

# Realpolitik Behind Humanitarian Interventions in Africa

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## Abstract

The UN has assumed significant number of humanitarian interventions worldwide since the end of the cold war. However, the motives behind humanitarian interventions are debated in the scholarship of international relations; specially between realism and liberalism. Since 2005, references have been made to the norm of R2P in UN interventions, which are presumed to be a pragmatic move towards pursuing humanitarian interest in defending civilians from casualty. This paper aims to analyze whether the council member states have shifted from pursuing realpolitik (national interest) to purely humanitarian intention using case studies of humanitarian interventions in African conflicts in the periods before and after the adoption of R2P. The paper argues that though there are limited humanitarian outcomes because of interventions, especially after the adoption of R2P, yet the Council members' national interest remains the main determinant of interventions in Africa.

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*Index terms—*

## 1 I. Introduction

The charter of the UN (chapter VII) provides a primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council (dubbed "the Council" hereafter). In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council can adopt a range of measures including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operations. In practice, during and in the post-cold war, the Council has been criticized for its failure to maintain peace in various states, such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia, which calls into question the legitimacy and limitations of UN military interventions. In addition, there exist lack of consistency in its measures. For instance, the Council adopted 124 resolutions on former Yugoslavia, while in Africa it was limited to 10 on Sierra Leone, 7 on DRC and 4 on Burundi. However, in the year 2005, the UN adopted the principle of the "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" into its vernacular to undermine the national interests of the council members during conflict tragedies. The responsibility to protect stresses that if a state fails to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity, the international community has the right to intervene militarily as a last resort. Proponents of realpolitik argue that such failures and inconsistencies are hinged on the national interests of the Council members. Few studies like Oliver and Chusi (2009) show that the commitment and interest of the states in mobilizing their troops and securing peace has been limited in Africa, such as in Sudan. They also emphasize the marginalization of Africa in the Council's priority by asserting the existence of disproportional engagement in critical conflicts. ??

## 2 II. Justification for Humanitarian

Intervention: IR Theoretical Perspective

By taking case studies of humanitarian intervention in African conflicts in the period before and after the adoption of R2P, the present paper tries to examine whether the Council has shifted from pursuing realpolitik (national interest) to purely humanitarian intent. The paper argues that though there are limited humanitarian outcomes because of interventions, especially after the adoption of R2P, yet the Council members' national interest remains the main determinant of intervention in Africa.

44 Available literature on the motives behind humanitarian intervention suggests the existence of mixed interest.  
45 Specifically, in international relations field, the motives of state intervention have been debated among the  
46 proponents of realpolitik (realists) and advocates of international law and treaties based on ethical and moral  
47 principles (liberals).

48 The classical realists (such as Carr and Mearsheimer) stresses the innate human desires to dominate one-  
49 another and infer this view to states. One of the core assumption of the realist theory is that states pursue selfish  
50 interest. Realists believe that states would act according to their own needs and increase their own well-being  
51 than act selflessly and share benefits with another state. In such pursuits, states usually demand for superiority  
52 in every area including self-preservation, military security, economic prosperity, and dominance over other states.

53 National interest and international order, according to realists, are always superior to ethics and morality.  
54 For realists, the moral impulse to assist those in humanitarian crises is subordinate to state's national interest.  
55 ?? Realists assert that states action is governed by their desires to maximize economic, political and military  
56 security (or "national interest"). The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes the realist argument on  
57 humanitarian intervention as; "If all states' actions are, in fact, motivated by self-interest, then state actions  
58 motivated solely or primarily by humanitarian considerations are not possible or morally justifiable". ?? Misha  
59 Seay (2007) argue that realists are cynical about intervention since it is inevitable to abuse. 5 Among the classical  
60 realists, Hans Morgenthau (1948) argues that political realism "maintains that universal moral principles cannot  
61 be applied to the actions of states". ?? He also argues that 'morals', 'rights' and 'values' can't be universal rather  
62 they differ in different states or environments; hence it is impossible to conclude that a particular humanitarian  
63 intervention is just. He is of the idea that humanitarian intervention rests on controversial commitments that  
64 may lead to conflict between states with different understanding of it. 7 Tucker (1975) mentioned that economic  
65 interests such as the protection of oil supply is behind American intervention. ?? Neoclassical theories of realism  
66 emphasize on the existence of anarchic system and argues that states seek to survive in such international  
67 system. Therefore, to preserve their interest, intervention can be one strategy. In favor of this, J. Bellamy (2008)  
68 highlights that it is generally not in the best interests of any sovereign state to interfere in the affairs of any  
69 other state. He adds that sacrificing resources, both military and monetary, for humanitarian goal alone is not  
70 the intention of super powers. 9

71 On the other hand, liberals believe that human beings are rational, hence despite their self-interest they can  
72 engage in collaborative and cooperative acts.

