

1 Mainstreaming Peace and Security in the Niger Delta: Resource
2 Control, Ethnic Nationalism and Conflict Cessation in a
3 Tumultuous System

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8 **Abstract**

9 As a metaphor of collective resistance to the "politically motivated assault by the majority
10 nationalities on the economic rights of minority communities", resource control expresses the
11 exponential challenge to the "politics of dispossession" of oil producing communities in the
12 federation of Nigeria. The Nigerian federal system, as incisively articulated in the protest
13 literature, embody the tyranny of the majority over hapless minority formations whose
14 struggle for relevance constitute in generational terms a challenge to the "coercive presence" of
15 the majority. The phenomenological exploration of this theme of hegemony in the Nigerian
16 federalism has found multiple expressions in the works of Saro-Wiwa, Okonta and Douglas,
17 Otite, Osaghae, Agbese and Suberu).

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19 **Index terms**— Hegemony, federation, coercive presence, federalism.

20 **1 PREAMBLE**

21 As a metaphor of collective resistance to the "politically motivated assault by the majority nationalities on the
22 economic rights of minority communities", resource control expresses the exponential challenge to the "politics
23 of dispossession" of oil producing communities in the federation of Nigeria. The Nigerian federal system,
24 as incisively articulated in the protest literature, embody the tyranny of the majority over hapless minority
25 formations whose struggle for relevance constitute in generational terms a challenge to the "coercive presence" of
26 the majority. The phenomenological exploration of this theme of hegemony in the Nigerian federalism has found
27 multiple expressions in the works of Saro-Wiwa, Okonta and Douglas, Otite, Osaghae, Agbese and Suberu). The
28 latent expressiveness of Nigerian federalism and the intractability of structural and distributive issues like fiscal
29 federalism have created the "terrain for violent and often mutually destructive confrontations between contending
30 social forces representing the state and vectors of civil society. Thus, the Nigerian state, in Gramscian terms,
31 lacks the "organic relations between political society and civil society" which characterizes the "integral state"
32 where hegemony implies "consent rather than domination, integration rather than exclusion, and cooperation
33 rather than suppression". ??Gramsci, 1971:56). The reproduction of this catastrophic balance in state-society
34 relations in Nigeria is manifest in the protracted social crisis in the Niger Delta.

35 This paper argues essentially that, the path to Sustainable peace and security in the Niger Delta resides
36 unalterably in "mainstreaming peace building and development programming" as a paradigm of Authors :
37 Department of Political Science, University of Calabar. E-mail : lixzito@yahoo.co.uk societal reconstruction
38 in the zone. In other words, in a turbulent system such as the Niger Delta, peace as a policy objective could
39 only be predicated on transformational activities which address "structural issues, social dynamics of relationship
40 building, and the development of a supportive infrastructure for peace" ??Leaderach 2006:21). In this regard the
41 peace dividend "cannot be separated from the question of the struggle for social and human dignity; "economic
42 longevity and ecological sustainability". In other words, the peace problematic is not unrelated to the "issue

43 of extant social and political conditions and the distribution of power". Thus, peace has become essentially a
44 security issue ("Securitization of peace"): peace and security are "two sides of the same coin" one cannot exist
45 without the other-and both are mutually reinforcing". Security in this context designates the "capacity of groups
46 (and individuals as their agents), to provide their physical and psychosocial needs and livelihoods". Given the
47 centrality of the state (the federal government) as a defining characteristic of the socio-political process, the need
48 to address significant structural and distributive problems in the Niger Delta should now be the focus of security
49 analysis and policy responses to the malignant social context of the region.

50 **2 II.**

51 **3 RESOURCE CONTROL AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM**

52 Central to the dialectics of confrontation in the Niger Delta is the intractable issue of resource control characterized
53 by peripherality, isolation and negation of the oil producing communities perpetuated through a system of
54 domination based on coercive economic and legislative controls within the structure of Nigeria's "centralizing
55 federalism". This coercive and overbearing control is well articulated by prominent fiduciary of the dominant
56 ethnic nationalities: the Nigerian Economist, Pius Okigbo. According to the Pius Okigbo Commission on Revenue
57 Allocation:

58 The owners of the minerals on which royalties are levied are indisputably, under the existing laws and under
59 constitution, the Government of the Federation. It follows that the payment of a part or the whole of the revenues
60 from this source to the State (or community) where the mineral is produced does not derive from a

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62 "The contest between state and nation is an ancient one, and for a simple reason -the interests of state and nation
63 seldom coincide. On the contrary, we find that both are constantly at loggerheads with each other. Do not be
64 fooled by appearance, exceptions or political punditry".

