

Egypt towards an Islamic State

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Abstract

Albeit the ridiculous claim on the implementation of the Hudud in Egyptian society, the history of this demand failed due to several reasons. Crucially, the unqualified community. Besides that, the Islamist movements translated the understanding of the Islamic State prejudicially. In the meantime, the demand for implementations of the Islamic State in Egypt has been a demand for a very long time, yet it never occurred. The failure of establishing the Islamic State instigated an unstable political spectrum. However, the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring in 2011 was an ample sign for establishing the Islamic State. In a paradox, the Muslim Brotherhood failed in several political and economic fields, which hastened the topple of the movement in 2013. This study analyses the incidents that occurred in Egypt towards the Islamic State implementation. By looking profoundly into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, this paper ascertained that the failure of democracy in Egypt instigated the emergence of ISIS in Sinai and besmirched the January Revolution reputation in Egypt and worldwide. This paper answers an arguable question: why Egypt fail to establish an Islamic State, albeit it is recognised as one of the leaders of Islamic countries and Arabs?

Index terms— egypt, islamic state, the muslim brotherhood, ISIS.

1 Introduction

Islam is the religion of more than one billion inhabitants. Islam was sent from God to his Prophet Mohamed SAW. Since that time hitherto, and Islam has been disseminated throughout the world. For instance, Islam has entered Egypt in the year 641. However, Egyptians did not initially embrace Islam, but it took approximately two hundred years to alter the bulk of Egyptians to become Muslims, contrary to Christians. Islam had affected Egyptians culturally, linguistically and -of course -politically. Egypt had been ruled by the Hudud for hundreds of years. Still, the last two centuries observed a tangible transformation in the Egyptian political culture. The Hudud was ceased due to social reasons. Crucially, the uprising of liberalists' voices. On the other side, the collapse of Khalifah in Turkey had undoubtedly influenced Egyptian politics. The political scene in Egypt witnessed no religious rule in the government. Islam was solely placed at Mosques. Ironically, several Islamic clerics demanded the uprising of Islam to encompass all aspects of lives, particularly political culture. This political motivation had conclusively conducted various Islamist movements into the political scene, significantly Ikhwanul Muslimin the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The Islamist organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded by Hassan Al-Banna, the schoolteacher. Al-Banna pursued to implement Islamic law in Egyptian society. Alas, he failed to attend the success of his effort as he was assassinated in 1949. But the dissemination of the Muslim Brotherhood has posthumously reached the globe after his death. Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood governed Egypt for a year from 2012 until 2013. Therefore, as the title of this paper insinuates, this study examines the challenges that faced the Muslim Brotherhood by two methods, religious and sociological scopes, to look in-depth at Egypt Towards an Islamic State.

2 II.

3 Islamic State

The theory of understanding the meaning of the Islamic state revolves around Islamic teaching -andhow Islam regulations should be affected. Strategically, for Islamic rules to occur in such a society as Egypt, there should be a shred of awareness in society. This indisputably includes the role of the family to socialise the children based on Islamic teachings (Ahmed, Clauss &, Salvaterra, 2013). ??aruqi (2005) argues that schools conjointly play such a crucial role in this process of development in the Islamic State. Beneath the Islamic State, the pupils will be subjugated to learn the Islamic curriculum to become prepared for ruling the Islamic State. Profoundly, the investigation of the Islamic State focuses on constrain. The constrain of political behaviours, religious fatwa, schools, and media. Correspondingly, the new concept of entrenching the Islamic State had effectively failed. It sociologically failed for the vacuum of experience and misunderstanding of the crucial steps that develop the Islamic State. For instance, the Caliphates of Abbasid, Umayyad and Ayyubid had historically indicated the veridical concept of the Islamic State. They produced clerics, scientists, and even new theories in the wars ??Mukatel, n.d.) Moreover, main understanding of the Islamic State was not the focus solely on the Hudud. This is particularly indicating that implementing the Hudud had constantly taken place in their rules. Yet, they established schools, hospitals and developed the state economically and politically. Initially, this is undoubtedly the evidence that those Caliphates existed for more than centuries. Furthermore, the Islamic State at that period witnessed the tolerance between the Muslims and non-Muslims (Kennedy, 1998). Egypt, however, constrained by Umayyad and Ayyubid dynasty, had remarked the tolerance between the Muslims and Christians. The rulers did not force the Christians to embrace Islam. Conclusively, those Caliphates established the most crucial constituent of politics, which is political stability. However, the current understanding of the Islamic State had completely morphed from a theory to another. This massive change in understanding the meaning of the Islamic State occurred palpably after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. Since then, the Islamic world impacted by unlimited scholars who produced a meaning of the Islamic State. Some of them had mutually pursued to establish a theoretical framework that could be implemented on the ground. At the same time, those scholars faced several challenges that sapped their ideology and physically dispatched them behind bars. Yet, hitherto, the Islamic world had never witnessed an actual implementation of the Islamic State. Undoubtedly, this eloquently dereliction is due to several internal and external reason.

