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7

8 **Abstract**

9 In November 2016, against most expectations, even among some Republican Party's
10 members, and despite his lack of political experience, as he had never held any public office,
11 Donald Trump won the presidential election in the USA through a campaign conducted
12 against the political elite. During the campaign he presented himself as an outsider, as
13 someone who would upend the corrupt political elite installed in Washington and that had no
14 real touch with the citizens. An elite that was fuelled by money and often forgot the national
15 interests. Trump was right when he believed that voters were expected to show their
16 dissatisfaction at the polls. This essay reflects on the reasons underlying his victory and aims
17 at proving that nationalism and populism were among them. It also tries to demonstrate that
18 nationalism and populism are still present in Trump's policies. An unorthodox President who,
19 till the moment, is merely following through on his campaign promises and rules over the
20 Un-united States of America.

21

22 *Index terms*— USA, Trump, nationalism and populism

23 **1 Introduction**

24 efore becoming the 45 th President of the USA Donald Trump had no political experience, but he was already
25 well-known, mainly thanks to his business activity and regular presence in the media. As Michael Kranish
26 and Marc Fisher (2016, p. 15) reported 1 Michael Wolff (2018) wrote that "Donald Trump didn't want to be
27 President". He only wanted to become "the most famous man in the world" and he was sure that he "would
28 come out of this campaign [...] with a far more powerful brand and untold opportunities" , more than three
29 decades before participating in the presidential race, he was already included in Gallup list as one of the ten most
30 admired personalities by Americans.

31 2 1 In the book titled Trump revealed. An American Journey of Ambition, Ego, Money, and Power. ?? New
32 York, 3 rd of January 2018.

33 . It is a controversial statement despite several examples presented by Wolff and not accepted as true by
34 Trump. A process that seems it is going to last. Some months ago, Trump collaborated with an enormous team
35 chosen by The Washington Post, appointed to investigate his life and for the writing of his biography, but he
36 refused to read Kranish and Fisher's book. Nevertheless he read Let Trump be Trump, the book written by his
37 former campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski, and deputy campaign manager, David Bossie, and he praised
38 the authors despite having replaced Lewandowski for Paul Manafort.

39 These two books are important to explain who Trump really is and how he conquered power. The list must
40 also include a book written by Trump himself: Crippled America: how to make America great again (2015) and
41 his 100-day action plan to make America great again, that is to say, his contract with the American voters.

2 A) NATIONALISM AND POPULISM: TWO CONCEPTUAL REALITIES

42 Besides, some others of Trump's books could deserve mention as they unequivocally prove his way of thinking
43 and acting without any shame of an undisguised narcissism 3 Adriano Moreira (2005, p. 367) affirms that "if
44 nation, when it changes into a political value, becomes linked to a certain attitude of exclusion towards different
45 groups, it does not impose necessarily an aggressive nationalism". Trump has a different perspective. For him,
46 nationalism needs to be aggressive to be respected. He makes an intentional confusion between . Throughout
47 the books that have been mentioned we discover not only the proud entrepreneur but also someone who is able
48 to take advantage of the media power to convince the voters. Someone who used -and keeps using -nationalism
49 and populism as his weapons. Donald Trump, a member of the American economic elite, began to show not a
50 patriotic but a national face. In fact, rivalry was always present in his discourse when he claimed that it was
51 necessary to make America great again. At this point, even if he could be seen as someone who placed national
52 interest first, nobody could say that his words revealed affection. He was just an American refusing external
53 superiority and a citizen worried with the presence of immigrants considering the fact that they were not only
54 stealing jobs from American unemployed people but also destroying American identity. 3 respect and fear or
55 between patriotism and nationalism because probably he has never heard De Gaulle's words: "Patriotism is when
56 love for our own people comes first; nationalism is when hate for other people comes first". It is an aggressive
57 nationalism because, as Gellner (1994, p. 126) affirms, only our group matters.

58 In this point, MacWilliams (2016) argues that Trump represents "the most recent expression of a longstanding
59 theme in American political life". A model based "on ascribing to any relatively disempowered group (whether
60 defined by race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief, or other identifying category) a certain
61 set of qualities that justify discriminatory treatment", those whom Trump considers «bad guys» or a threat for
62 American way of living.