65 Wole Soyinka (2009) legal right but from political or other considerations. To transform this political act
66 into a legal claim of right, as the producing states seem to want is to do violence to reality (1980:93) It is
67 not surprising that in line with this determination through the majority fiat, another majority ethnic fiduciary,
68 Olatunde Aboyade, "completely extinguished the-principle of derivation from fiscal federalism" ??Oyovbaire,
69 1985: 193). Rotimi ??uberu (1999) has rightly observed that "this change in the rules for allocating revenues has
70 been denounced by ethnic minority elements as a politically motivated assault by the majority nationalities on
71 the economic rights of minority communities who are perceived as too small and weak to threaten the stability
72 of the federation". The phenomenological exploration of this theme of hegemony (the structure of supererogation
73 and subordination) in the Nigerian federalism has found multiple expressions in the works of critics such as Ken
74 Saro-Wiwa, Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas.

75 Ken Saro-Wiwa's critical interventions in the Nigerian melodrama found expression in his analysis of the
76 structural determination (as well as the structural position) of the ethnic minorities in two critical spheres
77 of dispossession: politics and economics. Politics addresses the ethnic question of "unequal citizenship for the
78 minorities and the instrumentalist construct of Nigeria's multi-state federalism which facilitates the appropriation
79 of surplus by majority ethnic communities. This structural domination, as Ken Saro Wiwa notes, has engendered a
80 condition of domestic colonialism which has turned politics in Nigeria into the "harsh oppression of the minorities,
81 the unabashed and remorseless exploitation of those handicapped by their numbers". ??Saro-Wiwa, 1989:11).
82 In this context, "federal .instrumentalities" reinforces patterns of subordination and supererogation in a wide
83 spectrum of activities, resulting in a structural reproduction of the core of the periphery (majority ethnics) and
84 periphery of the periphery (minority ethnics).

85 The second and interrelated sphere of dispossession addressed by Saro-Wiwa is in the domain of "oil curse"
86 and the instrumentalization of disorder. As he trenchantly notes:

87 Oil was very much at the center of the civil war... Twenty years after the war, the system of revenue allocation,
88 the development policies of successive federal administrations and the Inactivity of the Nigerian elite have turned
89 the delta and its environs into an ecological disaster and dehumanized its inhabitants. The notion that the oil-
90 bearing areas can provide the revenue of the country and yet be denied a proper share of that revenue because it is
91 perceived that the inhabitants of the area are few in number is unjust, immoral unnatural and ungodly ??1995:
92 63-64) This and similar passages in Ken's prolific writings express in the most graphic manner the level of
93 conscientization and psycho-cultural disposition now fueling armed militancy in the Niger Delta. Psychocultural
94 disposition, determines the overall level of conflict in a society in terms of shared assumptions, perceptions and
95 images about "what people in a society values, their definition of friends and foes, and the means by which
96 groups and individuals pursue their goals" ??Ross, 1993). The perception of dialectics of control is critical to
97 understanding the existential dilemma of minority oil-producing states in the Nigerian, federal dispensation. The
98 legalization of expropriation of oil resources in favor of majority ethnics through a series of draconian decree has
99 been a subject of passionate debate in the literature. This spate of protest literature and critical interventions
100 on the Niger Delta vortex has no doubt generated extensive debate and searing examination of the structure of
Nigerian federalism and "resource control" agitation. The establishment and status quo option has been equally

102 propagated and defended as a 'systemic necessity' bearing on the political economy of state -society relations in
103 Nigeria.

104 Specifically, the term "resource control" betrays a deep tension between two contending social forces: first,
105 those who own the land where the oil resource is located but do not derive a corresponding benefit from the
106 exploitation of the resources. Second, those who wield political power, control the state, and are the greatest
107 beneficiaries of the oil wealth. How best to distribute the oil resource between these two groups in a way that
108 will lead to socio-economic development has generated an enduring set of debates and conflicts between the oil
109 producing communities and the state and its multinational oil partners. Given the activities of militants, which
110 disrupt oil exploration and exploitation activities in the Niger Delta region of the country these debates and
111 conflicts have taken on renewed urgency, and now engages scholars and policymakers alike.

112 Recurrent questions have been raised in defence of the status quo: can a monocultural economy like Nigeria
113 allow the control of her critical national resources from which over 90 per cent of her GNP is derived to constituents
114 units (states)? What is the implication of resource control for the enormous federal government responsibility
115 reflected in the exclusive list of the 1999 constitution? Given the history of ethnic strife and distrust, what will
116 also be the fate of states that depends exclusively on revenue from the federation account for survival?

117 A survey of extant literature on fiscal federalism suggests that in all federations horizontal and vertical
118 distribution of national resources between the central government and the federating units is one of the most
119 contentious issues. This issue is even more critical in federations with a monocultural economy like Nigeria. In
120 fact, there are no universally acceptable principles for This is because no two federations are identical in terms of
121 histories, politics, economies and ethnic/racial compositions. Consequently, the principles of revenue allocation
122 adopted by federating units (states) depend on many factors.

