

The Causal Relationship between Value-Added Tax and Social Conflicts: Evidence from Mozambique

Luciano S. Gule¹

¹ Osaka University

Received: 5 April 2021 Accepted: 1 May 2021 Published: 15 May 2021

Abstract

This research examines the causal relationship between social conflicts and Value-Added Tax (VAT) in Mozambique. The study tests two hypotheses; the 'tax-burden' hypothesis which is used to evaluate the long-run relationship, and the 'tax-conflicts' hypothesis which estimates the short-run relationship between VAT and social conflicts. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is used to examine this relationship. The data used comprise the period from 1994 to 2018. The outcomes of the study suggest that the prices of goods and services included in the new VAT system had a causal relationship with social conflicts in the short-run in Mozambique; these results support the 'tax-conflicts' hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, the unsustainable tax imbalances can be mitigated by exempting or reducing the VAT of some indispensable consumption goods and services. The VECM results of long-run causal relationships suggest a bidirectional causality between VAT and social conflicts, supporting the 'taxburden' hypothesis. Under this hypothesis our finding suggests that in the long-run Mozambique's central government should design a new VAT system; expand and diversify the sources of revenue.

Index terms— vector error correction model, value-added tax, social conflicts, causality.

1 Introduction

Value-Added Tax (VAT) is considered one of the most important tools when it comes to the fiscal policy development of the last quarter of the twentieth century in many countries. It was first adopted in Europe, and subsequently, it quickly spread around the world. Many developing countries adopted VAT for many reasons, among them: budget deficit, the adhesion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1 1 Oxfam states that, "The IMF and national elites have heavily influenced tax policy in developing countries (Intriago, 2011) , and for its simplicity. But one of the most argued reasons is related to budget deficits-phenomena observed when the government expenditure surpasses its revenue. This triggered many developing countries to start using VAT as a solution to their financial problems. Within a short time, VAT became a fashionable and important fiscal policy instrument. In fact, in these developing countries, VAT has been one of the most significant tax reforms (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Another reason that has led these countries to implement VAT is related to its characteristics. Palma (2015) affirms that the success of VAT is particularly associated with its generality and neutrality, which is obtained through its invoice and subtractive methods. These characteristics make VAT a simple tax to implement and collect.

Given that VAT can be implemented and collected without an organized tax structure, it gained much success in developing countries. For instance, in Mozambique, the new VAT system was introduced in 1999, influenced by the IMF policies toward developing countries, and as a measure to improve financial stability through the increase in internal revenue collection. However, as observed in past cases, the importation of policies without looking at the local reality, in most cases, tends to generate more problems than solutions. In this case, the

2 A) THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW VAT SYSTEM IN MOZAMBIQUE

43 new VAT system in Mozambique charged at 17 percent does not fit the Mozambican economic environment;
44 indeed, it is a reproduction of the Portuguese VAT system with a minor change 2 For most of the Mozambican
45 population, the new VAT system is a burden because they belong to low-income and was designed for a political
46 and socioeconomic environment that is quite different from Mozambique; thus, new VAT system in Mozambique
47 tends to be regressive rather than a progressive tax. A tax is "regressive" when low-income people pay a
48 higher fraction of their income in taxes than wealthier (Faridy and Sarker, 2011). This influence has had a
49 negative impact in many cases, focusing on indirect regressive taxation like VAT, and extensive tax incentives
50 for companies" (Itriago, 2011).

51 3 2 VAT standard in Portugal is 23 percent standard to all good and service, with 13 and 6 percent reduced
52 on certain essential goods and service, and Portugal had GDP per capita of U\$23,462 in 2019, compared with
53 Mozambique with 17 percent and no reduction and had GDP per capita of U\$487 in 2019. 3 45 percent live below
54 the poverty line, and approximately 80 percent of employment in Mozambique is in the informal sector (World
55 Bank, 2019). group and they spend a large fraction of their income on the consumption of goods and services.
56 As a result, the Mozambican new VAT system is a regressive tax. As stated above, for a regressive tax like VAT,
57 the burden is highest for low-income households and falls sharply as household income rises (Tax Policy Center,
58 2020). When VAT is increased, two things happen. First, the prices of goods and services paid by the consumer
59 increase (Toder et al., 2012), which tends to reduce household incomes. Second, the volume of business reduces
60 ??Toder et al., 2012), leading to a decrease in jobs. In the case of Mozambique, which is a small economy based
61 on imports, the implementation of the new VAT system led to an increase in prices of goods and services and
62 consequently to an increase in the cost of living, resulting in riots, demonstrations, protests, and strikes. In this
63 research, these events are collectively referred to as social conflicts.

64 This study, inspired by the fact that after the implementation of the new VAT system there has been a
65 constant rise in the number of social conflicts, and also any fluctuation in the prices of goods and services in
66 the international markets directly affects the prices paid by the consumers in Mozambique, attempts to establish
67 a causal relationship between VAT and social conflicts. To this end, I analyze the degree of social conflicts
68 as measured by the number of participants in riots, demonstrations, protests, and strikes. I also evaluate the
69 importance of VAT as a share of total revenue, and finally, I look at government expenditure as a total amount
70 spent on capital investments. With the above in mind, I examine the causal relationships between VAT and
71 social conflicts in the short-and long-run in Mozambique.

72 2 a) The Problem of the New VAT System in Mozambique

73 According to OECD et al., (2020), taxes on goods and services charged in African countries were the main source
74 of tax revenue; in 2017, it was on average around 53.7 percent of total tax revenue, VAT contributed an average
75 of 29.4 percent, making it the most significant tax on goods and services; also 18.6 percent of tax revenue came
76 from corporate taxes and 15.4 percent recorded from individual taxes at the bottom were social insurance taxes
77 with 8.1 percent and property taxes with 1.6 percent. The same case is in Mozambique, where VAT contributed
78 an average of 70 percent of the tax on goods and services, which accounted for 36.8 percent of total revenue from
79 2000 to 2017.

