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The Socio-Political Structure of Iranian Islamic Cities and the Role of Capacity Building in Achieving Good Governance with an Emphasize on the Production of Social Capital in Civil Society of Iran (A Critical View)

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The Socio-Political Structure of Iranian Islamic Cities and the Role of Capacity Building in Achieving Good Governance with an Emphasize on the Production of Social Capital in Civil Society of Iran (A Critical View)

Zohreh Fanni^α & Sahar Golchini^σ

Abstract- Recent changes in globalization, whether in developed or developing countries, have made nations seek a new form of governance. The basis of these changes is to reform the intellectual, cultural, and political structure of nations and governments to establish democracy. This study is an attempt to illustrate the formation of the structure of states as a set of factors (government, people, politics, social, political and local institutions) and the importance of the role of the political culture in governance and civil political culture in achieving good governance, particularly in societies with a traditional system of governance, and it posits social capital as the unofficial and effective social norm of democracy in a society. This article also examines the history of centralized governance structure and cultural models in Iran and aims to create new attitudes toward removing structural obstacles and create sustainable communities and optimal management. This article concludes that legitimacy, which is the moral basis of the authority of a governance system, derives from the satisfaction of the people of that society, and is referred to as the political culture of that country, and in case of public dissatisfaction and lack of public participation and trust, a crisis of legitimacy will occur in that society. Hence, in countries such as Iran, for reasons such as the individualistic system of governance, individuals are less able to participate in political decisions, and due to mistrust, the formation of civil institutions is less, and given the diversity of ethnicity and the multiplicity of cultures with diverse thoughts, weaknesses in the culture of civic engagement, and the dominance of the element of religion, good urban governance is at an early stage in Iran.

Keywords: social-political; political culture; good governance; social capital; Iran.

1. INTRODUCTION

Iran's prime cities reflect the power of governments, the governing ideologies in the society, and the manner of social interactions and practices. In fact,

there are fundamental differences between Iranian society and Western society in terms of geographical conditions, manner of ownership, the nature of power, and the system of social classes; therefore, the generalization of other countries' social theories on Iran is an unrealistic idea (Maroufi 2014, as cited in Katouzian 2000). Unlike European cities, Iranian cities have not been autonomous and independent, and in many ways are the result of power relations and centralized governance in the macro-socio-political structure of Iran. The political and social structure of Iran, both before and after Islam, has been based on the rule of different tribes because the primary social structure did not require complex social institutions (Zibakalam, 2014), and the political structure stemmed from the role of a father, boss, commander or (king) (Maroufi 2015, as cited in Pakzad 2011).

Thus, in a society of one's absolute and monopoly power, it was not possible to form an independent government since the ruler owned all the land and even the life and property of the people. The government in Iran indeed meant a division of affairs that was protected by the government and the clergy, and the social duty of the clergy formed a very close bond with the people because the clergy could easily impact public opinion because they were highly respected by the people (Algar, 1969). Yet, unlike medieval Europe, the clergy in Iran did not have a centralized organization independent from the central government (Ashrafi, 1974- Slugliet, 2005- Pakzad, 2011) in addition to the two factors of government and religion, a third factor played a role in complementing the socio-political structure and relations of government and society in Iran, which, due to geographical conditions and specific cultural characteristics, had different ethnicities with different traditions and characteristics. It was in this structure that clan or custom made sense, but it was not the concept of law and norms they wanted, consequently, due to the absence of a central army and bureaucracy, kings had to give rulers and tribal rulers authority (Reid, 1983).

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These tribes were the most effective means of control and security, particularly in the Qajar era, when they played a more prominent role in the structure of government. The customs are factors that are now valid among the people in the social framework of Iran.

The tendency of advanced countries has recently shifted toward drastically reducing the role of governments and revising their functions and duties (Evanze, 2003). The emergence of widespread social movements and the development of new forms of social organization and the demand for increased political participation have led to a widespread democracy in authoritarian regimes in the late 1980s and 1990s. There has been a shift from the role of formal structures and governments as decision-makers, emphasizing the role of civil society and creating a state-oriented urban management approach, to a proper urban governance approach (Barakpoor & Asadi, 2009). Given the complexities of social conditions for management and development policies, the government is not the mere governing agency but what is significant is the governance with the participation of other social forces at the domestic and international levels (UN-Habitat, 2002). In a proper governance model, the political system with a qualitative and strategic nature is present in the social arena and the government facilitates its intrusive and monopolistic role. Interactive social forces and groups form a harmonious and coordinated community for development and most importantly provide trust, cooperation and a networked structure organized throughout the process of social capital formation in civil societies.