The internal failure of the Islamic State had recently revolved around the unprepared individuals who took the lead. The preparation at this juncture highlights each aspect of lives. The individuals, for instance, in Al-Qaeda are not politically and socially socialised to establish a state as it is recognised in the country dictionary (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2021). Hence, Al-Qaeda members are not socialised to become teachers, doctors, and engineers. They, however, are socialised and trained to become combatants (Torok, 2010). With this, Al-Qaeda failed to establish the Islamic State. Furthermore, ISIS had been in a rigorous war in the Middle East in Syria and Iraq to establish an Islamic State. ISIS had seized half land of Iraq and Syria. It had cajoled the Muslims in Europe, Middle East, and Asia to come to Syria and Iraq to the Caliphate land (Fernandez, 2015). Accordingly, it was extremely vivid that ISIS had a coherent political state that seems unbreakable. However, ISIS had accordingly followed the same trajectory as Al-Qaeda (Wood, 2015). The focus was on recruitment without prior acknowledge of the individual background. ISIS had also shifted the children into combatants instead of students. In fact, shifting the whole community to combatants is the first step of dereliction. The community cannot succeed without education, health and political discourse. On the other side, the external reason behind the dereliction of establishing the Islamic State had been in the West's accounts. Islamically, the meaning of political opposition took place in Islam During the Prophet Mohamed period. The Companions had different perspective contrary to the Prophet in many incidents. It is, of course, known as the differences were not regarding the credo but political differences (Islamstory, 2016). Still, there was respect and mutual understanding between the two parts. At this juncture, it is peculiar how the Iranian Regime executes its political dissenter. This rationale led Islamists and sociologist to abnegate the abomination of the Iranian Regime against its political dissenters. This abomination does not lead to prosperity and democracy but dictatorship.

In referring to democracy, several countries pursued to establish Islamic State but in a different meaning. For instance, Aceh state in Indonesia implements the Hudud since 2006 hitherto. The government of Aceh is responsible for the Hudud and its formal implementation. On the other side, the Indonesian government does not implement the Hudud in each diameter in the country (Saâ, 2016), but solely Aceh.

4 III.

5 The Story of Egypt

Islam in Egypt had been presented through different accounts. Profoundly, it is critical to state that Islam is embraced by secularists, liberalists, modern Muslims, and terrorists. Critically, not all -Muslimsserve Islam as a whole. Yet, there are Muslims who rebuff to follow Islamic instruction. Still, there are Muslims who bear peremptory to their clerics. Vividly, the issue is not regarding Islam, but Muslims and their understanding of Islam.

101 The story of the Islamic State in Egypt shifted on several occasions. Historically, Egypt ruled by different rulers
102 such as, Umayyad Ottomans, Mohamed Ali Pasha, and his family. Furthermore, in 1952, the Free Volume XXII
103 Issue I Version I 36 () Officers toppled King Farouk and declared Egypt a republic nor kingdom (Gordon, 1992).
104 Those rulers produced a different understanding of Islamic State and -crucially Islamic Sharia. For instance, the
105 existence of the Umayyad caliphate witnessed the expansion of Islam in Morocco and 'Al-Andalus' Spain. At
106 that juncture, the negotiation over the Hudud played no part. It was compulsory to implement the Hudud. The
107 Egyptian Muslims lived juxtaposed the Egyptian Christians under the Hudud. Yet, history did not investigate
108 the negative response from Christians towards the Hudud. In the meantime, the political discourse over the
109 Hudud had developed and became physical violence. The argument over reckoning Egypt as an Islamic State or
110 Liberalist State is discursive. It has no sufficient answer to both sides, who assume Egypt is an Islamic State and
111 those who consider Egypt as a Liberalist State.

