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1	The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements in Democracy: The
2	Portuguese Case
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7 Abstract

Since its birth in Greece, democracy has evolved mainly with regard to the role people or 8 citizens must play in the system. That evolution explains not only the various modalities of 9 democracy but also the formation of political parties and their change over time. There is no 10 democracy without the parties, but the parties are not the owners of the democratic system, 11 and this encourages the appearance of non-partisan movements that wish to be part of the 12 power play. In Portugal, during Salazar?s dictatorship, political parties were forbidden. After 13 returning to democracy, Portuguese law currently does not allow regional or local parties, as 14 political parties need to act at the national level. However, the Constitution stipulated that 15 non-partisan groups had the right to present lists to the lowest level of local power, the parish 16 council. Despite the official constraint, these groups accepted the challenge, and their power 17 and influence have increased since the first local election in 1976, and it was no wonder that, 18 after the 1997 constitutional revision, the law had recognized them the right to apply for all 19 the organs of the local power. Later, due to political dissents, some politicians decided to 20 constitute non-partisan movements to run against the party that they had just abandoned. 21 Nowadays, these groups rule over 17 of the 308 municipal councils, namely Porto, the second 22 most important city in Portugal. Moreover, the nonpartisan movements are the third political 23 force concerning local power, ruling over more than 400 parish councils. 24

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At the time, scholars usually considered democracy as direct due to the participation of the citizens in the political

39 life of the city. However, taking into account the existence of some organs which were elected by the citizens,

40 it would seem appropriate to name it as an assembly or town meeting democracy. It has taken many centuries

41 for the establishment of the partisan system in which the parties accepted the role of giving a political voice to

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Index terms— non-partisan movements, political system, representative and deliberative democracy, and
 Portugal.

Introduction 1 Namely, "the right to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; the right to run for 28 elective office; the right to free expression; the right to form and participate in independent political organizations, 29 including political parties; the right to gain access to independent sources of information; rights to any other 30 freedoms and opportunities that may be necessary for the effective operation of the political institutions of large-31 scale democracy." ince its birth in the Greek world, five centuries before Christ, the word democracy was subject 32 to many debates and meanings, and not always in a positive sense. For example, Plato and Aristotle considered it 33 a distorted regime, prone to chaos, because the crowds generally confused freedom with decadence, and "Athenian 34 democracy was also the birthplace of the tendency to debunk discussion as sophistry or demagoguery" (Elster, 35 2012). 36

citizenship, assuming themselves as intermediaries of the political process between the citizens and the State. The 42 enhancement of the passive electoral capacity based on universal suffrage and the non-imperative vote became 43 the pillars of representative democracy, presupposing that "all its adult citizens possess a body of fundamental 44 rights, liberties, and opportunities" 1 ??Dahl, 2004, p. 59), and recognized that "voting is the most powerful 45 voice a citizen has to hold elected officials accountable for their decisions and behavior in office.". However, this 46 relationship does not mean that politicians are hostage to citizens. In fact, according to ??obbio, Pontara & 47 Veca (1985, p. 19) the reason explaining the prohibition of the imperative vote was precisely in the exigence of 48 changing the private political relation, conceived as the relation of exchange among people; a characteristic of a 49 feudalist society; into a public relationship, a quality of the legal and national State, according to the Weberian 50 51 interpretation. In that sense, the 1973 French Constitution, in its first chapter, section 3, point 7, stipulated that "the 52

representatives elected in the departments shall not be representatives of a particular department, but of 53 the entire nation, and no mandate may be given them.". However, the last part of the sentence led to the 54 dissatisfaction of the citizens whenever they felt that the parliamentary members whom they had elected no 55 longer represented them, creating a disconnection between how citizens imagined democracy and how politics 56 57 took place. According to Santos (2020), there was a progressive inbreeding tendency in the parties and a tendency 58 to capture institutional power by the party directories. This feeling was understood by Rousseau, who, reflecting 59 on the English democracy model, said that, as soon as the members of parliament "are elected, slavery overtakes it [the people of England]", and he advocated the return to the direct democracy. 60

Two centuries later, after two world wars, in the 1960s, the youth started to organize themselves claiming to participate in the decision-making process about political and social issues, namely about the war in Vietnam. Young people came onto the streets shouting their protests, as it happened in France during May 1968.Lijphart's criterion based on the concentration of political power to classify democracy proved to be insufficient as new social actors made their appearance in the political setting.

