

Social Impact of Migration: The Case of Armenia

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Abstract

This is an explanatory case study that uses a mixed method research design to investigate the social impact of migration on the country of origin. While recognizing that the effects of labor migration on the sending country vary greatly depending on the size of flows and type of migrants, the study reveals issues that result from migration particularly for small developing states. Aside from the positive effects of migrant remittances, which are rather substantial in solving problems in the short-term, the study considers the long-term effects of labor migration on the families left behind. Factors considered include health, education, and social that often produce negative effects in the communities of the home country.

Index terms— migration; health disorders; isolation; social problems; education.

1 I. Introduction

nush Sargsyan 1 1 While the case description is real, the names of people and places used in text are fictitious. is a young woman born in Dalarik, a village in the Armavir District of the Republic of Armenia. She is 32, completed the local high school but did not pursue higher education. Her father was killed in the Karabakh war with Azerbaijan and her two older brothers, Gor and Hakob, went to visit their uncle in the United States and did not return. Anush lives with her mother, has never held a job, and is not interested in acquiring skills and competencies that might lead to a productive career. She is content and has no issue with the way things are given the comfort and decent life the steady remittances from her brothers in the U.S. afford. She even knows the names of certain American cities and places in North Hollywood where her brothers live and work. She speaks about them with enthusiasm but is not interested in visiting them in the U.S.

Traveling through rural Armenia, one comes across similar cases that make one wonder if Anush would have strived to earn a degree and become a professional had there not been the uninterrupted flow of remittances her two brothers sent home regularly? A series of similar questions emerge that merit attention, particularly from the perspective of a small developing state that relies primarily on human capital for economic and political development. Beyond the short-term economic impact of remittances sent by migrants, are there significant longer-term social effects to consider?

Interest among social scientists to study the consequences and impact of migration has grown

Author: e-mail: abalian@aua.am migration outflows (whether for emigration or labor migration) have been issues of concern throughout the former Soviet Republics particularly because of large outflows since those states gained independence in the early 1990s. Migration is assumed to have a wide variety of social effects on the country of origin, although research in identifying the social impact on the source country is relatively sparse. Most studies have focused on the impact of migration on the receiving or destination country. Other studies have focused on the behavioral issues of migration, mostly of the migrants themselves, but not delving into the social problems that migration causes at home.

Hence, an examination of the social impact of migration on the community left behind may add new knowledge in the field and may invite the attention of policymakers on the issue. This study focuses on analyzing the effects of migration on the sending or home country. Considering that managing migration more effectively has become a policy debate in many post-Soviet developing countries, this study looks to measure the social impact of labor migration by way of analyzing those effects and providing relevant data for policy consideration. Such a study is particularly relevant today in view of the ongoing debate in the RA National Assembly, government and the media on migration trends. The high unemployment rate and slow-moving economy of Armenia combined with

47 increased labor demand in the Russian Federation and in other countries have made migration a viable option
48 for the local labor force.

49 2 II. Theories of Migration

50 Studies of migration define emigrants as those individuals or families that move to another country to establish
51 permanent residence. In most cases, emigrants leave behind relatives (sisters, brothers, parents and grandparents,
52 or distant family members, uncles, aunts, great uncles and great aunts, nephews, nieces, etc.) and friends. Also,
53 there are multiple situations where emigrants have initially moved to find employment across borders and have
54 ultimately decided to establish permanent residence. Somewhat different from emigrants and of central interest
55 to the current study are labor migrants that are considered to be those citizens that cross their home state border
56 for employment (at least initially). Both emigrants as well as labor migrants send home remittances to family
57 and/or relatives and friends at home there by making a difference in the wellbeing of the home society.

58 Considering that statistics on labor migrants are most often unreliable and difficult to track and analyze, this
59 study uses the definition of a labor migrant used by the United Nations (UN) 1990 International Convention
60 on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers as "a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
61 been engaged in remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national." The main purpose of labor
62 migrants is to find better-paying jobs across borders, mostly in construction and other jobs demanding skilled
63 labor. Labor migrants also include men engaged in farming in certain months of the year and seeking seasonal
64 work abroad in the down months.

