

1 Islamic Finance: A Bulwark against Crisis?

2 Dr. Hatem Derbel¹, Neila Dammak² and Ali Chkir³

3 ¹ University of West Paris Nanterre La Defense

4 Received: 7 February 2012 Accepted: 5 March 2012 Published: 15 March 2012

5

6 **Abstract**

7 The aim of this paper is to show that the Islamic finance is more stable than the conventional
8 finance constituting, thus, a means to reduce the impact of financial crisis. Using a VAR
9 model for the financial indexes of France (SBF250), United States (DOW JONES), United
10 Kingdom (FTSE100), Indonesia (JAKISLM) and Saudi Arabia (TADAWUL) covering the
11 period (26/02/2007- 12/20/2010), we show that the effect of a shock on the American market
12 during the period of crisis is negatively transmitted on all other markets, but with a small
13 extent on the market using the method of Islamic financing.

14

15 **Index terms**— Islamic Finance, Conventional Finance, financial crisis, VAR model.

16 The development of this sector does not come only from the increase of the Muslim population immigrant or
17 not, who is looking for financial products conform to Shari'a, but also from its efficiency and its performance.
18 Several financial analyses show that Islamic finance constitutes an ethical choice that avoids the drift of speculation
19 while reinstituting some values neglected by conventional finance, like trust. It prohibits not only investment in
20 sectors considered "illicit" such as alcohol, pork, prostitution and gambling, but also it prohibits the payment of
21 interest and speculation. Only investments in tangible assets are allowed.

22 The Islamic finance market is attracting a great interest. With annual growth rates of 15-20% on average over
23 the last five years, it represents an international segment recording the fastest growth in the finance sector. This
24 led us to be interested in this subject and to wonder us on the contribution of Islamic finance in comparison
25 with the conventional finance. A big part of literature contains comparisons of instruments used in Islamic and
26 conventional banking, and discusses the challenges of normalization and supervision linked to the Islamic banking
27 (Sundararajan and Errico (2002); World Bank and FMI (2005); Ainley et al. (2007); Semelle ??2007); Jobst
28 ??2007)).

29 However, there are very little empirical analysis on the role of Islamic finance in the financial stability. Some
30 papers discuss the risks in Islamic financial institutions only in a theoretical framework, while empirical studies
31 on Islamic banking are concentrated on issues linked to efficiency (Yudistira (2004); Moktar Abdullah and Al-
32 Habshi-Habshi (2006)). Although several studies on Islamic finance have been developed, its role in financial
33 stability has not yet been analyzed in a consistent, transnational and empirical way.

34 Our contribution in this paper is to lead an empirical study in order to check whether a finance based on
35 Islamic law is more stable or not than a conventional finance. To this end, this paper is structured as follows:
36 in section 2 we present the difference between Islamic finance and conventional finance. Section 3 discusses the
37 relationship between Islamic finance and financial stability. In section 4, we will conduct an empirical study to
38 determine whether countries using Islamic finance were less affected or not by crisis in comparison with those who
39 opt for traditional finance. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. ??Calyon), this market represents between
40 500 and 1000 billion dollars. Some products show an impressive growth as the Islamic bond market, the sukuks.

41 The purpose of a financial system, whether it is conventional or Islamic, is the mobilization of financial resources
42 and their allocation among various investment projects. However, the basic principles which govern an Islamic
43 financial system are different from the spirit of conventional finance. If in the "classic" finance, the norm which
44 chairs the decisions of an economic agent is to optimize the couple return -risk of its investments, the profitability
45 is not the only nor the main criterion of decision for the Islamic operators.

