election. The controversial cases of Okija Shrine oaths and agreements between Chief Chris Uba and Dr.  
54 Chris Ngige, Chief Emeka Offor and Dr. Chinwoke Mbardinuju, are only examples. Prior to 1998 party primaries;  
55 and 1999 general elections, Chief Emeka Offor took Dr. Chinwoke Mbardinuju to the popular but dreaded Okija  
56 shrine in Ihiala Local Government of Anambra state to take oath of allegiance to him if he becomes the governor.  
57 Haven secured this spiritual agreement; Chief Emeka Offor [who controlled 2002 and 2003, Chief Chris Uba did  
58 the same thing for Dr. Chris Ngige. All these power backups for victory are achieved under special arrangements  
59 that have high level financial implications for democratization.

60 It is important to state that religion as a factor in Anambra state politics has been silent in political discuss  
61 before 1999 general elections. However, between 1999 and 2003, the use of spiritualism to gain electoral victory  
62 became public knowledge and pervasive in political discuss. From 2003, the scenario of religious institutions  
63 playing the role of godfathers, and the struggle between such institutions and individual godfathers who have  
64 always employed spiriticism on their political sons on whose candidate shall emerge victorious characterised  
65 political contest in the state.

66 This paper therefore studies the phenomenon, with a view to explicate the economic connections and dynamics  
67 of religious institutional godfatherism in the politics of the state and to evaluate the mechanism of its victory over  
68 the individual godfathers.

## 69 2 II.

### 70 3 Materials and Methods

71 To effectively carry out this inquiry, this paper explored the history and practice of party primaries in Anambra  
72 State since 1999, which was the first period that the newly created state experienced electoral competition. The  
73 paper investigated the role of both the church and the claimed godfathers in the emergence of party candidates  
74 during party primaries and in the general elections. This was done by review of various publications in texts,  
75 journals, conference papers, workshops, government publications both international and local, civil society and  
76 human rights publications, newspapers and magazines.

77 This study, which was conducted in Nigeria beginning in the later part of 2009 and concluded in January  
78 2011, also used questionnaires to find out the precise influence which religious organisations had on voter choice  
79 of candidates during elections, choice of candidates for political appointments after elections, and the role played  
80 by these religious bodies in the management of political conflicts in Anambra state particularly during the various  
81 attempts to remove incumbent Governors between 1999 and 2007.

82 One thousand eight hundred questionnaires were distributed [Six hundred questionnaires in each of the three  
83 senatorial districts that make up the state] to the staff at the ecclesiastical quarters of the Pentecostal Fellowship  
84 of Nigeria (PFN), the Anglican Communion and the Catholic Church in the state. It was also distributed at the  
85 secretariat of the major political parties operating in the state most importantly, the People's Democratic Party  
86 (PDP), Action Congress (AC), All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP), All Progressive Party Alliance (APGA), and  
87 Labour Party (LP). Thirty copies each were distributed at each of these places while 1560 copies were distributed  
88 in major churches in the three geopolitical zones of the state (372 questionnaires in each zone]. The remaining  
89 90 copies of the questionnaire were distributed at the secretariats of RCC, AC, Grace of God, Christ Embassy,  
90 and Methodist church, Assemblies of God, ECWA, Winners Chapel and Redeemed Church of God.

91 The administration of the research instrument was carried out by research field assistants. They collected  
92 back the questionnaire on the spot without any missing. Simple percentage mechanism through a build up of  
93 mathematical tables was used in addition to content analysis to study, analyse and explain the data generated  
94 during the inquiry.

95 It must be acknowledged that the hostile political atmosphere in the state limited our data gathering to  
96 answers in the questionnaires as people were either sceptical of responding to questions or abhorred interview in  
97 its entirety. We are also limited to the questionnaire responses as our base for inferences as we have no other  
98 way of assessing our respondents' minds.