65 A dominant theory that explains why people migrate, i.e., illustrating the causes and effects of migration,
66 is neoclassical theory. In line with how these theorists posit in relation to development, here too the drivers
67 of migration are assumed to be associated with economic considerations, unemployment, costs and benefits
68 relative to working at home versus abroad (Todaro and Smith, 2006). Closely related to the latter is the push-
69 pull theory of migration that sets forth push factors in terms of solutions to overcome hardships in the home
70 country, including economic, political and social hardships. Logically, it follows that pull factors would include
71 the advantages offered by the destination country, including better wages, living and working conditions, and
72 political system. Narrowing down this argument to labor migration it is likely that highly qualified professionals
73 would find more fitting opportunities and job security in developed countries as opposed to the confined labor
74 markets of small developing countries. Whereas pull factors related to migrant laborers or unskilled workers stem
75 from the availability of jobs and better pay (Arango 2000 While neoclassical theory places emphasis on financial
76 drivers, such as wage differentials, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory considers various
77 other factors, questioning some of the elements considered in the former (Badie and Withol, 1993). The main
78 divergence from earlier theories is that labor migration decisions in developing countries are influenced by the
79 lack of state institutional safeguards or insurance protection from risks and market failures (Stark, 1991, 2003).
80 Remittances are integral to NELM theory, particularly as they apply to the causes and consequences of migration
81 (Faist 2000; Taylor 1999).

82 On the flip side, World Systems theory (Wallerstein 1974; Sassen 1988) views migration as a natural
83 phenomenon of globalization and the existence of unequal development between the highly developed countries
84 and the periphery. Along a parallel argument, Dual Labor Market theory (Piore 1979; Stalker 2000; Wallerstein
85 1974) regards migration as a structural phenomenon claiming that highly developed industrial economies are
86 designed such that they would require migrant inflows to fill those jobs that are necessary for the economy to
87 function but are generally unwanted by the native population because of their relatively less advantageous work
88 conditions and lower wages.

89 Also, whereas neoclassical theory views migrants as utility-maximizing agents for the country of origin in
90 terms of the money and skills they would bring back, the structuralist model presents a more pessimistic, adverse
91 observation. Papademetriou (1985: 111-112) argues that for sending countries migration contributes to the
92 "uncontrolled depletion of their already meager supplies of skilled manpower -and the most healthy, dynamic,
93 and productive members of their population."

94 3 III. Understanding the Social Impact of Migration

95 Studies have shown that migration impacts the wellbeing of the household itself, as well as the home community
96 and even the broader community in making development advances and growing the economy (Azam and Gubert
97 2006). In the current study, social impact of migration is analyzed in terms of the human and social consequences
98 that occur, particularly within the context of influences that may require social services and/or corresponding
99 policy legislation (national or regional).

100 4 a) The Value of Remittances

101 In order to understand the impact of migration on the social wellbeing of the country of origin, it is important to
102 understand the impact of remittances sent home paying special attention to social non-pecuniary consequences of
103 remittances. Included in this category is the "impact on health, education, gender, care arrangements and social
104 structures, and ethnic hierarchies in migrant communities" (De Haas 2007). From a benefits' perspective, De
105 Haas argues that "Migration leads to a ? transfer of investment capital and accelerates the exposure of traditional

106 communities to liberal, rational and democratic ideas, modern knowledge and education. ? The general
107 expectation was that the flow of remittances-as well as the experience, skills and knowledge that migrants would
108 acquire abroad before returning-would greatly help developing countries in their economic take-off” (DeHaas
109 2007, p.3).

110 In contrast, a number of other scholars maintain that migration tends to augment the social effects of
111 underdevelopment (Lipton 1981; Rhoades 1979; Hayes 1991; Rubenstein 1992; Binford 2003) and, aside from
112 the 'brain-drain' effect, relatively stable village communities break down or even collapse when the pillars of the
113 community depart. This leads to a passive community of elders, weakening skilled workforce, and a predominantly
114 remittance-dependent community of unemployed citizens (Adams 1969). The lack of young working hands results
115 in underutilized farmland and underproductive agriculture.

116 The use of remittances for different purposes is also viewed from a socio cultural perspective as being
117 detrimental. Lipton (1980) and Hayes (1991) argue that the regularity and aggregate amount of remittances
118 and parcels sent home by migrants result in a sort of liking for foreign products. This further increases the
119 feeling of dependency thereby reducing the motivation to work and decreasing community solidarity, by way of
120 weakening the opportunities for growing human as well as social capital and undermining "the socio cultural
121 integrity of migrant-sending communities" (De Haas 2007, p.5).

