Abstract- The UN has assumed significant number of humanitarian interventions worldwide since the end of the cold war. However, the motives behind humanitarian interventions are debated in the scholarship of international relations; specially between realism and liberalism. Since 2005, references have been made to the norm of R2P in UN interventions, which are presumed to be a pragmatic move towards pursuing humanitarian interest in defending civilians from casualty. This paper aims to analyze whether the council member states have shifted from pursuing realpolitik (national interest) to purely humanitarian intention using case studies of humanitarian interventions in African conflicts in the periods before and after the adoption of R2P. The paper argues that though there are limited humanitarian outcomes because of interventions, especially after the adoption of R2P, yet the Council members’ national interest remains the main determinant of interventions in Africa.

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Realpolitik Behind Humanitarian Interventions in Africa

By Henok Teka

Ambo University
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Abstract: The UN has assumed significant number of humanitarian interventions worldwide since the end of the cold war. However, the motives behind humanitarian interventions are debated in the scholarship of international relations; specially between realism and liberalism. Since 2005, references have been made to the norm of R2P in UN interventions, which are presumed to be a pragmatic move towards pursuing humanitarian interest in defending civilians from casualty. This paper aims to analyze whether the council members have shifted from pursuing realpolitik (national interest) to purely humanitarian intention using case studies of humanitarian interventions in African conflicts in the periods before and after the adoption of R2P. The paper argues that though there are limited humanitarian outcomes because of interventions, especially after the adoption of R2P, yet the Council members’ national interest remains the main determinant of interventions in Africa.

I. INTRODUCTION

The charter of the UN (chapter VII) provides a primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council (dubbed “the Council” hereafter). In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council can adopt a range of measures including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operations. In practice, during and in the post-cold war, the Council has been criticized for its failure to maintain peace in various states, such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, which calls into question the legitimacy and limitations of UN military interventions. In addition, there exist lack of consistency in its measures. For instance, the Council adopted 124 resolutions on former Yugoslavia, while in Africa it was limited to 10 on Sierra Leone, 7 on DRC and 4 on Burundi. Proponents of realpolitik argue that such failures and inconsistencies are hinged on the national interests of the Council members.

However, in the year 2005, the UN adopted the principle of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” into its vernacular to undermine the national interests of the council members during conflict tragedies. The responsibility to protect stresses that if a state fails to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity, the international community has the right to intervene militarily as a last resort. Few studies like Oliver and Chusi (2009) show that the commitment and interest of the states in mobilizing their troops and securing peace has been limited in Africa, such as in Sudan. They also emphasize the marginalization of Africa in the Council’s priority by asserting the existence of disproportional engagement in critical conflicts.2

By taking case studies of humanitarian intervention in African conflicts in the period before and after the adoption of R2P, the present paper tries to examine whether the Council has shifted from pursuing realpolitik (national interest) to purely humanitarian intent. The paper argues that though there are limited humanitarian outcomes because of interventions, especially after the adoption of R2P, yet the Council members’ national interest remains the main determinant of intervention in Africa.

II. JUSTIFICATION FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: IR THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Realism and Liberalism Debate

Available literature on the motives behind humanitarian intervention suggests the existence of mixed interest. Specifically, in international relations field, the motives of state intervention have been debated among the proponents of realpolitik (realists) and advocates of international law and treaties based on ethical and moral principles (liberals).

The classical realists (such as Carr and Mearsheimer) stresses the innate human desires to dominate one-another and infer this view to states. One of the core assumption of the realist theory is that states pursue selfish interest. Realists believe that states would act according to their own needs and increase their own well-being than act selflessly and share benefits with another state. In such pursuits, states usually demand for superiority in every area including self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, and dominance over other states.

