

Understanding the Primary Reason (S) Responsible for the Conflict in Darfur under the Larger Backdrop of the Sudanese Civil War By Sabyasachi Biswal

Sabyasachi Biswal¹

¹ O.P. Jindal Global University

Received: 11 April 2021 Accepted: 5 May 2021 Published: 15 May 2021

Abstract

Understanding the primary reason(s) responsible for the conflict in Darfur under the larger backdrop of the Sudanese Civil War? is an attempt by the author to understand the ethnic conflict and the subsequent genocide in Darfur as a continuation of the larger Sudanese Civil War. The brutal civil war and genocide with its roots embedded in the post-colonial ethnic division raged in the country for more than fifty years. According to the UN figures, it resulted in more than three hundred thousand casualties. Flowing from the understanding of these religious, tribal, and geographical ethnic complexities in Sudan, which percolated from the divisive conflict between North and South Sudan to Darfur, the research paper also tries to understand the events in terms of comparing and analyzing it through two very prominent Ethnic Conflict Theories - Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflict Theory, and Fredrik Barth's Boundary Maintenance Theory. Laden with chronological details, subsequent ethnic grievances, international intervention, and violent development of the conflict, complemented by the author's analysis, this paper will be an enriching read for everyone, especially those who are experts or have considerable interest in Conflict Management, Ethnic Studies, and Peace Studies.

Index terms— ethnic conflict, divided societies, postcolonialism, conflict theories, sudan.

1 Introduction

epublic of Sudan, often considered as a gateway between the Middle East and North Africa 1, due to its strategic trade routes, porous borders, intermingling identities (Embassy of the Republic of Sudan, 2008), has often been in a bloody stalemate since its independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Mandate in 1956. The mandate, which came under a heavy nationalistic backlash from both Egyptians and Sudanese in 1952, asked for self-determination of both the provinces, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and General Naguib of Egypt 2 (Watanabe, 2017). This prospect of self-determination created Africa's third-largest country sans geographical or demographical truth 3 1 Overlooks one of the vital Middle Eastern trade routes -Red Sea and holds the Nile crossing from North to South as Northern Africa's vital water resource and waterway. 2 Successfully overthrew British administered King Farouk I. 3 The independence unified and blurred important boundaries between highly polarised Arab Muslims in North Sudan and African Christians/Animists of South Sudan. , and sowed the seeds of a protracted and prolonged Sudanese crisis, as we experience it today. Termed as one of the world's worst genocides 4 While most of Sudan stood on a dividing ground of religion (Modola, 2017), the conflict, ranging for over 50 years, has seen elements of civil war between North and the South Sudan, state-sponsored ethnic massacre, division of resources followed by grievances, dozens of politico-military coups and changing factions of loyalty, all leading to the perpetration of genocide in Darfur from 2001-2004. 5 , race 6

, and clashing concepts of identity (Falola, 2003), intermingling in an albeit fractured community, Darfur came to be known as a very peculiar case of violence, based on identity-related grievances. Divided into three regions -Western, Southern, and Northern, Darfur shared open borders with Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic (CAR), and had a ruralized population of six million by 2002. Apart from the fact that it shared the same grievances with the South, i.e., Economic, and sociopolitical neglect from the central government in the North, the religious identity shared by all the tribes in Darfur was derived from Islam. The warring parties in Darfur showed no religious difference at all. The only point of contention, however, was the racial and boundary difference coming from colonial practices. This sharpened hostilities between these religiously homogenous tribes due to lack of resources and state failure, which once again divided the Darfurians into pro-Arab or pro-African. Therefore, this paper, perplexed by the plethora of prolonged, confusing timelines, a clashing political (Sikainga, 2009). These factors, added with the gruesome details of near holocaust accounts of the Northern regime on minorities in Black Book (Daly, *The Destruction of Darfur*, 2010) initiated the conflict in Darfur and its spill-over effect in neighboring Chad.