112 According to Shaukrallah (1994), Islamists are predominantly stemming from rejecting all political discourse.
113 Shukarallah assumes that Islamists utilise physical actions (violence) to attain their political agenda. Islamist
114 movements assassinated Sadat, the third Egyptian President in, 1981. However, this assumption is erroneously
115 proved. Islamist movements participate in political discourses since their foundations. The Muslim Brotherhood,
116 for instance, sought to win the People's Assembly on various instances. This fact scotched the assumption that
117 Islamist movements reject democracy. So far, the struggle to prove that Islamist movements are politically
118 prepared for democracy is inaccurate. Islamist movements are atomised into several organisations. There are
119 moderate Islamist movements, emissary Islamist movements and ultimately terrorist Islamist movements. Each
120 category of those Islamist movements represents an Islamic ideology. For instance, emissary Islamist movements,
121 such as Tablighi Jamaat, eschews the political discourse. The movements believe that politics is the main
122 reason for the dispute among Muslims. Hence, they do not include politics in their programs (Alexiev, 2005).
123 Whilst terrorist movements, such as ISIS, believes in physical violence to associate with the Hudud. It abnegates
124 all political discourse. Besides, it declares Jihad as the sole method of bringing Islam on the right trajectory
125 (Styszynsk, 2014). Conclusively, intermediate Islamist movements presume democracy and political discourse is
126 merely a method of prosperity and renaissance. However, Egypt contains all varieties of Islamist movements.
127 The imagination of Islamic Unity under one banner in Egypt seems elusive. There are no mutual interests among
128 all Islamist movements. On the other side, intermediate Islamist movements are victimised to the abomination
129 of Islam as a whole. The dissenters of Islam -andpolitical Islam do not differentiate between the sort of the
130 Islamist movements. For them, violence and terrorism occur because of the existence of the Islamist movements.
131 In the case of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood have been struggling to represent political Islam in a good
132 image. Alas, the movement faced several tribulations, such as incarcerations and ostracisation (Trager, 2011).
133 Albeit the Muslim Brotherhood adopts the intermediate ideology of political Islam. Although the movement's
134 dissidents had not ceased to promulgate rumours to besmirch the Muslim Brotherhood's reputation. Prior to
135 the Muslim Brotherhood rise in 2012, the movement had historically reckoned as a nationalist movement. Of
136 course, it had placed in vortex situations on different occasions. Yet, the movement had never been linked to
137 any violence, particularly during the Mubarak Presidency. Nowadays, the Muslim Brotherhood is considered a
138 terrorist movement in Egypt (Dalacoura, 2018). It is, banned from practising politics and appearing in any social
139 activity.