122 5 b) Migration and Human Capital

123 Katseli et al. (2006) look at the impact of migration predominantly through an analysis of remittances sent by
124 labor migrants and posit that the increase in household income often leads to reduced child labor and improved
125 educational attainment (at least in terms of high school completion). But, this is not always the case and the
126 opposite is more often true in small states. Thus, considering that education and work experience are important
127 contributors to human capital formation, home countries are more often disadvantaged in this respect. This is
128 consistent with what Carling (1996, p.50) states that "labor emigration has the potential to affect the stock of
129 human capital in the country of origin," commonly labeled as 'brain drain'.

130 On the other hand, Yezer and Thurston (1976) view migration as an investment from the perspective of human
131 capital theory. Along the same argument, Stark and Wang (2001) argue that migration can induce migrants to
132 amass a socially desirable level of human capital. As a result,

133 6 "An economy open to migration differs not only in the 134 opportunities that workers face but also in the structure of 135 the incentives they confront; higher prospective returns to 136 human capital in a foreign country impinge on human capital 137 formation decisions at home."

138 These authors examine the relationship between the actual and optimal formation of human capital in an economy
139 in comparison to providing public subsidies intended for human capital formation under normal conditions, absent
140 migration. Their study shows that in the event that a state has in place a migration policy geared toward placing
141 some restriction or control on migration, there will be greater tendency for pushing toward the optimal formation
142 of human capital at home. By this, the authors claim benefit from migration policies that act as catalyst for
143 brain gain (versus brain drain).

144 7 c) Migration, the Family Unit and Health

145 As stated earlier, it is often challenging to delineate precisely what the social impact of migration is on the source
146 country, but clearly the immediate and extended family unit are affected both positively and negatively. A 1994
147 RAND paper highlights that although migration may have a negative impact on families, but this may not be
148 large (Asch, 1994, xvi). In another study by the OECD Development Center (2006, pp.5-9) Katseli et al. (2006)
149 argue that migration may directly or indirectly affect the source state's human capital accumulation, children's
150 education and health, as well as the social wellbeing of the family unit, especially women. Aguila et al. (2012,
151 p.34) bring out yet another important aspect of the social impact of migration, namely, that "social networks
152 reduce the cost of migration for other groups of non-migrants, inducing them to migrate and thus perpetuating
153 the process." Migration rates may grow more rapidly in the case of labor migrants, but also show growth patterns
154 in the case of emigrants.

155 Migration also affects health taking on different forms. Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) argue that migration
156 might influence child birth rates or the decision of parents in different ways. "Migration may alter the fertility
157 decision through a number of avenues, such as changes in household income and the opportunity cost of time and
158 changes in knowledge about contraceptive practices" (Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005, p.11). 2 The effect of
159 labor migration on families is also discussed by Carling (1996) who brings forth several illustrations. In his view,
160 remittances "may also facilitate marriages in societies where dowry or bride wealth are common ? Remitted
161 earnings can also enable young couples to establish independent households earlier than what would otherwise
162 have been possible" (p.45). This argument is put forth as a positive force driving labor migration at the onset

163 and probably serving as a decisive influence in some cases. But, in some conservative societies (where dowry is
164 regarded as an advantage), labor migration of women is not always viewed as a positive standing for them, often
165 For small states, such as Armenia, this may be detrimental to development. In her study, Golinowska (2008)
166 argues that labor migration firstly causes separation of family members when the head of the household migrates
167 for work, often causing traumatic experiences to family members left behind. More importantly, the effect of
168 migration on health could be serious in some cases culminating in further deterioration and disabilities. Some
169 migrants are known to carry sexually-transmitted diseases that are subsequently transmitted to spouses causing
170 health problems (Manasyan and Poghosyan 2012).

171 having negative effects on 'men's choice' among other so-called candidates.

172 8 IV. Post-Soviet Migration Trends

173 The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered transformations in political, economic, social and cultural arrange-
174 ments, beliefs and attitudes. Though hope and despair coupled with anticipation and anxiety prevailed,
175 'independence' also offered new opportunities for those who quickly found their way in chaos. For the most
176 part, however, the shift created confusion for the vast majority of the population of the Newly Independent
177 States (NIS) 3 who did not know how to function in a non-autocratic regime and hesitated to make a move.

178 In the case of Armenia, the pre-independence 1988 earthquake, the economic collapse following independence
179 in 1991 and the political instability and conflict with Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave is believed to
180 have exacerbated the effects of migration. It is assumed that migration is triggered primarily by economic factors
181 and may fluctuate in intensity from time to time and, in spite of inflows from diasporic Armenian communities,
182 migration outflows continue to occur at a relatively high rate.