80 The increase in the tax revenue seen in Mozambique at the beginning of the 21st century is due to the
81 implementation of the new VAT system in 1999, which substituted the circulation tax of 5 percent for production
82 and 10 percent retail. The new VAT system increased the economic obligations of the poor, who make up the
83 majority of the population. Although the implementation of the new VAT system has brought many benefits
84 and accelerated economic growth in Mozambique, it increased the level of economic inequalities and increased
85 the price hike mainly in imported products 4 4 According to data obtained from United Nations Conference
86 on Trade and Development When it comes to trade, for example, in 2014, Mozambique had a trade deficit of
87 more than US\$4 billion. In 2013, Mozambique imported more than twice of its exports in value. From 2007 to
88 2013, Mozambique's exports doubled from US\$2.4 billion to US\$4 billion, while imports grew faster, increasing
89 from US\$3 billion to US\$10 billion. . In African countries, which rely on VAT as the main revenue source,
90 VAT increases without policy adjustments tend to be accompanied by growing concern about its impact on
91 low-income households. As the tax increases, general commodity prices also increase. This increase means that
92 the low-income households, in particular, will tend to spend a significant portion of the income on consumption
93 of goods and services, just as the business will have to increase the total price of goods and services to adjust
94 to the VAT increase. This increase in costs can also be seen in all products affected by the VAT increase. Toder et
95 al., (2012) state that "the increase in VAT can affect the total cost of goods and services consumed by citizens
96 or it can decrease the volume of revenue from the companies; the author also found evidence that suggests that
97 VAT can be passed to consumers through higher prices, where increases in VAT can increase the price of goods
98 and services or reduce the family's real income" (Toder et al., 2012).

99 In Mozambique, a new VAT system is problematic because 45 percent of the population live below the poverty
100 line, and approximately "80 percent of employment in Mozambique is in the informal sector" (World Bank, 2019);
101 therefore, the new VAT system in Mozambique is unsustainable and does not reflect the reality of the country
102 whose majority are low-income households. In this research, I point out that due to the lack of adequacy of the
103 policy to the local reality, a new VAT system is a burden for low-income families that make up the majority of
104 the population's "tax burden hypothesis". The Tax Policy Center (2020) affirms that "VAT is more proportional

105 to income when measured as a share of income over a lifetime; because the income saved today is generally spent
106 in the future, the survey also found that for a lifetime measure of income, the burden of VAT as a part of income
107 is less for high-income families than for others because VAT does not tax returns on new capital investments”
108 (Tax Policy Center, 2020). production and 10 percent retailers to a single rate of 17 percent, with a zero rate on
109 exports., following the IMF’s policy recommendation under its stabilization program to boost the State’s income
110 revenue and financial stability through the increase of internal revenue collection and bring transparency to its
111 indirect tax system. However, the consequences are putting the country’s economic growth and political stability
112 at risk; since the adoption of the new VAT system, the level of social conflicts (Figure 1) in Mozambique due to
113 the constant rise in prices of goods and services has been increasing. The critical point is that the new VAT rate
114 is very high compared to the population’s per capita income 5 II.

115 3 Literature Review

116 , which spends the largest share of income on consumption. The new VAT system in Mozambique is responsible
117 for increasing the total cost of goods and services paid by households, the majority of whom are low-income.
118 The persistent increase of prices of goods and services affected by the new VAT system in the short-run, in my
119 viewpoint, is the main cause of the social conflicts in the last two decades, “tax conflicts” hypothesis and coincides
120 with the tax reforms implemented. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine the causal relationship between VAT
121 and social conflicts in Mozambique.

122 VAT has several benefits in developing countries. However, there is a long debate over the implementation of
123 VAT in under-developed nations. Keen and Lockwood (2007) point out that VAT has worked as a “cash machine”
124 because it helped many countries to make additional revenue that they could not get before the implementation
125 of VAT Emran and Stiglitz write that VAT becomes complicated when implemented in a country with a huge
126 informal economy; (Emran and Stiglitz 2005). Keen (2008) found out that VAT indirectly taxes the informal
127 sector because certain products sold on the informal market are taxed VAT when imported. Boadway and Sato
128 (2009) proposed that VAT advantages depend on several factors, such as the country’s ability to tax individuals
129 and companies; they also found that regressivity of VAT becomes a prominent feature particularly in low-income
130 societies.

131 Bird and Zolt (2005) were more cynical about the impact of VAT on developing countries. They found that the
132 VAT that most often replaced the border tax was much regressive than previous taxes. Boadway and Sato (2009)
133 claimed that the tax reform policies that reduced tariffs and transferred the burden to VAT were undesirable
134 from the point of view of impartiality.

135 Several studies investigating the consequences of the zero VAT rate found that the zero VAT rate was a better
136 instrument than the tax exemption (Bovenberg, 1987;Gottfried, 1991). Analyzing the adverse effects of VAT in
137 Vietnam, Giesecke and Nhi (2010) found that a uniform tax without exemptions increased the total consumption
138 with adverse distributional consequences for low-income families; they also found that the adverse distributive
139 effects of VAT could be expressly changed, at a small cost for the gain of collective. Emini (2000) analyzed the
140 introduction of a pure VAT system in Cameroon. He found that a pure VAT system tended to be more favorable
141 than cascading taxes for economic activities that supported a substantial tax burden. Emini concluded that
142 increasing tax revenue through expanding the tax base was better than increasing the VAT rate. Bahl and Bird
143 (2008), concerning the impact of VAT on revenues, affirmed that until now, VAT is seen as an essential tool for
144 a good tax system for increasing tax revenue in many countries, and one of the primary sources of revenue in
145 many countries. However, Ebrill et al. (2002) found that “the rapid increase in VAT seen in many countries in
146 the 20 th century was the most dramatic -and perhaps the most important tax development phenomena in the
147 last century. For the authors, the adoption of VAT by many countries was intended to increase state revenues,
148 trade, and control persistent budget deficits. Many African countries affiliated to IMF who had budget problems
149 saw VAT as the optimal and straightforward solution to boost their tax revenue collection; this was the case with
150 Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, and Mozambique.