140 To understand the Story of Egypt towards the Islamic State in-depth: this paper examines a current issue that
141 still uninvestigated. How historically is Egypt prepared for the Islamic State? Genuinely, the de facto history
142 regarding this issue had never been placed on the negotiation table. Since Mohamed Ali Pasha hitherto, the
143 pursuance to establish Islamic State had never occurred in favour of all governments. It is obscure whether Egypt
144 does not consider this issue due to the minority of Copts rather preferring Egypt as a Liberalist State. In addition,
145 beneath the Ottoman Caliphate and the British occupation, the Hudud had evanesced. However, Egyptian history
146 witnessed various abortive attempts to revitalise the Hudud. The Muslim Brotherhood, alongside political elites
147 Mostafa Kamel and Sayyid Qutb to establish the Hudud again. At this juncture, the Muslims, Christians, and
148 Jews maintained their religious affairs. Egypt did not struggle with this political issue (Berger & Sonneveld,
149 2010). The differences between the current situation now and the Companions era is revolving around internal
150 and external factors. The Companions learned the Koran to know the new teachings and guidance from God.
151 There was no cultural influence on Muslims. The Persian and Roman Empires had not played a religious and
152 cultural influence role on Arabs. Thus, the current situation of Muslims and Egyptians differentiate from the
153 past (Qutb, 1964). Muslims nowadays are impacted by various external factors. For instance, the Western
154 influence on Egyptians had led the country to utilise the English and French language as a compulsory language
155 to work in the government. Learning a new language is a stimulus to learn new culture and adopt new habits
156 as well. Egyptians who studied in France had been influenced by the Western culture: they pursued to bring it
157 to Egypt. Yet, Mohamed Abdu, the Egyptian scholar who went to France for an academic purpose, returned to
158 Egypt to normalise Egyptians based on the Islamic teachings: he criticised the Western culture that in paradox
159 with Islam (Hadoor, 2017). Undeniably, Al-Azhar did not declare such a rigorous stance to cease this Western
160 influence. It had solely enjoyed an ethos by Egyptians and Saad Zaghloul (Hatina, 2000). Al-Azhar is historically
161 known as the pulpit for Muslims worldwide. Yet, its role is lacuna during serious circumstances. One of the
162 external factors that influenced Egyptians is the media. The Western media had not solely played a salient role in
163 Egyptian society, but it morphed the identity of Egyptians. The discourse over Egyptians is Pharaohs or Arabs

164 had complicatedly accentuated a profound social problem in Egypt. Egyptian secularists declare themselves
165 Pharaohs. On the contrary, Islamists declare themselves Arabs. This dispute is probably not leading to physical
166 abuse. Yet, it leads to a transformation in identity. The identity, however, shapes the personality and develop
167 the individual's thoughts An instance of Egyptian Islamists, considering them as Pharaohs, will marginalise the
168 Islamic side, which encompasses the Islamic teachings and Arabic language. As a result, the Islamic State will
169 play no role in the Egyptian political scene. Egypt will manifestly shift to a Secular State.

170 The comparative analysis of the differences between the Companion's period and the current situation
171 highlights the collapse of the identity. All Islamist movements in Egypt inveigle their cohorts to establish an
172 Islamic State and envisage reviving the Caliphate. Notwithstanding, those Islamist movements had left a gap
173 among its members to have an in-depth understanding of the movement's identity, objectives, and ideology. Thus,
174 the continuum of most of those Islamist movements collapsed and evaporated. One of those movements is Takfir
175 Wal Hijrah. According to Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil (2021), this movement instigated chaos and harmed the
176 political stability in Egypt. Hence, the Egyptian government made a pragmatic decision to remove this Islamist
177 movement. It was palpable for Egyptians that Takfir Wal Hijrah is causing troubles instead of developing society.
178 As such, Egypt, at this juncture, was in an ideological battle against the communists and socialists who seized
179 the social activities and universities during Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second Egyptians President. In addition,
180 Takfir Wal Hijrah declared Egypt as Islamic State without considering all ramification of their declaration. The
181 de facto is a preposterous idea to propagate for the Islamic State whilst the cohorts of the movements are not
182 well prepared. Egypt was simultaneously teetering on the brink of collapse due to its war against Israel. Besides,
183 the members of Takfir Wal Hijrah were mostly released from the incarcerations. They have not been socialised
184 socially, politically and even religiously to establish this alleged Islamic State. Arguably, the miss understanding
185 of the movement's identity is, unquestionably, the main culprit of the dereliction of the Islamist movements.

186 IV.

187 6 The Muslim Brotherhood a Case Study

188 The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the world. It was founded in
189 1928 by the schoolteacher Hassan Al-Banna. As a founder of the movement, Al-Banna emphasised Islam and
190 politics are inseparable (Farahat, 2017). Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood has been struggling to establish the
191 Islamic Laws in the legitimate rules. The pursuit has been ambling on the trajectory of democracy, rebuffing all
192 extremist ideologies. Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood eschewed extremism and the language of violence.
193 This has valorised the movement's stance against its dissenters. On the contrary, extremist movements have
194 an abject denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood. They assume the intermediate ideology adopted by
195 the Muslim Brotherhood is the main culprit of the Muslims ignorance. Of course, this seemed plausible in the
196 Muslim Brotherhood dissenters' accounts. Particularly after the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013 by
197 a military coup committed by the Minister of Defense Abdul Fattah Assisi.