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99 **4 III.**

100 **5 Gap in the Literature**

101 Many scholars like Coppedge and Reinecke (1991); and Hadenius, (1992) have made several efforts to construct  
102 scales of democracy that measure the three dimensions of democratization, which are; electoral competition,  
103 participation (universal suffrage), and essential civil liberties. Others like ??klar (1987: 686-714; ??nd 1996:  
104 26-27); and O'Donnell (1994: 60-62) argue that among other things that autonomous judiciary, institutionalized  
105 processes (often in a separate, autonomous agency), pluralism, rule of law, respect for human rights etc are  
106 characteristics of any democracy.

107 Consequently, scholars like Casanova [1994] and Epstein [1991] argue that religious institutions build  
108 democratic forces that challenge authoritarian regime particularly in Eastern Europe and Latin America.  
109 They have equally provided skills and organizational strength in civil society activism that are related to  
110 democratization (Verba et al. 1995). Thus, Zald and McCarthy (1987) and Smith (1991) argued that religion  
111 serves as instrument of resources mobilization for groups and organizations seeking to expand democratic  
112 participation or protect the interests of the marginalized.

113 Other scholars like Pals (1996) and Hughes (1995) noted therefore that religious institutions influences political  
114 choice or activities. For ??ughes (1995:39), individuals; Undoubtedly act on the basis of their beliefs and ideas,  
115 and the ways in which they conduct themselves follow from the religious and political conceptions to which they  
116 subscribe .

117 While ??als (1996: 85) As the carrier of social sentiments, providing symbols and rituals that enable people  
118 to express the deep emotions which anchor them to their community.

119 Thus, Hoge and Zulueta ??1985] note that the conditions that promote consensus among inhabitants of a  
120 common environment are likely to be present in formal organizations that encourage face-to-face interaction  
121 such as religious organizations. They are voluntary associations of individuals bound by strong affective ties  
122 and regular social interaction; their members are tied to particular indoctrination and maintenance of group  
123 norms (Stark, 1987). This enables such institutions to define and prescribe political agenda in the name of  
124 God and structure members' preferences for candidates, parties, and issue positions ??Wald, 1987: 57-63). This  
125 political function of the church are easily undertaken through such programmes as sermons, pastoral messages,  
126 adult education classes, poster displays, announcements and church publications. In this sense, existing religious  
127 traditions/attitudes toward authority, knowledge, obedience and the need for salvation make the function very  
128 efficacious. ??alton (1985: 47-49) observed that the churches provide many avenues for the reinforcement of  
129 such programmes and messages by bringing the membership together on a regular basis for formal worship and  
130 promoting informal social interaction among congregants. Secondly, deviants/truants from such programmes and  
131 directives can be punished ??Walton, 1985: 50). Consequently, Welch and Leege (1998: 19) see religion as a  
132 force for order, social control, and conservative positions on public policy.

133 However, Cartocci (2002) argues that religious organizations which were once exceptionally strong predictors  
134 of voting have lost their influence in the modern times. In Italian politics, it has been found out that the religious  
135 cleavage, eroded by a long term process of secularization which had already depressed its influence on the vote,  
136 received the final blow by the disappearance of the Christian Democratic Party, making politically irrelevant a  
137 religious driven vote. Catholics divide now themselves between a vote for the Left or the Right according to their  
138 political, rather than religious, preferences. However, the literature exposed a different historical experience in the  
139 Nigeria political process. Political contestation in Nigeria since independence has been structured considerably  
140 by Islam and Christianity [Odey, 2003;Zartman, 1992). This has determined voters' support for parties and  
141 candidates in Nigeria at different periods (Campbell, 1997).

142 The historical origin of the influence of religion on electoral choice in Nigeria dates back to the introduction  
143 of Islamic state through Jihad in the Sokoto Caliphate ??Enwerem, 1995: 21; ??digwe, 1968: 454). The political  
144 exploits made by the caliphate since then in Nigeria political history awakened the political consciousness of the  
145 Christians, which led to the formation of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the mid-1970s as a strong  
146 ecumenical movement ??Enwerem, 1995: 76). Ever since then the factor of religious affiliation has become a  
147 yard stick for voters' choice during elections. For instance, many Nigerians particularly from the South could  
148 neither vote for nor sympathise with Muhammadu Buhari during the 2007 elections because of his statement that  
149 Nigeria should be Islamized. To secure the support of the North for their presidential bids, late Chief Mashood  
150 Abiola and Dr. Orji Uzor Kalu became Moslems.

