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1	The Story of Jammu and Kashmir and Interpretation of Article
2	370 of the Constitution of India
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7 Abstract

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The paper examines and analyses the history of Jammu and Kashmir (after this JK) and the Article 370 of the Constitution of India in light of recent changes brought about in Article 370 9 by the Government of India. The paper discusses the story of present JK, which began in 10 1846 with the signing of the ?Treaty of Amritsar? between the British Government and 11 Maharajah Gulab Singh. The paper reflects upon the effect of Treaty and despotic rule of 12 Dogra rulers in JK. The paper also elaborates the political situation of JK in the 1930s and 13 briefly discusses the role of Sheikh Abdullah in the conception of the idea of ?Nava Kashmir? 14 (1944) and ?Quit Kashmir? movement (1946). Next, the paper focuses on the Independence 15 of Pakistan and India (August 1947). By this time almost all major Princely States except 16 Hyderabad, JK, Junagarh and Khanate of Kalat acceded either to Pakistan or India. 17 Subsequently, the paper deals with the invasion of JK by the Pashtun Tribes, which 18

¹⁹ occasioned the accession of JK to India (October 1947).

Index terms— jammu and kashmir, instrument of accession, sheikh abdullah, article 370, presidential order, presidential declaration.

the story of present J&K, which began in 1846 with the signing of the 'Treaty of Amritsar' between the British 23 24 Government and Maharajah Gulab Singh. The paper reflects upon the effect of Treaty and despotic rule of Dogra 25 rulers in J&K. The paper also elaborates the political situation of J&K in the 1930s and briefly discusses the role of Sheikh Abdullah in the conception of the idea of 'Naya Kashmir ?? (1944) and 'Quit ??ashmir' movement 26 (1946). Next, the paper focuses on the Independence of Pakistan and India ?? August 1947). By this time almost 27 all major Princely States except Hyderabad, J&K, Junagarh and Khanate of Kalat acceded either to Pakistan 28 or India. Subsequently, the paper deals with the invasion of J&K by the Pashtun Tribes, which occasioned the 29 accession of J&K to India (October 1947). After that, the paper examines the response of India to such attack 30 and the decision to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations (January 1948). The UN intervention resulted 31 in the 'Karachi Agreement' (July 1949), which established 'Cease-Fire Line'. The paper also scrutinises the role 32 of Sheikh Abdullah in internal as well as external unification of J&K with India. The paper further deliberates 33 upon the role of Sheikh Abdullah in the drafting of Article 370 (1949) and 'Delhi Agreement' (1952). The 34 35 paper critically analyses the unceremonious sacking of the Prime Minister of J&K in August 1953, although the 36 charges against Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir Conspiracy Case were suddenly dropped in 1964. Bakshi Ghulam 37 Mohammad replaced the Sheikh as PM of J&K, who was a mere puppet in the hands of Central Government. The Bakshi facilitated the erosion of autonomy of J&K in favour of Central Government, starting with the ratification 38 of Instrument of Accession by the Constituent Assembly of the State of J&K. (Drabu, 2015) The President of 39 India issued an Order under Article 370(1)(d) in the form of the 'Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 1954' 40 (after this '1954 Order'), which superseded '1950 Order'. The paper deliberates upon the '1954 Order' in great 41 detail and its implications for people of J&K, State of J&K and India. The paper then reflects the enactment 42 and enforcement of the 'Constitution of State of J&K' and the State Assembly election in 1957. After Sheikh 43

44 was released in 1964, the PM Nehru requested him to act as a bridge between India and Pakistan to find a 45 long-lasting solution to J&K. However, these efforts I.