73 Hence, a realist argument holds that intervention, whether humanitarian or not, are always guided by political  
74 interest and can't be grounded on moral foundation. free market justify their view that states continue to operate  
75 in cooperation and mutual benefit. Smith argues that liberals value "self-determination, community, and shared  
76 history" and gives greater importance to universal human rights "in which sovereignty is a subsidiary and a  
77 conditional value". 11 Classical liberalism, as reflected on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, is built  
78 on idealism, a philosophy that asserts a state has to act ethically and its foreign policy should promote world  
79 peace. Hence, under the liberal's assumption, humanitarian intervention reflects the moral and legal principle  
80 (obligation) of civilized states. ??2 In addition, liberals stress on the promotion of international liberal laws and  
81 institutions to reach the goals of world peace. Proponents of liberal school of thought emphasize that liberal  
82 institutions like UN are instrumental to preserve world peace. ??3 Hence, liberals tend to promote the importance  
83 of undertaking 'humanitarian' intervention at a multilateral level, as a moral duty of liberal states, to protect the  
84 endangered human life. It can be concluded that humanitarian intervention, from a liberal perspective, is justified  
85 as a liberal technique to protect the endangered innocent. R2P, whose focus is on human right protection, is a  
86 justification for the liberal scholars that believes in the progress of human nature and existence of harmony of  
87 interest.

### 88 3 III.

### 89 4 Humanitarian Intervention

### 90 5 Case Studies Before the Adoption of R2P

91 To better understand whether the Council has reached a shift from national interest to a humanitarian intent,  
92 the first case analyzed is the UN intervention in Africa in the pre R2P period. The case studies are used to  
93 explore the factors that made the council members decideto intervene or not. Accordingly, major wars in Africa  
94 till the period of 2005 are presented below pointing the casualties, and time span between the start of the conflict  
95 and the Council's intervention. The cases of Somalia and Rwanda, which are the biggest failures of the UN, are  
96 selected to assess the motives behind intervention (or non-intervention) in the conflicts. Somalia was one of the  
97 first states for the Security Council to deal with humanitarian intervention. The east African state of Somalia  
98 fell apart in 1990-1, following the collapse of its longstanding dictator-Zaid Barre-, with power falling into the  
99 hands of rival clan leaders. Most of the country, notably the capital, Mogadishu, descended into lawlessness.  
100 Moreover, the vulnerability of the Somali people and the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis was exacerbated  
101 further by mass drought leading to a death toll of 1 million Somalian. Golebiewski (2013) reminds us that the  
102 Council was not involved at the time except adopting a resolution 733 that impose embargo on all deliveries of  
103 weapons and military equipment to Somalia. ??4 He further notes that after a critic from the secretary general,

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104 African leaders and some civil societies for its double standard "assisting the Bosnian Muslims, which were far  
105 less dangerous at the time, but not helping the people of Somalia", the Security Council "reluctantly" adopted  
106 Resolution 751 in 1992 and established UNISOM I peacekeeping. Since the UNISOM I was not an organized  
107 strategy, it failed to stabilize the violence. On 3 December 1992, with the request of the United States to lead  
108 multilateral military intervention, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 794 calling member states to  
109 "establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" and authorized the creation of United Task  
110 Force (UNITAF). 15 led for the termination of UNITAF's operation by the US President Clinton's decision.

111 On a superficial view, the eventual deployment of UN mandated US troops in Somalia seems difficult to  
112 explain through a realist paradigm of international relations. For instance, Davidson argue that Somalia, as a  
113 small faraway country in Africa, "was of no obvious strategic interest" to the US. 16 However, this is odd with  
114 Wengraf's explanation. Lee blamed for "U.S. policy" that wrecked the economy of Somalia through its military  
115 sell to the dictatorial regime and IMF's insistence to adopt neoliberal measures (in 1970's) in return for loans  
116 which later caused for a drop in the annual per-capita income from \$250 to \$170. 17 He further argues that  
117 intervention in Somalia was the result of the national interest of US that was at stake than humanitarian interests.  
118 During the period of 1970's to 80's, Somalia was a longtime aid recipient of US. But later in the early years of  
119 the Cold War, Somalia became a client state of the USSR, while the U.S. supported the regime of King Haile  
120 Selassie in the rival Ethiopia. Following the dethrone Selassie's regime by the Soviet ally military junta in 1974,  
121 the superpowers switched sides, leading U.S. to start backing Somalia's dictator Ziad 18 16 Joanna  
122 Davidson, 2012, Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good? POLIS Journal Vol. 7  
123 17 Lee Wengraf, Making Somalia's nightmare worse; Operation Restore Hope 1992-1994, international socialist  
124 review issue #77 18 Ibid Therefore, one of the factors for US to focus on the Horn of Africa was its standoff  
125 with the rival USSR. This argument is supported by the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger illustrating  
126 his cynicism of U.S. policy with his 1974 popular comment "To give food aid to a country just because they are  
127 starving is a pretty weak reason". The US, which led the military intervention, was the very supporter of the  
128 dictatorial regime of Barre who from the beginning was engaged in killing and torturing of thousand dissidents;  
129 therefore, it makes the later intervention less of humanitarian in purpose. On the other hand, Somalia has  
130 a geopolitical significance to control the Arabian oil fields, which Carter's regime make use of this benefit by  
131 agreeing with Barre to access the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden for deploying the US military bases. Mark  
132 Fineman, Los Angeles Times writer, also noted that, in addition to the geopolitical significance of Somalia, U.S.  
133 priorities were driven by oil interests. 19 Exploration of oil were started since the beginning of the 1980s, U.S.  
134 oil corporations tendered billions of dollars worth of contracts under Barre. Therefore, it was evident that US or  
135 the Council's intervention was less humanitarian in purpose.

