The Activities of Niger Delta Militants: A Road March to Development

By Past. Dr. Abomaye-Nimenibo, Williams Aminadokiari Samuel, Barrister, Miss Abomaye Nimenibo, Comfort Tamunobarasinpiri Emmanuel & Hannah Iyerikabo

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Keywords: militancy, unemployment, business activities, development, revenue, and economy.

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Keywords: militancy, unemployment, business activities, development, revenue, and economy.

I. Introduction

The Niger Delta covers an area of over 70,000 square kilometres, covering the larger part of the South-South region and some parts of the South East region of Nigeria. It derives its name from the River Niger and is one of the world’s largest wetlands and Africa’s largest delta. The Niger Delta is one of the biggest deltas in the world, probably the third largest on earth. The region is regarded as one of the nine most difficult deltas of the world comparable to the Mekong, the Amazon and the Ganges. It is situated in the central part of southern Nigeria. It is situate between latitudes 4o and 6o north of the Equator and 4o and 8o east of the Greenwich. According to the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (2007), the area is said to have a targeted population of about twenty five million people (2006 National census figures and National Bureau of Statistics, 2006) with various ethnic groups numbering about forty-five, having the Ijaw, Edo, Igbo, Efik, Ibibio and Oron speaking tribes. The 2006 Population Census figure for Bayelsa State is 1,704,515 (One Million, Seven Hundred and Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifteen). The region is said to be rich in both renewable and non-renewable natural resources in terms of oil, gas, bitumen, etc., and accounts for 95% of the total revenue of Nigeria. This revenue is generated from oil and gas exploration with a contribution of not less than 80% of national wealth as was succinctly pointed out by Brisibie, 2001 and Tell Magazine No.33, 2008.

The swamp of the Niger Delta region (of which Bayelsa State is an integral part) is particularly blessed with crude oil. Crude oil in commercial quantity was first discovered in Nigeria at Oloibiri, Niger Delta region situate in present day Bayelsa State. Crude oil from the Niger Delta has been the lifeblood of Nigeria’s economic wealth. About 2.6 million barrels of crude is taken daily from the region, and this accrues millions of Dollars daily to the federation account of Nigeria (Ejibunu, 2007: 9-20).

The unquantifiable proceeds from crude oil is what the Nigerian government uses to build up its infrastructures such as the construction of dual carriage roads across the country, build extravagant physical structures and institutions in Abuja and other parts of the country, and even have fuel for her use. Irrespective of the fact that crude oil is produced in the Niger Delta region to sustain the Nigerian economy yet, contrary to expectations of its people, oil has failed to translate to regional prosperity and development in the Niger Delta” (Kimiebi, 2010).

The same oil that is the “hallelujah-glory” in other parts of the country has very little or no positive impact in the lives of the people from whose land this oil
came from. Unfortunately, Niger Delta the home of petroleum resources had no electricity, no potable drinking water, no decent hospitals, no respectable school buildings, and not even a standard trunk road. Residents rely on wooden boats and canoes for transportation, except for foreign oil company workers who travel by helicopters and sea trucks with high powered engines. Regrettably, the cost of one single flyover or bridge in a dry land such as Abuja is more than the length of all bridges in the Niger Delta region put together. The people of Niger Delta are executed and in great agony instead of being blessed by this black gold called crude oil.

In fact, crude oil that is a great blessing elsewhere became a curse to the people whose land produced it. The people, who once had enough to eat both from water and land, now, can hardly fill their stomach with crumbs as oil activities pollute both the land and water, impoverishing the area of Niger Delta. The people were even too poor to travel elsewhere to buy food since they were not even employed by these oil companies who pollute their land and water. The people suffered both culturally, economically, psychologically and even spiritually as some of their shrines were demolished because of oil locations. To add insult to injury, anybody who raises an eyebrow will be beaten, locked up by security operatives and even executed.

Finally, reality dawn on the people; and as a cow pushed to the wall, these oppressed people at a time had no choice than to fight back. MAJOR JASPER ISAAC ADAKA BORO started the physical struggle but died shortly. The seed had been planted in the subconscious of the people of Niger Delta. The tussle of the politicians like HAROLD DAPPA BIRIYE was not strong enough to repel the hands of both the colonial and Nigerian leaders.

The seed grew in KEN SARO-WIWA who also spearheaded the struggle in his peculiar way. He was brutally murdered with nine others by the SANI ABACHA administration. After then came the famous Kaimama declaration, and the Militancy phase of the struggle include: Niger Delta Freedom fighters such as Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), Joint Revolutionary Council, MENBU, Niger Delta Volunteer Force and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), etc.

The Militancy phase of the struggle became a violent arm struggle after the 2003 general elections. Politicians dangerously armed these already angry youths as thugs to win elections for them. After the elections, the boys were abandoned; and the politicians could not retrieve back those guns given to these boys. From then on, militancy and blowing up of oil wells took a new dimension, precisely January 11, 2006. The boys tested the rough waters of kidnapping, pipeline vandalization, and destruction of oil company locations (Amaize, 2006). Ever since Militancy had become a formidable force smothering or stifling the Nigerian economy so much that the Nigerian government with its entire military could not overpower them and somewhat resorted to the granting of amnesty to these boys. The live-wire of the Nigerian economy is today devastated as a result of the activities of Niger Delta militants. To what extent was the economy affected is not known. This study, therefore, seeks to find out the effects of the activities of these militant’s struggle on the Nigerian economy. Bayelsa State was used as a case study since she is a leading producer of crude oil; and also the centre of militant activities.

a) Statement of the Problem

It is the desire of the federal government of Nigeria to produce crude oil uninterrupted to generate revenue for the country and also to meet its crude oil quota, but this desire is not achieved due to the activities of Niger Delta militants. Since this desire is not met or achieved, then what is responsible? Is it as a result of activities of militants or for some other reasons that production quota fell short?