123 The two fundamental ones are, first, how the country became federal. Second, the political economy of the
124 country greatly influences the control and distribution of the nation wealth among its constituent units. The
125 political economy of the state determines the pendulum swing between centralisation and decentralization of fiscal
126 powers and control of critical national resources. In other words, the nature and pattern of federalism is congruent
127 upon the political economy of the state. Empirical evidence in federations shows that states with diversified
128 industrial economy tilts toward decentralization of fiscal powers and control of critical national resources, whereas
129 federations with weak monocultural economy tilt toward centralization of fiscal powers and control of resources.

130 However, in both models the central government collects the largest share of the national resources. It also
131 enjoys a wide range of jurisdictional powers over critical national resources and-uses taxation/constitutional
132 powers to limit the powers of the federating units over resources in their locality. There is no federation today
133 where the federating units enjoy more fiscal powers than the central government. It is also apparent that in
134 federal states, if the essence of federalism as a tool for managing conflicts in plural societies and correcting vertical
135 imbalances generated by revenue and expenditure assignments are to be realized, the federating units cannot be
136 economically and politically stronger than the central government (Okediji 2006; Osaghae 1991; Elaigwu 1979;
137 Aaron and Samuel 2005).

138 In older federations such as America and Canada, federal experiment has responded to the changing dynamics
139 of their political economy: from preindustrial social formation based on extractive industries to sophisticated
140 industrial systems of the 20th/21st century. Consequently, the fundamental permutation in the theory and
141 practice of American federalism, reflecting its tumultuous history and political economy: "dual federalism",
142 "centralizing federalism", "cooperating federalism", "creative federalism", "permissive federalism" and "new
143 federalism". (AAPS special issue, vol. 419, May 1975).

144 Each pattern was quite distinct from the other. Nonetheless, all of them responded to the changing dynamics
145 of the United State's economy. As the United States moved from an agricultural to industrial economy new
146 problems arose and with them new demands for government action: the United States moved from a system of
147 dual federalism to one of cooperative federalism, in which the national and state governments share responsibility
148 for public policies. The Great Depression brought about an end to dual federalism (under dual federalism, the
149 states and the national government each remain supreme within their own spheres)and a dramatic shift to a
150 strong central government and what became popularly known as cooperative federalism. The economy and the
151 exigency of the time forced the central government to cooperate with all levels of government to implement
152 President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies.

153 Under the "New Deal" the center (Federal Government) became unequivocally assertive through the institution
154 of regulatory agencies (the Treasury and Office of budget Management) which marked a fundamental departure
155 from the neo-classical economic tenet by legitimizing and rationalizing the right of the state to intervene in the
156 market.

157 Under the complimentary Keynesian principles of "positive definition of the neutral state" and "circular flow
158 of income", the Federal Government became not only an umpire but the ultimate arbiter in the management
159 of American economy in fiscal and monetary relations. The rising welfare states in North America and Europe
160 marked the supremacy of the centre over he constituent parts, determining a range of governmental intervention
161 from Agriculture to Education and unemployment benefits.

162 The "New Deal" became the programmatic expression of the "positive conception of the "neutral state" and
163 "circular flow of income". Since the Keynesian system "regards the capitalist economy as a leaking tyre that
164 must be pumped continuously if it is not to go flat and grind to a halt", the heightened role of the federal

165 government -which is constantly required to pump the economy thrust fiscal -monetary policies became supreme
166 in the management of centreperiphery relations in American Federalism.

167 The neo-Richardian system of Reagan era ("Reagonomics") endeavored to reduce the powers and responsibility
168 of the central government in favour of greater responsibilities by the states governments, the federal government
169 has continued to assume greater power of the exchequer as the current intervention of the Obama administration
170 to save American monetary and corporate institutions from collapse suggests. This financial strength has enabled
171 the federal government to obtain the compliance of the states and counties through its Grant-In-Aid Schemes.

172 The federal government has increased greatly in size and influence, both in terms of its influence on everyday
173 life relative to the state governments. This is because no state can tax as effectively as the federal government.
174 This keeps the states in check since they depend on aid from the federal government to meet their responsibilities.

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176 federating states/provinces control more revenues than the central government. In addition, where the
177 states/provinces enjoy jurisdictional powers over the resources found in their areas such resources are not
178 exceptionally critical to national resources. In other words, the federation does not depend solely on such
179 resources for its survival. Lastly, to correct vertical imbalances and set national standard in service delivery the
180 central government is allocated more funds by the constitution through either taxation and/or direct control of
181 essential resources within the federation.

