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Abstract- The objective of this paper is to analyze the intergovernmental relations between the Ethiopian federal government and the Afar regional state and their implications for the underdevelopment of the Afar region. The data for this paper were gathered through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as review of published and unpublished documents. Specific tools for primary data collection include observation, focus group discussion, and key informant interviews. Electronic recording was used in the process of gathering appropriate data from the various categories of people in the region and federal officials. The quantitative data was gathered through the administration of a questionnaire. Intergovernmental relations are a ubiquitous dimension of federal systems, despite differences among federations. True federalism and its implementation necessitate consistent intergovernmental relations principles and practices. The cooperation effort among the different levels of government needs to be backed by well-designed and institutionalized intergovernmental relations.

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Keywords: federalism, intergovernmental relations, federal government, afar regional state, party channel, special support board, and socio-economic development.

I. Introduction

Intergovernmental relations have become a notable feature of federal political systems. Federations create various structures and arrangements to facilitate interaction between the central government and constituent units. This article tried to examine the power relations between Afar National Regional State and the federal governments. Accordingly, the article is organized into six sections, including of Ethiopia this introductory part. Section two sheds light the concept and importance of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in federations. The third section provides highlight regarding IGR in the Ethiopian federation. The fourth section assesses the mode of relations between Afar Regional State and the Federal government such as the party channels, the legislative bodies and executive institutions of the two levels of governments. The fifth section provides an overview of the horizontal relations between Afar Regional State and Tigray Regional State and the final section draws the conclusion.

The article concluded that IGR in Ethiopia didn’t bring the intended transformation in Afar Regional State due to the categorization of political parties as members of EPRDF and affiliated parties of which undermine the role of the Afar National Democratic Party in co-determining national policy issues with the federal government; absence of an independent institution in charge of consolidating IGR and inadequate support provided to Afar Regional State by the national party, legislative and executive branches as well as Tigray Regional State through the twinning arrangement created between regional states for this purpose.

II. Intergovernmental Relations in Federations

Federations are composed of two (or more) orders of government operating within a constitutional framework, with one order providing shared rule through common institutions for certain specified purposes and with the other order (or orders) providing regional or local self-rule through the governments of the constituent units for certain specified purposes (Watts, 1996: 1). This signifies that federalism divides the sovereignty of the state between the central and regional governments, which requires some sort of interaction to work in cooperation for the mutual benefits of the two levels of government (Cameron, 2001). Similarly, Nigussie (2015) stated that the existence of two levels of government and the division of political powers between federal and state governments are essential features of federations. In an attempt to explain the inevitable interactions between levels of government in federations, Assefa (2009) asserted that the division of political power between the federal government and the
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) can be broadly defined as "interactions between government units of all types and levels within a political system" (Watts, 2001: 23). According to Kandel (2020), IGR refers to the interaction among the various levels of government or understanding the roles and responsibilities of each level of government and developing effective relationships to improve their ability to meet their expectations. The term IGR captures "the working connections that tied central governments and the constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and interdependent political power, governmental control, and decision-making" (Agranoff, 2004:26). Similarly, Brian (2001:129) defined the term "IGR" as the "relations between central, regional, and local governments (as well as between governments within any one sphere) that facilitate the attainment of common goals through cooperation." In short, IGR focuses on how different orders of government in federal political systems communicate and collaborate with each other, encompassing the complex and interdependent relations among various spheres of government in legal, financial, and administrative matters and policy coordination (Nigussie, 2015).

IGR is a ubiquitous dimension of federal systems, despite differences among federations. The system of IGR has vertical and horizontal dimensions. The vertical dimension refers to the relations between the federal government and the constituent units on issues of common interest, and the horizontal dimension has to do with the relations among the constituent units of a federation (Cameron, 2001, Assefa, 2009, Poirier and Saunders, 2015). Although both kinds of relations have a profound role in shaping the way in which a particular federation functions, the relations between the central government and the constituent units of a federation have primary importance (Cameron, 2001).

Through IGR, the levels of governments "share information, pool power and resources, and negotiate and implement cooperative arrangements that determine who does--or should--do what" (Poirier and Saunders, 2015:2). Several institutions and processes are involved in this interaction through which federal partners enter into relations with each other (Ibid). But the institutions and processes that federations have developed to manage the intergovernmental relationship vary widely in several dimensions. They vary from federation to federation and within federations between different time periods and different policy areas (Simeon, 2001). To put it in plain words, different federations exhibit different structures and features of intergovernmental relations because the mechanisms of IGR are the results of the bounded rational preferences of the political actors and the issues they need to address through intergovernmental relations (Haileyesus, 2014).

There is no single federal model that is applicable everywhere (Watts, 2003), and as a result, each federation has followed a distinctive path based on its own particular circumstances and conditions (Cameron, 2001). According to Watts (2003), federations vary in their institutional design, the character of the diversity within their societies, their degree of economic development, and their policy agendas. Similarly, Cameron (2001) elaborated that the size of the country, the size of the population, and the distribution of the population within the territory may all affect the structures and processes of intergovernmental relations. He further mentioned that the following factors have paramount importance in determining the nature of IGR structures and processes: social and cultural factors (the racial, religious, linguistic and cultural composition of a given country), historical factors (the force of tradition and common political experience), constitutional and institutional factors (the number and relative size of the units in a federation; the degree of asymmetry among them, and the degree of institutionalization (whether the IGR is highly institutionalized, with formal structures and processes that channel intergovernmental activity, or it may be conducted in an informal, ad hoc fashion, depending heavily on the nature of the circumstances and the preference of the particular political actors). Therefore, as Watts (1996) put it, in order to understand the factors that have shaped the distribution of powers in each federation requires an examination of the historical and cultural context that led to its original creation, that influenced the drafting of its constitution, and that continued to influence the subsequent operation of the federation.

