Displaced Livelihood and the Security Dilemma: A Study on Forced Migration of Rohingya People in Bangladesh

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Abstract- This paper uses ‘livelihood displacement’ theory to understand the disempowerment and social exclusion of forced migrants in a host country. To explore the real situation, this article reveals different strategies taken or adopted by Rohingya people who were forced to migrate in Bangladesh, like as, their struggle to access power or engagement in criminal activities. It is an attempt to investigate how the feeling of otherness in forced migrant’s mind creates migration-security nexus in a host country like Bangladesh. This paper concludes that only shelter is not enough to lead a decent livelihood for forced migrants as it requires providing them with the access to asset, right to work and other legal facilities. The access to resources and legal facilities may help to restrict them from informal activities and security may come into the grip of Bangladesh government.

Keywords: forced migration, displaced livelihood, migration-security nexus, security dilemma, rohingya.

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Abstract - This paper uses 'livelihood displacement' theory to understand the disempowerment and social exclusion of forced migrants in a host country. To explore the real situation, this article reveals different strategies taken or adopted by Rohingya people who were forced to migrate in Bangladesh, like as, their struggle to access power or engagement in criminal activities. It is an attempt to investigate how the feeling of otherness in forced migrant's mind creates migration-security nexus in a host country like Bangladesh. This paper concludes that only shelter is not enough to lead a decent security for forced migrants. It is an attempt to analyse different strategies taken by Rohingya forced migrants in Bangladesh to overcome livelihood crisis.

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I. Introduction

Understanding the situation of forced migrants, their livelihood and the feeling of social exclusion are essential to analyse the security dilemma of a refugee host country. UNHCR report (2019) reveals that the world now has 79.5 million forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, human right violation etc. This data makes it very clear that, whether we want it or not we all have to deal with this global issue. For example, even though Bangladesh is a non-signatory state of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, it is overburdened by the massive forced migration of Rohingya from Rakhain state of Myanmar. From this point of view, this paper examines the extent to which displaced livelihood further creates security dilemma of a refugee host country. In this paper, we explored various literatures on displaced livelihood to understand the struggle of forced migrants in a host country. Further, we investigate the response of Rohingya forced migrants in Bangladesh to persist their livelihood, like their involvement in informal power struggle and criminal activities. To pursue this analysis, this article argues that the displaced livelihood creates a feeling of disempowerment among forced migrants and they try different strategies to overcome the situation which may create a migration-security nexus in a host country like Bangladesh (Jacobsen, 2014). In other words, this article argues that temporary shelter of forced migrants without other facilities may create a security dilemma for a host country. Based on this ground, this is an attempt to analyse different strategies taken by Rohingya forced migrants in Bangladesh to overcome livelihood crisis.

II. Analytical Framework

From this point of view, this article proceeds from a displaced livelihood and security perspective. 'Displaced livelihood' entails the livelihoods of forced migrants is different from other kinds of migrants or poor people of a country (Jacobsen, 2014). Jacobsen (2014, p. 99-100) identified three key differences of displaced livelihood- i) all forced migrants are faced with the loss of assets, family and community, emotional and physical health; ii) struggle of re-establishment on the host community, mostly in a confined camp; iii) dependency on humanitarian assistance. 'Migration-security nexus' turned to a prominent new research agenda just after the cold war period (Waever et al., 1993; Lohrmann, 2000 & Hammerstad, 2014).

According to Lohrmann (2000, p. 4), displacement of people across borders affect security in three levels- i) national security agenda as it is a threat to their economic well-being, social order, cultural and religious values and political stability, ii) relation between states as it creates tension in bilateral relations, iii) individual security and dignity of forced migrants. This article seeks to test 'problem of insecurity' assumption inherent in migration-security nexus that might be a consequence of displaced livelihood.