63 Carlos de la Torre (2017) affirms that Trump used "ethnic criteria to differentiate the people from three out
64 groups -Mexicans, Muslims, and African-American militant organisations". In fact, Trump's statements against
65 these groups are abundant. For instance, Mexicans were accused of being "rapists" or "criminals" and Trump
66 retweeted three anti-Muslim videos from the deputy leader of Britain First, Jayda Fransen, not to mention that
67 he recovered George W. Bush's axis of evil. That is why he banned entrance, initially for 120 days, from seven
68 majority-Muslim countries -Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen -or suspended both the entire
69 US refugee admissions system for 120 days and the Syrian refugee program indefinitely. 4

70 2 a) Nationalism and Populism: Two Conceptual Realities

71 In this crusade he blamed the political elite. He accused Washington politicians to drive the country into the
72 abyss. A clear populist behaviour.

73 Trump intentionally mixed the concepts of nationalism and populism since the announcement of his candidacy
74 when he presented his "us-versus-them narrative", a narrative in which he denounced that "«the other» is
75 attacking us from without and weakening us from within as our leaders stand by clueless and ineffectual" (Mac
76 Williams, 2016, p. 1).

77 Trump believed that "insecurity encourages an authoritarian xenophobic reaction in which people close ranks
78 behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders" (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 443).

79 This essay reflects on his strategy to achieve power and to conduct policy and it proves that, in both
80 circumstances, we find ourselves faced with a fusion of nationalism and populism. Two concepts that need
81 clarification.

82 Nationalism and populism represent different concepts even considering the fact that they seem elusive and
83 allow many interpretations, a commonplace in Human and Social Sciences. Indeed, it is not an easy task to
84 clarify the meaning of both the concepts because the words that are in their origin -Nation and People -are far
85 from a consensual definition.

86 In fact, nation is more than the Renan's metaphor -a everyday plebiscite -or Malraux's idea -a community of
87 dreams -and Pinto (2017, p. 330) remembers that Adriano Moreira defends that the expression «people» is used
88 "at times to convey compassion and at other times to endow political dignity to the communities of citizens or
89 voters".

90 According to Anthony Smith (2003, p. 1), nationalism is a red line that "traverses the history of the modern
91 world from the fall of the Bastille to the fall of the Berlin Wall". A long life because social scientists consider
92 that "nationalism is a modern movement and ideology, which emerged in the latter half of the eighteenth century
93 in Western Europe and America". It is a movement that started to be inclusive, then became exaggerated and
94 reached its apogee "in two world wars" and, with globalisation, started "to decline and give way to global forces
95 which transcend the boundaries of nation-states".

96 In this sense we can say that globalisation was responsible for the decline of nationalism because the world
97 became a village, a place where almost everybody is constantly on line, and the culture changes to a new global
98 model. However, this transformation is not well-accepted by those who are proud of their culture and refuse any
99 modification. That is the reason for the emergence of nationalist parties and movements. It is a phenomenon
100 easier to be explained in the countries that import the model than in the country -USA -that exports its way of
101 living.

102 In what concerns populism, it appeared in the 19 th century and, according to Frank Venturi, Herzen was its
103 originator. Populism is a controversial concept. Mudde & Kaltwasser (2012, p. 2) affirmed that it was necessary

104 "to separate populism from features that might regularly occur together with it", such as
105 nativism and authoritarianism.

106 Populism can be seen as "an ideology (Laclau 1977; Mudde 2004) 5 5 Indeed, Mudde (2004) affirmed that
107 "Populism constitutes an ideology, even a 'thin' one".

108 , style of politics (Knight 1998), specific discourse (Hawkins 2009) or the political strategy (Weyland 2001)"
109 (Pappas, 2014, pp. 2-3). A list that can be augmented because, as Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikovski (2004.
110 p.1) affirm in a literature review, populism "has been defined based on political, economic, social, and discursive
111 features (Weyland 2001, p.1) and analyzed from myriad theoretical perspectives 6 Populism is a way of articulation
112 of the discourse aiming at fighting for hegemony. A fight between two entities -people and elite -considered as
113 homogenous. A conflict that can never be solved through negotiations. An antagonism that does not accept
114 intermediaries, because "the populist leader considers only himself in conditions to decipher the will of the
115 people" (Pinto, 2017, In this essay I define populism not as an ideology or a thin-ideology. In fact, when we
116 analyse the populist parties' programs we can find a mix of elements from the left and the right. On the other
117 hand, populism draws the line inside the country and it separates the citizens in two opposite fields: people
118 and elite. This division shows that the place of birth does not automatically mean the right of belonging to the
119 people. That is the reason why some populist parties consider themselves as the true people. In 2002 elections,
120 after being defeated, Viktor Orbán, FIDESZ's leader, said that "we, here in this square, cannot and will not be
121 in opposition, because . The internal elite is always made responsible for the social problems.