183 In contrast, Georgian migration is different where more women than men migrate (Badurashvili and
184 Nadareishvili 2012), which tends to be traumatic for the traditional Georgian society. Also, the migration
185 experience is often challenging for Georgian women from the standpoint of the difficulties they encounter with
186 reintegration and re-adaptation to ethnic traditions upon return home. This often incites more migration. Much
187 like in Georgia, women are active migrants in Belarus, but this is largely in the form of urban-rural migration for
188 better job opportunities and improved living standards (Bobrova, et al. 2012). At the same time, somewhat in
189 line with the earlier depiction, migration impacts the family unit; urban migrants get married and have children
190 later than the women that are left behind in rural communities.

191 Aside from individual decisions to migrate generally articulated in terms of solutions to economic issues,
192 "nationalism and separatism, territorial claims, and hegemonic ambitions have provoked ethnic conflicts, civil
193 wars and, as a result, refugee flows and internally displaced persons" (Tishkov et al. 2005, p.26). In the case
194 of Armenia, the conflict with Azerbaijan has produced both internal and external migration. Internal migration
195 flows have generally been movements away from border villages for more security. For those who have stayed,
196 external migration has been exhibited both in terms of labor migration, as well as emigration.

197 V. The Case of Armenia Though internal migration has moved young people from rural communities to the
198 capital Yerevan and, in much smaller numbers, to other major cities within the same district (marz), the current
199 study does not consider the effects of internal migration. Rather, it tackles labor migration, which mostly involves
200 male heads of households leaving to the Russian Federation and, to a lesser extent, to other CIS countries and
201 Eastern Europe. This flow is dominated by 25-50 year old males who leave their families to find employment
202 elsewhere (although many do not return).

203 The Social Snapshot and Poverty in Armenia (World Bank 2016) 4

204 9 VI. Research Propositions and Methodology

205 presents data from the 2015 Integrated Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) showing that 5.3% of households and
206 10.3% or 130,000 of household members 15 years old and above were absent from home for at least three months
207 in the period 2012-2015. Of the total number of absentees from home, 78.5% had migrated to other countries,
208 of which 89.3% to the Russian Federation. Another study by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration
209 and Development has reported that migration outflows as at 2013 account for 26.3% of the Armenian population
210 (KNOMAD 2016).

211 In the case of Armenia, the dominant majority of migrants are males, which is mostly explained by two factors:
212 first, males are generally considered to be heads of households, while females are considered to be the principal
213 caretakers of the family, specifically the children. Secondly, labor migrants, especially men going to Russia for
214 work, are primarily engaged in construction and agriculture (Manasyan and Poghosyan 2012). This trend of
215 labor migration is consistent with the findings of a similar study on Latvia confirming that migrants' wives take
216 care of the household and children, which also leads to an increase in household chores and other work they must
217 do themselves. Similar to Armenia, there are cases of negative impact that lead to break up in the family, mostly
218 as a result of the migrants' long absences, unofficial marriage abroad and need to provide for two families, or not
219 returning home at all (Križne and L'ce 2012; Manasyan and Poghosyan 2012).

220 The study uses a mixed method within an explanatory design that explains (a) why migration is viewed as a
221 negative force in Armenia; and (b) what are the non-economic social consequences and difficulties resulting from

222 or caused by migration. Thus, the propositions considered in the study in relation to the research questions are
223 as follows:

224 An explanatory case study approach was selected to explain 'social impact' and to fully understand the
225 phenomenon of migration delving deep into the social effects it may have on the Republic of Armenia. The
226 mixed method has facilitated understanding those impacts using a variety of data sources to answer the research
227 questions and associated propositions. Data sources included government migration statistics; a survey of urban
228 and rural households with at least one migrant worker (n = 536); 5

229 10 VII. Data Analysis and Interpretation

230 and informal conversations with select cases from the sample surveyed (n = 23). The variety of sources used
231 and the continuous process of triangulating the findings provided the opportunity to establish agreement among
232 independent sources or to clear inconsistencies. In unusual instances, direct observations were made to supplant
233 information where the data raised questions of insincerity or imbalance. The testing of the survey questionnaire
234 and actual administration were conducted in June 2016 through June 2018. The length of time was dictated by
235 the necessity to return to the target sites multiple times for data verification and supplemental data collection
236 or validation.