151 On the other hand, the self acclaimed godfather of Anambra politics, Chief Chris Uba employed the instrument  
152 of African Traditional Religion [ATR] to determine whom to impose both as a party candidate and governor of  
153 the state [Ngige, 2005). This practice was a repetition of the deal between Chief Emeka Ofor and Dr. Chinwoke  
154 Mbadinuju during the 1999 general election.

155 The literature reveals that back in the 55 BC Roman Empire; godfatherism existed because a wealthy  
156 candidate would quietly arrange for his election to the desired office with a band of political "go-betweens". These  
157 professional gentlemen would proceed to mark out the Roman tribes into smaller and wider sections, arrange  
158 voters into clubs and fraternities, compound with each section for its votes, marshal the faithful henchmen to  
159 the electoral comitia, and duly pay over the stipulated honorarium upon delivery of the elections (Scott, 1973).  
160 Today, in Nigeria, elections (both primary and general) are habitually subverted/determined by political parties

161 and political elites through the illegal use of money, physical force and governmental patronage deployed through  
162 the intermediary of "perverse brokers" (Olarinmoye, 2007: 33) known as godfathers. 'godfatherism' is therefore  
163 a prevalent phenomenon in Nigerian politics.

164 These godfathers disfranchise voters (Scott, 1973), serve as go-betweens for politicians in a situation of voters' alienation and distrust in return for contracts and political appointments ??Agbaje, 2005). They achieve this  
165 aim by creating political structures called parties with their resources [Weinstein, 2005: 602-603] and then invite  
166 the mass to join. After this, they rely on the massive deployment of material resources (Wang and Kurzman,  
167 2007a) to dominate the political process. Chief Chris Uba declared;

168 The godfather has in his possession knowledge of the sort of incentives most likely to "move" potential The  
169 need to protect themselves against disappointment in their relationship with their clients who become controllers  
170 of first degree resources through their brokerage activities has pushed godfathers into taking initiatives that has  
171 had the consequence of entrenching electoral corruption in Nigerian politics. Olarinmoye [2007:4) noted that;  
172 godfather-brokers in order to face-up to the possibilities of constant re-arrangement of power configuration in  
173 their relationships with political clients and the negative impact which such has on their existence as brokers have  
174 been forced to restructure their modus operandi, that is evolve from individuals reliant on second degree resources  
175 to individuals who control first degree resources in their own right. In other words, transforms themselves from  
176 being 'godfather-broker' to becoming "godfatherpatron.

177 IV.

## 179 6 Framework of Analysis

180 Public choice theory is considered the most applicable theoretical tool for this study and analysis. Public choice  
181 theory originated as a separate field of study a half century ago in the works of its founding fathers, Kenneth  
182 Arrow (1951), Anthony Downs (1957), Mancur Olson (1965), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) among  
183 others.