46 Islamic finance is a financial system which relies primarily on Shari'a. This last is a set of laws and rules which
47 govern in Islam the economic, social and political life. The existence of such system lies in the desire to ensure

48 that financial products are compatible with legal and ethical principles of Islam. The prohibition of riba is one
49 of the sources of divergence of view between Islamic finance and conventional finance. From the etymological
50 point of view, the term riba comes from the Arab word "arba" which means to increase. This term refers to two
51 distinct concepts in the terminology of conventional finance, namely the interest rate and usury. The first term
52 indicates the amount paid for the use of money, whereas the second one refers to the offence committed by one
53 who lends money at excessive rate. Although usury in conventional societies should be condemned, the interest
54 on the contrary is accepted. However, Muslim philosophy condemns and prohibits any interest rate it is usury
55 or not.

56 The prohibition of the practice of interest is not foreign for other religions. Indeed, it also prevailed among
57 Christians and Jews. The prohibition of riba in Islam finds its origin in the Quran, the sacred book of Muslims
58 and the main source of Islamic law. The Quran forbids expressly, in several times, the practice of riba. «... O
59 the believers! Fear Allah and abandon the usurious interest, if you are believers ». Quran 2, Verse 278.

60 The perception of a fixed remuneration, only after the passage of time and disconnected from the real
61 profitability of the investment project, is prohibited by the Shariah. It is considered unproductive and socially
62 destructive. In fact, achieving substantial profits from usurious contracts, the owners of capital would take more
63 risk or to engage in commerce or in any economic activity. This will lead to the emergence, alongside the loans
64 with interest, other behaviors as harmful as the wear that is hoarding. In this particular vision come from
65 two other requirements of Islamic law. First, hoarding is prohibited because it diverts funds from productive
66 activities. Then, what is even more fundamental, any financial transaction must be backed by real assets. Thus,
67 financial products such as subprime mortgages can not be created in this system.

68 The prohibition of riba is a logical perception that Islam has the function of money in an economy. In
69 conventionel economies, money has three functions: medium of exchange, unit of account and instrument of
70 transfer value over time (store of value). But according to the logic of Muslim philosophy, money is a simple
71 instrument to create real value and to facilitate trade but do not become the object of exchange itself. It therefore
72 does not fulfill this role transfer value over time.

73 The elimination of interest plays a central role in establish order in the economic. The Islamic economy is
74 based on a different perception of the value of capital. It is the work that generates wealth, not capital. Money
75 trading is not comparable to other businesses. Muslim philosophy and endorse the trade of goods but prohibits
76 any profit from a transaction purely "financial".

77 The management of uncertainty and profit sharing between different stakeholders in a financial transaction is
78 another source of conflict between Islamic finance and conventional finance. Islamic finance promotes equitable
79 sharing of gains and risk between the investor (lender) and the entrepreneur (borrower), whatever the form of
80 financing used. A financial transaction that transfers all the risks associated with an investment project on a
81 single stakeholder is therefore contrary to the principles of Shari'ah. Sharing arrangements must be agreed in
82 the contract signed by the determination of a proportion of loss or gain. Thus, some forms of financing from
83 conventional financial system are all in keeping with the spirit of the Shariah and replicable in Islamic financial
84 system, while others, including the classical debt contract, are automatically excluded. In a financial system
85 based on sharing profits and risks, such a situation could occur because investors (ie banks) are able to properly
86 monitor the progress of the investment project.

87 Moreover, Muslim jurisprudence prohibits the uncertainty in the terms of a contractual relationship.

88 The concept of gharar refers to any exchange in which there is an imprecise, ambiguous, or uncertain element.
89 That includes not only trade in goods that the salesman is not in position to sell, but also the contracts which
90 depend on an unpredictable event. The uncertainty in case of sale of a future product consists in the impossibility
91 of predicting the quality and/or the quantity of the sold product. This last must be clearly defined and known
92 so that the sale is valid and so that there is no hazard.

93 It should be noted that goods, the object of the exchange, should not necessarily exist at the time of the
94 signing of contract. Thus, the forward sale is not condemned. The transaction is in conflict with the Shari'a
95 principles only if the terms of the exchange are The maysir is defined as any form of contract in which the right
96 of the contracting parties depends on a random event, such as gambling. The operations which rest on pure
97 speculation in order to carry out a profit are illicit (haram) and thus are prohibited in Islamic law.