237 In the initial phase of the study, the analysis used secondary data on migration available through the RA
238 National Statistical Services to identify villages or towns with the highest outflows of labor migrants to countries
239 of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). 6 These statistics were used to develop the sample size that would
240 ensure the validity and generalizability of findings. The number of survey respondents is 536, which exceeds the
241 valid sample size required for the population of labor migrants (N = 232,647). 7 5 A larger number of households
242 were approached randomly but were not administered the survey if they did not meet the key criterion of
243 having a migrant family member. This number represents the actual number of survey respondents, i.e., the
244 wives or mothers of labor migrants that took the survey. 6 The countries included in the statistics are the
245 Republics of Belarus and Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation, the latter representing
246 the destination with the largest proportion of labor migrants from Armenia. 7 Armstat, 2017. The data collected
247 from the survey (n = 536) 8 was analyzed to depict the general characteristics of the population surveyed and
248 to establish correlations among dependent and independent variables. Chart 1 depicts the size of the household,
249 without counting in the migrant(s) from the households surveyed. In many cases, the household count included
250 grandparents as is customary in Armenia and, in a few cases, great aunts and uncles. The graph peaks at the
251 most dominant household size of five (??), usually comprising the migrant's wife, two children, and the migrant's
252 parents. The trough level is one (1) representing the smallest household size, which in the sample surveyed is
253 simply represented by the wife of the migrant left behind. The number of cases in this category is low and
254 represented by newlyweds having a migrant husband.

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256 12 Chart 1: Household Distribution

257 The percent distribution by age-group and gender of households in the sample surveyed is depicted in Chart
258 2. These data include the migrants themselves. The bar chart depicts that, except for the ?15 and ? 71 age
259 groups, where males have dominance over females by 0.2%, all other age groups are female-dominant, though the
260 migrants themselves are mostly males (94% of total migrants). The female dominance of the sample surveyed
261 (and also of the inferred population, in general) is largely attributed to the absence of males from the home
262 country and also to the demise of Armenian soldiers in the conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-
263 Karabakh territory. 9 The ?15 and ? 71 age groups evidently are not affected by this and reflect normal
264 gender distribution trends. As to the reasons supporting labor migration, the analysis revealed that labor
265 migrants generally opt to work in countries other than their home state to increase earning potential. This is
266 driven by several underlying factors, not mutually exclusive, the most dominant being unemployment or seasonal
267 unemployment (45%); pursuing better-paying job opportunities (42%); inspired or encouraged by friends (38%);
268 or simply responding to job announcements (3%). Considering that drivers or reasons of migration, albeit
269 important, are beyond the boundaries of this research, no further analysis was performed on this component.

270 Next, the analysis centered on variables related to spending patterns of remittances sent home by migrants
271 as those are distinctly related to social issues. To answer this question, the survey respondents were asked
272 to indicate only one spending priority (even though they also could be spending some smaller proportion of
273 remittances on other things). As shown in Chart 3, 26% of the households surveyed spend the remittances they
274 receive principally on daily consumables (mostly food items) and 21% spend them on general household needs,
275 including utilities, supplies and purchases of personal items. Whereas the former was dominantly representative
276 of city dwellers, the latter represented the spending pattern of villagers that grew fruits and vegetables and had
277 animal farms (albeit on a small scale for household consumption).

278 **13 Chart 3: Spending of Remittances**

279 Spending remittances on the education of children, especially on higher education, was ranked as a priority by
 280 18% of the sample surveyed, but prevalent only among city dwellers with children in higher education. The
 281 respondents that ranked education as priority for spending remittances were in the 36-50 agegroup, i.e., families
 282 with near or at university-age children. Equally important for 17% of those surveyed, also among city dwellers
 283 as in the previous case, was investing in owning a home (real property) either for themselves or for a son (not
 284 daughter, as specified by respondents) preparing to get married. This is a preferred investment that stems from
 285 the desire for future stability and security (generally evident among peoples that have been displaced or driven
 286 out of their homes because of war or political unrest). The much less popular preference for spending remittances
 287 is investing in private business, at 14%. This too was found to be dominant among city dwellers who understood
 288 the long-term advantages of starting a business. Of the 75 respondents indicating business investment as a
 289 priority spending category, 51 were women engaged in micro retail with no physical outlet. Among those whose
 290 husbands were earning more or sending home larger remittances, a prevalent practice was to stash away money
 291 to be able to accumulate savings for a business startup (without adequate proof of realization). The remaining
 292 4% of priority areas included eleven (11) cases of spending on health issues (usually major surgery, though this
 293 could have been a priority at time of survey only); eight (8) cases of saving for upcoming weddings (mostly of
 294 a son, though there were three instances of dowry for daughters); and four (4) cases of saving to buy a vehicle
 295 (those were farmers who were on seasonal work abroad and aimed at making enough money to buy a truck for
 296 agricultural use).