182 In line with the observation above, architects of fiscal federalism in Nigeria have sought to strengthen
183 the powers of the federal government through differential powers of control and allocation, which ensure the
184 subordination of the state components to federal control. The justification for this development derives from the
185 centrifugal pressures on the system by the regions in the First Republic, as each region felt viable economically
186 enough to join the League of ministates in Africa. As a consequence, for the oil-producing minority states
187 of the ND, the development of hegemonic rentier federal system has unleashed a systemic process of structural
188 abnegations as the power elite at the centre reinforce and legitimise allocative system through majority controlled
189 Fiscal Commissions (especially Aboyade, Okigbo and Danjuma Commissions), which permanently relegated the
190 principles of derivation. This heightened the process of "surplus accumulation" from oil revenue to majority ethnic
191 formations based on questionable criteria, which clearly compromised the interest of the minorities in the ND.
192 Thus, through Decree 15 of 1967, Decree 13 of 1970, Decree 9 of 1971 and Decree 6 of 1975 the "balance of control
193 and access to revenue" titled Towards Fiscal Centralisation at the Federal Level". The process of transformation
194 was "effected through the progressive reduction of the principle of derivation and the strengthening of the principle
195 of the Distributive Pool Account (DPA)". The cumulative effect of this skewed allocative mechanism on the oil-
196 producing states was asymmetrical structure of benefits in which the majority ethnic nationalities, to paraphrase
197 Thucydides, get what they may while the weak ethnic minorities concede what they must.

198 By a calculated act of creating and proliferating more states and local governments areas in the non-oil
199 producing geographical majority ethnic zone, the systematic transfer of oil resources to their benefit became a
200 major feature of inter-government fiscal relations. As Christopher Orubu (1999:189) aptly concludes:

201 The view is strongly-held among many critics from the oil producing states that the historical blow dealt
202 upon the principle of derivation is the product of the political game play and the overwhelming propensity of
203 the majority to play down on the preferences of the minority. It turns out that Nigeria's oil is produced in the
204 minority states, where access to political power at the national level is Herculean, if not an impossible task.

205 As a consequence of this powerlessness of the minority social formations, Orubu (1999:187) contends, the
206 "people have no effective politic-kinetic framework to address the issue of unfair distribution of revenue, as each
207 dominant group in the country struggles to maximize its own benefit from the "God given" petroleum resources".
208 Seen in this context, the structure of revenue allocation has had profound impact on the configuration of Nigerian
209 federalism. Cyril Obi (1998:263) has similarly noted that, "with revenue allocation largely implying the allocation
210 of oil revenues, oil is central to the politics of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria, the economic crisis, and the
211 transcendence of the destabilizing tendencies within the system".

212 Fiscal federalism, therefore, as conditioned by the "politics of oil revenue acquisition and distribution strikes
213 at the very basis of the existence of the Nigeria federation and the rules of entry and exit from the ruling
214 class". Conversely, as the widespread communal protests in the Niger Delta suggest, the evolution of a "non-crisis
215 generating approach to revenue allocation is germane to the stability and development of the Nigerian society".
216 This dialectics of revenue generation and denial constitutes the source of deepening crisis of Nigerian federalism.
217 The current crisis in the Niger Delta is one definite consequence of "feelings of neglect which have been suppressed
218 for quite a long time". This is obvious from the quantum of protest actions from NGOS and community-based
219 social action groups. The Kaima declaration of the Ijaw Youth Conference held on December 11, 1998, was even
220 more explicit in terms of the range and depth of grievance of oil producing communities: i. That the quality of
221 life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, suppression and marginalization; ii. Despite the
222 huge contribution of Ijaw nation's territory to oil revenue, our reward from Nigerian states remains avoidable
223 deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military repression; iii. That the unabating damage done to
224 our fragile natural environment and to the health of our people is due in the main to uncontrolled exploration
225 and exploitation of crude oil and natural gas which has led to numerous oil spillage, uncontrolled gas flaring, the
226 opening up of our forests to loggers, indiscriminate canalization, flooding, land subsidence, coastal erosion, earth

227 tremors etc. Oil and gas are exhaustible resource and the complete lack of concern for ecological rehabilitation, in
228 the light of Oloibiri experience, is a signal of impending doom for the people of Ijaw land. In the light of the above,
229 it has become a central assertion in the oil producing states that the claim of marginalization is not theoretical
230 but existential reality in the ND. This awareness and conscientization has provided basis of revolt against the
231 structure of Nigerian federation constructed to advance the interest of majority ethnic nationalities. Thus, the
232 contradiction arising from oil production and maximal neglect fuels demands by oil producing states for adequate
233 "compensation, basic infrastructure, community development projects, employment of indigenes, payment of
234 reparations for past exploration and degradation" of the oil producing environment. The consequence of this
235 groundswell of discontent in the ND was a violent eruption of youth militancy, which threatened the petroleum
236 industry and hence the sources of 95% of the Federal Governments foreign exchange earnings. Between the period
237 1993 and 2009, several attacks and occupation of oil platforms, flows stations, operating rig terminals, pipelines,
238 refineries and power installations have incapacitated petrobusiness in the region. For instance, Shell has been
239 forced to shut down operations in many parts of the ND costing the company and government an estimated one
240 million dollars daily.