Later on, some authors in the USA proposed a participatory democracy, and Habermas presented a deliberative 66 model in which a decision is made by discussion among free and equal citizens. Two new models, as "not all 67 forms of deliberation are «participative»; and not all forms of participation are «deliberative»" ??Floridia, 2013, 68 p. 3). This finding is crucial because, as Hochstetler & Friedman (2008, pp. 1-4) affirmed, "political parties 69 are the primary channel for representation in democracies", but we cannot ignore that civil society organizations 70 71 (CSOs) can also become mechanisms of representation while promoting "the values and interests of citizens in 72 collective decision making processes.". However, as these organizations "are not chosen by an electorate, and they do not govern", some researchers hesitate "to use the term representation as a description of CSOs' activities.". 73 This evolution constitutes proof of the fragmentation of the previous party systems and explains the rise of the 74 populist parties, characterized in essence by charismatic leadership and the refusal of political intermediation. 75 Santos (2012, p. 273) explained the way how Berlusconi used his enterprise, the Fininvest, to create a party, Forza 76 Italia, following a business model closely associated with him. Later, the widespread use of social media, allowing 77 citizens to become prosumers -producers and not only consumers -, led to a new model based on trouble-free 78 and independent distribution able to reach followers at unprecedented speed. That new paradigm explains the 79 political success of Beppe Grillo and the Five Stars Movement, a sort of digital populism. 80

However, the crisis of representation and the political anemia of mainstream parties also led to new political forms of organization, as citizens started to insist on playing a different role in political life.

A paper prepared by International Idea (2018, p. 6 2) defends that "many new social and protest movements have transformed themselves into political movements and are contesting elections in order to command decisionmaking power". This situation can be found in the Portuguese political system due to the action of non-partisan groups at local power, which represents a double challenge.

On the one hand, these groups do not want to change the matrix of representative democracy because they do not affect its two basic principles: universal suffrage and the non-imperative vote. On the other hand, they wish to show that, despite the increasing complexity of the problems, citizenship has a fair amount of say in what concerns to democracy. Nowadays, citizens consider that they met the conditions to put an end to one of the four Bobbio's paradoxes. That one assuming there is a "contradiction between the technical inability of the citizen, as such, and the increasing demand of technical specialization necessary to the knowledge of issues concerning the political ability, for example, the economic and financial policy." **?**Santos, 1998, p. 19).

94 **2** II.

95 Portugal: The Evolution of the Electoral Law

96 When Salazar came to power, he accused the political parties of being responsible for the crisis that Portugal 97 was enduring. He said that, in general, he had no fear of the parties. However, he dreaded the partisanship 98 existing in Portugal because the parties were formed around people with narrow interests and personal appetites, looking to satisfy them both ??Ferro, 1933, p. 140). Later, in 1949, in a speech in Porto, Salazar reaffirmed 99 that both during the monarchy and the first republic, with 52 governments in less than 16 years, the parties had 100 forgotten the national interest, and the only conclusion was that the partian model had failed. That was the 101 reason explaining his refusal to accept the legalization of political parties, despite the Foundation in 1930 of the 102 National Union, which many scholars consider as a supporting party to the regime. 103

During some decades, the opposition was controlled by the illegal Portuguese Communist Party, whose militants 104 were persecuted and imprisoned, and the Socialist Party had its birth outside Portugal, in West Germany in1973. 105 Only after the 25th of April 1974, the new order accepted parties as pillars of democracy, the founding act of 106 the partisan system. Then, it was not hard to convince the citizens that the parties, mainly those created by 107 politicians who had been persecuted by the previous regime, would play a crucial role in the new democratic 108 society. However, due to the peculiar conditions to keep the unity of the State, avoiding the independence of 109 Azores and Madeira, the creation of regional parties was forbidden. Massetti & Schakel (2015, p. 866) believe 110 that a great deal of the political The Role of the Non-Partisan Movements in Democracy: The Portuguese Case 111 struggle of regionalist parties "consists of trying to push the territorial dimension into the political agenda, thus 112 making it a salient dimension of party competition". In Portugal, the fear was that Azores and Madeira could 113 no longer accept to be part of the country. 114