198 The history of the Muslim Brotherhood did not witness prosperity and sophistication. As the movement
199 played the role of the main dissenter in the face of dictatorship: it had faced dissolution, incarceration, and
200 confiscation of its properties (Munson, 2001). For critics, this had occurred because of the movement's motto
201 that emphasises 'Allah is their destiny, the Prophet is their leader, Koran is their constitution, and the death
202 for the sake of Allah is their destination' (Khalid, Hassan & Sajid, 2020). This motto, of course, stands against
203 several ideologies. It does not coexist with the principle of Secularism that believes religion and politics must
204 be bifurcated. It accordingly does not concur with the interest of the Egyptian military. Arguably, these
205 discrepancies between the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military headed to a recondite situation.
206 The relationship between the two sides has been sapped in various political incidents. The constant grapple
207 over the political ascendancy indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood had lost in many political battles. Since
208 1954 until the collapse of Mohamed Morsi the first civilian President of Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood hurled
209 in incarcerations and faced executions. Antithesis from the oppression and political deprivation, the Muslim
210 Brotherhood won most of the Egyptian elections, particularly after the January Revolution in 2011. Historically,
211 the Muslim Brotherhood believed in democracy to attain its political agenda. Its political agenda is the fulcrum
212 of the argument to establish the Islamic State. However, the distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood and
213 other Islamist movements to establish the Islamic State is extremely non-Volume XXII Issue I Version I 38 (
214) comparative. It argues that the Muslim Brotherhood took the political ascendancy not only in Egypt, but
215 Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (al-Anani, 2020).

216 To establish an Islamic State, Hassan Al-Banna pursued and cracked to ascertain answers for all disputable
217 issues. This encompasses social issues, religious issues, even sportive issues. He inculcated to his cohorts that to
218 establish an Islamic State that implements Islamic teachings in its society, the Muslim must unite beneath one
219 banner. However, the challenges faced by the Muslim Brotherhood have been recurring in each decade. With a
220 vituperative attack on the movement's structure, the Muslim Brotherhood had not challenged external crisis in
221 Egypt, but its members subjugated to an internal crisis that successfully bifurcated the movement into two sides
222 in different periods. Ironically, the oppression towards the Muslim Brotherhood did not cease its expansion on
223 Egypt's soil. Even the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 had remarkably witnessed the dissemination of
224 the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology worldwide. Several scholars have attributed to the expansion of the Muslim
225 Brotherhood in Egypt's society and worldwide (Munson, 2001; Zollner, 2009a; Anani, 2016). Sociologically, the

226 Muslim Brotherhood sufficiently has an epiphany towards the hazard committed by the Egyptian government.
227 Therefore, it entrenched a coherent sociological network in Egypt by having more than 100 branches in all
228 Egyptian diameters. Those branches were juxtaposed with schools, social clubs, and clinics. The domination
229 of the Muslim Brotherhood over Egyptian society did not favour the movement itself. Yet, it had intriguingly
230 favoured Mubarak's regime economy. According to Leiken & Brooke (2007), the Muslim Brotherhood is not
231 a revolutionary movement; it inveigled Egyptians to win their hearts for a gradual Islamisation. The whole
232 ideology and structure of the Muslim Brotherhood are built on the Islamic ideology. Besides, the movement
233 focused on socialising its members on Islamic teachings, nationalism, and Islamic globalisation. According to
234 (Pandian, Gomaa & Pazil, 2020), the Muslim Brotherhood main ideology is Ustaziatul Alalam which means to
235 govern the world by Islamic perspective. The Muslim Brotherhood focuses on shaping individuals to become
236 stalwart members to promulgate the concept of the movement in all Egyptian diameters. The members sought
237 to procure social dominance prior to political ascendancy. As such, the Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in
238 physical violence as a solution to establish the Islamic State; it believes in the democratic trajectory as the sole
239 and crucial method for a developed state. This developed state will uprise by individuals. Crucially, the internal
240 system of the Muslim Brotherhood is reflexively producing the image of political Islam. This political Islam was
241 not grappled by the military to cease the envision of establishing the Islamic State. The Islamist movements that
242 argued with the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the movement concept: had disowned the movement strategy to
243 seek political ascendancy. Those movements had likewise considered the Muslim Brotherhood as the pursuers of
244 power. Arguably, after the collapse of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, those Islamist movements established their political
245 parties to become other pivotal roles for political Islam in Egypt. Certainly, those movements such as Salafi and
246 Jamaat Islamiyah were far from the Muslim Brotherhood experience. However, the political environment in
247 Egypt was felicitous for all social and political movements to practise their agenda. Alas, Islamist movements
248 failed to become united beneath one banner. Accordingly, the demand for political Islam had rumbustiously
249 concealed. The prevailing environment in Egyptian politics focused on the procurement of more seats in the
250 Parliament. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood obtained the majority of the Parliament Election: it also won
251 the Presidential Election in 2012 (Aknur, 2013).