2 II.

Analysis of the Background: The Whats and Hows of a Conflict that Shook the World "that so long as the social practice continues to be pursued as if ethnicity did hold the key to the structures of inequality, the actions of the dominant and the responses of the dominated alike serve to reproduce an ethnically ordered world" (Basil, 2004). Ethnicity, as pursued by Samuel Huntington and Horowitz, has been used to define principal causes of conflict much before the Cold War. According to Holloway, the ethnic characters, when properly analyzed, can lead to a conclusion that acts as a crossroads between hundreds of interrelated political, economic, and social factors as sharp points of division (Holloway & Stedman, 2002). In similar lines, ethnic imageries and ethnicization of Sudan in the context of colonialism and post-colonial development have eventually grown into a toxic power relation, responsible for conflict over resources and behavior of the Sudanese state. Shifting ideologies among near similar minded Arab Islamic Parties in Khartoum over the years and their overall understanding of the rebellion in Southern region and Darfur. The events of Darfur were not inclusive factors of Sudanese Civil War, but its flowing consequence perpetuated in a fixed timeline, starting from 1989. The conflict is traditionally analysed through a lens of ethnic ingroups and role of the state. (Pieterse, 1996). In other words, it can very well be argued that the seed of conflict in Sudan was sown way back when an Anglo-Egyptian collaboration snatched the region in 1899, along with the independent sultanate of Darfur in 1916, from the Ottoman Empire. With Darfur incorporated as an integral part of Sudan. These tribes were animists in religion. Mostly elites settled near the Nile Valley. Receiving help from English patronage. A result of missionary conversion during colonial period. A result of Oil trade with South Asian Countries. Due to their conversion into Christianity. Due to North Sudan's initial plan of Islamic revival in Sudan and enactment of Sharia.

Volume XXI Issue I Version I 2 () conundrum in Khartoum, and changing warring parties in the conflict, will try to simplify and narrow down the understanding of primary reason(s) that are responsible for the events in Darfur. Taking inference from various contradictory literature ranging from environmental degradation, race, religion, division of resources, cultural hegemony, and politics, this paper will try and find the principal factors that will help explain the onset of the conflict. The article, in a first, will also try to connect the different literary backgrounds, and analyze if the factors are exclusive or mutually reinforcing in nature to perpetuate the conflict as its rationale and argument. Darfur, even after gaining its momentum as a separate conflict in the 1990s should not be isolated from the larger picture of the Sudanese Civil War. (Baltrop, 2011). It is this historical backdrop from 1956 that will set the pace for the background of this conflict from 1989 onwards, and its conversion into a full-blown genocide from 2001-2004. In the end, the explanation will try to argue as to what theory of ethnic conflict fits the case-study in Darfur -Barth's Boundary Model or Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflicts theory.

(Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, 2007). The region then was divided into two parts based on ethnic lines, where the Northern part containing Arab Muslims was under Egyptian rule, while colonial power of England controlled the Southern part with non-Arab tribes. However, regardless of England's control over the Southern region, it was financially drawn towards Arabs in the North due to their immense private wealth and merchantry, acquired through years of sheikdom under the Ottoman Empire (Brosche, 2008). This not only shifted the power of control to the 2% of Arab elite residing in North Sudan but created a huge economic and identity divide, where Arabs looked down upon Africans in the South as Abeer (slaves). With the independence of the region of Sudan and Egypt from the Anglo-Egyptian Mandate in 1956, the entire region, which was technically three separate ethnic boundaries, i.e., North Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur got muddled up into one state, as the Republic of Sudan (Sikainga, 2009). This change was not only a complete disregard to ethnic and geographical truth but created a highly polarized multi-ethnic country where Arab Muslims residing in North Sudan had ultimate power over the rest of the Southern region containing African Christians, Animists, and African Arab tribes of Islamic descent in Darfur (McCormack, 2008). This divide also saw minimum wealth distribution among the entire country, with elites in Khartoum possessing immense private property, whereas the regions in Darfur and South were marginalized and kept poor. It further fueled hatred between African Christians/Animists in the South and Arab Muslims in the North, who used to look at each other as imperialist slaves and jihadis respectively. This factor made Sudan a battleground for many

