

Analytical View of Pakistan-United States Relations: Past and Present

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Abstract

Relations between Pakistan and United States are like the swing of pendulum. Pakistan, from the very first day, is playing catalyst role for the interests of the United States in the region. But the relations between two countries remained difficult and widen the trust deficit with the span of time. Despite aids from the US, Pakistan also suffered irreparable loss for her pleasure and to get financial support from unequal ally. History reveals that United States always used Pakistan for self-purposes. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Pak US relations in the current scenario. Methodology: This is a descriptive study which consists of secondary source of data collection based on reports, books, periodic journals, web-based articles..

Index terms— pak-us relations, 9/11, GWOT

1 I. Introduction

Pakistan-United States relationship has always been on a rocky path and poses a challenge for foreign policy of both the states. Pakistan after creation acted as a key ally in the region during cold war to promote the interests of the United States. The course of relationship, however, remained very arduous. Determining any future course of action between the two, trust deficit is a dominant factor. The tragedy of 9/11 completely altered the level of engagement and nature of relationship (Ahmed & Kharal, 2015). Many nations of the world faced dreadful crisis due to the incident of 9/11 which led to invasion and assaulting of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies and had deteriorated the security climate of South Asian region. The inimical environment created by the US-led Global War on Terror [GWOT] has brought grave consequences and troubles for Pakistan than any other state. In spite of unfriendly relations, the US succeeded to acquire assistance of Pakistan in GWOT through threats and incentives, simultaneously (Rabbi, 2012). Both the states have emerged from comparatively unassociated to Islamabad as a devoted ally, to Islamabad as a menace for the US, and to Islamabad has been considered a untrustworthy friend since the last 15 years (Rijnbeek, 2016). The United States have always assisted Pakistan in providing funds and support and in return Pakistan has provided her logistic support. There have also been prevailed distrust and uncertainty in the relationship (Akhtar, 2012). The relations also saw hurdles and obstacles in GWOT. Arguably, the Author ? ? ? : Government College No.1 D.I.Khan, KP Pakistan. e-mails: Shahhussain1613@gmail.com, munsifalisherazi@gmail.com, Zafarabbas2004@gmail.com Pak-United States relations from the very beginning of GWOT, replete with resentment and confine to the reiteration of the U.S on Pakistan with the insistence to do more to root out the militant groups (Asghar, 2015). It is argued that the nature of relations between two countries remained diverse in democratic and nondemocratic regimes in Pakistan. Due to mutual distrust and convergence of India and United States, Pakistan is getting closer to regional powers i.e. China and Russia.

For better understanding, the researchers have divided this paper into three main domains i.e. Areas of cooperation post 9/11, hurdles that affected relations and current scenario. Before proceeding further it is better to have a look on history of relations from Pakistan's inception and the event that led to the establishment of partnership between Pakistan and United States in the Post September 11 scenario.

2 II. Historical Perspective

In order to understand US diplomacy after 9/11, it is essential to look into the history of seventy years relations of Pakistan and United States. After independence, Pakistan joined US block due to its security and economic fragility (Akhtar, 2012). Pakistan was fully aware of power imbalance in the subcontinent and was desperately looking for ways to neutralize it (Nadim, 2017). Due to India's policy of non-alignment, the United States chose Pakistan in the region amid cold war crisis (Akhtar, 2012). Pakistan had become most reliable ally of US in Asia (Kux, 2001, p. 1). While in the beginning United States gave military and economic support to Pakistan (Banerjee & Commuri, 2014).

To ensure security of newly independent state Pakistan went on to acquire membership of SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955, respectively. Both states concluded mutual defence agreement in May 1954. In the same time security was the prime interest of Pakistan and United States considered Pakistan as an advantageous partner because of its geostrategic importance to contain the spread communism in Southeast Asia and Middle East (Akhtar, 2012). Pakistan received \$1.2 billion to \$1.5 billion military aid from United States of America. While another \$3 billion was granted from 1947 to 1965 in form of technical assistance, agricultural commodities and economic development funds (Akhtar, 2012) and in return Pakistan allowed United States to create airbases near Badabher (Rijnbeek, 2016).