151 A study conducted by Alemayehu and Abebe, about fiscal reforms in Ethiopia, found that the VAT revenue
152 collection in Ethiopia had shown a significant increase of 50 percent than the substitute sales tax since its
153 introduction. They argued that VAT collection domestically contributed 14.9 percent of their total revenue, while
154 VAT charged on imports contributed 27.1 percent. The authors attributed the significant influence of import
155 VAT to the total VAT collection in Ethiopia to its well-controlled adoption. Finally, very few researchers have
156 analyzed the lack of VAT neutrality and have comprehensively analyzed the social impact of VAT to determine
157 the best VAT model that fits low-income households in developing countries.

158 4 III.

159 5 Methodology

160 To examine the causal relationship between social conflicts and value-added tax in Mozambique, we use the
161 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). To estimate our model, we divided the methodology into three steps:
162 the first is to inspect the existence of stationarity in the variables using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit
163 Root test proposed by Dickey and Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979); Then the Johansen cointegration test was
164 performed (Johansen, 1988,????????? ?? = ?? + ?? 1 ?????????? ????? + ?? 1 ??=1 ? ?? ?? ?????????? ?????

9 A) UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS

165 $+ \alpha_1 \beta_1 = 1 - \rho_1 - \rho_2 - \rho_3 - \rho_4 - \rho_5 - \rho_6 - \rho_7 - \rho_8 - \rho_9 - \rho_{10} - \rho_{11} - \rho_{12} - \rho_{13} - \rho_{14} - \rho_{15} - \rho_{16} - \rho_{17} - \rho_{18} - \rho_{19} - \rho_{20} - \rho_{21} - \rho_{22} - \rho_{23} - \rho_{24} - \rho_{25} - \rho_{26} - \rho_{27} - \rho_{28} - \rho_{29} - \rho_{30} - \rho_{31} - \rho_{32} - \rho_{33} - \rho_{34} - \rho_{35} - \rho_{36} - \rho_{37} - \rho_{38} - \rho_{39} - \rho_{40} - \rho_{41} - \rho_{42} - \rho_{43} - \rho_{44} - \rho_{45} - \rho_{46} - \rho_{47} - \rho_{48} - \rho_{49} - \rho_{50} - \rho_{51} - \rho_{52} - \rho_{53} - \rho_{54} - \rho_{55} - \rho_{56} - \rho_{57} - \rho_{58} - \rho_{59} - \rho_{60} - \rho_{61} - \rho_{62} - \rho_{63} - \rho_{64} - \rho_{65} - \rho_{66} - \rho_{67} - \rho_{68} - \rho_{69} - \rho_{70} - \rho_{71} - \rho_{72} - \rho_{73} - \rho_{74} - \rho_{75} - \rho_{76} - \rho_{77} - \rho_{78} - \rho_{79} - \rho_{80} - \rho_{81} - \rho_{82} - \rho_{83} - \rho_{84} - \rho_{85} - \rho_{86} - \rho_{87} - \rho_{88} - \rho_{89} - \rho_{90} - \rho_{91} - \rho_{92} - \rho_{93} - \rho_{94} - \rho_{95} - \rho_{96} - \rho_{97} - \rho_{98} - \rho_{99} - \rho_{100}$
166 $?? + \alpha_1 \beta_1 = 1 - \rho_1 - \rho_2 - \rho_3 - \rho_4 - \rho_5 - \rho_6 - \rho_7 - \rho_8 - \rho_9 - \rho_{10} - \rho_{11} - \rho_{12} - \rho_{13} - \rho_{14} - \rho_{15} - \rho_{16} - \rho_{17} - \rho_{18} - \rho_{19} - \rho_{20} - \rho_{21} - \rho_{22} - \rho_{23} - \rho_{24} - \rho_{25} - \rho_{26} - \rho_{27} - \rho_{28} - \rho_{29} - \rho_{30} - \rho_{31} - \rho_{32} - \rho_{33} - \rho_{34} - \rho_{35} - \rho_{36} - \rho_{37} - \rho_{38} - \rho_{39} - \rho_{40} - \rho_{41} - \rho_{42} - \rho_{43} - \rho_{44} - \rho_{45} - \rho_{46} - \rho_{47} - \rho_{48} - \rho_{49} - \rho_{50} - \rho_{51} - \rho_{52} - \rho_{53} - \rho_{54} - \rho_{55} - \rho_{56} - \rho_{57} - \rho_{58} - \rho_{59} - \rho_{60} - \rho_{61} - \rho_{62} - \rho_{63} - \rho_{64} - \rho_{65} - \rho_{66} - \rho_{67} - \rho_{68} - \rho_{69} - \rho_{70} - \rho_{71} - \rho_{72} - \rho_{73} - \rho_{74} - \rho_{75} - \rho_{76} - \rho_{77} - \rho_{78} - \rho_{79} - \rho_{80} - \rho_{81} - \rho_{82} - \rho_{83} - \rho_{84} - \rho_{85} - \rho_{86} - \rho_{87} - \rho_{88} - \rho_{89} - \rho_{90} - \rho_{91} - \rho_{92} - \rho_{93} - \rho_{94} - \rho_{95} - \rho_{96} - \rho_{97} - \rho_{98} - \rho_{99} - \rho_{100}$