This article examines a case called 'Rohingya influx event' in Bangladesh and analyse security dilemma related to the event within bounded limit. An 'explanatory case study' approach is chosen to understand the displaced livelihood and security dilemma of Bangladesh in Rohingya displacement crisis. This study is qualitative in nature. The secondary sources of data includes the analysis and review of published books, journals, newspapers, online media sources, scholarly articles. The content analysis of newspaper has been the main source of data for this

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study. The specific themes are used for making explanations. The common themes of the collected and analysed data are explanations of the situation, innocence, vulnerability or criminality, national security, sources of the news and personal or group tragedies. After specifying the themes, data are collected to ensure results.

III. Literature Review

This section is an attempt to look into the literature related to the debate among the refugee vs. forced migration studies to find a perfect definition that suits for Rohingya community living in Bangladesh. After that it attempts to go through the displacement and livelihood of refugees that further impacts on their daily life. Further it reveals the migration-security nexus that may cause from displaced livelihood of forced migrants. Finally, it is an attempt to explore how it all relates to the case of this article, that is- Rohingya displacement to Bangladesh.

a) Forced migration

Forced migration refers to the extreme conditions under which a person or a community unwillingly decide to undertake the migratory journey (Scheel & Squire 2014). Forced migrants are people who have been forced to leave their own country because of conflict, persecution, inequitable access to natural resources, declining living conditions, chronic and pervasive human rights abuses, or for environmental reasons such as drought or famine (Koser 2007, Scheel & Squire 2014). These people are often described as refugees. However, Koser (2007) mentioned it clearly that all forced migrants are not included in the definition of refugees. To get recognition as refugee, one has to be persecuted politically by the state while most of the case of modern forced migration seems more created by internal conflict with ethnic or religious lines which is indirect persecution by state (Koser 2007). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2018) defines forced migration as follows:

A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).

Forced Migration concept is problematic in the absence of clear legal framing while refugee has recognised legal support via Refugee Convention and Protocol (Chimni 2009). UNHCR extended their hand in practice where they deal refugee and refugee like situation, more commonly people displaced by civil conflict or war are also categorised as refugees in practice (Hugo & Bun, 1990). Generally, according to the international and regional human rights treaties and customary international law, forced migrants are entitled to enjoy the full range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights except for right to vote, right to stand for public office and the expulsion of aliens (McAdam 2014). Under the extended principle of non-refoulment in human rights law, even if a person is unable to meet the criteria of refugee, he or she may receive protection (ibid 2014). But labelling displaced people as refugee or as forced migrant or as illegal migrant depends on the bureaucratic interests and procedures of a host country (Scheel & Squire 2014).

b) Displaced livelihood

In 1990s, the theme ‘sustainable development’ came into light in the writing of different scholars and it was included in the UK’s development policy (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005). ‘Sustainable livelihoods’ modelled as a system including different capacities, assets, and activities necessary to lead healthy life. It comprises of not only material assets like land, livestock or money, but also in need of adequate human capital- health, education, skills and experience, and social capital (Jacobsen, 2014). Jacobsen (2014, 100) also mentioned that the latter part of the definition of “sustainable livelihood” is really important to study in case of forced migrants. While Calhoun (2010, 12) reveals that the existing social capital of host country can play a vital role in achieving ‘livelihood’, like- housing, employment etc.

The Forced migrants are socially excluded from community through no use of their skills and experiences, denial of permission to work, lack of appropriate credentials and discrimination at the work place. The ‘social exclusion theory’ is in need to understand the monopoly and power relation from the host context that determines the ‘exclusion’ livelihoods experience of forced migrants. This theory explains the denial of access to the capitals/ assets to the poor and marginalised people (Bhella & Lapeyre, 1997). The mechanism of social exclusion includes- a) exclusion from resources or properties via laws, politics and regulations, or b) exclusion by using certain social and physical characteristics like race, gender, language, ethnicity, origin, religion, etc. (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005).