98 Finally, Islamic finance prohibits investment in the illicit economic activities. The financed assets must be
99 halal, i.e. relative to an activity in conformity with Shari'a, which exclude for example the activities related to
100 the sectors like alcohol, the armament, the pornography,? etc.

101 Two important points summarize the main difference between Islamic finance and conventional finance:

102 ? The moral dimension in the decisions financial entails change in the internal organization of the bank
103 (including the establishment of a Shariah board) and involves a number of additional obligations (such as
104 managing Funds collected through Zakat). ? The rules operating of the Islamic bank will also change the
105 relationship bank-customer as it exists in the world of conventional finance. Since the applicant is, to some
106 extent, investor and it is partly the same risks that the bank can no longer talk only of a depositor-relationship
107 bank or lender-borrower relationship but a real investor-entrepreneur, similar to that which exists in direct
108 investment transactions. Thus, in its credit allocation decisions, the assessment will take as an entrepreneur and
109 the economic potential of his project. For its part, the client takes into consideration not only the profitability of
110 investment offered by a bank but also its social commitment and his commitment to the principles of Shari'ah.

111 ? However, in reality, there are a number of convergences between conventional finance and Islamic finance: ?
112 In search of greater profitability, conventional banks are expanding their investment activities. ? The Islamic
113 banks are developing products such as Murabaha, close to the traditional debt instruments on own account and
114 on behalf of others. ? These trends partly blur the differences between Islamic banks and conventional banks.

115 The financial crisis which was triggered in 2006 by a crash of the subprime mortgages in the United States,
116 and revealed to the world in February 2007, then transformed into international financial crisis since August 2007
117 is considered as the most serious of the post-war period. It did not only affect the mortgage credits granted to
118 the risky American households, but it was propagated towards the banking and financial system. It has crippled
119 the financial systems of several countries and caused the disappearance of the major financial institutions.

120 The crisis has shown that conventional finance is very vulnerable and unable to survive alone. Islamic finance
121 has been erected as an alternative to the conventional financial system.

122 However, the debate on the relationship between Islamic finance and stability during the period of subprime
123 crisis is with double edge. On the one hand, several financial analysts consider that the Islamic finance, by its
124 nature, is more stable than the conventional finance (Moody's (2008), Bouslama.G (2008), Drown.C (??009)).
125 Indeed, in conventional finance, the proliferation of financial innovations in deregulated markets has led to a
126 massive monetary creation with a very thin real basis. The excessive use of models of securitization made
127 difficult to understand the characteristics of new products in terms of risk. The central bank may also play a
128 crucial role in financial instability if it allows an expansion of the credit not sustained by adequate resources, i.e.
129 a credit growth without a sufficient growth of the saving in the system. So the central bank allows, through its
130 monetary policy, the banks to be involved in an expansion of credit without counterpart (in terms of savings).
131 In fact, it is not the expansion of the credit which can result in a crisis situation, but it is the expansion of
132 credit without counterpart which leads to a diversion of the real saving from the productive activities towards
133 the nonproductive activities, which in its turn weakens the creative process of real wealth. The absence of these
134 devices in Islamic finance made this type of financing a more stable system. The prohibition of interest and
135 devices of sharing profits and losses create a financial system based on real assets. Consequently, banks cannot
136 initiate or accentuate a speculative process. The credit is based on real savings and this one can release an output
137 only if it is directly invested in productive activities. The banks are competed only for the real investment and
138 their resources are reinvested in real activities. As a result, economic growth is durable and does not contain
139 negative impact on social justice since inflation cannot be used to impoverish creditors and employees and to
140 enrich debtors and speculators.

141 In addition, deposits in a bank cannot be transformed into loans or used to buy financial assets and become
142 reserves or a base for a new loan at another bank, contributing thus to a creation of purchasing power and to
143 inflation. The deposits must be reinvested directly by the bank in production and trade activities.