Beginning of the Story he story of present J&K begins on 16 th March 1846, when the 'Treaty of Amritsar', 46 which is also called as 'Sale Deed of ??ashmir', was signed between the British Government and the Maharaja 47 Gulab Singh of Jammu, by which the State of J&K was transferred to Maharaja Gulab Singh for a consideration 48 of about 7.5 million rupees. ??Jha, 2019) The British acknowledged the loyalty, closeness and help of Maharaja 49 Gulab Singh to the East India Company during Anglo-Sikh War. As a result, Maharaja Gulab Singh could strike 50 a very economical deal, which included an area of approximately 84,471 sq. Miles and a population of about 2.5 51 million. A British Army Officer Robert Thorp has exposed the inhuman nature of the Treaty in the following 52 words: (Thorp, 1870) "Towards the people of cashmere, we have committed a wanton outrage, a gross injustice, 53 and an act of tyrannical oppression, which violates every humane and honourable sentiment, which is opposed 54 to the whole spirit of modern civilization and is in direct opposition to every tenant of the religion we profess." 55 With the 'Treaty of Amritsar', began a shrewd, corrupt and ruthless reign of Dogra Rulers in J&K, where 56 despotic Hindu Kings ruled over a Muslim majority population. The 'Treaty of Amritsar' contained 10 Article 57 and was silent on how the internal administration of the State shall be carried out, as a result, it provided 58 unrestricted rights to the Dogra rulers to administer the hapless population of J&K, who had no say in 'Treaty 59 60 of Amritsar'. The 'Treaty of Amritsar' overlooked even elementary rights of the people of J&K. As a result, 61 the entire State was pushed into a chaotic economic condition, which was aggravated by religious intolerance, 62 persecution, exploitation, repression, discrimination and levy of exorbitant taxes, to recover the expenditure

resulting out of the 'Treaty of Amritsar'. The situation of people in Kashmir has been depicted by Muhammad
Iqbal below: (Iqbal, 1932) "O breeze if thy happen to go Geneva way, Carry a word to the nation of the world,
Their fields, their crops, their streams, Even the peasants in the vale, They sold, they sold all alas, How cheap
was the sale."

Article 9 of the Treaty ensured protection to the State from any external aggression by the British Government. Such protection guaranteed by the British Government ensured the Maharaja Gulab Singh to have full internal autonomy and authority. Besides above, British Troops backed the Maharaja to suppress any resistance by the natives of J&K brutally. The feudal policies of Maharaja pushed the masses towards poverty and misery, causing the emigration of over 4,000 artisans from Kashmir to Lahore. Even the British advised Maharaja to be more considerate to his population; Otherwise, it may cause the total collapse of his administration. The misrule by Maharaja caused discontent against the Dogra rulers and led to the general impoverishment of the population.

74 1 The Rise of Sheikh Abdullah

The tyrannical rule of Dogra Rulers continued unabated till the middle of the 1920s when began the first wave of 75 political awareness among the Kashmiri Muslims, which was an outcome of a ban on All-Muslim Organisations, 76 77 burgeoning labour crisis and widespread exploitative practices by the Monarch. In October 1924, a group of Kashmiri Muslims presented a memorandum to the Lord Reading to protest against the repressive rule of 78 Maharaja. Almost at the same time, the first generation of graduates from abroad returned to J&K after 79 having studied the idea of democracy, nationalism and liberty. These graduates wrote extensively against the 80 discriminatory rule of the Maharaja and formed an informal group in the form of 'Fateh Kadal Reading Room 81 Party'. One of the most prominent graduates, who returned to J&K after having completed M.Sc. in Chemistry 82 83 from Aligarh Muslim University in 1930 was Sheikh Abdullah, who intended to take up further studies in 84 the United Kingdom. Thus, applied for a scholarship to the State Government of J&K but was denied the scholarship. He took up a simple job of a School-Teacher but played a vital role of mobilising public opinion 85 against the Maharaja's oppressive and discriminatory rule. (Bhattacharjea, 2008) In 1932, Sheikh Abdullah laid 86 the foundation stone of 'Muslim Conference', which was later rechristened as 'All India J&K National Conference' 87 in 1939. The Sheikh Abdullah's leadership transformed the political movement against the Dogra Rule in J&K. 88 Sheikh Abdullah was known for his political wisdom, which is evident from the programmes and campaigns of 89 his Party to mobilise masses. The best-known example of his political prudence is 'Naya Kashmir Manifesto', 90 which was adopted by the 'National Conference' in August 1945. This manifesto was based on social, economic 91 and political equality for all including women. The manifesto advocated the way to achieve social, economic and 92 political equality is by putting an end to feudal order in J&K. In the centenary year of the 'Treaty of Amritsar', 93 94 Sheikh Abdullah launched the 'Quit Kashmir' movement against the Maharaja on 12 th May 1946 and demanded 95 the annulment of unlawful and inhumane 'Sale Deed of J&K'. The 'Quit Kashmir' movement was inspired by 96 the 'Quit India' movement (1942) by Indian Nationalist against the British Rule in India. The 'Quit Kashmir' 97 movement was condemned by the Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Muslim League, on the other hand, Jawahar Lal Nehru not only supported this movement but also reached Kashmir on 16 th May 1946 without a permit to 98 show solidarity with the movement and also fight the case against Sheikh Abdullah but Nehru was forced to 99 return without meeting Sheikh. Sheikh along with his 3 Party men was tried at Badami Bagh cantonment on 100 the charges of sedition and treason and was sentenced for nine years and was confined to jail till 30 th September 101 1947, when he was prematurely released. (Nayar, 2019) III. 102

