

1 From Habermas Model to New Public Sphere: A Paradigm Shift

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5

6 **Abstract**

7 Though Habermas model of public sphere was framed for describing the public and sphere at
8 the state-level however, its principles and mechanisms are postulated as relevant to the theory
9 and practices of global public sphere (GPS) and global civil society (GCS). The emerging
10 digital technologies and particularly global connectivity through Internet and social
11 networking have added new dimensions to the existing GPS thereby generating a new public
12 sphere (NPS). The determinants of NPS like globalization, social software etc. do not seem to
13 stand against the Habermas view of public sphere rather stand supportive and enhancing to
14 the principles and requirements of an ideal public sphere both at the national and global
15 levels. This paper unfolds this issue at length by juxtaposing the research findings from the
16 existing research.

17

18 **Index terms**— Habermas, Public sphere, Global public sphere, ICT, Globalization, Netizens.

19 **1 INTRODUCTION**

20 y the public sphere we mean a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be
21 formed with access for all citizens ??Habermas, 1974: 49). The term 'public' refers to ideas of citizenship,
22 commonality, and things not private, but accessible and observable by all (Papacharissi, 2002). The public
23 sphere is a vital component of sociopolitical organization. It is the space where people come together as citizens
24 and articulate their independent views to influence the political institutions of society. Civil society is the
25 organized manifestation of these views and the relationship between the state and civil society is the cornerstone
26 of democracy. Without an effective civil society capable enough to structure and channelize citizen debates over
27 diverse ideas and conflicting interests, the state drifts away from its subjects ??Castells, 2008).

28 Citizens act as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of
29 freedom to assemble and associate and the freedom to express and publish their opinions about matters of
30 general interest. This kind of communication in a large public body requires specific means for transmitting
31 information and influencing those who receive it ??Habermas, 1974: 49). Between the state and society lies
32 the public sphere, "a network for communicating information and points of view" ??Habermas 1996: 360). The
33 interaction between citizens, civil society, and the state, communicated through the public sphere ensures that
34 the balance between stability and social change is maintained in the conduct of public affairs (McChesney 2007).

35 Carey argues that the privatizing forces of capitalism have shaped a mass commercial culture that has
36 replaced the public sphere. Although he recognized that an ideal public sphere may never have existed, he
37 called for the revival of public life, as a means of protecting independent cultural and social life and resisting
38 the limits of corporate governance and politics (Carey, 1995). The commercialisation of the public sphere,
39 the contribution of cultural manufactures including advertising and public relations, Habermas argues, have
40 manifested in refeudalization of the public sphere where the public are once again reduced to the status of
41 spectator, and expert opinion has replaced 'true' public opinion (Ubayasiri, 2006). Habermas recounts how the
42 potential for critical discourse was drastically curtailed by the triumph of corporate capitalism, the manipulation
43 of public opinion by the advertising industry, and the rise of a passive consumption mentality amongst the masses
44 (Crack, 2007).

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45 Several critics idealize the public sphere and think back on it as something that existed long ago, but eroded
46 with the advent of modern, industrial society. Sensing the demise of the great public, Habermas traced the
47 development of the public sphere in the 17th and 18th century and its decline in the 20th century. He saw
48 the public sphere as a realm of our social life in which public opinion could be formed out of rational public
49 debate (Habermas, 1991 ??Habermas, [1973])). Such informed and logical discussion, according to Habermas,
50 could facilitate public agreement and decision making, thus representing the best of the democratic tradition
51 (Papacharissi, 2002). If citizens, civil society, or the state fail to meet the demands of this interaction, or if
52 the means of communication between two or more of the key components of the process are blocked, the whole
53 system of representation and decision making comes to a deadlock (McChesney 2007).

54 influence politics and become politically active (Jones, 1997;Rash, 1997;Bowen, 1996;Grossman, 1995). Some
55 emphasize that the technological potential for global communication does not guarantee that people from
56 different cultural backgrounds will also be more understanding of each other, and they cite several examples
57 of miscommunication (Hill & Hughes, 1998). Similarly, access to the internet does not guarantee enlightened
58 political discourse. Moving political discussion to online virtual space excludes those with no access to this space.
59 Moreover, connectivity alone does not ensure a more representative and vigorous public sphere (Papacharissi,
60 2002).