In Iran, during the 1953-1978 period, considering the historical characteristics of government, government and society and the social and cultural structure of Iran, the hostile relations of governments with civil society, their unconventional structure, the domination of states over all the political, cultural, social and administrative affairs of cities, petroleum rental income, and eventually political corruption and instability and the lack of political participation in the ruling system expanded, reflecting the formation of constitutional and Islamic revolutions in Iran. Reviewing the research conducted on the social and political structure and the formation of proper governance in Iran and other countries reveals that most studies have merely examined proper governance in terms of dimensions and indicators, and other international research, have examined the reasons, requirements, context, and barriers to proper governance in cities. The present article examines the role of Iran's governance, social, and political structure and the obstacles and capacities of proper governance and the political culture of the governmental system and the weakness in the political culture of social participation in Iran in the absence of fully implemented governance, and the role of social capital production and civil society institutions in

establishing governance in all international and national regional societies, and addresses the role of social actors as key players in the development of a country. In this article, we believe that the nature and characteristics of the political culture of government and the political culture and ethics of the participants in each nation have a direct impact on the manner of realizing good governance in each country because the type of governance and the balance between centralization and decentralization of decision-making to deliver services and increased social order helps realize good governance.

Hence, we believe that in order to move from the obstacles (centralized and hierarchical government) toward good governance, it is essential to revise the structure of the centralized system of government and establish decentralized and democratic approach in parallel with the participation of public institutions, management agencies, and the private sector. This will not occur unless there is a reciprocal link between government and social forces and civil organizations in order to enforce the rule of law, accountability, transparency in decisions and actions, accountability, continued supervision, non-discrimination, non-corruption, and public commitment, and above all, civil ethics should be defined and implemented in societies.

II. LITERATURE

Fokoyama (1986- 2000) believes in a dialogue between civil society and the government. In his view, good governance occurs when governments move through social discourses and integration between states and nations (Burchll et al., 1991-2000). (Safarian and Emamjomeh-Zadeh, 2017) believe that in some countries the pattern of good governance is in line with globalization and new technical conditions, changing the way we interact and trust and collaborate at all levels of society. (Sardarnia, 2017) examines the governance in Iran from a pathological point of view, and emphasizes on the civic ethics of public institutions and government, in addition to structural reform and how people and government communicate. Hashmatzadeh et al. (2017) consider the political culture and characteristics and historical background of nations in each country to be effective in achieving good governance. (Poorahmad et al. (2018) argue that to achieve good governance, traditional approaches in developing countries, namely the focus on management, need to be reduced and local governments should be strengthened. (Sundaresan, 2019) believes that the planning system and management structure in Bangladesh derive from how public and private associations compete, and maintains that planning at the local level is more desirable. Concerning the role of culture on participation, (Dang, 2018) claims that cultural models such as

religion, gender, etc, in countries with specific conditions and histories, have a particular impact on participation, for instance, China and Italy that have a centralized, hierarchical structure of government, are very different from the Netherlands, which has a consensus-oriented individualist culture. (Gjaltema & et al, 2019) also argues about the formation of mega-governments as a combination of government and administration. In this mode of governance, societies are interconnected and the state and the government have a complementary role, but this type of governance is a new concept and one needs to look at its implementation comprehensively and operationally. Given this and most of the research reviewed on the subject of this article, most authors consider the barriers to good governance to be the lack of citizen participation in decision-making, lack of interaction among government agencies, and lack of local governments' involvement in governance, insufficient funds to inform people about their demands and requirements. For instance, In India, the main challenge is the lack of coordination among parties, and in Latin America, citizens' disinterestedness in local issues (UN-habitat, 2016; Gordon, 2016; Dacruz et al., 2019). This article now argues that, throughout Iran's history, governance structure and political culture of governments and the participatory political culture of the people and the ethics of the participants have a direct impact on the implementation of good governance in Iran.

III. METHODOLOGY AND METHOD

The authors of this article aim to analyze good governance concerning the civil political culture of government and people in Islamic Iranian society. In the theoretical section, the study of the history, context, and different political, cultural, and social experiences of the Iranian government and nation is pointed out since the beginning of Islam. The current structure of the state administration system, which consists of three legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, plays a key role in all decision-making. This descriptive-historical study examines the relationship between good governance and political culture of participation and the roots of the obstacles to good governance in countries such as Iran and used resources and valid scholarly articles and books to draw on the experiences of other countries. It also outlines the role of all government and civil society organizations, social actors and ordinary citizens in good governance, and offers recommendations in this regard to promote civic participation and raise awareness devoid of ethnic and religious prejudice, reform in political culture, and Civil and social capital growth.

IV. THEORETICAL APPROACH

a) *Macro Socio-political Structure*

The post-Islam political-social mechanism in Iran has been the result of the interaction among the three elements of government, religion, and customs (Maroufi 2014-2015) these three factors have shaped the territorial organization, and their balance has guaranteed socio-political stability. It seems that this macrostructure of government in this period consolidated and shaped the political and social structure of the current cities and the existing system of governance. In the following, the impact of each factor on the urban scale will be examined.

i. *Governing Institution*

The Iranian city in the Iranian political system has been the royal seat and center of political and governmental power, and the growth of cities has been dependent on the government and there has been no independent non-governmental urban entity (Sultanzadeh 1984; Maroufi 2015) the reason that some cities have grown and some have declined throughout Iran's history has been the role of the rulers in the flourishing of some cities (Turner 2002; Piran 1991). In Iran, at the outset, government leaders presided over the city's administrative and local government divisions (Ashraf 1970). At the urban scale, many of the city's affairs and were managed by government affiliates; this is the reason for the lack of independence of the Iranian cities from the government. Urban affairs were initially governed by the ruler or the king, the sheriff, and the headmen and the judiciary (Beaumont et al., 1990; Costello 1992).