National interest and international order, according to realists, are always superior to ethics and morality. For realists, the moral impulse to assist those in humanitarian crises is subordinate to state’s national

Author: Ambo University, e-mail: henokteka87@yahoo.com


2 Oliver and Chusi. 2009. Intervention in African conflicts by the united nations security Council,
Realists assert that states action is governed by their desires to maximize economic, political and military security (or “national interest”). The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes the realist argument on humanitarian intervention as; “If all states’ actions are, in fact, motivated by self-interest, then state actions motivated solely or primarily by humanitarian considerations are not possible or morally justifiable”.3

Misha Seay (2007) argue that realists are cynical about intervention since it is inevitable to abuse.5 Among the classical realists, Hans Morgenthau (1948) argues that political realism “maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states”.6 He also argues that ‘morals’, ‘rights’ and ‘values’ can’t be universal rather they differ in different states or environments; hence it is impossible to conclude that a particular humanitarian intervention is just. He is of the idea that humanitarian intervention rests on controversial commitments that may lead to conflict between states with different understanding of it.7 Tucker (1975) mentioned that economic interests such as the protection of oil supply is behind American intervention.8

Neoclassical theories of realism emphasize on the existence of anarchic system and argues that states seek to survive in such international system. Therefore, to preserve their interest, intervention can be one strategy. In favor of this, J. Bellamy (2008) highlights that it is generally not in the best interests of any sovereign state to interfere in the affairs of any other state. He adds that sacrificing resources, both military and monetary, for humanitarian goal alone is not the intention of super powers.9 Hence, a realist argument holds that intervention, whether humanitarian or not, are always guided by political interest and can’t be grounded on moral foundation.

On the other hand, liberals believe that human beings are rational, hence despite their self-interest they can engage in collaborative and cooperative acts.10 Right to liberty and the idea of institutions are at the center of liberals’ discussion of the existing IR. The core tents of liberalism including equality before law, adoption of democratic governance, human rights and free market justify their view that states continue to operate in cooperation and mutual benefit. Smith argues that liberals value “self-determination, community, and shared history” and gives greater importance to universal human rights “in which sovereignty is a subsidiary and a conditional value”.11 Classical liberalism, as reflected on President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, is built on idealism, a philosophy that asserts a state has to act ethically and its foreign policy should promote world peace. Hence, under the liberal’s assumption, humanitarian intervention reflects the moral and legal principle (obligation) of civilized states.12

In addition, liberals stress on the promotion of international liberal laws and institutions to reach the goals of world peace. Proponents of liberal school of thought emphasize that liberal institutions like UN are instrumental to preserve world peace.13 Hence, liberals tend to promote the importance of undertaking ‘humanitarian’ intervention at a multinational level, as a moral duty of liberal states, to protect the endangered human life. It can be concluded that humanitarian intervention, from a liberal perspective, is justified as a liberal technique to protect the endangered innocent. R2P, whose focus is on human right protection, is a justification for the liberal scholars that believes in the progress of human nature and existence of harmony of interest.

III. Humanitarian Intervention

Case Studies Before the Adoption of R2P

To better understand whether the Council has reached a shift from national interest to a humanitarian intent, the first case analyzed is the UN intervention in Africa in the pre R2P period. The case studies are used to explore the factors that made the council members decide to intervene or not. Accordingly, major wars in Africa till the period of 2005 are presented below pointing the casualties, and time span between the start of the conflict and the Council’s intervention. The cases of Somalia and Rwanda, which are the biggest failures of the UN, are selected to assess the motives behind intervention (or non-intervention) in the conflicts.

7 See e.g. Daniel Fiott, 2013
8 Rober W. Tucker, 1975, Oil: The Issue of American Intervention
9 Bellamy, Alex J. 2008, “Humanitarian intervention in world politics” In The Globalization of World Politics,
12 Misha Seay 2007, op cit in note 5

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**Table 1: Conflicts, Casualty and intervention in Pre R2P: Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of conflict</th>
<th>Lives lost (mil)</th>
<th>IDP* and refugee population (mil)</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2000 MONUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia 1st and 2nd civil wars</td>
<td>1989-96 and 1999-2003</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1990 ECOMOG, 1993 UNOMIL, UNMIL (observer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991-2002</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1992 UNISOM I &amp; II, 1993 UNITAF, 2007 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>UNOB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethio-Eritrea</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2000 UNMEE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation from UN and Wikipedia sources (*IDP- internally displaced People)

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a) **Intervention in Somalia: UNISOM, UNITAF**

Somalia was one of the first states for the Security Council to deal with humanitarian intervention. The east African state of Somalia fell apart in 1990–1, following the collapse of its longstanding dictator-Zaid Barre-, with power falling into the hands of rival clan leaders. Most of the country, notably the capital, Mogadishu, descended into lawlessness. Moreover, the vulnerability of the Somali people and the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis was exacerbated further by mass drought leading to a death toll of 1 million Somalian.