61 2 II. HABERMAS MODEL OF PUBLIC SPHERE

62 The public sphere mediates between society and state where public organizes itself as the bearer of public opinion
63 that accords with the principle of public information which once had to be fought for against the monarchies
64 and which made it possible to exercise democratic control of state activities ??Habermas, 1974:50). Thus, public
65 sphere lies between the state and society in the form of a network to exchange information and viewpoints
66 ??Habermas 1996, 360). It should however, be noted that much of the earlier theories about public sphere has
67 tacitly assumed a nation-state frame (Fraser, 2005). This public sphere occupies both the physical as well as the
68 virtual space of media. The press is autonomous from the state, has a diverse ownership, and reflects a wide
69 range of views (McChesney 2007).

70 The structural preconditions for the Habermas model of public sphere were:

71 First, media institutions are the foundation of the public sphere as these provide information and forums for
72 public dialogue. The national press carried the public views across the state ??Habermas, 1974).Second, an
73 addressee of public debate in the shape of sovereign state was essential. Public opinion provided an instrument
74 for making the state accountable and responsive (Crack, 2007). Third, a vibrant civil society was imperative to
75 guide the public debate ??Castells, 2008).

76 The Habermas public sphere was an effort to provide the bases for a new form of civic engagement, for
77 example, the debates was free and open to all as equals, irrespective of their social status. Participants strived
78 to make debate intelligible to others; and when interrogated, provided reasoned justification for their opinions.
79 There is a national communications network and a national media, with a citizenry having common interests
80 (Papacharissi, 2002). Indeed, the association between the state and the public sphere has been so close that it
81 has seemed natural. The state provided institutional foundations for domestic public spheres due to the reason:
82 public discourse was hosted by print media that had a mainly national circulation; as a sovereign body, the state
83 symbolised an obvious addressee of public deliberation amongst those subject to its authority; and the shared
84 citizenship of deliberators provided a rationale for all to uphold the basic norms of publicity in discourse. (Crack,
85 2007) III.

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87 The contemporary information society and knowledge industries are characterized with the removal of all
88 the temporal and spatial barriers to distanced communication with the help of information communication
89 technologies (ICTs). A structural precondition of transnational public spheres is communicative networks to
90 enable broad participation across state borders. This prerequisite has already been met in terms of material
91 capability. The technologies of the networked society do not just extend previous communication media, but are
92 qualitatively different in terms of structure, speed, and scope (Crack, 2007). The new public sphere is emerging
93 out of the digital gadgets starting from a 'computer' then connecting them into 'Network', which started within a
94 building, then cities, states and finally 'global-networks' came up with the gadget of 'Internet', a global platform
95 giving every citizen an opportunity to become an 'international-citizen' (Chan & Lee, 2007). This platform offers
96 global discussion and dialogue opportunities on non-stop basis (Nawaz, 2010).

97 The public sphere that was once, anchored around the national institutions of territorially bound societies
98 has shifted to a public sphere constituted around the media system (Volkmer 1999; El-Nawawy & Iskander
99 2002; Paterson and Sreberny 2004). This media system includes mass self-communication, that is, networks
100 of communication that connect many-to-many in the sending and receiving of messages in a multimodal shape
101 of communication that can bypass mass media and often escape government control (Castells 2007). As the
102 communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and participatory, the networked population is acquiring
103 greater access to information, more opportunities and facilities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced
104 ability to undertake collective action (Shirky, 2011).

105 One can observe an increasing number of liberal individualist online initiatives that promote the use of the
106 Internet to enable the individuals to access a plethora of political information and express their views directly
107 to elected representatives ??Dahlberg, 2001:618). Anonymity online helps one to overcome identity limitations
108 and communicate more freely and openly, thus encouraging a more enlightened exchange of ideas (Papacharissi,
109 2002). Since the advent of the Internet in same period, social media have become a fact of life for civil society
110 worldwide that now involves many actors, ranging from regular citizens, activists, nongovernmental organizations,
111 to businesses, market brokers, telecommunications firms, software providers, and off course, governments (Shirky,
112 2011).