However the Constitution granted the right to the independent citizens to involve themselves in the political 115 life outside the partisan world. Almeida (2010, p. 172) considers that this resolution intended to replicate the 116 situation of Northern Europe, especially in Germany, where the federal regime allows a strong bet of political 117 parties at the level of central and regional governments, and clear disinvestment at the lowest level. However, 118 those parties do not exist only in Northern Europe. For example, Brancati (2008) studied this phenomenon in 119 120 thirty-seven democracies around the world from 1945 to 2002, Massetti & Schakel (2015, p. 867) undertook a 121 quantitative analysis of "74 regionalist parties distributed across 49 regions and 11 countries and participating in national and/or regional elections held between 1970 and 2010", and Subhan & Kasi (2018, p. 220) presented 122 a case study about the regional political parties of Balochistan, one of the four provinces of Pakistan in which 123 they got to the conclusion that regional political parties acted "as a check on the mainstream parties" because 124 they played a role of "catalyst and keep them from centralizing the powers", and so "they flourish the democratic 125 mindset and strengthen the system.". 126

In the Portuguese case, besides the small dimension of the country, in the initial conjuncture, the parties and the militaries of the Revolution Council thought that the decentralization should be conducted by national parties, despite accepting that independent movements could act at the lowest level, but they did not follow the idea that "political decentralization encourages politicians to form regional parties, and voters to vote for them." 22Report 2008, p. 136)

131 **??**Bracati, 2008, p. 136).

Thus, it is noteworthy to see if citizens took profit from this benefit. This study requires finding out the number of non-partisan candidacies as well as the electoral results that they have got.

¹³⁴ **3 III.**

135 4 The Electoral Results

In the first local election, on 12th December 1976, the non-partisan movements were identified in the ballot paper not for a designation, as it happens with the parties, but through Roman numerals. Despite that, they elected 1.232 representatives for the Parish Councils, mainly in Braga -209 seats, Porto -139 elected, Coimbra -119 representatives, and Aveiro -103 places, districts located on the north and central coast.

In the second local election, on 16th December 1979, these nonpartisan groups only elected 696 representatives,
even being the sixth political force at the local level. It seemed that the parties had changed their strategy and
decided to invest on the local level.

The third electoral act, on 12th December 1982, showed a slight recovery, but the fourth one, on 15 th December 144 1985, led to a new decline, before the fifth election, on 17th December 1989, led to a small rise. However, in 145 1993 the non-partisan movements elected 1.234 representatives, thanks to 123.351 votes, 2,29% of the total, and 146 in 1997, this amount increased to 1.594 representatives, corresponding to 152.055 votes and an average of 2,85%. 147 On 16th December 2001, the situation changed because the non-partisan groups started to apply for all the

organs of local power. Then, they elected 31 municipal councilors, 93 deputies for Municipal Assembly, and 2407
members for the Parish Council, due to 232.861 votes, an average of 4,44%.

In 2005, the non-partisan groups continued the growth trend, and they elected 45 members for the Municipal Council, including 6 presidents, thanks to 133.146 votes, and an average of 2,47%. In that electoral act, there was an additional reason for this positive result. The leader of the social-democratic party, PPD/PSD, refused his support to the candidates who were facing problems with the law, and some of them, namely Isaltino Morais and Valentim Loureiro, formed non-partisan movements, ran against their former party, and won.

Rosenberg, Kahn & Trun (1991) proved that it was "possible to shape a political candidate's image in a way which may affect electoral outcomes". In 2005, the Portuguese voters showed that local governance based on a proximity policy was worth more than the symbol of the party. In what concerns to the Municipal Assembly, they obtained 115.999 votes, an average of 2,15%, and 121 deputies. Finally, for the Parish Council, they gained 245.740 votes, 4,57% of the total, corresponding to 2.202 representatives and the presidency of 292 Parish Councils, 260 of them by a large majority.