184 The core principles of the theory are: 1. In the political sphere, people aspire to promote their common good.  
185 2. In the pursuit of people's common good, voters, politicians and policy makers are supposed some how to rise  
186 above their own parochial concerns. 3. This implies that public choice assumes that people are guided by their  
187 self interests but their motivations in political process are not different from those of the people one is associated  
188 with. As result voters "vote their pocket books" supporting candidates and ballot propositions they think will  
189 make them personally better off. 4. Thus, the individual becomes the fundamental unit of analysis. Public  
190 choice rejects the construction of organic decision making units, such as the people, the community, or society.  
191 Groups do not make choices, only individuals do. 5. Public and private choice processes differ, not because the  
192 motivations of the actors are different, but because of stack differences in the incentives and constraints that  
193 channel the pursuit of self interest in two settings. 6. There is no mechanism for making collective choices  
194 other than dictatorship that translates the preferences of diverse individuals into a well behaved social utility  
195 function, in this case; religion, faith and its application. 7. In this order, voters in democratic elections will  
196 tend to be poorly informed about the candidates and Public choice theory therefore adopts the assumption that  
197 all individuals, be they workers, politicians, or bureaucrats, are motivated more by self The godfather-patron  
198 captures the party machinery for himself. With his control of the party structure he becomes the sponsor of  
199 politicians. He uses his control of party machinery to impose his clients as party candidates for elective office and  
200 ensures their electoral success through activities which have been characterized as electoral corruption. Success  
201 of the party at elections translates into direct access of the godfather-patron to public treasury and policies.  
202 That is, the godfather in his bid to secure stable access to state resources and ensure his continued existence as a  
203 "Bigman" engages in electoral corruption to install a puppet ??Ibrahim, 2006b; ??brahim, 2007). On this lie the  
204 root of political struggle that ensued in Anambra state since 1999 between the godfathers and their victorious  
205 clients on the one hand; and the individual godfathers and the institutional godfather -the Church on the other.  
206 It is therefore interesting to note that while literature dominantly explored the role of religion and godfatherism  
207 in democratic politics, it has not evaluated the superiority of one over the other nor has it explored the financial  
208 nexus that inform their joint competition to install political office holders. This paper pursues these.

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211 Year interest than by public interest. However, it recognises that men are not angels and focus on institutional  
212 rules under which people pursue their objectives. Religious teachings and doctrines being the ultimate among  
213 the rules are expected to determine and/or influence the electoral choice of voters and candidates.

214 This theory enables the paper to investigate: a]. the reactions and contributions of religious groups to electoral  
215 processes in Anambra state; b]. The impact or role of religious affiliations and belief in the selection and voting  
216 for electoral contestants during elections in the state; c]. The impact of the input from religion on the political  
217 structure during the conduct of elections and the conversion of the inputs from the religious institutions by the  
218 political structure into output, and the role of religion in the resolution of the political conflicts that characterize  
219 Anambra state since 1999. Therefore, I consider this theory appropriate for the study.

220 V.

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## 221 8 Data Collect?on and D?scuss?ons Party Pr?mar?es and Elec- 222 toral Cho?ce ?n Anambra State

223 Primary elections are one means by which a political party nominates candidates for the following general election  
224 in which other parties contest for public office. Primary elections in the South East particularly Anambra State  
225 are generally anarchical, fraudulent and a criminal experience that defies all known theories. The dominant  
226 political elites that floated political parties at the national level had their states of origin as their sphere of  
227 influence wherein they decide who occupies what position in the party and who becomes each party's flag bearer  
228 in the general elections. To legitimize this, they were mandated by their various national secretariats to organise  
229 primaries in their state during 1999 and 2003 general elections.

230 During the various primaries termed "indirect", party membership plays almost no role in choosing party  
231 candidates. Carl LeVan ??2006] notes that;

232 In addition to this, the People's Democratic Party [PDP] constitution (Article 13) for instance provided that  
233 political appointees such as ambassadors, ministers and advisors are to become "automatic delegates" at the party  
234 convention (Dan-Musa , 2004). Under this circumstance, all the special advisers, assistants, and commissioners  
235 at the state level are automatic delegates. But where the party is not in good terms with the governor, or where  
236 the governor belongs to another party, the national Secretariat makes use of the individual "godfathers," who  
237 bankroll and use patronage networks to carry out much of the fieldwork for candidates.