The forced migrants who have already lost their assets in their country of origin later found them again in a trap of not having or using their assets which gives them a feeling of disempowerment and as a result they resort to different methods to overcome this situation (Jacobsen, 2014). Further question arises about how forced migrants’ livelihoods are different from the labour migrants or other marginalised groups of host country. Cemea (1997, 1572) has mentioned that each type of loss has an impact on forced migrants’ personal life,
economic and social condition, psychological health and cultural life. At the same time host country can prohibit them from any kind of legal access and freedom of movement. They are mostly treated as guests who have only the right to live temporarily with minimum access to livelihood facilities (Jacobsen, 2014). Further concern about displaced livelihoods is insecurity among host community.

c) Migration-security nexus

Existing IR literature on international security highlights that displaced forced migrants may contribute to insecurity and conflict within the host country (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Lischer (2005) identifies forced migrants as threat to both internal and inter-state conflict. On the other hand, the alternative literature on human security criticised the existing national security notion and says it undermine the security of individual forced migrants (Betts 2014). This debate can be described under social constructivist’s securitization approach as it says security and insecurity both are socially constructed (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998; Hammerstad 2014). It has created a forced migration and security nexus in the academia and security studies have the wish to understand in which situation forced migration leads to uneasy and conflict situation in a host country (Hammerstad 2014).

IV. Context of Rohingya Displacement

Following an intermittent clash with the Buddhist majority and repression by the government of Myanmar, around 1.1 million Rohingya have fled from Myanmar to Bangladesh and now living in the Cox’s Bazar district in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 2019). Although there is a debate on the number of documented and undocumented Rohingya forced migrants residing in Bangladesh, it is estimated that around 200,000-400,000 Rohingyas were living in Bangladesh prior to the crisis (Rahman, 2010). However, due to the outbreak of violence in Myanmar, recent Rohingya exodus began on August 2017. Over 742,000 persecuted people have fled since that time (UNHCR, 2019). Bangladesh initially showed negative attitude towards the displaced Rohingya people, but ultimately hosted more than a million of people in her land under humanitarian ground. As a result, right now Bangladesh is a host to one of the largest refugee population in the world: more than 9,05,754 reside in densely- populated camps and settlements across Cox’s Bazar district (Kolsted 2018). The Rohingya refugees living in the eight upozilas in the Cox’s Bazar (Teknaf, Ukhiya, Cox’s Bazar Sadar, Ramu, Chakoria, Maheshkhali, Kutubdia, Pekua) may have the potential to generate insecurity and conflict in those particular region and Bangladesh as a whole (UNDP 2018). Some studies have found that when large numbers of refugees arrive in a country-and especially when they are in a destitute situation and do not share ethnic or cultural linkages with the host community—there is always a risk that social tensions, conflicts and even violence might arise (UNHCR, 2011). Likewise, there are a number of studies that discuss how refugee camps are perceived as increasing social problems and tensions in communities, including alcohol consumption, gambling, prostitution and other criminal activities (Codjo et al. 2013). Although refugees are the most vulnerable people, they sometime become force to generate conflict and violence in the host societies (Swain, 1996; Reuveny, 2008). The issue of Rohingya is no exception in this case of Bangladesh. A tension and hostile relationship between and within communities of Bengali and Rohingya has already generated in the said region, which require uniformed policy for ensuring social cohesiveness among the Bengali people and Rohingya people and to mediate the conflicting attitude between and within communities.

V. Displaced Livelihood vs. Security Dilemma: Findings

Refugees all over the world face the feeling of ‘othering’, so going back peacefully in their own place is more lucrative to them (Grove & Zwi, 2006). Rohingyas in Bangladesh also feel in the similar way. Many Rohingya wants to go back in their own country by getting citizenship but they are in fear of some gang who are standing against repatriation. They even killed some majhees (Camp head) by shooting in open day light as they campaigned in favour of repatriation (Taher, 2019). Most of general Rohingyas are suffering for their action and afraid of them. On the other hand, Bangladesh government provides them ‘temporary protection’ with very limited facilities, more precisely by giving them shelter only (Hoekstra, 2017; UN News, 2018). On November, 2018 and on August 2019 two attempts were taken by Bangladeshi government to repatriate Rohingyas. But both attempts were failed terribly. In some camp Rohingya gang’s celebrated by arranging feast when the repatriation talk failed between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Over this issue Rohingyas are fighting and creating chaos in camp. Many issues are here to blame from both Bangladesh and Myanmar’s side. Apart from those issues there is allegation against Myanmar’s army that they are infiltrating ‘spy’ to hinderance repatriation program. Those who are willing to repatriate they are threaten to kill by those spies (Taher, 2019). On September, 2017 Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) arrested 4 Myanmar’s citizens accusing them as spy. All of them are from Mundow, Myanmar. BGB’s concerned officer said “These 4 Rohingyas admit in primary inquiry that they work as Myanmar’s military source” (DW, 2017). In this condition, Rohingya forced migrants are facing severe
problem in the camp and outside and attempting different strategies to pursue their decent livelihood.