In 2009, the local elections should obey the Law n^o 46/2005 preventing a president of the municipal council or the parish council from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same office. This law was more damaging to the parties than to the non-partisan groups that proved, once again, that the parties could not ignore them at the local level. They received 226.111 votes, i.e., 4,09% and 67 seats in the Municipal Council,

205.317 votes corresponding to 3,71% and 224 deputies for the Municipal Assembly and 337.613 votes, an average 165 of 6,11% and 2 673 mandates in the Parish Council. 166

In 2013, the non-partian movements reached a high level of representation, as they got 6,89%, i.e., 344.531 167 votes and 112 mandates for the Municipal Council, 6,52% or 325.724 votes and 352 places in the Municipal 168 Assembly, and 9,57%, corresponding to 478.273 votes and 2.978 seats, namely 342 presidents, for the Parish 169 Council. 3 Parties are not subject to IRC and still benefit, in addition to the provisions of a special law, from the 170 exemption from the following taxes: tamp duty; tax on inheritance and donations; municipal tax contribution on 171 the taxable value of the properties or part of properties owned by them and intended for their activity; other taxes 172 on assets provided for in paragraph 3 of article 104 of the Constitution; car tax on the vehicles they purchase 173 for their activity; value-added tax on the acquisition and transmission of goods and services that aim to spread 174 their political message or their own identity, through any media, printed, audio-visual or multimedia, including 175 those used as advertising material and means of communication and transport, the exemption being effected 176 through the exercise of the right to the tax refund; value-added tax on the transmission of goods and services in 177 special fundraising initiatives for its exclusive benefit, provided that this exemption does not cause distortions of 178 competition. 179 Finally, in 2017, the non-partian groups elected 130 representatives for the Municipal Council, thanks to 180

181 351.352 votes and an average of 6.79%. They also obtained 396 seats in the Municipal Assembly, due to 333.559 182 votes and 6.45%, and 3.355 mandates for the Parish Council, corresponding to 504.055 votes and the average of 183 9.75%

These results prove that the non-partisan movements are more important than many political parties at 184 the local level. Indeed, only two political forces -Socialist Party and Social-Democratic Party -elected more 185 representatives than the non-partisan groups. 186

IV. The Complaints of the Non-partisan Groups 5 187

Since the 1997 constitutional revision, according to point 4 of article 239, "Nominations for elections to local 188 authority organs may be submitted by political parties, either individually or in a coalition, or by groups of 189 registered electors, as laid down by law". However, the Organic Law 1/2001 did not treat the parties and the 190 191 groups which were identified by a Roman numeral as equals. It was a drawback in comparison with the parties, as these could use their symbol, which functioned as their brand image. This point survived for several years, though 192 193 the actual Organic Law 1/2017, in its fourth point of the article 23.^o stipulates that each group of elector citizens has the right to a designation and that the denomination "may not contain more than six words, nor be based 194 195 exclusively on the name of a natural person or integrate the official denominations of political parties or coalitions with legal existence, nor contain expressions directly related to any religion, national or local institution". The 196 197 reference to the name of a natural person means that citizens should not see each of these groups as a oneperson 198 movement.

Moreover, according to the first point of article $19.^{\circ}$ of the Organic Law 1/2007, the lists of candidates of non-199 partisan groups for local governmental organs must be "proposed by a number of citizens corresponding to 3% 200 of voters registered in the respective voter circumscription", being that in the largest municipalities the number 201 of proposers can reach 4000. It is important to note that the non-partisan movements are obliged to present the 202 list of proposers even when they intend to be reelected while the political parties do not need to deliver that 203 204 list. Moreover, the non-partisan movements are dissolved immediately in the same day of the electoral act, and this situation can affect significantly the relationship between the citizens and the elected independent members. 205 Finally, the nonpartisan groups are obliged to pay a VAT rate of 23% in all the electoral expenses while the parties 206 are free of For these reasons, many of the non-partisan movements decided to constitute an organization called 207 the National Association of Independent Municipal Movements in 2010. Indeed, the influence of each nonpartisan 208 group was felt only at a very narrow level, and it was necessary to join other groups to fight against a system 209 whose lawful functioning depends on the parties. Without a national organization, the non-partisan movements 210 would not be able to mobilize civil society to recognize that it is necessary to change the law to respect article 211 $113.^{\circ}$ of the Portuguese Constitution, which refers to equal opportunities and treatment of different candidates in 212 electoral campaigns. The first results of this campaign have already appeared, as the Ombudsman's institution 213 214 has advised the Republic Assembly to discuss the issue, and to find a solution to assure that the equity principle 215 is respected. 216 Finally, it is worth mentioning that, after winning the election, a non-partisan movement decided to turn into

217 a party. It happened in the Autonomic Region of Madeira, more specifically in the parish of Santa Cruz. The group Together for the People (JPP) was legalized as a party by the Portuguese Constitutional Court on 27th 218 January 2015 because its leadership wished to run in the 2015 regional election. It is an apparent contradiction 219 because the Portuguese Constitution forbids regional parties, and this new party was specifically formed to run 220 for the regional election. 221 V.