protracted inter-state wars over state grievances, uneven distribution of resources, and ethnic dehumanization. The conflict, that started right from 1956, when rebel group Anya Nya fought for the self-determination of South Sudan, eventually got transferred to more organized Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983. SPLM/A, and the public demanded for a self-determination of Southern Sudan and asked for a secular and federal Sudanese government (Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, 2007). However, a question that might come up is where does Darfur, which is the focal point of this paper, lie in this bigger picture? It was 20 Known as the Islamic Legion. 21 Even if the plan failed in 1988 with African government of Chad defeating the Arab government in Libya in a war for inciting civil unrest in Chad, the soldiers trained and recruited by Gaddafi still stayed with Khartoum, armed. 22 Maintenance of Boundary. 23 Holy men in the fuqaras (courts) of Keira sultanate. 24 An Ottoman region in the pre-historic states of Daju, Tujur and Wadai. 25 The first men in Darfur; Darfur translates into land of fur. 26 No government until 1989 propagated its idea of Sudanisation and Arabisation including Sharia in Darfur. 27 The famine of 1960s and 1980s.

28 began to sprout due to lack of resources and visible demarcation of boundaries 28, i.e., African Muslims protesting Arab pastoralism and migration 29, these rules were not challenged. It is also partly because of the central government in Khartoum before 1989, who even after siding with Arab pastoralists of Darfur, did not challenge the historical law of the land (Flint & De Wall, 2008). 28 It was the first case in Sudan where environmental degradation created ethnic boundaries. 29 African Muslims created boundary wall around their farms to keep nomadic Arabs of Darfur from using it. 30 He ignored the unsigned peace pact between former Sudanese President Mahdi and SPLM/A illegitimate and unconstitutional. 31 The Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. 32 China was guessed to mine and trade in at least 70% of Sudanese Oil reserves. 33 Whose economic benefit was also not shared with Southern Sudan and Darfur. 34 It also included members of Libya's abandoned Iron Legion. 35 Chadian Fur tribes became a part of this movement out of frustration with the Janjaweed, who used to cross into Chad and pillage or take control of land ownership. until 1989 that Darfur not only enjoyed a distance from the North-South divide, but also did not feel any direct effect of the conflict. However, the region still functioned as a route for militias, trained and assisted by neighboring Arab tribes of Chad and Libya 20, to fight for the Government in Khartoum and ward off Southern rebels. It was a comprehensive plan designed as a compliment to Sudanisation, by Libya's erstwhile leader Muammar Gaddafi under his plan of Islamic revival or Arabization 21 of North Africa (Ali, 2007).

Nevertheless, before we go to the shifting political conundrum in North, it is very important to understand the history of Darfur and the multiple tribes that reside in it with same religious identity but different geographical ethnicity 22. Darfur, which is separated from the capital Khartoum by a seven-hundred-kilometer dirt road, is an arbitrary sign of the huge historical divide that both the sides have lived through, much before the construction of colonial boundaries (Bassil, 2004). Bordered with Chad to the West, and with an area approximately the size of Spain, Darfur established its core around Jebel Marra mountains, which are known mostly for its fertile lands. The region, unlike its Northern and Southern counterparts, has an Islamic religious identity, which is transferred from the Ulama 23 of Keira region 24 in the 17th or 18th Century (Mohamed, 2005). Nonetheless, in contrast to complete Islamisation, the internal administration of Darfur never forced Sharia or banned primordial African pagan rituals. With the migration of more Ulama from Arab land, the Islamized traditional Fur 25 elite created a connected aristocracy with pagan African tribes, with negotiable ethnic boundaries, extending into land sharing (O' Fahey, 1980). This inter-connectedness later paved way for competition among Arab migrants opting for pastoralism, and traditional Africans clinging to farming, where under a mutual agreement Arabs were to pay taxes to Africans for cattle grazing in their lands (O'Fahey, 1980). This land law extended well beyond pre-historic times and was left untouched when Sudan reached independence in 1956. It was because of this mutual land law that Darfur, for the greater part of the Sudanese Civil War, kept its near semi-autonomous status 26 with negligent ethnic cleavage. In fact, in times of natural calamities 27 when minor ethnic cleavages Nonetheless, in 1989 a coup organized by National Islamic Front and led by Omar Hasan al-Bashir successfully scuttled previous peace talks with South 30 to empower Arab-Islamic Sudanisation and put a definite end to historical land laws in Darfur to benefit the Arabs (Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, 2007). His two-pronged approach, garbed as national reconstruction for an Arab-Islamic state, not only allowed him to establish Sharia throughout the country but also gave him a reason to divide Darfur into three regions, cutting through African Islamic tribes to deplete their power and number 31 (Olsson & Siba, 2010). Bashir was also able to escape international condemnation for his act, since Sudan, by 1989 became a strategic partner of China, trading in oil resources 32 from Southern Sudan 33 (McCormack, 2008). However, the African tribes in Darfur did not revolt against the collaborative Arab nomads backed by Bashir, who by the name of Janjaweed 34 headed by Musa Hilal started taking control of landownership in Darfur. The reasons can be attributed to a lack of leadership in aiding revolution, and negligent military firepower against a much superior government, procuring arms, and equipment from China to protect the oil wells from Southern capture (Daly, *The Destruction of Darfur*, 2010). But, by the late 2000s, two prominent fronts sprung up in Darfur-The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). Both the fronts had different mandates, where JEM was a mix of African and Chadian 35 Fur tribes, and wanted to fight Arab nomads, and eventually the government for segregating and taking control of land in Darfur. They had no aspirations for the secession of Darfur. SLM/A on the other hand was inspired mostly by the larger SPLM/A 36 in Southern Sudan and wanted self-determination of Darfur and equal representation in government of Sudan. It was constituted mostly with Zaghawa and Masalit