Although there are variations among federations, IGRs are an integral and significant part of every federal system (Poirier and Saunders, 2015). One of the common features of federations is the simultaneous existence of two sets of powerful motives: (1) those seeking united action for certain purposes and (2) those seeking the autonomy of the distinctive constituent units of government for other purposes (Watts, 1996: 2). The other common feature among federations has been the need for effective internal intergovernmental arrangements. All federations are responding to the same functional requirement, namely to find ways of managing the interface among governments (Cameron, 2001 and Watts, 2003).

Federations create various structures and arrangements to facilitate interaction between the central governments and constituent units (Cameron, 2001). Various authors have explained the importance of IGR in many ways. McEwen (2015) mentioned that IGRs are essential to all political systems with multi-level government. Similarly, Kandel (2020) explained that the IGR coordination mechanism in the federal system is crucial for development delivery from sub-national
governments in a coherent way based on the concurrent functions. He further elaborated that the prime goal of intergovernmental relations is to bring effectiveness and efficiency to public service delivery. According to Sharma (2011), the aim of IGR mechanisms is to achieve "policy coordination" by facilitating interactions among the executives of the two orders of governments.

IGR power-sharing facilitates intergovernmental cooperation or federal-regional and interregional cooperation and coordination (Watts, 2003 and Bolleyer, 2006). In this regard, Nigussie (2015) mentioned that IGR forums facilitate negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of information, and cooperation between the institutions of the two levels of governments. He further explained that IGR regulates and enhances communication between the institutions of these two levels of governments that have defined jurisdictions and are supreme within their respective powers.

III. Intergovernmental Relations in Ethiopia

Following the collapse of the military rule in 1991, the government of the EPRDF introduced a federal political system organized on the basis of the recognition and institutionalization of the right of ethno-territorial communities to self-determination, creating primarily ethnic-based territorial units and providing for the option of ethnic "secession" (Alem, 2004 and Hashim, 2010). The federal arrangement paved the way and created the opportunity to undertake political and constitutional transformation and to devolve state power along ethno-linguistic lines (Hashim, 2010). The idea of federalism presupposes the existence of levels of government with defined competence and dominion of jurisdiction on the same land (Solomon, 2008).

In a federal system, the powers and functions of each government are outlined as part of the division of power and maintenance of their sovereignty (Balcha, 2007). In this regard, the 1995 FDRE Constitution clearly establishes two levels of government and obliges each level to respect the other’s constitutional powers (Art. 50 (8)). Both the federal government and regional states have legislative, executive, and judicial powers within their respective jurisdictional limits (Art. 50(2)). Article 51 and 52 of the constitution list the exclusive powers of the federal government and regional states, respectively. The constitution also establishes a symmetrical federal system in that the powers, functions, and prerogatives given to the member states of the Ethiopian federation are uniform (Art. 49(4)).

IGR are the responses that have been developed to facilitate cooperative policy making among divided governments within a federal system. They are supposed to play a "bridge-building" role to bring a degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers and provide the mechanism by which different levels and branches of governments interact with one another in the process of meetings the needs and interests of the public (Dessalegn, 2014). The cooperation effort among the different levels of governments need to be backed by well-designed and institutionalized intergovernmental relations. IGR is a vital norm and continues to be widely shared as one of the most common characteristics of any federation (Nigussie, 2015). The very existence of a federal structure and the constitutional entrenchment of different levels of governments working in the same territory and serving the same people necessitate the conduct of relations between the different levels of governments (Haileyesus, 2017). According to Assefa (2009), IGR can achieve the desired objectives only when its structures and processes are guided by important principles. IGR regulates and enhances communication between the institutions of the two levels of government that have defined jurisdictions and are supreme within their respective powers (Nigussie, 2015).

The economic, political, socio-cultural, and environmental objectives stipulated in the FDRE Constitution (Art 88–92) make intergovernmental cooperation inevitable between the federal government and regional states. However, the Ethiopian Constitution is silent when it comes to the principles that guide the system of IGR and the necessary institutions that make it work (Assefa, 2009). In Ethiopia, lack of formal vertical and horizontal IGR mechanisms necessitates some level of institutionalization of IGR (Assefa, 2009, Nigussie, 2015, and Ketema, 2018). Academics and practitioners agree that IGR in the Ethiopian federation is in need of some level of formal institutionalization, and the implementation of coherent IGR principles and practices is required for the realization of genuine federalism. The argument for the institutionalization of IGR generally aims to ensure that regional states participate and make their voices heard in federal legislation and policies. This is because IGR is a mechanism for consultation with and inclusion of regional interests in federal legislation and policy formulation prior to their implementation (Ketema, 2018).

In Ethiopia, there is lack of an independent institution in charge of consolidating IGR, and this in turn has created gaps in the regularity, continuity, and effectiveness of vertical and horizontal interactions (Nigussie, 2015). Absence of institutionalized IGR is one of the factors that weakened devolution of power and the ability of regional states to actively participate in setting national objectives (Tesfaye, 2002). Rather, a patron-client type of relationship was established between the federal government and regional states through which the central leadership dominated political power and resources throughout the country by placing local clients at sub-national levels (Ibid).
The system of IGR put in place in Ethiopia for the last two decades was the one in which the federal government predominate the relationship between levels of government and was largely informal. The Ethiopian federation lacked coherent principles, guidelines, and institutional systems for governing IGR schemes (Assefa, 2009). Federal institutions with mandates related to IGR, such as the House of Federation (HoF) and Ministry of Federal Affairs, have underlined the need for formal institutionalization and policy frameworks (Assefa, 2009 and Ketema, 2018).

The formal vertical and horizontal structures of IGR in Ethiopia are characterized by a few un-institutionalized structures such as the Special Support Board, ministers and Bureau Heads, forums of different offices of line ministers and regional bureaus, as well as regional bilateral and multilateral forums between regional governments. Moreover, the Ethiopian IGR is characterized by the dominance of the federal government in formulating national policies in the light of the ethos of "developmental state" that is envisioned by the incumbent party for the country (Haileyesus, 2017).