103 2 Maharaja

¹⁰⁴ **3** Independence and Partition

After World War-II and change in the Government of Great Britain, it was announced on 20 th February 1947 105 that India should be granted independence, not later than August 1948. Upon the failure of the 'Cabinet Mission' 106 (1946), Lord Mountbatten proposed the '3 rd June Plan' of Partitioning India into India and Pakistan, which 107 was ultimately accepted by both Indian National Congress and Muslim League. To decide the status of Princely 108 States, the Indian National Congress advocated the adoption of the method of Plebiscite, which was also used to 109 determine the territories of Pakistan but the Muslim League was adamant that the decision of the Ruler of the 110 Princely State shall be final. Because of consensus over the Mountbatten Plan, the British Parliament passed 111 the 'Indian Independence Act', which shall create 2 Dominions on 15 th August 1947 by Section 1 (The new 112 Dominions) of the Act. The most controversial provision of the Act was Section 7 (Consequence of the setting up 113 of the new Dominions), which announced the lapse of suzerainty of British Empire over the Indian Princely States 114 and also lapsed of all treaties and agreement signed between British Empire or any person having authority on 115 the date of passing Act, which was 18 th IV. 116

117 4 Consolidation of India

The herculean task of consolidating India was taken up by the Home Minister Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, who was 118 ably assisted by Mr V. P. ??enon Initially, the State of Hyderabad had requested to the British Government to 119 exist as an independent Constitutional Monarch under the British Commonwealth of Nation, but the Governor-120 General of India Lord Mountbatten rejected it. The State of Hyderabad which was situated right in the middle 121 of India having no sea link or land border with Pakistan proposed a Standstill Agreement with India for one 122 year on 29 th November 1947. As the Standstill Agreement was nearing its end, Hyderabad was pushed to take 123 a call on its accession to India. However, the Nizam intended to exist as an independent state, so the political 124 125 organisation Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (MIM) recruited Razakars, who started targeting those sections of 126 the society which favoured accession to India. Observing the situation in Hyderabad, India advised the Nizam to check communal violence in the state. On 21 st August 1948, the Nizam of Hyderabad approached UN Security 127 Council (after this UNSC) under Article 35(3) of the UN Charter, claiming such a situation had arisen which 128 may affect international peace and security. When Nizam did not control the persecution of innocent minorities 129 in Hyderabad, India was left with no choice but to execute 'Operation Polo' on 13 th September 1948. The 130 Hyderabad army surrendered on 18 th September 1948, and the Nizam acceded to India. By a conservative 131 estimate, it is assumed that these Razakars killed at least 20,000-40,000 people (Sunder Lal Committee (1949)). 132 On 22 nd September 1948, the Nizam of Hyderabad also withdrew his complaint from the UNSC. (Thomson, 133 134 2013) The State of J&K was the only State which was bordering both India and Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh 135 ruled J&K, and like Hyderabad, J&K also intended to exist independently, as Switzerland of West, because 136 Pakistan was an Islamic Nation and he knew that existence of a Hindu ruler in a Muslim Nation should be difficult. India was a tough choice due to existence of Democracy in India, as he may not have similar authority 137 in India. Maharaja having royal connect with Lord Mountbatten had discussed this scheme with him as a friend 138 in July 1947. However, Lord Mountbatten advised Maharaja that the independent existence of J&K sandwiched 139 between 2 opposing nations will be a difficult proposition. Thus, Maharaja had bought some time for himself 140 by signing the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and proposed the same to India. Nevertheless, Pakistan had 141 some other plans, as it started breaching the Standstill Agreement by steadily and increasingly strangulating the 142 essential supplies like food, petrol and salt to J&K. In September 1947, Maharaja had twice offered to accede 143 to India on the condition that India respected the reservation of Maharaja against Sheikh Abdullah, but Pandit 144 Nehru refused the accession both the time. Pandit Nehru insisted that Sheikh Abdullah shall not only be released 145 but also head the popular government in J&K. The pressure from Pandit Nehru forced Maharaja to release Sheikh 146 Abdullah and his party men on 30 th September 1947. While observing the unfolding of events and the mood of 147 Maharaja, Pakistan decided to take an alternative route, where the Governor-General of Pakistan ordered Akbar 148 Khan to train Pashtun Tribal Muslims to enter and conquer whole of J&K forcefully. These Pashtun Tribal 149 Muslims, who were trained, along with Pakistani Army officials in civil dress, armed with modern weaponry 150 and supported by Pakistan State for supplies (including petrol and food) motored into J&K on 21 st October 151 1947. (Akbar Khan, 1992) These 10,000+ strong-armed men, who invaded J&K with the motive of over-throwing 152 Maharaja, called themselves 'Azad Kashmir Army'. Once they entered J&K, there was no potency in Maharaja 153 Army to defend the State against the 10,000+ strong-armed forces marching towards Srinagar. When the Muslim 154 soldiers in the Maharaja's Army joined the invaders in Uri on 23 rd October 1947, then it the Maharaja had just 155 three options. First, to try to fight back the invaders with under-equipped and low on morale Army, which will 156 157 end in defeat. Second, to watch these armed personnel to take-over the State of J&K. The third and final option 158 was to request India for help, which Maharaja did but Lord Mountbatten being the Governor-General of India was adamant that India cannot help or protect J&K till the State accedes to India, as it may cause a fullfledged 159 war which shall be detrimental for a new-born nation like India. Thus, on the eve of 26 th October 1947, when 160 Srinagar was staring at massacre the next day. Maharaja voluntarily signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 th 161 October 1947, which was unconditionally accepted late in the night of 26 th October 1947 by Lord Mountbatten. 162 (Nayak, 2019) Volume XXI Issue XV Version I 163