African ethnic groups. Despite these differences, both the fronts were the result of frustration among African Darfurians against the government, for prejudiced division of economic resources, which led to underdevelopment, ethnic segregation, violation of traditional laws, Arab appeasement, and atrocities (Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, 2007). This eventually resulted in violent strife led by government forces and Janjaweed militias against the cadres of JEM and SLM/A in late 2002, when North Sudan and the Southern rebels were undergoing peace talks (??7). This ethnic cleansing, which was termed genocide in 2005 by the US, resulted in the displacement of 1.4 million people, and the death of 3,00,000 to 4,00,000 non-combatants (Copnall, 2013) including women and children, in the world's bloodiest stalemate, which still hasn't allowed Darfur and the international community to recover from.

When the first Arab gathering in Darfur in 1989 sent a botched ethnic complaint to Khartoum accusing Fur and other African tribes of sectarianism, it already warned the world of another genocide in Darfur. In fact, in the 21st century, virulent forms of tribal sectarianism, territorial expansionism, emergent agrarian, and racial crisis have been major individual factors of ethnic conflicts, where the crux of these conflicts is to establish a pure, agrarian utopia on the grave of their traditional victims (39-36). Take into note that the inspiration was only a theoretical perspective as SLM/A like JEM did not want SPLM/A or any Southern ideology to meddle in Darfuran affairs. (??7) Initial stage of Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Due to the Darfur war, leaders from Darfur were kept away from this conflict. (??8) There are also reports of Janjaweed crossing Chad border and indiscriminately killing Chadians and African refugees from Darfur. (??9) A post-modern commercially motivated conflict also refights ancient battles as a method of mobilisation. (Kiernan, 2007). Through the above-mentioned analysis, we can also see a pattern of such ethnic hatred fought from ancient colonial times, where the government in Khartoum, to propagate Arab-Islamic state, have been waging a war against the African tribes in Darfur and Southern Sudan, in a whole. However, the only problem that the researchers and the analysts face while looking at the events is that they stagnate the reason for perpetration to only one of the factors mentioned above. Therefore, to build the rationale of the paper, it is essential to reinforce factors of environmental degradation, ethnic hatred, and state grievances together, as the conflict flows by from 1956-2004. The above argument presented through the analysis of the background states that the conflict, which started as an ethnic hatred from colonial times, turned into a grievance against the state where solidification of boundary lines due to environmental degradation helped mobilize Africans and Arab tribes into their specific side for warfare in Darfur. Thus, it answers the second part of the research question by clarifying that the factors responsible for the perpetuation of the conflict in Darfur are mutually reinforcing, playing out according to the whims of the parties over the years. Now, to understand the paradigms even better, a comparative study of the conflict, sampling it through two ethnic conflict models is necessary, to denote which one of the two exemplifies the understanding of the conflict better. The two theories in question are -Fredrik Barth's boundary maintenance model and Edward Azar's protracted social conflict model.