238 In Anambra state however, the godfathers are used to making a list of preferred candidates who have paid for  
239 those positions in millions of naira and with the approval of the national secretariat of their political parties impose  
240 such on the state structure and party. In addition to paying handsomely for such positions, they equally enter  
241 into agreement under oath in any chosen Traditional religious shrine that guarantee the godfathers' access to and  
242 control of the state's financial policies, development programmes and appointments after the general elections. It  
243 is my argument that the euphoria of the transition from military to civilian regime in 1999 did not allow politician,  
244 religious leaders and even researchers to monitor the role of religion in Anambra politics. However, the crisis  
245 between Chief Emeka Ofor [godfather] and Governor Chinwoke Mbardinuju [whom he installed] between 1999  
246 and 2002 exposed the role played by African Traditional religion [ATR] in the emergence of party candidates.  
247 After Dr. Chinwoke Mbardinuju took oath of allegiance to Chief Emeka Ofor, the later manipulated the electoral  
248 process to ensure the emergence of the former both as the PDP party flag bearer in the primaries and the governor  
249 of the state between 1999 and 2003.

250 This practice continued into 2003 but with a wider and more sophisticated dimension both along the party and  
251 religious lines. Ochereome (2005) exposed the role played by African Traditional Religion (ATR) in the selection  
252 or choice of Dr. Chris Nwabueze Ngige as the PDP flag bearer during the 2003 general elections in Anambra  
253 state while other candidates sought for the blessings and support of all the major religious bodies. ??bianyo  
254 (2008:17) concurred to this point in the following manner;

255 The point to be made here is that political office seekers particularly aspirants to the office of the governor  
256 appreciated the important role played by religious groups in the emergence of candidates.

257 Following the problem between the incumbent Governor with his godfather and by extension the PDP, Chief  
258 Chris Uba who by virtue of presidential connection and party financing -another acclaimed godfather -was given  
259 the mandate to deliver the state for PDP as the Governor has cross-carpeted to Alliance for Democracy Rather  
260 than a congress system, or open primary elections, delegates are nominated by local governments rather than  
261 by party members. Since the LGAs depend on the governors for financial and political support they are easily  
262 persuaded. This system allows the party near total control over candidate selection and returned all but one of  
263 the governors to office in 2003 (see also ??ew 2004, 139-173).

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265 There were other candidates who sought the blessings of the various religious leaders in the state, like Dr Chris  
266 Ngige, but never received the endorsement of any major denomination. Dr Chris Ngige is a Catholic who  
267 campaigned on a subject very dear to the Catholic Church -that is return of schools to the missions or churches,  
268 yet the church never endorsed him.

269 [AD]. Earlier Dr. Chris Ngige -a member of RCC -was said to have approached the church hierarchy for  
270 blessing and support but was asked to wait for another period because Mr. Peter Obi who was an aspirant  
271 under the All progressive People's Alliance [APGA] had already been chosen as an RCC consensus candidate.  
272 He was taken to the famous Okija shrine by Chief Uba for oath of allegiance. Obi emerged as APGA flag bearer  
273 without challenges while Chief Uba manipulated the PDP primaries and imposed Ngige as PDP candidate. On  
274 the day of the PDP convention, Chief Uba came to the convention venue with buses full of rented people that  
275 were perceived to be non-Anambra residents. He stood at the entrance of the convention ground, and handed  
276 over the PDP delegate cards to these rented boys. These cards were meant to be given to Local Governments  
277 and political appointee delegates as entrance permit to the convention ground. In the end, Ngige was declared  
278 winner, whilst other aspirants either fruitlessly went to the court or decamped to other parties.

279 The stage was set for a show of electoral power between the individual godfather -Chief Uba, Dr Ngige's  
280 sponsor and the institutional godfather -the hierarchy of RCC, Mr. Obi's sponsor. Denominational politics  
281 joined forces here as Chief Uba -A member of the Anglican Communion -won the support of the former Bishop

282 of the Niger and Dean of the Anglican Communion, Dr. Anakwenwa. Chief Uba using presidential connection  
283 [Ochereome, 2005] got the Independent National Electoral Commission ??INEC] to declare Ngige winner while  
284 the RCC mobilised its vast majority of popular support that posses documentaries about the elections and filed  
285 a suit in the court against the INEC verdict. Through court litigations, the RCC vacated INEC verdict through  
286 the presentation of original results from the polls and recovered Mr Obi mandate. Mr. Obi was finally sworn in  
287 as the governor of the state.