*Note that none of these powers were elected by the people or representatives of the people, and they were not required to respond to the townspeople.

ii. *Religious Institution*

The impact of religion in Iranian Islamic cities has been such that it has contributed to shaping the social, economic and political relations of the city (Yousefifar 2010). In addition to considering the individual dimensions of Muslim life, Islam focuses on social life and people's actions and behavior in society. One of the supervisory bodies for these principles is the Awqaf, which is an important economic and social entity that is considered to be a non-governmental institutional body formed on the basis of citizens' goodwill and in terms of cultural, social, economic and cultural dimensions. In terms of cultural, social, economic and management dimensions, it has played an important role in such affairs as the establishment of public utilities, the protection of the poor, women, helping the local economy, social cohesion and the promotion of justice among the people, the dependence from the state (Shahabi 2004; Ahlers 1994; Emamjomeh-Zadeh 1993; Maroufi 2015).

iii. *Custom Institution (neighborhood)*

The neighborhood complements the spatial, social, and administrative structure of the Iranian city. In the formation of neighborhoods, family, ethnic, and religious solidarity has been involved and reflects the cultural diversity existing in different tribes and ethnicities, and this bond between residents has provided psychological security and increased cooperation and collaboration among them (Khirabadi 1997; Maroufi 2015). Initially, Iranian cities were urban neighborhoods of a self-governing social syst (Costello, 1992) and these cities, individual interests were integrated into the collective interests of the neighborhood, and the rights and duties of individuals were based on their membership and solidarity in the neighborhood community. The management of the neighborhoods was delegated to the headman, and the customary nature of these neighborhoods prevented the government from interfering in the neighborhood system (Avery et al., 1991) in addition, another nongovernmental organization (the social hangout), which today forms part of the urban space organization, was responsible for the social and moral control of neighborhoods, and some ethical people and Zurkhaneh played the role of establishing social order and public morality, defending the neighborhood and organizing religious ceremonies and promoting sportsmanship (Martin, 2005; Floor, 1971; Arasteh, 1961; Ridgeon, 2007).

b) *Urban Planning and Management System in Iran*

The planning and management system of urban development in Iran has been centralized from the beginning thus far, and its two main characteristics were the sectionality and poor role of local people and organizations in the development process. This system had legal, structural, functional, and inter-organizational predicaments, and despite efforts to balance activities and organizations, the focus of all government (Hanachi, 2004) was on centralized power, and there was no arena for public participation (Imani, 2002). In Banasheri's opinion, some of the common features of South Asian countries, including Iran, are as follows:

- Decision-making has top-down processes;
- Decentralization policies are poorly implemented;
- The awareness and enforcement of civil rights among citizens and officials are very poor;
- There is little effort to increase local resources and investment in education and social capital production (Imani, 2002; Banasheri, 1999).

The full intervention of the centralized government in socio-economic policy-making and planning over the last 50 years has severely weakened local management and civil society institutions, preventing citizen participation in decision-making (Kazemian & Rezvani, 2001). The formation of executive units of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

has been through various ministries as the sectoral planning system and through the five-year economic, social and cultural development plans of Iran that have impacted the functioning of cities (Rahnamaie, 1994-2009) or through a petroleum-based single-product economy policy that results in a quasi-rental economy without the benefit of society (Habibi, 1996; Haji Yosefi, 1999; Rahnamaie & Keshavarz, 2010). However, in the new view of urban management, the shift in attitudes toward the role of the public and private sectors in the process of community development is confirmed.

c) *Political Culture*

Vebera (1965), holds that political culture is the pattern of individual beliefs and attitudes about the system and political issues and political inclinations of a nation's political values and traditions that are closely linked to the extent of people's participation. Additionally, Almond and Pawell (1992) argue that sustainable attitudes are beliefs and feelings in society. The political culture of a nation derives from the historical background and social, economic, and political structure of each society (SefiZadeh, 1994; Haji Yousefi & et al., 2017) and is transmitted from generation to generation (Kazemi, 2003).

The most important inclination at the level of a system is the legitimacy of a government that enables the realization of a political system, which is called the ethical foundations of authority and is understood as the political culture of a nation that. In the process of socialization, it is institutionalized and deals with subjects that form our basic perceptions of government, the rights and obligations of the governors and the governed, the patterns of elections, political change, and so on. To understand the legitimacy of a system, people's positive or negative judgment must be sought with regard to government behavior. There is no longer a crisis of legitimacy if the elements of a given society are satisfied with the efficiency of a government at the level of participation, distribution, and equality (Razi, 1995; Simour & Listed, 1995).