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243 These social forces accelerated the dissension against the over-centralization of the polity by the military and
244 subsequent governments, the control of oil and the distribution of its benefits among the constituent units of the
245 federation and the state and multinational oil companies' policies and practices that disadvantaged the region,
246 destroy its environment and impoverished its people. The reactions of these organizations state and multinational
247 policies over their rights and access to the resources found in their territory culminated in heightening the clarion
248 demand for resource control.

249 **7 I. CONFLICT DISORDER AND STATE RESPONSE**

250 As noted above, what sparted as non-violent protest by youths and civil society organizations in the late 1980s
251 against marginalization and environmental degradation later developed into a fearsome resistance involving
252 heavily armed militant factors of MEND, NDVF, MOSIEND, etc) against the Joint Task Force deployed in
253 the Niger Delta. It could, therefore, be argued that one grave dimension of the instrumentalisation of disorder
254 is transformation of imminent social movements into armed militancy, especially following the execution of key
255 leadership of MOSOP: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the "Ogoni 9". For instance, the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) under
256 Asari Dokubo has undergone tremendous transformation from a social movement "employing discourses of ethnic
257 identities and solidarities with a wide public appeal, into a privatized militia" dedicated to self-determination
258 of the "Ijaw Nation". Departing from the cautious and less confrontational posture of its forebear, the Ijaw
259 National Council, the IYC drew on the "strategy successfully championed by MOSOP", and rose to" "national
260 and international prominence with the Kaiama Declaration that paralleled its foundation in December 1998".
261 The Kaiama Declaration, as noted by ??bi (2001, 71) was: Reportedly adopted by representatives of 500 Delta
262 communities and 25 organisations in the Bayelsa town of Kaiama. It denounced social marginalization and
263 environmental damage and central state repression and oil exploration, and called for the "withdrawal from Ijaw
264 land of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigeria State.

265 This Declaration marked a vital watershed in the campaign for social and environmental justice and set the
266 stage for the tragic events currently unfolding in the Niger Delta in terms of reciprocity of force as a mean
267 of prevalence. The volatile space of the Niger Delta is now characterized by the "establishment of extra-state
268 political formations, their legitimizing discourses and social practices". Thus, IYC presented the Delta minorities
269 with a novel alternative; "the chance to root peripherally, isolation, and silence in resisting action" (Said, 1994).
270 As Bade Onimode once observed in relation to this deadly dialectics of hegemony and counter-hegemony, the
271 Nigerian federal system is "evolving by fissiparity rather than aggregation". The manipulation and poiliticization
272 of ethnicity turned governance into struggle for control of state which, in conditions of monolithic political
273 structure and generalized material scarcity-, under the military became "Hobbesian, violent and deadly"., In this
274 unnerving condition (as demonstrated by the Ogoni experience),

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276 II actively or positively to the rule of the governing classes" (Rothchild, 1998).

277 From the standpoint of libertarian theory and praxis, the politics of resource control represents a challenge by
278 civil society groups and communities in the ND over the control of oil and the distribution of its benefits among
279 the constituent units of the federation. In other words, the people of the region are simply saying since the state
280 and its multinational oil partners cannot take care of their developmental needs, they should give them back
281 what naturally belongs to them so that they can take care of themselves. This is the core-complex of the ND
282 conflict.

283 The activities of civil society groups in the ND region have emerged as the most serious threat to the corporate
284 existence of Nigeria. Their activities have been characterized by popular mobilization, social protest, opposition,

285 advocacy and criticisms in favour of reform, change and accountability in the exploration, exploitation and
286 management of the oil resources found in their territory. The high points of their grievances, agitation and
287 protests are, first, that they want a fair share of the resource generated in their territory by whatever legal
288 means. Second, they want compensation for the past neglect, marginalization, injustice and inequity they had
289 suffered in the hands of both the state and multinational oil companies in the exploitation of the oil resources.
290 All these are legitimate claims, which subsequent governments since independence have been unable to address
291 and the consequences are telling on the country now ??Ikelegbe, 2001:437).

292 Over the years, the federal government has tried to address the problems of the region through administrative
293 agencies such as the NDDB, OMPADEC and NDDC. However, because of the enormity of the problem, corruption
294 and the lack of commitment on the part of the government/multinational companies these efforts have amounted
295 to nothing (Fraynas, 2000; ??kpan, 2004). In fact, these measures have further aggravated the situation, which
296 makes the government to rely more on repressive policy in response to the activities of civil society groups in the
297 ND region ??Suberu, 1998). State repressive policies in the region have changed the manner of conduct of the
298 struggle and resistance of youths in the ND.