To curb the excesses of these militants in the Niger Delta, the Federal government came up with amnesty programme. However, to what extent has this solve the teething problem in the Niger Delta needed to be investigated.

Since the advent of militancy; particularly hostage-taking and attacks on oil installations, scholars have argued that it is not the activities of militants but inefficiency on the part of oil companies that have affected the revenue generation through crude oil.

Students alienate and hardly agree in arriving at a definite answer or solution. It is, therefore, the desire of the researchers to examine the effect of the low productivity of crude oil production and its effect on the Nigerian populace especially the Niger Delta area. It is also not clear why Niger Delta youths have taken to arms struggle and other criminal activities despite the amnesty programme granted them. Therefore, these issues needed to be investigated.

b) Objective of the Study

The core objective of this research work is to ascertain the immediate and remote causes of the Niger Delta militancy and how their activities affect the economy.

The specific objectives of the study include:

i. To investigate and ascertain the extent of loss of government revenue as a result of the activities of these Niger Delta militants.

ii. To ascertain the extent to which the activities of militancy has affected crude oil production.

iii. To determine the level to which 13% derivation fund has improved the Niger Delta region.
Finally, the study seeks to explain the causes of militancy in the Niger Delta region and provides a concrete solution that will savage the problem.

c) Research Questions

The following research questions guide the researchers in this research work.

i. How does militancy affect the production of crude oil in the Niger Delta region?

ii. How does militancy affect the production of crude oil in the Niger Delta region?

iii. How does militancy affect business activities in the Niger Delta region in particular and the nation in general?

iv. How does militancy lead to unemployment in the region?

Hypothesis

The following hypotheses are set forth to guide this research work:

i. Ho: Militants activities do not have a significant effect on the Nigerian economy.

H1: Militants activities have significant effect on the Nigerian economy.

ii. Ho: Militancy does not have a significant effect on business activities in the Niger Delta.

H1: Militancy has a significant effect on business activities in the Niger Delta.

iii. Ho: Militancy in the Niger Delta has not significantly led to the loss of thousands of lives.

H1: Militancy in the Niger Delta has significantly led to the loss of thousands of lives.

d) Significance of the Study

It is believed that the result of this research work will be useful to the Federal Government of Nigeria in general and the Bayelsa State government in particular as well as the general public. The result of the research is believed to clearly show the impact of militancy on the economy of Nigeria.

It is also believed, that the research will be an eye opener to oil companies operating in the Niger Delta to adjust their operative patterns. The totality of the human race and the African continent shall benefit from this study if they would identify the pitfalls and make necessary adjustments.

e) Definition of Terms

Effect: Change (either positive or negative) that somebody or something causes on another person or thing.

Militant: An aggressive combatant, vigorously active, especially in support of a cause who uses destructive force to achieve his/her aims.

The Collins Cuboid Advance Learner’s English Dictionary, 4th edition described a militant as someone who believes in something very strong and is active in trying to bring about political or social change, often in extreme ways that other people find unacceptable.

The New Oxford Dictionary of English (2001) defines a militant as a person who is combatant and aggressive in support of a political or social cause and typically favouring extreme, violent or confrontational methods.

The 6th edition of the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defined militant as using or willing to use force or strong pressure to achieve his aims especially to achieve social or political change.

Militancy: The act of aggressive combatants coming together as militants to use destructive force to achieve their aims. The word militancy is a derivative of the word militant.

Economy: An economy is an area of the production, distribution, or trade, and consumption of goods and services by different agents in a given geographical location. It is the relationship between production, trade, and supply of money in a particular country or region.

Illegal Bunkering: The act of practicing siphoning and transporting stolen petroleum products from one area to another.

II. Review of Related Literature

a) Historical Background

Works of eminent scholars on Niger Delta militancy has been examined.

The Niger Delta covers an area of over 70,000 square kilometres, which covers a major part of the south-south region and some parts of South East region of Nigeria. The swamp of the Niger Delta region (of which Bayelsa State is an integral part) is particularly blessed with crude oil. Niger Delta region crude oil was the first to be discovered in commercial quantity at Oloibiri in 1958 at Oloibiri situate in present day Bayelsa State (Abomaye-Nimenibo, 2015). Crude oil from the Niger Delta has been the lifeblood of Nigeria’s economic wealth. About 2.6 million barrels of crude is taken daily from the region, and this accrues millions of dollars daily to the Federation of Nigeria’s account (Ejibunu, 2007: 9-20).

These colossal proceeds from crude oil are what the Nigerian government uses to build up its infrastructures such as the construction of dual carriage roads across the country, build extravagant physical structures and institutions in Abuja and other parts of the country, and even have fuel for her use. Whereas the oil produced in the Niger Delta is the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy, but oil has failed to translate to regional prosperity and development in the Niger Delta (Kimiebi, 2010).

But the same oil that is the “hallelujah-glory” in other parts of the country has very little positive impact on the lives of the people from whose land it is produced. Niger Delta, the home of petroleum resources, had no electricity, no potable drinking water, no good hospitals, no good school buildings, and not...
even a standard trunk road; although a negligible part had a handful of these in the cities. Residents rely on wooden boats and canoes for transportation, except for foreign oil company workers who travel by helicopters and sea trucks with high powered engines. The people of Niger Delta are continually being executed and in great agony instead of being blessed by this black gold called crude oil. In fact, this crude oil that is a blessing elsewhere became a curse to the people whose land produced it. The people, who once had enough to eat both from water and land, now, could hardly fill their stomach with crumbs as oil activities polluted both the land and water, impoverishing the area of Niger Delta. The people were even too deprived to travel elsewhere to buy food since eighty percent of her population were not engaged as workers by these oil companies who pollute the land and water. The Niger Deltans have suffered both culturally, economically, psychologically and even spiritually as some of their shrines were consciously destroyed because of oil locations. To add insult to injury, anybody who raises an eyebrow will either be beaten, locked up by security operatives or executed.