222

223 6 The Central Power as a Dream

In Portugal, the Constitution allows independent citizens to apply for a seat in the National Assembly only if 224 taking part in a party's list. At the beginning of the process, there were many independent deputies. Pinto 225 (2012, p. 138) refers that "in 1976, when the opposition struggle, exile, and political prison served as a letter of 226 recommendation, there were 48 independent deputies, that is, 18.25% of the total". However, in 2002, there were 227 only 19 independent deputies, i.e., 8.3%, and, in 2005, the number dropped to 11 and a relative weight of 4.8%. 228 Nevertheless, the results that the non-partisan groups got at the local level led them to fight for changing the 229 first point of article $151.^{\circ}$ of the Constitution. They knew that if they presented a petition with 1000 signatures 230 it would be published in the Assembly Diary, and if the number of signatures reached 4000, it would be discussed 231 in the plenary of the Assembly. Then, they presented a petition with 6.285 signatures, and this petition n. 232 240/XII (2.^a) was discussed on 10th October 2013. The citizens did not need to wait for the end of the discussion 233 to know the result. The parties played a 'double deal' as they were both judge and jury. The citizens could not 234 take part in the debate. They had the right to participate but just as listeners. 235

Thus, they heard the representative of the Socialist Party say that the parties, in contrast to occasional groups, 236 had forms of internal and external control. Moreover, he criticized the atomistic representations because they 237 defended particular or local interests and not the national will. Later, the representative of the Communist Party 238 remembered that the concept of «independent» was far from consensual, and that there was a campaign against 239 the parties and that some movements met all the legal requirements to be considered parties, but they refused 240 that designation. He did not point any example of that campaign, but it should be said that there are multiple 241 cases. . For instance, in the USA, there is the Citizens Against Political Parties (CAPP) whose goal is "to 242 eliminate or minimize both the Republican and Democrat parties so that our nation can become closer to the 243 goal of a true democracy", and in the Netherlands, Fortuyn (2002, p. 186) 4 defended that the country "should 244 become a real lively democracy of and for the ordinary people, and depart from the elite party democracy we are 245 currently acquainted with". 246

Returning to the debate, the representatives of the Christian-Democratic Party and of the Social-Democratic 247 Party agreed with the communist position, and the non-partian groups were described as "episodic and inorganic 248 movements". Only the Left Bloc supported, partially, the idea of the petition because its representative said that 249 it was a process that "should be returned to society". Because it was within "Portuguese society that strength 250 and consensus should be created", a necessary desire "so that, at a proper time, the Constitution can recognize 251 this space that society has created". The independent groups liked to hear that it was necessary "to discuss the 252 monopoly of representation by political parties", but they left the session with a hand full of nothing. The dream 253 of presenting lists to the National Assembly was between the mirage and the utopia, as all the changes on the 254 law are under the monopoly and responsibility of the parties. 255

History shows that the system protects itself, even when it recognizes the need for change. Once the Portuguese
legislative life is based on the existence of parliamentary groups, parties affirm that the non-partisan movements,
being directly linked to local interests and visions, cannot establish a unique parliamentary group.

²⁵⁹ 7 VI. The Complaints against the Nonpartisan Movements

Several years after applying for all the organs of local power, the government of so many Parish Councils and 260 some high-ranking Municipal Councils, namely Porto and Oeiras, provided the non-partisans groups increasing 261 visibility, and this presence in the public arena led to permanent scrutiny. Citizens wanted to know if these groups 262 represented a new way of doing politics, enhancing a closer relationship between representatives and voters. As 263 these groups maintained many of the Parish and Municipal Councils that they have won, we should believe that 264 265 voters were satisfied with them. However, some attitudes of the leaders and main executives of these groups proved that they were not completely devoted to the public cause, as they placed their interests before common 266 ones. The case of Oeiras, a municipality in the western part of the Lisbon metropolitan area, can be pointed as 267 an example. 268