144 The Islamic financial system is a system where there are no assets without risk and where all the transactions
145 are based on the sharing of profits or losses. The contracts like futures, options, swaps are prohibited because
146 their realizations are characterized(D D D D) C

147 Year by an obvious uncertainty. However, the operations and the products of Islamic finance are not
148 only strongly leaned and closely related to the real economic sphere but also completely independent and are
149 disconnected from the traditional financial sphere. This has the effect of reducing uncertainty, duct savings
150 towards the real and material investments, and the completely elimination of speculation and its effects which,
151 often, distort economic predictions, skew the prices of goods and inflate the consequences of a possible crisis.

152 In Islamic finance, interest rate is not used as monetary policy instrument. The central bank does not refinance
153 the banks, and does not provide financial instruments to the banks as it is the case in conventional finance. The
154 central bank applies quantitative ceilings on the monetary aggregates. Such a policy was effective in maintaining
155 financial stability and in the exclusion of speculative booms and inflation.

156 The sources of financial instability of the conventional system, i.e. the abundance of liquidities, the credit
157 without counterpart, the speculation and the fixing of interest rate by the central bank are absent in Islamic
158 finance, ensuring, thus, the stability of this system. A finance based on the rules of Shari'a condemns the interest
159 which encourages the polarization of money in the hands of minority, but institutes, in compensation, the sense
160 of sharing and equitable redistribution of wealth.

161 On the other hand, other financial analysts consider that Islamic banks are unstable and may lead to many
162 risks in the financial system that differ from those of conventional banks, such as liquidity risk, operational risk
163 and legal risk. Choong and Liu (2006) argue that Islamic banking services, at least as practised in Malaysia,
164 diverge from the sharing of profits and losses principle, and in practice are not very different from the traditional
165 system. Their results suggest that the quick growth in Islamic banking sector is principally fed by the revival of
166 Islam in the world rather than by the advantages of the sharing of profits and losses principle, and that Islamic
167 banks should be regulated in a similar way as their western counterparts.

168 The prohibition of interest may result in the underdevelopment of funding sources. Thus, Islamic banks face
169 specific obstacles in the management of liquidity. Moreover, as indicated by Noyer.C (2009), the weakness of
170 standardization of the products and the lack of harmonization of Islamic norms, due to differences between
171 the interpretations of the Shari'a specialists, may increase the operational risk and legal uncertainty making,
172 thus, the follow-up of the sharing of profits and losses principle much more complex as the volume of the bank
173 transactions increases. Similarly, the prohibition to finance certain sectors limits the categories of assets eligible for

5 F) ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL

174 investments, which contributes to increase the risk of concentration in sectors more sensitive to the conjuncture.
175 In the same context, Cihák.M and Hesse.H ??2008) show that the more the size of the Islamic banks increases,
176 the more they find difficulties of adjusting their monitoring systems of the credit risk. They also note that the
177 market share of Islamic banks has no significant impact on the financial strength of other banks.

178 The analysis of the principles of Islamic finance does not allow, alone, resolving the question of the relationship
179 between Islamic finance and financial stability. It is necessary to supplement them by an empirical analysis.
180 For this reason, we will conduct an empirical study to check whether countries practicing Islamic finance were
181 relatively less affected by the crisis than those using the conventional method of financing.

182 1 a) Data and methodology

183 Our purpose in this empirical section is to determine whether Islamic finance is able to absorb shocks in the
184 context of a global economy very disturbed by the world financial crisis. To do this, we use a VAR model
185 including a sample of 5 markets indexes: of France (SBF250), United States (DOW JONES), United Kingdom
186 (FTSE100), Indonesia (JAKISLM) and Saudi Arabia (Tadawul). The data, collected from Datastream, are daily
187 frequencies and cover the period from 26/02/2007 to 12/20/2010.

188 2 b) Descriptive study

189 According to Fig. ??, we note that all series in level have an upward trend which disappears when the series are
190 in first difference. All series of the market indexes relating to the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, United
191 Kingdom and Indonesia, are a priori nonstationary.