a. Psycho-Social dimension of displaced livelihood: Rohingyas are associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Furthermore, other mental health concerns including: explosive anger, psychotic-like symptoms, somatic or medically unexplained symptoms, impaired functioning, and suicidal ideation are also present. War affected communities have previous records of going through this kind of mental issues (UNHCR, 2018). On March 2017, in Cox’s Bazar, Action contre la Faim did an assessment named “Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support Rapid Needs Assessment on Undocumented Myanmar Refugee Settlements" (ibid). In that assessment they have find out that adolescent boys are facing excessive anger and quarrelling for the lack of playground, poor socio-economic situation, safety and security tension etc.

On the other hand, adolescent girls are facing lack of hygiene products and lack of safety and gender-based violence which leads to increased stress and anxiety, suicidal thoughts etc. At the same time women are going through scarcity of water sources, remote sanitary facilities from house, fear of being abused at home and outside which results into excessive anger, stress linked to re-productive health related problems, feeling of hopelessness and suffocation etc. on the contrary for men unemployment, inability to support family leads towards irritation, stress related to tension with family, rude behaviour, anxiety etc. Elderly people’s feeling of health insecurity and lack of facilities for religious practice create a feeling of irritation and emotional numbness. Moreover, disabled persons are going through irritation, loneliness, sadness in the absence of proper medical treatment and under the deprivation of basic needs (ibid). Apart from that, a large number of unemployed and idle Rohingyas have been engaging in different criminal activities for money. Elizabeth Hallinan, Advocacy Manager for Oxfam’s Rohingya Response, said: “Rohingya people feel as though they are in limbo with no end in sight. They are alive, but merely surviving. Immediate action is needed so they are free to travel and work to provide for their families" (Molla, 2019b). Most of the youth in the camps sit idle engaging in fights and violence also engaged to the drug trafficking" (ibid). Rohingyaas children are not allowed to state-run schools. Rohingyas are only allowed to work in occupations created by the UNHCR organisations within the camp (ICG, 2018). Where thousands of young men are sitting idle, unemployed and hungry with an uncertain future their crime will rise without any surprise (The Daily Star, 2019a).

b. Power struggle within and outside the Rohingya population: With the large-scale displacement of Rohingya into Bangladesh, multiple groups are competing for power within and outside the refugee population. Leadership among Rohingya refugees are fragmented by competition and conflict between groups (Wake, Barbelet and Skinner, 2019). After 1992’s Rohingya influx the then government of Bangladesh vested the responsibility to Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC) and Ministry of Food and Disaster Management (MDFM) to oversee camp administration. RRRC has in turn appointed two Camp-in-Charge (CIC) (one in each camp) to be the focal point in the camps who supervised a small group comprised of a Majhee, teacher, imam, and a male and female refugee. However, UNHCR Report (2007) mentioned it clearly that Mahjees with the favour of CICs and local police are key reason of human rights violation and insecurity in the camp (UNHCR, 2007). A recent survey found that one in three Rohingyas had “little or no” trust in the mahjees” (Holzl, 2019). Even UNHCR’s pilot project of electing women leaders for Rohingyas is facing resistance and threats from different power sources (The Daily Star, 2018). To unelected mahjees, the idea of being replaced by a woman doesn’t go well (Holzl, 2019). Since the beginning of the recent crisis in September 2017, the government has deployed thousands of soldiers from the Bangladeshi military to manage the camps and to resolve disputes. They have been divided into administrative zones led by Rohingya leaders chosen by Bangladesh military. Each of them is responsible for around 200 families (Karim, 2018).