299 Thus, civil society has been able to transform the ND grievances from a mere demand for development from
300 the multinational oil companies and the state, into a political and comprehensive agitation that challenges the
301 authority and legitimacy of the state over the control and allocation of national resources. The failure of the
302 state to find a political solution to the problem has led to very sensitive demands of resource control and self-
303 determination within the federation ??Ikelegbe 2001). As a consequence, "the tempo, activity, cohesion and
304 commitment of the civil groups indicate that, somehow, the state-resource authority and stateregional/ethnic
305 resource distribution would have to be negotiated, redefined and reconstituted if national stability and unity
306 is to be sustained" ??Ikelegbe, ??2001; ??64). This issue raises fundamental questions pertinent to revenue
307 allocation, which protagonists of state' rights have overlooked over the years. The questions are, first, can a
308 federal state like Nigeria with a mono-cultural economy relinquish the control of critical national resource from
309 which it derives over 80 per cent of her GNP to its constituent units? Second, what are the implications of
310 that for funding federal establishments, especially defence, education, health and foreign policy? Third, given
311 the history of ethnic strife and distrust, what will also be the fate of states that depend exclusively on federally
312 allocated revenues for survival? Primarily, it is important to note that, in all federations, the degree to which
313 the central government/constitution allows the constituent units jurisdictional powers over particular resources
314 depend on the importance of the resources to fiscal outlay as a percentage of the gross national product, and by
315 implication to the ability of the central government to meet is a statutory responsibility: defence, foreign policy,
316 education; health; industrial development etc. For instance, in the United States, oilproducing states enjoy
317 certain jurisdictional powers over the oil found in their locality, because oil is not a crucial national resource. In
318 other words, the United States Government does not depend on oil revenues for its survival, as is the case in
319 Nigeria. The American economy is so diversified and industrialised that the contribution of oil revenues to her
320 GNP is less than 10 per cent, whereas in Nigerian oil contributes over 80 per cent of her GNP. In the US, the
321 manufacturing sector, science and technology, telecommunications and entertainment industries provides more
322 to the economy than the mineral sector.

323 In the case of Nigeria, the country possesses enormous resources, but the inability of the leadership to harness
324 these resources for the development of the country explains the over dependence on oil revenues. The federal
325 government relies on the oil resources to perform its colossal responsibility as contained in the exclusive legislative
326 list: defence, education, roads, electricity, health, foreign policy, power and steel among others. The states also
327 depend on the same federally collected revenues for virtually everything. ??wabueze (1983) puts it trenchantly
328 when he wrote:

329 Federally collected revenue is the main stay of the finances of state governments, accounting for a little over
330 90 per cent of their total revenue upon this revenue, therefore, depend on the ability of the states to maintain
331 services-to pay their staff, pay for essential supplies and execute capital projects (1983:56). and prerogative have
332 argued that any fiscal adjustments that would affect state-resource authority and stateregional/ethnic distribution
333 radically given the nature of the country's political economy would be unsettling for the federation. What this
334 translates to in real terms is that the political sway and financial might that the federal government is currently
335 exercising in both national and international politics is simply due to the size of her pocket. That Nigeria is a
336 major player today in most International, Regional and Sub-regional organisations such as the United Nations
337 (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is mainly due to
338 a combination of factors, the most prominent being her financial capacity. There are numerous instances where
339 the Nigerian government has used her financial strength to swing and influence many international and regional
340 decisions in favour of her national interests and that of the African continent in general.

341 Similarly, the argument goes, on the domestic scene, we cannot over emphasize federal presence in all facets of
342 the Nigeria's national life such as defence, education, health, environment, science and technology, aviation, iron
343 and steel, including over sixty -seven items on the exclusive legislative list reserved for the federal government.
344 Thus, agitation for the federal government to surrender her jurisdictional powers over the oil resources to the
345 oil producing states will simply mean that the "Crippled Giant" ??Osaghae, 2002) will simply become a basket
346 case.

347 9 MAINSTREAMING PEACE AND SECURITY

348 Advocates of resource control like Ken Saro-Wiwa have point to the vast differences in infrastructural
349 developments of the core (majority nationalities) and peripheral (minority nationalities) areas in the Nigerian
350 federation and the differential incorporation of its elements into strategic sectors of its economy.