192 Figure ??

193 3 Year

194 To study the stationarity of variables, we use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). Table 1 reports the
195 results of this test. These results show that all the market indexes are non-stationary in level, but stationary in
196 first difference and, consequently, they are integrated of order one (I (1)). The unit root test indicates that all the
197 series of market indexes exhibit the same order of integration. According to the terminology of Engel and Granger
198 (1987), there may be a possible long-term stable relationship between these variables. To test cointegration, we
199 use the approach of Johansen (1995). The first stage of this analysis is to determine the number of gap of the
200 autoregressive vectorial model (i.e. VAR (p)). To do this, we estimate some numbers of autoregressive processes
201 and we retain the one that jointly minimizes the criteria of Akaike and Schwartz. Table 2 presents the overall
202 results. $\hat{\beta}$: the operator of first difference; $\hat{\beta}_0$: the matrix of dimension parameters ($k \times 1$); t : the vector of random errors;
203 $\hat{\beta}_1$: the matrix of dimension parameters ($k \times k$); $\hat{\beta}_2$: the matrix which determines the number of cointegrating relationships.

204 $\hat{\beta}_3$: the eigenvalues of the matrix ($\hat{\beta}_2$),

205 Johansen statistic can then be determined. The results of tests are based on the comparison of the statistic
206 LR (likelihood ratio) with the critical values at 5% level. If this statistic is higher than these values, we conclude
207 that there is at least one cointegration relationship between variables; otherwise, no relationship of cointegration
208 exists between them. The results of the trace used to determine the rank of cointegration are presented in table
209 3 below: The exam of this table shows that there is no cointegration relationship. Before estimating our model,
210 we conduct the causality test of Granger to examine not only the interdependance between markets, but also to
211 specify the sense of causality.

212 4 e) The causality test

213 To better specify the nature of short-term dynamics and the sense of causality, we used the causality test of
214 Granger (1969). The causality test specifies the short-term relationship and indicates which of the variables has
215 an impact on the other. The results of the Granger causality tests are reproduced in table 4.

216 5 f) Estimation of the model

217 The estimations are provided by the Eviews software. The found results are better analyzed by using response
218 functions to a shock. In this paper, we are only interested in analyzing the impact which a shock could have
219 on the US market on the other markets. This shock, occurring in one period, is not maintained. But, since the
220 model includes an autoregressive and an economic dynamic, through functions of reaction, the shock persists in
221 attenuated form during some time. The initial positive shock on the DOW JONES tends to be reduced gradually
222 as other markets take it into account later in their functions of reaction. $\hat{\beta}_1$ We note first that the effect of the
223 shock on DOW JONES is more important in the markets where finance is conventional (about 0.016 in the U.S
224 and 0.01 in France and United Kingdom) in relation to those where finance is Islamic (about 0.004).

225 $\hat{\beta}_2$ We also note that the shock on the DOW JONES is transmitted negatively on all other markets but with a
226 different extent. In France, we observe a continuous decrease of the SBF250, which becomes negative after two
227 periods and a half. This last reaches its minimum on the level of the 3rd period (-0.003). A $\hat{\beta}_3$ reversal of the

230 trend is also noted. Indeed, it reaches a positive sign but very weak on the fourth period and then decreases
231 again to have a negative sign during the fifth period. In the U.S and United Kingdom, almost the same trend
232 was observed. Indeed, we notice a continuous reduction of the index which reaches its minimum at the end of the
233 2nd period (-0,004), then it increases while remaining negative before the effect of the shock fades. On the other
234 hand, in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, we note, at the beginning, a positive effect during the first two periods,
235 and then the indexes start to decrease gradually to reach a minimum during the fourth period of about -0.0001.

236 In the light of this work, it is clear that the current financial crisis was transmitted negatively on all the
237 markets. This effect is of weak extent in the markets where finance is Islamic. Consequently, Islamic finance can
238 constitute an effective additional financing system beside conventional finance in the Western countries in order
239 to reduce the effect of crisis.