288 A field investigation carried out to establish the various activities of the two blocks during and after the  
289 elections and the reasons behind church's active involvement in the electoral process reveals the followings:

### 290 10 vi. Religion in Anambra State Political Process

291 One of the crucial strategies which major contenders to the governorship position in Anambra state adopted to  
292 balance the denominational bias, which in fact authenticates that fundamental influence of religion, was that  
293 each candidate choose their deputies from another religious denomination. ??bianyo (2008:17) captured it in the  
294 following way: However, the Catholic Church, which has its members as the gubernatorial candidates for the  
295 major parties, gave her mandate for Mr. Peter Obi of APGA. While Chris Uba, an Anglican settled for Dr.  
296 Chris Ngige whom he had earlier led to Okija shrine for oath and who has his (Uba's) brother an Anglican  
297 as his deputy. It is therefore evident that religion played a key role in the selection or emergence of governorship  
298 candidate in Anambra state during the 2003 general elections. This fact was supported by data from the field as  
299 can be proved by the following reports. To validate or invalidate this opinion, we proceed with our field report  
300 being data collected from our respondents on the issue.

### 301 11 VII.

### 302 12 Field Survey

303 The questionnaires were evenly distributed to the two dominant Christian denominations in the state whose  
304 support for the candidates was considered decisive and which has been competing for the control of the state  
305 and its institutions. The entire 1800 respondents are adults with universal suffrage, who may have participated  
306 in the said election. Most importantly, 24% of the respondents from the Anglican Communion [AC] and 34.8%  
307 from RCC, which constitute 58.8% of the total research sample, are within the age bracket of 45 to 75 years.  
308 They belong to the decision making organ of different organisations and wings in their various churches. It  
309 is equally from this age bracket that electoral officers, election monitors, party officials and party/candidates'  
310 representatives are recruited. They equally belong to the age group that are members of different Civil Society  
311 Organizations (CSOs). In essence, they are well informed about and or engaged in all that transpired during the  
312 election period and within the electoral system.

313 The following data were collected as respondents' party membership. It is important to point out that all the  
314 gubernatorial candidates had their ticket balanced religiously. Mr Peter Obi had as his running mate, Mrs Virgy  
315 Etiaba, whom it was alleged was the candidate of the Anglican Archbishop of the Ecclesiastical Province of the  
316 Niger. Dr Chris Ngige had as his running mate Dr Okey Ude an Anglican but a relation of his political god  
317 father Chief Chris Uba.

318 A further inquiry reveals that these respondents numbering 750 belong to different political parties by virtue of  
319 registration and membership. The above table shows that 34.8% are card carrying members of the PDP, 12% are  
320 members of ANPP, 24% belongs to AC, 21.6% are members of APGA, while only 7.6% are registered members of  
321 other political parties. Therefore, by virtue of party membership, our respondents were drawn from major parties  
322 in Anambra state. However, they did not vote along party identity during the elections. 9.2% respondents only  
323 voted for the PDP when it is on record from the questionnaire that 34.8% were registered members of the PDP.  
324 Only 4.8% voted for ANPP when the card carrying members of the party among our respondents constitute  
325 12%. AC was not different because 33.2% voted for AC when its cardcarrying members constitute 24% of the  
326 study sample. None of the 7.6% of the respondents voted for other parties outside APGA and PDP when they  
327 registered with other parties. A total of 52.8% voted for APGA when APGA's card carrying members are only  
328 21.6%. It is therefore clear that our respondents did not vote on the basis of their party affiliations.

329 An advanced inquiry into what informed their choice of candidate at the polls reveals that 8.4% of the  
330 respondents voted out of personal conviction/choice, 16% were influenced by campaign promises/gifts, church  
331 membership motivated 21.6% of them to vote for their candidates, and 54% voted for a specific candidate simply  
332 because they were instructed by their church leaders to do so. Therefore, majority of the respondents were  
333 influenced by religion to make their voting choice.