¹⁶⁴ 5 Kashmir Issue

Once Lord Mountbatten accepted the Instrument of Accession, the Indian Army flew early in the morning to 165 Srinagar to fight the invaders. (Schofield, 2002) Sheikh Abdullah, along with his party-men not only welcomed the 166 Indian Army at the Srinagar Airport but also helped them. Thus, the first Indo-Pak war began on 27 th October 167 1947 and extended up to 31 st December 1948. Upon the accession of J&K to India by Maharaja, the Governor-168 General of Pakistan Jinnah ordered his General to attack J&K. However, the General refused because same 169 British General Auckinlake headed both the Armies of India and Pakistan and he had been informed about the 170 accession of J&K to India. ??Pradhanmantri Series, 2013) Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not accept this accession 171 as he claimed that the accession was forced upon J&K by India. Thus, Jinnah invited Lord Mountbatten and 172 Pandit Nehru to Lahore to discuss and settle the matter amicably. However, Sardar Patel was resolute that if 173 Jinnah wants to talk, he shall come to India. On 1 st November 1947, Lord Mountbatten went to Lahore, where 174 Jinnah refused to accept the accession of J&K to India and claimed that J&K was a Muslim majority State and 175 quoted the example of Junagarh and condemned the use of power by India in J&K. Replying to Jinnah, Lord 176 Mountbatten clarified that no force was used by India in J&K to secure the accession instead the Maharaja and 177 the people of J&K requested India to accept the accession of J&K to India in the wake of the extraordinary 178 situation created because of invasion and use of brute force by the Pashtun tribe from Pakistan. Besides this, 179 Lord Mountbatten advised Jinnah to withdraw forces from J&K and play a constructive part in conducting a 180 plebiscite in peaceful conditions. (Akbar, 2017) At the same time in Kashmir, the Maharaja announce on 30 th 181 October 1947, Sheikh Abdullah shall head the emergency administration, till the war with invaders is continuing. 182 On 22 nd December 1947, India warned Pakistan to block any help provided to invaders in J&K. Otherwise, it 183 shall be forced to take pre-emptive steps. On 1 st January 1948, India submitted a Complaint to UN Security 184 Council, which placed the J&K issue before the UN with an intention that UN shall acknowledge the invasion of 185 Pakistan on J&K, to force Pakistani forces to vacate J&K and to find a final and lasting solution to the question 186 of accession of J&K to India. At the UNSC, USA & UK took a stance unfavourable to India; this saddened 187 188 Pandit Nehru. Thus, India sent a delegate to the UNSC, headed by Gopalaswami Ayyangar in February 1948. 189 On 5 th February 1948, Sheikh Abdullah addressed the UNSC and firmly supported the Government of India's 190 stance as stated in the Complaint filed against Pakistan on 1 st January 1948. He went beyond that and explained the circumstances of accession and the request from Maharaja and people of J&K to accept the accession. Not 191 only this, but he also explained that there was no need on the part of Prime Minister Nehru to assure the people 192 of J&K that upon normalisation of the situation, a plebiscite shall be conducted to determine the will of people 193 of J&K, which PM Nehru did when he visited Srinagar upon the request of Sheikh Abdullah on 13 th November 194 1947. (Noorani, 1999) After Sheikh Abdullah's address in UNSC, the signing of Instrument of Accession by 195 Maharaja was never questioned by the UN. 196