Golebiewski (2013) reminds us that the Council was not involved at the time except adopting a resolution 733 that impose embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. He further notes that after a critic from the secretary general, African leaders and some civil societies for its double standard “assisting the Bosnian Muslims, which were far less dangerous at the time, but not helping the people of Somalia”, the Security Council “reluctantly” adopted Resolution 751 in 1992 and established UNISOM I peacekeeping. Since the UNISOM I was not an organized strategy, it failed to stabilize the violence. On 3 December 1992, with the request of the United States to lead multilateral military intervention, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 794 calling member states to “establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations” and authorized the creation of United Task Force (UNITAF). However, this mission was thwarted because the US decision to take sides during the operation led to the retaliation of Aideed- one of the warring faction who killed 18 US soldiers. This ultimately led for the termination of UNITAF’s operation by the US President Clinton’s decision.

**Why the intervention in Somalia?**

On a superficial view, the eventual deployment of UN mandated US troops in Somalia seems difficult to explain through a realist paradigm of international relations. For instance, Davidson argue that Somalia, as a small faraway country in Africa, “was of no obvious strategic interest” to the US. However, this is odd with Wengraf’s explanation. Lee blamed for “U.S. policy” that wrecked the economy of Somalia through its military sell to the dictatorial regime and IMF’s insistence to adopt neoliberal measures (in 1970’s) in return for loans which later caused for a drop in the annual per-capital income from $250 to $170. He further argues that intervention in Somalia was the result of the national interest of US that was at stake than humanitarian interests. During the period of 1970’s to 80’s, Somalia was a longtime aid recipient of US. But later in the early years of the Cold War, Somalia became a client state of the USSR, while the U.S. supported the regime of King Haile Selassie in the rival Ethiopia. Following the dethrone Selassie’s regime by the Soviet ally military junta in 1974, the superpowers switched sides, leading U.S. to start backing Somalia’s dictator Ziad Barre. Therefore, one of the factors for US to focus on the Horn of Africa was its standoff with the rival USSR. This argument is supported by the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger illustrating his cynicism of U.S. policy with his 1974 popular comment “To give food aid to a country just because they are starving is a pretty weak reason”. The US, which led the military intervention, was the very supporter of the dictatorial regime of Barre who from the beginning was engaged in killing and torturing of

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15 UN UNOSOMI http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm


18 Ibid
thousand dissidents; therefore, it makes the later intervention less of humanitarian in purpose. On the other hand, Somalia has a geopolitical significance to control the Arabian oil fields, which Carter’s regime make use of this benefit by agreeing with Barre to access the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden for deploying the US military bases. Mark Fineman, Los Angeles Times writer, also noted that, in addition to the geopolitical significance of Somalia, U.S. priorities were driven by oil interests. Exploration of oil were started since the beginning of the 1980s, U.S. oil corporations tendered billions of dollars worth of contracts under Barre. Therefore, it was evident that US or the Council’s intervention was less humanitarian in purpose.

b) (Non) Intervention in Rwanda: UNAMIR

The Rwandan genocide is the great tragedy that haunts the UN and the west to date, which they were a mere “eyewitness” or “bystander”. The Hutu majority Rwanda was dominated by the ethnic minority of Tutsi in the political affair. That was short-lived when dissatisfaction on the increased social, economic and political difficulties were heightened in the country, followed by hostilities between the Hutu armed forces and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1993. The outbreak of the civil war was started in April 1994 following the death of president Habyarimana and his entourages when their plane was shot down by missile. The incident was reported by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwandan report as “Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighboring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region”.

Few literatures argue that lack of media coverage or clear communication on African crisis has misguided the international community to act on African countries, especially the prolonged battle between Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda. However, the UNRC report admitted that the “Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States and at the United Nations were aware of the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to prevent it. Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused to acknowledge the genocide”. The report also condemns not only the silencing by the international leaders but their declined effort “to use their political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy of the genocidal government”.