Barth's boundary maintenance model proposes that ethnic boundaries are fluid, temporal and highly flexible. The proposal of his model was based upon ethnographies study of Arab and African tribes in Darfur in the 1960s along with his friend Gunner Haaland (Nielsen, 2008). The model elucidates that "categorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact, and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation" (Barth, 1998). Therefore, this allowance of historical continuity leading to interaction with other groups elucidates the importance of boundary as the ultimate definition of a group and not its culturally ethnic content.

Under similar descriptions, the African and Arab ethnic groups in Darfur used to maintain their boundaries through the utilization of ecological resources, much before colonization. Beyond the factors of death, birth, and intermarriage, boundaries were kept purely on lines of economic symbiosis, where interaction was limited to competition or cooperation. The title of an African and Arab descendant in Darfur therefore, described a person's occupation more than its culture, and thus was highly negotiable. African tribes in the region of Darfur were primarily farmers, led by the hakura land tenure law, where the man was respected for the land he has kept and crops he has grown.

Volume XXI Issue I Version I 4 () Similarly, the Arab tribes were pastoralists and cow breeders, owing to their historical nomadic pattern. A man's capability in the Arab Darfuran tribe was decided by the number of cattle heads he has reared (Vermeulen, 2000). Livestock had limited importance in African tribes but if an African tribesman, following the loss of his crops, rears cows in significant numbers, he can migrate with the Arab tribesmen and must adopt certain rules of the same (Nielsen, 2008). Surprisingly, this structured boundary negotiation is not even visible in these two tribes when they negotiated with their common religion -Islam. Indeed, boundaries change rapidly in times of conflict, but the current animosity between Arabs and Africans in Darfur was not historical (??0) On the other hand, protracted social conflict (PSC) is a theory developed by Edward Azar. According to him, it generally refers to the conflicts which are mostly inevitable, intractable and stem out from real politics where parties engage in conflicts over scarce goods, the comparative advantage of power, or when a party feels that its historical identity is threatened or frustrated (Azar, 1990). PSC in its evaluation and sampling takes many factors responsible for the genesis, dynamics, and continuation of the conflict. The factors range from external level colonial legacy, domestic historical social formation, needs, linkages from regional or political actors, etc. It is only right to sample the conflict in Darfur to understand the situations that will explain the dynamics of the conflict. Ongoing for more than 50 years, the tensions in Darfur and the conflict associated have been divided into many clashing timelines. These timelines, affected by changing leaders, the intensity of

international pressure and ecological disasters have repeatedly incited the dormant factors into a PSC. As we all know, the creation of Sudan was the result of the end of a colonial mandate in 1956. The problem arose when the three separate regions of Darfur, South Sudan, and North Sudan, with its polarized legacy, got incorporated into one country, absent ethnic reconsideration. This incorporation not only dumped economic resources in the North, including the capital Khartoum but also incited a social division between Arabs and other African ethnic groups. As years progressed, the Arab sentiment, fueled by Nimeiri's plan for complete Arab-Islamisation of Sudan in 1971. In fact, until 1989, Barth's theory of boundary maintenance can only be used to understand the consolidation of unity among Darfurians which made it avoid the conflict from 1956. 41 The acute ecological shortage due to famines did not fiddle with the boundary negotiations. 42 Sudanisation. Out of fear of being overrun by Africans in Sudan and neighbouring countries.

(Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, 2007) deemed credible oppositions useless in Darfur. Followed by Bashir's enactment of Sharia in 1989, it created a sharp division between Arabs and Africans over the division of resources, dissolving negotiable boundaries, and economy. This not only created access and acceptance need among Africans in Darfur, but they also felt the necessity to mobilize for their security. With the formation of JEM and SLM/A in Darfur, the government in Khartoum, led by Bashir and Janjaweed, intervened in Darfur via violent means, killing civilians to stop further recruitment. International linkages played a major role in the conflict of Darfur, where the Sudanese Arab government was supported by Libya postindependence and China 42 post the coup in 1989. This international support also consolidated Khartoum's politico-military linkages, where the arms and soldiers procured from China and Libya 43 respectively were used to militarize rural Arabs to launch offensives against Africans in Darfur. Similarly, Chad which was led by a famous Zaghawa African, President Idris Deby also supported the Africans in Darfur 44 IV.

