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Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s

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Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s

Syed Fakharuddin Shah ^α & M. Zubair Khan ^σ

Abstract - Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the first elected prime minister of Pakistan. His initial strategy of accommodation and power sharing with the regionalists in Balochistan had a positive impact on the national politics. The regionalists started to distance themselves from secessionist tendencies. However, the policy of pacification was short-lived. The central government, instead of addressing political conflicts with consensus, resorted to undemocratic means. The process of democratization in Balochistan was disrupted and the provincial government was dissolved. The autonomists were sidelined and were dubbed as 'anti-state elements'. The extremists, within the autonomists' fold, were infuriated and started the armed insurgency. The central government launched an army operation to cope with insurgents. Bhutto's regime marked a tendency towards executive despotism. Despite provincial government's alleged defiance of federal authority, the central government could have treated them with patience and tolerance visualizing the sensitivity of the Balochistan crisis.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to highlight the ties between Islamabad- Balochistan in a historical perspective. Many historical and political developments have been discussed in this article to manifest the circumstances leading to clash between the Centre and Provincial Government of Balochistan. The study focuses on some pertinent issues.

- The reasons of accommodating the regionalists for the Butto regime after the general elections of 1970 and its repercussions on the politics of Pakistan with special reference to Baloch nationalism.
- The causes of the shift in the Federal government strategy towards the Baloch nationalists and its significant impact on politics of regionalism in Balochistan.
- The implications of third uprising in Balochistan and Centre' response (military action) towards it.

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II. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE TO ACCOMMODATE THE REGIONALISTS

After assuming the reins of government, General Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962 and dissolved the National Assembly and the two Provincial Assemblies (Ahmed, 2004). Yahya Khan announced the Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) on 30th March, 1970, which laid down the basic principles to which constitution confirmed (Soomro, 2006).

Yahya Khan announced the general elections to be held on 5th October, 1970 on the basis of adult franchise (Rashiduzzaman, 1970). Despite strong misgivings against the LFO, the political parties welcomed the decision of Yahya regime to hold elections. They decided to participate in the polls and issued their manifestos (Chandio, Ahmad & Naseem, 2011). The political activities began in January, 1970. All the political parties decided to participate in the elections (Ghazali, 1999).

National Awami Party (NAP) also took part in the elections. It enjoyed considerable backing in Balochistan and NWFP (Mehmood, 2003). NAP had leaning towards socialism (Rashiduzzaman, 1970). It was ardent supporter of provincial autonomy. NAP had played a significant role in the anti-one unit movement. It bitterly opposed President Ayub Khan authoritarian regime for its alleged crimes and cruelties against Baloch (Kutty, 2009). Its election campaign in Balochistan was mostly organized and run by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Marri and Attaullah Mengal (Awan, 1985). Another prominent and powerful Sardar of Bugti Tribe, Akbar Bugti, also worked for the NAP. He became his tribe's chief at a youthful age. He joined Republican Party in 1958. He also served as MNA and Minister of state (Banerjee et al. 2005).

a) *Regionalists' success in the elections*

The elections' result reflected three different centres of powers as Awami league (AL) in East Pakistan, The PPP in Sindh and the Punjab, NAP and Jemiat Uleemae Islam (JUI) in NWFP and Balochistan (Gilani, 2008). The Awami League got an overwhelming majority and won 160 seats out of total 162. It came out as the single largest political party in the National Assembly. Peoples'party emerged as the second largest party and secured 81 seats out of 138 from West Pakistan. The NAP won six seats and Jammatt-i-Islami

captured four seats of National Assembly (Awan, 1985). LFO did not lay down any special majority or consensus among the units in making the new constitution. It required only simple majority which the Awami League had. It could also form the government at the central level. The president could withhold his assent regarding the constitution in case of violation of terms mentioned in LFO. But it was a later question. The ruling junta failed to foresee such possibility of Mujib's victory in the elections (Alvi, 1971). They were also expecting some sort of flexibility and compromise from Awami league on Six Points which were viewed in West Pakistan as amounting to secession points. However, in the post election scenario Mujib adopted very stern and adamant attitude on Six Points. Bhutto's opposition to Mujib's Six Points brought him close to like minded Rawalpindi Generals (Khan, 2006). Bhutto and the ruling generals decided to postpone the session of National Assembly. Yahya Khan's political tactic was to use Bhutto to get out of the self-created situation but due to his ill-planning Bhutto seemed to exploit Yahya to come out as the sole leader of West Pakistan (Khan, 2006).