The UN launched its first peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) in October 1993 to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Hutu government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic front. However, the mission proved insufficient to protect the slaughtered 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus. With the lightly-armed 5,000 peacekeepers, which initially in October 1993 was limited to 1400 far less than the planned 2500, scattered throughout Rwanda, UNAMIR was unprepared to confront the dangerous wave of terror unleashed by Hutu extremists against Tutsis and Hutu moderates. The extremists also kidnapped and executed 10 Belgian troops and marked several for death, which consequently led Belgium to quickly withdraw its troops from UNAMIR and plead for suspension of UNAMIR.

The UN’s indifference over Rwanda’s case was evidenced in the series of negligence to strongly condemn the act of “genocide”. Daniel Golebiewski (2013) noted that the “Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN had business as usual meetings and were hesitant to use the word genocide, which would force them to take action”. He also mentioned that lack of states’ will to send their troops to an increasing chaotic environment, the Security Council had a hard time convincing member states to contribute their troops for an expanded operation. France, which initially used to provide military assistance to Hyderabad’s youth militia or Interahamwe-fomenter of the genocide, near the end of the 100 day genocide deployed its troops (under operation Turquoise) to establish a safe turquoise zone. Though this shows France’s ability to intervene, the operation was nothing but a mistake that the zone enabled many genocidal Hutus to safely escape to Zaire in advance of the victorious RPF soldiers. Eventually, after much criticism from NGOs and other human rights observers over not intervening earlier to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the Council adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994 to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda in

21 http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm
23 Daniel Golebiewski (2013), op cit note 14
the period between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.

Why failed?

Dominique Maritz (2012) support the above evidence that the dominant actors like Belgium, US and France were well informed of the situation on the ground, hence the early evacuation of their citizens. She further noted that the genocide convention of the 1948 carries both moral and legal obligation for them to intervene. Hence, she vehemently criticized the failure and outlined the rationale behind lack of intervention which is lack of internal pressure for action or in short “lack of political will”. The departure of peacekeepers from a school in Rwanda where thousands of civilians had massed hoping for protection was a similar case in point, like the Srebrenica or recently in Syria, that the international actors can remain indifferent unless their interests are at stake. In 19 April 1994, the US and UN security council’s vote to withdraw 90% of the peacekeepers, which dips the number of troops to 270, shows that the supply of the mission was less equipped and there were unclear directions which led the peacekeepers not being able to use force to even defend themselves, let alone stop any of the killings. Ten years later in 2004 Stockholm conference on international genocide, Kofi Annan noted that the world had the capability but lacked the will to prevent the mass slaughters happened at that time. Therefore, lack of will to take on the commitment necessary to prevent the genocide was the main reason for the failure to prevent civilian causality in Rwandan case. Thus, it can be argued that realism can explain UN’s failed operation in Rwandan case.

Case Studies After the Adoption of R2P (post R2P)

In practical terms, the first time the Council made official reference to the responsibility to protect was on 28 April 2006, in resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The resolution, which recognizes a set of criteria to form a basis for humanitarian intervention in situations of armed conflict, was adopted after six months of debate among the council members. The resolution emphasizes a comprehensive approach to the prevention of armed conflicts by reaffirming previous resolutions including 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) which are concerned with the protection of civilians in armed conflict and resolution 1631 (2005) that concerns about the cooperative arrangement between UN and regional security organizations. Accordingly, three months later in August 2006, the council adopted resolution 1706 authorizing the first post R2P deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur (United Nations Mission in the Sudan- UNMIS operation). To date, R2P has featured prominently in the number of resolutions adopted by the council to civil war states including Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Central Africa Republic.

For liberals who are the moral crusaders for human right protection, the moral suasions that are advanced by R2P are effusively welcomed. However, the question remains (as to) whether states have been shifted to act as moral actors in the period after the adoption of R2P. Some evidences including fatal humanitarian crisis in the ongoing Syrian civil war and the previous Darfur crisis put a reasonable doubt on R2P’s compelling nature to protect communities at the risk of humanitarian crisis. Africa, as depicted in the table below, suffered most from tragedies of civil war even after 2005, some of which are escalations of previously unresolved conflicts. The cases of Darfur, Mali and Libyan are examined below to see whether moral justification or realpolitik prevail over interventions in Africa Post R2P.