Pak-US relations entered into a new phase in the decade of 1960s because of Sino-Indian war of 1962. United States decided to send aid to India (Rijnbeek, 2016). In the meanwhile the aid of Pakistan was frozen by the US in 1965, 1971 & 1975 which made Pakistanis realized that the US is not a trustworthy friend (Javaid, 2014). The fragmented security order between Washington and Islamabad remained for next 15 years (Bashir & Mustafa, 2014). Eventually Pakistan left SEATO and CENTO in 1972 and 1979, respectively (Akhtar, 2012). In reaction to the Pakistan's latent role in nuclear enrichment capability, Carter administration ceased US aid to Pakistan in 1979. However, after USSR incursion of Afghanistan in 1979, US once again considered Pakistan as a major partner to counter USSR expansion (Kronstadt, 2006). The Afghan religious extremists were chosen by the US as their allies to wage proxy war against Soviets. These religious extremists were also trained by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence to lead the proxy war. With the patronage of Pakistan Army and supported by bountiful American military aid, these mujahedeen's declared a holy war against Afghan government and its allied Soviet forces (Ahmed, 2002). Regan's government developed cordial relations with Pakistan and gulf between the two countries was reduced. In 1981 \$3.2 billion military and economic aid was authorized to Pakistan for six years, and later on in 1986 \$4.2 billion was approved for 1988-93 (Anwar, 2013).

After withdrawal of Soviets from Afghanistan, US began to criticize Pakistan's nuclear program and the then Bush administration ceased aid to Pakistan in 1990s. Economic and military aid and provision of important military equipment were stopped under Pressler amendment (Kronstadt, 2006). After the Soviet withdrawal, despite Islamabad best efforts, Hekmatyar failed to gain control of Kabul (Noor, 2001). Taliban succeeded to get control of 90 percent territory of Afghanistan and defeated their enemy, the Northern Alliance (NA). The Taliban were ethnically Pakhtuns. Pakistan was the main supporter of Taliban regime from 1996 until 9/11. The 9/11 Commission Report, Taliban government received recognition from Islamabad along with significant political and diplomatic assistance. In lieu, she envisaged to use Afghanistan's "Strategic Depth" in any dispute with India arising in the future. Jihadi outfits operating in the Pakistan also received Taliban's assistance to spur jihadi movement in Indian occupied Kashmir which started in 1989 (Rais, 2001; Shah & Riaz, 2013). India tested nuclear devices after 24 years of abeyance. In reaction Pakistan immediately conducted nuclear tests, inspite of international community particularly U.S. exertion of inhibiting it for doing so. The explosion of such nukes was widely criticized by the world, and U.S efforts of nonproliferation in the South Asian region suffered a major setback (Kronstadt, 2006). A series of sanctions were imposed against Pakistan on 16 th June, 1998 by U.S, due to Arms Export Control Act 58 of Glenn Amendment. U.S viewed Indo-Pak race of nuclear arms as a major threat for the peace and security of South Asia (Anwar, 2013). U.S once again imposed sanctions against Pakistan after 12 th October 1999 military coup by General Musharraf. U.S ceased all sorts of aid to Pakistan under Foreign Assistance Act (Section 508) (Akhtar, 2012).

3 a) Establishment of relation after 9/11

The catastrophic event of 9/11 changed the entire scenario of the world politics and brought astronomical effects (Ahmed & Kharral, 2015). The attacks of September 11, 2001 challenged the hauteur of world's single super power whose land was not assaulted before in the history (Javaid, 2011). After 9/11 Pakistan came under the extreme pressure of United States and the world had been changed for both US and Pakistan. The nature of relationship between two countries began to change after this event. The President George Bush put forward a clear option before the world with the proclamation that "you are either with us or against us" (Zehra, 2004; Javaid & Mushtaq, 2014). Pakistan was compelled to join US led GWOT give up its two decade antiquated foreign policy (Shah & Riaz, 2013). After joining GWOT, Pakistan facilitated US with logistic support, intelligence sharing, and approach to its military bases and airspace. Military intelligence of Pakistan assisted in the identification of important targets and Taliban operated outposts including other safe heavens of terrorists in Afghanistan. U.S. military used bases in Pakistan and relied on its logistic help for ground operation against Taliban and other terrorist sanctuaries in eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2001). In exchange Pakistan got extraordinary incentives, including culmination of diplomatic boycott; military and economic assistance over and