167 $?? + \alpha_1 \beta_1 = 1 - \rho_1 - \rho_2 - \rho_3 - \rho_4 - \rho_5 - \rho_6 - \rho_7 - \rho_8 - \rho_9 - \rho_{10} - \rho_{11} - \rho_{12} - \rho_{13} - \rho_{14} - \rho_{15} - \rho_{16} - \rho_{17} - \rho_{18} - \rho_{19} - \rho_{20} - \rho_{21} - \rho_{22} - \rho_{23} - \rho_{24} - \rho_{25} - \rho_{26} - \rho_{27} - \rho_{28} - \rho_{29} - \rho_{30} - \rho_{31} - \rho_{32} - \rho_{33} - \rho_{34} - \rho_{35} - \rho_{36} - \rho_{37} - \rho_{38} - \rho_{39} - \rho_{40} - \rho_{41} - \rho_{42} - \rho_{43} - \rho_{44} - \rho_{45} - \rho_{46} - \rho_{47} - \rho_{48} - \rho_{49} - \rho_{50} - \rho_{51} - \rho_{52} - \rho_{53} - \rho_{54} - \rho_{55} - \rho_{56} - \rho_{57} - \rho_{58} - \rho_{59} - \rho_{60} - \rho_{61} - \rho_{62} - \rho_{63} - \rho_{64} - \rho_{65} - \rho_{66} - \rho_{67} - \rho_{68} - \rho_{69} - \rho_{70} - \rho_{71} - \rho_{72} - \rho_{73} - \rho_{74} - \rho_{75} - \rho_{76} - \rho_{77} - \rho_{78} - \rho_{79} - \rho_{80} - \rho_{81} - \rho_{82} - \rho_{83} - \rho_{84} - \rho_{85} - \rho_{86} - \rho_{87} - \rho_{88} - \rho_{89} - \rho_{90} - \rho_{91} - \rho_{92} - \rho_{93} - \rho_{94} - \rho_{95} - \rho_{96} - \rho_{97} - \rho_{98} - \rho_{99} - \rho_{100}$
168 $?? = 1 - \rho_1 - \rho_2 - \rho_3 - \rho_4 - \rho_5 - \rho_6 - \rho_7 - \rho_8 - \rho_9 - \rho_{10} - \rho_{11} - \rho_{12} - \rho_{13} - \rho_{14} - \rho_{15} - \rho_{16} - \rho_{17} - \rho_{18} - \rho_{19} - \rho_{20} - \rho_{21} - \rho_{22} - \rho_{23} - \rho_{24} - \rho_{25} - \rho_{26} - \rho_{27} - \rho_{28} - \rho_{29} - \rho_{30} - \rho_{31} - \rho_{32} - \rho_{33} - \rho_{34} - \rho_{35} - \rho_{36} - \rho_{37} - \rho_{38} - \rho_{39} - \rho_{40} - \rho_{41} - \rho_{42} - \rho_{43} - \rho_{44} - \rho_{45} - \rho_{46} - \rho_{47} - \rho_{48} - \rho_{49} - \rho_{50} - \rho_{51} - \rho_{52} - \rho_{53} - \rho_{54} - \rho_{55} - \rho_{56} - \rho_{57} - \rho_{58} - \rho_{59} - \rho_{60} - \rho_{61} - \rho_{62} - \rho_{63} - \rho_{64} - \rho_{65} - \rho_{66} - \rho_{67} - \rho_{68} - \rho_{69} - \rho_{70} - \rho_{71} - \rho_{72} - \rho_{73} - \rho_{74} - \rho_{75} - \rho_{76} - \rho_{77} - \rho_{78} - \rho_{79} - \rho_{80} - \rho_{81} - \rho_{82} - \rho_{83} - \rho_{84} - \rho_{85} - \rho_{86} - \rho_{87} - \rho_{88} - \rho_{89} - \rho_{90} - \rho_{91} - \rho_{92} - \rho_{93} - \rho_{94} - \rho_{95} - \rho_{96} - \rho_{97} - \rho_{98} - \rho_{99} - \rho_{100}$
169 $+ \alpha_1 \beta_1 = 1 - \rho_1 - \rho_2 - \rho_3 - \rho_4 - \rho_5 - \rho_6 - \rho_7 - \rho_8 - \rho_9 - \rho_{10} - \rho_{11} - \rho_{12} - \rho_{13} - \rho_{14} - \rho_{15} - \rho_{16} - \rho_{17} - \rho_{18} - \rho_{19} - \rho_{20} - \rho_{21} - \rho_{22} - \rho_{23} - \rho_{24} - \rho_{25} - \rho_{26} - \rho_{27} - \rho_{28} - \rho_{29} - \rho_{30} - \rho_{31} - \rho_{32} - \rho_{33} - \rho_{34} - \rho_{35} - \rho_{36} - \rho_{37} - \rho_{38} - \rho_{39} - \rho_{40} - \rho_{41} - \rho_{42} - \rho_{43} - \rho_{44} - \rho_{45} - \rho_{46} - \rho_{47} - \rho_{48} - \rho_{49} - \rho_{50} - \rho_{51} - \rho_{52} - \rho_{53} - \rho_{54} - \rho_{55} - \rho_{56} - \rho_{57} - \rho_{58} - \rho_{59} - \rho_{60} - \rho_{61} - \rho_{62} - \rho_{63} - \rho_{64} - \rho_{65} - \rho_{66} - \rho_{67} - \rho_{68} - \rho_{69} - \rho_{70} - \rho_{71} - \rho_{72} - \rho_{73} - \rho_{74} - \rho_{75} - \rho_{76} - \rho_{77} - \rho_{78} - \rho_{79} - \rho_{80} - \rho_{81} - \rho_{82} - \rho_{83} - \rho_{84} - \rho_{85} - \rho_{86} - \rho_{87} - \rho_{88} - \rho_{89} - \rho_{90} - \rho_{91} - \rho_{92} - \rho_{93} - \rho_{94} - \rho_{95} - \rho_{96} - \rho_{97} - \rho_{98} - \rho_{99} - \rho_{100}$

170 Where, α_1 , β_1 , ρ_1 , and ρ_2 , are the short-run dynamic coefficient of the model's adjustment long-run
171 equilibrium; K-1 is the lag length reduced by 1; ρ_1 denotes speed of adjustment coefficient with a negative sign;
172 $??$ is the error correction term, which is the lagged value of the residuals obtained from cointegrating
173 regression of the dependent variables on the regressor; this error correction term contains information derived
174 from the long-run cointegrating relationship and $??$ denotes our residuals.