b) Historical Perspective of the Niger Delta Crisis

According to Ejibunu (2007: 26), the discovery of oil in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region in 1957 triggered a chain of events that led to the political and economic marginalization of the inhabitants. Indeed, it has been argued that oil has been more of a curse than a blessing to the people who have been at the receiving end of horrendous government oppression and brutality, often resulting in fatalities. Ejibunu (2007) went ahead to say that over 60 years of oil production and hundreds of billions of dollars of oil revenue were realized by government and yet, the local people remained in abject poverty and without basic amenities such as water and electricity. The Niger Delta has a long history of violence; and insomuch that the situation has gone from bad to worse. This situation has given rise to the recent emergence of armed militant groups, willing to kill as part of their campaign to have control of the share of the regions oil wealth.

The campaign for fair deal or control of the oil wells by the people did not start today but rather in 1966 when Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro led a rebellion under the umbrella of the Delta Volunteer Service (DVS) which organises campaign against the Federal Government by declaring the Niger Delta a Republic. However, the insurgency was crushed, but it has brought consciousness into the minds of the people. The spirit and consciousness to bring to the international level, the suffering and deprivation of the people of the Niger Delta were championed by Ken Saro-Wiwa in the 90s. He applied peaceful, non-violent means reminiscent of the strategy and tactics of Mahatma Gandhi but to no avail. He aimed to redress the political and socio-economic wrongs imposed on the Niger Delta people. He was tenacious and determined in the pursuit of emancipator ideals through the platform of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which he founded in 1992 with other like minds. The government of General Sanni Abacha and the oil companies were not comfortable with the activities of Saro-Wiwa and his Movement. In no time, Saro-Wiwa was accused of inciting members of MOSOP to kill four Ogoni elders. He and eight other fellow compatriots were arraigned for trial, in a military tribunal, set up by the despotic and repressive government of General Sanni Abacha, for the murder of the four Ogoni elders including Mr. Albert Tonbari Badey the then Secretary to Rivers State Government and Head of Service; and they were convicted and hanged in November 1995 and buried at Port Harcourt Cemetery having poured acid on the lifeless body of Ken Saro Wiwa to prevent immortalization of the body by the Ogonis (Abomaye-Nimenibo, W. A. S. eyewitness account). However, Saro-Wiwa’s more likely “crime” is his effort to organize the Ogoni ethnic minority to stop the destruction of their homeland caused by operations of Shell and Chevron, the multinational oil companies, and seek compensation for his people’s lost farmland and fisheries” (Ejibunu, 2007: 35).

A decade after the hanging, the potential consequences of the Niger Delta conflict have escalated in both human and economic terms. Various militant groups have sprung up of recent to undermine the activities of the oil companies using different methods and tactics, thereby daring the Nigerian state. Prominent among such groups are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), and Movement for the Survival of the Igbo Ethnic Nationality (MOSEIN) and of recent, the Niger Delta Avengers.

Finally, reality dawn on the people; and like a cow pushed to the wall, these oppressed people at a time had no choice than to fight back. The Militant phase of the struggle became a violent arm struggle after the 2003 general elections. Politicians dangerously armed these already angry youths as thugs to win their elections. After the elections, the boys were dumped; and the politicians could not retrieve back those guns given to them. From thenceforth, militancy and blowing up of oil wells took a greater dimension, precisely January 11, 2006; the boys tested the rough waters of kidnapping, pipeline vandalization, and destruction of oil company locations (Amaize, 2006). Ever since Militancy had become a formidable force smothering or stifling the Nigerian economy so much that the Nigerian government with its entire military could not overpower them and rather resorted to the granting of amnesty.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

MILITANCY AND NIGERIA’S OIL SUPPLY

MILITANCY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

NIGERIAN ECONOMY

MILITANCY AND ILLEGAL BUNKERING

MILITANCY AND INVESTMENT

MILITANCY AND LOSS OF HUMAN LIVES

Fig 1: Militancy and the Economy

c) Militancy and Nigeria’s Oil Supply

Ayodele (2008) cited the crises in the Niger Delta among others for the surging price of crude oil in the international market saying that, when the Niger Delta sneezes, both Nigeria and the international community catch a cold.

Chris (2009) explained the situation better by saying that the rising spate of militancy in the Niger Delta has taken on Nigeria’s oil supply, and that Nigeria has lost at least one-quarter of its oil production due to the frequent attack by militants on oil installations resulting to shutdowns.

Anayochukwu (2009) explained the decreasing nature of Nigeria oil production due to militancy. From a peak of an average of 2.1mbpd (million barrels per day) achieved in March 2008, he said Nigeria’s production decline to 1.7mbpd by May 2009. He went further to state that because of the same attacks by militans, production decline to between 800,000bpd (barrels per day) and 1.2 mbpd in June same year. Explaining further, he said Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) which account for 60% of Nigeria’s oil production capacity suffered the most that year. From a previous production capacity of about 1.0 mmdp, Shell’s delivery drastically dropped to an alarming 140,000 bpd as at June 30, 2009 indicating a 85.9% drop in production due to relentless shut-downs caused by militant attacks.

Still writing on the topic, Anayochukwu stated that with the Bonga Oil well attack, Shell alone now accounts for about 745,000mbpd shut-ins. Three times that year, the sweating oil major has declared “force Major” an official announcement that it will be unable to meet its supply obligation.

Eni (2008), exactly confirmed this report of Bonga attack, saying that, within 24 hours of the Bonga attack, Chevron was hit by rampaging militants resulting to a production loss of 225,000 and 120,000 bpd respectively, which reduces the country’s output by 345,000bpd with dire consequences on the economy.