As already said, Isaltino Morais was the president of the Municipal Council when he started to have problems 269 with the judiciary, and his party solved to express a lack of confidence in his new candidacy. Then, he formed 270 an independent movement -the IOMAF (Isaltino, Oeiras more ahead), and he conquered not only the Municipal 271 Council and Assembly but also almost all the Parish Councils. Later, after losing the judicial appeals, Isaltino 272 was jailed and his vice-leader, Paulo Vistas, became the new president, after replacing Isaltino who accepted to 273 become the head of the list for the municipal assembly. However, after being released, Isaltino intended to return 274 275 to his former position, and he formed another non-partisan group, INOVAR (Oeiras coming back). Besides, a 276 third municipal member of IOMAF also decided to form a new group. Thus, the 2017 electoral act was not only 277 a battle between parties and non-partisan movements but also a war among the independent groups, and this 278 situation can represent a growing gap between citizens and representatives.

Another complaint against the non-partisan groups results from the fact that several leaders have not resisted the call of the parties, accepting to lose their independent label. This situation is particularly serious when a politician, who was a member of a party, became independent before returning to his former party because citizens can see it not only as the lack of coherence but also as the lack of a genuine commitment to defending democratic values. This example proves that when a non-partisan group has its

284 8 Conclusion

The first conclusion to take is that non-partisan groups represent an increasing reality in the Portuguese political landscape, and they should not be considered an epiphenomenon. Their electoral results do not depend on luck. In fact, after conquering a Municipal or Parish Council, the non-partisan movements seldom lose it, and this proves that citizens are satisfied with the movements' performance once in power and value them highly.

Secondly, it is worth noting that not all of these groups are really independent because some of them resulted from partisan cleavages and other ones do not refuse partisan support. However, there are many truly independent movements, mainly at the parish level, and this circumstance can be regarded as a kind of revisiting the ancient spirit of neighborliness of the community theorized by Ferdinand Tonnies.

Thirdly, despite their aim to apply for the National Assembly, at least for the time being, the nonpartisan groups must make do with the local level. For changing the law, powerful social pressure would be necessary, and, at the moment, the parties have control of the situation, and they do not bet in profound alterations.

Finally, in what concerns to ideology, Lipset & Rokkan (1967) affirmed that the existence of regionalist parties was the political manifestation of the centerperiphery cleavage in a given political system. This essay accepts that statement and considers that it can be suitable to explain the case of the non-partisan movements in Portugal. Massetti & Schakel (2015) proved "very clearly that regionalist parties in relatively rich regions tend to develop a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology."

In Portugal, when the non-partisan movement appears due to a partisan dissidence, it might seem tied down to the former matrix. When the non-partisan movement is independent, we can say that the proximity policy goes beyond the traditional opposition left-right. ??ughes, Runfola & Cormier (2018, p. 192) defend that "the drivers of policy response vary with the proximity of the problem", and this is the reason explaining that "when an issue is highly local, the policy response is influenced by problem severity". That means severity is the main criterion concerning the hierarchy of the problems. As Hedegaard (2014, p. 366) recognizes, "being proximate to recipients of a social benefit affects attitudes towards the benefit".

308 To summarize, non-partian groups can help to keep democracy alive and healthy, and they already play an 309 important role in Portuguese political life, but their fight for space is far from being finished. They won successive battles, they consolidated their position, but they surely aspire to more than that. origin at a party disagreement 310 is possible to reverse the situation. That is why some voices start saying that the independent movements are 311 not always independent. Klaukka, Van der Staak & Valladares (2017, p. 109) state that "in response to reduced 312 membership and public trust, many parties are aiming to re-establish ties with broader groups in society, such 313 as citizen movements". In Portugal, the mainstream parties understood that, in some cases, regaining the head 314 of a non-partisan group is the step required to control the system at the local level. 315

Finally, we should note that the demarcation line between parties and movements is not always unambiguous. Indeed, some leaders of non-partisan movements do not refuse political support coming from a party. For instance, in Parta, Pui Maning mag elected then realected and in both gauge healed by CDS^{-1}

in Porto, Rui Moreira was elected then reelected and, in both cases, backed by CDS.

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