240 6 Year

241 In light of the results of Granger causality tests, we observe bidirectional causality between the couples of markets
242 (France, Arabie Saoudite) et (Arabie saoudite, Indonésie). However, we note the presence of unidirectional
243 causality from the U.S market to all markets and from France to Indonesia.

244 The absence of cointegration between nonstationary series and the existence of causalities between the series
245 stationary in first difference, leads us to estimate a model VAR in difference.

246 The purpose of this paper is to highlight the benefits of Islamic finance. Theoretically, several studies have
247 shown that this type of financing can reduce the effect of crisis. In order to illustrate this report empirically, we
248 used an econometric model, specially a VAR model for the case of the financial markets of the United States,
249 France, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The results show that the transmission of the current crisis is weak in the
250 markets which are used Islamic finance. Indeed, regarding the extent of the effect, we noted that the reduction
251 in indexes is more important in the United States, United Kingdom and in France compared to those in Saudi
252 Arabia and in Indonesia. So, the negative effect of the shock is more important in the markets where finance is
253 only conventional.

254 Unlike conventional finance which is periodically hit by crisis of varying severity, Islamic finance can be
255 regarded as a stable and efficient financial system to absorb shocks, and able to promote growth and job creation.
256 Nevertheless, juridical and fiscal adjustments are necessary to accelerate its development. ^{1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9}



Figure 1:

256 10 11
257

¹© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

²© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

³© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁴© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁵© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁶© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁷© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁸© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

⁹© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

¹⁰© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

¹¹© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

Figure 6 consists of three line graphs. The top graph shows DLTADAWUL (solid line) and LDOWJONE (dashed line) from 2007 to 2010. The middle graph shows LJAKISLM (solid line) and DLDOWJON (dashed line) from 2007 to 2010. The bottom graph shows DLTADAWUL (solid line) and LDOWJONE (dashed line) from 2007 to 2010. All series show a general downward trend over the period.

Year	DLTADAWUL	LDOWJONE	LJAKISLM	DLDOWJON
2007	0.12	8.5	6.4	5.6
2008	0.08	8.4	6.2	5.8
2009	0.04	8.3	7.9	6.0
2010	0.00	8.2	7.8	5.4

1

- (1) : Model no constant and no trend
- (2) : Model with constant
- (3) : Model with constant no trend
- d) The cointegration test

Figure 3: Table 1 :

2

	P=1	P=2	P=3	P=4	P=5
Akaike information criterion	-	-29.72890	-	-	-
	29.27527		29.77227	29.79541	29.77246
Schwarz criterion	-	-29.45768	-	-	-
	29.12745		29.37744	29.27679	29.12985

Johansen (1995) proposed a test based on the vectors corresponding to the highest eigenvalues of the matrix

[Note: CYear model presented by equation (1):]

Figure 4: Table 2 :

3

Date: 12/23/10 Time: 01:02
Sample (adjusted): 2/28/2007 12/20/2010
Included observations: 994 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: LDOW JONES LFTSE100 LSBF250 LTADAWUL LJAKISLM
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)

Hypothesized	Trace
No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue Statistic
None	0.033598 67.41256
At most 1	0.018796 33.44227
At most 2	0.009124 14.58113
At most 3	0.003918 5.470157
At most 4	0.001576 1.567685

Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level

* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level

**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values

Figure 5: Table 3 :

4

	Year			
	D	D	D	D
)	C			
(
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests				
Date: 12/24/10 Time: 00:00				
Sample: 2/26/2007 12/20/2010				
Lags: 1				
Null Hypothesis:				
DLFTSE100 does not Granger Cause DLDOW JONES	994	0.00135	0.9707	
DLDOW JONES does not Granger Cause DLFTSE100		162.765	1.E-34	
DLSBF250 does not Granger Cause DLDOW JONES	994	0.28234	0.5953	

Figure 6: Table 4 :

258 [London] , London . Financial Services Authority.

259 [Econometrica] , *Econometrica* 37 p. .