The practice on the ground is different from the constitutional rhetoric regarding the powers of regional state governments because they remain dependent on the federal government to be able to carry out their duties (Aalen, 2002). Regional state governments followed all policies adopted by the EPRDF without questioning (Turton, 2006). TPLF cadres were assigned as advisors to monitor the locally elected administrators who had to ensure their accountability to the TPLF unit to remain in their position (Abbink 2006; Aalen 2002).

There is a need for a central/focal institution responsible for designing policies on IGR and coordinating and guiding the entire IGR system in Ethiopia. The absence of such an institution has been the concern of the Ethiopian government. The Proclamation 471/2006 issued to re-determine the duties and responsibilities of the executive organs in Ethiopia gave the MoFA the power to strengthen IGR. According to Art. 21(6) of the proclamation, MoFA was decreed to be the focal institution to establish good relations and cooperation between the federal government and regional states. Similarly, the Proclamation 691/2011 issued to re-determine the duties and responsibilities of the executive organs has reapproved the previous powers of MoFA (MoFA, 2013).

One of the institutions competing to assume the role of IGR in the Ethiopian Federation is the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The establishment of the Intergovernmental Relations Directorate General under MoFA may indicate the government’s interest in formalizing the IGR system in Ethiopia. For instance, two of the duties and responsibilities of the IGR Directorate General of MoFA are undertaking studies on the establishment of transparent and detailed systems of relations between the federal and regional governments; the gaps, weaknesses, and problems of government relations; and preparing policy and strategy proposals that would create firm ground for IGR (MoFA, 2011).

### IV. Mode of Relation between Afar Regional State and the Federal Government of Ethiopia

#### a) Party Channel as Mechanism of Relation

After the EPRDF took control of state power in 1991, Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and restructured the constituent units of the federation along ethnic lines (Teshome and Zahok, 2008; Alem, 2010). The institutionalization of ethnic federalism as an organizing principle encourages political parties to organize along ethnic lines, and the party channels function as the main vehicles of IGR (Alem, 2005). According to Haileyesus (2014), the mechanisms of IGR in the Ethiopian federation have been shaped predominantly by the party system.

The government of EPRDF has undermined regional autonomy through its centralized party system (Aalen, 2006). The party organization has created different kinds of relations among political parties. The parties administering the four major regional states (Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, and Tigray) were members of the ruling EPRDF coalition front. On the other hand, the ethnic political parties administering the peripheral regions (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somalia) were not members of the coalition. Even though these affiliated parties were not members of the ruling coalition front, EPRDF, they voted with it on important issues that came before the federal government (Alem, 2004). The vertical and horizontal IGR have been relatively smooth because the multiethnic ruling coalition and its affiliated ethnic parties have enjoyed a monopoly of power at all levels of government in their respective regional states (Alem, 2010). However, the affiliated parties have not been allowed to be members of EPRDF because they were not considered mature enough to join the coalition (Alem, 2004).

Participants of the study interviewed during the fieldwork in December 2018 and March 2019 mentioned that the affiliation relationship has no constitutional ground. According to one official of the House of Peoples Representatives, affiliation indicates the level of relationship created between EPRDF and the political parties administering the Developing Regional States. He asserted that the justification behind the creation of this kind of relationship originated from the analysis of the socio-economic conditions of the nations, nationalities, and peoples when federalism was introduced in Ethiopia. He further explained the situation as follows:

*When EPRDF came to power in 1991, it understood that the socio-economic development of the people living in*
Developing Regional States was incompatible with the ideology and the socio-economic and political programs of the EPRDF. The program of EPRDF wishes modern and developed production relations with clear division of labor, which is appropriate to the development of capitalist system. Contrary to this, the production relations of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities have been based on clan. The livelihood of pastoralist communities has been based on animal production and a mobile way of life. Absence of permanent settlement is the hallmark of backwardness, and hence the development of these communities had to be accelerated with the provision of special support before being made members of the ruling coalition, EPRDF. Thus, the affiliation relationship was intended to stay until these communities reached the level of socio-economic development compatible to the capitalist production relationship, which the federal government aspires to establish (Interview on 16 March 2019, Addis Ababa).

Another federal official working in the EPRDF’s Foreign Relations Office further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

Political parties have to set their social, economic, and political programs they aspire to achieve. Moreover, they need to have ideologies that can guide their activities. In this regard, the EPRDF has been guided by the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy. On the other hand, clan is the social foundation of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in the Afar Region, which is unsuitable for the ideology of revolutionary democracy. For instance, leadership in clan-based societies has been transferred from fathers to sons across generations. Thus, in such societies, being born to a family of a certain clan leader is enough; there is no need to plan to achieve certain political objectives and programs. Knowledge, capacity, experience, commitment, and other requirements have not been given due consideration when someone is empowered to occupy a certain position. Therefore, the living conditions and political thinking of pastoralists have to be significantly transformed to enable them to move out of clan mentality and adopt the culture and working procedures of political parties before being accepted as members of the EPRDF establishment (Interview on 12 February, 2019, Addis Ababa).

Moreover, one of the members of the HPR standing committee explained that class is the social basis of the Revolutionary Democracy by which EPRDF has been guided. He further elaborated that class based societies like peasants, proletariat, city bourgeoisie and the educated Afar reflected:

The shared agreement among the participants of the interviews was that the affiliation relationship between the regional ruling party, ANDP, and EPRDF did not benefit the Afar region as expected. Rather, it has undermined the autonomous status of Afar Regional State due to federal intervention in its jurisdiction. They underscored that this form of relationship made the affiliated party members instruments for the advancement of EPRDF’s agenda because they could not maintain their position in their own region without the goodwill of the leaders of the national party/front. As one educated Afar reflected:

The categorization of political parties as members of the EPRDF or affiliated parties is a deliberate marginalization of Afar and other regional states administered by affiliated parties in many ways. First, the national policies and strategies have been designed by the coalition members of
the ruling party, EPRDF, which, as a result, such policies and strategies reflect the interests of the agrarian societies in the four regional states but fail to address the affairs of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities. Secondly, the leaders of the four regional states (EPRDF members) decide on the national development policies and strategies without considering the voice of the affiliated party. Thirdly, the regional state party, ANDP, was made a mere recipient of the orders coming from the federal government, which undermined the prerogative of the party. Fourth, the federal government has continued to indirectly rule the Afar region through the cadres assigned to the region as advisors in the name of capacity building, which is in practice violating the self-rule right of the regional state (Interview on 22 March 2018, Semera).