Eni went further to say that the activities of militants have not only reduced Nigeria’s oil production, but also crippled government future production plan of four million barrels of crude oil per day in the coming years.

Most elaborate of these militant activities and the resultant effect is the work of Ledum (2009). Ledum & Azubuike (2009) stated the dates of attack and the barrels of oil loss per day. Ledum’s work is more elaborate about militant activities than other scholars.

President Yar’Adua in 2009 supported and crowned this report by mentioning all these writers while signing the 2009 budget into law. In his speech, he said, “due to militant activities in the Niger Delta, our oil production has declined to as low as 1.6 mbpd from a projection of 2.209 mbpd” (cited from Newswatch, May 4th, 2009, p.12).

d) Militancy and Nigerian Revenue

The direct translation of the thousands and millions of barrels of crude oil loss of Nigeria’s revenue as a result of militancy is in billions and even trillions of naira. Many authors have also written about this loss caused by militants. According to Ledum & Azubuike (2009), the total cost of oil loss per barrel due to the activities of militants in 2006 alone is N2.45 trillion or $27.2 billion. He stated that the number of oil barrels lost in the first nine months of 2008 alone was about $20.7 billion. Ledum’s report tallies slightly with NNPC official statistics for that year 2006.
According to NNPC official statistics, the total amount lost to militant activities for the year 2008 is about N6.27 trillion or $44 billion.

Eni (2008) focusing on the monthly and yearly loss of oil revenue, went down in clear gave details of the daily loss of oil revenue as a result of Bonga and the Escravos attack which figure she put at $46.5 million per day. Eni’s report differs from the account of Babalola (2008) who set the daily loss of crude oil revenues at about $84 million, which is about $39.5 million difference. Hassan (2007) on his part added that militant activities affected both the federal government and oil-producing State government revenues. He wrote that due to militancy, Niger Delta States have been falling in their oil production quota and that means a lower 13% derivation fund. Hassan even quoted a (then) nearly elected State Governor who cried out that it was as if his state was no longer producing oil.

**Table 2.1: Crude Oil Production From 1981-2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRODUCTION (mbpd)</th>
<th>BILLIONS OF NAIRA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>5.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1.241</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>7.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1.495</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td>7.97</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>1.341</td>
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<td>796.98</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>2.118</td>
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<td>2.280</td>
<td>3,431.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>6.07 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
So far, the Niger Delta militants have disrupted the nation’s oil production level as opined by Anachukwu (2008). He wrote on the barrels of oil loss, due to militant activities. The attack on Bonga oil field, located 75 nautical miles (120 kilometres) off the coast of Bayelsa State resulted to a loss of 225,000 bpd. The next day Egbea 1 militant group attacked the Abiteye-Olero pipeline, Okada village in Edo State; causing a shut-in of another 120,000 bpd. With these shut-ins, Nigerian crude oil export dropped by 1mbpd.

e) Militancy and Investment

We all know that there shall be no meaningful investment in an area of crises. Thus, according to Onwuzuruegbu (2008), oil production in the Niger Delta is being produced at gun points; else the militants will sack them. He went on to say companies are folding up and those left are producing under military protection. Almost all writers agree with the above reality. Hassan (2007, p. 22) writes that since the start of the crisis, particularly hostage-taking and attacks on the oil installation in the Niger Delta, there has been the drought of business activities. The area has also experienced restiveness which has reduced growth in the business sector in the past eight years. Writing further, it says that in Rivers State alone, companies stopped operations as expatriate workers either gone back to their countries or have taken cover in other areas. Mr. Tele Ikuru (then Deputy Governor of Rivers State) completely agreed with Hassan’s report in 2007 when he said “Rivers State has become a carcass of itself. Go to Trans-Amadi, and you will see that about 80% of the companies have closed; not because of their inability to manage the business properly, but because of the demonic activities of our youths” (http://dailyminst.com).

Ayodela (2008), on his part, went further to explain that militancy in the Niger Delta does affect investment in the oil and other sectors of the economy. He explained that foreign investment in other sectors which has been on the ascendancy since 1999 may have likely freeze. To the government, there are no thanks to militancy in the Niger Delta.

f) Militancy and Unemployment

Militant activities in the Niger Delta scare both new and existing investors away. Companies are folding up, and expatriate workers either going back to their countries or go into hiding as a result of the activities of militants in the Niger Delta region. “SPDC retrenched 3,500 workers in September 2007” (Punch Newspapers, 2007a: p.14). Indoroma Petrochemical Company shut down its operations thereby rendering over 3,000 youths jobless and aggravating the unemployment situation in Nigeria (Sunday Trust Newspaper, 2007).

As a result of militants’ activities, Royal Dutch Shell oil production has dropped from one million bpd to about 380,000 bpd at its Bonny terminal in the South of the Niger Delta as a result of militant activities. Exxon Mobil has also experienced increased insurgent activities in its Nigerian operations.

Hassan (2007) reported that Anglo/Dutch oil firm Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) sacked 3,500 workers in September 2007. He also wrote that a similar action took place in 2004 where Shell retrenched about 1,400 workers all in a bit to reduce operational cost. Once again no thanks to militancy by the Federal and State Governments.

Anayochukwu (2009) wrote that in 2008, Shell owed her contractors and workers, and went ahead to sack about 4,000 of her workers. These were both full time and contract staff, and many of them were from the Niger Delta, a sad effect of militancy on the people of the region.

Daily Trust, July 7th, 2009, also reported the same episode. Mr. Tele Ikuru (the then Deputy Governor of Rivers State), opined that Indorama Petrol Chemicals has shut down operations thereby rendering over 3,000 youths jobless and aggravating the unemployment situation in Rivers State.

g) Militancy and Illegal Bunkering

The International Crises Group (ICG) report No. 118, September 28, 2006, defined illegal bunkering as a dangerous practice of siphoning and transporting stolen fuel from one place to another.

