Border and Textuality in the Mediterranean: United States and Spain in Transition towards Democracy under the Cold War

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INTRODUCTION

The political transition catalyzed a dynamic of change processes, in the whole of Spanish society, in order to create a "complex western, democratic and pluralistic system". The opening of borders accelerated the process of Europeanization and Americanization of the productive process, of the structure and social habits, of the forms and construction of knowledge, besides the homologation of the practice and the conception of the international relations.

The international dimension was an indispensable chapter of the process to contextualize on the long-term plan the nature of Spanish policy towards the Mediterranean and the guidelines of modernization in a Europeanist and westernizing sense. This process would end by closing the modernizing and regenerating cycle with which the twentieth century began.

From these preliminary considerations emerges the objective of the present work the analysis of the textual meshes derived from the Mediterranean and semi-peripheral condition of Spain, and consequently border, on a temporary framework in which the Cold War system would transit from the Distension to the resurgence of discourse and containment practices whose epilogue would trigger the end of the international system that would emanate from the Second World War.

The reflection in the heat of the polyhedral meaning of the border in the historical and cultural baggage of the United States and Spain, from the coordinates of the Mediterranean world, we project it in two discursive universes in which we believe that the notion of frontier illustrates and provokes suggestive scenarios of reflection: on the one hand, the crossroads that cover a good part of Spain's trajectory during the century in the light of the debates and the challenge of modernity and modernization, from its two priority vectors - European modernity in terms of Europeanization and the paradigm of modernity illuminated from the United States to the thread of Americanization and the symbol of Manifest Destiny; and on the other, the different planes that converge from Washington and Madrid around the Mediterranean as a border from the security prism.

The notion of the border from its polysemic universe not only refers to a purely geopolitical and geoeconomic conceptions, but is projected in the symbolic space as another framework of the culture of knowledge. A crucial dimension in the construction of imaginary and identities and whose colonial potential in the connection between knowledge and power has been highlighted by authors such as Walter D. Mignolo when reflecting on the border thinking or Boaventura de Sousa Santos when inquiring about the abysmal lines in Western thought.

I. Homologation and Standardization in Spain from the Secular Textures of its Europeanization and the Americanization Process

The American century and the hegemony of the United States would result in a restatement of modernity. From the end of the 19th century and until World War II the civilizing mission in its European version would be reformulated around the United States when it started its rise to great world power, rearticulating around the Manifest Destiny and all the mythology of the border. After the Second World War it would be "Development"
and "Modernization" that took over, relegating the civilizing mission to a secondary place.

The hegemonic place of the United States at the end of the cycle of world wars would connect with American exceptionalism. A particularity that, in the words of Paul Isbell, has stimulated the impression, even the certainty, that "God has chosen them to bring democracy to the people of the world, having been distinguished by the hand of God himself from among the preceding world powers precisely for its democratic faith and for its emergence as the only world superpower that, supposedly, does not exploit a colonial empire."

The slogan of Development - understood in its economic and political dimension - connected with the New Deal substrate, the border promise of political and economic democracy on which the political economy of the informal American empire would be legitimized from the preliminaries of the Cold War.

The process of Americanization of knowledge and its connections with the exercise of power would enter a critical phase after World War II. The divisions by areas in the social sciences derived intellectually from the dominant liberal ideology in the 19th century that held that the State and the market, politics and the economy, were analytically separate domains. But there were many realities that they did not fit entirely within the scope of the market or the State, they would be included in a residual miscellany, sociology. Finally, two areas in the social sciences derived intellectually from the preceding world powers precisely for its democratic faith and for its emergence as the only world superpower that, supposedly, does not exploit a colonial empire."©

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This classic panorama would be radically transformed from the interwar period and, especially, after the Second World War according to the Americanization of the knowledge map. This division of labor would disappear and, instead, all these disciplines of social knowledge would universalize its object of study. The configuration of this knowledge in the Areas Studies in the American academic world would illustrate its connection with the global power needs of the new hegemonic power.

Perhaps the discipline that best registered in the Anglo-Saxon field the extraordinary incidence of the analysis of Development and Modernization was that of economic theory after World War II. In the North American post-war academic and political circles, the central issue in economic thinking would revolve around growth. In this climate of optimism in which one of the most decisive cycles of economic growth and expansion of the last two centuries began, Josep Fontana argues, in "apply to the whole world" those advances with the purpose of "Get backward countries out of their poverty and bring them to the fullness of development." A slogan on which American propaganda would be overturned in the framework of the Cold War.

In the specific field of the Mediterranean world, as a border scenario, the American wedge Orientalism after World War II would illustrate a pragmatic profile from the keys of the theory of modernization and the needs of Containment. Until the Second World War, a situation in which the United States began to occupy the position that until that moment had been played by Great Britain and France on the periphery, had barely treasured an Orientalist experience. East, explicit Edward W. Said, became for the United States: (...) More than a religious question that it had been for centuries for Europe, it is an administrative and political question. The new social scientist and the new expert on whose shoulders the weight of orientalism would fall (...) In any case, the new Orientalist resumed hostile cultural attitudes and maintained them.

After World War II, peripheral interests of the United States would be strengthened and, in particular, in the Middle East and North Africa, where an important network of geostrategic resources was created. The progressive decline of the imperial presence of Great Britain and France would give way to the United States to "exercise its new imperial role." In the global strategy of Containment, cultural policy would play a leading role. It was in this context that an academic and institutional mesh on Orientalist studies would be established. The model, both for its strategic dimension and its "sensitivity to political and security issues," would be the Middle East Institute, founded in Washington in 1946. From this foundation a wide institutional and associationist mesh was created –such as the Middle East Association-, programs in various universities that would have the support of the Federal Administration but also of banks, oil companies, and multinationals.

Development and modernization emerged, argues Andrew Rotter, from the uncertainties and concerns of US administrations to deal with instability in the periphery, especially as the tide of decolonization went through the entire ancient imperial cartography. Washington would be involved in development policy as a fundamental part of the Containment -of the globalization of Containment. The development was intended to provide a long-term solution against communist contagion. But while the Containment underlined the obligations of the United States to defend freedom, development theory was inspired by the old American vision of appropriation or legitimization of the process of social change and in the survival of a sense of superiority over the dark-skinned peoples of the Third World. In practice, after that scientific discourse, they survived "The old ethnocentric platitude, about uplift and regeneration formerly directed at the Philippines, China, and Mexico...".