The distribution of political culture at different levels of society and across different social groups is not the same, one of the most important of which is different political culture among masses and elites (Kazemi, 2003). The political culture of the masses consists of the attitudes of the masses, which include citizens and participants and civil society that they do not have the system under their control (Zarei, 2009). In this respect, there are three types of political culture in most countries, including restricted, passive and subordinate, and participatory or active political culture that are of great importance. Now, the history of the political culture in Iran is examined in the following periods:

** Iranian Political Culture from the Beginning of Islam to the Islamic Revolution*

Throughout the history of Iranian political culture, from the beginning to the Persian Constitutional Period, tyranny and force have been dominant and for a variety of complex reasons, the culture of permanent dependence has been opposed to the culture of participation, and the processes of socialization and acculturation have reinforced this type of culture (Bashryeh, 2011). In developed countries civil society was stronger and it resisted the political system and the rulers could not seize the property of the people in Europe, every city had a community that people formed. Yet, in Iran, European feudalism was never formed because most of the land was state-owned (feudalism) (Keshavarz, 2009; Shanehchi, 1994). Therefore, there were no laws to protect people's property and to protect them from external danger; consequently, there was dispersion across ethnic groups in Iran, and this always caused a sense of insecurity among the people (Ravandi, 1989; Akbari, 1991). Most people in the period did not have a proper understanding of the concepts of rule of law, liberty, and democracy, and most people sought freedom from oppression (Zibakalam, 2013) and there was a culture of out-of-group distrust, intergroup prejudices, and violence against aliens (Sariolghalam, 2014). The constitutional revolution was formed, but the political irrationality of the people prevented its full implementation. Then came the Pahlavi era in which some reforms were implemented but they were unsuccessful because authoritarian political culture (monopoly and individualism) coincided with patriarchal culture in decision making. Additionally, during this period, the political culture of interference in the outcome of the election became common (Ghahramanpour, 2004; Ghalibaf & Shushtari, 2013; Sadeghi & Ghanbari, 2017).

** Iranian Political Culture from the Islamic Revolution Onwards*

At the beginning of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the ideology of the revolution affected the masses by weakening the ethnic and environmental class identity and by superior Islamic identity. However, in fact, the people's participation was not based on group interests but rather on the general interests of the revolution, the type of the struggle and the nature of power led to the establishment of populist government characterized by political participation and mobilization (Bashryeh, 2011). This period is known as the ideological government era, whereas the Islamic Republic Party was the only dominant party and the government intended ethical and intellectual control of the people in the Islamic style of society (Abbasian, 1999). The period was a major source of reinforcement for suburbanites, immigrants, and peasants, accompanied with different attitudes and cultures, and with the quasi-rental nature, the middle class, which was effective in democratizing in Iran, was weakened

(Shahramnia, 2007; Azghandi, 2010; Sadeghi & ghanbari 2017). Thus, at the beginning of the period, due to structural requirements, neither the political culture of civil society nor the government had the priority of forming good governance.

Since the second and third periods of the Islamic Revolution, with the slogan of economic changes and reforms, the system of values, and changes in political culture and globalization, the way was paved for civil political participation. Daniel Lerner believes that if the political culture of a nation is to grow, at the macro level, there should be political peace and investment to reform the political structure. Mohammad Khatami's re-election in 1997 signaled a shift in reformism, with voters not seeking a better life but protesting against ideological domination in society, demanded political and civil liberties and the rule of law and elimination of tensions in foreign policy (Asayesh & et al., 2011). Subsequently, the press increased quantitatively and qualitatively, and spontaneous civic participation replaced mass participation, such as the elections of the councils with the aim of delegating decision-making and increasing participation that provided the basis for the expansion of the middle class and the emergence of civil society and democracy. Yet, in the years after 2005, due to the lack of structural reforms, the reformists were excluded and popular support declined and continues to decline due to unkept promises and distrust.

d) The Difference between Governance and Good Governance

Governance refers to the development of governance styles in which there are boundaries between the private and public sectors (Stoker 1987). Governance is a type of conceptual approach to represent actors in public administration. Interactive government is a government in which there is an interaction between government and society (Kooiman, 2003; Laleh Pour, 2007; Mehdizadeh, 2001). (Dunsire, & et al, 1988) argues that bureaucracy is a hierarchy that acts as a decree and that the whole process of institutionalization must be taken into account in the management process. (Abramse, 1988) believes that bureaucracy is not the reality behind the political veil, and governments' self-censorship impedes their political performance. According to Abramse, the government is an act and not an instrument. As a new paradigm in public administration, good governance has created a point of interaction between various disciplines of the humanities such as management, economics, political science, sociology, law, public policy, and international relations (Safarian & Emamjomeh-Zadeh 2017). Good governance has been provided by international institutions since the 1980s in response to the adverse conditions of developing societies. The origin of good governance can be traced back to Chester Barnard's

ideas. He sees the solution to many social issues in chain collaboration and participation of all actors of government agencies, the private sector, and public institutions. Good governance signifies a paradigm shift in the role of governments, which is, in fact, a type of grounding for development based on the needs of the people and the participation of government and social forces in decision making. (AJZT et al., 2010; Azeez, 2012- Baddach & Malgorzata, 2017).