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**Table 2: Conflict, Casualty, and Intervention in the post R2P: Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of war</th>
<th>Death and displacement (in M and K)</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>2.3m displaced; ~300k death</td>
<td>UNMIS 2005; UNAMID 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>MINURCAT 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1999-2007; 2004-2013</td>
<td>—5m death in general</td>
<td>MONUSCO 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.86mil displaced; ~50k death</td>
<td>UNMISS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>374k displaced; ~8k death</td>
<td>MINUSMA 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation from UN and Wikipedia *(m= million, k= thousands, ~ = nearly)*

### c) Intervention in Darfur and R2P

The civil war in Darfur was started in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups began to fight the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed militia, which they accused of oppressing Darfur’s non-Arab population. The war was initially triggered by the dispute among ethnic factions over access to resources, mainly land and water, and later culminated to genocide when the government of Omar Al-Bashir responded to rebel’s attack by carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Darfur Peace Agreement which was signed between the government and one faction of Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi on May 2006, was short-lived when both Justice and Equality Movement and the rival faction of SLA (led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur) rejected the accord. Subsequently, the reaction of Al-Bashir led for the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians from the combat, starvation and disease, and the displacement of millions to refugee camps. Despite such humanitarian disaster, the response from the council was, in Flint and De Waal word, “too little too late”.28

**UNMIS, AMIS and UNAMID in Sudan**

The UN passed a resolution 1590 on March 2005 establishing the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in response to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement between the government and Sudan people’s liberation movement (SPLM) on January 2005. The mission’s tasks were to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, protection, promotion of human rights, and to support Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS’s inadequate resources (around 7000 peacekeepers), which is under-funded and ill-equipped, hampered its mandate of protecting civilians and eventually was substituted by UNAMID, or African Union-United Nation Hybrid Mission in Darfur, under the council’s approval of Resolution 1769 in July 2007.29

Though the UNAMID mission sustains so far, the answer to the question whether the intervention was successful is certainly precise, it was failed to protect the genocide. Rebecca Tinslay (2009) explains this failure as

“The most obvious hindrance to the UNAMID force has been its lack of troops. To date only 9,000 of the 26,000 troops promised are on the ground. UNAMID is so resented and mistrusted by Darfuri people…who believe it is in league with the Sudanese government. ...From the start UNAMID has lacked helicopters, logistics and communications equipment, all essential to cover an area the size of France with very few paved roads. … UNAMID is unable even to protect itself from attacks, let alone protect civilians and humanitarian operations in Darfur.”30

Furthermore, Bensouda, an international criminal law prosecutor and legal adviser, presented her report to the council’s 7199th meeting in 17 June 2014 saying,”It is indeed an understatement to say that we have failed Darfur’s victims who continue to bear the brunt of these crimes”. She further lamented over the impunity of the suspects of genocidal crime to bring them to justice. Her report also covered a deep concern of the large number of continuing displaced people, constraints over humanitarian aid workers and Al-Bashir’s impunity despite his six international travels.31

Similarly, Hervé Ladsous- a former French diplomat and current U.N. peacekeeping chief explained that there was no tangible progress towards resolving the conflict.32

### Why tepid response?

In answering the reason for the reluctance of international community over Darfur, Bellamy and Wheeler (2011) outlined three possible explanations. They highlight that the Sudanese government refusal to accept non-African deployment in Darfur was one of the factors hindering foreign troops. Strong opposition from