122 These concepts became two of the most striking features of the 20 th and 21 st centuries. Indeed, The First
123 World War cannot be explained without nationalism and the causes of the Second World War must be found
124 both in a nationalistic perspective and in populist regimes, such as Nazism, Fascism and Sovietism. Orwell said
125 that nationalism was the worst enemy of peace. Populism can be placed in the same camp.

126 Despite their differences, nationalism and populism share some common elements as they are often associated
127 with conflicts conducted under national pride. However, the red line is drawn differently. In nationalism, the
128 line separates «we» and «they» but the line coincides with the border of the country. «We» stay inside the
129 frontier: Nation is conceived as the own world, a community. Outside this frontier there is another world
130 where «they» must stay. The others usually seen as a threat for our nation. 6 Including structuralism,
131 post-structuralism, modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics, political psychology, political
132 economy, and democratic theory. 7 This change of logic was first presented by Ernesto Laclau. According to
133 Pinto (2017, p. 54), this modification occurs when "the Government does not respond to the demands of its
134 citizens, and one of those demands succeeds in mobilizing and initiating change from a differentialist logic -one
135 that recognizes Government authority -to the equivalential logic". the nation cannot be in opposition" (Bozóki,
136 2015, p. 19).

137 The next point will prove that Trump used nationalism and populism during his campaign to the presidency.

138 **3 b) Running for the Spotlight: Assessing Trump's Campaign**

139 As Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher (2016) show, Donald Trump is a "global brand" and he decided to use
140 this successful characteristic, but not his money ?? 8 According to Wolff, Trump only loaned the campaign "\$10
141 million, provided he got it back as soon as they could raise other money".

142 , to become President of the USA. A decision that came up public on June 16, 2015, and made laugh many
143 American politicians and political and social analysts who thought to be in presence of Trump's attempt to get
144 visibility once again. That was the position, for example, of Jeffrey Toobin or Clarence Page. Not to mention
145 that Politico "called Trump's announcement «one of the more bizarre spectacles of the 2016 political season thus
146 far»" (Mac Williams, 2016, p. 2).

147 He was sure that the campaign would be longin the USA law does not stipulate the number of days to promote
148 the candidature -and the presidential election "the most controversial and polarizing election in modern American
149 history". He was prepared for it as his promises proved. The continuous presence on television and the knowledge
150 of the business affairs as a school of life of a self-made man who knew that he would count on "a responsive
151 chord" (Schwartz, 1973). A large number of American citizens and not only those who were said to be the usual
152 suspects "working class, white, dispossessed males" (MacWilliams, 2016, p. 3).

153 It is worthwhile to record that his support came from several sources. For example, six years ago, when
154 interviewed by Fox News, Trump said: "I think the people of the Tea Party like me because I represent a lot
155 of the ingredients of the Tea Party". A proof of nationalism which attracted financial support. In an article
156 published by New York, Wolff (2018) mentions that "the right-wing billionaire Robert Mercer, a Ted Cruz backer
157 whom Trump barely knew, offered him an infusion of \$5 million" and Robert and his daughter Rebekah convinced
158 Trump about the plan "to take over the campaign and install their lieutenants, Steve Bannon and Conway".

159 Trump was lucky since Hilary Clinton won Democratic Party nomination. Indeed, as Hawkin, Dudley &
160 Wen (2016, p. 93) affirm, Bernie Saunders would be a "similar contender" because "commentators have noted
161 the strong ideological and stylistic similarities between these candidates and the radical populists of the left [in
162 Sander's case] and right [in As Hillary became the nominee of Democrats, Trump could successfully follow his
163 populist fight against Washington swamp.

164 His controversial feature was well-known. He refused to behave like a politician even when he copied the
165 politicians' techniques like the use of the teleprompter. He did not care about his hard words and opted

166 intentionally for an incendiary discourse. That is the reason for many of his statements becoming headlines.
167 Sentences that the mass media broadcasted improving Trump's impact on the audience. Mass media that Trump
168 considered as enemies even when he defended that he appreciated many journalists, mainly belonging to the
169 financial area 9 It is a decision that could be seen as xenophobic in opposition to the previous administrations
170 which viewed legal immigration as desirable economically and acceptable culturally. A charge rejected by Trump
171 because he defended that he was not persecuting legal immigrants but illegal ones. Or, as , his favourite subject.
172 A populist because populism looks at media and parties as responsible for the bad functioning of representative
173 democracy.