The same idea was reiterated by another interviewee:

The federal intervention in the Afar region has been challenging the autonomous status of the regional state. Key positions in the regional state were given to loyal leaders who had to work to enhance the interests of the national party. For instance, the former president of Afar Regional has stayed in power and office for more than twenty years because he administered the region in a manner that respected the interests of the federal government at the expense of the interests of the people in the region. In a performance evaluation conducted in 2010, the president was criticized in furthering the interest of the federal government at the expense of interests of the people in the region. This accusation was shared by many members of the Regional State Council. However, the two officials from the federal government who were leading the evaluation strongly defended the position of the regional president. Moreover, one key employee of EPRDF warned that if the regional council discharged the president, EPRDF would not work in cooperation with ANDP which as a result the President sustained his Position for several years (Interview on 21 April 2018, Semera).

One of the regional officials asserted that the above kinds of federal intervention in the mandates of the regional state are contradictory to the powers and responsibilities of the regional state enshrined in the national constitution. The 1995 FDRE Constitution made clear that regional states have the power to establish a "state administration that best advances self-government, a democratic order based on the rule of law" (Art 52 (2)). Moreover, Art. 37 (2) of the 2002 Revised Constitution of Afar Regional State revealed that the Afar region has the right to self-determination, self-administration in its own region, as well as the right to have appropriate and fair representation and to have effective participation in the federal government. However, the federal intervention has been threatening the power of the Afar Regional State when viewed in the light of the contradiction between the above constitutional provisions and its implementation on the ground.

The involvement of the federal government in implemented on the ground regional politics, presented and described above, was further corroborated by the quantitative data. Table 1.1. below depicts the role of the federal government in placing regional leaders who could satisfy the interests of the federal government.

Table 1.1. The Political Right of Afar in Electing Top Level Regional Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see from Table 1.1. above, the percentage of respondents who believed that key positions in Afar Regional State have been held based on the good will of the federal government is greater, 256(73.1.6) than others who think the other way, 85(24.3%) and very few, 9(2.6%) respondents were unable to decide. This indicates that the federal government has been stretching its hands in deciding who should hold key positions in the Afar Regional State.

During the field work in Zone three of Afar Region in November 2018, the researcher observed one of the officials of the Zone administration distributing the newsletter of EPRDF, Addis Ra’e which literally mean “New Vision”. According to this official, the Zone administrations receive newsletters from the regional state administration and distribute it to each Woreda on Quota basis. The newsletter provides information on various issues of the national party and it is one of the instruments through which the party indoctrinate its ideology, Revolutionary Democracy and the principle of democratic centralism.

According to one educated Afar, the party administering Afar Regional State has been committed to implement orders of the federal government. Afar Regional State government has to implement the programs of the regional party. This relationship shows how the system makes the regional state subordinate to
the federal government. Still another regional official explained how the system of relationship established between the national ruling party, EPRDF and affiliated parties like ANDP made Afar Regional States disadvantaged as:

The national policies did not give due consideration to the affairs of pastoralist communities. There was no pastoralist development policy, pastoralist agriculture package and pastoralist health extension package for the last twenty-six years. We have been complaining in view of policies, strategies and packages which could address the problems of the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Now the Pastoralists Development Policy is formulated but not yet adopted. This shows how the interests of the pastoralist communities have been marginalized at policy level. This in turn has its own impact on the pace of the socio-economic development in our region (Interview on 22 March 2018, Semera).

Through the examination of the working relation between EPRDF and ANDP is helpful to understand the role of affiliated parties in deciding on national policies and the political support provided by EPRDF. According to one federal EPRDF official, few representatives of Afar Regional State have been participating in EPRDF Council meetings that discussed on national policy agendas. However, Afar participants attend council meetings as observers with no right to vote on issues discussed in meetings because ANDP is not member of the ruling party, EPRDF. This participation therefore helps the leaders of Afar Regional State only to know what is going on at the national level. The above sentiment has been voiced by one of the regional official as:

Few regional officials have been participating in the meetings of EPRDF Council and EPRDF Executive Committee. They also attend quarterly and annual evaluation meetings. However, they have no right to debate and to be part of the decisions passed in such meetings. Moreover, in such meetings, participants of the developing regional state have no opportunity to properly reflect the problems and interests of their people in the EPRDF meetings. In several occasions leaders of ANDP were complaining that member parties of EPRDF alone should not decide on national issues. As Ethiopians, the affiliated parties representing the Developing Regional States need to have their say on national agendas which one way or another affects the lives of the people in their respective regions (Interview on 10 March 2018, Semera).

The role of Afar Regional State in determining national policy issues presented and described above was further complemented by the quantitative data. Table 1.2. below portrays the respondents’ opinion regarding the position of Afar Regional State government in co-determining national policy issues with the federal government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.2. Participation of Afar Regional State in the National Policy Making Process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Afar Regional State Government co-determined national policy issues with the federal government</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we infer from Table 1.2. above, the percentage of respondents who argued that the government of Afar Regional State have not been determining national policy issues with the federal government, 241(68.9%) is greater than others who believed the other way 100 (28.6%). Few respondents 9(2.6%) were unable to decide. Therefore, this quantitative data strengthened the qualitative one. Therefore, the responsibility of the leaders of Afar Regional State is to implement policies adopted by the federal government.