As Mark Bevir (1999) states, governments usually do not have good relations with democracy, but in most developed cities, civic participation and transparency have been prioritized as good governance. This is a model of law based on the interactions between government and civil societies that are accompanied with change and reform in societies; (Farntzeskaki & Wittmayer, 2014; Weingarh et al, 2010). This is a way of governing people in society (Rhodes, 2007) and a set of commonly accepted indicators such as sustainability, fairness and justice, efficiency, transparency, accountability, and civic participation (UN-Habitat, 2007).

e) *Grounds of Good Governance*

Good governance has two social and political grounds that work in the social sector to harmonize the different social strata in public policy-making and social justice and its political dimension plays a legal and management role in consolidating democracy (Azzez, 2016; Safarian & Emamjomeh-Zadeh, 2017).

- ❖ Social structure of good governance model: This section highlights the three main pillars of participation in society: government, civil society, and the private sector, there is no hierarchical structure (Shirvani & Hajeh Rajabi, 2011; Elsenhans, 2001; Borzil, 2008).
- ❖ Political structure of good governance model: In this section, governments have a facilitating and accelerating nature and have a strategic orientation and there is no hierarchical structure. This section has two areas and includes indicators that prevent communities from moving toward development.

i. *Deterrent factors*

At the macro-scale, factors such as maladaptive laws and regulations that are based on improper supervision and lack of ethics, and ease of communication and transparency between citizens is not possible (Katozian, 2012; Danayi fard, 2009), or political instability and violence against people stabilizes the country's social landscape and negatively impacts the efficiency and attraction of foreign investment. Moreover, the lack of control over corruption incurs unjust costs and damages the country's economic base (Huntington, 2006; Safarian & Emamjomeh-Zadeh, 2017). In urban policies, delegating duties, responsibility and accountability (Davies & Imbroscio, 2003; Gordon, 2016; Zahedi, 2007; Rahnamaie & Keshavarz, 2010),

provides the move to social investment, Radaelli & et al., 2012), and discusses some of the institutional and structural changes and capacities toward the realization of good governance (Bovaird & Löffler, 2003; Rode, 2017).

ii. *Effective Factors*

Establishing these indicators provides the basis for the functioning of the political system and the formation of good governance in the context of the right of expression and accountability whereby people can hold the government accountable and express their views freely (Farzin Pack, 2004; Wallace & Pichler, 2008) or the rule of law, where everyone is equal before the law and the rights of the majority and minority are taken into account. The efficiency and effectiveness that meet the needs of communities and the inappropriate performance of governments lead to a large workload and the inability of governments to win citizens' trust (Ale Omran, 2011).

f) *The Relationship between Political Culture and Good Governance*

Politics and government are the linking points between political culture and good governance. Good governance is understood within a political system in which civil society and the private sector participate, it can be argued that the political culture of a society is an important ground and capacity to form good governance in a country. (Sharif Zadeh, 2003) states that "any attempt to establish good governance in a society extrinsically, when ideological, cultural, and infrastructural grounds are not provided, cannot bring about the rapid growth of democratic culture in that society." Robert Dall considers political culture essential for the expansion of participation. Almond and Powell also believe that the reason for political underdevelopment in Third World countries is due to their historical, cultural and psychological background; that is, in these societies a type of culture has been formed that has prevented the growth of areas of political participation (Seifzadeh, 1994). In fact, neglecting the political culture may defeat any plan, thus models of a country's political development are ineffective in many countries because they are incompatible with the culture of the host society. However, today the concept of good urban governance has evolved to a new concept and approach called centralization or multilevel governance (Jessop, 2004) or creativity and government that reflect the formation of the concept of the creative city and creative class that has led to the production of social capital. In this respect Florida (2000) has promoted creative governance, namely facilitating and enhancing the processes of public participation and the emergence of decision-making civic institutions (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009) at various levels of policymaking that stem from a close relationship between social and political aspects

(Pratt, 2010). The result is the emergence of a new approach called smart city in the built environment of the city, arguing that intelligent governance (i.e., reforming the state structure to become smarter and increase knowledge and awareness to create interaction between people and government) because by reforming the government structure with modern and technical methods an appropriate context is provided for educating and enhancing the intellectual knowledge of nations in line with forming the culture of civic engagement and the creation of popular institutions (Meijer & Bolivard, 2015).

V. CIVIL POLITICAL CULTURE IN IRAN AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

Civic political culture includes the values, knowledge, and dispositions of citizens (Olamidi & Aransi, 2017). It also enables citizens to shape the social, economic, and political destiny of nations. (Anton (2011) claims that civic political culture is the best basis for democracy and its practice.