175 IV.

6 Findings and Discussions

176 To better understand the relationship between social conflicts and VAT, I summarized the variable data using
177 descriptive statistics in Table 1. Then I present a unit root test proposed by ADF, followed by the Johansen
178 cointegration test using trace and max statistics. And finally, I present the main results using the VECM model,
179 where first I present the long-run and then the short-run relationship. 1990) to see the order of cointegration.
180 And in the last, we performed the granger causality test (Granger et al., 1974), which is based on Vector Error
181 Correction Models. This test is used to determine the causality direction between the variables.

7 a) Data

182 In this research, I employ time series quarterly data covering the period from the first quarter of 1994 to the
183 fourth quarter of 2018. Variables that are used are the degree of social conflicts, which is measured by the number
184 of participants in riots, demonstrations, protests, and strikes, VAT variable which is measured as the share of
185 VAT on total revenue, and the Government Expenditure as a total amount spent on capital expenditure. The
186 degree of social conflicts was obtained from the social conflicts Africa Database (SCAD) and center for democracy
187 studies (CDS); VAT data was obtained from the Mozambique Tax Authority, and government expenditure data
188 was obtained from Mozambique Administrative Tribunal. To proceed with the estimation, I converted all of the
189 variables into a log form. "A model with a log dependent variable often more closely satisfies the assumptions
190 when logs are applied, the distributions are better behaved, and taking logs reduces the extrema in the data and
191 curtails the effects of outliers" (Woolridge, 2012).

8 b) Vector Error Correction Models

192 When using time series data, it is important to perform a stationarity test to ensure that it is stationary. If
193 the data is or not stationary, we may have spurious regression, which can mislead our results. If series are not
194 stationary, it means that data generated does not evolve around 0, meaning that they exhibit a trend. (Dickey
195 and Fuller, 1979). Thus, in this research, I used ADF to test the stationarity of the variables. ADF was used
196 because in this research there is no missing gap and also there is no significant structural break. Once found
197 that the variables are not stationary, then we can proceed with the cointegration test. In this research, I do this
198 by using the Johansen cointegration test (Johansen and Juselius 1988; Johansen 1990). This test gives us two
199 results: Maximum eigenvalue and trace statistic.

200 When two or more variables are cointegrated, it implies that there is a long-run relationship, meaning that
201 there must exist some granger causality among variables (Maddala and Kim, 1998). Hence, we can proceed using
202 the Granger-causality test to examine the nature of the relationship between variables; if they are cointegrated
203 within the first difference, the VAR model cannot be used because it can mislead the results. (Engle and Granger,
204 1987). Thus, in the cointegrated variables, there is a need to include an error-correction to examine the equilibrium
205 relationship and capture the short-run and long-run dynamics. Below is our specified VECM model, composed
206 of three variables.

9 a) Unit Root Test Results

207 The ADF test performed shows us that the variables are not stationary and levels; therefore, to make them
208 stationary; I had to take the first differencing; after taking the first difference, the data became stationary. Below
209 table 2 shows the result of the ADF stationary test. The above table shows that the absolute value of t statistics
210 in the log of social conflicts (ln (SC)) with a value 1.900 in intercept and -0.819 intercept & trend are lower than
211 5 percent critical values of -1.950 and -3.152 respectively; this tells us that we can not reject the null hypothesis,
212 meaning that the variable ln (SC) is not stationary. The same can be said regarding the log of value-added tax
213 (ln (VAT)) with t statistic of 0.548 in intercept and -0.998 in intercept & trend and a 5 percent critical -1.950 in
214 intercept and -3.452 intercept & trend; also, in the log of government expenditure (ln (GovExp)) with t statistic
215 of 3.490 in intercept and -1.863 in intercept and trend and 5 percent critical value of -1.950 in intercept and
216 -3.452 intercept & trend. This result tells us that we cannot reject the null hypothesis in this series, meaning
217 that all the series are not stationary at level. Therefore, we proceed to report the results at the first level.

222 The results from the first difference in the social conflicts ($\ln(SC)$) variable shows us that the absolute
 223 value of -6.175 intercept and -6.708 in intercept & trend in t statistics are higher than 5 percent critical values
 224 of -1.950 intercept and -3.452 in intercept & trend respectively; we can reject the null hypothesis, and accept
 225 the alternative hypothesis meaning that the variable ($\ln(SC)$) stationary. Also, both of value-added tax (\ln
 226 (VAT) and log of government expenditure ($\ln(GovExp)$) in their first difference, the t statistics are higher than
 227 critical values. Therefore, in this series, the results show that we can reject the null hypothesis when taking the
 228 first difference. The ADF test for Unit Root suggests that our series are not stationary at level, but they are at
 229 first difference. We conclude that our series is integrated with order one I (1). So, in this situation, it is necessary
 230 to perform a cointegration test to establish whether there exists a long-run relationship among our variables.

231 10 b) Cointegration Results

232 In econometrics, when the series is integrated with an order I (1), two prominent cointegration tests can be
 233 performed: the Engle-Granger cointegration test and the Johansen cointegration test. In this research, we use
 234 the Johansen cointegration test, and it is performed on the level form of our variables.

