

1 Higher Education Policies in Brazil: From a Foreign Policy 2 Strategy to the Dismantling

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8 **Abstract**

9 Brazil moved from the most dynamic period in its educational policies during Lula's period
10 (2002-2010) and Rousseff's government (2011-2016) to their dismantling by Michel Temer's
11 (2016-2018) and Jair M. Bolsonaro's governments. By employing a comparative analysis, we
12 argue that, during the PT's governments, there was a convergence between foreign policy and
13 domestic development goals. The overall goal was to combine both economic prosperity and
14 welfare policies. In Temer's and Bolsonaro's governments, the education sector has suffered
15 from budget cuts and termination of international programs. Despite a lack of clear purpose
16 in Bolsonaro's government decision-making, we have seen a noticeable denial-driven setback
17 in education policies.

18

19 **Index terms**— higher education; foreign policy; brazil.

20 **1 Introduction**

21 From 2003 to 2011, Brazil experienced the most remarkable economic growth since its transition to democracy
22 in 1985. The victory of former factory worker Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from the Worker's Party (PT) in the
23 2002 presidential elections represented a historic milestone in Brazilian democracy, inaugurating a period marked
24 by economic prosperity and social inclusion. PT governed the country until 2016, when Dilma Rousseff, the
25 first woman elected president in Brazil, was removed from office in a controversial impeachment process (Singer,
26 2018). The brief but troubled government led by Vice President Michel Temer represented a decisive step away
27 from the previous model, as he pursued a neoliberal agenda. The dismantling of reforms that occurred during
28 the PT years continued with the election of the far-right Jair Bolsonaro as president in late 2018. Elected on the
29 basis of an anti-PT and anti-left discourse, Bolsonaro has sought to undermine the path traced by the previous
30 governments. Such is the political basis that underlies the analysis of higher education policies and education
31 internationalization efforts, which is the subject of this paper.

32 Higher education policies were also part of the foreign policy agenda, as the PT's governments aimed to
33 increase universities' internationalization through international cooperation and the creation of universities that
34 specifically aimed to promote regional integration. The pluralization of Brazilian foreign policy was a noticeable
35 feature of Lula's agenda, which included diversified policy issues and an increasing number of state and non-
36 state actors (Cason & Power, 2009). Among the new issues on the foreign policy agenda, higher education
37 programs stood out: the emphasis on South-South relations became intertwined with the goal to promote social
38 and economic development. In this sense, amplifying social access to public universities and promoting Science
39 and Technology (S&T) policies which relied heavily on public universities in Brazil became a sensitive aspect of
40 the foreign policy agenda.

41 Brazil shifted from the most dynamic period of educational policies in Lula's period (2002-2010) that remained
42 and were amplified in Rousseff's government (2011-2016) to Bolsonaro's government which has taken the opposite
43 direction. On the one hand, between 2003 and 2016 the PT's governments created 18 universities, 422 technical

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44 schools, and 173 new campuses. In this period, 7.1 million young people were admitted to Brazilian universities.
45 On the other hand, Temer's government approved a 30% budget cut for the 63 federal universities under
46 Constitutional amendment n.95/2016. Today, Bolsonaro leads an era of "scientific denialism" and moralism,
47 culminating in a possible loss of countless scientific education and research institutions (Leher, 2019).

48 The radical changes experienced by the national politics reflected directly on the educational policies. But
49 in what way? The objective of this article is to understand how Brazilian political changes in the analyzed
50 period between 2007 and 2019 affected higher education policies, emphasizing universities' internationalization.
51 Likewise, it aims to identify similarities and differences between four political periods and understand the reason
52 for this dramatic change of direction in Brazilian educational policies.

53 The article argues that, during the PT's governments, there was a convergence between foreign policy and
54 domestic development goals. The overall goal was to promote development, combining both economic prosperity
55 and welfare policies. The increase of offer in education was inserted in the welfare logic. Particularly, higher
56 education policy was considered key to achieving social inclusion and industrial development, especially in
57 Rousseff's government. At the same time, the educational policies were reflected in the foreign Marcela Vitarelli
58 Batista ? , Roberta Rodrigues Marques da Silva ? & Thais Ferreira Rodrigues ?

59 2 Methodology

60 We pursued a comparative analysis, conducting bibliographical research of the most prominent authors in
61 the contemporary domains of Brazilian Political Science, Brazilian Foreign Policy, and Brazilian Political
62 Economy. We analyzed political speeches, official documentation, and the budget data available from the "Portal
63 Transparência" (Transparency Portal) -the government platform dedicated to making all expenditures of the
64 federal government public.

65 The paper is organized by presidential administrations in the following time sequence: Luiz Inácio Lula da
66 Silva second term ?? (2007-2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Michel Temer (2016-2018), and Jair Messias
67 Bolsonaro (2019-). First, we conduct an analysis of the foreign policy matrix 2 as it is essential to understand the
68 central role of education in certain foreign policy periods, specifically, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff. We also
69 highlight how this relationship was broken during later governments. Finally, we highlight the most important
70 public education policies associated with each government. The result is a broad comparative table detailing
71 policy in every studied period.

72 We argue that, during the PT's governments, educational policies were a priority and, more importantly, a part
73 of the foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, during Michel Temer's and Jair M. Bolsonaro's governments,
74 the education sector suffered budget cuts and lost its importance. Therefore, a progressive dismantling of higher
75 education policies in Brazil is evident, with a particular impact on the internationalization of the country's
76 universities. a) Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2007-2010): a step forward i. Autonomy, multilateralism, and South-
77 South cooperation The idea of becoming an international and regional power is historically rooted in Brazil's
78 political agenda. According to Soares Lima and Hirst (2010: 21), "since the early years of the twentieth century,
79 Brazil's major foreign policy aspiration has been to achieve international recognition in accordance with its belief
80 that it should assume its 'natural' role as a 'big country' in the world affairs". Therefore, since its military
81 period (1964-1985), Brazil aimed to consolidate its role as a new economic power, but it was only during the
82 1990s, through Mercosur, that an effort was made to establish macroeconomic openness and regional integration.
83 From 2002, Lula da Silva's active foreign policy, taking advantage of a favorable external economic situation,
84 achieved a large part of these leadership ideals.