The Provision of training was the other mechanism of relationship between EPRDF and ANDP. Quota was given to affiliated parties to participate in training where few members of ANDP were participating in trainings organized by EPRDF. According to one Afar Regional Party official, the focus areas of trainings provided were on issues related to the experiences of the four regional parties which form the ruling party, EPRDF. He questioned, as to whether the federal government want to bring social transformation in the Developing Regional States. He further stated:

had the federal government genuine concern to raise the political consciousness and to induce party politics among regional leaders of Developing Regional States, it would have provide continuous training to members of ANDP on issues which have direct bearing on the livelihood of pastoralists.

Another interviewee has also similar sentiment as stated:

The member parties of EPRDF and affiliated parties have different political culture and experience in the area of party politics. The constitutional objective of building one political and economic community in Ethiopia cannot be achieved without transforming the people administered by affiliated parties. The ANDP cannot embrace the ideology of Revolutionary Democracy unless the regional state leaders
are adequately supported to move out of clan thinking. Therefore, continuous trainings have to be given to members of ANDP on party politics which would help them to accelerate the development of their region to catch up the relatively developed regional states. (Interview 17 February 2019, Addis Ababa).

The provision of special (support to Developing Regional States is one IGR mechanism between EPRDF and ANDP. Several federal institutions has been providing capacity building support to similar sector Bureaus and Offices in Afar region. The EPRDF is one of the federal institutions which have been supporting Afar Regional State by sending professionals. One of the federal official working in the EPRDF Office mentioned that the political support have been given to Afar region based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between EPRDF and ANDP. Accordingly, four cadres representing the relatively developed four regional states (member parties of EPRDF) have been sent to Afar region. Office of EPRDF has been paying the salaries and other incentives to these cares. He further elaborated that the main activities of these cadres have been coordinating members of EPRDF living in the region and motivate them to support the regional state, performing party capacity building activities to indoctrinate EPRDF’s ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, supporting the officials of ANDP by consulting on how to planning the activities of the party, preparing discussion documents and brochures of the party, introducing the culture of EPRDF and democratic ways of evaluating tasks performed.

The dominance of the federal government in formulating policies presented and described above was further corroborated by measuring the extent of respondents’ agreement or disagreement regarding the role of Afar Regional State in formulating policies. Table 1.3. below portrays whether Afar Regional State leaders formulate and execute policies and strategies reflecting the region’s specific condition.

Table 1.3. Policy and Strategy Making and Execution Experience of Afar Regional State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we infer from Table 1.3. above, the relative percentage of respondents who expressed their disagreement regarding the role of Afar Regional State in formulating and executing policies suitable to the regional specific context is greater 265(75.7%) than those who expressed their agreement 70(20%) and the remaining 15(4.3%) of the respondents were unable to decide. As discussed in the qualitative data, policies have been initiated by member parties of EPRDF (parties ruling mostly agriculturalist communities) which as a result they failed to reflect the condition of pastoralists. Members of affiliated parties simply accept such policies without contextualizing them with the reality of the regional states.

b) Legislative Bodies as Mechanism of Relation

The 1995 FDRE Constitution made clear that the House of Peoples Representatives and Regional State Councils have the highest authorities and power of legislation on matters falling under their jurisdiction. Common discussion forum among the legislative bodies of the two levels of governments is important to create conformity between the federal constitutions and the laws enacted by regional states. However, participants of the interview mentioned that, there was no discussion forum between the legislative bodies of the federal government and regional states for more than a decade.

One of the members of the HPR Legal Service and Administration Standing Committee explained about the importance of organizing forums where the legislative organs of the two levels of governments discuss on various activities in the country like sharing experiences, making decisions and giving directions on common affairs (Interview, 12 December, 2018, Addis Ababa).

The data obtained from available institutional documents support the above information. According to MoFA (2013) the legislative branches of the two levels of governments started their relation by organizing the first discussion forum between the speakers of HPR and Regional State Councils in 2004. The document made...
clear that the first forum did not perform tangible tasks beyond conducting inaugural meeting and adopting rules of procedure.

The speakers of the federal and Regional State Councils conducted their second conference in 2006. The participants of the conference were the speakers and deputy speakers of the House of People’s Representatives and Regional State Councils, selected members of the HPR Standing Committee, chairman of the Regional State Council standing committees and few professionals of the regional state organizing the forum. The rules of procedure indicated that the discussion forums of councils have been conducted twice a year (Ibid).

According to the regulation number 1/2007 adopted by the common discussion forum, the objectives of forums include working for the existence of procedures which could reflect public representation in each council, enacting related laws in conformity with one another, discharging its responsibility in the effort of creating one economic community and enhancement of rule of law and good governance by discussing on tasks to be performed by member councils, discharging its responsibility to strengthen the parliamentary system through experience sharing, support and capacity building practices in a coordinated manner.

According to the objective and regulation of its establishment, the reforms and capacity building activities performed by the common forum include accomplish reforms on the organization and procedures of each council which would enable them achieve their mission successfully, making improvements made by the councils consistent and standardized, performing capacity building through wide experience sharing, providing training to members of the councils and professionals on legislative and control procedures as well as reform tasks and supporting in creating conducive work environment by solving lack of equipments and facilities of the councils.

The common discussion forum has been organized every six month in the nine regional states and the two city administrations on round basis. One of the interviewees mentioned that the common discussion forums of the legislative organs of the two levels of governments have been lead by the speaker of the federal parliament and the speaker of the regional state organizing the forum. According to him, discussions were focusing on improving the legislating practice and proper implementation of oversight over the activities of the executive branches of federal and regional state governments. One of the members of Afar Regional State Council interviewed during the field work explained the procedural approach of forums as:

In between the forums the speaker of the Regional State Council which will organize the next forum has to make all the necessary preparations in consultation with the speaker of the federal house. In the conference, speakers of the nine Regional State Councils and the city administrations present their working performances. Then the strength and weaknesses of the works of each council have been discussed in detail. The council which performed best has been held as a model and others are encouraged to share the experience of that regional council. Regional State Councils which showed less performance are advised how to correct their weakness (Interview 24 March 2019, Semera).