113 There is extensive civil society-based deliberation in cyber space. Besides online discussion forums, there is
114 an enormous amount of web publishing being undertaken by individuals and civil society organizations that
115 facilitate public deliberation. There are thousands of civic activist groups that use the Internet to draw attention
116 to particular issues to spark deliberation at local, national and global levels. This extension of the public
117 sphere can be observed from how web publications and online dialogue have stirred debate and protests over
118 capitalist globalization. ??Dahlberg, 2001:621-22). Similarly worldwide demonstrations against Iraq war in
119 2003 were primarily organized using ICTs (Hara & Shachaf, 2008). Business, public organizations, and cultural
120 groups are using this virtual environment for conferencing, public meetings, delivering informational services,
121 and performances or exhibits (Messinger et al. 2008)

122 4 IV. DETERMINANTS OF NEW PUBLIC SPHERE

123 Cyberspace is delineated as a 'new public space' made by people and 'conjoining traditional mythic narratives
124 of progress with strong modern impulses toward self-fulfillment and personal development' ??Jones, 1997:22).
125 Cyberspace is public as well as private space. This character of cyber space attracts those who want to reinvent
126 their private and public lives. Cyberspace offers a new terrain for the playing out of the centuries old friction
127 between personal and collective identity; the individual and community (Papacharissi, 2002). The reason for
128 this optimism is that good Internet skills, independent of level of education, may actually serve as a predictor of
129 online political actions (Min, 2010).

130 Media became a vital component of the public sphere in the industrial society (Thompson, 2000). If
131 communication networks are supposed to form the public sphere, then our society, the network society, is more
132 competent than any other historical form of organization, to organize its public sphere on the basis of global
133 media communication networks (Cardoso 2006; ??ull 2007;Chester 2007). In the digital era, global media includes
134 the diversity of both the mass media and Internet and wireless communication networks (McChesney 2007). It
135 should however be noted that mass media alone do not change people's minds. Media transmits opinions, and
136 then they get resonated by friends, family members, and colleagues. It is the later social step in which political
137 opinions are shaped (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 2005). The Internet in general and social media in particular, can make
138 a difference in this second step of opinion formation (Shirky, 2011).

139 The network society is characterized by a trend towards individualization, social fragmentation and new forms
140 of mediated community. The logic of networked organization is horizontally differentiated and polycentric. The
141 old cohesive hierarchies are substituted by a huge number of strategically significant 'nodes' in the network,
142 which can cooperate and conflict with one another. Network structures traverse all spheres of society, including
143 politics, government, the economy, technology, and the community (Van Dijk, 2006). These processes disrupt
144 the conventional understandings of space, borders, and territory, and influence the institutional foundations of
145 public sphere deliberation (Crack, 2007). A recent multi-country study shows that social networking is generally
146 more common in higher income nations because wealthier countries have higher rates of internet access. However,
147 people in lower income nations use social networking at rates that are as high as found in rich states (Pew, 2011).

148 Long ago it became clear that acquiring and dispersing political communication online is fast, easy, cheap,
149 and convenient (Abramson et al., 1988). The structural conditions of nation-state based public spheres are being
150 supplemented by transnational networks that offer the structural potential for extended forms of publicity. 'These
151 are threefold: communicative networks, governmental networks, and activist networks' (Crack, 2007). As in the
152 case of Habermasian model, media should be free from state and market influence; governance organizations
153 should be accountable and receptive to public opinion; and civil society institutions should observe basic norms
154 of deliberation ??Habermas, 1974). If there is a convergence of these conditions around a given issue area, then
155 transnational networks could facilitate meaningful critical dialogue (Shirky, 2011;Min, 2010;Crack, 2007). a) ICTS
156 ICT refers to computers, software, networks, satellite links and related systems that enable people to access,
157 analyze, create, exchange and use data, information, and knowledge in ways that, were almost unimaginable
158 hitherto.

159 ICT is used almost interchangeably with the Internet (Beebe, 2004). It is better to comprehend ICT in
160 perspective of creating a new set of relationships and places, agora rather than as a high-tech tool. It is one
161 more global field in which struggles over the distribution of power, resources and information will be fought out
162 (Van Dijk, 2006). The Internet is a unique matrix of networks which is based on a 'many-to-many' model of
163 information distribution, as opposed to the 'one-to-many' structure of mass media (Crack, 2007).