85 Under the command of a diplomat Celso Amorim, foreign policy was defined by the search for autonomy,
86 increasing the Brazilian presence as a global actor based on the logic of multilateralism through South-South
87 strategic relations. The focus on South American and Latin American relations was clearly mentioned in Lula's
88 inaugural speech: "The highest priority of the foreign policy in my government will be the construction of a
89 politically stable, prosperous and united South America based on democratic ideals and social justice. For this,
90 a decisive action to revitalize Mercosur is essential, [as it has been] weakened by the crises of each of its members
91 and often by narrow and selfish views of the meaning of integration. [...] We will deepen relations with major
92 developing nations: China, India, Russia, South Africa, among others" (FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2003) In the
93 context of the "autonomy for diversification" strategy (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2011), Brazil sought the reduction
94 of economic asymmetries with world powers, forming alliances with developing countries, non-traditional partners,
95 and regional alliances, as well as prioritizing South-South cooperation. Therefore, Brazil pursued more balanced
96 gains among parties, avoiding a hierarchy of domination common in the Northern countries. Unasur was conceived
97 as an institution with strong guidelines, focusing in particular on regional defense, developmentalism, and
98 democracy. Largely created as a result of the Brazilian geopolitical design, Unasur reflected Brazil's search
99 for autonomy and its willingness to become a regional and global player (Sanahuja, 2012).

100 The creation of BRICS in 2009 is also worth mentioning for the purposes of this argument. By the end of its
101 first summit in Russia, the group released the joint statement of the BRIC countries' leaders. The document,
102 endorsed by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, attempted to promote the G20 summit's decisions in dealing with
103 the financial crisis of 2008, fostering cooperation, policy coordination, and political dialogue. The second BRIC
104 summit held in Brazil underlined the countries' "support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world based
105 on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision making

106 of all States" (2nd BRIC Summit -Joint Statement, 2010). Due to the important differences of the member
107 countries and the nonbinding legal character of decisions, the bloc has had limited scope since the beginning
108 (Stuenkel, 2017). Aligned with the universalist and autonomist characteristics of Lula's foreign policy, the BRIC
109 group was a counterbalancing attempt to promote new power alliances based on non-occidental cooperation.

110 The emphasis on South-South cooperation paved the way to the pluralization of foreign policy topics.

111 Middle-income countries face similar development-related challenges in a multiplicity of policy areas, such
112 as education. In this sense, the welfare policies implemented by Lula's government domestically would soon
113 be considered fundamental to the building of strong international leadership. Brazil obtained unprecedented
114 prestige in the international arena, emphasized by the defense of sovereignty and national interests (Louback,
115 2016). South-South cooperation flourished around central developmental policies, including policies on higher
116 education.

117 ii. Educational Public Policies: strong steps The Brazilian higher education landscape is characterized by an
118 imbalance in the system, with a high percentage of underqualified private universities and, for a long time, a
119 dubious student selection system in public universities. According to Benincá and Pereira (2016), "the Brazilian
120 university, like all of Latin America, has always been based on meritocratic and individualistic criteria, which
121 disregard social stratification and antagonistic structural conditions". Therefore, the main challenges are, on
122 the one hand, the universalization and democratization of access to higher education, and on the other hand,
123 the improvement of quality and internationalization. That said, the most dynamic period for Brazilian higher
124 education since the 1985 democratization occurred during Lula's rule. His government focused on the expansion
125 of public institutions. Public policies were designed to expand and geographically internalize 3 higher education,
126 as well as to promote the inclusion of socially, ethnically, and territorially marginalized students. Brazil, "an
127 incomplete elementary education country, started to conceive that the historically marginalized population could
128 partially be seen on university desks" (Martinez, 2018: 6).

129 According to Almeida de Carvalho (2014):

130 "?the difficulties of the poorest social class in accessing this [higher] educational level and, although the
131 barriers to entry could be overcome, the government's perception that the main challenge was the permanence of
132 those socially vulnerable student in the face of high spending in private establishments. (?) Lula's] governmental
133 agenda was redirected in order to significantly increase [the number of] places at public universities, especially in
134 the federal segment".

135 The Program of Support for Restructuring Plans and Expansion of Brazilian Federal Universities (REUNI
136 -Programa de Apoio a Planos de Reestruturação e Expansão das Universidades Federais) 4 , instituted by decree
137 no 6.096 of 24 th April 2007, relied on the strategic role of the universities, especially the public ones, in promoting
138 economic and social development. The policy had as its starting point the assessment that "the net education
139 rate of Brazilian higher education was very low and far from the target of 30% 5 proposed by the National
140 Education Plan (PNE 2001-2010)" (Almeida de Carvalho, 2014).

141 The expansion of the Federal Higher Education Network began in 2003 with the interiorization of federal
142 university campuses. Thus, the number of cities with federal universities increased from 114 in 2003 to 237 by
143 the end of 2011. The universities created had multicampi structures and, not infrequently, were installed in
144 municipalities that had never before hosted higher education institutions (Brackmann 2010; Martinez, 2018).

145 In his inauguration ceremony, Lula da Silva affirmed: "We managed to take federal universities and professional
146 education schools from the capitals to the inland" (Lula da Silva 2010 6). On the same day, Fernando Haddad,
147 then Minister of Education, concluded that the expansion of the federal network changed the life of the Brazilian
148 people, saying that "the population now understands the true meaning of education, which is the emancipation
149 of the individual".

150 From 1909 7 to 2002, 140 federal technical schools were created in Brazil. After the implementation of REUNI,
151 342 new institutions were established. Fourteen new federal universities were created between 2003 and 2010
152 with the purpose to interiorize public higher education. Other four-University for International Integration
153 of the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony (UNILAB), Federal University of Western Pará (UFOPA), Federal University
154 of Latin American Integration (UNILA), and Federal University of Southern Border (UFFS) were planned for
155 the regional and international integration (MEC, 2010 8). These new universities were strategically disposed
156 across the national territory from the Amazon region to southern Brazil. Two of these universities were given an
157 international vocation and specific mission -the Federal University for the Integration of Afro-Brazilian Lusophony
158 (UNILAB) based in Redenção, in Ceará, and the Federal University for Latin American Integration (UNILA) in
159 Foz do Iguaçu, Paraná. Between 2007 and 2012, the restructuring expansion occurred, increasing the numbers
160 of student places in 59 universities. Also, in the same period, the number of enrollments in HEIs grow 46%.