In a global sense Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh ironically influence how support for conservative dictators in Latin America and other peripheral spaces as a dam of containment to communism and as a
priority of the principle of national security, it would fossilize socio-economic and political structures, hindering the goals that were preached and foreseen in the development models sponsored by the United States from academic and political centers. "In the US experience in the Western Hemisphere, it would appear that in the pursuit of hegemonic control, the means came to undermine the very values and institutions that hegemonic leadership was intended to preserve for the system."

This analysis and this anti-communist rhetoric were embedded in the politics of Containment. Still, it concealed a rejection of any political formula, and not only in Latin America, but that could also question and jeopardize the economic and geostrategic interests of the United States. As in other peripheral scenarios, the successive US administrations did not conceptualize the problems of those border spaces in Central-Periphery terms but essentially from the dialectic of East-West bipolarity.

The debate around modernity and tradition that runs through the Spanish 20th century flows around the Casticism-Europeanization dialectic. Still, the American century will permeate the language and practices of modernization from the keys of Americanization. In the tenure of time between centuries, the Spanish-American war would deeply determine the images of the United States between Americanization and anti-American sentiments. For an enlightened and informed minority of Spaniards, the American political and legal model presented great appeal. The critical circles towards Catholic fundamentalism and oligarchic power, among them some of the most prominent leaders of federal republicanism - the case of Pi and Margall - or intellectuals such as Rafael María Labra, would weave a positive image of the American socio-political model.

In the context of the Spanish-American war, the negative and accusatory image reflected in the press, American travel books, and textbooks were coated, in turn, of a moralizing zeal to the extent that Spain was proposed as a countermodel. These perceptions would be made explicit about what Richard Kagan would have defined as the "Prescott paradigm", the basis of the image of Spain in the United States for a long time, according to which Spain appeared as a countermodel and as an antithesis to values and the position of the North American Republic. "America was the future - republican, enterprising, rational; while Spain - monarchical, indolent, fanatic - represented the past."

In Spain, as in the rest of Europe, regardless of rhythm and intensity, the first third of the century will show the first symptoms in the Americanization process. A term that we use, in the sense in which Dominique Barjot puts it when translating:

(…) a deep cultural reality, the generalization of a way of life, of a civilization born on the other side of the Atlantic by combining of multiple contributions, mostly from Europe. This Americanization has its origin in the transfer to Western Europe of production methods, consumption models, ways of life, socio-cultural practices, and thinking schemes born or adopted originally in the United States.

The reflection on the problem of Spain and the search for solutions to its secular delay, tragically portrayed in the crisis of 98, would be channeled from the cultural atmosphere of Regenerationism from formulations that would become from Casticism to Europeanization. The modernity embodied by the United States would be spun as an edge of the latter in the sense of promoting an opening for models on which to inspire and modulate modernization.

The extraversion of the United States, especially in the twentieth century, would in turn encourage anti-American reactions whose cultural components would be inseparable from local and historical circumstances. Anti-Americanism has been determined in Spain by the very historical nature of Spanish-American relations and by the emerging role acquired by the United States, from the eruption of American power to transit towards the twentieth century until its hegemonic rise after the cycle of world wars.

Spanish anti-Americanism in the course of the twentieth century, as Alessandro Seregni emphasizes, has been modulated according to two traditions of political culture, “two sets (or families)”, which overflow the perimeter of the policy itself: one referring to the right and the other, to the left. The first, which would integrate Falangists, nationalists, traditionalists, and fundamentalists Catholics and monarchists, among others, would be nurtured, especially during the dictatorship of General Franco, of values in the antipodes of the identity signs of the United States, such as the contempt of democracy and liberalism, aversion to capitalism, hatred of Protestantism or anti-Masonic obsession, in addition to a nationalism wounded by common history whose nodal point would be the war of 1898. On the other hand, the anti-American discourse of the left will crystallize basically after the signing of the Pact with the United States in 1953 and the support is given to the dictatorship of General Franco. The American support to Franco would polarize on some of them already preexisting elements:

(…) there were factors that could contribute to developing, then, to influence the evolution of left-wing anti-Americanism. In this sense, the generalized impulse towards the market economy and the capitalist system can be identified as the primary impulse (…) sustained by socialist thinking and, in different ways, by Marxist doctrine. A second motivation can be found in the strongly hostile and critical attitude maintained by the communist parties of Western countries concerning the American universe (…) A third motivation could be found in the third-world and anti-imperialist attitudes typical of a part of the left, at least since the 1970s.

Since the signing of the Spanish-American secret Pacts in 1953, the perception of the past, from a
On the other hand, the perspective argued by the Europeans does not channel the reflection from the effects of the historical process but the panorama of the "purposes, intentions and actions effectively undertaken by the actors." Consequently, the responsibility arose if there had been "the US foreign policy in the subsistence of the Franco regime." Successive US administrations would have been fundamentally interested in achieving their central objectives, the use of joint military installations, and "incorporating Spain into the Western defensive system." It is beyond doubt that the democratization of the regime, "if it had occurred spontaneously, it would have had some advantages for American interests, it would have favored the ideological cohesion of the Western side and the veto on Spain's entry into NATO could have been lifted." However, "a decision was never taken to actively enhance the democratic evolution of Spain because this would have jeopardized the supreme objective of guaranteeing the collaboration of the regime for the good use of the bases." The strategic interest in ensuring the use of military bases would have marginalized interest in liberalizing the Franco regime for greater coherence and ideological cohesion in Western Europe. When the transition process began, the attitude of the American institutions was less active and determined than the actions of Western European governments. In sum:

The Europeanists point out, in this regard, that economic cooperation and the promotion of exchanges of all kinds, such as those carried out by democratic Europe with Franco's Spain in its last stage, was not incompatible with political and strategic isolation very different from the alliance and the support that the Governments of the United States provided simultaneously to the dictatorship. This is the difference in the attitude of the Common Market Europe, which tolerated the Franco regime while encouraging exchanges with Spanish society, and the attitude of Washington, which openly allied itself with the dictator and cooperated militarily with him.18

This historical baggage and this wealth of experiences, images, and perceptions that have nourished the anti-Americanism of both "right" and "left" would determine, together with the attitude and gestures of the US administrations, the judgments and prejudices towards the United States in the Spanish political and opinion media during the process of transition and consolidation of democracy.

By these precedents and the convulsive situation on the Mediterranean flank of the Western security system, the departure of the American presence in Libya in 1970 and the concern expressed by the Revolution in Portugal in 1974 emphasized the geopolitical priority of the Iberian space from the American perspective. The US ambassador in Spain from 1975 to 1978, Wells Stabler, confessed that the United States "did not do much" to promote some kind of political change in post-Franco Spain. Their concern revolved primarily around the stability of their geostrategic priorities. In fact, on January 24, 1976, the new Hispanic-American Treaty of friendship and cooperation crystallized - not a simple agreement as it had been until then.