Despite of such practices, the forum had several limitations and has failed to strictly perform its activities in accordance with the rules of procedures. According to an interviewee, one of the problems has been lack of motivation on the part of speakers of Regional State Councils to use the comments provided during discussions as an important input to improve the working performance in their respective regional states.

Supervisions conducted by members of the HPR Pastoralist Standing Committee have been serving as mechanism of through which the federal government planned to support Afar Regional State. The standing committee provide feedback to the regional state council about strengths and weaknesses observed during field observation. Nevertheless, such relation between the two legislative organs did not help to accelerate the development of the regional state. In line with this, one of the members of the HPR Pastoralist Committee reflected:

The standing Committee of the HPR has been conducting field observation in Afar Region. However, several constrains have limited the support provided by the federal government. Irregular conduct of supervision by the federal government (once every year, every two years and sometimes not at all for instance in 2017), capacity limitation and prevalence of conflicts as well as misappropriation of resources on the part of the regional state (Interview 18 May 2019, Addis Ababa).

c) Executive Institutions as Mechanism of Relation

There have been multidimensional relations among the executive organs of the federal government and regional states. Such vertical relations have been made between sector offices of the federal ministries and their counterpart Bureaus and offices in regional states. According to the report on IGR practice in Ethiopia, some of the federal executive organs have signed memorandum of understanding with sector Bureaus of regional states. The main functions and responsibilities of the consultation forums of each sector is clearly stipulated (MoFA, 2013). The relation between two Ministries and their counterpart Regional Bureaus namely Health and Education are discussed below just to show how executive institutions have been serving as a mechanism of relation between the federal government and Afar Regional State.

According to one of the interviewees from Health Bureau of Afar Regional State, the focus areas that the Ministry of Health agreed to work in coordination with the Afar Regional State Health
Bureau, Zonal health departments and Woreda health offices are increasing the number of mothers giving birth in health institutions with the support of health professionals; identify pregnant women in each Kebele with the support of development team leaders and make them visit health posts every month to consult with health professionals; prepare experience sharing forums among development teams and work in coordination with leaders of health sectors from Region to Woreda levels in order to conduct forums with religious fathers, traditional midwives and community elders on quarterly basis.

Another interviewee further elaborated that the Ministry of Health has been working in coordination with the Regional Health Bureau in constructing health stations and health posts as well as in fulfilling medical equipments for health stations and expanding health extension programmes. He also mentioned that the Regional Health Bureau conduct implementation evaluation with the Ministry of Health twice a year.

According to the explanation of a health professional working in the regional Health Bureau, reduction of maternal death in the region is one of the positive outcomes of the coordination efforts between the Ministry of Health and the Regional Health Bureau. However, the report on the IGR Practice in Ethiopia, revealed that factors like capacity limitation in the Regional Bureau, inability to present implementation reports timely, problem of completing tasks according to their plan and absence of systems of accountability on those who failed to implement their plans in accordance with the agreement reached have been adversely affecting the relation between the ministry and the regional Health Bureau (MoFA, 2013).

The Ministry of Education has been working in cooperation with Education Bureau of Afar Regional State. The Ministry has been coordinating consultation forums on education and training. One of the Branches didn’t help to improve the delivery of social and economic services is greater 244(69.7%) than others who believe the opposite 98(28%) and the.

Discussion forums have been organized alternatively in different regions where the Regional Education Bureaus evaluate plan implementations on quarterly basis. Although such forums are important in creating common understanding and sharing of experiences, there are problems adversely affecting the relation between the Ministry and regional Education Bureau such as inability to implement some of the common affairs agreed in the discussion forums; failure to implement the federal rules and regulations; inability to complete activities/tasks according to plans scheduled; and above all absence of legal institutional framework which could guide the relation between the federal and regional executive institutions.

The contribution of the cooperation between the federal and regional executive branches in improving the social and economic services in Afar Regional State presented and described above was further corroborated by quantitative data. Table 1.4. below portrays the extent of respondents’ agreement/disagreement as to whether the cooperation between the federal and regional executive branches has helped to improve the services provided in the regional state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The cooperation between the federal and Afar Regional state executive branches has enabled the Afar people to get improved social and economic services</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1.4. depicts above, the proportion of respondents who believe that the cooperation between the federal and regional state executive branches didn’t help to improve the delivery of social and economic services is greater 244(69.7%) than others who believe the opposite 98(28%) and the remained 8(2.3%) undecided. Therefore, from the data indicated that the supports provided by the federal executives (ministries) could not enable the Afar people to get improved social and economic services.
**d) The Provision of Special Support as Mechanism of IGR**

All regions of the country were not at similar level of political and socio-economic development when Ethiopia was restructured following the introduction of ethnic federalism in 1991. When EPRDF took power in 1991 and restructured the country through federal arrangement, it became obvious that the peripheral areas of the country mostly inhabited by pastoralists lagged behind others. In this regard, Yohannes and Mahmmud (2015) mentioned that Ethiopian pastoralists are one of the groups who lag behind others in terms of their socio-economic and political development because of negligence and marginalization by past governments.

Cognizant of the existing regional disparities the preamble of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia stipulated the need to rectify the existing imbalance and to work hard to promote the interests of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia with the intent of building one political and economic community, the common destiny of Ethiopians. It seems with this understanding that the government of EPRDF gave constitutional consideration to the historically disadvantaged societies of the country at least in principle (FDRE-Constitution Article 89 (4)).