161 The REUNI also guaranteed financial support for the growth of the number of places, existing courses, or new
162 courses. In return, universities should improve their performance indicators, such as student/teacher ratio, as
163 well as dropout and enrollment rates (Trombini et al 2020). In the period between 2003 and 2011, there was an
164 increase of 111 % in the offer of places in oncampus undergraduate courses in federal institutions. The growth of
165 91,655 places in the period from 2007 to 2011, going from 139,875 places in 2007 to 231,530 in 2011 (Trombini
166 et al 2020), is particularly noteworthy.

167 The creation of new universities materialized in the direction of the foreign policy adopted by Amorim, fulfilling
168 an important role in accomplishing the objective of promoting regional integration. In Lula da Silva's government,

3 B) DILMA ROUSSEFF (2011-2014/ 2016): RESTRAINT IN CONTINUITY I. ROUSSEFF'S FOREIGN POLICY

169 the African coastal countries were placed among South-South strategic priorities (Almeida, 2015). UNILAB had
170 the mission to promote human resources to contribute to integration between Brazil and other member countries
171 of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, especially in Africa, including Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-
172 Bissau, Mozambique, St Thomas and Prince, as well as Portugal and East Timor. UNILAB proposes to promote
173 regional development and cultural, scientific, and educational exchange.

174 UNILA, created in 2010 had the mission to establish a clear relationship between the university and Mercosur,
175 as well as with the Latin American integration project. At the moment of its foundation, it aimed to create
176 10,000 places for undergraduate and graduate students from Brazil and the neighboring countries (Almeida,
177 2015; Brackmann 2010).

178 Along with the growing number of public universities, Lula's government also aimed to promote social inclusion
179 by facilitating access and permanence in the universities. In order to achieve the first goal, the Unified Selection
180 System (SiSU -Sistema de Seleção Unificada) was established, allowing students to apply to institutions in various
181 states of the country only using the National High School Exam (ENEM) 9 score. This way, SiSU allowed an
182 increase in the center-periphery flow and the democratization of higher education in Brazil. It gave more options
183 of the universities to apply to a larger group of students with a range of financial backgrounds from small and
184 medium cities. As a result, the number of students enrolled in public universities jumped from 3 million in 2005
185 to 5,5 million in 2011 10 .

186 In addition to access, universities were also able to expand their actions aimed at the permanence of students
187 Diagram 01: The expansion of budget from the Ministry of Education Though the expansion of public universities
188 was substantial, finishing the narrative at this point would tell only part of the story. The private higher
189 education system also experienced a massive expansion during Lula's government. Historically, private universities
190 constitute most of the offer in the country's higher education. In 2007, two-thirds of Brazilian students were
191 enrolled in private institutions (Marques, 2018). In 2017, there were 296 public institutions, against 2,152 private
192 ones.

193 Lula boosted private higher education institutions through public financing of student debt. He focused on
194 "Brazilians who do not hold higher education degrees, whose monthly income per family does not exceed the
195 value of up to 1 (one) minimum wage and 1/2 (half)" ??Brasil, 2005 12). In this sense, the program aimed to
196 expedite the inclusion of socially neglected students in private institutions (INEP, 2017) 13 .

197 In 2008, by Law no. 11.892, Lula's government created the Federal Network for Professional, Scientific
198 and Technological Education 14 . As ambitious as REUNI, the Federal Network was aimed at the expansion
199 and geographical internalization of professional federal institutions. These higher education institutes provide
200 technical-level qualifications and several basic-level courses in the industry and service areas. The expansion
201 of the education system during the PT's government was outstanding: there were created 38 federal institutes,
202 two new Federal Technological Education Centers (CEFET), the Federal Technological University of Paraná
203 (UTFPR), 22 technical schools linked to federal universities, and the Colégio Pedro II high school.

204 According to Marques (2018:2), the expansion of the higher education network was outstanding. In 1996 there
205 were 922 higher education institutions (HEIs), 211 of which were public (23%) and 711 private (77%), with a
206 total of 1,868,529 students enrolled. In 2005, the total number of HEIs rose to 2,165 with 231 public (10.7%)
207 and 1,934 private (89.3%) institutions. In the same year, the ratio was the following: from a total of 4,453,156
208 students, 1,192,189 (26.77%) were in the public sphere and 3,260,967 (73.23%) in the private sphere. In 2011
209 (the first year of Rousseff term), there were 284 public HEIs and 2,081 private ones, a legacy left by the Lula
210 administration. Finally, there was a total of 6,739,689 students enrolled in private and public institutions. Below,
211 we present a diagram showing the increase of HEIs during Lula's government:

212 Source: Elaborated by author, Marques 2018.

213 Diagram 2.0: The expansion of the higher education institutions during Lula's government However, the
214 expansion of higher education was not exempt from criticism. On the one hand, critics highlighted the fact
215 that the REUNI allowed hiring of a limited number of teachers and technical-administrative personnel, which
216 was below the necessities. On the other hand, in the private sector, higher educational institutions, notably
217 smaller ones, lacked systematic research, which might have put its graduates at a competitive disadvantage in
218 the job market (Louback, 2016:62). Silva (2017:9) calls the expansion of private higher education a "fast delivery
219 diploma" with the objective of "increasing public education through distance learning programs".

220 In summary, during Lula's period, higher education was a tool to promote foreign policy, especially regional
221 integration, as well as a drive to promote social programs. Lula ended his government with one of the highest
222 popular approval rates in Brazilian democratic history, estimated at 87% 15 . Unlike other governments in
223 the region, like Bolivia and Venezuela, despite his popularity, Lula knew how to respect democracy and the
224 alternation of power. Lulism ended with the transfer of Lula's political support leading to the election of his
225 successor, President Dilma Rousseff.

226 3 b) Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014/ 2016): restraint in continuity 227 i. Rousseff's Foreign Policy

228 The foreign policy in Rousseff's government followed the same matrix as did Lula da Silva's government. Still,
229 there were some adjustments based on the management style and the changing international environment.