Still to establish supremacy, Rohingyas sometimes get involved in various crimes and internal conflict. According to Ukhia Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) Mohammad Nikaruzzaman, some 50 complaints of clashes involving Rohingya people are being reported every day (Alamgir and Rubel, 2018). Even Rohingya community leaders are targeted, harassed and warned by camp’s less moderate factions, most often like as Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) (Solomon, 2019). On the other hand, Majhees are often killed by different power seeking groups. Killing over supremacy is now a regular issue in Rohingya camp (Molla, 2018). Mohib Ullah who chairs the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights (advocacy group based in the Kutupalong camp in Cox's Bazar) said "It is true that power struggle exists among some Rohingya groups, and some are getting involved in crime to serve their own ends" (Uttom and Rozario, 2019). Apart from this, different gangs are trying to keep foothold in the camp which is creating panic in the camp (Molla, 2019a). Many Rohingya criminal are making their own gang in camp. The purpose of making this gang is to earn money via illegal activities. Many Rohingya who worked as a gang man died out of those rivalries.
Matters like establishing supremacy on Rohingya camp leads to violent clash (Samakal, 2018). According to Cox’s Bazar zilla police, at least 14 gangs are present in Ukhiya and Teknaf Rohingya settlement areas. Seven groups are active in each area. Each group consists of 12-20 people (Kuddus, 2019). Rohingya gangs are not only creating panic in Rohingya camps, they have become a matter of concern to local politicians also. A local Jubo League (Awami league political wings) leader was killed by a Rohingya gang. Moreover, his family was deterred by Rohingya extremist when they tried to recover his body (Aziz, 2019). This incident agitated local people very much.

c. Illegal money through arms trade and drugs trafficking: The underworld notorious criminals use the south-east border of Bangladesh as the major transit point for arms smuggling. The smugglers sell the small firearms and explosives to terrorist groups and gangsters (Daily Asian Age, 2016). In 2016, 2017 and 2018 (New Age Bangladesh, 2018), the Rapid action Battalion (RAB) found arms manufacturing facilities in Cox’s Bazar area and these arms were believed to be sailed to local terrorists, robbers, arms dealers and trespassing Rohingyas (bdnews24.com, 2016). Within 2014-2018, 6999 firearms recovered from Chittagong division and 1720 from Cox’s Bazar; and 3793 arrested from Cox’s Bazar related to this crime (Khan and Jinnat, 2019). The rising demand after the influx of Rohingya encourages the weapon syndicates to put more effort in their production. Around 60 KM of border area at Teknaf under Cox’s Bazar district remained open due to Rohingya influx which is one of the main routes for arms smuggling. They also maintain several offices in Chittagong, Khagrachari, Bandarban, Cox’s Bazar and Dhaka to make liaison with different groups (Daily Asian Age, 2016). Police said many Rohingya youths are involved in arms dealing and robberies. The Rohingyas made collaboration with local dealers and get involved in arms trade. Robbery occurs frequently in villages surrounding the Nayaparha and Leda refugee camps with those arms (Mahmud, 2018). Likewise, by using arms Rohingya gangs illegally collect money from camp shops. Law enforcement officials are often injured by those gangs when they tried to stop them from extortion (Majumdar et al, 2017). These shops are also centre of various illegal activities, like drug and arms trade which bring huge amount of illegal money (Molla, 2019a). Especially Yaba is mentionable as top selling drugs because of its availability and high demand. Jeremy Douglas, an expert of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) said that yaba is cheap, highly addictive and one can produce 10000 tablets per hour by hiding anywhere (Douglas, 2008). More than 52% of yaba was made at Chittagong as it is located in the border of Bangladesh-Myanmar and become the main route of smuggling yaba (Ibid). Since August 2017 Bangladesh have seized more than 10 million yaba pills from local drug peddlers and Rohingyas camps. One Rohingya drug mules claimed to Al Jajira that, ‘there are some 400 to 500 yaba carriers in the Rohingya camps, but they do not know each other for security reasons’ (Alsaafin, 2018). Rohingya camps are overpopulated and due to curfew for aid workers after 7 pm, it has become a perfect place to hide consignments (Bremner, 2018). Now it is an assumption that ‘At least 15 syndicates are involved in the smuggling of the pills to the capital from Cox’s Bazar’ (Khan and Islam, 2019). Murder over gang dispute about the sharing of money earned from smuggling is also common in Rohingya camps (Rashid, 2019). Cox’s Bazar police stated on 1 September, 2018 that, ‘there have been 22 murders in the Rohingya camps in the past 12 months, as well as 80 drug-related cases’ (Makhuddum, 2018). On 4 May 2018, Bangladesh government start countrywide anti-narcotics drive. As it was not working well, they arranged surrender programme in Teknaf on February 16, 2019 (Khan and Islam, 2019). On that day a total of 102 yaba dealers and smugglers have officially surrendered to police with 350,000 yaba tablets and 30 firearms (Hasan and Aziz, 2019). Nevertheless, 102 is a very minimal number in compare to true picture. Drug lords are still active in the camps and doing their job with the help of Rohingyas.