Various studies have shown that participatory culture enhances governments' responsiveness to the present and future needs of society and provides foresight in major policy and decision making (AKinola & Akutson, 2000; opoola, 2013). Characteristics of the civil political culture of nations that facilitate the process of participatory governance include the close relationship of the people with the political system in a broad sense, active participation of people in government activities such as elections and taxation, justice in government officials, membership in political associations. trust and civic engagement, and most importantly, a proper civic or participatory culture (Almond & Verba, 1965). According to Almond (1965), a political system that allows citizens to participate actively in the political process is called a participatory culture and on the other hand, when people are allowed to participate in a limited way, it is called culture, and when people have neither the opportunity nor the desire to participate, the political culture is narrow-minded. Political culture in Iran has been studied from a variety of historical viewpoints, and almost all of the results show that in the ruling groups, it is difficult to find a favorable view toward expanding participation in the political arena. In examining the major features of political culture among the different classes of the Iranian middle class, Ardie Gastil showed that Iranians believe that humans are naturally evil and authoritarian, that everything is changing and cannot be trusted, one must be skeptical and distrustful of those around him, etc. In the current circumstances in Iran, political trust, and particularly trust in the government, has been severely damaged. One of these factors is the behaviors of the government, but some of them stem from the historical political culture in Iranian society. The people of Iran were long been aware of the fact that

violence and coercion prevailed, and the social order between people was traditional and ineffective, resulting in inappropriate social contracts and relationships. In such circumstances, everyone attempts to promote profit-oriented and deceptive individualism (www.Khaniki.com).

a) *Elements and Characteristics of Citizens' Political Culture in Iran*

Given that Iran is in transition in most respects, therefore Iran's political culture is consequently between the two forms of subordinate and active (participatory) culture, which in some cases it may also be claimed that subordinate culture dominates. These elements at both macro and micro levels are as follows:

- *Structural problems:* The structure of our country evades participation, and appropriate laws have not been enacted to remove barriers to public participation and provide the basis for participation in various fields. Throughout Iran's history, governments have relied on traditional bureaucracies as one of the barriers to participation, and this bureaucracy has passed down from the past, preventing people from participating at all levels.
- *Quasi-rental and centralized structure:* One of the problems in Iran is the government that is interested in having everything for itself, and that prevents civic participation, even centralization does not allow institutions such as councils to have an executive status. big bureaucracy and government involvement are some of the causes of structural weakness. Most governments in Iran are not from the middle-class and do not stem spontaneously from the people. Meritocracy and competitiveness in administrative and political relations are weak, which has led to the negligence of competitiveness and participation is passive and directed.
- *Lack of political stability:* Political instability is the opposite of good governance. In this section, mostly the quality of public services and citizenship or the enforcement of laws and the use of violent and non-civil means, or domestic unrest, etc., or government commitments in policy are considered. The higher the quality of these indicators, the better the political stability (Saanei, 2006). In contrast to instability, there are subcultures. According to Graham Fuller, Iranian culture is a culture that surrenders to the extremes in almost all respects. According to Marian Zunis, said" the basis for Iran's elite participatory behavior is its cynical political attitudes, mistrust, insecurity, and abuse among individuals". In fact, the lack of patience and political tolerance among political and social groups and forces, and even people have been features of Iranian civil political culture (Heshmatzadeh et al., 1986).