In this logic, we should interpret the comment of the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, by affirming the day after the frustrated coup attempt of State of February 23, 1981, which was "an internal Spanish question." A gesture that contrasts with the support for democracy shown by the Western European states and the statement of the American congressmen themselves supporting Spanish democracy and indirectly recalling the Secretary of State's untimely comment19.

From the prism of the peripheral projection of Spain towards the South in geocultural terms, it would be determined by its orientalist luggage. The perception and the imaginary built around the southern border, the historical trace of Islam on the peninsula, and the peripheral projection of the coloniality of power refers to Orientalism. The Spanish case presents specific features highlighted by Edward W. Said. In Spain, the imperial dimension - the one that looks outside - that undoubtedly exists and nourishes much of the culture emanated from Orientalism is interwoven by the historical fact that "Islam and Spanish culture inhabit each other instead of confronting belligerence."20

This dual dimension of Orientalism in the Spanish case would move the sphere of cultural production and even political culture towards the East - in particular towards the Arab world and the Mediterranean. The "Spanish colonial experience in northwestern Africa had a limited impact on the development of Arab studies, which remained focused on the study of their "domestic East". Unlike France and
Great Britain, the “Spanish university Arabists did not actively engage in the colonial adventure.” It would be the Africanists who, linked to the projection towards the nearby Mediterranean-African overseas, would become the architects of the production of most of the studies on North Africa -basically Morocco and Western Sahara.21 The official attitude of the Spanish administration influenced, in the opinion of Vicente Moga Romero, the split between "academic Arabism and more militant Africanism with an ideological wedge focused on ethnic and religious determinism."

Africanism, as the term began to be used in the mid-19th century, would be referred, as Federico Villalobos argues, to those who, in their own ability or within the framework of institutions or opinion groups, claimed “the existence of vital interests for Spain south of the Strait of Gibraltar-strategic, economic, historical and even moral - and advocated decisive action, both by the state and by the particular initiative, in defense and promotion of such interests.”

II. SECURITY AND BORDER TEXTUALITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FROM WASHINGTON AND MADRID

The decline of the Regime, and the new episode of the decolonization crisis in the light of the outcome of the dossier of Western Sahara, would become in full distension among the superpowers. However, the Mediterranean would be shaken by the changes that happened in Libya with the advent to power of Gadafi in September of 1969, and the Soviet presence in Libya and Algeria, the Arab-Israeli war of Yom Kippour in 1973 - and the processes of transition to democracy that would phase it in Mediterranean Europe and south-Greece, Portugal, and Spain-. The Mediterranean, however, would remain a secondary scenario throughout the Cold War in terms of the perception of Europe's security,24 despite its growing importance for the protection of the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Détente, says Thomas G. Paterson, would determine the end of the period of the predominance of the United States based on its nuclear superiority and incontestable economic supremacy, on that horizon of economic cycle change. The Détente seemed to restore control of the great powers and to reassure them of their control over their areas of influence and to better coop the challenges of the Third World.25

The Nixon Administration, embarking on the path of Détente for pragmatic and realistic motivations, would explore its review of the rigidities of Containment. This would involve a more conscious approach to the complexity of the international system, the relative decline of the United States, and a diplomatic approach based on the logic of the balance of power that would make it possible to distinguish between ideological and geopolitical threats.

In the early years of the Nixon Administration, the problems of the Third World, except the Middle East -amid the oil crisis- would occupy a secondary place in the presidential foreign policy agenda. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would be more interested in preserving American spheres of influence in the third world than in the economic needs of their development.26

After the resignation of Richard Nixon, the policy of Détente Gerald Ford would be subjected to the pressure of the group of falcons that made up part of its Administration and the control of the Congress on the development of foreign policy. These difficulties would become visible in a context of turmoil in the Mediterranean periphery shaken by the Triumph of Gadafi and the Green Revolution in Libya, the Arab-Israeli war, and the pericycle of the Mediterranean European dictatorships-Greece, Portugal and Spain - allied with Washington.

Spain was embarked in a time of deep uncertainty. In the explicit context of the General Franco Regime, its end would take place in the middle of a deep internal crisis, international pressure for the policy of repression, and a new episode of the southern threat in the wake of the colonial crisis in Spanish Sahara and the improvised and misguided solution of the Madrid Accords of 1975. Amid this convulsive panorama in the Mediterranean, the United States was embarking on negotiating its security status in Spain, whose primary objective was to preserve the operability and use of its military bases. The North American Administration, says Encarnación Lemus, would maintain the centrality of its support for Don Juan Carlos, but without neglecting the full support for the "Francoist official." In the document that President Ford received to prepare his conversation with Arias Navarro on August 1 in Helsinki, it was stated that:

We have two main interests: firstly, and in the short term, we want to renew the pact of friendship and Cooperation, which expires in September, so that we can continue to use our bases to support our forces in Europe and the Mediterranean. Secondly, in the longer term, we want to preserve the orientation of Spain in favor of the United States and the West during the post-Franco period.27

Precisely the Portuguese question would be on the agenda of Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger’s visit to Madrid to convince General Franco to intervene in Portugal and stop the revolutionary process, but the dictator was persuaded that nothing would happen in Portugal and you had to let time pass.28 The great enemy from the perspective of Henry Kissinger and the State Department in Western Europe were the communist parties and the fear that they might come to power. The role of the communist and socialist parties...
and their allied trade unions was a matter of concern to American diplomacy and its intention towards the transition processes in the Iberian Peninsula. The attitude of the American administration, as Encarnación Lemus well synthesizes, towards Iberian transitions:

(...) continued to demand from its partners that they did not assign urgency to the reforms; to some extent, the Americans wanted to control the pace of liberalization. Everyone agreed that change was necessary; the divergence of opinion inside and outside of Spain lay in how and when. The American objective pursued peninsular stability, and looked from fear at the Communist force in Portugal and Italy. On the inside, he weighed the danger of a conservative involution if the changes arrived too quickly and in the face of these two eventualities, the same formula is always offered, to approach the transformation slowly and prudently.29

It should not be forgotten, as rightly points out the above-mentioned author, that the visit of Gerald Ford to Madrid, where he arrived on May 31, 1975, was in full debate about the European rejection of any express link between Spain and Western security and the American desire to reverse is animosity in order not to harm the budding negotiation for the maintenance of the US military facilities in Spain. An illustrative testimony of Washington's pragmatism would be the interview held at the American Embassy in Madrid between the head of the Legation, Stabler, and the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, Felipe González, on October 25, 1975, in the course of which he acknowledged that "our interests oblige us to deal with governments as they are and not as we would like them to be"30.