105 above writing off debts (Ahmed, 2016). Attacks of September 2001 brought a landmark in the relationship of
106 both countries to such an extent that by 2004 Pakistan was considered as a 'major Non-NATO ally' ??Kronstadt,
107 2007, p. 11). In return Pakistan was given \$1.2 billion in initial three years in armaments exports, writing off \$
108 1 billion debt and was provided \$ 1 billion more funds by United States. Pakistan was also provided \$ 3 billion
109 economic aid and so as to enhance the professional competence of its armed forces. In aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan
110 had to suffer soldiers and civilian casualties, 2795 soldiers and 21672 have been killed and 8671 suffered injuries
111 in 3486 bomb attacks as well as in 283 suicide blasts. 90,000 military and para-military forces are fighting against
112 terrorists on the border. Since 9/11 Pakistan has lost \$ 68 billion in US led war on terror. In accordance with
113 statistics evidence till April 2010, the nation faced 8,141 brutal episodes of terrorism-many more have occurred
114 since then (Akhtar, 2012).

115 President Musharraf in his book while assessing advantages and disadvantages of not joining US led war
116 on terror said that, if Pakistan withstands US in GWOT then it could face harsh and extreme consequences.
117 Due to three reasons, He eventually joined the US war against terrorism. First of all Pakistan was militarily
118 fragile country that it was unable to counter US aggression. Secondly Pakistan's feeble economy could not
119 bear further economic sanctions. Thirdly Pakistani society was divided on the basis of languages, cult and
120 ethnicity (Musharraf, 2006). President Musharraf was of the view that if Pakistan refused to give logistic support
121 then the US could approach India for such assistance which might badly affect Pakistan's stance on Kashmir.
122 Furthermore one of the most serious concerns was safety of Pakistan's nukes. Pakistan was pretty much aware
123 of India's conspiracy regarding its nuclear programme. So it was favourable time for India to acquire the favour
124 of International players in this regard (Musharraf, 2006).

125 4 b) Areas of Cooperation

126 Pakistan has provided logistic help in Operation Enduring Freedom by allowing US to use its airspace and three
127 air bases. President Bush appreciated both the Pakistan's role and said that Musharraf is a brave leader and his
128 nation is a key partner in GWOT (Akram, 2002). Both the states became united against menace of terrorism
129 and made efforts to counterpoise the remains of terrorist groups of Taliban and Al-Qaida. Without any earlier
130 commitment between the two states, Pakistan assisted US in form of logistics help. US was also given access
131 to different military bases such as Shamsi, Pasni, Dalbandin and Jacobabad. Pakistan went on to provide nearly
132 100,000 gallons per day without any prior amount. Pakistan deployed nearly 35000 troops on frontier for averting
133 the most wanted Taliban leaders from escaping and apprehended 420 Al-Qaida and Taliban absconders. Pakistan
134 fully supported allied forces through technology and brainpower of humans (Akhtar, 2012).

135 New partnership was secured and strengthened through lifting of sanctions and granting of aid. "Democracy
136 sanctions" were removed by President through Brownback-II amendment. Nuclear sanctions were lifted for the
137 period of five years through Ackerman amendment. Military sales and assistance were restarted through issuance
138 of a waiver by President of US. United States concurred to instantly cancel Pakistan's loan and granted \$600
139 million and \$177 million for economic, security and military support respectfully for 2002. It was announced by
140 Bush leadership to provide \$3 billion as economic and military aid to Pakistan in 2003 (Sattar, 2010) ??Ahmed &
141 kharal,2015). c) To enhance the regional stability of South Asian states In order to improve the security situation
142 of South Asian countries both Pakistan and United States are working together. South Asia is a densely populated
143 area with massive armaments. This region is full of manpower and financial resources. There are two very hostile
144 atomic powers.US toiled very hard to guarantee stability in the region and get the three states, Pakistan, India,
145 Afghanistan close with each other. After 9/11 US is of the opinion that peace in the region is very crucial for
146 success of his "War on Terror" operation in Afghanistan (Akhtar, 2012). Despite all this, the alliance contained
147 both the bitter and sweet characteristics, swarming with complications. Acute engagement and disengagement
148 has also been seen in the alliance between the two states (Banerjee &Commuri, 2014).