230 Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Chancellor Higher Education Policies in Brazil: From a Foreign Policy Strategy
231 to the Dismantling from January 2011 to August 2013) maintained the same government objectives as Lula
232 da Silva: development through the diversification of commercial partners in the South-South model and the
233 affirmation of Brazil as a global actor. South America was kept as a priority on the Brazilian external agenda.
234 However, the persistence of the international economic crisis and political instability were defining factors in
235 constraining Brazil's actions and limiting its international leadership (Bastos & Hiratuka, 2020). Some authors
236 suggest that Rousseff's foreign policy was different from Lula's since she was less active (Cornetet, 2014). Others
237 believe Rousseff's administrative profile and view of international politics was not the same in terms of the
238 international projection of Brazil in comparison to that of Lula. Moreover, it is mentioned by some critics that
239 she prioritized internal politics over external (Stuenkel, 2017; Cornetet 2014; Louback, 2016).

240 Nevertheless, it was during Rousseff's government that several cooperation projects expanded and flourished.
241 Rousseff reinforced integration projects such as Mercosur (supporting the suspension of Paraguay after the
242 institutional coup against Fernando Lugo in 2012 and Venezuela's accession to the bloc), Unasur, CELAC
243 and BRICS. In 2011, the BRIC group incorporated South Africa. Now BRICS, the bloc gained a global
244 approach, including the African continent. The economic cooperation was reinforced by the creation of the
245 BRICS Investment Bank. With the capital of USD 50 billion, the bank would promote strategic action in several
246 areas including higher education research.

247 According to Muhr and Azevedo (2019), education was mentioned twice in the BRICS annual summit
248 statements: in 2009 and 2013. Nevertheless, the intra-BRICS educational cooperation developed after the first
249 meeting of the BRICS Education Ministers in Paris in November 2013. This meeting happened at the 37th
250 session of the UNESCO General Conference. The BRICS' agenda sought to highlight the relevance of education
251 as an imperative dimension in South-South cooperation. The objectives were directed toward "inclusive and
252 equitable quality education" and "lifelong learning opportunities for all"; moreover, education was a "political
253 project for emancipation, liberation, and a political-economic independence" (Muhr and Azevedo, 2019).

254 Though Rousseff kept a low profile in foreign policy, it is noteworthy that her government not only maintained
255 Lula's foreign policy agenda focus on development and welfare promotion but also highlighted education as a
256 central policy issue. If Lula had inaugurated the pluralization of foreign policy agenda and the pursuit of social
257 inclusion in the domestic arena, it was Rousseff government that promoted the marriage between foreign policy
258 and higher education.

259 4 ii. Expansion and Continuity in Education

260 Rousseff continued Lula's project of higher education expansion, aiming to increase the number of universities,
261 remove barriers to the entry of marginalized students, and promote higher education institutions' internationalization.
262

263 During her government, four new federal universities were created in the poorest North and Northeast regions,
264 in areas with no public higher education institutions: UFESBA and UFOB in the south and west of Bahia;
265 UFCA in Ceará, and the multi-campi UNIFESSPA, covering the south and southeast regions of Pará.

266 Beyond expanding the number of student places in public universities, Rousseff sought to reduce social and
267 ethnic asymmetries in the entry of new students. During her first term, important Law no. 12,711/2012 known
268 as the "Quotas Act" was approved. It was a historical reparation in a deeply unequal country ruled by the
269 decimation of indigenous people since the colonization process. Brazil was the country that received the largest
270 number of enslaved blacks in the world, 4.9 million people, and the last country in the West to abolish slavery.
271 This law determined that federal higher education institutions linked to the Ministry of Education must reserve,
272 in each selective contest for entry into undergraduate courses, at least 50% of their vacancies for students who
273 attended public high schools. The places must be filled by self-declared people of color and indigenous people,
274 as well as by people with disabilities.

275 After the abolition of formal slavery, no public policies were planned for the newly freed black population to
276 be incorporated as citizens into the society in a dignified manner. As a result of racism which became structural,
277 the black population had lower access to education. Over a century behind, the quota law fulfilled the role of
278 promoting equitable access to opportunities through higher education. Data from IBGE (National Statistics
279 Bureau) show the chance of getting a degree has increased almost by four times among the black population
280 in the country. Since the first experiences of affirmative action in higher education, the percentage of black
281 Brazilians who graduated from universities grew from 2.2% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2017. Although inequalities
282 are still significant, this public policy has a transformative potential, which can be seen from the data released
283 by the National Association of Directors of Federal Institutions of Higher Education (Andifes). The study
284 reveals that, for the first time in the history of Brazil, there are more non-white (51.2%) than white students in
285 higher education institutions. In this group, 64.7% attended public high school and 70.2% came from families
286 with monthly per capita income of up to 1.5 minimum wages (Ribeiro, 2019: 22-25). (Aveiro, 2014:17). This
287 international academic mobility program aimed to promote innovation, modernization, competitiveness, and
288 international insertion through the technicalscientific training of young Brazilians in high-ranking international
289 universities (Muller 2013:47). At the same time, the program supported the attraction of recent PhD graduates
290 and senior international researchers to Brazil. The rationale behind the program is the potential to produce a
291 significant impact on the Brazilian industry, the sector in which most of these professionals would be integrated.

292 The project covered four main areas of knowledge, with four types of scholarships: sandwich degree (SWG),
293 postgraduate and postdoctoral studies, the attraction of young scientists to Brazil, as well as professional and
294 technological education. Scholarships for undergraduate students were prioritized, which was an innovation in
295 higher education policies in Brazil; until then, the focus had always been on graduate studies. According to
296 Sehnem (2019), Rousseff had personal involvement with the program, which seemed to raise its status and
297 guaranteed resources for its execution (Sehnem, 2019). Of 101,446 scholarships awarded in the period, 78%
298 (78,980) were for the Sandwich Graduate Program (SWG), with an investment contribution of almost R\$10.5
299 billion (CAPES e CNPq, 2016).

300 Initially, the program was aimed at the U.S. universities, similar to Barack Obama administration's plan
301 "100,000 Strong in the Americas" 16 . Two international cooperation agreements were signed between the U.S.
302 and Brazil in a short period of time in 2011. Faced with the difficulty of accomplishing this in a limited amount
303 of time, there was the decision to expand the partnerships with approximately 30 countries (Prolo and Vieira,
304 2017).