After Gerald Ford's brief presidency, the triumph of the Democratic presidential candidate in the 1976 elections would bring James Earl Carter to the White House. His mandate would modulate a foreign policy and a style of détente that formally contrasted with the previous administration. The style of the Carter administration's policy of détente, argues Jarel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, would be characterized by a relatively optimistic view of global change and a liberal internationalist orientation,31 at whose discursive vanguard was the defense of human rights. Moral flag that would often conflict with the strategic priorities of the Cold War and the underlying dynamics of Containment.32

The events of 1979 in the wake of the Islamist revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would be analyzed in geopolitical and historical terms by Zbignew Brzezinski, its national security adviser, in the light of the Soviet Union’s desire to alter the balance in the Middle East.33 Both crises in the Middle East would overshadow a picture that would shift to the overall level of détente policy. Under the effects of the agitating events of 1979 in the Middle East, it would be Jimmy Carter, as Josep Fontana rightly argues, who would launch the reactivation of the Cold War. Containment returned from the ruins of détente, which always had powerful detractors in the United States.34

In that convulsive horizon, Republicans under the leadership of Ronald Wilson Reagan would reach the presidency in January 1981. In his political program, he presented himself as a man who would "restore" American historical values inside and outside the United States. On the international level, in the face of the drift of the 1970s, he promoted the restoration of moral strength. With his rhetoric, says Carmen de la Guardia, "he revived the fear of communism of the early years of the Cold War and insisted on intervening militarily where democracy would be in danger."35 His political discourse captured the imagination of many Americans attracted by their optimistic, messianic, and voluntarist textuality in a self-sustaining way that would reverse the American decline - or at least self-perceived-and purge the Vietnam syndrome.

His foreign policy program would increase in the US military budget and insist on the need to install nuclear weapons in Europe. His most ambitious commitment would be articulated around the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced by Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983, which planned the creation of a special defensive system using nuclear missiles.

A fundamental dimension of the Containment of the new Administration would be projected in the determined support for anti-communists anywhere in the world. Ronald Reagan's Containment policy would show some reminiscences of the conception of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles on the subject of liberalization and the notion of roll-back in peripheral mapping, but with a more extreme and ambitious staging.36

In the light of the Containment and the desire to exorcise the memory of Vietnam, military interventions and undercover operations would intensify. An activity that would be projected throughout the geography of the Third World and that in the Mediterranean and the Muslim world it would have as scenarios the involvement in the war in Afghanistan supporting the Islamist guerrillas against the Soviet invasion, support for Iraq in the war against Iran, the pro-Israeli position maintained by the US administration during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 or the air attack on Libya against the Gaddafi regime in 1986.

The Mediterranean, from Washington’s perspective, would be seen during the Cold War as a peripheral and border space modulated from the premises of the Containment and security imperatives where multilateral strategies, channeled from NATO, would cohabit with bilateral strategies established with various Mediterranean basin states. A space in which cultures of shared security would overlap, with Europeans from the Atlantic and European institutions,
and the premises of their policy towards the Middle East and the Arab-Muslim world.

Before the Second World War, American planners argue Noam Chomsky, sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the Middle East. Alexander Kirk, the US representative in Saudi Arabia, would say that only a stable world order under the “American system” would be possible since the United States would help “backward countries to help themselves so that they could lay the groundwork so as not to have to depend on others.”

The containment policy of the Truman Administration, argued by Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, would bequeath three substantial contributions to US policy towards the Middle East. After the Second World War, peripheral interests of the United States would be strengthened and, in particular, in the Middle East and North Africa, where an important network of geostrategic resources was created. The progressive decline of the imperial presence of Great Britain and France would give way to the United States to “exercise its new imperial role”.

At first, American politics, instead of being guided by ideological imperatives and considerations not necessarily related to the Cold War, did so by other types of more pragmatic and strategic keys, especially by economic interdependence between the Western world and the Middle East, especially because the fact that most of that oil coming from the Middle East was under the control of American oil companies.

The Truman administration’s second legacy in American politics in the region was its intervention on the question of the Palestinian Mandate. The Truman Administration helped the establishment and creation of Israel, but at a high cost, by harming the enmity of the Arab world and the emergence of a new problem, the Palestinian refugees. The privileged relationship of the United States with Israel eroded the efforts of US diplomacy to establish a system of regional collective security while promoting the good image of the Soviet Union to the Arab states.

Ultimately, the Truman administration would leave as a legacy a policy incapable of reconciling American rhetoric with its ambitions in the Middle East. After the postwar world, two threats against Western interests would be delineated: on the one hand, the direct intervention of the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, communist subversion from within those states or its eventual confluence with radical Arab nationalism, the triumph of which could lead to regimes opposed to the West. Washington, conclude Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, tried to ride five horses simultaneously: promote their economic interests and extend their political influence, implement the containment policy, support the colonial powers, articulate a privileged relationship with Israel and show themselves as a defender of the Arab nationalist movements.

President Dwight Eisenhower would continue the lines of the previous administration in the policy of Containment in the Middle East. The pragmatism with which they would act in the peripheral geography concerning the most assertive national movements -not necessarily Marxists or sympathizers of Marxism- would also be manifested in the Middle East by aligning themselves with the most conservative Nationalist forces, even if it represented the sacrifice of the moral and political values of the Republic and the violation of international law.

In the White House, his successor, John F. Kennedy, would be directed without much success towards the promotion of peace, the promotion of development -in connection with the developmental discourse of the new administration- and the cushioning of tensions between Israelis and Arabs. From Washington, attempts would be made to promote social and economic reforms and political modernization from Rabat to Tehran to prevent radical Muslims from falling under the influence of the Kremlin.

In the course of the 1960s, the US alignment with Israel became increasingly consistent. President Lyndon B. Johnson would accelerate the tightening of aid policies towards Arab countries. Less tolerant than John F. Kennedy towards Third World nationalism was convinced that the United States should do more to guarantee access to Middle East oil and reverse the Soviet incursion into Egypt and elsewhere in the “chaotic Arab world.”

In the 1970s, the Nixon Administration’s policy towards the Middle East would try to promote the strategy of two twin powers -Iran and Saudi Arabia- that would act as gendarmes of the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the pro-Israeli orientation of US policy would become increasingly decisive. Three episodes –the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year - would alter the precarious balance and plans of US policy in the Middle East, substantially affecting the strategic oil market.