The rationale for the provision of special support to the Developing Regional States is presented in some detail by the Ministry of Federal Affairs. Accordingly, the support is based on the following grounds: First, the federal government has constitutional responsibility (Art.89/4) to support nations, nationalities and peoples that are least advantaged in their socio-economic development. Second, the existing capacity and development gaps among regional states necessitate positive intervention for the realization of the long term plan of the country, building one political community. Third, the interest of the developing regional states to get support from the federal government in order to accelerate their socio-economic development is the other rational. Fourth, the District Level Development Programme (DLDP) started during the Transitional period (1991-1995). The DLDP was one of the strategies set by the government of the FDRE in 2000, to realize the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) (MoFA, 2017).

Institutional arrangements were made for the Provision of Special Support to the Four Developing Regional States. First, the federal government organized an office called “Office of Regional Affairs” within the Prime Minister’s office. Until 2001 this sector supported the establishment of government structures in the regional states and its support was focusing on the construction of offices, elementary schools, hospitals and health stations as well as improving the implementation capacity of the Developing Regional States by providing trainings and practicing experience sharing (MoFA, 2016). However, the supports provided could not bring substantial changes in terms of building the implementation capacity of the regional states. In line with this view one of the directorates of the MoFA stated:

> There was an obvious gap between the efforts made and the changes brought in building the implementation the capacity of the Developing Regional States. In 2002 the ruling party (EPRDF) thoroughly examined the support provided and sort out the reasons for the limited achievements. It was found that the technical advisors and professionals deployed to the Developing Regional States were performing tasks on behalf of the respective sector offices and administrators where they were assigned rather than focusing on building the capacity of workers and administrators. This had its own adverse effect on the purpose of the provision of the special support to the Developing Regional States. The government decided to change its approach of providing support which as a result the Office of Regional Affairs was replaced by the Ministry of Federal Affairs which was believed to foster the development efforts in the Developing Regional States (Interview, 24 December 2018).

Later, the Special Support Board was established in 2004 to coordinate the efforts of the federal government in providing special support to the Developing Regional States (Haileyesus, 2014). The Board was established by the Council of Ministers Regulation No. 103/2004 to provide affirmative support for “less developed regions”. This regulation was amended by the regulation No.128/2006 and the latest regulation of the Council of Ministers No. 24/2011 repealed the 2006 regulation. The Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA) is in charge of coordinating the special supports provided by members of the Special Support Board (MoFA, 2016). It was first established under proclamation NO.256/2001 that defined the powers and duties of the reorganized executive organs of the FDRE. Hence the core processes of MoFA ought to bring equitable development in the Developing Regional States, prevent and resolve conflicts, strengthen the federal system, uphold federal-regional relations in the country, and maintain good relations, peace and tolerance among different religions and beliefs (Ibid).

The purpose of the special support provided to various sector offices in Afar Regional State is to enhance the capacity of planning and executing socio-economic developments, enhancing public participation, ensuring good governance and supplying quality government services to the community. Supports have been provided to build the required capacity with the intent of fostering development and enabling the regional state to stand by its own after certain years. However, inability of the leadership to enhance the implementation capacity comparable to the support provided is remained to be the unresolved problem (MoFA, 2016).

The institutions forming the Special Support Board are the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Ministry of
Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development. According to the bulletin published in June 2011 by its Public Relation Office, the vision of MoFA is to “realize lasting peace, strong intergovernmental relations and equitable development in Ethiopia by 2020”. However, one of the technical advisors working in the head office, Addis Ababa, asserted that this vision could not be attained given the inadequate support which have been provided and the existing capacity limitations in the Developing Regional States. Further building on this assertion, one of the directorates of the MoFA reflected:

*The vision of MoFA was not set based on the common agreement among support providing and support recipient organs. It was set without considering the commitment of member institutions of the Special Support Board and the existing tangible implementation capacity limitations in the Developing Regional States. Later based on the experiences gained, the time required for the realization of the vision was extended to 2025 to make it compatible to the vision of the country, achieving middle income status by 2025... to a more open, inclusive, equitable and democratic society (interview 23 December 2018).*

All member ministries of the Special Support Board have assigned their own technical advisors to provide support to Afar Regional State. The technical advisors of the MoFA have been coordinating the activities of other technical advisors at regional, Zonal and Woreda levels. The technical advisors of MoFA assigned at Zonal and Woreda level are known as cluster coordinators. The official document of the Ministry of Federal Affairs showed that in 2018 fiscal year the total number of federal technical advisors deployed in Afar Regional State was 54 out of which 51 were from the seven ministries forming the Special Support Board and the remain 3 were from EPRDF office. Therefore, two kinds of advices have been given for the Regional State (MoFA, 2018). According to the regional coordinator of MoFA, the technical advisors supporting the regional state are known as ‘development team’.

Each technical advisor provides support to their respective sector Bureaus or Offices where they are assigned. For instance, technical advisors deployed by the Ministry of Education, provide support to the Regional Education Bureau and to the Woreda Education Office. They work in cooperation with their respective Bureaus and Offices. They also attend the management meeting of their respective sector Bureaus and Offices to discuss on activities done and evaluate gaps. Technical advisors were expected to play an important role in areas identified as development sectors (Education, Water, Health, Agriculture and Natural Resource and Civil Service and Capacity Building).