149 5 III. Challenges That Struck Relationship

150 Following are the challenges that have been witnessed in post 9/11 scenario

151 6 a) Growing Indo-USA Strategic Partnership

152 Under the Bush Administration, United States and Indian partnership got better and better ??Guihong, 2003).
153 The sanctions were also lifted from India through US new policy towards South Asian region. Moreover, US also
154 acknowledged India's status of nuclear power, negotiation on technology transfers and made a civil nuclear deal
155 with it in 2005 (Evans, 2012) .

156 The US endeavours for a turmoil free South Asian region is dispirited by the U.S itself because of signing
157 nuclear deal and providing worth US \$ 5.5 billion weaponry to India which startled the regional states ??Farooq
158 and Rashid,2017). Pakistan was also disturbed due to this nuclear deal between US and India. President
159 Bush used the term of 'Natural Partner' for India and US at the time of signing civil nuclear deal in October,
160 2008. This contributed much in abating the relations (Ahmad, 2011, p. 223; Ahmed &Kharal,2015). Islamabad
161 showed concern for Indo-US nuclear deal and considered it as a threat for the security situation of Pakistan, and
162 asked Washington for a similar cooperation and offer in order to increase its nuclear capability. But it refused
163 by the US because of Pakistan's doubtful image and history of involvement in proliferating nuclear technology

164 (Ahmad, 2012). International community including the United States and coalition forces perceived that without
165 Pakistan's collaboration it would not be possible to bring peace and prosperity back in Afghanistan. Pakistan
166 offers the most convenient way for NATO supplies to pass and reach to the troops fighting in Afghanistan.
167 Moreover Afghanistan relies upon Pakistan for trade due to landlocked country (Akhtar, 2012).

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169 8 Differences over nuclear issue continue to hinder US-Pakistan 170 cooperation (Armitage et al, 2010). b) Pakistan's Tilt 171 towards China

172 When the Indo-US ties starts to strengthen, it alarms Pakistan's paradigm of security. Pakistan (Murphy,
173 2004;Waheed, 2017).

174 Disclosure of Pakistan's involvement in proliferation of nuclear weapons further escalated the problems of
175 future relationship between US and Pakistan (Hasan, 2004;Javaid & Mushtaq, 2014). United States has a great
176 fear regarding security of Pakistan nuclear technology. China is also aiming at building two nuclear plants in
177 Pakistan therefore Washington asked Beijing to declare its position internationally (Akhtar, 2012).

178 9 d) Anti-American Sentiments

179 Due to enmity towards policies of US regarding Pakistan, there can be found feelings and sentiments in the people
180 against US which have emerged due to Drone attacks by US in FATA. According to a survey, 60% of Pakistanis
181 consider US as a hostile country. The incident of Raymond Davis further escalated abhorrence and the CIA
182 activities in Pakistan are also opposed by Pakistani citizens (Akhtar, 2012). In the June of 2008, an airstrike by
183 the US army killed 11 para-military soldiers of Pakistan Army Frontier Corps, along with eight Taliban(DAWN,
184 2012) and episode of Salala check-post on November 26, 2011 in which twenty four Pakistani soldiers were killed,
185 widely opposed in Pakistan (Akhtar, 2012).

186 10 e) Osama Bin Laden

187 Osama bin Laden was assassinated by the US forces in Abbotabad, Pakistan on 2 nd May, 2011 which caused
188 an extreme deterioration in relations (Kronstadt, 2012, pp. 8-9). The discovery of America's most wanted
189 foe found in an allied state created an alarming situation for United States. The US started doubting at the
190 intentions of Pakistan in GWOT due to the incident of Bin Laden (Rijnbeek, 2016).