d. Displaced livelihood and gender perspective: Another way of earning illegal money is human trafficking, especially sex trafficking. It is a well-established truth that the vulnerability of Rohingyas is exploited by many human trafficking groups even before the exodus to Bangladesh on 25 August 2017 (Fortify Rights, 2019b). Recent incidents give a boost to the previously established trafficking business. US State Department’s Trafficking in Person report downgraded Myanmar in Tier 3 country for failing to protect Rohingyas from trafficking and Bangladesh in Tier 2 for Rohingya women trafficking from the camp (Oh and Lainez, 2018). Mostly ‘desperate men, women and children are being recruited with false offers of paid work in various industries including fishing, small commerce, begging and domestic work’ but they are trapped by the trafficking gang (UN News, 2017). In most case, before trafficking Rohingya women are brutally raped and physically abused by them (ibid). The other side of the story is some Rohingya female are working under sex trafficker by...
their own consent as they have no alternative option to survive. Sex trade is thriving in Kutupalong camp where tens of thousands of vulnerable women are fuelling the business (Rashid and Caller, 2018). Many Bangladeshi women work with sex traffickers and help them to escape from camp to reach a brothel. In brothels of Rohingya camp most clients are Rohingyas. Outside the camps most of hotels of Cox’s Bazar most of the clients are Bangladeshi and some are foreigners from America and Europe (Ibid). Child trafficking is also present in Rohingya camp. Sometimes traffickers abduct children from the camp and demand ransom from parents. Though, even after sending money often they do not get back their children (Coorlim and Page, 2019). Bangladesh government has decided to build barbed wire fencing around the camps due to increasing human trafficking in the camps. UN organizations and different NGO’s are also taking steps to prevent human and sex trafficking.

Another important gender perspective is women’s participation in outside work. They receive threats from religious groups for going out to work for aid groups in the camps. Fortify Rights said it had gathered evidence regarding ARSA’s involvement in this particular incidence. On the other hand, ARSA has denied it’s involvement on Twitter regarding the matter. However, Lewis, Mc Pherson and Paul (2019) reveals that, from January 2019, almost 150 females who were working as teacher for BRAC left their job. An UN memo says Rohingya women engaged in volunteer work increasingly “faced individualized threats, as well as community threats via announcements made by religious leaders following prayers” (Solomon, 2019). As a result, steps to make Rohingya women independent is now going through a challenge.