297 Looking into the social impact of labor migration, the survey first measured the length in months of the
 298 migrants' longest absence from home. 10 As depicted in Chart 4, the most prevalent length is seven (7) to eleven
 299 (11) months with 35% of those surveyed in that band, 18% in the band of 12-17 months and 12% representing
 300 those who have spent up to two years abroad in one tour. Outside of these bands, there are those seasonal
 301 migrants who usually travel abroad to work for part of the year and work on their farms for the rest; this group
 302 spends six (6) months or less working abroad and constitutes 25% of those surveyed. In the last two bands are
 303 those that were working abroad for more than two years (6% for 25-36 months and 3% for longer). Many of the
 304 spouses of migrants in the last two bands (and a few in the third band) cast doubt on their husband's return
 305 home and struggle to get adjusted to their situation.

306 The next set of questions related to the types of social problems encountered by the family left behind.

307 Respondents were asked to check up to four (4) answers from the provided list and were given the option of
 308 adding-in items excluded from the list. Analysis of the data from respondents helped to identify the dominant
 309 social problems related to labor migration, as shown in Chart 5.

310 Unquestionably, the most dominant social issue caused by labor migration is that those left behind are bound
 311 to assume added roles in the family. In this respect, the follow-on interviews with mothers and wives of migrants
 312 helped to draw common themes among urban and rural households. Whereas the latter claim that not only do
 313 they have to assume additional household chores, but also have to take care of responsibilities in the family farm;
 314 urban residents spoke about additional chores related to children's curricular and extra-curricular activities. As
 315 one interviewee explained, "I never had to worry about my son's schoolwork before. That was something my
 316 husband loved doing. Now, that too is on me and I am not as good at it." In contrast, a rural resident raised
 317 the shortage of productive labor in the village to sustain agriculture. "My husband and his brothers are not
 318 here, which makes us women having to work on the farm in addition to looking after our children. Often, I pull
 319 in my son to help out with those chores." Another dominant theme was found to be anxiety disorder caused by
 320 the absence of the father; 66% of respondents marked separation anxiety as a problem that has had negative
 321 behavioral consequences. This type of health condition is described by those interviewed further as being "fear
 322 of being among people so as to avoid people asking me questions or not participating in public events afraid that
 323 others are pointing to me or they are judging me," elaborated a young woman whose husband had been away for
 324 over two years. Another interviewee talked about the negative encounters that her son, a twelve year-old, had in
 325 school. "Just before the holidays, a classmate asks him if his father is coming home for the New Year. He goes
 326 ballistic and starts pushing and shoving that boy, throwing around books and notebooks in the classroom. He is
 327 a good boy and helps me around the house, but he is incapable of dealing with comments or questions about his
 328 father."

329 The majority of respondents who had indicated having separation anxiety, also indicated suffering from
 330 other psychological disorders, such as depression, eating disorders, and even obsessive-compulsive behavior (65%
 331 combined) and social exclusion (39%). Follow-on interviews showed that respondents with such disorders suffered
 332 from feeling helpless and worthless or did not hope they would be together again; and some had developed extreme
 333 undereating disorder (though this can be manifested in the opposite way). As one woman elaborated, "his long
 334 absence makes me wonder what the future holds for us. I am always at home, doing housework or working on
 335 the farm. Well, I don't even visit or meet with my friends anymore. I've lost touch with everything."