191 11 f) F-16 Issue (2016)

192 Earlier, it was decided that Pakistan will get fighters on discounted rate of \$270 million which was partially
193 funded by the Foreign Military Financing Programme of the US.A deal of worth \$699 million was signed for eight
194 F-16 fighter jets, but congress didn't permit due to some differences and problems regarding Pakistan's reluctance
195 to eliminate Haqani network safe havens on its territory and security of its nuclear weapons. It was unacceptable
196 to Pakistani leadership who were at the opinion that the deal must be completed without any pre-requisites or
197 any new conditions. It was stated by foreign minister's advisor Sartaj Aziz that if the deal becomes unsuccessful,
198 Pakistan could find any other country for buying jets. Analysts were of the opinion that Pakistan could look up
199 to either China or Russia to fulfill its defence needs (Syed, 2016).

200 12 g) Current Scenario

201 The trump administration's policy towards Pakistan marks a shift (Chauhdary, 2018). In a groundbreaking
202 speech in August 2017, US President Donald Trump laid out his government's policy for South Asia, authorizing
203 more American troops to Afghanistan and insisting that Pakistan must either "do more" to restrain Islamist
204 militants, or face consequences. Top leadership of Trump administration came to a conclusion that Pakistan
205 is not a trustworthy partner in GWOT but others are at a view that the US must not put the relation in
206 jeopardy by completely cutting off relations with Pakistan. Many initiatives of the Trump administration were
207 intended to force the Pakistani military to make a clear choice between backing the US, which finances much of
208 its military operations, and continuing to provide secret support for the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network,
209 which is fighting American and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Trump Government took many initiatives in order
210 to compel Pakistani armed forces to choose an option between supporting the US which provide funds for most
211 of their operations and persisting to dispense assistance for Haqqani network and Taliban which are brawling
212 with the US and Afghan military personnel in Afghanistan.

213 In May 2017, President Trump addressed the Arab-Islamic-US summit in Riyadh. One of the key points of
214 Trump's speech that infuriated many Pakistani commentators were his mention of India as one of the countries
215 that had suffered due to terrorism, with no acknowledgement of the Pakistani Army's contribution in fighting
216 jihadist terror. The Nation, mentioned that because of Trump's exclusion of Pakistan's efforts and sacrifices in
217 GWOT, most of Pakistani media groups were feeling mortified and embarrassed as they are only Muslim state

218 with nuclear power. Besides that merely a chance was even refused to prime minister of that country which is
219 supposed to be a Frontline state to even lay down his viewpoint and perspective.

220 The June 2017 Pentagon report discussed the role of "elements of Pakistani government" in providing support
221 to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network inside Pakistan's territory and need to take action against
222 all terrorist groups. The US intelligence community was already convinced of the presence of terror outfits in
223 Pakistani territory and the material support being provided to them by Pakistan's security establishment (Kaura
224 & Era, 2017).

225 A senior military officer of Pakistan in his interview stated that Pakistan started to discriminate between
226 the militants. First, there was Al-Qaeda which is a threat for both the US and Pakistan. Second, there was
227 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan which was a threat to Pakistan only and not to the US. Third, there were groups like
228 the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba which have nothing to do with Pakistan but
229 are only threats for the United States and maybe India (Nadeem, 2017). Trump made frequent tweets in which
230 he vociferated Pakistan's lies and hoodwinks and said that the US aid to Pakistan had not achieved any expected
231 results and was of no use. It was decided by the State department that until Pakistan will not take any strong
232 action against the militant outfits such as Taliban and Haqqani group, the US will suspend its military aid till
233 then.

234 United States delegates have revived their demands on Pakistan to take strong actions for eradicating Haqqani
235 network that invaded the US troops in Afghanistan, and to pressurize Taliban militants to come to a compromise
236 by peace talks and demand handing over of Dr. Shakil Afridi who helped to find Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad
237 city and is now jailed (Bengali & Sahisep, 2017).

238 President Trump victimized Pakistan by making his first tweet in 2018 in which Trump asked Pakistan to give
239 back all the aid received by Pakistan in previous years and alleged Pakistan for giving only hoodwinks and lies.
240 As a result of which Trump government has freeze the security and military aid (Afzal, 2018), which includes
241 \$900 million & \$255 million in Coalition Support Fund & Foreign Military Financing respectively. Due to which
242 Pakistan Foreign Minister issued the statement that the US is a "friend who always betrays" (Ahmed, 2018).