260 [Islamic Economic Studies] , *Islamic Economic Studies* 12 (1) p. .

261 [The Economist (December)] , *The Economist* December. p. 9.

262 [The International Journal of Accounting (2008)] , *The International Journal of Accounting* March 2008. 43 p.

263 .

264 [Abdelkader and Ahmed ()] Sid Abdelkader , Ahmed . *Finance Islamique et développement »; Revue du tiers monde*, 1982. 23 p. .

265

266 [Ainley et al. ()] M Ainley , Mashayekhi A , H Hicks , Arshadur R , Et Ravalia A . *Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges*, 2007.

267

268 [Banque Mondiale and Fmi ()] E T Banque Mondiale , Fmi . *Financial Sector Assessment »; A Handbook*, (Washington) 2005. Worldbank.

269

270 [Bouslama ()] G Bouslama . *La finance Islamique : une rescapée du tsunami des subprimes ? », Banque Stratégie*, n°264, novembre, 2008. p. .

271

272 [Choong et al. ()] Beng Choong , Ming-Hua Soon , Liu . <http://ssrn.com/abstract=868567> *Islamic Banking: Interest-Free or Interest Based? »; Available at SSRN*, 2006.

273

274 [Euromoney (2009)] *Conférence de Paris sur la Finance Islamique*, Séminaire Euromoney . 30 Septembre 2009.

275 Paris; Banque de France Eurosystème. 29.

276 [Dickey D and Fuller W ()] A Dickey D , A Fuller W . *Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root*, 1979. 74 p. .

277

278 [YudistiraD ()] YudistiraD . *Efficiency in Islamic Banking: An Empirical Analysis of Eighteen Banks*, 2004.

279 [Engel R and Granger C ()] F Engel R , W J Granger C . *Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation and Testing*, 1987. 55 p. .

280

281 [Granger ()] C W Granger . *«Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross Spectral Methods*, 1969.

282

283 [Jobst A ()] Jobst A . No. 07/117. *The Economics of Islamic Finance and Securitization*, (Washington) 2007.

284 International Monetary Fund. (IMF Working Paper)

285 [Johansen S ()] Johansen S . *Likelihood-Based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models*, 1995.

286 [Krichene N and Saidane E ()] Et Krichene N , Saidane E . *Résilience et stabilité de la Finance Islamique*, 2009.

287 [Martin et al. ()] Cihak Martin , Hesse , Heiko . WP/08/16. *Islamic Banks and Financial Stability*, 2008.

288 International Monetary Fund. (Working Paper)

289 [Moody's Investors and Services ()] Moody's Investors , Services . *Gulf Islamic Banks Resilient Amid Global Credit Woes*, 2008.

290

291 [Olson and Zoubi Taisier A ()] Dennis Olson , Zoubi Taisier A . *Using accounting ratios to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC region*, 2008.

292

293 [On Shaky Ground ()] *On Shaky Ground*, 1994.

294 [Special Comment, novembre] *Special Comment*, novembre, 19.

295 [Sundararajan V and Errico L ()] Et Sundararajan V , Errico L . <http://ssrn.com/abstract=880303> *Islamic Financial Institutions and Products in the Global Financial System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead*, 2002. 2002. p. . (IMF Working Paper 02/192)

296

297

298 [Abdelkader and Ahmed ()] ‘« Economie Islamique, principes et réalités : l’expérience récente des pays arabes’.

299 Sid Abdelkader , Ahmed . *Une première évaluation* 1990. 31 p. . (Revue du tiers monde)

300 [Moktar et al. ()] ‘« Efficiency of Islamic Banks in Malaysia: A Stochastic Frontier Approach »’. Hamim S Moktar , Abdullah Naziruddin , Syed M , Al-Habshi . *Journal of Economic Cooperation among Islamic Countries* 2006. 27 (2) p. .

301

302

303 [Noyer ()] ‘« Stabilité mondiale, l’avenir des marchés de capitaux et de la finance’ C Noyer . *Islamique en France* 2009.

304