235 Before moving forward, we have to perform a lag selection test; as we know in economics, the dependence of
 236 an independent variable on a dependent variable is rarely instantaneous; Very often, the independent variable
 237 responds to the dependent variable with an interval of time, and this interval of time is called lag, there is no
 238 rule for how much lags should Volume XXI Issue V Version I

239 11 (E)

240 be chosen, but too many lags can cause a problem of serial correlation and misspecification errors, and lose a
 241 degree of freedom. To avoid these problems, in this research, I use the Akaike information criterion which best
 242 suits our model. Looking at table 3, the rank 0 with trace statistics of 45.52 is higher than the critical value of
 243 29.68; In this regard, we reject the null hypothesis. In the maximum rank one, which means that there is one
 244 cointegration in our equation in this model, here the trace of 13.99 is lower than the 5 percent critical value;
 245 Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration; The same can be said at maximum rank
 246 two where our trace statistic of 2.82 is lower than 5 percent critical value of 3.76, meaning that our equation
 247 is cointegrated rank 1 and 2. Notes: Rank 0,1,2 are respective null hypotheses, where the rank 0 means that
 248 there is no cointegration equation Table 4 presents max statistic results; The null hypothesis that we have a
 249 cointegration equation on maximum rank 0 is rejected because the max statistics of 38.23 is higher than the 5
 250 percent critical value of 20.97. But looking at the two maximum ranks, we cannot reject the null hypotheses of
 251 no cointegration because the max statistic of 5.27 is lower than the critical value of 14.07; The same conclusion
 252 can be drawn at maximum rank two, where the max statistic is 2.01 and lower than 5 percent critical value of
 253 3.76. Given the result of trace statistics and max statistics, we conclude that we reject the null hypothesis of no
 254 cointegration in our model. The above results imply that our series are related and can be combined linearly.
 255 Both maximum rank 1 and 2 agree with the hypothesis that we have more than one cointegration equation in
 256 this model. Therefore, we can proceed with estimating our three variable VECM even though the cointegration
 257 test shows two cointegrating equations (Harris 1995).

258 12 c) Results of Vector Error Correction Model for Long-run

259 Relationship Once found that our results are cointegrated, this implies that there is a long-run relationship
 260 between social conflicts, value-added tax, and government expenditure in Mozambique. Hence, we can proceed
 261 with the estimation using both long-run and short-run models. To estimate the long-run model, we will be
 262 using the VECM. VECM can be understood as a system with a vector of two or more variables, where all the
 263 variables are endogenous, and we do not have an exogenous variable. And we use VECM to examine the long, and
 264 short-run dynamics of Social conflicts, valueadded tax, and government expenditure; the VECM model restricts
 265 the long-run behavior of endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating relationship; This cointegrating
 266 term is called the error correction term.

267 The long-run relationships can be derived using Johansen normalization restriction, where the error term ϵ_t
 268 ϵ_t is generated. The below ECT equation result shows that in the long-run, VAT denoted by \logVat , with
 269 a value of -1.615, and government expenditure denoted by \logpubexp with a value of -0.479 in our results, have
 270 a positive impact on social conflicts, represented by \logScad ; and both coefficients are statistically significant
 271 and 1 percent level, which means that in the long-run, both value-added tax and government expenditure
 272 have symmetric effects on social conflicts. $\epsilon_t = [1.000 \quad -1.615 \quad -0.479] \epsilon_{t-1} + 0.479 \epsilon_{t-1} + 7.162 \epsilon_{t-1}$ Volume XXI Issue V Version I 6 (E)

273 The generalized form of the specified model, which has social conflicts as the target variable (Equation 1), can
 274 be specified as below: $\Delta SC_t = 0.006 \Delta SC_{t-1} + 0.622 \Delta VAT_{t-1} + 0.858 \Delta GovExp_{t-1} + 0.19 \Delta SC_{t-1} + 0.179 \Delta SC_{t-1}$

275 In the above equation results, the ECT (-0.179), indicates that the adjustment term is negative and statistically
 276 significant at 1 percent level; this suggests that there is long-run causality running from value-added tax and
 277 government expenditure to social conflicts. For the short-run coefficient looking at VAT with a value of 0.858
 278 and significant at 1 percent level, we can say that the new VAT system causes social conflicts, but government

281 expenditure doesn't cause social conflicts in the short-run because our coefficient is not significant. Looking at
 282 the VAT equation (Table 5) the ECT with a value -0.0762 is negative and significant at 5 percent; This denotes
 283 a convergence to long-run equilibrium, showing us that there is causality in the long-run.

284 Observing the short-run causality effects, we can infer causality from social conflicts to VAT at a 1 percent
 285 level, while for government expenditure, we cannot infer causality in the short run. And last looking and the
 286 public expenditure equation with positive and not significant ECT, we cannot infer long-run causality, meaning
 287 that in this equation, there is no convergence to long-run equilibrium. Both equation 1 and 2 with higher values
 288 of ECT denotes that the alteration fluctuating fast tells us that in the long-run, there is bidirectional causality
 289 between VAT and social conflicts in Mozambique. This result leads to the "tax-burden" hypothesis. This result is
 290 consistent with our expectation about causality between VAT and social conflicts in Mozambique. The significant
 291 implication that comes from our VECM long-run relationship result is that a continuous increase of social conflicts
 292 in the long-run causes an increase in prices of goods and services because VAT is a primary source of tax revenue.

293 Therefore, lowering the VAT on the prices of goods and services will reduce State revenue capacity, which will
 294 affect government expenditure. Again, reducing government expenditure will increase social conflicts because the
 295 government needs revenues, which are mainly composed of VAT revenue, to execute public spending. Thus, we
 296 have a vicious circle of prices of Volume XXI Issue V Version I

297 13 (E)

298 goods and services increase, social conflicts increase. Regarding government expenditure, we did not see any
 299 relationship with social conflicts or even VAT, and therefore, to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long-run, the
 300 government needs to diversify and expand its revenue system. Also, the policymakers need to design a Tax
 301 revenue system and specifically a new VAT revenue system that suits the local reality, so the VAT will not be
 302 a burden for most of the population who live in extreme poverty. Also, the government of Mozambique should
 303 encourage services that boost domestic production so that even when prices fluctuate internationally, the local
 304 impact can be minimized. And In the long-run, the policy implication suggested that there is interdependence
 305 between the increase in price on goods and services affected by VAT and the rise of social conflicts.