174 Trump presented himself as the voice of the forgotten people and accused Hillary of being the voice of the
175 established interests.

176 The reading of his manifesto allows identifying many populist and nationalist evidences, implying a plan of
177 "restoring honesty, accountability and change to Washington". So, he proposed "a lifetime ban on White House
178 officials lobbying on behalf of a foreign government" and "a complete ban on foreign lobbyists raising money for
179 American elections". Besides, with the collaboration of Congress, he would enact "new ethics reforms to Drain
180 the Swamp and reduce the corrupting influence of special interests in our politics".

181 All these proposals were populist because they were against those who influenced the political decisions.
182 However, the word «foreign» points to nationalism as well. Nationalism was also visible when Trump promised
183 to "begin removing the more than 2 million criminal illegal immigrants from the country and cancel visas to
184 foreign countries that won't take them back". Besides, these measures would be accompanied by suspending
185 "immigration from terror-prone regions where vetting cannot safely occur". It was a clear intention to «clean»
186 the USA from those whom Trump considered a threat for the national security. many of these «bad guys» came
187 from Mexico, Trump promised to work "with Congress", aiming at introducing legislative measures to construct
188 "a wall on our southern border with the full understanding that the country Mexico will be reimbursing the
189 United States for the full cost of such wall". In what concerns the reimbursing model, Trump did not present a
190 real proposal.

191 Trump promised to establish "a 2-year mandatory minimum federal prison sentence for [those] illegally
192 re-entering the U.S. after a previous deportation". For discouraging the repeaters, he" suggested a higher
193 punishment: "a 5-year mandatory minimum" for those illegally re-entering "with felony convictions, multiple
194 misdemeanour convictions or two or more prior deportations".

195 Trump's immigration policy was not only against illegals. He promised to reform "visa rules to enhance
196 penalties for overstaying and to ensure open jobs are offered to American workers first". A convincing promise
197 mainly in the areas where many Americans had been left behind when the factories were relocated despite
198 American economy recovering since June 2009.

199 When we analyse the data collected by Jon Huang, Samuel Jacoby, Michael Strickland and K. Rebecca 10

200 4 II.

201 A Populist in the White House , we understand the effect of Trump's nationalism and populism on the voters.
202 So, according to race, only 8% of Black, 29% of Hispanic/Latino and 29% of Asian voted for Trump.

203 Besides, 84% of Trump's voters considered that most illegal immigrants working in the U.S.A should be
204 deported and 86% supported Trump's idea of building a wall along the entire U.S. border with Mexico.

205 Trump's voters really appreciate their candidate: 94% considered him honest and trustworthy and that he
206 had the temperament to serve effectively as president. The populist discourse had been successful. It was a
207 confirmation that Trump really dominated the American reality.

208 Some politicians complain about the people they govern. Trump believed that «his» people really loved him.
209 An unquestionable truth or a dogma for all populist leaders. Charisma as a blessing allowing them to understand
210 people's will without needing any intermediary bodies.

211 The role of individuals is an endless discussion. Indeed, while structural realism defends that individual
212 policymakers are less important than the system structural features, classical and neoclassical realism and
213 constructivism hold that individuals exert a strong influence. In this case, the question could be placed in
214 this way: would

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216 Another populist characteristic is polarisation. That was the reason for presenting Hillary Clinton as representing
217 the political elite, an elite that forgot the people, while Trump promised that the weaker regions and citizens
218 would not be left lagging behind.

219 the system or, on the contrary, would the system oblige him to change his discourse?

220 Many analysts believed that Trump's discourse would change when he entered into the Oval Room as many
221 examples could be found both in Latin America and in the European Union. Indeed, everybody knows the
222 difference between Syriza's promises and the measures that it was forced to adopt once in power.

223 However, an important element must be taken into account. Syriza is a left populist party ruling a poor
224 country. Trump belongs to the right wing and he heads a rich country, even if he considers its present situation

225 as ruinous. Syriza’s populism comes from the bottom. Trump’s populism is an elite populism. It comes from the
226 top.