305 However, the project attracted criticism. Schwartzman (2015:35) pointed out that "the universities were
306 forced to expand without enough resources and preparation and could not cope with the new inflow of students
307 and professors hired with working conditions that do not match with the previous standards". In addition, the
308 program sent students and researchers mainly to English-speaking countries in the regions like the United States
309 and Europe.

310 The impetus towards building both a socially inclusive project and strong South-South cooperation around
311 shared development goals -including higher education policies -came to an end in 2016 when the PT, Rousseff's
312 and Lula's political party, was involved in a corruption scandal. Former president Lula himself faced charges.
313 Furthermore, an economic recession started. Facing severe economic constraints and increasing political isolation,
314 Rousseff was removed from office on 31 August 2016, as a result of an impeachment process 17 . Her successor,
315 Vice President Michel Temer, facilitated a U-turn in the policy agenda, aiming to promote radical neoliberal
316 policies with profound impacts on higher education.

317 5 c) Michel

318 Temer (2016-2018): beginning of dismantling

319 The vice president of Dilma Rousseff assumed the presidency on 31 August 2016. Not only the national politics
320 were in disarray, but the international context of this period was also somehow unstable. The election of Donald
321 Trump in the United States and Brexit in Europe further contributed to this scenario. In South America, the
322 so-called "pink tide" period ended with the Paraguayan coup against Fernando Lugo, as well as the election of
323 Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Sebastian Piñera in Chile, and Pedro Kuczynski in Peru (Pereira, 2015).

324 In Brazil, Jose Serra was appointed chancellor, promising a disruption with the previous governments. Serra,
325 who was not a diplomat but a politician, proposed 10 action guidelines 18 , in which he criticized what he called
326 diplomacy based on "ideological conveniences of a political party and of its foreign allies". Serra left office in
327 March 2017 and, despite the plans, none of his projects ended up being implemented.

328 After Serra resigned, Aloysio Nunes, also a politician, assumed the ministry. He defined a more pragmatic
329 approach to Mercosur, aiming to promote the "deideologization" of relations with Venezuela. Nunes also pursued
330 a new pattern of relations with the United States, negotiating the use of the military base Alcântara in the
331 Northeast by the American army. Through several official lines of communication, the Brazilian Ministry of
332 Foreign Affairs criticized Latin American countries that supported Rousseff in the impeachment trial 19 . The
333 most notorious case was the relationship with Venezuela. Not only the commercial exchange dropped considerably
334 but also Venezuela was suspended from the Mercosur. Furthermore, the readmission of Bolivia to the group
335 stagnated as a result (Costa Silva, 2019).

336 In the domestic realm, Temer prioritized the discussion of the unpopular economic reforms. In December 2016
337 -only four months after Rousseff impeachment -Congress approved Constitutional Amendment no. 55, which
338 significantly compromised the financing of public policies offered by the government, among them, education.
339 Amendment to the Constitution no. 95/2016, thus, instituted a New Fiscal Regime, which would be in place
340 for 20 years. It established for each fiscal year an individual limit for primary expenses of the Executive Power,
341 equivalent to the primary expense paid in the fiscal year 2016. It included the remains to be paid and other
342 operations that affect the primary result, corrected by the variation of inflation the National Wide Consumer
343 Price Index -IPCA. For Carvalho (2018), the approval of this amendment represents the dismantling of Brazilian
344 social policies inspired by the European welfare states through the suffocation of their financing.

345 Indeed, it is estimated that the education field will lose R\$45 billion (USD 8.3 billion 20) by 2025 with the
346 Stability and Growth Program 241 (PEC 241). The freeze is to make several goals of the National Education Plan
347 (PNE) unfeasible. It should be noted that the successive cuts in education funds have already been happening
348 since 2014 and, with the approval of the Constitutional Amendment no. 95/2016, the situation has worsened. In
349 a Technical Report of the Assembly (2019), regarding the primary expenses paid between 2014 and 2018 by the
350 Ministry of Education and the impact the amendment has been already causing, it was noted that the investment
351 in education in Brazil fell by 56% over four years. Between 2014 and 2018, it decreased from R\$11.3 billion (USD
352 20.8 billion) to R\$4.9 billion (USD 9 billion). There was a drop in the amount spent on the three levels of
353 education -basic, technical and higher -, according to a survey based on the budgets realized in the period and

354 corrected by the IPCA. As a whole, the portfolio budget was reduced by 11.7% between 2014 and 2018, from
355 R\$117.3 billion (USD 21.6 billion) to R\$103.5 billion (USD 19.1 billion).

356 Regarding the expenses for higher education, there was a drop of 15%, from R\$39.2 billion (USD 7.3 billion)
357 in 2014 to R\$33.4 billion (USD 6.2 billion) in 2018 21 . Most of the resources that were available were used
358 for compulsory expenditure, including personnel and social security charges. In this period, this expense grew
359 by 11.4% from R\$48.8 billion (USD 9 billion) to R\$54.4 billion (USD 10.1 billion). If we consider the 2018
360 budget, in practice, for every R\$100, the government spent R\$4.70 on investments and R\$52.50 on employees and
361 maintenance. The remaining amount, R\$42.80, was used to pay current expenses (mandatory and discretionary)
362 -in other words, the funding expenses and expenses on various services to maintain the university structures
363 (cleaning services, water, electricity, etc.), as well as student assistance, fundamental to their permanence in the
364 universities (City Hall Newsletter, 2019 22).

365 The proposal and subsequent approval of the AC 55 generated several protests and strikes in federal universities
366 against budget cuts. Some critical intellectuals also began to be persecuted by the Education Ministry and the
367 Judiciary that prohibited activities that debated the coup and its consequences. In 2018, political scientist Luis
368 Felipe Miguel, a professor at the University of Brasilia, offered the course "The coup of 2016 and the future of
369 democracy in Brazil," as a result facing hostility from Education Minister Mendonça Filho. Mendonça Filho
370 publicly declared his intention to appeal to the Public Ministry on preventing the course from being taught but
371 stopped after backslashing due to the negative repercussions the case

372 **6 B**

373 took. Sectors of the media and academia accused the government of promoting censorship, a practice largely
374 adopted by the Military Regime in Brazil (1964-1984). In solidarity, more than 10 universities in several states
375 included the course in their programmes.