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Russia, China and AU over western intervention in the wake of war on terror was another hindrance. Their third view corresponds with the realists’ argument of “statism” tendency of states. They argue that great power leaders do not have the moral right to shed the blood of their own citizens on behalf of suffering foreigners. They also add that majority of great powers have self-interested reasons for not taking offensive measure over the Sudanese government, for instance, “China has significant interests in Sudanese oil; Russia has a smaller oil interest but also sells arms to Sudan; and the United States sees Sudan as a vital regional ally in the war on terror. The enduring logic of statism means that these powers afford more weight to their interests than they do to the lives of Darfurians”.33 It is worth noting that the first two reasons of Bellamy and Wheeler don’t hold water for the simple reason that foreign soldiers were deployed despite Sudan government’s refusal and the moderate stance of Russia and China in the council. In addition, as amnesty international report showed, China and Russia involved in arms sell to the Sudanese government despite the UN arm embargo.34 Therefore, the failure in Darfur crisis is attributed to the primacy of national interest of council members over humanitarian motive. R2P was neverdefunct in Darfur case but the international community was less willing, under the R2P, to undertake proportional intervention to protect innocent Sudanese from the threat of mass atrocity.

d) Libyan Civil War

The Libyan civil war or Libyan revolution was an armed conflict between loyal forces of Col. Muammar Gaddafi and rebel forces that broke out in the context of the wider “Arab spring” in mid-February 2011. The protest over the undemocratic regime of Gaddafi, who ruled for forty-two successive years, was inspired by the revolutions in the neighboring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. Within few weeks of the revolution, the opposition group’s movement for change and quest for democratic change was evolved into an armed struggle following violent reaction by Libyan authorities. Oppositions took control of several towns and announced the formation of a “transitional national council”.35

Libyan Intervention and R2P

In 26 February 2011, the council passed the first resolution 1970, freezing the assets of Gaddafi and his inner circle and ban for their travel, and referred the matter to the international criminal court for investigation. In the following month, before the start of the armed measures taken by allied western countries, Gaddafi’s forces began pushing the rebels back and retaking many of the towns eastward previously under the control of the rebels. This led for the council under the auspicious of France and Britain authorized UN resolution 1973 enforcing member states to establish a no-fly zone over Libya and to use all necessary measures to protect innocent civilians.36 However, though the subsequent air strikes by the allied forces resulted in the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime, the campaign couldn’t end conflicts in Libya and bring the desired outcome of intervention under R2P. The independent’s 2013 report under the title “we all thought Libya had moved on – it has, but into lawlessness and ruin” shows that Libya has plunged into its worst political and economic crisis since the overthrow of Gaddafi. The report also claims that “Despite threats to use military force to retake the oil ports, the government in Tripoli has been unable to move effectively against striking guards and mutinous military units that are linked to secessionist forces in the east of the country”37. Later in 2014, the General National Congress (GNC), which was elected by popular vote earlier, started to govern Libya for a while till discontent arises allegedly for being dominated by Islamists and its funding of other Islamist militants. The discontent led for the second civil war among several rival factions in May 2014 resulting in closing of business activities, drop of oil exports, death of 4000 and mass exodus of Libyan to neighboring Tunisia.38

Realpolitik Behind Intervention

At the outbreak of the revolution, Gaddafi’s violation of human rights was quickly condemned by supranational institutions like AU, EU, GCC and UN, and world leaders. Almost all of the Western countries cut off diplomatic relations with Gaddafi’s government over an aerial bombing campaign in February and March 2011. Using the R2P doctrine, the council condemned ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights’ and recalled the Libyan authorities to discharge their responsibility to protect their population. It also imposed a series of international sanctions and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court.39 Therefore, the sense of moral duty to protect civilian has to some

37 The independent 3 September 2013 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on-it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8790741.html
extent pressed the international community, specially allied force, to intervene.

However, the case of Libya was not a full-fledged manifestation of R2P norm as it couldn’t prevent, protect and rebuild the nation Libya. Therefore, it can be argued that international norms are not sufficient to explain intervention in Libya. In contrast to the R2P norm advocators, I argue that intervention in Libya has little to do with the humanitarian norm. Instead, foreign policy doctrine of realism or realpolitik i.e. economic and security concerns were greater driving forces behind the intervention than a pure humanitarian concern. Here are some of the explanations.