b) *East Pakistan debacle*

Bhutto made very sentimental address on the occasion and said "we have to pick up pieces, very small pieces but we will make a new Pakistan" (Khan, 2006). Bhutto assumed the office of Chief Martial-Law Administrator (CMLA) and President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 20 December, 1971 (Ghazali, 1999). At that time, country was suffering from the gravest crisis in the history of Pakistan (Khan, 2006). Bhutto inherited serious problems. Baloch and Pashtun Nationalism was at its climax. The nation was totally demoralized on the humiliating defeat in 1971 war (Amin, 1998). It was looking forward to an end of Martial Law and the formation of permanent constitution. Apart from political problems, economic issues were coming on the surface with great intensity (Hussain & Hussain, 1993). Bhutto had three advantages in bringing life to normalcy under democratic dispensation. First, his political party succeeded in the election in West Pakistan on the promise of Roti, Kapara and Makan. The People had attached a lot of hopes from the new regime. Secondly, the Supreme Court had declared Yahya's rule as illegal and unconstitutional. Thirdly, the status of armed forces had been lowered as a result of its defeat and separation of East Pakistan (Rizvi, 1986). In 1970 polls, Awami League (AL) won majority seats in the East wing, PPP got success in the Punjab and Sindh where as the NAP and the JUI secured most of the seats in Balochistan and NWFP. All political parties were urging for the formation of representative government on the basis of the election results. Bhutto also realized that Martial law could not be imposed for long time and establishment of the constitutional governments are indispensable (Raza, 1997).

c) *Required consensus for making of constitution*

Bhutto also tried to bring political forces on board to gain consensus vis-à-vis making of new constitution. Bhutto removed the ban on NAP (Raza, 1997). It was banned by Yahya Khan during Indo-Pak war of 1971. Wali Khan and other regionalists welcomed the decision and issued pro-government statement in the Press. At last an accord was negotiated between Bhutto and NAP on 6 March, 1972 (Bhutto, 1972). Its salient features were as follows:

- Martial Law would be lifted from August 14, 1972 and the National Assembly would be convened to consider the draft constitution.
- The central government would appoint the governors in the provinces in consent with the majority parties in NWFP and Balochistan.
- The Governments in the centre and in the provinces would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority.
- The government at the centre and at province level would be established on the basis of parliamentary majority.
- As mentioned above, in accordance with the negotiated agreement, NAP JUI's nominees, Arbab Sikander in NWFP and Ghaous Bakhsh Bizenjo would be appointed as the Governors of Balochistan.

The agreement faced serious threat in the beginning due to trust-deficit between the two signatories. NAP had serious misgivings about the central government's decision regarding the dismissal of many public officials, belonging to provinces, without giving them access to the court. NAP regarded the central government's decision as an attack on the provincial autonomy. NAP-JUI government threatened to review the decision of the federal government about the dismissal of the civil servants (Khan, 2006). In reaction, Bhutto withheld the appointment of the NAP-JUI's nominees for governor ship in NWFP and Balochistan. In order to settle the differences, different rounds of talks were held between two contending political forces. However, Bhutto decided to lift Martial Law and made its declaration on 14th April at the National Assembly session. The National Assembly also approved unanimously the provisional constitution. NAP-JUI's nominees were sworn in as the Governors of NWFP and Balochistan on 1 May, 1972 and on 28 April, 1972 respectively. The accord, no doubt, saved the country from political quagmire for a short time. Later on, it failed to stop confrontational politics.

d) *External objectives*

Bhutto was a shrewd politician (Hassan, 2009). He made an agreement with NAP-JUI to buy time and got help for his external objectives like an agreement

with International Monetary Fund (IMF), settlement with India and support on the constitutional draft (Raza, 1997). The government succeeded to get NAP-JUI's support on the above discussed initiatives. Bhutto viewed the formation of governments in Balochistan and NWFP as temporary solution (Waseem, 1994). Afterwards it became obvious when the provincial governments were allowed to remain in power in NWFP and Balochistan just for nine months.

III. CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE TOWARDS BALOCHISTAN

Certain historical facts throw light on the factors that made federal government of Bhutto to drift back from its early initiative to accommodate Balochistan.

a) *Jamotes-Mengals Dispute*

The relations between the ministry of Attaullah Mengal and central government began to strain due to many reasons (Rahman, 2009). According to central government's version, the provincial authorities had arrested some leaders of Jamote tribe in Lasbela-rivals of Mengals. The Jamotes reacted and launched an armed rebellion against the authorities. Attaullah Mengal took help of his own established lashkar to fight against the Jamotes (Abbas, 2005). The lashkar also had the backing of regular forces. The central government intervened and called upon the provincial government to stop military action against the Jamotes. Upon refusal, federal troops entered Lasbela to halt the lashkar's activities. The provincial government headed by Attaullah Mengal opposed the central government's interference (Kutty, 2009). The nationalists alleged that Bhutto's regime had caused the Jamotes uprising for political gains to dismiss the NAP-JUI's government. They alleged that Bhutto's regime had caused the Jamotes uprising for political gains to dismiss the NAP-JUI's government (The Pakistan Times, December, 1974).

b) *Killing of settlers*

Marri tribes' men were also blamed for raiding and killing Punjabi settlers in the Pat Feeder area. Balochistan Student's Organization (BSO) was also charged of kidnapping federal railway officers. So far as the disturbance in the Pat Feeder and Lasbela district were concerned, the nationalist writers were of the opinion that they were the handiwork of the central government so as to dislodge the provincial government (Janmahmad, 1988). The nationalists disagreed with the government's accounts. They conceived themselves as loyal Pakistanis, devoted to national integrity and solidarity. They claimed that the criminals of Pat Feeder areas had been rounded up. They also pointed out that it was 8 casualties that had happened and not 42 (Janmahmad, 1988).

c) *Political assassinations*

The Center-Balochistan's relations further deteriorated due to assassination of Abdus Samad Achakzai of Pashtunkhawa. The deceased was a severe critic of Bhutto's policies. His assassins were never arrested. Second killing was that of Maulvi Shamsuddin, Deputy Speaker of Balochistan Assembly, Wali Khan accused Bhutto of these killings so as to create civil war between Pashtun and Baloch (Harison, 1981).

d) *Different initiatives taken by the provincial government*

The central government was irritated by the decision of the provincial government to get rid of non-Baloch officials from the provincial bureaucracy. The provincial government also took control of Police and law enforcing agencies and opposed military interference in the provincial matters. Bhutto government did not like the initiatives of the provincial government (Breseeg, 2004). Bhutto regarded Baloch leaders as great obstacle in getting rid of landlordism (Herald, July 1986).

The government of Pakistan also pressed other charges against the NAP's provincial government as that of expulsion of Punjabi employees from different departments such as the railways and education (Government of Pakistan White Paper, 1974). The government of Pakistan viewed the confrontation in some areas of Balochistan originated by some Sardars to maintain their status quo regarding their feudal authority (Government of Pakistan White Paper, 1974).

e) *Sardari System*

It was believed that Sardars were agitating against socio-economic modernization of the province because it would abolish the Sardari system and their hegemony in the area (Government of Pakistan White Paper, 1974). This stance of the government contradicted its own strategy of extending support to "the good Sardars" or "cooperative Sardars". This argument of the government lost its credibility due to its protection and extension of privileges to these Sardars who were in its good books. It was Lawrence Zering's point of view that Bhutto exploited the Marri and Mengals against the Bugties. He also sided with the Khan of Kalat when the Bugties were no longer needed (Ziring, 1980).

f) *Foreign involvement*

Bhutto decided to dismiss ten months old Balochistan government two days after the discovery of Soviet made arms and ammunition from the Iraqi embassy. The weapons were allegedly sent for Iran by Iraq. The federal government professed charges against NAP's leaders. These charges had wider effects. It meant that NAP leadership was not only challenging the constitutional authority but also in collusion with Iraq and Soviet Union had planned to disintegrate both Pakistan

and Iran (Harison, 1981). They considered Shah of Iran's pressure on Islamabad. Tension between Iran and Iraq, and Soviet's support to Iraq in its dispute with Iran were the key factors in the removal of Mengal ministry (Harison, 1981). The NAP leaders categorically denied all the changes. They were of the view that the basic aim of the blame game was to create so-called justification to dismiss the provincial government in Balochistan (Harison, 1981).

g) *London Plan*

"London Plan" was another allegation charged against NAP's government. In 1972, many veteran political leaders visited London. The political leaders who had gone to London were Nawab Akbar Bugti, Nabi Bakhsh Zehri, a famous member of Qayum Khan's Muslim league, Attaullah Mengal, Ahmad Nawaz Bugti, Wali Khan and Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman (Awan, 1985). National Trust Newspapers and government controlled media reported the conspiracy as "London Plan". According to press report, it was hatched by the gathering of politicians in London. It was allegedly planned to dismember the country. The NAP's leaders issued statement of denial in the strongest terms with regard to the so-called London Plan. Wali Khan said that he was unaware of any such plan. He went on to say that all published material in this regard was false and baseless as an attempt to malign the provincial government of Balochistan which paved the way for its dismissal.