The institutional arrangement and deployment of technical advisors have not been able to accelerate the development of Afar Regional State due to several challenges. One of the challenges related to the Special Support Board is lack of coordination among members of the Federal Board institutions. The 2016 report of the Ministry of Federal Affairs substantiate the above idea:

*The institutional arrangement and deployment of technical advisors have been supporting sector offices in the five Woredas of the Zone. (Interview, 8 February 2018, Semera).*

The other problem of the Board is the deployment of small number of technical advisors. In this regard Participants of the interview asserted that the manpower resource deployed in Afar region is too small compared to the support needed to bring about meaningful change in the region. The same idea was reiterated by the regional coordinator of the Ministry of Federal Affairs:

*The efforts of member Ministries of the Special Support Board ministries in enhancing the implementation capacity of Woredas in Afar region have been constrained by lack of adequate manpower (technical advisors). For instance, the MoFA has assigned only one cluster and one Woreda coordinator in Zone five. Therefore, they cannot effectively, coordinate the activities of other technical advisors who have been supporting sector offices in the five Woredas of the Zone. (Interview, 8 January, 2018, Addis Ababa).*

The other problem is related to the capacity of technical advisors providing support to the Developing Regional States. Participants of the interview asserted that some of the technical advisors lacked experience and the required capacity. Therefore, lack of experience and limited capacities on the part of technical advisors has its own impact on the effectiveness of the support provided. One of the authorities working in the Office of the ruling party, EPRDF, further strengthened the above idea when he stated:

*There are still gaps in the changes scored in Afar Regional State despite of the deployment of professionals to support the development efforts in the region. The change after several years of support is not as such significant. The role of advisors sent from the center in bringing the anticipated rapid change and development is still very slow. I doubt whether these professionals have been carefully selected and deployed to the region (Interview, 8 January, 2018, Addis Ababa).*

The other problem was failure of member ministries of the Board to create conducive working environment to technical advisors deployed to Afar Region in order to maximize their support to the regional state. According to the views of the interviewees, the conditions in which the technical advisors have been living and working has its own adverse impact on their...
motivation and commitment. In this regard one of the cluster (Zonal) coordinator in Afar region asserted:

The Federal Board institutions have wide gaps in providing incentives and in fulfilling the necessary facilities for us (technical advisors deployed in the region). For instance, we do not have our own offices which as a result, we have been forced to share offices of Zonal and Woreda workers. Such working environment has been significantly affecting our privacy and comfort. Lack of transportation has constrained our movement to Woredas. Moreover, we have been using our own personal laptop to keep the required data. Had the respective Federal Board ministries provided us different incentives and facilities, we would have fully engaged in building the capacity of the regional leadership at different levels (Interview, 22 January 2018, Awash 7 Kilo).

The shared agreement among technical advisors interviewed during the field visit in 2017 and 2018 was that Afar Regional State leaders at different levels lacked commitment and initially they did not wholeheartedly accept the importance of the special support given to the regional state. Similarly, most interviewees mentioned that lack of serious concern on the part of the regional leadership to the support provided by the development team is the other problem. Some of the leaders at different levels have not been participating in the quarterly evaluation of the implementation performance of the support provided. Participants of the interview mentioned that rent seeking mentality on the part of the leadership is one of the problems which reduced the contribution of the supports provided for the development of Afar Regional State. In line with this view, one educated Afar reflected:

Leaders of the regional state have been prioritizing their own interest at the expense of the benefits of the community. Some of the leaders give the clan lands to rent seeking investors, own land for themselves or in the name of their families instead of using the support they have been given by different stakeholders. Leaders have not been trying to maximize the contribution of technical advisors. The prevalence of rent seeking mentality among Afar Regional State leaders has been hindering development in the region which as a result ensuring the benefit of the community has become difficult (Interview, 22 January 2019, Semera).

The special support provided to Afar Regional State by the various stakeholders presented and described above was further substantiated by the quantitative data obtained through the administration of questionnaire. Table 1.5. below depicts the respondents’ judgment regarding the role of the special support in the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

**Table 1.5. The Contribution of Special Support to Afar Regional State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes I believe</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No I do not believe</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey data collected by the researcher, 2019

As we infer from Table 1.5. above, the percentage of respondents who believed that the contribution of the special support for the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State is insignificant, 256(73.1%) is greater than others who do not believe in that way. Through cross tabulation respondents who contend that the provision special support to Afar Regional State did not bring significant change in the socio-economic development of the region or were asked to explain the reasons behind the less contribution of the special support to the socio-economic development of Afar Regional State.

**Table 1.6. Problems in the Provision of Special Support in Afar Regional State**

If your answer to the above question (Table. 7.1.) is no, what are the factors adversely affecting the provision of special support in Afar Regional State?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Believe</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited capacity of the technical advisors (professionals) deployed in the region to support different sectors</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of coordination among professionals supporting the various sectors in the region</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited awareness of the community about the purpose of the provision of the special support to the region</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of motivation and commitment among the leaders of the regional state at different levels</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>301.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey data collected by the researcher, 2019
As we infer from Table 1.6. above, 187(73.0%) of the respondents argued that limited capacity of the technical advisors deployed in the region to support different sectors has its own impact for the less contribution of the special support to the socio-economic development of the Afar Regional State. Others 172(67.2%) of the respondents argued that lack of coordination among technical advisors supporting the various sectors in the region is the cause for the less contribution of the special support to the region’s socio-economic development. Moreover, 196 (76.6%) of the respondents asserted that limited awareness of the community about the purpose of the provision of the special support to the region is cause for the less contribution of the special support for the socio-economic development of Afar the region. Moreover, 217(84.8%) of the respondents argued that lack of motivation and commitment among the leaders of the regional state at different levels is the main factor why the special support provided to Afar Regional State is not translated into meaningful socio-economic development.

V. Conclusion

This paper shades light on the power relation between Afar Regional State and the federal government. The mechanisms of IGR between the two levels of governments have been the party channel, the legislative and executive organs as well as the provision of special support. However, this multidimensional relation did not help to transform the socio-economic development of Afar Regional state due to several reasons. The affiliation relation between EPRDF and ANDP which deny the regional state to co-determine on national policies and strategies, the federal intervention in the regional jurisdiction, conduct of irregular supervision by the federal government, inadequacy of the support provided to the regional executive branches. Finally, the special support provided by various stakeholders to Afar Regional State did not bring the expected change in the socio-economic development in the region. The rhetoric change scored in the region is far from the reality on the ground. There is a big gap between the reality and the development hope that was promised when the provision of special support started.

References Références Referencias