¹⁹⁷ 6 VI.

198 Constitutional Relation of J&K with India Article and explaining the reason for it, he argued that-"In the case of other Indian States, the Instrument of Accession will be a thing of the past in the new Constitution; the States 199 have been integrated with the Federal Republic in such a manner that they do not have to accede or execute a 200 document of accession for becoming units of the Republic and, in the case of practically all States other than 201 J&K, their constitutions have also have been embodied in the Constitution for the whole of India. It would not 202 be so in the case of Kashmir as the State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration due to the special conditions 203 prevailing in Kashmir." Adding to this, he further elaborated that-"In the first place there has been a war going 204 on within the limits of J&K Statepart of the State is still in the hands of the enemies, and in the second place, 205 the Government of India, have committed themselves to the people of Kashmir in certain respects. They have 206 207 committed themselves to the position that an opportunity will be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves the nature of their Constitution." (Nayyar, 2014) From the above reading of explanation given by 208 Gopalaswami Ayyangar to Constituent Assembly, it could be easily inferred that the Article was temporary. 209

On 25 ??Guha, 2007) The evolution of Constitutional relation between India and J&K is briefed in Figure 210 3. (Kapur, 2019) These agitations against 'Delhi Agreement', planted seeds of apprehension about India after 211 Pandit Nehru in the mind of Sheikh Abdullah. It is believed that this led to a change of stance by Sheikh 212 Abdullah and his meeting with Mr Adlai Stevenson, the US Presidential candidate and Chinese Prime Minister 213 Zhou Enlai was considered being an effort to negotiate independence for J&K or a shift towards Pakistan. 214 Sheikh's speeches in April and July 1953, reflected such emotions by him. (Nayyar, 2014) This culminated in 215 the sacking of Sheikh Abdullah Government on 8 th August 1953, on the ground of loss of support from his 216 217 Cabinet, even without allowing him to prove his majority on the floor of the house. On 9 th August 1953, Sheikh 218 Abdullah was arrested on the charges of 'inciting communal disharmony; fostering hostile feelings towards India 219 and treasonable correspondence with foreign powers', more commonly known as 'Kashmir Conspiracy Case'. 220 (Aslam, 2018) Sheikh Abdullah was confined to a farmhouse in Kodaikanal for more than a decade, till 8 th April 1964, when the State Government suddenly dropped all charges against him. (Noorani, 2008) Volume XXI 221 Issue XV Version I After Sheikh Abdullah was removed as Prime Minister of J&K, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, 222 who acted as an agent of Central Government replaced him. On 15 th February 1954, the Constituent Assembly 223 of J&K ratified the accession of J&K to India. On 14 th May 1954, the President of India passed the '1954 224 Order', exercising his powers under Article 370(1)(d), which majorly was based on the principles laid down in 225

the 'Delhi Agreement'. The '1954 Order' also included the controversial Article 35-A, which provided for special
privileges to the permanent resident of J&K. (Rajagopal, 2017) After enforcement of the Constitution of J&K on
26 th January 1957, the first elections for the Legislative Assembly for the State of J&K took place in March-June
1957. After the successful conclusion of the elections in J&K, the Home Minister of India Govind Ballabh Pant,
upon his visit to J&K exclaimed that-"The State of J&K is now fully a part of India. This leaves no possibility
of a plebiscite in J&K." (Singh, 2018) The political situation in J&K has been briefly elaborated in Figure 4.
(Ahmad, 2000) VII.