First, Europe’s interest in general and France in particular was in play. Countries like Britain, Italy and France have had interest in Libya as a large sum of their oil comes from Libya. Kazianis (2011)argued that the drop in the level of oil import due to the civil war has caused damage to the economies of those importing countries and subsequently they played leading roles in the intervention by providing air force, training and arming Libyan rebels. 40 Türkmen (2014) argued that France in particular played a decisive role in the intervention, from starting the air attack before even the NATO mission was officially launched to supporting rebels with arms without informing its allies “which was against the UNSC Resolution 1970 that constituted the base of Resolution 1973 and prohibiting arms shipments to the parties. It was severely criticized by Russia on the grounds that NATO engagement exceeded the decisions of the UN Security Council”. 41 Moreover, Sarkozy’s failure to deal with the “Arab Spring”, as the people of Tunisia turned against him at the wake of the eruption of revolution, and the heated debate in French politics over Islam had damaged Frances reputation in the Arab world, hence taking the lead on Libya was part of the strategy to recover France’s reputation in the Arab world.

Second, for chemical weapons in Libya, making the country more dangerous and intervention therefore a higher priority. In 2003 the Libyan government has agreed to dismantle its weapon of mass destruction against Chadian forces during the ra nge of Libyan missiles to no greater than 300 kilometers. However, they didn’t give up the program to develop medium-range missiles based on Scud technology. 42 Besides, Libya has been accused of using chemical weapons against Chadian forces during clashes in 1986 and 1987. Kazianis (2011) highlighted that the west was afraid the danger that “Libya may use its remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons against its own people or in a terrorist attack against western powers”. 43

Third, Western’s fear of Gaddafi’s sponsorship of terrorism if he won the civil war. Kaplan (2007) discusses that Gaddafi was accused of establishing terrorist training camps on Libyan soil in 1970s and was also ‘suspected of attempting to assassinate the leaders of Chad, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo)’. 44 Hence, till 2003 when the government renounce terrorism and WMD, Libya was on the US list of States sponsoring terrorism and implemented trade restrictions against Libya. Therefore, due to its bad record of relations with the west Gaddafi can return to sponsoring Islamic terrorist groups if he wins the civil war. This potential return, as Kazianis (2011) argue, can be a danger to the neighboring Europe. 45 The case of Libya shows that though initially R2P was referred, the mission failed to both ‘protect’ the innocent civilian from falling into an ongoing second civil war and ‘rebuild’ their state.

n) Intervention in Mali

The roots of Mali’s crisis date back to May 2006 following sudden eruption of minor conflicts in northern part of the country (the so called Azawad region) between government force and alliance of Islamic fighters and armed ethnic Tuareg insurgents. The escalation of conflicts and government’s ineffectiveness in handling the conflict resulted in the March 22 military coup that ousted president Amadou Toumani Toure. The following month, the ethnic based rebel, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), declared independence of Azawad. However, the collapse of MNLA’s relation with Islamic militants (including Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) led for the waning of its power and was driven out from the northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. 46 Subsequently, the Islamic rebels, after establishing their power in north, expanded to south. In general terms, the Mali crisis has resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands and the death of thousands.

Intervention: Operation Serval, MINUSUMA and Operation Barkhane

The advancement of Islamic rebels forced the MNLA to call for the intervention of its former colonial

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power- France. France, backed by UN resolution 2085, immediately deployed around 4000 troops under Operation Serval in January 2013. France’s attack on Islamist rebels not only restrained their southward expansion but also depleted their capacity. The first mission was ended in 2014 and replaced by a wider geographic operation in Sahel region. The ongoing counter-terrorism operation, operation Barkhane, covers five countries including Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso with French forces of 3000. The UN also established the United Nation Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSUMA) in 2013 under resolution 2100. The mission’s duty was renewed in 2014 under resolution 2164 that include ensuring security, stabilizing and protecting civilians, facilitating national dialogue and reconciliation, reestablishing state authority, promotion of human right and rebuilding the security sector. However, the missions including France, UN and AU was failed to restore peace. The missions failed to rehabilitate the displaced people. Though France’s bombing of jihadists has driven them out from the north Mali, it has apparently helped them to spillover their organization and influence to the neighboring countries like Niger. Richard Reeve summarizes the five-strategic failure of France’s mission. First, France has miscalculated the crisis as an only a jihadist terrorism problem and forgets the chronic division in internal politics, hence failed to solve the conflict between state force and Tuareg separatists. Second, France failed to fight in ground the dispersed terrorist forces which leads to the deterioration of security condition when jihadists start reorganized themselves. Third, Operation Serval displaced jihadists problems to neighbors. Fourth, Operation Barkhane’s ‘partnership’ with sahel military was less effective in the fact that these militants of sahel had a record of inflicting their own citizens than protecting them. Last, the partnership with national governments over the war on terror has strengthened and legitimatize their regime despite their autocratic tendency.