336 The picture presented by an older woman in a relatively smaller village was more alarming. "Take a walk
 337 through our streets and you will understand why our village is depressed, economically and socially. Our
 338 men are gone, we don't have enough working hands to work on our lands." This is consistent with what
 339 Adams (1969) describes as a passive community of elders, weakening skilled workforce, and a predominantly
 340 remittancedependent community of unemployed citizens. In larger rural communities, however, passiveness also

341 was observed in the younger generally content with their lives "just the way it is," as indicated by a 23-year-old
342 female living at home. Among family members included in the sample, 18% showed indifference toward learning
343 and were disinterested in education (much like Anush introduced at the opening of the study), though a few
344 indicated that they may want to learn sewing or needlework. All of those were 16-35-year-old village residents
345 with migrant brothers or spouses who also had not attended university. This shows that, particularly in small
346 rural communities, individual educational decisions are led by the quality of life and attainments of those in
347 their immediate surrounding. This refers to the relative position of individuals in a community as characterized
348 by economic capital and human capital (Weeden & Grusky 2005). Here, economic capital means one's material
349 resources like income and assets as indicators of social status (Oakes & Rossi 2003).

350 14 VIII. Conclusion

351 Among the propositions considered in the study, the analysis has shown that remittances positively impact the
352 education of the younger generation in the home state, particularly providing for the higher education of children
353 left behind, though this is reflected in 18% of the population surveyed and ranked third among the priorities
354 of spending remittances, after daily consumables and general household needs. Moreover, this spending priority
355 was not found to be true outside the capital, which could partially explain the slowdown of human capital
356 growth in rural communities and the unequal distribution of wealth and economic growth between urban and
357 rural populations. Also, 21% of migrants who were away from home (in a single tour) for over 18 months,
358 were all from rural Armenian villages. This too has contributed to the slower growth in human capital in rural
359 Armenia, which could be improved if intangible resources, such as skills and knowhow that migrants acquire
360 working abroad, were used for narrowing rural-urban inequalities with returning migrants' investment in human
361 capital at home. Moreover, the male figure, mostly father, is perceived by Armenian society as an important
362 influence on children's upbringing, particularly with respect to their educational attainment and prospects, but
363 the 'breadwinning' obligation was found to be dominant. Though patterns of child behavior varied by social
364 context, the findings agree with much of social science and policy research on the negative impact of fathers'
365 absence on children's socioemotional development (Lamb, 2010; Shwalb et al., 2013). Among the adults surveyed
366 for this study, 38% mentioned a decline in their child's school performance and 33% referred to the rise of
367 school absenteeism. Overall, 35% indicated experiencing child raising difficulties, some verbalizing the envisaged
368 "father's role in authoritative parenting, which would lead to better emotional, academic, social and behavioral
369 outcomes for our children."

370 The negative impact on the health of other than children was observed in the form of separation anxiety
371 disorder in women among younger spouses who feared that their separation would be unending and gradually
372 became unsociable, withdrawn, and irritable. Only 4% of those surveyed checked "sexually transmitted diseases"
373 caused by labor migration but, when probed further, none admitted that their migrant was infected by the
374 disease. Social taboos placed by Armenian society on sexually transmitted diseases is probably the reason why
375 people didn't like talking about it or referring in any way to their husband's promiscuity.

376 The last proposition considered dealt with the longer-term social problems arising from remittances sent home
377 by migrants. Though many of the negative impacts of migration mentioned above also are true in the longer-
378 term, what is specifically relevant to remittances is the panacea for the poor to gain a "foothold on the ladder"
379 as argued by (Sachs 2005) which, however, turns to a permanent way of life.

380 Admittedly, migration reduces socio-economic inequalities to some extent, it also decreases migrants' desire to
381 find a job locally and increases migration propensities by others. Families get used to the steady flow of income
382 and are not willing to do with less and want to avoid a downward spiral.

383 Adopting a controlled and somewhat restrictive migration policy is not necessarily an effective instrument to
384 curtail labor migration. Rather, considering that job opportunities in the regions are relatively lacking, state
385 policy should be focused on creating incentives that would be attractive to potential migrants gradually affecting
386 the multiplier effect of labor migration.

387 15 Bibliography



Figure 1:




Figure 2: Chart 2 :

388 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

¹The study looks exclusively at Mexico, using statistical data from 1997.

²(H)

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⁴NIS includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

⁵The referenced publication uses a survey based on the UN definition and methodology of international migration. © 2019 Global Journals Volume XIX Issue VI Version I

⁶This sample size far exceeded the valid sample size of 384 at a confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of 5%. Considering that the surveys were conducted face-to-face, additional villages were added to increase variation to the extent possible.⁹ The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which broke out before the declaration of the independent Republic of Armenia ended in 1994 but the conflict continues to be unresolved. Skirmishes across the border still cause fatalities. In Armenia, military service is mandatory for males 18-27 years of age.

⁷The length of time in months the migrant has worked abroad every separate time travelled or tour of duty.

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