227 These specificities explain the composition of Trump’s cabinet. An affluent cabinet in the image of the leader.
228 As Stephen Mihm (2016) wrote, Trump assembled “an administration made up of the sorts of people whom
229 sociologist C. Wright Mills famously called the power elite” 11 Andy Smarick and Kelsey Hamilton (2017) . A
230 long time ago, Mills (1956, p. 75) defended that “within American society, major national power” resided “in
231 the economic, the political, and the military domains”. However, still according to Mills (1958, p.32), “as each
232 has assumed its modern shape, its effects upon the other two have become greater, and the traffic between the
233 three has increased”.

234 As it was already said, Trump belongs to the economic elite and he pretends to fight against the political elite.
235 However, the composition of his cabinet proves that there is a gap between the words and reality.

236 American political system is presidential and the system of checks and balances ensures that executive,
237 legislative and judicial powers are independent and control mutually.

238 Trump understood that he could blame the political elite but he could not lead against it. He needed its
239 support to implement his promises.

240 12 This element could support Trump’s idea on the political elite. However, Smarick and Hamilton also related
241 that Trump’s choices were “conventional compared “the combined government experience of President Donald
242 Trump’s initial domestic policy cabinet appointees to that of the first confirmed officials of the previous three
243 administrations” and they concluded that they had “fewer years of experience in government service than the
244 previous administrations analyzed”. They noticed that six of Trump’s appointees had “no government experience”.
245 regarding experience in congressional positions, statelevel elected office, and senior federal appointed positions”.

246 Hence, we can admit that Trump had “little faith in those who have served in governmental institutions” and
247 might “rely less on those with public-sector experience”. A criterion also obeying personal confidence.

248 Kirk Hawkins, Rebecca Dudley and Wen Jie (Fred) Tan (2016, p. 103) think that “even as Trump carries out
249 his promises to rescind or modify key policies -and some of the changes may be serious -he is unlikely to target
250 core institutions of US democracy or eliminate liberal capitalism”. This statement takes into account that Trump
251 is the President of a country with a well-functioning system.

252 Therefore, despite all the marks of nationalism and populism, the 2016 US presidential campaign was “similar to
253 previous populist moments, reflecting a temporary disconnect between traditional parties and their constituents,
254 rather than widespread outrage at a political system that has routinely failed to satisfy basic standards of
255 governance”.

256 That disconnect was the reason for the emergence of populist waves both in Europe and in Latin America as
257 a temporary answer, not a sustainable solution. Populism rises as an illusion before it falls as a disappointment.

258 In the USA, the predominance of the Democratic and Republican parties does not grant space to the appearance
259 of a strong alternative party. The electoral competition will go on being only between two forces. Two different
260 forms of conceiving the country without compromising the Founders’ heritage.

261 In what concerns foreign policy, Trump believes that his personality and business acumen will be enough to
262 renegotiate better agreements and he never worries if his personality and business experience will be enough to
263 convince the other countries and organizations. It is the populist rule. A situation susceptible of provoking a
264 difficult relationship between the President and the Congress even with Republicans in control of Congress and
265 the White House. An internal fight into the Republican Party due to the gap between President’s will and the
266 reality. However, in this case, Trump cannot be accused of disrespecting the Congress or of giving in to Jewish
267 lobby, an influent element of the American policy. Indeed Hillary Clinton won 71% of Jewish votes while Trump
268 only received 24%. So, rather than trying to please American Jews it is probable that this Trump’s decision
269 represents a challenge to American worldwide competitors. A way of occupying its own space. A further mark
270 of nationalism.

271 In what concerns Iran nuclear sanctions, Trump said that “he was waiving the nuclear sanctions for the last
272 time in order to give Congress and European allies 120 days to improve the agreement or face U.S. abandonment
273 of the pact” 13 . However, the European allies made clear that they wanted to support the Joint Comprehensive
274 Plan of Action.

275 Is it time to remind that, two centuries ago, Lord Palmerston said that his country had neither eternal allies
276 nor perpetual enemies? Nationalism at its best. Populism will follow.

277 6 III.

278 7 Conclusion

279 Populism and nationalism were present in Trump’s campaign as this essay proved. On the inauguration day
280 Trump’s discourse was a little softer than during the electoral race. Indeed, after having threatened to jail Hillary
281 Clinton, he thanked her. However, it was short-lived, as his continuous tweets prove.