Cole (2010) wrote that the issue of bunkering is at the heart of Nigeria’s many problems and trying to solve the instability in the Niger Delta without confronting these problems is like trying to bribe a billionaire with a thousand dollars. He estimated that an upward of 200,000 barrels of oil was stolen each day from the region.

Cole’s estimate of about 200,000 barrels falls within the estimated range of the TCG, which projected that Nigeria’s loss to illegal bunkering is from 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day which figure is an equivalent output of a small oil-producing country.

On his part, Ledum (2009) focused only on the amount of lost to illegal bunkering estimated at $3billion in the first seven months of 2008.

While other authors wrote only on the monetary loss to illegal bunkering, Hassan (2007) went further to talk about the reasons for illegal bunkering. According to him, illegal bunkering has been a fundamental source of fund for anti-government militant groups whose warlords, has publicly admitted their involvement and others have said they consider the practice a defendable means of providing income for aggrieved and impoverished residents of the oil producing communities.

ICG’s interview with warlord and leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo supported this claim of Hassan.
Asari-Dokubo is being quoted to have said in his defence of illegal bunkering that "My people are taking back what is ours."

Hassan also went further to say illegal bunkering do not only tell hard on the government, but even harder on the oil companies. He revealed that oil industry officials admitted during a research interview that paying off militants and criminal groups is a far better and cheaper option than dealing with costly bunkering related shutdowns and repairing physical damages caused by the militants.

Hassan concluded by saying that, even the government is aware of this illegal bunkering and may have decided to deliberately keep silence over the issue. Quoting a Bayelsa State high anonymous official, he said "when the boys are able to do bunkering, they are quiet. There is restiveness when bunkering stops and they have nothing else to do."

The operation of militants in the Niger Delta and the insecurity has made it impossible for security agencies to adequately cover locations of various oil facilities; and this has created a soft landing ground for illegal oil bunkering to thrive in the region. Illegal Oil Bunkering and euphemism for oil theft have assumed considerable dimensions in the Niger Delta. An estimate ranging from 30,000 to 200,000 bbl/day of crude oil is lost to bunkering (Oudeman, 2006). Can the government stop it when her militia of all ranks are the alias? Who or how can this oil bunkering by Militant groups be check-mated is food for thought in Nigeria.

h) Militancy and Lost of Human Lives.

The most valuable resources Nigeria has lost due to militancy activities in the Niger Delta is the loss of human lives. "We are not only talking regarding money lost but real lives that were lost; and it is quite a tremendous loss to the economy. There are unaccounted costs in human misery with about 6,000 persons killed during the period of militancy and another 2,000 taken as hostages. If we were to buy peace, we would have spent less, (Ledum cited from Newswatch May 4, 2009, p.14).

Anayachukwu (2009) writing on the lives lost due to militancy added that the loss of lives does not come only from the side of militants’ activities; but also from retaliatory attacks from the Military Joint Task Force (JTF). He took his reference from the Ijaw Youth Council (JYC) who constantly accuses the JTF of attacking Ijaw communities and killing lots of innocent persons all in the name of searching for militants.

Chris (2009) explained some of the instances that people were killed because of militancy. He said on April 2, 2008; two flow stations belonging to Agip; located in the Forcados were blown off. 11 soldiers were reportedly killed. Writing further, he said over 100 persons were said to have been killed during the attack on Bonga oil field by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on the 17th of July 2008. The list of loss of lives in the Niger Delta does not end but rather, is on a daily basis.

i) Causes of Militancy

Almost all writers point accusing fingers to the Federal Government of Nigeria as the cause of combativeness. The long neglect of the region is the remote cause of the emergence of belligerency.

Oladimeji (2009) cited in Atlantic Express, Vol. 9, 2009, said "If we are, to be honest with ourselves, we have not been fair to the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta has been producing the funds with which we’ve been running this country for so many years. The funds were used to build Abuja where I came from this morning, those lovely roads, bridges, and offices came from Niger Delta". Oladimeji’s statement is just one of the numerous statements from top federal government officials admitting that the federal government has indeed neglected the region for too long.

Eneware (2009) approached this issue aggressively. Using the Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary’s definition of militants as a yardstick, he said all past and present Nigerian leaders are militants. Speaking further, “militancy will not end in the Niger Delta region until the federal government itself denounces it militant approach to the problems of the Niger Delta region; because Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’adua is a militant, so is Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo.”

In an open letter to Mr. President, Ekpemupolo 2009 asked the following questions: “Mr. President, how many Niger Deltans have oil fields, blocs or even allocations that girlfriends are entitled to in Abuja? Does it sound just amidst such truth that General T.Y. Danjuma sold 45% of one of his marginal field (Akpo field) to a Chinese firm for 2.3 billion dollars, still keeping 55%? Can this happen to the Hausas, Yorubas or Igbos? Do you think there can be peace where the people do not have appreciable stakes in their resources, composition, and corporations of multinational in the region? The answer emphatically is “No!” cited from the vanguard, August 31st, 2009, p. 39. The above utterances show that outsiders’ benefiting from oil proceeds and side-lining the owners is the core cause of militancy.

Boyloaf, however, sees lip service and unnecessary government procedure as the cause of the neglect of the region which has led to militancy. “You can imagine when they built Abuja, they did not set up any committee, when they (federal government of Nigeria) built Third Mainland Bridge in Lagos, no committee was also formed. Regarding the Niger Delta, they will be creating different committees and offices for people to make money” cited from Tell Magazine, July 14, 2008, p.21.

Delta has been producing the funds with which we’ve been running this country for so many years. The
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Suleiman (2008) supported the view of Boyloaf when he said poor management from the top is responsible for this protracted crisis in the region. All they do is to give lip service to issues affecting the area without implementing anything reasonable.