252 Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood acquisitively encountered the political and social domination in Egypt: it has
253 hankered down due to other Islamist movements inclinations. Crucially, those Islamist movements perturbed the
254 Muslim Brotherhood to implement Sharia Law. Salafis and even Tablighi Jamaat that abjure politics beseeched
255 Morsi to proceed with the Hudud. This, paradoxically, produced nuisances to the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt,
256 politically, economically and socially, was not prepared to morph from the applied legitimacy to the Hudud. The
257 linearity of the Muslim Brotherhood was to subject Mubarak's regime on trial. Morsi, the Egyptian President,
258 faced several political challenges that -regrettably -hastened his collapse in 2013. According to critics, the Muslim
259 Brotherhood was subjected to bear political pressures from all Egyptian sides; hence, the movement did not
260 apportion its account to establish an Islamic State. At the political level, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood
261 were not in the stage of accepting the Hudud. Vitally, the essential key player in the Egyptian political scene,
262 the military. It had its stance against that decision. Egyptians themselves were not prepared to socialise based
263 on Islamic teachings and considering Egypt as an Islamic State. Contrarily, the Muslim Brotherhood never
264 pursued to morph the Egyptian constitution and resort to Koran as the legitimate law. Despite this, the Muslim
265 Brotherhood faced several scandals that undoubtedly besmirched the Muslim Brotherhood reputation. One of
266 those political calumny was the inclination of the Muslim Brotherhood to turn Egypt into another Kandahar
267 (Al-Hadad, 2021). Towards the end, the internal political and economic crisis were ample to accentuate the
268 instability of the Muslim Brotherhood government. This government had also failed to palliate the abomination
269 that propagated on social media and talk shows. Thus, this political dereliction highlights that the State of
270 Apparatus was fiercer than the Muslim Brotherhood -and -the Muslim Brotherhood did not govern Egypt. It had
271 solely won the Presidential seat; thus, the government collapsed after a year. The military coup that toppled the
272 Muslim Brotherhood government occurred with the assistance of Al-Azhar, Mohamed ElBaradei, Assisi, Pope
273 Tawadros II, and ultimately Salafis, who betrayed the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafis, who placed the Muslim
274 Brotherhood in a vortex situation several times due to their Islamic demand, emerged in the military coup and
275 declared their rebuff to the Muslim Brotherhood government and demanded Morsi to step down (Delibas, 2019).
276 Conclusively, the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood failed the January Revolution. It brought the military
277 again to power. The consequence of the military coup did not lead Morsi's supporters to face the music. It
278 resulted in thousands of martyrs in Rabba Sit-in in 2013. Hitherto, there are more than 60000 political detainees
279 behind bars (Oxford Analytica, 2021). This military coup had successfully devastated the objectives of Egyptian
280 to end up the military rule that took place in 1952 until 2011.