3 Conclusion

, helping the conflict spill beyond the borders into Chad. All these factors supported the genesis and the continuation of the conflict in Darfur from 1989 to 2005. Even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 among North and South Sudan, the conflict remains latent in Darfur with parts of Arab tribes along with government-supported Janjaweed still engaged in tussles with African tribes in Northern Darfur (McCormack, 2008). It also supports Azar's claim that "incorporating conflicting communities into one political entity retards the nation-building process, strains social fabric and breeds fragmentation" (Azar, 1990).

With the above-mentioned arguments and literature, it is difficult to decide from the comparative study as to which model best describes the conflict. Both the studies have their fair share of shortcomings which also cannot be described by any other remaining models of ethnic conflicts. Barth's model fairly focuses on boundary negotiations between African Muslims and Arab Muslims in pre-historic times. It does give us a clear-cut understanding of how these negotiations merged a unity among Arabs and Africans in Darfur before colonial divisions. However, in a long run, it fails to mention what factors led the Arabs to break through the boundary negotiations and consolidate their identity beyond the scope of their occupation to fight a war based on a narrative created by a supporting central government. It also fails to explain as to how other variables such as culture, regional competition, colonial capitalism, and state encroachment affected these boundaries (Nielsen, 2008). Barth messed his entire theory when he failed to explain that why even after adopting pastoralism and migrating with Arab tribes, an African did not technically turn into an Arab, and later in times of the conflict, conveniently took sides of its African brethren.

4 References Références Referencias

In the end, it will be safe to say that it is not only the factors mutually reinforcing each other in the analysis of the background to help understand the onset of the conflicts, but it is equally important to use Barth's boundary model and Azar's PSC model in compliment to each other to better understand the spectrums of the conflict in Darfur, divided into pre-colonial Sudan and post-colonial Sudan. Here, Barth's model will not only reason the historic unification of Arab and Africans but will help Azar's model to look closely at the factors responsible for the breakage of these negotiations. It can also lead to the formation of suitable incubating factors which can lead to the future strengthening of these negotiations again through track two diplomacy to ensure peace and security in the longer run.

In the other hand, the PSC model which successfully describes the genesis, and the continuation of the conflict misses out on factors such as tribal sectarianism, ecological boundary negotiations and forgets to explain as to what led to the breakage of the boundary between Arabs and Africans, due to its tilt towards greater technicality. In fact, in contradiction to its theory that "PSC is mostly seen in fragile, the autocratic government", the government in Khartoum, even if autocratic by the end of 1970, was no way near fragile, with greater support from foreign countries in exchange for oil well rights. Moreover, PSC allows channel for greater conflict negotiations through track two diplomacy (Azar, 1990), but nothing as such happened in Darfur, where conflict was latent much beyond the internationally stipulated period of 2005. This international failure 45 has led to increase in refugees with no means of repatriation, spilling into neighboring Chad with problems such as malnutrition,

III. Rationale and Argument: Comparing and Contrasting the Conflict through Ethnic Theory Models

[Note: (Hagan & Richmond-Rymond, 2009)]

Figure 1:

288 starvation, increased mortality rate, short-term conflicts leading to mass slaughter, that has affected 4.7 million
289 people in Darfur out of 6 million (UNOCHA, 2004). ^{1 2}

¹An estimate of 3,83,000-4,00,000 civilian casualty.5 Divide between the Islamists in North and Christian/Animists in the south.6 Arab and African identity.7 Tribes of Rizaiqat, Missairiya, Ta'isha, Beni Halba and Mahamid.8 Tribes of Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Tunjur and Daju.

²Understanding the Primary Reason(S) Responsible for the Conflict in Darfur under the Larger Backdrop of the Sudanese Civil War

290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342

[Asia] , *Asia*

[Unocha (2004)] , Unocha . https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html 2004. May 13, 2019.