164 New technologies provide information and tools

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166 that have the potential to extend the role of the public in the social and political arena. The mushroom growth of
167 online political groups and activism certainly depict political uses of the internet (Bowen, 1996;Browning, 1996).
168 The internet and related technologies due to their nature can augment avenues for personal expression and foster
169 citizen activity (e.g. Kling, 1996;Negroponte, 1998). The Internet and wireless communication, by enacting a
170 global, horizontal network of communication, offer both an organizing tool and a means for debate, dialogue, and
171 collective decision making ??Castells, 2008). Modern communication technologies easily merge into each other to
172 enhance connectivity and raise accessibility (Kleinberg, 2008;Fidler, 1997). For example, cell phones are owned
173 by overwhelmingly large majorities of people in most major countries around the world, and they are used for
174 multiple purposes beyond just phone calls. A recent multicountry study shows that text messaging is a global
175 phenomenon -across the 21 countries surveyed, a median of 75% of cell phone owners say they text (Pew, 2011).
176 Blogs and networking sites represent the most popular online category across the world when ranked by average
177 time spent, followed by online games and instant messaging (Molinari & Porquier, 2011).

178 6 b) Networking

179 A digital network consists of two or more computers that are linked in order to share resources (such as scanners,
180 printers and CDs), exchange files, or allow electronic communications. The computers on a network are linked
181 through cables, telephone lines, radio waves, satellites, or infrared light beams (Winkelman, 1998). The Internet
182 is the world's largest, most powerful computer network (Manocchehr, 2007). Networked computers have the
183 potential to expand the scale of the worlds beyond our imagination (Bell, 2008).

184 Digital social networks refer to social networks primarily realised by means of computer-mediated communication
185 (Licklider et al., 1968). The first instance of a social networking platform was SixDegrees.com, launched in
186 1997 (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). Most appropriate to the global setting, networks are capable of structuring social
187 relationships without constraint of place or the need for co-presence (Axford, 2004). Most social software research
188 focuses on the relations between social entities in digital social networks and their interaction, while community
189 information systems contain and group social entities (Klamma et al., 2007). Social networking sites used to
190 publicize political agendas can influence voters' behavior (Molinari & Porquier, 2011). This role of social media
191 has been witnessed in several election campaigns in the last few years (Anduiza, 2009;Stirland, 2008;Hachigian
192 & Wu, 2003). c) Social Software 'Social-software' is that specie of software which helps conduct social activities
193 and socializing process at any temporal level including the international communications. This results in the
194 establishment of a 'new environment' of global interaction, which has both positive and negative aftereffects for
195 the international community (Oblak, 2002). The social software has shaped and stimulated 'new public sphere'
196 as a backdrop of global communications for the novel 'global society' which never existed in a form that every
197 member of this society can instantly interact with another member beyond the traditional limits of time and
198 space (Bell, 2008).

199 The term 'social software' encompasses a wide range of different technologies, along with the social aspect of
200 these technologies that often emerges from an integrated use of different technologies. Commonly used social
201 software includes weblogs, wikis, RSS feeds and social bookmarking (Dalsgaard, 2006). Similarly, the social
202 network sites (SNSs) are the web-based services that allow individuals to: create a public or semi-public profile
203 within a bounded system; articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection; and view and pass
204 through their connections and those made by others within the system however, the nature and labels of these
205 links vary from site to site (Boyd & Ellison, 2008).

206 What makes SNSs distinctive is not that they help individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they allow
207 users to articulate and make visible their social networks. This can lead to interactions between individuals that
208 would not otherwise be possible, but that is often not the goal, and these meetings are frequently between those
209 who share some offline connection (Haythornthwaite, 2005). Social media can reduce the costs of coordination
210 and can compensate for the disadvantages of undisciplined groups. As a result, it is now possible for larger, looser
211 groups to take on some kinds of coordinated action, such as protest movements and public media campaigns that
212 were previously reserved for formal organizations (Shirky, 2011).

213 Beyond common features like profiles, Friends, comments, and private messaging, SNSs vary greatly in their
214 services and user base. Some have photo or videosharing capabilities; others have integrated blogging and instant
215 messaging technology. Mobile-specific SNSs have also been launched (e.g., Dodgeball), and some web-based SNSs
216 also support limited mobile interactions (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, & Cyworld) (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). It is
217 better to think about social media as a long-term tool that can strengthen civil society and the public sphere.
218 This may be called the political changes in the life of a country, including prodemocratic regime change, follow,
219 rather than precede, the development of a strong public sphere (Shirky, 2011).