e. Militant Activities in the Rohingya camp: ARSA, formerly known as Harakat al Yaqueen (faith movement) is a militant organization formed by Rohingyas attacked for the first time at three police outposts in the Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships in October 2016 (Bashar, 2018). ARSA claimed they fight for the rights of Rohingya (Ibid). The recent exodus of Rohingya is an outcome of an attack on 25 August, 2017 on Myanmar’s police and armed post by ARSA. The Central Committee for Counter Terrorism of Myanmar declared ARSA a terrorist organization and the military mounted a brutal campaign against Rohingya (Ibid). Hefazat-e-Islam (Protectors of Islam), a hard-line coalition of Bangladesh government-allied Islamist organizations threatened to launch a jihad against Myanmar unless it stops persecuting the Rohingyas (ICG, 2018). There is also report that Hefazat men are trying to collect new Rohingya supporters from camps, especially orphaned children and newly arrived (Joehnk, 2017). Border areas of Cox’s Bazar district have been used in the past as a base for recruitment and training by extremists. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) has promised to liberate the Rohingya Muslims of Rakhine from the state of Myanmar. There are reports stating that they traffic children and train them as their soldiers (Majumdar et al, 2017).

Apart from police, other sources confirm that in the tourist town Cox’s Bazar, at least seven to ten Rohingya terrorists’ groups are active and involved in criminal activities and among them ARSA is the largest (Patwary and Rubel, 2019). German based news agency Deutsche Welle (DW) in its one report reveals that ARSA is active in Rohingya camp and they are trying to establish Islamic Law in the camp (DW, 2019b). Furthermore, they are giving training to Rohingyas for fighting against Myanmar’s army. One ARSA member claimed to DW that there are almost 3500 ARSA member active in Rohingya camp. He also mentioned that they do not have enough arms and ammunition with them (DW, 2019b). It is important to mention that, the camps are closed for outsiders after 5 pm and Rohingyas are left to their fate. A report of the Hunger Project Bangladesh stated that 123 new mosques were built in within a short span of time (Majumdar et al, 2017). Mosques have become a place of socialization and indoctrination. Even religious leaders offer money to young children to come to Mosque (Ibid). According to Fortify Rights, on March 2019, ARSA abducted and tortured at least five Rohingya from refugee camps (Fortify Rights, 2019a). They also added that ARSA’s target is anyone who have expressed critical views of ARSA or are believed to be “informants” for Bangladesh or Myanmar authorities. ARSA is now asking for ransom and support from general Rohingya and religious leaders (Ibid). In another report by International Crisis Group (ICG) on 25 April 2019 mentioned that the ARSA has shown willingness to deploy deadly violence to hasten its aim (ICG, 2019). But ARSA announced its denial of ICG report findings via its Twitter account. Even if ARSA denies its activities, the camps are breeding ground for militant groups as Bangladesh government restricted Rohingyas from any kind of formal education. Rohingya children largely rely on informal private “tuitions” in dwellings and networks of madrassas that purely lack of formal education. Hefazat-e-Islam has considerable influence over the madrassa network in the camps via funding and religious education (Ibid). So it needs to give special attention to prevent any kind of further crimes by militant groups.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has highlighted the situation of forced migrants in displacement which includes social exclusion and marginalisation in host country, mental
trauma carrying from country of origin, denial to access assets and social power in host country etc. It has argument regarding the denial of all sorts of opportunities to lead a decent life in host country and the feeling of deprivation and ignorance further engaging them in power struggles and criminal activities both inside and outside of the camp, earning money from drugs and arms trafficking or from extortion, gender based violence, engagement in militant activities etc. It further explains how these problems create a security dilemma for the host country like Bangladesh. However, it is necessary to mention that Bangladesh government has already taken a great humanitarian approach which is ‘open door policy’ to shelter a huge number of displaced Rohingyas while the country is already overpopulated despite not being economically capable enough to take the responsibility of such a massive number of Rohingyas. Further, empirical research is required to understand the root causes of their displacement and how it effects a host country and how a third world state like Bangladesh can play better role to protect their national and global security. This article concludes by saying that, as a human being, displaced Rohingya people also have the right to lead a decent life. The aggression from their origin country and the feeling of deprivation in the host country are solely responsible for their unproductive and criminal activities which can lead to the demise of both the refugees and the host country. If provided better livelihood, the refugees can turn into a great asset in turn and strengthen the infrastructure and development of the host country.

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