306 14 d) VECM and Wald Test for Short-run Causality Results

307 In this research, I test the short-run causality between the variables using the Wald test. To check causality, I
 308 use the Wald Coefficient test, which tells the direction of causality. As a criteria, we reject the null hypothesis if
 309 the probability value of chi-square is below or equal to 5 percent. The null hypothesis of this test is described
 310 below:

311 ? H 0 : no Granger-Causality ? H 1 : the null hypothesis is not true

312 In Panel 1 in table 6 looking at social conflicts as a dependent variable, the VAT with a chi-square of 3.13
 313 and probability of 0.00 and significant at 1 percent level, and here we can reject the null hypothesis meaning
 314 that VAT does granger social conflicts. The same cannot be inferred with government expenditure, which has
 315 a chi-square of 0.55 and a probability value of 0.46 and higher than 5 percent level, here we cannot reject the
 316 null hypothesis. Meaning that government expenditure does not granger social conflicts. In Panel 2, where
 317 VAT is a dependent variable to social conflicts with a chi-sq. 28.08 and probability value of 0.08, we cannot
 318 reject the null hypothesis, and we can conclude that social conflicts does not granger VAT in Mozambique in the
 319 short-run. However, looking at P-Values in panel three, both social conflicts and VAT do not granger government
 320 expenditure; in both variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which means that in the short-run, there
 321 is no causality from both social conflicts and VAT to government expenditure. Overall, looking at these results,
 322 we can conclude that there is a unidirectional causality running from social conflicts to VAT in the short-run in
 323 Mozambique. This result leads to the "tax-conflicts" hypothesis, which means that the increase in prices of goods
 324 and services affected by the new VAT system in Mozambique is the source of social conflicts in the short-run.
 325 To control social conflicts in the short run, the government of Mozambique should exempt or reduce VAT on
 326 essential goods and services, such as cereals (especially rice, maize, and wheat) and fuel, which are crucial for
 327 low-income households.

328 15 V. Conclusion and Policy Implications

329 The present research aimed at studying the relationship between VAT and social conflicts in the short and
 330 long-run in Mozambique from 1994 to 2018.

331 For that purpose, I used two hypotheses, "tax burden" and "tax conflicts." The study was motivated by the
 332 fact that the oscillation in prices in the international market affected the goods and services included in the new
 333 VAT system within the Mozambican market. However, even with this relationship, there has never been any
 334 study that looked at the social implications. This study filled the gap in the research I used econometric analysis
 335 to understand the short and long-run relationship between VAT and social conflicts using VECM models. From
 336 this model I concluded that in the long-run, there is a bidirectional relationship between social conflicts and VAT,
 337 the Volume XXI Issue V Version I 8 (E)

338 results described above show that social conflicts triggered an increase in the prices of goods and services
 339 included in the new VAT system and vice versa. These results supported our "tax-burden" hypothesis. while in

340 the short-run, the results show a unidirectional relationship, running from VAT to social conflicts. This result
 341 substantiated the "tax-conflicts" hypothesis. From these results, it can be said that to contain social conflicts
 342 in the short-run, the government of Mozambique should exempt or reduce the VAT rate on essential goods and
 343 services, such as cereals and fuel, which are crucial for low-income households.

344 A policy implication drawn from this study is that, in the long-run, to contain social conflicts, the government
 345 should design a new VAT system that is adapted to the local socio-economic conditions, which comes with
 346 adjustment programs for low-income households, so that VAT will not be regressive. In addition, the government
 347 of Mozambique should encourage services that boost domestic productions so that even when prices fluctuate
 348 internationally, the local impact will be minimized.

349 Similarly, the government of Mozambique should seek to expand its tax base. VAT should not be seen as a
 350 substitute for other taxes, such as income tax or property tax. Further, the Mozambican government should
 351 move to the formal economy. By making these changes, the government will increase the sources of revenue to
 execute the government expenditures essential to contain social conflicts. ^{1 2 3}




Figure 1: Figure 1 :

1

Variables	Mean	SD	CV	Min	Max
social conflicts	8.200	1.101	0.134	5.704	9.798
value-added tax	3.744	0.403	0.108	2.933	4.331
government expenditure	19.710	0.785	0.039	18.360	20.973

Figure 2: Table 1 :

352

¹According to world bank development indicators, In 2019 the GDP per capita of Mozambique was \$487.

²Year 2021 © 2021 Global JournalsThe Causal Relationship between Value-Added Tax and Social Conflicts: Evidence from Mozambique

³© 2021 Global JournalsThe Causal Relationship between Value-Added Tax and Social Conflicts: Evidence from Mozambique

2

Variable	Specification	Z(t)	5% critical value
ln(SC)	Intercept	1.900	-1.950
	Intercept & trend	-0.819	-3.152
? ln(SC)	Intercept	-6.175	-1.950**
	Intercept & trend	-6.708	-3.452**
ln(VAT)	Intercept	0.548	-1.950**
	Intercept & trend	-0.998	-3.452
? ln(VAT)	Intercept	-6.976	-1.950**
	Intercept & trend	-7.246	-3.452**
ln(GovExp)	Intercept	3.490	-1.950
	Intercept & trend	-1.863	-3.452
? ln(GovExpS)	Intercept	-7.876	-1.950**
	Intercept & trend	-8.429	-3.452**

Note: ** denotes significance at 5 percent.

Figure 3: Table 2 :

3

Maximum Rank	Trace statistic	5% critical value
0	45.52	29.68
1	13.99	15.41
2	2.82	3.76

Notes: Rank 0,1,2 are respective null hypotheses, where rank 0 means that there is no cointegration equation at 5 percent level.