²³³ 7 UN Intervention in J&K

India's filed a complaint to UNSC against the tribal invasion in J&K, who were trained, helped and supported 234 235 from the Pakistani soil on 1 st The UNSC Resolution 47 is considered to be one of the most important declarations 236 by UNSC, and it laid down principles on which restoration of peace and order shall be secured in J&K and also the precondition which is required to be fulfilled by both countries for final determination of status of J&K 237 by conduction plebiscite in J&K under the auspices of UN Representative, i.e. Plebiscite Administrator. This 238 Resolution 47 was supplemented by the Resolution passed by UNCIP on 13 th August 1948, which had three 239 parts. The Part-I dealt with the Cease-Fire Order, which required both the parties to immediately order their 240 forces to cease fire and to avoid any statement or actions that may aggravate the situation. In the Part-II (Truce 241 Agreement), for the first time, the UN acknowledged the presence of Pakistani troops in J&K, which was a 242 material change from the previous situation. Section-A of Part-II required Pakistan to withdraw all tribal men 243 and other Pakistani Nationals from J&K. Upon accomplishment of this, under Section-B of Part-II, the UNCIP 244 shall inform Government of India about such withdraw and then India shall also call back additional troops 245 from J&K and maintain a minimum number of armed personnel as required to preserve law and order in J&K. 246 247 The Part-III (Plebiscite) of Resolution, declared that upon achievement of above explained two parts, the future status of J&K should be determined by the will of people of J&K through a plebiscite. permanent residents of 248 J&K under Article 35-A introduced by the '1954 Order', which was recently repealed by the '2019 Order'. Hence, 249 demand by Pakistan on international fora, again and again, to conduct a plebiscite in J&K is with no cause and 250 could be considered to be taking advantage of their own mistake. A brief timeline of UNSC resolutions passed 251 in the India-Pakistan Question w.r.t. to the complaint of India, the dispute relating to the accession of J&K to 252 India and final solution to the dispute is reflected in Figure 6. 253

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²⁵⁵ 8 Background of Article 370

As discussed above, while addressing the Constituent Assembly about Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 256 257 Gopalaswami Ayyangar explained the extraordinary situations which exit in J&K and required special provision 258 for J&K. (Thapliyal, 2019) In addition to that, internationalisation of J&K was another factor which weighed in dealing J&K differently from other Princely States. Adding to it, the repetitive promises made for the plebiscite 259 260 in J&K had complicated the whole situation. On 27 th October 1947, Lord Mountbatten wrote a personal letter to Maharaja Hari Singh, where he expressed that his Government wished to settle the question of accession of 261 J&K to India by a reference to the people of J&K upon restoration of Law and Order and to expel invaders 262 from the soil of J&K. (Chandhoke, 2014) Similarly, on 2 nd November 1947, Pandit Nehru in his All India Radio 263 address to the nation explained the reasons for accepting the accession of J&K to India and also declaring that the 264 people of J&K shall determine the fate of J&K. (Roy, 2010) Pandit Nehru reiterated this promise of conducting 265 a plebiscite in J&K in Srinagar on 13 th November 1947, when he visited J&K upon an invitation from Sheikh 266 267 Abdullah. (Soz, 2018) Pandit Nehru while reassuring the people of J&K that future of J&K shall be determined by the people of J&K and India shall accept the outcome of plebiscite even if it was against India. Such a promise 268 by Pandit Nehru is the reflection of the confidence that he had in J&K w.r.t. accession to India, as he knew that 269 Jammu and Ladakh region which was Hindu and Buddhist majority region would vote in favour of India and the 270 Muslim majority region, i.e. Kashmir shall vote in favour of India due to unimpeachable influence that Sheikh 271 Abdullah has in Kashmir and Sheikh's inclination towards India. Thus, Pandit Nehru restated the promise of 272 plebiscite in J&K on All India Radio on 23 rd December 1949. (Nayyar, 2014) In addition to above, several 273 UNSC Resolutions including UNSC Resolution 47, UNCIP Resolution on 13 th August 1948 and 5 th January 274 1949, insisted on the final determination of the status of J&K shall take place through the democratic method 275 of free and impartial plebiscite. 276