376 In spite of the financing cuts, Temer inaugurated five federal universities, which had been planned by Rousseff:
377 Federal University of Jataí (UFJ), Federal University of Catalão (UFCAT), Federal University of Agreste de
378 Pernambuco (UFAPE), Federal University of Rondonópolis (UFR), and Federal University of Delta do Parnaíba
379 (UFDPar). However, Temer promoted setbacks in priorities of Rousseff's agenda. Science without Borders, in
380 the form of an undergraduate interchange program, ended in 2017. The justification behind the decision was the
381 high cost of keeping students out of the country at a time when higher education was undergoing several budget
382 cuts.

383 **7 d) Jair Messias Bolsonaro (2019-2020) i. Bolsonaro's foreign 384 policy: matrix loss**

385 The Brazilian context in 2018 was defined by great polarization against the PT. Jair M. Bolsonaro, considered
386 an outsider, despite his long political career as a deputy, infamous for his racist, misogynist, and pro-dictatorship
387 rhetoric, was elected president of Brazil with 55% of valid votes. Bolsonaro was elected in the context of
388 an international wave marked by the election of far-right and populist representatives for the executive posts,
389 including American President Donald Trump as the most prominent case.

390 In his inauguration speech, Bolsonaro affirmed: "we are going to remove the ideological bias from our
391 international relations. We are looking for a new time for Brazil and for Brazilians!" (BRASIL, 2019 23).
392 His chosen Minister of Foreign Affairs was Ernesto Henrique Fraga Araújo, a career diplomat who, distancing
393 himself from his counterparts, expressed conservative ideas towards what he called "globalism" and demonstrated
394 his admiration to the United States and the ideals of Trumpism. Araújo stated in his inauguration speech that
395 the aim of his government was to "recover the role of the Foreign Ministry as guardian of the Brazilian truth and
396 memory. (?) Brazil will not ask permission from the 'global order' to do whatever it takes to achieve its goals 24
397 ."

398 Bolsonaro holds a revisionist agenda aimed at removing the legacies of the progressists' governments. In foreign
399 policy, his government rejects the international order and its rules, as well as the advances achieved by minorities
400 in different countries. According to Rodrigues (2019), this is one of the greatest U-turns in Brazilian foreign
401 policy since the military regime, configuring a loss of status in one of the best organized, stable, predictable, and
402 respected areas of the Brazilian state. A country that cared for sociability through diplomacy and international
403 law, started aligning itself with the policy of constant international crisis. President Bolsonaro, called by North
404 American newspapers "Trump of the Tropics", has pushed the country into a pivotal state for the ultra-right
405 in Latin America, putting in question the whole legacy of the Brazilian leadership in the regional and global
406 contexts (Rodrigues, 2019: 1-8). Authors such as Fuser (2019) and Spektor (2019), have already defined the
407 changes that occurred as "subservience diplomacy" and "rupture diplomacy".

408 In his first year in office, Bolsonaro supported the creation of the Forum for the Progress and Integration of
409 South America (PROSUR). The initiative was launched in March 2019 at the meeting of the South American
410 presidents in Santiago, Chile. This mechanism was designed as a model for regional dialogue to strengthen
411 relations and cooperation among South American states. In September of the same year, during the UN General
412 Assembly in New York, the operating guidelines were defined by the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
413 Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay. In the released document, the areas of infrastructure, energy, health,

8 II. EDUCATIONAL POLICIES: THE DENIALISM SETBACK

414 defense, security, and fighting crime and disasters were listed as key policy issues. Education was absent. A
415 brief mention of the need for access to quality education can be found in the sessions of the event dedicated to
416 objectives, however, no discussion took place.

417 The creation of the PROSUR, with the exclusion of several countries in the region, and the loss of space for
418 education in the integration priorities points, in principle, to the dismantling of Unasur and an alignment of the
419 presidents identified in a right-wing political spectrum in the reorganization of policy priorities among public
420 authorities in the region.

421 Against the Brazilian customary diplomatic tradition, in 2019, Bolsonaro declared, before the elections, his
422 support to Mauricio Macri in Argentina. He affirmed that Argentina could become "the new Venezuela 25 ".
423 With the victory of Macri's opponent Alberto Fernandez, Bolsonaro declared that the Argentinians "did not
424 choose well". There was a radical change in the foreign policy agenda that might have affected not only the
425 bilateral relationship but Mercosur as a whole together with other regional arenas.

426 We can affirm that there is a matrix loss in the foreign policy, involving the reputation crisis due to the change
427 in foreign policy and the conduct of the president of the republic.

428 8 ii. Educational Policies: the denialism setback

429 The political moment for Brazilian education is being defined mostly by the draconian budget cuts and the
430 symbolic aggression against its communities and academic institutions. Since the beginning of 2019, the Ministry
431 of Education have blocked around R\$6 billion (USD 1.1 million) under contingency policies which, followed by
432 other ministries, have been submitted.

433 Approximately a third of this amount -around R\$2.2 billion (USD 410 million) -is linked to the budget for the
434 federal universities. Year by year, the government measures are reducing what equates to 0.8% of the GDP from
435 the public spends with social policies and public investments. At the same time, movements for weakening the
436 autonomy of the universities, disrespecting their administrative elections of their directors and deans, seem like
437 the tip of the iceberg of the government's true intentions.

438 Indicated by Olavo de Carvalho , the first person to assume the Ministry of Education's post was Colombian-
439 born Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez. During his short time as minister, his speeches and ideas have dazed and worried
440 the whole of the academic field. Despite being a professor, his first measure in the ministry would be to rewrite
441 history books. In his words, the military coup in 1964, was a "civic moment": "There was an institutional change,
442 not a coup against the Constitution at the time". Speaking about the universities, he said that "they should be
443 reserved for an intellectual elite". In addition to praising Pablo Escobar for his civic actions in Colombia, the
444 MEC sent a note to schools asking for the children to be in a military formation to sing the National Anthem
445 and for that action to be recorded. Further, it was requested that Bolsonaro's campaign slogan "Brazil above
446 everything, God above all the people" was read during the event at schools (Leher, 2019).

447 After a short period, Vélez Rodríguez was dismissed. The new minister, Abraham Weintraub, in his
448 inauguration speech, sustained that he would fight against "cultural Marxism" in the universities, showing his
449 alignment with the presidential family's ideology. His bolsonarist argumentation was absurd, using simplistic
450 denominations, which could be compared to a generalization stating that everyone from the political left are
451 communists.