In the 1980s the collapse of the triangular strategy of the United States -Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran- in the region would push for a review of US foreign policy in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This revision would not only affect the realignments of US policy with certain actors -such as Iraq and Iran that would embark on a war- but that the preservation of their strategic interests would lead to a growing military presence of the United States. At the end of the Cold War, the main change in US policy towards the Middle East would be that the United States had become the hegemonic power, at least in geopolitical terms.

In the explicitly Spanish context and agitation in the Mediterranean basin during the 1970s, Spain, embarked on the process of political transition and the re-articulation of its foreign policy from democratic keys.
would have to face fundamental security decisions - in the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean framework - by the inertia of its international standardization in European and Western terms.

The foreign policy of the Governments of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), and especially those chaired by Adolfo Suárez (1976-1981), gravitated around the search for new coordinates in line with the democratizing challenge. While it is true that the new foreign and security policy project began to be brushed, its guidelines would not be defined with precision until the advent of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) in 1982, whose realistic turn would eventually fully incorporate Spain in Europe and the West. A process that is well known for historiography and that we have dealt with in other studies and to which we make a superficial approach from these pages42.

In the reception speech to the Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences of the ex-president of the Government Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, delivered on November 16, 2005, entitled precisely "On the external transition," he returned to the international exceptionalism of Spain to the time to face the return of Spain to the international stage, as one of the factors that would revolve around the controversy of the Atlantic anchorage of Spain. A path not alien to the controversy:

Some of the positions contrary to Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance suffered, perhaps not consciously, from lack of realism and lack of humility. For example those who advocated that Spain not be incorporated into any of the Eastern and Western blocs, in force then, and preferred that it be incorporated into the group of the non-aligned, among which it could achieve an eminent position43.

Referring to this last reference to the attitudes promoted by the PSOE, neutralist fickleness was not a space claimed only from the most progressive circles but also formed part of the corollary of options and lines of action inherited from the regime of General Franco and who made an appearance in those early years, of the Transition.

The external dimension of the transition would be channelled into articulating a democratic foreign policy. Still, in those early years everything polarized around the enterprise of political change. The Transition and the construction of democracy in post-Franco Spain captured the interest of international actors, and the agenda of a foreign and security policy is still to be fully defined. The founder of the “Grupo Tácito” and second vice president of the Government of Adolfo Suárez, Alfonso Osorio, pointed it out in an interview conducted on January 13, 2010, in which he stated that “we must take into account that at the time I was in government our main and almost unique goal was the transition to democracy and the holding of elections.”44

In this sense, any approach around the myth of consensus in foreign policy must start from the gravity of the dynamics of political consensus as a strategy for promoting of change and the transition to democracy. However, there were issues on the international agenda it was very problematic to find compliances, including the question of the failed decolonization of the Sahara or the determination of Spain's position regarding the Atlantic Alliance.

The consensus on foreign policy had been one of the most persistent however, Fernando Rodrigo argued that it is necessary to speak more properly of “tacit pact”, which “allowed progress only on those foreign policy issues that did not create division between the main political forces committed to the arduous task of establishing the main lines of our democratic system.”45

The priority objective of the first Transition Governments, at least until 1981, was the overcoming of the external inheritance of Francoism and the normalization of the international relations of Spain to advance in the globalization of diplomatic relations and achieve the approval of Spain with its European environment.

The Government of Arias Navarro, as Charles T. Powell recalls, “was as sparsely operational abroad as it was in the interior." However, the diplomacy developed by Foreign Affairs Minister José María de Areilza and his undersecretary, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, would begin to orient towards the pursuit of these priority objectives. The Atlantic link with Washington was given special attention by José María de Areilza. In this sense, Henry Kissinger had declared himself in favor of democratization in Spain, but as the Spanish minister would observe, “he saw a high degree of reserve to what that process could bring as a discordant element or complication factor in European and Mediterranean political chess.”46 A testimony coinciding with Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, who claimed that: “For them once Spain had a settled democracy, they probably preferred a dictatorship than a democratic question, but once democracy was settled in Spain, it seemed right to them”47.

Finally, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger agreed to the conclusion of a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in January 1976, ratified by the Senate shortly after the visit of the Kings of Spain to Washington in June of that year. The text presented a more political character than its precedents and was directed, in the opinion of Florentino Portero, to prepare what was considered by both parts as the ultimate goal of the bilateral relationship: the integration of Spain into the NATO.48

After the cessation of Arias Navarro and the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister in July 1976, it arose the opportunity to design a more ambitious foreign policy, a path in which the new Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre, would play a crucial role. The new Minister is, in Javier Rupérez's opinion, the one “who feels the foundations of what
politics was... of what Spain's foreign policy was going to be." It was "the most creative moment of foreign policy" because it is from the Palacio de Santa Cruz from where "it is generating," the "normalization of relations," approach to the European Communities, the "first connections with NATO."49

The winding process of Euro-Atlantic insertion would translate, in some way, the complexity of the Transition and the difficulties derived from the vagueness of foreign policy indecisive issues. Europe and the incorporation into the process of European integration became the priority objective of Spain in the Transition.

In the face of the greater convergence of political forces towards Europe, Spain's position in the Western defensive system would be a particularly sensitive issue before public opinion and in the political discussion among parliamentary forces.

From the Atlantic perspective, says Florentino Portero, the main interest of the Atlantic Alliance resided in the territory itself and in its geographical position, that is, the geostrategic asset. To this purely geostrategic assessment could be added another political one, because with the entry of Spain into the Alliance, "neutralist tendencies would be controlled, deeply rooted in the leftist parties."50

From the Spanish point of view, it is clear that at the military level, Spain has sought to command and control the Canary Islands-Strait of Gibraltar-Balearic Islands axis, the southern border -the gravitational axis of its security since the beginning of the century. But from a political point of view, the incorporation of Spain into NATO was a very controversial and deeply ideologized issue.

Since 1977, as Javier Rupérez recalls, Spanish diplomacy would develop a policy of an approach to NATO, although conceived as a long-term objective.51 The Government's position, as Florentino Portero has analyzed in detail, would begin to be clearer since March 1978, on the occasion of the defense that the Foreign Minister made before the Senate of Spain's entry into NATO. His intervention generated great controversy and raised positions found within the UCD. The official position assumed by the UCD and thus would be evident in the following elections in 1979 and in the investiture speech of Adolfo Suárez, where he explained his desire for Spain to be part of NATO, for "coherence with its European and Western vocation," but as long as the "peculiarities" of Spain were satisfied and broad parliamentary support was consummated.