[A result of weak peacekeeping mandate of UNAMID, lack of condemnation from western countries, China's veto for Sudan in UN
A result of weak peacekeeping mandate of UNAMID, lack of condemnation from western countries, China's veto for Sudan in UNSC, lack of foresightedness among international actors to stop the spill over of Civil War into Darfur,

[Barth ()] F Barth . *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 1998. Waveland Press. (Long Grove)

[Copnall (2013)] *BBC News*, J Copnall . <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22336600> 2013. Retrieved May 11, 2019.

[Kiernan (ed.) ()] *Blood and Soil: A world history of genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, B Kiernan . R.R. Donnelley (ed.) 2007. Harrisonburg. (1st ed.)

[Holloway and Stedman ()] 'Civil Wars and State-Building in Africa and Eurasia'. D Holloway , S J Stedman . *Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective*, M R Beissinger, & C Young (ed.) (London) 2002. John Hopkins University Press. p. .

[Baltrop ()] 'Conflict, War and Peace'. R Baltrop . *Darfur and the International Community*, A Rowe (ed.) (New York) 2011. I.B. Taurus and Co. Ltd. p. .

[Brosche ()] 'Darfur -Dimensions and Dilemmas of a Complex Situation'. J Brosche . *Uppsala: Universitetsstryckeriet*, (Uppsala) 2008. (1st ed.)

[Hagan and Richmond-Rymond ()] *Darfur and the Crime of Genocide*, J Hagan , W Richmond-Rymond . 2009. New York: Cambridge University Press. (1st ed.)

[McCormack ()] *Darfur in 10 Minutes*, P McCormack . 2008.

[Daly ()] *Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a Humanitarian Crisis*, M Daly . 2007. New York: Cambridge University Press. (1st ed.)

[Republic of Sudan. (ed.) (2008)] *Embassy of the Republic of Sudan*, <http://www.sudanembassy.org/index.php/sudans-foreign-policy> Republic of Sudan. (ed.) 2008. Retrieved May 10, 2019.

[Olsson and Siba ()] *Ethnic Cleansing or Resource Struggle in Darfur*, O Olsson , E Siba . 2010. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg Press.

[Flint and De Wall ()] J Flint , A De Wall . *Darfur -A new history of a long war*, (New York) 2008. Royal African Society. (1st ed.)

[Modola (2017)] *Human Rights Watch*, S Modola . <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/south-sudan> 2017. Retrieved May 10, 2019.

[Nielsen ()] S E Nielsen . *Ethnic boundaries and conflict in Darfur. Ethnicities, VIII*, 2008. p. .

[O'fahey ()] R S O'fahey . *State and Society in Darfur*, (London) 1980. St. Martin's Press. (1st ed.)

[Watanabe ()] *The Darfur Conflict*, E Watanabe . 2017. (Director). Motion Picture)

[Daly ()] *The Destruction of Darfur. In Darfur's Sorrow: The forgotten history of a humanitarian disaster*, M Daly . 2010. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. .

[Bassil ()] 'The Failure of the State in Africa: The Case of Darfur'. N N Bassil . *Australian Quarterly* 2004. 76 (4) p. .

[Azar ()] *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts*, E Azar . 1990. Hanover: Dartmouth Publishing Co. (2nd ed.)

[Ali ()] 'The Origins and Organisation of Janjaweed in Darfur'. H Ali . *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, AD (ed.) (Massachusetts) 2007. Harvard University Press. p. .

[Falola ()] *The Power of African Cultures*, T Falola . 2003. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

[Sikainga ()] 'The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis': Understanding the Darfur Conflict'. A Sikainga . *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective* 2009. (5) .

[Mohamed ()] *Understanding the Conflict in Darfur*, S M Mohamed . 2005. Copenhagen. Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen

[Pieterse ()] 'Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse'. J N Pieterse . *Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, E N Wilmsen, & M Patrick (ed.) (Chicago) 1996. The University of Chicago Press. p. 33.

[Vermeulen ()] H Vermeulen . *The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 2000. (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff International)