452 Right before his inauguration, Bolsonaro criticized what he called "the Marxist junk" in schools, announcing
453 that one of his goals would be to remove any trace of Marxism from Brazilian education. He also accused the
454 university community of allowing certain sexual behavior, not compatible with the Christian morality, more
455 specifically, the Pentecostal and evangelical morality. The new minister Weintraub followed the exact same
456 guidelines. According to Leher (2019), his argumentation to disqualify the universities had two main points:
457 the ideological criticism regarding the existence of "cultural Marxism", and the accusation of Brazilian public
458 universities being a high cost to the people and still not being known as institutions of excellence, which equals to
459 not figuring on the rank of the 100 best universities in the world. According to the minister, the federal universities
460 promoted "shambles" and political events, as well as immoral parties.

461 During the election campaign, some of the electoral judges supported the removal of anti-fascist posters and
462 banners and the interruption of classes that included any electoral debate in several federal universities' campuses.
463 On 31 October 2018, the Brazilian Supreme Court decided unanimously against the police intervention in the
464 universities in favor of the Constitution and of the fundamental rights established by it, including the freedom
465 of professorship, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. The scientific denialism of the government can
466 be seen in the changes in different bodies and national agency, including the IBGE, the Brazilian Institution
467 for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama), the Chico Mendes Institute for Conservation
468 and Biodiversity (ICMBio), the Economic Defense Administration Council (Cade); The National Institute of
469 Spacial Investigations (INPE), the Finep, The CNPq, the Capes, the universities; and the Federal Education and
470 Technology Institutes, linked to the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication (MCTIC)
(Leher, 2019:15).

472 Refusing scientific evidence, Bolsonaro's leaders intended to deny the reality. Brazil could become a country
473 conceived by cults and for capitalists avid to expand their frontiers and to scale their businesses. This group
474 supports the extraction of ore in indigenous territories, promoting fires in the Amazon to clean the path for

475 pasture, disrespecting workers' rights to a level analogue to slavery, or even deviating money from social security
476 to banks and investment funds.

477 University autonomy, guaranteed by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, has been threatened by the presidential
478 decrees. The Decree no. 9.794, from 15 May 2019, established that the appointment of the main positions for the
479 direction of the Federal University should be preceded by an analysis of the names by the Federal Government,
480 creating the Integrated System of Appointments and Consultations:

481 "The acts of appointment, designation, exoneration and dismissal related to commissioned positions and
482 functions of trust of a federal institution of basic education and higher education, of a federal center of
483 technological education, of a federal technical school and of a federal agrotechnical school shall be carried out as
484 the rules of the institution, except for the position of top manager of the institution and holder of a legal organ
485 of the Federal Attorney General's office installed at the institution 27 ."

486 In June 2019, minister Weintraub launched a program called "Future-se", the objective of which "is to promote
487 a major financial autonomy to universities and federal institutes through incentives to private fundraising and to
488 entrepreneurship" (MEC, 2020), discharging the government from funding the public institutions. The program
489 was for voluntary accession, which means that only universities and federal institutes interested in participating
490 would be included. Besides Volume XXI Issue III Version I 46 () this program, the ministry also suggested the
491 introduction of monthly tuition for postgraduation stricto sensu, which is currently free and pointed out that the
492 option for the expansion of Brazilian higher education is private education, controlled by the investment funds.

493 One of the democratic disruptions under Bolsonaro's administration was the failure to comply with the rector's
494 elections by the academic communities through triple lists. It was customary to abide by the choice of the
495 academic community since it is a name chosen within the institutions by electoral rules, considered fundamental
496 for the university's autonomy. However, Bolsonaro, until the beginning of 2021, chose a different candidate in
497 40% of the cases. Out of 34, he nominated 15 who were in the 2nd or 3rd positions in the electoral colleges'
498 disputes.

499 Although not illegal, this recurring attitude of Bolsonaro is criticized for weakening universities' mechanisms
500 of participation and guaranteeing plurality, seen as a controlling method of federal institutions and a violation of
501 the principles of university autonomy, impersonality, and public morality.

502 **9 III.**

503 Discussion: Higher Education Policies from Lula to Bolsonaro Klein and Schwartzman (1993) affirmed that
504 the analysis of higher education policies produced in Brazil in the period of 1970-1990 showed "patterns of
505 policymaking that are closely related to the nature of the political regimes under which they occurred". After
506 Rousseff's deposition, although Brazil is still a formal democracy, a radical transformation from the PT's
507 governments to Temer and Bolsonaro also resulted in a dramatic change in policymaking. In comparative Table
508 ???.0 below, we outline the main differences among the past four governments in their educational policies.

509 **10 Conclusion**

510 The results provided in this article indicate that in the PT's governments, from Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff,
511 higher education policies were a priority on the agenda and universities' internationalization was part of foreign
512 policy strategies. Education was also a tool to promote foreign policy and a drive to develop social programs.
513 Rousseff's impeachment ended the expansion and prioritization of higher education as public policy.

514 In Michel Temer's and Jair M. Bolsonaro's governments, the education sector has suffered budget cuts and a
515 reduction in importance. Temer's administration approved unpopular bills jeopardizing social rights and budget
516 allocation for education, health, and retirement funds. With Bolsonaro, since it is an ongoing process, we still
517 cannot see the results clearly.

518 However, what we have seen so far presents a denialdriven setback in many sectors, notably, in science and
519 education policies.

520 Bolsonaro denied the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, adopting an anti-lockdown and antivaccination
521 discourse, as well as supporting the use of so-called "preemptive" medication with no support in the literature.
522 His denialist discourse is in direct clash with both the international and Brazilian scientific community. As a
523 result, Brazil is one of the worst-hit countries by the pandemic worldwide, with over 380,000 deceased at the
524 moment that we finish this article.

525 It is impossible not to mention the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Brazil's higher education alumni.
526 All public and private campuses are closed, and the classes are held online. In an unequal country such as Brazil,
527 access to computers and the internet is highly uneven. There was no initiative from the Ministry of Education to
528 support universities. Reports show the institutions have used their own resources to cover emergency support for
529 students. In addition, the economic context of impoverishment, increased income inequality, and unemployment
530 leads many quota students to search for jobs to support their families. Though there is no consolidated data on
531 schooling evasion, there is a general perception it has increased.