But the atlantic determination of Marcelino Oreja did not count on the endorsement of the president. In September 1980, he would be replaced by José Pedro Pérez-Llorca in the Palace of Santa Cruz. Adolfo Suárez did not share the hurry of Marcelino Oreja for rushing Spain's entry into NATO. The reasons are multiple: first, he feared that aerating the problem of the Atlantic Alliance could jeopardize the fragile political consensus; secondly, he was not willing for the left-wing political forces, openly opposed to joining NATO, to monopolize the flag of neutrality and neutralism; and finally, Franco's heritage in his political culture and his worldview. Adolfo Osorio affects precisely this genetics since Adolfo Suárez was "a clear product of the Movement". Unable to be in Europe, Adolfo Suárez "followed that same line of the Third World and the United States."52

It has been affirmed on some occasion that Adolfo Suárez, somewhat intuitively and naively, intended to promote a "third way" in international relations, which led him to these drives and initiatives such as the celebration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid, which, according to Marcelino Oreja, intended to raise the international profile of Spain, where a large international conference had not been reunited since the one held in 1906 in Algeciras.53

After the resignation of Adolfo Suárez, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo announced in his investiture speech on February 18, 1981, a few days before the attempted coup, his intention to initiate consultations with the parliamentary groups to raise a majority, to "Choose the moment and define the conditions and modalities in which Spain would be willing to participate in the Alliance." The entry into the NATO was for Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, and for the main part of the centrism, one more step incorporating Spain to the West.

The decision was precipitated as a result of the review of relations with the United States, since that the validity of the Treaty was about to expire. The text approved by the Cortes referred to the guarantee of the entire Spanish territory, progress in the Gibraltarian dispute, and that Spain's entry into the NATO is used as a pressure instrument to accelerate the stagnant negotiating process to enter the European Communities. On May 29, 1982, Pérez-Llorca signed the Instrument of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.

With the beginning of the 1980s it is taking place the opening of the debate on the main outstanding issues of foreign policy. It was an eminently political and very ideological debate. Faced with the thesis defended by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, from his investiture speech, there would be opposed the...
arguments of the PSOE and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE). In the anti-Americanism that was projected on the issue of the Atlantic Alliance, it must be taken into consideration the reading of the past:

The Spanish position—in the words of Ángel Viñas—did not fit the historical experience of Western European countries with which all Spanish parties, including those on the left, wanted to join. Western Europe considered the US troops as liberators of fascist chains. Influenced by the collective memory of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco regime, in Spain (…) the American soldiers (…) were considered as the incarnation of political support for the Franco regime.55

The new generations of socialists were poorly trained in international issues, and their positions and theses used in political debates were eminently doctrinal. In Florentino Portero’s opinion:

In general, the foreign policy of the United States was denounced, qualifying the Alliance as an instrument of US imperialism (…) It was insisted that the entry of Spain would represent an imbalance of the balance of forces between both blocks (…) From a national perspective, it was noted that Ceuta and Melilla were out of the Treaty, that the Alliance did not assume the scenarios where Spain had real threats, an allusion to the Maghreb, and that the risk of suffering a nuclear attack increased. Against the centrist proposal, they defended the maintenance of the bilateral relationship with the United States.56

In October 1982 began the period of socialist legislatures in the course of which the transition of foreign policy would culminate what Celestino del Arenal called the “constituent period.”57

Once in the Government, the Socialists set out to achieve two fundamental objectives: the consolidation of democracy and the socio-economic modernization of Spain. The consummation of both objectives, says Charles T. Powell, demanded “not only a favorable international context but the full insertion of Spain in the block of democratic countries with firmly established civil and economic societies.”58 In practice, it meant achieving not only the incorporation into the European Communities but also the permanence in NATO.

On June 12, 1985, there were signed the Treaties and Acts of Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Communities, whose actual entry into force would take place from January 1, 1986.

The most delicate and committed chapter of socialist management in that decade was the definition of the peace and security policy in deciding the future of Spain before the Atlantic Alliance. Conceived in its formulation and execution from a pragmatic spirit, the peace and security policy were founded on three pillars: the Atlantic Alliance, Western Europe, and bilateral ties with the United States. In a statement by Felipe González to the newspaper El País made on November 17, 1985, he argued why he had decided to move from the “ethics of ideas to that of responsibilities.”59

The possible turn of the PSOE modified the margins on which the new Government designed its Atlanticist strategy as part of its global foreign and security policy project. As was the case with the UCD, the socialist government had to face its particular journey through the desert, resolving the contradiction between its European vocation and its neutralist tendencies. The pragmatist turn would cause divisions within the Party and militancy, in addition to the Government itself. Fernando Morán, like Charles T. Powell and Florentino Portero remember, would end up assuming the realistic turn. The support of the economic block and Narcís Serra, Minister of Defense, facilitated the definitive slip of Felipe González towards the Atlanticism, against the proposals of Alfonso Guerra.60

Also, the partial opening of the gate of Gibraltar in December 1982 seemed to confirm the thesis argued that the presence of Spain in NATO would support the scope of an agreement with Britain over the dispute.

In the pre-announcement of the referendum stage, the Executive embarked on the elaboration and dissemination of his political project, embodied in the famous “Decalogue for the security of Spain." That document was intended to seek support within its party, being presented to the XXX Congress of the PSOE in December 1984, and gain parliamentary support, where it had already been presented on October 23, 1984. The document reflected the philosophy of the Government that had chosen to Europeanize the Atlantic anchors of the international position of Spain.

The entry of Spain into the European Communities strengthened the Atlanticist strategy before the decisive appointment of the referendum, held on 23 October 1986. Despite the high abstention rate, 40.6%, the thesis of the Moncloa obtained an endorsement of 52.49% of the votes.

Once the Rubicon of the referendum was over, a diplomatic process was initiated within the Alliance to outline the participation model of Spain to achieve “the maximum degree of integration without violating the provisions of the referendum.” Spanish diplomacy turned to the French precedent to resolve the relationship with the integrated structure of NATO.

Following the accession of Spain to the Western European Union in November 1988, on December 1, 1988, there would have taken place the signing of the Defense Agreement with the United States, similar to those signed with other European allies, in which in addition to suppressing the contingencies of 1953 contemplated a substantial reduction in the US military presence.

Spain, in the words of Ángel Viñas, had proceeded to the “Europeanization of strategic options”. The foundations were laid for Spain to return to the “mainstream of European economic, political and security events.”61
Spain's new Euro-Atlantic anchors would determine the perception and projection of its external action towards peripheral scenarios in the Mediterranean-African world and Latin America, no longer presented itself before as an isolated interlocutor. Still, they would do so from its new European and western identity.