282 Trump is a populist and a nationalist. His discourse is similar to that of Marine Le Pen, not just because
283 they have become regular features on prime time television and front pages. Trump intends to build a wall.
284 Marine wants to take control of France’s frontiers. Both of them wish that their citizens have precedence over
285 immigrants with respect to jobs. None of them has a positive view of an intercultural relationship. Both consider

7 CONCLUSION

286 that enemies are inside and outside their borders. In what concerns education, Trump was mainly supported in
287 his campaign by white people without a college degree -67%. In French presidential election only 8% and 9% of
288 Marine's supporters had a college degree.

289 The education level is important because those who have a college degree are less prone to accept without
290 questioning. They do not agree that "economic gains have gone almost entirely to those at the top" (Inglehart
291 & Norris, 2017, p. 443) and they usually identify and distrust populism.

292 Besides, his foreign policy is worrying traditional allies and challenging USA enemies and competitors even
293 if Pence considers that Trump has "restored American credibility on the world stage" ??4 14 Available in
294 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/20/in-cabinet-meeting-pence-praises-trump-once-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/20/in-cabinet-meeting-pence-praises-trump-once-every-12seconds-for-3-minutes-straight/?utm_term=.5be0c04e7e21)
295 [every-12seconds-for-3-minutes-straight/?utm_term=.5be0c04e7e21](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/20/in-cabinet-meeting-pence-praises-trump-once-every-12seconds-for-3-minutes-straight/?utm_term=.5be0c04e7e21).

296 . A substantial part of American citizens, mainly those who vote for Democrats, does not approve his decisions,
297 but Trump knows that the other part agrees with him, because he says and does what they really want.

298 Trump is not the first American populist leader and he will not be the last one. In the past, the establishment
299 worked. It accepted occasional political changes but not an outright of the system. Trump intends to go beyond.
300 Check and balances system will not let him. Representative democracy can heave a sigh of relief. Trump's way
301 of acting has already provoked a difficult relationship with the other organs of power and even inside his team, as
302 the endless list of resignations has proved, despite Mike Pence's commendations. Indeed, at a Cabinet meeting,
303 Pence decided to praise Trump for the entire team during over nearly three minutes before he offered fourteen
304 separate commendations for Trump. 13 Available in [https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/](https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2018/iran-180112-voa01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2201%2eal0ao0clup%2e20y4)
305 [2018/iran-180112-voa01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2201%2eal0ao0clup%2e20y4](https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2018/iran-180112-voa01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2201%2eal0ao0clup%2e20y4) Some decades ago, Mills (1956,
306 p. 74) told us that "behind such men and behind the events of history, linking the two, are the major institutions
307 of modern society". After all, in the USA the presidential term is short and, despite several amendments, the
Constitution is still the one elaborated by the Founding Fathers and a country is not a business. ^{1 2 3}

The America we
deserve (2000), How to get rich (2004), The way to the top: the best
business advice I ever received (2004), Think like a billionaire:
everything you need to know about success, real Estate, and life
(2004), The best golf advice I ever received (2005), Why we want you to
be rich: two men, one message (2006), How to build a fortune: your
plan for success from the world's most famous businessman (2006),
The best real estate advice I ever received: 100 top experts share their

[*Note: strategies (2006), Trump 101: the way to success (2006), Think big and kick ass (2007), Never give up: how I turned my biggest challenges into success(2008), Think like a champion: an informal education in business and life (2009), Time to get tough: making America #1 Again (2011), Midas touch: why some entrepreneurs get rich -and why most don't (2011), Trump tower (2011), Crippled America: how to make America great again (2015).*]

Figure 1:

Trump, a Nationalist and a Populist Leader
Year 2018

4

(F)

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[politics/election-exit-polls.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/politics/election-exit-polls.html)

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[https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/politics/election-exit-polls.html)

Figure 2:

5

(F)

Jon Johnson (2017)

grasped this potential conflict when writing *The art of breaking the deal: what President Trump can and can't do about NAFTA*.

[Note: deal]

Figure 3:

¹Some months later Trump changed his initial measures and so Iraq was removed from the list and Syrian refugees were no automatically forbidden to enter into the country.

²In *Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America*. The cover of the book shows a worried and angry Trump. He explained the option for that photo as a way of showing the awful situation of his country.

³Available in http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?_c_id=3&objectid=11767303.12 Available in <http://www.aei.org/publication/government-experienceand-president-trumps-domestic-policy-cabinet/>

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- 319 [Martinelli ()] A Martinelli . *Beyond Trump. Populism on the rise. Milano: Edizioni Epoké -ISPI*, 2016.
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