220 7 d) Blogs

221 The blogs are a class of social software often used in organizations for social networking (Kumar et al., 2004).
222 For example, Weblogs support independent and individual presentation (Dalsgaard, 2006). The term 'Blog' is a
223 short form of 'Weblog' and can be most appropriately described as an online journal (Drexler et al., 2007). The
224 act of 'Blogging' is the creation of such logs. For some businesses, the 'real' news is not just a ticker-tape-like

news feed from Reuters or the BBC. In business, the most important news is what you and those you care about, did yesterday, are doing today, and plan to do tomorrow (Klamma et al., 2007). Likewise, the comment feature of blogs provides the opportunity for feedback from anyone in the world creating limitless collaborative options. The political use of the blogging phenomenon is one of the outstanding indicators of the impact that the e-communication is having on the political arena (Kahn & Kellner, 2004; Kevin, 2007). In sum, they are potentially powerful collaborative tools (Drexler et al., 2007).

ICTs are the creator and booster of globalization which is the process that constitutes a social system with the capacity to work as a unit on a planetary scale in real or chosen time. Capacity here refers to technological, institutional (deregulation, liberalization, & privatization), and organizational capacity (networking as a form of structurisation of activity) (Held et al. 1999; Giddens & Hutton 2000; Held & McGrew 2007). These processes have shifted the debate from the national domain to the global debate and prompted the emergence of a global civil society and of ad hoc forms of global governance. Consequently, the public sphere as the space of debate on public issues has also shifted from the national to the global level ??Castells, 2008).

What is being witnessed in this global age is not the end of politics but rather its relocation elsewhere (Toffler, 1991). The national/international dualism no more defines the structure of opportunities for political action instead it is now located in the "global" arena. Global politics have transformed into global domestic politics, which rob national politics of their boundaries and foundations ??Beck, 2006: 249). The increasing inability of nation-states to face and control the processes of globalization of the issues that are the object of their governance leads to ad hoc forms of global governance and, eventually, to a new form of state (Waters, 2001; Holton, 1998; Hirst & Thompson, 1996). However nation states, despite their multidimensional crisis, do not disappear, instead they transform themselves to adjust to the new context. Their transformation is what really transforms the contemporary landscape of politics and policy making ??Castells, 2008).

Moreover, a number of contemporary issues are global in their nature and in their treatment ??Jacquet et al., 2002). Among these problems, the most prominent is global warming which is characterized by the damage caused due to unsustainable development. Such issues require global policies to be observed across the globe (Grundmann, 2001). This again reiterates the nation state inabilities. It is however obvious that not everything or everyone is globalized, but the global networks that structure the planet affects everything and everyone. The obvious reason for this phenomenon is that all the core economic, communicative, and cultural activities are globalized (Castells, 2008).

V.

8 DISCUSSIONS

Research shows that exchange within many deliberative forums fails to approximate the other requirements of Habermas model in various ways. First, reflexivity is often just a nominal part of online deliberations. Second, many online forums fail to attain a reasonable level of respectful listening or commitment to working with difference. Third, it is difficult to validate identity claims and information put forward. Fourth, certain individuals and groups tend to dominate the discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. Fifth, existing social inequalities lead to extensive exclusions from online forums. Finally, the growth of economic interests into areas of online life is resulting in the displacement of rational deliberation by instrumental rationality in many online forums ??Dahlberg, 2001:623). However, it is argued that conventional public sphere theory is inappropriate to evaluate the import of crossborder communicative flows, since it takes for granted an alliance between political territory and the circulation of dialogue. Moreover in the mass society, this relationship seemed so close that some have made the flawed extrapolation that public spheres require a physical locale (Crack, 2007).

Furthermore, Habermas noted that while granting free access has never compelled every member of the community to participate. Similarly the online public spheres cannot expect all users of the web to engage in meaningful dialogue (Ubayasiri, 2006). In any case the world is being progressively restructured by a complex web of social relations and the suffusion of media infrastructure in daily life. Mass society is being transitioned to a network society. Social and media networks are shaping its prime mode of organization and most important structures at all (van Dijk, 2006).