334 In addition, 80% of the respondents acceded to the fact that the religious factor played a role in the selection  
335 of candidates by different political parties in the state, while only 14.8% disagreed. However, the opinion of the  
336 majority was further consolidated by the fact that 98% of the 1800 respondents admitted that their churches  
337 prayed for the success of their member gubernatorial candidate for the said election and campaigned for them.  
338 Though 71.2% maintained that no threat of sanction was issued by their church leaders against voting for non-  
339 member, it is clear from the above that religion played an influential role in the selection and voting behaviour  
340 of Anambrarians during the 2003 general elections. No election was conducted in 2007 into the governorship  
341 position, therefore, further reflection on this is not possible for now

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## 342 **13 Religion and Political Appointment Anambra State**

343 Researchers have proved that religious influence equally has been a major determinant in the appointment of  
344 political office holders in the state. For instance, ??bianyo (2008:16-17)

## 345 **14 43**

346 During the two years tenure of Dr Chris Ngige before he was ousted by the court a brief profile of appointments  
347 made showed that he also favoured the RCC also though with a more acceptable balance with the AC more than  
348 that of Obi's regime. It could be recalled here that AC sponsored his fraudulent victory. Those appointments are  
349 presented below as follows: Those who benefited from these appointments often make financial donations to their  
350 church, and do establish connections between their and relevant government institutions and parastatals in terms  
351 of requests for specific aids, programmes and events. Through the participation of these government institutions  
352 and parastatals, donations are made to these churches, though in most cases unannounced. An interview granted  
353 to a senior members of the clergy under pledge of anonymity on December 15, 2010 at Awka reveals this. These  
354 increase the financial power of the churches concerned and solidify their dominance over other churches in terms  
355 of socio-political relevance.

## 356 **15 VIII. in**

## 357 **16 Global**

358 The result of the field survey conducted to find out the relationship between political interests and donations or  
359 the major reason for donations for church projects reveals the following: Question: Which of the following reasons  
360 informs major donations in your church? From the above table, 54.61% admitted that many major donations in  
361 their churches outside dues and levies for project were done by politicians in appreciation for the support given to  
362 them by the church. While 19.17% agreed that some of the donations were made by those that are anticipating  
363 church support for their political ambitions. Put together, 73.78% of our respondents agree that church support  
364 for political aspirants of politicians in general attracts project funds.

365 Certain reliable information has it that most of the Cathedral churches and even mini-cathedrals built in  
366 Anambra State between 2006 and 2010 were either partially funded by the governor of the state and other  
367 political office holders or completely built by them. Some of the godfathers and political aspirants to highly  
368 positioned office have equally built such projects for certain churches and publicly celebrated their completion.  
369 For instance, Sir Emeka Offor, a prominent Anambra politician and the political godfather of Dr Chinwoke  
370 Mbadinuju [a former governor of the state], has through his foundation built many churches. In addition to  
371 these, there is evidence that these political office holders distribute expensive cars like Hummer Sand Jeeps to  
372 leaders of these churches. One of the leaders was alleged to have been given a duplex during the 2007 gubernatorial  
373 election. On these lies the desperate and unhindered efficacious political mobilization of their members in support  
374 of political aspirants from their denominations during elections. The hostile political environment in the state  
375 and the active penal instruments existing in the various churches against deviant members limit our ability to  
376 document these pieces of information. However, the political character of this philanthropism lies in the fact that  
377 such gifts are really given during election years, and these politicians cease to attend these local churches within  
378 their constituencies after the elections.

## 379 **17 IX.**

## 380 **18 Conclusion**

381 Religion has been identified as a strong force that influence people's way of life, association and decision. Nigerians  
382 like the vast majority of Africans are Religion in the Political Economy of Democratization in the South Eastern  
383 Nigeria: The Anambra State Experience 45 spiritualists whose tacit belief in the supernatural superiority over  
384 man's affairs and in the life after has made them highly amenable to the political choice of their religious  
385 leaders. This has however clashed with the ultimate demand of the acclaimed godfathers who by virtue of their  
386 wealth distribute money and materials to the masses. This force is considered important and strong due to the  
387 increasing level of poverty Nigerians are experiencing. On this note, it must be mentioned here that the leaders  
388 of the various religious groups in Anambra state provided the opportunity and ground for the various political  
389 aspirants to distribute money and materials to members of their churches as a neutralising factor to the challenge  
390 posed by poverty to their control of their members. This together with the power of religious belief neutralized  
391 and subdued the individual godfathers in the competition for the election of political office holders in the state.