351 Ken's diagnosis of the structural subordination of the minorities in the Nigerian federation is unflattering in its
352 exposure and criticism of the system that breeds institutionalized deprivations, but does his prognosis for action
353 -confederation of ethnic nationalities -provide a way forward? There is no doubt, as he noted that the Nigerian
354 constitution "offered a stronger central government and left the ethnic minorities totally unprotected in terms of
355 their economic resources and their culture". Thus, for Ken, the existential problem that arises, is that since the
356 constitution vest the entire mineral resources in the country in "parliament to share as it pleases," in:

357 A situation where the ethnic minorities provided most of the mineral resources (oil) and yet Were a minority
358 in parliament, and where oil was the "be-all" and "end-all" of Nigerian politics and the economy, as well as
359 the central focus of all budgetary ambitions, there was no way the ethnic minorities, including the Ogoni, could
360 protect their great inheritance ??1995:55) The solution to this existential dilemma for the ethnic minorities in the
361 entropic federation of Nigeria lies in the reconsideration of its constitutive principles of coexistence or engagement.
362 Ken Saro-Wiwa (1995: 90-98), therefore, advocates unequivocally that:

363 The only way forward for Nigeria was to allow each ethnic group to exercise autonomy and grow at its own
364 pace using its genius and its political system...!, therefore, suggest that elected representatives of all ethnic groups
365 in Nigeria should gather at a National Conference to select an interim government consisting of twenty reputable
366 Nigerians men and women...from all parts of the country.

367 Ken's panacea for the reconstruction of statesociety relations in Nigeria, however, raises serious epistemic
368 and ontological questions bearing on sociological assumptions about the character of the state in plural social
369 formations. His position is no doubt consistent with the sociological assumptions about "plural societies
370 (commonly referred to as "salad model") which stresses the enduring nature of plural divisions, the discontinuities
371 between sections differentiated by ethnicity, religion or culture and the high probability of violence in the process
372 of political change.

373 The contradictions, contentious and inherent dilemma of the Nigerian federation in terms of asymmetrical
374 relationship between federalism (state boundaries) and pluralism (ethnic clusters) as competing units of repre-
375 sentation, distributive and redistributive policies (fiscal federalism) and the unsettled problem of constitutional
376 design for democratic dispensation persist. The configuration of these issues has turned the Nigerian state into a
377 cauldron of incendiary conflict dominated by hegemonic propensities of contending majority ethnic social forces
378 and in recent times, an equally vehement resistance of minority ethnics social movements, especially in the Niger
379 Delta region. Thus, the peculiar attribute of the Nigerian federation currently is the ethnic base of state (regime)
380 power reproduced in the context of politics of support or what Enloe (1973: 29) calls "state security ethnic map."

381 It is, however, becoming clear that the contending positions on the resource control divide (defenders of federal
382 or state/oil communities rights and privileges) cannot be exclusively sustained in the accelerating and complex
383 condition of the management of modern state as well as the imperatives of constitutional theory and practice of
384 democratic governance in a federal system. Over centralization of fiscal control in the federal government lacks
385 ontological justification in the poor state of the roads, health, education and other infrastructures under FGN
386 exclusive M arch 2012 On the other hand, despite these manifest realities, prescription such as Ken Saro Wiwa's
387 for the cure of Nigeria's structural pathology (confederal Nigeria) may satisfy widespread popular minorities'
388 sentiment, but as a sustainable project in constitutional practice and development, it may be worse than the
389 disease. At the global level hardly any confederation has so far survived the systemic turbulence of the twentieth
390 century and the accelerating forces of micro-nationalism which saw the end of such experiments in state-building
391 as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and USSR is gathering momentum all over the world, especially in the artificial
392 state context of Africa. A prescription for a confederation of ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, is in the final analysis
393 a "trap for the overbold and unwary". Even the surviving experiment in confederation (Switzerland) in the 20th
394 century has now irreversibly moved towards a strong central control to meet the increasingly complex challenges
395 of managing a modern state-especially fiscal and monetary regime.

396 In the light of current global condition where only heavy weights increasingly call the tune and where Lilliputs
397 are equally finding relevance and influence through regional integration, it would certainly be a sad development
398 to a potentially rewarding historical accident that creates a primal economy of scale through the location of
399 sixty percent of the current population of West Africa in what became Nigeria. What perhaps Ken should have
400 argued for and invested his energy in consummating would have been, first, a heightened derivation based on
401 the principle that governed fiscal allocation in the First Republic and, second a mechanism that ensures direct
402 impact of this resources on oil producing communities such as Ogoniland. In other words, the infrastructural
403 crisis and environmental disorder in Ogoniland is to a considerable extent a systemic resultant of fiscal failure on
404 the part of the elite that dominate federal and state governments and parastatals.

405 The above review of prevailing argumentation on resource control controversy and the assertiveness of the
406 federal state in support of its statutory functions (as entrenched under military tutelage in the 1999 constitution of
407 the Federal Republic of Nigeria) suggests the imperative need for the restructuring of intergovernmental relations
408 to correct the structural imbalance in fiscal allocation and marginalisation of oil producing communities.
409 The responsibilities of the Federal Government under the exclusive list of the constitution may demand greater

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410 arrogation of fiscal resources. In terms of fiscal federalism, however, this translates into the disproportionate
411 appropriation of oil revenue by the majority ethnic nationalities at the expense of the oil producing communities
412 and states. Ken Saro-Wiwa has noted in this regard that:

413 The way and manner in which the states and local governments were created were an affront to truth and
414 civility, a slap in the face of modern history; it was robbery with violence. What Babangida was doing was
415 transferring the resources of the delta, of the Ogoni and other ethnic minorities to the ethnic majorities -the
416 Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba -since most of the new states and local governments were created in
417 the homes of these three. None of the local governments or states so created was viable: they all depended on
418 oil revenues which were to be shared by the states and local governments according to the most outrageous of
419 criteria such as expanse of land, equality, underdevelopment and all such subsidies. The brazen injustice of it
420 hurt my sensibilities beyond description.