281 The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood did not outright the demand of the Islamic State. Alas, it instigated
282 a new key challenger in the political scene in the Middle East, which is ISIS. The new key challenger annexed half
283 Syria and Iraq. They declared their land as the awaiting Caliphate -The Islamic State. The propaganda of ISIS
284 cajoled Muslims in Europe, Asia and the Middle East to agglutinate them. At this juncture, ISIS recruited tens
285 of thousands of children, women, and youths. The declared Islamic State did not focus on educating the children
286 and providing a felicitous role for women in society. Antithesis from this, ISIS socialised its new members as
287 combatants. Crucially, ISIS brainwashed them on the abomination of the West and the Arab Regimes. Besides,
288 the physical socialisation that shaped their identity as Mujahideen. However, the neglect of society and its

289 demand caused the collapse of Syria and Iraq. The awaiting Caliphate failed to attain its objectives due to
290 the extremism of ISIS. The continuation of ISIS was an intimidation not merely for the Middle Easters but for
291 the world (Gross, 2017). Genuinely, ISIS promulgated in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Uganda, Egypt, Nigeria and the
292 Philippines. So far, NATO battled ISIS and defeated it in Syria and Iraq. Yet, the existence of ISIS still in the
293 continuum in Egypt. Sinai contains an obscure number of ISIS combatants. Those combatants were previous
294 members of the Muslim Brotherhood who joined ISIS after the collapse of the movement. Furthermore, ISIS in
295 Egypt has antecedent police and military officers who stripped off their accustomed lives to shift into extremists.
296 Only the emergence of ISIS occurred after the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood. The fact that the failure of
297 democratisation in Egypt was one reason why ISIS cajoled the previous members of the Muslim Brotherhood
298 and adjoined them. This path of ISIS caused the lives of Egyptian officers and augmented inescapable chaos in
299 Sinai.

300 V.

301 7 Discussion

302 The interpretive analysis of the literature review shows that the failure of political Islam in Egypt caused the
303 emergence of ISIS in Egypt. Of course, the Muslim Brotherhood is an indisputable fact with ISIS, but the
304 failure of the Muslim Brotherhood was a sign for Muslim youths that political Islam leads to no destination
305 but to retrograde. In contrast, the denunciation against the Muslim Brotherhood for the emergence of ISIS is
306 extremely unreasonable. Egyptian history had witnessed the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to establish
307 a democratic state. Yet, it failed because of the military intervention in politics. The role of the Muslim
308 Brotherhood in society indicates a pertinent relationship between the movement and Egyptians. Similarly, the
309 Muslim Brotherhood grappled with the British occupation, dispatched its members for jihad against the Zionists
310 in 1948; it also participated in the January Revolution. However, the dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood
311 considered the movement as an antagonist of democracy because of its demand to establish an Islamic State.
312 Nevertheless, the political vicissitude in Egypt indicates that it is elusive to turn Egypt into Islamic State. The
313 steps to entrench a coherent Islamic State in Egypt requires the community to be fully educated Islamically. For
314 instance, the change of school curriculum: as such, teaches that Egypt is a civilian country. Without going into
315 much detail regarding the Islamic State, the alleged Islamic State by ISIS was not profoundly a State. It argues
316 that ISIS did not build school, hospitals, authorities. Their faked Islamic State was such propaganda to recruit
317 more members and instigate chaos in the Middle East.

318 During the Muslim Brotherhood government, the faced challenges were hugely more than expected. The
319 movement struggled politically to unite all the revolutionists of the January Revolution into one hand against
320 Mubarak's regime. Alas, it failed due to the discrepancy of thoughts. Ironically, the revolutionists were against
321 the Islamic project led by the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the Islamists adjured the Muslim
322 Brotherhood to proceed with the Hudud. This, of course, requires the Muslim Brotherhood to change the
323 Egyptian culture and the constitution. At least nominally, the Egyptian economy was teetering on the brink
324 of collapse. Furthermore, the Egyptian streets had witnessed a weekly demonstration demanding Morsi to step
325 down. Conclusively, proceeding with the Hudud and considering Egypt as Islamic State is a very reckless political
326 movement. It would be, undoubtedly, an ambush to incite the Egyptian streets against the Volume XXII Issue I
327 Version I 40 () literature review, the Muslim Brotherhood had practised politics since 1928, but the movement
328 was not prepared politically and socially to govern Egypt. Thus, the movement did not predict the military coup
329 and lost in the second political battle against the military after the first battle in 1954.

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