The problems of the southern border, according to its peripheral projection towards North Africa, and especially the Maghreb, would continue to suffer during the Transition of an integral response from the formulation and concretion of the security policy. However, full international approval and insertion in its Euro-Atlantic anchors would break the groundwork for the staging of an authentic Mediterranean policy.

The geopolitical, geoeconomic, and symbolic ingredients of the southern border for Spain present very different components of the North American appreciation of the Mediterranean space from the textuality of the Containment. In the Spanish case, the southern border calls beyond the concerns generated by geopolitical instability a whole symbolic flow broken by cultural constructions such as orientalism and the gravity of historical neighborhood relations with the other shore of the Mediterranean.

Concerns about security under Spain's Mediterranean condition would derive from the permanent border nature of the Mediterranean and the perception, collective imagination, and reading that has historically permeated the collective mentality of Spanish society.

The Mediterranean, often a place of exchanges and encounters, has been a line of fracture, confrontations, and antagonisms. Antagonisms have worsened since the nineteenth century by European expansion. As Pedro Martínez Montávez points out, the “Mediterranean route is also, in the first and last instance, the colonial penetration route.” The Arabs, almost unanimously, see it and feel this way, as a material reality and as a symbolic reality. It would demarcate a geo-historic border space between two worlds: the West and the Islam and which would ultimately refer to the Mediterranean as a scenario on which a mental or symbolic border would be projected.

The new Mediterranean coordinates from the beginning of the 20th century would underpin the secular tendency to polarize the border towards the south, as a historical conditioner, whose perception refers - in the words of José María Jover- “not only to the existence of a political demarcation or a delineation of civilizations but antagonism between the Spanish and the Moors” the European and the Muslim. A notion widely socialized in the historical consciousness of the Spanish people and protected in a past conflict with the other shore of the Mediterranean and that reached the climax of its symbolic value during the civil war for the role of North Africa and the participation of the “Moors” among the rebel forces.

During the dictatorship of General Franco, it would not lose its border status but acquire new forms of expression as a result of the decolonization and the access of Moroccan independence in 1956, opening up a long period of disputes around the Spanish presence in North Africa, and the bipolarization in which the Mediterranean would be immersed by the East-West confrontation, especially after the power vacuum left by the old European colonial powers in the fifties.

The changes in the Mediterranean and North Africa, as a consequence of decolonization, would have profound consequences on the perception of the international environment by the regime of General Franco. The independence of Morocco and the impending irruption of Rabat’s irredentism brought the Spaniards back to the threat of the south, their border character and they returned to collective memory, especially of the Africanists, the violent and conflictive past and dramatic episodes of the war of Rif. The Ifni war of 1957-1958 illustrated on a small scale the liveliness of this threat and the precariousness of Spain’s defensive resources.

From now on, the southern border and the threat of the south would not only remain a focus of permanent attention to foreign policy and national defense. Still they would also be incorporated into the agenda of relations with Washington and the successive processes of renegotiation of the 1953 pacts in the course of the sixties -1963 and 1968-

For the United States, the golden rule since 1954, states Rosa Pardo, was “to guarantee the use of military bases and, to ensure this, to contribute with minimum economic and military assistance to keep the country stabilized and maintain the necessary friendship with the Francoism.”

With the arrival of Castiella to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there would be attempted to undertake a more coherent and planned foreign policy. The end went through the strengthening of relations with the United States, improving defensive coverage, the approximation to Western Europe, and profiting the assets of its international prestige in its policy towards Latin America and the Arab world.

The instability in the Mediterranean since the mid-fifties under the Suez crisis, radical Arab nationalism, and fear of Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean, and decolonization processes in the Maghreb would greatly influence foreign policy and the premises of the national defense of the regime of General Franco.

From this perspective, the war of Ifni of 1957-1958, together with the impact of the recent independence of Morocco, leave noticeable consequences on Madrid concerning the threat of the South and defensive indigence.
The turning point in relations with France would be underpinned after military cooperation in the Ifni War. In any case, military cooperation between the two countries in southern Europe and Africa, especially Morocco and the Sahara territories, has always developed in the spirit of preeminence of French interests.68

Finally, a problem added to the horizon of Spanish-American relations and aspirations to improve the defensive and economic benefits of the agreements would become the role and the links established between Washington and Rabat in the framework of the Cold War. Throughout the years, the United States would have a policy of appeasement and equidistance in the recurrent tensions between Madrid and Rabat for the sake of its global security interests in the region in the framework of the Cold War. In short, it was about avoiding a conflict between two allied states and regional destabilization.69

During the trip of Spain to the center of the international system changes of concept there would be forged changes of concept, among them, the notion of an authentic Mediterranean policy whose effective development would not take place until well into the eighties. In this sense, the elements of continuity would coexist with the irruption of elements of change and revision concerning the near overseas. The underlying elements of Orientalism-Africanism, which we already mentioned, in the Spanish case would remain in force.

In terms of images and perceptions, the period circumscribed between 1975 and 1986 was turbulent in Spanish-Moroccan relations, in line with the tensions inherited from the decolonizing process and the disputes that would mark the agenda of Rabat and Madrid. An aggravated situation, as Eloy Martín Corrales clarifies, due to new factors in the international context and the negative impact of three events for Arab-Muslim perception in the West: in the first place, the Arab-Israeli war and the consequences derived from the exorbitant rise in crude oil prices; the second, the increase in the armed struggle practiced by Arab organizations, the "anathematized terrorism"; and finally, the momentous event of the Islamist revolution in Iran, "responsible for the birth of the fear of 'Islamic tide'". In short, the image of the "Arab-Muslims suffered a significant deterioration that was extended to all countries and inhabitants of this cultural-religious field. The negative perception of Moroccans was updated with the new stereotypes generated in places far away from the neighboring country."70

The graphic catalog of the images of the south, particularly of Morocco, in line with these pitfalls, dotted the satirical graphic chronicle that appeared in magazines such as El Papus or El Jueves, but also newspapers and weekly newspapers such as Época, Cambio 16, or Trunfo, among others. They picked up the negative vision of the Arab-Muslims projected in comics such as El Guerrero del Antifaz, El Capitán Trueno, or Audaces Legionarios, but whose speech had become outdated and were renewed with a "direct and fresh" language knowing how to express in ironic and iconoclastic key the evolution of neighborhood relations with Morocco.