Ayodele (2009) on his part stated that the heart of the matter in the Niger Delta is an injustice done to her; more so, the region is the goose that lays the nations golden egg; but it has nothing to show for it except a wasted landscape.

\[ j \] Summary of Literature Review

Having analysed militancy empirically, especially as it affects Nigeria’s oil production; revenue; investment; unemployment; illegal bunkering; and loss of human lives, it is indeed clear that militant activities has caused a lot of havoc to the Nigerian economy as a result of the negligent of the Niger Delta. Thanks to fallen heroes like Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, Ken Saro Wiwa, Chief Dappa Biriyi, and others who pioneered this struggle with good intention.

However, present-day militancy cannot be discussed without mentioning names like high chief Micheal Ateke Tom (a.k.a Abuja Daddy), Alhaji Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, High Chief Government Ekpenemopolo (a.k.a Tompolo), Boyloaf the trigger puller of Niger Delta, Joshua Maikava, The Young shall grow, Electoral Samuel Umunaro, Henry Okah, Africa Ekperesingha, Ogun Boss, Invisible Grenade, High Chief Ajupe Bibopere alias Shoot at sight, with women to mention but a few. These people are called freedom fighters of the region, but the federal government of Nigeria calls them militants and even criminals.

Though militancy is evil per se, it should be noted that it has brought some benefit to the region. It has brought some recognition to the region in the eyes of both the local and international community. Gen. Azazi was appointed Chief of Defence Staff to compensate the region. We have the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the ministry of Niger Delta. The Obasanjo administration employed thousands of youths even those unqualified; into federal offices because of militancy in the region. Most importantly the region produced its first Vice-President who later became the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in recognition of a just cause as compensation for the backwardness of the Niger Delta. It is an agreeable fact that the region’s security, for now, is still not encouraging. However, if proffered solutions are accepted and implemented, about 80% of the security challenges in Nigeria or even the world would have been solved. The Niger Deltans are naturally warriors yet, they are peace loving people who are ever ready to resist or repel any oppression when pushed against the wall.

\[ III. \quad \text{Method of Study} \]

The method of study guided the investigators in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting observations. Thus, the research design used in this work is the survey design; specifically, the questionnaire survey.

With a census figure of about 150 million people in Nigeria, it will be very difficult or even impossible to study the entire population hence, our case study centres on Bayelsa State the hbo of all petroleum activities; and the sample population was that of oil companies, selected state ministries, students, public servants, farmers, fishermen, and entrepreneurs.

Regarding sampling design and procedures, the study was based on the effect of militancy on the Nigerian economy, with Bayelsa state as the targeted...
Regarding the data, the primary data collection method was applied instead of the secondary data collection method. One of the researchers and two other relatives joined to distribute the questionnaires and also did well by collecting them back. Respondents are anonymous and were assured of secrecy to build up confidence, hence the honest, sincere and accurate response. Out of 1,600 questionnaires sent out, we were able to gather 1,420 representing 88.75%.

a) Data Analysis Techniques

Interviewees’ responses were collated and analysed for use. We use Chi-Square to test our hypothesis. The Chi-Square test is given by the formula:

\[ \chi^2 = \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e} \]

Where:
\[ \chi^2 \] = Chi-Square
\[ F_o \] = Observed frequency
\[ F_e \] = Expected frequency

The Expected frequency (Fe) has the formula:

\[ F_e = \frac{TC \times TR}{TO} \]

Where:
\[ TC \] = Total Column
\[ TR \] = Total Row
\[ TO \] = Total Observation

Also, a critical value of 5% or 0.05 level of significance was for the purpose of determining the Chi-Square (x2) value with a given degree of freedom (df). The formula or DF is:

\[ df = (N - 1) (K - 1) \]
\[ N = \text{Number of option in the column} \]
\[ K = \text{Number of selected questionnaires} \]

IV. Presentation and Analysis of Data Results

We analysed our data from the questionnaire which helped us answer the questions that initiated this research work.

As stated earlier, a total number of 1,600 questionnaires were distributed, and only 1,420 were successfully retrieved and were used for this research work.

Data gathered from the field study were presented in frequency distribution tables and analysed using simple percentage and Chi-Square formulas.

The population for the study is an infinite one but youths between the ages of 18 and 35 years constitute the targeted respondents of employable age and others who are graduates, secondary school leavers, and artisans.

Chi-square X2 statistical test was used to validate the statistical significance of the research findings. The formula is:

\[ X^2 = \sum (F_o - F_e)^2 \]

\[ F_e \]

Where:
\[ F_o = \text{Observed frequency} \]
\[ F_e = \text{Expected frequency} \]
\[ \sum = \text{Summary sign for total frequency} \]

a) Presentation and Analysis of Data

Out of the total number of 1,600 questionnaires distributed, 1,420 were collected as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Gender Distribution of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE MALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.2: Occupational Distribution of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SERVANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIL COMPANY WORKERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC SERVANTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH ERMEN/FARMERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3: Educational Qualification of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUALIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTER DEGREE</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.Sc/HN D</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAEC/NECO</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSLC</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>421%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Age Range of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 -29</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 -39</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 -49</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 AND ABOVE</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) The Decision Rule in testing

If the calculated chi-squared ($X^2$) is greater than the tabulated or theoretical chi-square ($X^2$) at a given level of significance and degree of freedom (df), we accept the alternate hypothesis, by rejecting the null hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1 (H0): Militants activities do not have a significant effect on the Nigerian economy.

Table 4.5: Responses to test on Relationship between Militant activities and the Nigerian economy (QUESTION 9 - Do you think Militants activities negatively affects Nigeria’s current Oil production?)

(Hypothetical data)

To calculate the expected frequencies (E) using $E = MN$, we have T.