Despite the enthusiasm regarding the innovative uses of the internet as a public medium, it is still a medium invented in a capitalist era. It is an essential part of a social and political world (Jones, e) Globalization M arch 2012 1997). The Internet has to some extent been developed, monitored and regulated by government. Nor are online interactions free of corporate power. The Internet is now mainly developed and controlled by commercial interests and online commerce dominates the Web. As such it is vulnerable to the same forces that originally transformed the public sphere. The same forces defined the character of radio and television, media once admired for providing innovative ways of communication (Papacharissi, 2002). However, a huge amount of cyberdiscourse takes place relatively autonomous from state and economic affairs ??Dahlberg, 2001:617). The anonymity of the authors over the internet and the arguable tendency towards mass tyranny, seemingly dent the very foundation of the public sphere, and its ability to produce positive public opinion. The need for 'control' would then arguably challenge the very freedoms accorded by the internet and the public sphere (Ubayasiri, 2006).

However, the internet will open the door to a cultural and political renaissance, despite the fact that large corporations will take up a fraction of it to launch their cyberventures. It has the capacity to trigger a cascade of changes (McChesney, 1995). Many studies have shown how citizens utilize computers and the Internet for

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287 enhanced political and democratic initiatives. But for the so-called cyber pessimists, the Internet is nothing but
288 a digital replica of the real world where one observes politics as usual (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Wilhelm, 2000).
289 Virtuality has been a vital feature of the public sphere in most of its historical manifestations: which means that
290 discourse has been conducted at a distance (Warner, 2002). Therefore there is no a priori reason why computer
291 mediated communication should be incompatible with critical publicity (Crack, 2007).

292 9 CONCLUSIONS

293 It seems inappropriate to compare the public sphere of 21st century with the public sphere of 18th century. The
294 ICTs are rapidly transforming all the societal, political and economic aspects of life. There has been a paradigm
295 shift mainly realized through technologies. However, the Internet itself can not turn on some fundamentally new
296 age of political participation and grassroots democracy (Hill and Hughes, 1998). ICTs can certainly help connect,
297 motivate, and organize dissent. Whether the expression of dissent is strong enough to bring social change is a
298 question of human agency. New technologies provide additional tools, but they cannot all alone alter a political
299 and economic system that has existed for centuries (Papacharissi, 2002).

300 Furthermore, the so-called 'digital divide' is also evident within states as well as between them. Country-specific
301 studies have proved that the pattern of marginalisation correlates with groups that experience broader
302 disadvantages, such as women, ethnic minorities, ruralists, and the poorly educated ??Norris, 2001:77-86). The
303 'Information Age' sounds like an unsuitable misnomer when it comes to mind that a person in a developed
304 country is 22 times more likely to be an Internet user than someone in a developing country (UNCTAD, 2006,
305 p. xi). However, if socioeconomic factors creating 'digital divide' mark new public sphere as undemocratic then
306 it is ironic to note that Habermas public sphere, the pinnacle of democracy was also rather undemocratic in its
307 structure throughout the centuries, by not including women or people from lower social classes (Papacharissi,
308 2002).

309 The network society causes the temporalspatial boundaries of public spheres to be increasingly fluid ??Castells,
310 2001a). A favorable confluence of communication networks, governance networks, and activist networks, may
311 facilitate the emergence transnational public spheres around certain issue-areas. The balance of problems versus
312 prospects for the expansion of critical publicity will vary vastly depending on the subject and social movement
313 concerned. However, it is evident that there are certain constraints to the further consolidation of transnational
314 public spheres and these must be addressed to materialize the revival and transformation of public sphere (Crack,
2007). Recent research is more focused on the ^{1 2}



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Figure 1: Figure 1 :

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


Figure 2: Figure 1

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316 From Habermas Model to New Public Sphere: A Paradigm Shift "environmental" view in contrast to the
317 instrumental view of Internet freedom. According to this idea, positive

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319 determined by a variety of factors that including, not only socioeconomic and demographic factors, but also
320 physical, psychological, cultural, and ecological factors (Min, 2010).

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9 CONCLUSIONS

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