Figure 4: Table 3 :

4

Maximum Rank	Max Statistic	5% critical Value
0	38.23	20.97
1	5.27	14.07
2	2.01	3.76

Figure 5: Table 4 :

5

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables		
	?Social Conflicts	?VAT	?Gov Exp
?SC (-1)	-0.622*** (0.0911)	-0.248*** (0.0556)	-0.105* (0.0628)
?SC (-2)	0.259** (0.102)	0.0576 (0.0732)	-0.225*** (0.0782)
?VAT (-1)	0.858*** (0.216)	0.0144 (0.0623)	-0.0386 (0.149)
?VAT (-2)	0.251 (0.182)	-0.0407 (0.132)	0.265** (0.125)
?Gov Exp (-1)	0.197 (0.148)	0.0869 (0.111)	-0.0487 (0.102)
?Gov Exp (-2)	0.0168 (0.148)	-0.0483 (0.0905)	-0.166 (0.102)
ECT (-1)	-0.179*** (0.0584)-		
ECT (-2)		-0.0762** (0.0356)	
ECT (-3)			0.0419 (0.0403)
Constant	0.00626 (0.0164)	0.00212 (0.0100)	0.0305*** (0.0113)
Observations	97	97	97

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, *, **, *** denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent.

Figure 6: Table 5 :

6

Excluded	Chi-sq	DF	Probability
?VAT	3.13		0.00
?Gov Exp	0.55		0.46
Panel 2 Dependent Variable ?VAT			
Excluded	Chi-sq	DF	Probability
? social conflicts	24.08	22	0.08
?Gov Exp	0.74		0.39
Panel 3 Dependent Variable ?Gov Exp			
Excluded	Chi-sq	DF	Probability
? social conflicts	0.59	2	0.44
?VAT	0.89	2	0.34

Figure 7: Table 6 :

- 353 [Emini ()] ‘Analyse de L’incidence d’une TVA Imparfaite à L’aide d’un Modèle Calculable d’Equilibre Général:
354 Application au cas Camerounais’. C A Emini . *Cahier de Recherche CREFA* 2000. (0006) . Université de Laval
- 355 [Engle and Granger ()] ‘Cointegration and Error-Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing’. R F
356 Engle , C W Granger . *Econometrica* 1987. 55 (2) p. .
- 357 [Dickey and Fuller ()] ‘Distribution of the Estimates for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root’. D A
358 Dickey , W A Fuller . *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 1979. 74 p. .
- 359 [Gottfried and Wiegard ()] ‘Exemption Versus Zero Rating: A Hidden Problem of VAT’. P Gottfried , W
360 Wiegard . *Journal of Public Economics* 1991. Elsevier. 46 (3) p. .
- 361 [Bovenberg ()] ‘Indirect Taxation in Developing Countries: A General Equilibrium Approach’. A L Bovenberg .
362 *IMF Staff Papers* 1987. 34 (2) p. .
- 363 [Maddala and Kim ()] G S Maddala , I Kim . *Unit Roots, Cointegration, and Structural Change*, (Cambridge)
364 1998. Cambridge University Press.
- 365 [Johansen and Juselius ()] ‘Maximum Likelihood and Inference on Cointegration: with Applications to The
366 Demand for Money’. S Johansen , K Juselius . *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 1990. 52 (2)
367 p. .
- 368 [Giesecke and Nhi ()] ‘Modeling Valueadded Tax in the Presence of Multi-production and Differentiated Exemp-
369 tions’. J A Giesecke , T Nhi . *Journal of Asian Economics* 2010. 21 (2) p. .
- 370 [Palma ()] ‘O Sistema De Iva Em Moçambique: Adoção E Características Gerais’. C C Palma . *Nomos: Revista.*
371 *do Programa Pós-Graduação em 2015.*
- 372 [Emran and Stiglitz ()] ‘On selective indirect tax reform in developing countries’. M S Emran , J E Stiglitz .
373 *Journal of Public Economics* 2005. 89 (4) p. .
- 374 [Boadway and Sato ()] ‘Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with An Informal Sector’. R Boadway , M Sato .
375 *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 2009. 1 p. .
- 376 [Intriago ()] *Owning Development: Taxation to Fight Poverty*, D Intriago . 2011. Oxford: Oxfam Research.
- 377 [Faridy and Sarker ()] ‘Progressivity of Value Added Tax in Developing Countries: Empirical Evidence from
378 Bangladesh’. N Faridy , T Sarker . *Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin* 2011. 17 p. .
- 379 [Bird and Zolt ()] *Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of The Personal Income Tax in Developing*
380 *Countries*, R M Bird , & E Zolt . 2005. Atlanta, Ga: Georgia State University Press.
- 381 [Oecd ()] *Revenue Statistics in Africa*, Auc Oecd , Ataf . 2020. 2020. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- 382 [Granger and Newbold ()] ‘Spurious Regressions in Econometrics’. C W Granger , P Newbold . *Journal of*
383 *Econometrics* 1974. Elsevier. 2 (2) p. .
- 384 [Johansen ()] ‘Statistical analysis of cointegrating vectors’. S Johansen . *Journal of Economic Dynamics and*
385 *Control* 1988. 12 (2-3) p. .
- 386 [Bahl and Bird ()] ‘Tax policy in Developing Countries: Looking Back -And Forward’. R W Bahl , & R Bird .
387 *National Tax Journal V* 2008. 2 p. .
- 388 [Ebrill et al. ()] *The Allure of Value Added Tax. Finance and Development Quarterly Magazine of IMF*, L M
389 Ebrill , J Keen , V Bodin , Summers . 2002. 39.
- 390 [Keen and Lockwood ()] ‘The Value-Added Tax: Its Causes and Consequences’. M Keen , B Lockwood . *Journal*
391 *of Development Economics* 2007. 92 (2) p. .
- 392 [Harris ()] *Using Cointegration Analysis in Econometric Modelling*, R Harris . 1995. London Prentice Hall.
- 393 [Keen ()] ‘VAT, Tariffs, and Withholding: Border Taxes and Informality in Developing Countries’. M Keen .
394 *Journal of Public Economics* 2008. 92 p. .