277 The issue of accession of J&K to India, geographical position of J&K sandwiched between India and Pakistan, 278 administrative problems in J&K, the internationalisation of J&K at UNSC, statements by various personalities 279 and continuance of War between India and Pakistan till 31 st December 1948, forced Constituent Assembly to 280 consider Special position for J&K in the Constitution of India, which was approved by Constituent Assembly unanimously. However at the same time, it was also ensured that Article 370 was temporary and transient 281 provision by putting it under Part-XXI of the Constitution of India, i.e. 'Temporary, Transient and Special' 282 Provisions (the term 'Special' was introduced in 1962 by 13 th Constituent Amendment Act, 1962). Moreover, 283 the short title of Article 370 also reads as 'Temporary provisions with respect to the State of J&K'. Furthermore, 284 the provision Article 370 was drafted in such a fashion, so that, the President of India along with Government 285

of J&K was empowered to determine the Constitutional relation between India and J&K, and no intervention 286 or approval of Legislature was required. As a result, Article 370 was aimed to be transitory provision until the 287 situation in J&K did not normalise, and J&K could not be treated like any other State in India. A concise 288 interpretation of Article 370 is indicated in Figure ??. Thus, the intention of the Constituent Assembly w.r.t 289 Article 370 was to provide for a makeshift arrangement for J&K in Constitution of India. (Koul, 2015) After 'Delhi 290 Understanding' in May 1949, it was agreed between the leaders of India and J&K that a separate Constituent 291 Assembly for J&K should be established for the drafting of the Constitution of J&K for the dual purpose of the 292 abolition of monarchy in J&K and also to represent the will of the people of J&K. Based on 'Delhi Understanding' 293 the General Council of National Conference passed a resolution on 27 th October 1950 for the establishment of 294 the Constituent Assembly of J&K and the Yuvraj Karan Singh proclaimed that end on 1 st May 1951 for election 295 of Constituent Assembly of J&K based on Universal Adult Suffrage. The elections for the Constituent Assembly 296 of J&K was held in September-October 1951, and the first session of Constituent Assembly of J&K was held on 297 31 st October 1951, and the Constitution of J&K was enacted on 17 th November 1956. Thus, unlike any other 298 Princely State, J&K was allowed a separate Constitution for itself due to the peculiar position as existed in the 299 State. However, the UNSC by its Resolution 91 clarified that any action that may be taken by the Constituent 300 Assembly of J&K to determine the future and affiliation of the whole of J&K would not be considered as the 301 302 final disposition of matter of J&K according to the principles of UNSC Resolutions.

³⁰³ 9 Recent Changes to Article 370

The '2019 Order' which was issued by the President of India on 5 th August 2019 and the Presidential Declaration 304 under Article 370(3) of the Constitution, 2019 which was issued on 6 th August 2019 has completely changed the 305 Constitutional relationship between India and J&K and now J&K is at par with any other territory of India with 306 no exception. Constitutional experts have a diverging opinion on the recent change to Article 370, many claimed 307 that the changes made are not only unconstitutional but is equivalent to fraud on the Constitution of India. 308 In contrast, many others claimed it to be not only constitutionally valid but also in the best interest of India 309 and J&K. Thus, it is imperative to understand how the whole constitutional process unfolded to understand the 310 constitutional validity of the technical repeal of Article 370 and the Constitution of J&K. 311

Volume XXI Issue XV Version I 32 () take place in summer of 2021 after the delimitation exercise is completed
in J&K. (Tripathi, 2019) The argument given by the Home Minister of India on the floor of Lok Sabha is that
over 70 years of Article 370 brought nothing to State except militancy, leave alone prosperity. Thus, repeal
of Article 370 shall bring a new dawn for the people of J&K, and it shall bring about development and more
employment opportunities in the State. In short-run, repeal of Article 370 requires some caution and imposition
of restriction in J&K due to fears of violent protests abated by our neighbour, but in the long run, it shall result
into an actual integration of J&K into India and bring prosperity and development for people of J&K.

 The Azad Kashmir Army reached Muzaffarabad, which is about 150 Km from Srinagar and this is where the Azad Kaashmir Government was formed on 25 October, 1947.

 The Maharaja Army was absolutely incapable of stopping these invader from marching forward and the Azad Kashmir Army reached Uri without dropping a sweat. Brigadier Rajendra Singh destroyed the only bridge which connected Uri with Srinagar, which was just 100 Km away.