Hence,

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{So } 1019 \times 311 & = 223.18 \\
1420 & = 80.37 \\
1019 \times 112 & = 101 \times 214 \\
1420 & = 153.57 \\
1019 \times 189 & = 1019 \times 214 \\
1420 & = 150.7 \\
401 \times 311 & = 401 \times 112 \\
1420 & = 275.56 \\
401 \times 189 & = 401 \times 214 \\
1420 & = 87.82 \\
401 \times 210 & = 401 \times 214 \\
1420 & = 31.63 \\
401 \times 311 & = 401 \times 112 \\
1420 & = 53.37 \\
401 \times 189 & = 401 \times 214 \\
1420 & = 59.30 \\
401 \times 210 & = 401 \times 384 \\
1420 & = 108.44
\end{align*}
$$
At 5% (0.05) level of significance using two degrees of freedom (2df), the tabulated or theoretical chi-squared, $x^2 = 9.488$. Calculated chi-square is greater than the theoretical chi-square ($x^2$), we accept the alternate hypothesis which says that there is a strong significant effect of militants’ activities on the Nigerian economy.

Hypothesis 2 (Ho): Militancy does not have significant effect on business activities in the Niger Delta.

Table 4.6: Observed and Expected Frequency Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Frequency (O)</th>
<th>Expected Frequency (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>223.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>80.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>135.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>153.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>150.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>275.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>87.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>31.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>53.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>60.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>59.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>108.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1,420</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,420</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using $x^2 = \frac{\Sigma (210 - 223.18)^2}{223.18} + \frac{(98 - 80.37)^2}{80.37} + \frac{(155 - 135.63)^2}{135.63} + \frac{(134 - 153.57)^2}{153.57} + \frac{(200 - 150.7)^2}{150.7} + \frac{(222 - 275.56)^2}{275.56} + \frac{(101 - 87.82)^2}{87.82} + \frac{(14 - 31.63)^2}{31.63} + \frac{(34 - 53.37)^2}{53.37} + \frac{(80 - 60.43)^2}{60.43} + \frac{(10 - 59.30)^2}{59.30} + \frac{(162 - 108.44)^2}{108.44}

\[0.78 + 3.87 + 2.77 + 2.49 + 16.13 + 10.19 + 1.98 + 9.83 + 7.03 + 6.34 + 40.99 + 26.45 = 128.85\]

At 5% (0.05) level of significance using two degrees of freedom (2df), the tabulated or theoretical chi-squared, $x^2 = 9.488$. Calculated chi-square is greater than the theoretical chi-square ($x^2$), we accept the alternate hypothesis which says that there is a strong significant effect of militants’ activities on the Nigerian economy.

Hypothesis 2 (Ho): Militancy does not have significant effect on business activities in the Niger Delta.

Table 4.7: The analysis of question no. 11(Do you think militancy makes the Niger Delta Region unfriendly to business activities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DETAILS</th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>424   (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS(M)</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1,420 (T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hypothetical data)

Using $x^2 = \frac{MN}{T}$

\[\frac{677 \times 424}{1,420} = 202.15 \quad \frac{677 \times 996}{1,420} = 474.85 \quad \frac{743 \times 424}{1,420} = 221.85\]

\[\frac{743 \times 996}{1,420} = 521.15\]

Therefore, calculated $x^2 = 265.48$. 
Table 4.8: Observed and Expected Frequency of Question 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Frequency (Fo)</th>
<th>Expected Frequency (Fe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>202.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>432</td>
<td>474.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>221.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>564</td>
<td>521.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,420.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using $x^2 = \sum \frac{(Fo - Fe)^2}{Fe}$ we have:

$$\frac{(245 - 202.15)^2}{202.15} + \frac{(432 - 474.85)^2}{474.85} + \frac{(179 - 221.85)^2}{221.85} + \frac{(564 - 521.15)^2}{521.15} = 9.08 + 3.87 + 1.29 + 251.24 = 265.48.$$ 

Therefore, calculated $x^2 = 265.48$.

At 5% (0.05) level of significance using two degrees of freedom (2df), the tabulated or theoretical chi-squared, $x^2 = 9.488$. Calculated chi-square is more than the theoretical chi-square ($x^2$), we accept the alternate hypothesis which says that militancy in the Niger Delta has a very strong significant effect on business activities in the Niger Delta Region and extension on the Nigerian economy.

**Hypothesis 3 (Ho):** Militancy in the Niger Delta has not significantly led to the loss of thousands of lives.

Table 4.9: The analysis of question no. 14 (Do you agree that Militancy has led to the loss of thousands of human lives in the Niger Delta Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE RANGE</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>413(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 AND ABOVE</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,335(M)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1,420(T)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hypothetical data)

Using $x^2 = \frac{MN}{T}$

$$\frac{1335 \times 4}{1,420} = 388.28 \quad \frac{1335 \times 44}{1,420} = 422.12 \quad \frac{1335 \times 2}{1,420} = 2.824$$

$$85 \times 413 = 24.72 \quad 85 \times 449 = 26.88 \quad 85 \times 296 = 17.72$$

$$85 \times 413 = 24.72$$
Table 4.10: Observed and Expected Frequency of Question 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Frequency (Fo)</th>
<th>Expected Frequency (Fe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>388.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>422.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>282.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>246.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>24.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>26.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>24.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using \( x^2 = \sum \frac{(F_o - F_e)^2}{F_e} \) we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{(403 - 388.28)^2}{388.28} + \frac{(405 - 422.12)^2}{422.12} + \frac{(280 - 282.45)^2}{282.45} + \\
\frac{(247 - 246.32)^2}{246.32} + \frac{(10 - 24.72)^2}{24.72} + \frac{(44 - 26.88)^2}{26.88} + \\
\frac{(16 - 17.72)^2}{17.72} + \frac{(15 - 24.72)^2}{24.72} = 0.56 + 3.87 + 0.69 + 0.02 + 1.88 + 8.77 + 26.88 + 0.17 + 3.82 = 46.66.
\end{align*}
\]

Therefore, calculated \( x^2 = 46.66 \).