243 Pakistan has been jointly nominated by the both UK and US to be placed in Grey List by moving the FATF
244 which was also backed by Germany and France. Pakistan was accused of not taking strong actions against
245 some outfits that are labeled as terrorists under UN Security Council Resolution 1267. Particularly the Falah-
246 i-Insaniyat Foundation and Jamaat-ud-Dawa who were freely operating was more bothering specifically Hafiz
247 Saeed was allowed to perform the functions like fund raising and organizing of rallies freely within the whole
248 country. From 2012 to 2015, Pakistan had also been put on the Grey List for three years (Hussain, 2018).
249 Pakistan is now reshaping and resettling everything out of fear of US using FATF's strategy to safeguard the
250 stake. Both the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation and Jamaat-ud-Dawa were put in the state's banned list by the
251 ordinance issued by President of Pakistan Mamnoon Hussain which amended Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act of
252 1997 (Younus, 2018).

253 Seven Pakistani firms were put in the list of foreign organization accused of involvement in nuclear trade by
254 Trump government which is supposed to be a threat to the US policy interest and national security. Pakistan's
255 objective to be a member of NSG could be weakened due to this step (Iqbal, 2018).

256 The US Ambassador in India, Kenneth Juster said that Washington was working closely with partners to
257 secure India's membership in the elite club of NSG who can trade fissile materials and nuclear technologies
258 (Express Web Desk | New Delhi |, 2018) the US efforts to include India into NSG while keeping Pakistan out can
259 further jeopardize the nuclear imbalance in South Asia -a fact to which the US media and think tank community
260 remains mostly oblivious (Global Village Space News Desk, 2018).

261 A diplomatic tension arose following a fatal traffic accident in Islamabad by the United States military attache,
262 Colonel Joseph Emanuel Hall, killing two youngsters on the motorcycle, one of whom died on the spot while
263 the other sustained injuries (Altaf, 2018). Col. Hall was booked in a criminal case. Because of his diplomatic
264 exemption, he was not taken into custody but police is now going to get his driving license cancelled. For putting
265 Colonel name in the exit control list (ECL), The capital police has sent a letter to Interior Ministry. Police
266 has also sent a letter to Federal Investigation Agency for putting the Colonel Joseph's name on the watch list
267 (Chaudhry, 2018).

268 In the wake of simmering diplomatic tensions the Trump administration has decided to impose new restrictions
269 on Pakistani diplomats in the US limiting their movement to 25 mile radius. In return, Pakistan on the same day
270 also imposed limitations and constraints on the US diplomats' travelling in Pakistan (Janjua & Harris, 2018).

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272 **14 (H)**

273 **IV. Conclusion**

274 There have always been situational based relations between the United States and the Pakistan. These
275 situations motivated actions and practices of both states. Both the states cooperated on many occasions for
276 certain interests but this cooperation disturbed many times and relations saw setback due to unexpected incidents.
277 Due to their mutual dissension the desired goals have not been achieved yet in GWOT because the nature of
278 relations remained diverse in democratic and non-democratic regimes in Pakistan. In non-democratic rule,

279 Pakistan served purely in the US perspective. But in democratic governments, fragility in relations has been
280 witnessed due to clash of interests which leads towards a rift in ties. Both the US and the Pakistan preferred
281 their national interests over alliance whenever deemed necessary. Lack of trust always dominated these relations
282 that impeded their efforts in countering terrorism but this trust deficit did not result in complete cut off because
283 both possess vital importance for each other. Because of Global Supremacy of the United States, It would not
284 be in the interest of Pakistan to afford complete disengagement similarly the US can't achieve its desired results
285 in the region especially in Afghanistan without assistance of Pakistan due to its geo-strategic importance. In
286 order to achieve the desired result, it is suitable and appropriate for Pakistan and the US to reformulate their
287 mutual relationship by concentrating in fields of cooperation and convergence, and collaborate with each other
288 for ensuring greater achievements. ¹

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