Motives of Intervention and R2P

UN’s rejection of MNLA’s independence entitlements and France’s mission upon the request of the interim government seems that interventions were for the best interests of the Malians. President Hollande in his 2013 new-year speech addressed to the journalists and diplomats saying “We are faced with a blatant aggression that is threatening Mali’s very existence, I have decided that France will respond, alongside our African partners, to the request from the Malian authorities. We will do it strictly within the framework of the United Nations Security Council resolution. We will be ready to stop the terrorists’ offensive if it continues.” From this perspective, it seems though the intervention has an element of the responsibility to protect.

However, contrary to this, the objective of France’s incursion is debated. For instance, the question for intervention was raised simultaneously from Central Africa Republic (CAR) and Mali, but France immediately responded to Mali’s request in January 2013 and delayed CAR’s request till the end of 2013. Among other reasons, economic and security interests were along the drivers of France’s intervention in Mali than a pure humanitarian intervention. Kimenyi (2013) quoting Katrin Sold (member of German council on Foreign relations- DGAP) “France has interests in securing resources...particularly oil and uranium, which the French energy company Areva has been extracting for decades in neighboring Niger” concludes that France’s foray is driven by economic interest than humanitarian. This was also evidenced in France’s deployment of its force near the Uranium mines, extracted by French company, in Niger- a former colony. Similarly, Mazyaev (2013) contends that the intervention was aimed at economic recolonization of Africa by vying with china. Moreover, the presence of large scale French firms that provide service in construction, energy, communication and finance sector, such as Bouygues, Bolloré Africa Logistic, Areva energy, Orange and BNP-Paribas, can be another argument that interventions were directed at keeping economic interest. On other hand, the expansion of Islamist rebels in west and north Africa is a threat to Europe in general. This is supported by Derian, French defense minister, “In Mali, it is our own security that is at stake: the security of France, the security of Europe...” and Katrin Sold* France fears that Mali could become a retreat and training center for Islamist terrorists if an Islamist state were established there. Besides, though David Cameron complimented Hollande’s intervention, he refused to send British troops, an indication that Libya was more important for British than Mali. Therefore, I argue that realism can best explain the intervention in Mali.

50 Kimenyi and Routman (2013) http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2013/01/18-mali-challenges-kimenyi
IV. Conclusion

The paper has analyzed five cases of UN peacekeeping operations, two in the pre R2P period and three since after the adoption of R2P in African conflicts along with their motivations. As indicated in the essay, the case studies show that interventions in African conflict has less significant humanitarian outcome. This was, as the paper argued, because of the primacy of council members’ national interest over humanitarian intent. The paper shows that the case of Darfur was an exception that the R2P was totally violated. Mali and Libyan crisis, though references were made to R2P, the motives were mainly of national interest than humanitarian. Though France’s intervention in Mali has squashed terrorists in the north part of the country and the Libya intervention resulted in ousting of the brutal regime of Gaddafi, it is made clear that the interventions were never cost free- more unrest followed intervention in Libya and Mali. There is an optimism that in the post R2P regime there was a move from single state domination (like US in Somalia and Belgium in Rwanda) to multilateral effort in addressing humanitarian intervention (cases of Mali and Libya). However, as shown in five of the case studies, all interventions couldn’t bring the desired level of security or peace, in some even led for worst humanitarian crises which is against the principles of R2P. In Somalia and Rwanda case studies, it was evident that the council dealt with unreliable operations with no clearly stated problem, underlying cause, integral strategy and befitting capacity. Yet in Mali and Libya cases though it seems that the interventions were organized, they failed to realize peace and security. In general, the essay underlines that economic and security interests than humanitarian intentions were the main drivers of intervention in both periods, before and after the adoption of R2P.