Likewise, the dossier of Western Sahara, the problems arising from the fishery negotiations, and the claims about Ceuta, Melilla, and the Rocks polarized a negative vision, which was largely embodied in the satirical images in the image of King Hassan II or the criticisms to the democratic lacks of the Alawi kingdom. The problem of Ceuta and Melilla in these years did not create in Spain any kind of patriotic unity. For rights, in the traditional key, the defense of cities constituted an inescapable obligation, at least formally. For the left, hiding until the Democratic Transition began, Ceuta and Melilla "symbolized the hated Spanish colonial adventure in Morocco and were considered colonial enclaves." However, the transition to democracy in Spain and the strategic and ideological changes in the main parties of the left - PSOE and PCE - would slowly change their position towards Ceuta and Melilla.71

Slowly, there would emerge new issues, such as drug trafficking or the emergence of North African immigration since the 1970s and 1980s, which began to concern certain sectors of society and the Spanish press. The conformation of democracy in Spain and the incorporation into the instances of European construction would have a decisive effect, in textual dynamics and the survival of these Orientalist prejudices.

In political terms, the great turn would crystallize in Mediterranean politics. This in the twentieth century, had become from an eminent polarization around the Maghreb and, especially, Morocco, to be articulated as a Mediterranean policy itself after the 1980s, whose horizons extend to the whole Mediterranean basin. However the Maghreb will continue to play a priority role. The gravity of Morocco in the Spanish policy towards the Mediterranean is an excellent indicator of how the transformation of foreign and security policy and changes in the international system has determined, especially the end of the Cold War,72 the formulation and articulation of an authentic global Mediterranean policy from Spain.

The articulation of a Mediterranean policy would be preceded by the inertia of the equilibrium policy towards the Maghreb. The first Transition Governments had polarized their international priorities towards Europe and the West. The Mediterranean would be relegated, as Susana Sueiro rightly points out, to the background, and the guidelines of diplomacy would comply with the inertia of the equilibrium and pragmatism policy developed since the 1960s. Spain, "for the first time throughout the century, did not focus the objective of its foreign policy in the area of the Strait
or North Africa, but its primary interest consisted in its approach to Europe.  

Instability in North Africa was the most important obstacle to articulating of a more coherent policy towards the Mediterranean. During the 1970s and 1980s, the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria was a continuing threat to regional stability. The balance policy would tend to foster good relations with the two Maghreb states. What determined the Spanish strategy -affirms Richard Gillespie- was “the Spanish concern to find a way to contain the nationalist ambitions of Morocco, since these were the ones that most directly affected their national interests.” Only Morocco and its “claims concerning Ceuta and Melilla, was a potential problem for Spanish internal politics.”

Despite the failure of the equilibrium policy, as highlighted during the Sahara crisis in 1975, it would continue to be the guideline of the improvised responses to relations with the Maghreb. Tensions with Morocco would continue despite the Tripartite Agreement of Madrid. The official Spanish position on the issue of Western Sahara would be set in February 1976 by José María de Areilza. It was considered to be a problem of “decolonization”. Spain would have ceded the administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, but not a “sovereignty that resided in the Saharawi people.” The policy of alternative balances gave no results. Attempts to placate Algeria regarding the problem of Western Sahara or the concessions to Morocco in the Agreement of 1977 would eventually feed a dynamic of instability that would eventually affect the pressures on Ceuta and Melilla or the discourse around the Africanity of the Canary Islands.

The absence of consensus on the question of Western Sahara, the other major controversy together with the entry into the NATO in Spanish foreign policy, would contribute -affirms Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-, to the “successive Spanish governments put into practice reactive policies with those who tried, in tow of the pressures of Morocco, the Polisario Front or Algeria, to maintain an equidistant relationship with all of them.”

With the arrival of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to the Presidency in 1981, there would be prioritized relations with Morocco. Subsequently, the arrival of POSE to the Government in 1982 would not initially alter in practice the policy towards the Maghreb. In the possible turn that is noticed in the Government of Felipe González, it would end up abandoning support for the thesis of the Polisario Front on the issue of Western Sahara and continuing the approach line to Morocco already initiated its predecessor.

Ultimately, it would be the Governments of Felipe González who would end up, in the medium term, laying the foundations for the development of an authentic Mediterranean policy and theoretical foundations, outlined to a large extent by Fernando Morán, and according to which the Mediterranean would return to occupy a priority place in Spanish politics. The proposal of the PSOE would focus on developing a “systematic design of a global nature of the action, outside, although the implementation of this model will not become visible until the integration processes in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance are completed.”

The Europeanization of Spain’s foreign and security policy would have its translation to the Mediterranean framework, a secondary area in the priorities of the European Community. The Mediterranean and especially the Maghreb, as Miguel Hernando de Larramendi points out, went “from being rhetorical aspects of Spanish foreign policy to becoming active priorities of foreign action, with which Spain aspired to find a space of influence in the international matters.”

The conception of security, in its complexity and integrity, would obey an eminently liberal vision since it was based on the a priori that the Barcelona Process would stimulate a “virtuous dynamic”. In short, from the acute analysis of Bichara Khader - director of the Center for Studies and Research on the Contemporary Arab World of the Catholic University of Leuven - it would be: (...) the liberal recipe in its most orthodox version of deregulated markets, which would supposedly increase the attraction of the Mediterranean space for local and international, private and public investors, which should favor the region’s competition, growth, and, in ultimately, the reduction of migratory pressure and the weakening of the “Islamist opposition” and “social upheavals”; that is, stability in the Mediterranean space.

This optimistic scenario of stability for the “economy” was combined, from the European point of view, with another scenario, equally optimistic and almost angelic, of stability for democracy and peace. Here the hypothesis postulated that economic development, induced by the opening of markets and its exposure to international competition, the capture of foreign investments, and privatization, would eventually expand the “middle classes”, vectors of democratic transformations.

The precise definition of the place of Spain in the world and the articulation of a democratic and homologated foreign and security policy, on track in the process of Europeanization of public policies, together with the profound socio-economic and cultural changes of Spanish society, would have profound repercussions on Mediterranean politics and relations with the Maghreb and the Mediterranean Levant.

In conclusion, the process of international standardization of Spain after Franco’s Regime and the Transition to democracy had deep consequences in the Spanish foreign and security policy. The accession to NATO and European Community was determinant for the development of a real Mediterranean Policy. The international dimension was very important to understand the political transition in Spain, its international place in the international system of the Cold
War and its policy toward the Southern border, the Mediterranean. The United States played a protagonist role in this change process in Spain as a model of modernity and as an anchor of Spanish foreign and security policy during the Cold War. The United States and Spain projected on the Mediterranean their cultural baggage of Orientalism and the inheritance of their history in the definition of their foreign policies to the Mediterranean periphery. This cultural background would emerge in their governmental speeches showing the core mentality toward the periphery.

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