- *Negative individualism and apathy in politics:* In the structural and macro perspective, one can point to individuality in policymaking and religious justification. *Relativism, lack of consultation, and selfishness divide people*, preventing the formation of political groups (Heshmatzadeh et al., 2017). Additionally, climatic conditions, ethnic and tribal diversity, different customs and traditions, national and local and regional divisions and tribal attributes, and most importantly, the rule of ignorance and fatalism divide people.
 - *Political distrust and authoritarian culture:* This is rooted in social mistrust and is subjective. Accordingly, an individual in civil society is not interested in partnership because of political indifference and evasion from responsibility and the hopelessness from positive change. This distrust stems from the long history of tyranny in Iran and the rule of colonialism in contemporary Iranian history (Katoozian, 2012). The authoritarian spirit is still rooted in society and democracy is meaningless. In fact the authoritarian culture makes the presence of participatory and civic institutions, parties and free media meaningless. As Huntington maintains, "a culture that is deeply anti-democratic denies the expansion of democratic institutions or if it does not hinder the effective functioning of democratic institutions, makes it difficult" (Huntington, 2001).
 - *Violence and lack of tolerance:* The lack of patience and political tolerance among political and social groups and civil society has been a long-standing feature of Iranian civil political culture. For instance, when the demands of the people increase and the government does not respond to their demands and the people are silenced, they react violently to the governments. However, the political struggle of the people has also been based on antagonism (Keshavarz, 2009). Therefore, Elimination culture, along with violence, has been part of the political culture shared between governments and the people (Jamalzadeh, 1992).
 - *Tendency toward conspiracy theory:* The result of all this is that Iranians, both at the government and the community, instead of rational and scientific analysis of problems, seek a mysterious force outside the Iranian will, or believe that political developments in Iran are due to the hidden hands of foreigners (Razaghi, 1996).
 - *The poor tendency toward desirability:* Lack of awareness of citizenship rights and lack of demands from governments concerning good governance indicators and lack of understanding of the concepts of justice, equality and law, participation, security, and the lack of policy-making have led to the government's ignorance of the demands of the people. The people of eastern countries, including Iran, seem to have overlooked the importance of desirability, prosperity, and freedom, which has been the cause of various attacks on Iranian territory throughout history, and Iranian's attention to security.
 - *Law evasion:* In fact civil and state political culture in Iran has a law-evading character because in this culture the law has never been in the interest of the individuals and the state and the nation avoid obeying it for specific reasons (Kazemi, 2003). Establishing a strong relationship with the people and the lack of public participation in policy-making and law-making have led to law evasion. Additionally, bribery due to economic rent in Iran, particularly in the pre-Islamic era, has historical roots.
 - *Participation evasion:* Civil participation is one of the key foundations of good governance and in Iranian civil political culture due to the subordinate political culture, the political behaviors of individuals are a combination of opportunism, inaction, resignation, and covert protests and fears (Amini, 2011). The structural reason for this is that social groups are more dependent on governments and the instability of class interests in society has not been institutionalized in Iran.
 - *Complexity and lack of transparency:* Analysts who have studied Iranian culture from the outside claim that Iranian political culture is very complex, being metaphorical and allusive. In addition, there is a greater lack of transparency in Iranian politics between the state structure and the elite community. There is also complexity and individualism in some of the government's relationships with citizens, which impedes transparency.
 - *The weakness of civil society:* The weakness of civil society in Iran has an impact on the extent of participation because civil society is a key element of participation and its status as a constituent and organizing factor is important. Parties and organizations are part of a civil society that has appeared to evade participation as a result of the autocracy. These institutions cannot function properly and have become vulnerable leverage in government. Additionally, the authoritarian spirit of organizations and parties in Iran and hostility and the lack of coordination among them have harmed their participation (Heshmatzadeh et al., 2017).
- b) *Good Governance (Production of Social Capital at Civil Society)*
- Civil society as one of the three components of good governance structure has a long history, yet its evolution is linked to modern times. Civil society is a set of private and civil structures, institutions, unions, associations, parties, and groups that engage in social

action. In addition, NGOs can also be mentioned that are involved in various activities such as charity, social damage, human rights and environmental protection, etc. and development activities move along with the government, providing community growth and development in line with sustainable development through expanding partnerships (Banks, 2012). Larry Diamond considers civil society as a socially organized, self-creating, heavily supporter, and independent from the government that adheres to a set of common laws in which citizens express their desires and interests and exchange information (Diamond, 2008). Through civil society and the strengthened civil partnerships, flexibility in social interactions and intergroup collaborations and networking relationships and interactive social capital negotiations will expand. The role of civil society in the macro and micro domains of the managerial structure of nations is discussed below:

c) *The Role of Civil Society in Achieving Good Governance*

Management domain: If governments are reasonably organized in good governance models and increase efficiency, accountability, and transparency, they will gain external trust between the government and the people, consequently moving many of the day-to-day tasks of the government toward macro tasks.

- ❖ *Political domain:* By the formation of social groups, good governance provides the basis for the formation of objective and subjective aspects of political democracy and has an impact on political culture. A horizontal structure in good governance maintains political equilibrium, and all components of the system and social network are interconnected, learning concepts and become accustomed to network inconsistencies (Alvani, 2009). In fact, with the formation of parties and civil organizations, experts and thinkers feel secure and creativity grows in civil society. Most importantly, men and women are equal in this society, and with these conditions, political vitality is guaranteed and trust is established between the people and the government.
- ❖ *Economic domain:* Fukuyama emphasizes the role of social capital through social and civic participation in economic development (Fukuyama, 2002). Civil and media freedoms, civil society institutions such as trade unions, parties, and credible elections have empowered the people to control or oust governments. Failure by governments to respond adequately to the demands of the public and private sector paves the way for the economics of rent and corruption. In such a society, human capital and social capital facilitate lawlessness and bribery rather than creativity and initiation. Thus, government tax revenue capacity is reduced and the government is

unable to perform its duties, provide for GDP, employment, business environment, investment, and social capital productivity.

- ❖ *Social domain:* The model of good governance, with equality of all social forces, provides the basis for social justice. There is no gender, race, age, etc. discrimination in this policy-making. Expanding the fair choice of all people in a society and creating equal opportunities for life makes it easier to preserve natural resources for future generations and provides education and learning opportunities for all. The proper functioning of the government system guarantees the moral foundations of that society and eliminates all forms of moral corruption. At the international level, well-trained social capital can also move toward sustainable development, solve environmental and pollution issues and help achieve social development are taking steps.
- ❖ *Cultural domain:* The presence of all members of society in social and political relations promotes national cohesion, accelerates the process of civil society formation, reduces ethnic prejudice, and increases the capacity to withstand dissent. Government transparency can provide people with confidence and government policies are institutionalized with the right values and norms and ethics, people's behavior is regulated and defined in terms of specific rules and procedures. Good governance can promote participatory political culture while providing physical and material security, political security and interactions between people.