532 Already functioning under political, economic, and sanitary constraints, public higher education universities
533 will face new challenges in 2022. The Law no. 12.711/2012, the Law of Quotas, establishes that: "Art. 7 th
534 -Within a period of ten years from the date of publication of this Law, the revision of the special program for

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535 access to higher education institutions for black, brown and indigenous students and for people with disabilities,
536 as well as those who have completed high school in public schools, will be promoted".

Following years of decline in financing, which resulted in a setback in the creation of new student places in the universities, the PT's legacy in education will be faced with a debate on whether or not the inclusion of those ethnically and economically marginalized in the Brazilian society will prevail. 1 The focus on the second term is justified by the fact that the majority of higher education policies implemented occurred during this period. 2 According to Senner (2003:36), the foreign policy matrix "concerns the more general outlines of a country's foreign policy and seeks to determine the way in which it conceives the dynamics of the international system". 3 Historically, most universities were located close to the East Coast or big cities. 4 For a detailed presentation and discussion of REUNI, see: Silva, 2017. for all; education as a factor of social and economic development in the country; and education as an instrument to combat poverty and social inclusion. One of the goals was to "increase the gross enrollment rate in higher education to 50% and the net rate to 33% of the population aged 18 to 24, ensuring the quality". The REUNI one development from the PNE focusing on public higher education. 6 <http://reuni.mec.gov.br/noticias/37-noticia-destaque/> 684-lula-destaca-politica-de-interiorizacao-do-ensino-superior-e-profissional 7 1909 was the year of the creation of the first university, the Manaus Free University School. 8 <http://portal.mec.gov.br/ultimas-noticias/212-educacao-superior-1690610854/16096-presidente-Lula-da-Silva-da-Silva-entrega-campi-de-universidades-e-institutos-federais> 9 Created in 1998 during Cardoso presidency, the National High School Examination (ENEM) was a standardized Brazilian national exam that evaluated students' academic performance at the end of basic education. The exam improved its methodology and, in 2009, it started to be used as a mechanism of access to higher education through the Unified Selection System (SiSU), the University for All Program (ProUni) and agreements with Portuguese institutions. ENEM participants can also apply for student financing in government programs, such as the Student Financing Fund (FIES). The results of ENEM continue to enable the development of studies and educational indicators. 10 The ENEM is also accepted in foreign universities. In Portugal, at least 50 institutions accepted the exam grade to select Brazilian candidates. The United Kingdom, France and the United States are also accepting, but the application involves other processes as well. 11 <https://www.gov.br/pt-br/servicos/obter-bolsa-de-estudo-do-prouni/> Accessed August 2020. 12 See in "Brasil. Casa Civil. Lei nº 11.096, 13 de janeiro de 2005". 13 http://portal.inep.gov.br/artigo/-/asset_publisher/B4AQV9zFY7Bv/content/dados-do-censo-da-educacao-superior-as-universidades-brasileiras-representam-8-das-matriculas-21206 14 <http://portal.mec.gov.br/rede-federal-inicial> 15 Ibope 2010, <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2010/12/popularidade-de-Lula-da-Silva-da-Silva-bate-recordee-chega-87-diz-ibope.html> Accessed 2020. 16 Increase the number of American students in China. The Chinese government supports the initiative by awarding 10,000 scholarships (Bridge Scholarships) to American students. 17 For a detailed analysis of this period, see Singer, 2018. 18 For a detailed, see <http://www.funag.gov.br/kipri/images/repertorio/diretrizes-governo-Temer-Ministro-Serra.pdf> 19 Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, in addition to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). 20 Currency quote R\$ to US\$ of Mayo 2021. 21 Source: Siafi (Sistema Integrado de Administração Financeira do Governo Federal) 22 The data take into account the primary expenses of the current budget carried out by the MEC and of leftovers from the previous budgets paid in the financial year, corrected each year by the IPCA for the 12-month period ended in June of the previous year to which the budget law refers, as required by amendment no. 55/2016. 23 <https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-plano-1to/discursos/2019/discurso-do-presidente-da-republica-jair-bolsonaro-durante-cerimonia-de-recebimento-da-faixa-presidencial>. Accessed 09/27/2020. 24 BRASIL, (03/01/2019). <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/19907-discurso-doministro-ernesto-araujo-durante-cerimonia-de-posse-noministerio-das-relacoes-exteriores-brasilia-2-de-janeiro-de-2019> 25 Using Venezuela as an example of a failure "communist" country. 26 Olavo de Carvalho is a self-taught philosopher, responsible for the ideological base of "bolsonarism". Although he did not have a government position, Olavo de Carvalho guaranteed his influence in appointing alumni, known as "disciples", for important positions in the areas of educational and foreign policy. ^{1 2}

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Ministry of Education budget increase in billions of R\$




Figure 1:

Higher Education Institutions increase 2004-2011




Figure 2:




Figure 3: B

	Lula da Silva (2003-2011)	Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)	Michel Temer (2016-2018)	Jair M. Bolsonaro (2019-)
Political view	Central-left - Welfare state	Central left	Central-right - Liberal	Extreme-right - Liberal
Foreign Policy initiatives in Education	UNILA/UNILAB	Science without Borders BRICS	None	None
Educational programs	REUNI Reformed FIES ProUni SISU PNAES	Science without Borders "Law of Quotas"	No new programs. Science without Borders was extinguished. Reduction of higher educational investments.	Future-se (abandoned)
Number of public HEIs	224 in 2004 to 285 in 2011	296 (2016)	299 (2018)	302 (2019) ²⁸
Number of private HEIs	2,099 (2010)	2,111 (2016)	2,238 (2018)	2,306 (2019)
Students enrolled in HEIs	6.407.733 (2010)	8.052.254 (2016)	8.451.748 (2018)	8.604.526 (2019)
Number of new public universities	14 universities 126 campi	4 universities 57 campi	5 universities	None
Total budget spent on Educational sector	2008: R\$ 66,7 billion	2016: R\$ 109,90 billion	2018: R\$ 114,31 billion	2020: R\$ 110,65 billion

Figure 4:




Figure 5: In

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Figure 6: Table 1 . 0 :

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