421 Thus, from Ken Saro-Wiwa's standpoint, Nigerian federalism is in the final analysis a captive state dominated
422 by powerful ethnic social forces constantly in conflict over material reward of state power. The struggle for control
423 of the federal power structure either through the "ballot box" or the "barrel of a gun" has been a recurrent decimal
424 in the dynamics of power calculus among fiduciaries of the tripolar action-set that constitutes the arena of politics
425 in Nigeria. Irrespective of periodization and regime type, the paramount goal has been the same: ethnic power
426 is fundamentally dependent on control of state power.

427 Addressing these "negative externalities" in Nigerian federalism is crucial to the mainstreaming of peace and
428 security in the Niger Delta. As an operative concept in peace-building, mainstreaming designates the "art of
429 integrating a given set of values from one primary domain into a secondary one with the aim of bringing the
430 insights from the former to bear on the latter and to achieve by this process a value-added outcome for the
431 resulting practice". Thus, one of the cardinal conclusions from peace and conflict studies bearing on development
432 programming is the extricable linkage between sustainable peace and the struggle for social and human security:
433 "economic longevity and ecological sustainability".

434 Security in this context designates the "capacity of groups (and individuals as their agents) to provide their
435 physical and psychological needs and livelihoods". In a turbulent system such as the Niger Delta, peace as a
436 policy objective could only be predicated on transformational activities which address "structural issues, social
437 dynamics of relationship building, and the ??Leaderach, 2006: 12). The general assumption in this context
438 is that the conflagration in the Niger Delta reflects, as Mats Friberg (1992) argues, the "failure of governing
439 structures to address fundamental needs, provide space for participation in decisions, and ensure an equitable
440 distribution of resources and benefits that makes identification with a group so attractive and silent in a given
441 setting". Since the elimination of deprivation is the primary concern of the oil-bearing communities of the
442 Niger Delta, the path to peace and sustainable development lies in empowerment through a policy regime which
443 recognizes the systemic linkages between security, economic empowerment and development. This is the crux
444 of "mainstreaming peace building in development programming" in the Niger Delta. That is, the progressive
445 "elimination of objective conditions" that limits the capacity for groups to satisfy their physical quality of life
446 indices, as well as "reduction of years and anxieties about their abilities to meet these needs" ??Ibeanu, 2000).
447 This is so because, as widely reflected in the literature, the root causes of the crises in the Niger Delta are
448 political and economic which "engendered marginalization, poverty and environmental degradation (proximate
449 causes). These in turn trigger widespread social deprivation (Idemudia and Gte, 2006: 393). As Cyril Obil
450 (1997) has aptly noted, "the region is by far the most central to the nation's economic and political survival",
451 but paradoxically, it is one of the "poorest, least developed and reciprocated for its contributions to national
452 wealth". In this regard, John ??ederach (2006: 25) has noted that:

453 Contemporary conflicts necessitate peace building approaches that respond to the real nature of those
454 conflicts?? demands innovation, the development of ideas and practices that go beyond the negotiation of
455 substantive interests and issues. This innovation I believe pushes us to probe into the realm of the subjective
456 -generationally accumulated perceptions and deep-rooted hatred and fear.

457 In policy terms, given the centrality of the federal government as the ultimate arbiter in the socio-political
458 process, the need to address significant structural and distributive problems in the Niger Delta should now be
459 the locus of security analysis and policy responses to the malignant condition of the region. In the final analysis,
460 the infrastructural development of ND will depend on how available derivation resources are structured and
461 allocated. This entails, (i) a fiscal regime, which allows the oil producing communities to benefit directly from
462 revenue allocation and (ii) how the federal government can ensure that the greater proportion of allocation to
463 states/local governments based on the derivation is committed to capital projects. The federal government can
464 achieve (i) and (ii) above by tying allocations derived from oil revenues to specific developmental project in the
465 oil producing areas to prevent the governing elite of the state and Local Government from the diverting these
466 resources to projects of ostentation across the Region. ^{1 2 3}

¹© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US)

²© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US) social policies and the social order are "imposed by direct domination on
those who do not consent either

³© 2012 Global Journals Inc. (US) responsibilities. This requires fundamental restructuring



Figure 1:

Professor Celestine Bassey & Dr. Felix Akpan
I.

Figure 2:

V. I

Figure 3:

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