At 5% (0.05) level of significance using two degrees of freedom (2df), the tabulated or theoretical chi-squared, \( x^2 = 9.488 \). Calculated chi-square is greater than the theoretical chi-square (\( x^2 \)), we, therefore, accept the alternate hypothesis which says that militancy in the Niger Delta has significant led to the loss of thousands of human lives.

c) Analysis of Other Data

Answers to question 16 (whether militants’ activities reduced Nigerian oil revenue?) revealed that 99% of the respondents agreed by saying YES.

Question 12: Do you agree to the fact that effects of militancy on business activities has rendered many unemployed in the Niger Delta Region?

Table 4.11: Responses to Question 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>NO.RESPONSES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Study 2017

About, 65.5% of the respondents agreed that the effects of militancy on business activities had rendered many unemployed in the Niger Delta.

We also discovered that illegal bunkering in the Niger Delta Region is not wholly fuelled by militants but rather, sponsored by top government functionaries in line with question no.10 which is a yes answer of 70% and was further confirmed by discussion with the interviewees.

d) Discussion of Results

From our empirical analysis, it was discovered that militancy in the Niger Delta has in no small measure affected the economy of Nigeria due to loss of substantial amount of money as revenue which should have accrued to the Nigerian government. This study corroborated the findings of Chris (2009), Anayochuku (2009), Eni (2008) and Ledum (2009). Similarly this study has also corroborated the findings of Anayochuku
The researchers at this moment concluded that militancy in the Niger Delta, has a significant strong effect on the Nigerian economy; which is not only visible on oil sector alone, but also on the other sectors. Militant activities have greatly hampered business investments and activities thereby reducing employment opportunities. It also led to unemployment of already employed workers in the region. Militancy led to loss of human lives, and it increases illegal bunkering. On the part of the government, militancy reduces the annual revenue of the federal government. It also reduces the 13 derivation fund of oil producing states and also distracts government developmental efforts.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

a) Summary

The focus of this research work was to critically examine how militancy in the Niger Delta affects the economy of our dear country Nigeria.

Through the literature review, we see how millions of barrels of crude oil were lost to the nation due to the activities of militants’ in the Niger Delta Region; and how these loss translates to millions of U.S Dollars. The work also shows how militancy affects investment and business activities and how it increases the unemployment rate in the region. It also revealed that violence (militancy) to some extent contributes to illegal bunkering and has also led to the loss of thousands of human lives amounting to loss of human capital. Causes of militancy in the Niger Delta were as a result of neglect, downgrading and degrading of the region by successive governments of Nigeria since independence.

Research questions were raised, and the hypothesis formulated. Survey research design; specifically questionnaires were used to collect field data. Then Chi-Square and simple percentage method were used to test the hypothesis. The result revealed that militancy has a strong significant effect on the Bayelsa State economy in particular and that of Nigeria in general.

b) Conclusion

Our findings also showed that militancy in the Niger Delta has its pros and cons such as loss of lives, unemployment and closure of businesses on the one hand and the other hand the neglect of the region which has been brought to the fore, and some youths are being empowered and trained abroad, specially by the Ministry for the Niger Delta being created during the administration of one of its illustrious sons in the person of former President of Nigeria Dr. Goodluck Obele Jonathan.

Despite the few changes, the region is still neglected, without good road network, overhead bridges, poor sanitary conditions, no portable drinking water, no standard clinic not to talk of a good hospital with drugs, etc.

c) Recommendations

The first way to solve any problem is to first and foremost to find out the remote and immediate causes of the problem and then find solutions to resolving the matter or crises.

In agreement with Akachukwu (2008)’s view, we observe that the problem of the Niger Delta is not just non-development of infrastructures. The existence of systemic error in administration or governance is seen to be responsible in the neglect of the Niger Delta region. Once the systemic error is corrected, things will fall in their rightful positions.

We are also of the same view with Kayode (2007) that the Niger Delta will develop when the region is competitively handled and not politicized. Fundamental approaches to solving the problem should be applied instead of merely playing with the people’s misery. There should be no mushroom development, but one that the Niger Deltans needs.

Electoral malpractices also help fuel militancy and have in no small measure led to fuelling of crisis in the Niger Delta Region. A free and fair election in the area will usher in genuine political leaders in the Niger Delta Region; which will checkmate politicians from hiring and equipping these boys to help rig elections and after that dump them without retrieving the guns given them. Thus, the already angry youths having weapons of destruction in their hands, are willing to turn-in mayhem and go hay-wild to destroy lives and properties within its sphere of operation. Therefore, a properly conducted free and fair election will do well to solve this perennial problem.

Furthermore, we make the following recommendations:

a) The billions and thousands of dollars spent by the federal government of Nigeria and the oil companies operating in the country on security vote of the region should be used to develop the Niger Delta Region.

b) Youths of the region should be gainfully employed; to keep them busy during the day and sleep at night; because they will be too tired after work to embark on criminal activities.
c) The federal government should increase the budget of the Niger Delta to enhance real development to repeal the kind of mushroom development in place now.

d) The systemic correction is necessary to bring about justice and fair play, and brings no more marginalization in fiscal federalism.

e) Credible free and fair elections without thuggery should be encouraged hence forth, which will prevent the youths from being armed.

f) Thanks to amnesty, but it should not end with a presidential handshake, but rather be assimilated into the various sectors of the economy.

g) Post amnesty programs should be put in place to cater for the trainee’s rehabilitation.

h) Indigenes of the region should be allowed to have an appreciable stake in the proceeds of their oil instead of outsiders in the name of one Nigeria.

i) Military approach to the problems of the Niger Delta should be discouraged as it seems to pour fuel into the fire.

j) Finally, the researchers recommend that freedom fighters should lay down their arms and give peace a chance by using dialogue in their approach to resolving differences.

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