 The Azad Kashmir Army was slowed down due to destruction of bridge but once they reached Barahmullah, they indulged in wanton destruction of life and property, looting, murdering and kidnapping and raping women. The population of Baramullah was reduced to 1/3 of its original numbers.

 The Azad Kashmir Army surrounded Srinagar by the evening and the Maharaja was requested by his advisor and Prime Minister Meher Chand Mahajan to sign the Instrument of Accession. The whole population of Srinagar was shivering in fear of the next day.

Figure 1: Figure 1:

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July

1947. It effectively resulted in the independence of almost 565 Princely States on 18 th July 1947. The 'Indian Independence Act, 1947', did not provide any directions or suggestions to these Princely States. Thus, Lord Mountbatten tried to supplement the Act by addressing these Princely States on 25 th July 1947, where he advised the Princes to accede to either of the 2 Dominions, i.e. India or Pakistan, keeping in mind the geographical continuity of their State to the Dominion and giving up only such powers which they had surrendered to British Empire like, Defence, Communication and External Affairs with no financial implication. By 14 th August 1947, most of the Princely States had acceded to either of the Dominion except for Hyderabad, J&K, Junagarh and Khanate of Kalat. On 12 th August 1947, the ruler of J&K, Maharaja Hari Singh proposed a 'Standstill Agreement' with both the Dominions, while he made the final decision regarding the future of his State. While Pakistan accepted the 'Standstill Agreement' on 15 th August 1947, India requested the Maharaja to send a representative for discussion. Parallelly, Pakistan became independent on 14 th August 1947 with Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its Governor-General

Figure 2: and India became independent on 15 th August 1947 with Lord Mountbatten as Governor- General, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru as Prime Minister and Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel as the Home Minister of India.

. Most of the Princely States which were geographically connected with India had acceded to India by 15 th August 1947, with notable exceptions like Junagarh, J&K and Hyderabad. (Menon, 2014) Junagarh on 15 th September 1947, acceded to Pakistan when Nawab of Junagarh Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III signed

Figure 3:

Figure 4:

Nishan?nahi

Constitutions, two heads of State, two flags?these in one State we shall not allow, not allow).

chalengejahi chalenge' (Two

Upon enforcement of

Figure 5:

	On 26 October, 1947, Maharaja signed In- strument of Accession and the first Prime Minister of J&K was Mehr Chand Mahajan, who was merely an agent	On 9 August, 1953, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was appointed as PM by Yuvraj Karan Singh	Constitution of J&K on 26 January, 1957, the first elec- tions in J&K were held in March-June, 1957, 68 out of 75 seats were won by National Con- ference and Bakshi continued as
26 Year 2021 Vol- ume XXI Issue XV Ver- sion I	of Maharaja Upon insistence from Pandit Nehru, on 30 October, 1947, Sheikh Abdullah was appointed by Maharaja as Head of Emergency Administration in J&K	On 8 August, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as PM of J&K by Yuvraj Karan Singh as he lost the confidence of his Cabinet	the PM of J&K The Kashmir Accord in Novem- ber, 1974, paved way for Sheikh Abdullah to main stream poli- tics as CM of J&K and he con- tinued as CM till his death in 1982 After the demise of
()	On 5 March, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as second PM of J&K by Ma- haraja	In Sep-Oct 1951, first elections in J&K took place to elect 75 seats Constitutent Assembly of J&K and all 75 seats were won by National Conference	Sheikh Abdullah, the political baton in J&K passed on to his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah and the era of political instability and the rise of political mili- tancy began in J&K

[Note: bring]

Figure 6:

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which provides that Legislative powers exercised by the Parliament due to President's Rule in a State would
 not cease to operate after the revocation of President's Rule but continue to be in force unless repealed, amended
 or altered by the competent Legislature.

Hence, as it stands today, the '2019 Order' has superseded the '1954 Order', and the whole of Constitution of India applies to the State of J&K with no exceptions or modifications. Besides, Article 370 has been modified to remove all three clauses and replace it with just one clause which reinforces the '2019 Order' and lays the foundation stone for complete Constitutional integration of J&K into India.

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328 .1 Conclusion

The recent changes to Article 370 of Constitution of India came to be a surprise for many Constitutional Observers, where they exclaimed that if modifying Article 370 was so easy, why did we wait so long to made these necessary change and other observers of the issue of J&K in India claimed that since the Constituent Assembly was relieved of their duties way back in 1957, therefore, the temporary provision of J&K had become permanent.

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