VI. ARGUMENT

Across the developing world, countries with limited financial resources have suffered from weak and corrupt governments because they have failed to provide citizens with comprehensive development. To transform the relationship between government and the people and achieve good urban governance to fill the gap between the people and the government, civil society organizations have provided the opportunity to meet the needs of citizens and have been able to work internationally with a coordinated and innovative approach to empower disadvantaged communities. The study of its civil society is a requirement of good urban governance in every society. Civil society is distinct from society because it involves citizens to be eager to express their interests and ideas in the public domain and to hold the government accountable for the achievement of their mutual goals and demands. The main function of civil society is to reduce the power of governments. Civic partnerships that have led to the formation of NGOs (local development) are an innovative bottom-up plan aimed at reducing the dominance of governments in public affairs. Through

providing educational programs and empowering skills by governments, individuals, as a social asset of that community, capitalize on ideas and creativity. In this respect, the importance of the role of cultural capital and social capital in societies with different political cultures can be emphasized. A nation's access to social capital and improved human resources requires culturally appropriate infrastructure and an understanding of dominant cultural models that are rooted in history, geographical features, ethnic and tribal tendencies, and most importantly ideology of that community to have fair access to optimal services. Cultural roots are learned in childhood and families and pass from one generation to another. However, social capital is flowing, thus social capital and the culture of individuals in the community are linked. The cultural structure of society shapes its social structure, reduces cultural multiplicity (racial, ethnic, and religious), reduces social interaction and cooperation, enhances the dominance of parties, and the dominance of power increases, and due to the multitude of beliefs, people's mistrust is increases, formation of civil partnership slows down, leading to weakened social capital and backwardness in a country. Traditional societies such as China, India, Bangladesh, and Iran, which have different historical and cultural experiences, have a tribal ideological structure with religious fanaticism, and due to the dominance of certain parties, national cohesion and harmony between peoples are weakened, and justice in enjoying the services is diminished and the foundation of public participation and trust and the formation of social capital and civil society are weakened. Therefore, these experiences are different from the cultural origins of European countries and require proper planning under the cultural-political structure and participatory civil culture following local and indigenous development.

VII. CONCLUSION

It can be seen that resources in many countries are seldom coordinated with power, even in resource-rich countries, because they have less autonomy to develop as a result of weaknesses in decision-making strategies between nations and governments. This article seeks to illustrate how to change from governance to good urban governance and change the ideologies and political culture of government and civic participation. Planning in countries that have implemented good governance is not hierarchical. All actors are coordinated and there are relationships among local governments, organizations, residents and urban movements. The change to incorporate effectiveness, partnership, justice, and so on to create new urban governance (such as creative governance, smart governance) is in line with the sustainability of urban development. We argue that lack of access to information and transparency in the structure of a

government is a key constraint on policy change and leads to failure in the realization of governance because innovation and creativity in governance (interaction between people and social actors and the government) alleviate the problems of societies. We need comprehensive, global governance solutions. However, we believe that the problems of good governance will vary according to geographical conditions, historical backgrounds, cultural models of nations, and its implementation is more difficult in traditional, centralized governance structures with strong religious and ideological roots. Elections and referendums in these countries and structural reforms are less achieved due to inequality. It is only in a free and democratic political system that good governance and equal political participation are guaranteed to all. Democracy is the most effective mechanism that can protect the political power of citizens.

Political culture in Iran has also been studied from a variety of historical angles, and almost all of the results indicate that the reason for the lack of development of civil governments throughout Iranian history has been the political culture of Iranians and the culture of civic participation (Moghimi, 2003) because the ruling groups have a very favorable view of political participation and competition. Besides, tribal structure, ethnic and cultural fragmentation, regional divisions, authoritarian political structure, individualism and political apathy, religious justification, tendency toward conspiracy theory, mistrust and hatred, political developments, gender-based culture, media-impacted political culture, and so on are considered as important obstacles. Therefore, the authors of this article recommend that these deficiencies in the lack of integration in Iranian political culture require greater attention from social actors and the formation of a bottom-top bureaucracy at the local government and enhancement of participation and awareness of civil rights, public education, and concentration on corrective plans. It should be emphasized that the role of civic education among the people is highly significant because it gives people a deep understanding of their role in public affairs and expectations of the government and that government actors must respond to their needs so that the sense of belonging and dependence on the country increases. In what follows, reform patterns and ideal examples are suggested for changes in traditionally structured governments.

- Observance of justice and law (equality and proportionality) among all people and governments and respect for mutual rights;
- Capacity-building for decision-making by the economic and social elites in the urban area, ordinary citizens (integrated decision-making) through consultation;

- Building trust among citizens, with an emphasis on an integrated approach and the sharing of power among different public and state institutions;
- Using the neighborhood planning model and indigenous development concerning the cultural and social structure (participation of citizens, residents and local councils);
- Provision of educational budgets by governments to raise public awareness in civic engagement, particularly in schools;

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