392 In essence the political economy of this involvement of the religious leaders is characteristically defined by the  
393 financial gains associated with their member emerging victorious in the political contest. It is also associated  
394 with the various policy preferences such denomination enjoys in such administration and to the personal gains  
395 such leaders enjoy from their member politician. Thus, the major source of support for each political regime in  
396 Anambra state determines the nature of political appointments made after elections. Consequently, using the over




Figure 1:

397 bearing power of belief system, the religious institutional godfathers became dominant in the democratization  
398 processes of the state for purposes of financial benefits. <sup>1</sup>

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i. Compilation of fictitious names on voters' registers, illegal compilation of separate voters' list, abuse of the voter registration revision exercise, illegal printing of voters' cards, illegal possession of ballot boxes, collaboration between polling officials and agents to subvert the electoral rules, late or non-supply of election materials to opposition strongholds, delay in opening polling centres located in opposition strongholds (Pre-election voter compliance).	Volume XII
ii. Stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers, falsification of election results, Illegal thumb-printing of ballot papers, stuffing of ballot boxes, under-age voting, multiple voting, illegal printing of electoral result forms (as in the case of Form EC 8 and EC 8A used in collation and declaration of election results in 2003 and 2007 elections), deliberate refusal to supply election materials to certain areas, announcing results in places where no elections were held, unauthorized announcement of election results, harassment of candidates, agents and voters, change of list of electoral officials, box-switching and inflation of figures and long delays or manipulation of election tribunals to protect stolen verdicts, inducement of voters with food and money, threatening voters with the use of force (Kurfi, 2005; Ibrahim, 2006).	Volume XII Is- sue XII Ver- sion I D D D D ) ( Science Human So- cial Journal of Global

*[Note: 39 voters to vote for a preferred candidate (Wang and Kurzman, 2007b). This knowledge enables the godfather to engage in illegal election activities such as: C 2012 Year I am the greatest godfather in Nigeria because this is the first time an individual single handedly put in position every politician in the state (Ibrahim, 2006).]*

Figure 2:

*[Note: 2 40 issues on the ballot. They act on the directives of the church.]*

Figure 3:

2 42

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Global Journal of Human Social Science

S/N

1.

Question  
Which of  
the following  
party are you  
registered in?

PDP ANPPAC APG

34.8% 12% 24% 21.6%

2. Whch of the parties did you vote for during i the Governorship election in 2003? 9.2% 4.8% 33.2% 52.8%

Source : field survey report, 2009.

[Note: C 2012 Year © 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)]

Figure 4:

reveals that:

1. In the composition of Anambra State Executive; RCC received 16 out of the 23 post [69.6%], AC has 6 [26.1%] while the Pentecostals only occupied 1 post [4.3%].
2. Recruitment at Nwafor Orizu State College of Education; RCC captured 60 out of the 65 employments made [92.30%], AC got 3 posts [4.62%] while the Pentecostals received 2 posts [3.08%].
3. Appointment of Special Advisers; RCC secured 20 positions out of 27 [74.07%] while AC got 7 representing 25.93%.
4. Appointment of Principal Officers of Statutory Boards and Parastatals; RCC got 16 out of 19 positions available [84.2%] while the AC got 3 i.e. 15.8%.

Sources : ANIDSCOPE, December [2008]; Sunday Sun Newspaper, March 15 [2009]; The Society for Equity, Justice and Peace [Secretariat of the Diocesan Council of Laity, Diocese of the Niger Awka]

Figure 5:

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