Nawab Akbar Bugti supported the NAP in the elections of 1970. The differences developed between the Nawab and NAP's leaders. The Nawab wanted NAP support for his women candidate for senate which NAP declined to extend. Nawab also disliked the becoming of Ahmad Nawaz Khan, his younger brother, the Minister for Finance in the provincial cabinet (Khan, 2006). Nawab agreed with government allegations against NAP. He also acknowledged his backing to the alleged conspiracy but later on, he claimed to disassociate himself from the said plan. His stand provided a great support to Bhutto's regime in dislodging the provincial government of Balochistan. Bhutto, in return, awarded him the portfolio of Governor of the province (Khan, 2006).

h) *Lack of culture of political tolerance*

Party in power at the centre did not seem to acknowledge the very concept of political tolerance and culture of pluralism in politics. NAP was considered as emerging potential political rival to PPP at the central level.

IV. IMPACTS OF STRAINED CENTER - BALOCHISTAN RELATIONS

a) *Dismissal of Balochistan Government*

Bhutto dismissed the provincial government on the night of 14th February. The NAP-JUI's government in

N.W.F.P also resigned in protest. The central government jailed important leaders of the opposition (Government of Pakistan White Paper, 1974; Jalal, 1999).

b) *Banning of National Awami Party and Supreme Court Verdict*

Bhutto government accused the NAP leaders of creating chaos and unrest in the country. They were also charged of challenging the integrity and entity of the state in collusion with Afghanistan (Khan, 2006). Eventually, the federal government decided to ban the NAP and declared it as unlawful body (Noor, 2008). Its offices were closed down and many prominent leaders of NAP were also jailed. Thereafter, the central government filed a reference to the Supreme Court on 24 February, 1975 in accordance with section 4 of the Political parties act, 1962. The Supreme Court issued notices to the NAP leaders. In response, Wali Khan, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Sardar Attaullah Mengal submitted separate written statements in the court. The court held the following acts of NAP as prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of the state (Chaudhry, 2011).

- NAP contended that it was no longer bound by the constitution as PPP, the ruling party, had itself not acted upon the tripartite accord. The Court declared it as a subversion of the constitution.
- The Court observed that NAP was actively seeking secession in the name of autonomy.
- If political party talks of changing international boundaries of the State it was clear violation of the concept of external sovereignty of the country.
- Seeking the right of self determination for the tribal areas which had already exercised and opted for Pakistan, is amounted as prejudicial to sovereignty and unity of the state.
- According to Hamid Khan, the judgment of the Supreme Court has the following weaknesses.
- The two judges, on whom objections were raised, should have voluntarily withdrawn because objections were based on valid arguments.
- The court manner in disposing of the objections was seemed to be hostile and unfriendly.
- The courts conclusions against NAP and its leadership were harsh and dependant upon inherently inadmissible evidence.
- The court dismissed the applications of some politicians for being impleaded in the proceeding. "Mr Justice Hamoodur Rehman had been good judge and wrote some outstanding opinions. This judgment and the proceedings on which it was based were certain disappointing (Khan, 2006).

c) *Military operation*

The central government deployed more than 80,000 troops in Balochistan against 55,000 Baloch guerrillas (Harison, 1981). The government of Pakistan also sought military assistance from Iran to counter the insurgency (Amin, 1998). The Iranian government pursued oppressive and iron-fisted policies to suppress the Iranian Baloch nationalists. It had also a lot of concerns about the effects of the Greater Balochistan Movement in Pakistan on Iranian Baloch (Breseeg, 2004).

V. DISCUSSION

NAP-JUI alliance formed its ministry in Balochistan. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was appointed as Governor of Balochistan. He belonged to the Bizenjo tribe. He was a politician of negotiations rather than confrontation and conflict (Baz Khan, 1999). Atullah Mengal, who was the Sardar of the Mengal tribe, became Chief-Minister, whereas Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri headed NAP in the Provincial Assembly. These Sardars had great status and influence in their respective regions (Breseeg, 2004). The NAP-JUI government in Balochistan expressed its political desire of promoting democratic values, stability, peace, rule of law and individual rights. It also wanted to keep cordial relationship with the central government. Attullah Mengal, Chief Minister of Balochistan, spoke of making a shining Balochistan (Khan, 2006).

Provincial government of Balochistan took various steps during its nine months period. National Council of Arts was established at Quetta to promote Baloch Culture. However, Mengal's Ministry was retreated on the language issue and Urdu was adopted as the provincial language (Breseeg, 2004). Perhaps the nationalists adopted Urdu as official language of the province because they could not ignore the Pashtun sensitivities on the language issue (Janmahmad, 1988). The other reason might be to remove diverse pressure from supporters of Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto (Harison, 1981).

Unfortunately, it was not provided a chance to survive and dismissed by the central government on the flimsy grounds. The NAP leaders categorically denied all these allegations. They viewed that the basic aim of the blame game was to create so-called justification to dismiss the provincial government in Balochistan (Harison, 1981). They claimed themselves the loyal Pakistani and committed to the national integrity and solidarity. It believed that Sardars were agitating against socio-economic modernization of the province because it would abolish the Sardari system (Government of Pakistan White Paper, 1974). This stance of the government contradicted its own strategy of extending support to "the good Sardars" or "cooperative Sardars" and its protection and extension of privileges to these

Sardars who were in its good books. Bhutto exploited the Marri and Mengals against the Bugties. He also backed the khan of Kalat when the Bugtis were no longer needed (Ziring, 1980).

Different versions and explanations have been given in regard to the dismissal of the provincial government of Balochistan. According to Dehwar, a nationalist writer, mistrust of the Bhutto's regime against regionalists caused the removal of the provincial assembly (Dehwar, 1994). Some political analysts pointed out external factors in this regard.

The Bhutto regime failed to accommodate the regionalist forces in Balochistan (Fani et al., 2011). Due to ill-conceived and non-pragmatic strategy of the federal government pushed the extremists within NAP's fold to turn to secessionist activities (Haq, 2006). They lost faith in democracy and democratic set up. The central government could have treated them with patience and tolerance visualizing the sensitivity of the Balochistan crisis. The removal of the elected provincial government made mockery of the federal system envisioned in 1973 constitution. National integration, particular with reference to Balochistan, could neither be achieved nor strengthened by the culture of centralization or authoritarianism. After the dismissal of the Balochistan Government, the Baloch guerrillas started an uprising in Balochistan which subsequently spread to other parts of the province (Guardian, 1975). The army was called in to grapple with the insurgents. This was the great political blunder of the Bhutto regime because it provided a chance to ambitious army to re-enter the body politic (Wirsing, 2008).

Bhutto initially adopted the strategy of sharing power in the province of Balochistan with democratically elected political parties (Mazari, 2003). This brief democratic era had a significant impact on the politics of regionalist in Balochistan. They distanced themselves from secessionist tendencies (Grare, 2006). They clearly asserted to be the loyal citizens and patriotic Pakistanis. Unfortunately, the process of democratization in Balochistan was disrupted by the central government. The central government accused the autonomists as "anti-state elements" (Khan, 2006; Raja, 2012).

As mentioned earlier, the regional actors in Balochistan were demanding regional autonomy before the elimination of democratic institution. They were seeking the creation of a Balochistani majority province and devolution of power from the federation to the provinces. Instead of resolving political conflict with consensus, the central government resorted to military option (Titus & Swidler, 2000). The province was engulfed in civil war. As a result of use of force, the separatist feelings in Balochistan were further intensified. The military operation created further deep-seated hatred, disillusionment, resentment and desire for revenge among the Baloch. It had far-reaching

consequences for Center-Balochistan ties. It intensified the atmosphere of mistrust between the both-the centre and Balochistan province. Bhutto's initial strategy of sharing political power with regionalists had good impact on national politics (Jones, 1980). The Nationalists categorically distanced themselves from secessionist activities. They also adopted Urdu as official language. They also avoided from taking an extreme political line. They assured the federal government of their cooperation. PPP Government undermined the elected government in Balochistan. NAP was totally sidelined and the various guerrilla groups surfaced and took up arms against a strong central army. The insurgency was mostly launched by Balochistan Peoples' Liberation Front (BPLF) and Balochistan Students organization (BSO). The BPLF originated from the Parari organization which was involved in rebellious activities during Ayub Khan's rule (Harison, 1981). During military operation, NAP was the victim of ambivalence on the issue of secession (Ahmad, 1992). NAP was of the opinion that it desired to redress the political conflicts on the negotiating tables but military operation had left no option except to fight against use of unprovoked force (Amin, 1998).

Armed conflict between the Baloch rebels and army was at its peak in the early 1973. The guerrillas mostly took up arms in Sarawan, Jhalawan and Marri Bugti areas (Khan, 2006). The fighters were commanded by Mir Hazar Khan, Mir Lawang Khan, Ali Muhammad Mengal, Safar Khan and Khair Jan Bizenjo. Kalat and Mustang areas were led by Sulaiman Khan Ahmadzai. Insurgency in Muhammad Hasni area was organized by Mir Aslam Khan Gichki. Despite huge deployment of forces, the rebels blocked roads leading Balochistan from Sindh (Amin, 1998). The armed forces were met with stiff resistance at Mali Lawang Khan along with his 35 rebels were killed while fighting against the forces (Ahmad, 1992).

The uprising leaders remained ambivalent about the demand of right of secession. The leftist groups wanted to broaden the nationalist movement by including other nationalities in their democratic socialistic struggle. The tribal groups did not take into account the leftist programme (Amin, 1998). The Baloch guerrillas faced a much larger army. They were not well-equipped and were ill-organized. They were dependent upon the help of Afghan government (Harrison, 1981). The Baluch guerrillas tried to disrupt communication links and deployment movements of the army. Military convoys also came under attacks (Amin, 1998). According to one estimate 6,000 Baloch fighters were killed and army suffered 3,000 casualties in the conflict (Weekly Takbeer, September, 1986; Gazdar, 2006). The guerrillas got assistance mainly from the Marris, the Menglas, Hasnis and the Bizenjos. The Balochi movement tried to form contacts with their co-ethnics in

Afghanistan. Afghan government started to provide support to it but it had to review its strategy, Pakistani Government in order to counter it, started to extend help to Islamic dissident in Afghanistan (Amin, 1998).

Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo acknowledged Soviet inspiration with regard to the Baloch struggle. It was difficult to find out Soviet intervention but circumstantial evidence showed its interest in the uprising (Amin, 1998). So far as Afghan government interference was concerned, about 2700 Baloch guerrilla fighters built their camps in Afghanistan with its assistance (Harison, 1981). However, it is important to note that Afghan rulers did not agree to the Baloch leaders and regarded Balochistan as a part of their movement for greater Pakhtunisitan (Amin, 1998). The central government also started Hyderabad conspiracy case against 55 persons of NWFP and Balochistan. They were accused of "waging war" against the state. This continued for almost years and ended with the ouster of Bhutto's Government and promulgation of Martial Law in 1977 by General Zia ul Haq.

VI. CONCLUSION

Bhutto's rule marked a tendency towards the central ascendancy and executive despotism. The 1973 Constitution was adopted with the consensus of all units. It envisioned provincial autonomy by establishing institution for an equitable distribution of resources. However, his rule did not promote the culture of tolerating voice of dissent. His regime resorted to hard steps in dealing with the regionalists. He also considered that strong centre could be inevitable for national unity and political stability. He used undemocratic tactics to get rid of NAP-JUI government in Balochistan. Despite provincial government's alleged defiance of federal authority. Bhutto could have treated them with tolerance and moderation realizing the sensitivity of the situation in Balochistan.

Military action, banning the NAP and arresting its leaders created a wave of discontent and sense of deprivation in Balochistan. This untoward, situation could be averted if provisions of the constitution, relating to provincial autonomy were implemented in letter and spirit. The removal of the provincial government and continuance of emergency even under an elected government made mockery of federal System. The centralized and authoritarian political culture provoked a strong reaction in Balochistan. These were undemocratic practices which deprived Balochistan of an effective voice in political institutions and thereby, reducing their interest in the continuity of union. National integration, especially with reference to Balochistan crisis, can neither be achieved nor strengthened by centralization and authoritarianism. National integration grows gradually in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual trust. Balochistan should have been given equal

participation at federal and provincial policy making levels and decision making. Unfortunately, the central government adopted the strategy of suppression instead of pacification in dealing with provincial government of JUI-NAP in Balochistan. The centre's lack of forbearance in tackling the regionalists evoked the Baloch uprising. The apprehensions of Balochistan about the centre were not uncommon phenomena in the pluralistic societies. But it became most distressing when the mistrust and suspicions turned into a strong sense of insecurity and fear among the people of Balochistan. They sensed that big unit was trying to dominate the smaller one with well calculated and deliberate policy. Without following the principles of federalism in letter and spirit, the centrifugal forces in Balochistan were bound to become stronger and powerful.

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