136 The Rwandan genocide is the great tragedy that haunts the UN and the west to date, which they were a mere  
137 "eyewitness" or "bystander". The Hutu majority Rwanda was dominated by the ethnic minority of Tutsi in the  
138 political affair. That was short-lived when dissatisfaction on the increased social, economic and political difficulties  
139 were heightened in the country, followed by hostilities between the Hutu armed forces and the Tutsi-led Rwandese  
140 Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1993. The outbreak of the civil war was started in April 1994 following the death of  
141 president Habyarimana and his entourage when their plane was shot down by missile. The incident was reported  
142 by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda report as "Within a period  
143 of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war  
144 and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming,  
145 rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighboring countries and maybe half as many became internally  
146 displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the  
147 violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region"  
148 20 Few literatures argue that lack of media coverage or clear communication on African crisis has misguided the  
149 international community to act on African countries, especially the prolonged battle between Hutu and Tutsi of  
150 Rwanda. However, the UNRC report admitted that the "Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States  
151 and at the United Nations were aware of the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to 19 Mark Fineman  
152 January 1993 The Oil Factor in Somalia [http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-18/news/mn-1337\\_1\\_oil-reserves](http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-18/news/mn-1337_1_oil-reserves)  
153 20 Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:  
154 Lessons from the Rwanda Experience March 1996 <http://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/50189764.pdf> take  
155 the steps needed to prevent it. Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading  
156 foreign actors refused to acknowledge the genocide". The report also condemns not only the silencing by the  
157 international leaders but their declined effort "to use their political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy  
158 of the genocidal government". 21 The UN launched its first peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) in October 1993 to  
159 monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Hutu government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic front. However,  
160 the mission proved insufficient to protect the slaughtered 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus. With the  
161 lightly-armed 5,000 peacekeepers, which initially in October 1993 was limited to 1400 far less than the planned  
162 2500, scattered throughout Rwanda, UNAMIR was unprepared to confront the dangerous wave of terror unleashed  
163 by Hutu extremists against Tutsis and Hutu moderates. 22 The extremists also kidnapped and executed 10  
164 Belgian troops and marked several for death, which consequently led Belgium to quickly withdraw its troops  
165 from UNAMIR and plead for suspension of UNAMIR. The UN's indifference over Rwanda's case was evidenced  
166 in the series of negligence to strongly condemn the act of "genocide". Daniel Golebiewski (2013) noted that

## 5 CASE STUDIES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF R2P

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167 the "Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the UN had business as usual meetings and were hesitant  
168 to use the word genocide, which would force them to take action". He also mentioned that lack of states' will  
169 to send their troops to an increasing chaotic environment, the Security Council had a hard time convincing  
170 member states to contribute their troops for an expanded operation. ??3 France, which initially used to provide  
171 military assistance to Hyderabad's youth militia or Interahamwe-fomenter of the genocide, near the end of  
172 the 100 day genocide deployed its troops (under operation Turquoise) to establish a safe turquoise zone. 24  
173 21 [http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide\\_in\\_rwanda.htm](http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide_in_rwanda.htm) 22 Michael N. Barnett 1997 "The  
174 UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda Cultural Anthropology" 12(4):551-578 American  
175 Anthropological Association.

176 Though this shows France's ability to intervene, the operation was nothing but a mistake that the zone enabled  
177 many genocidal Hutus to safely escape to Zaire in advance of the victorious RPF soldiers. Eventually, after much  
178 criticism from NGOs and other human right observers over not intervening earlier to stop the genocide in Rwanda,  
179 the Council adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994  
180 to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law  
181 committed in the territory of Rwanda in Dominique Maritz (2012) support the above evidence that the dominant  
182 actors like Belgium, US and France were well informed of the situation on the ground, hence the early evacuation  
183 of their citizens. ??5 She further noted that the genocide convention of the 1948 carries both moral and legal  
184 obligation for them to intervene. Hence, she vehemently criticized the failure and outlined the rationale behind  
185 lack of intervention which is lack of internal pressure for action or in short "lack of political will". The departure  
186 of peacekeepers from a school in Rwanda where thousands of civilians had massed hoping for protection was a  
187 similar case in point, like the Srebrenica or recently in Syria, that the international actors can remain indifferent  
188 unless their interests are at stake. In 19 April 1994, the US and UN security council's vote to withdraw 90%  
189 of the peacekeepers, which dips the number of troops to 270, shows that the supply of the mission was less  
190 equipped and there were unclear directions which led the peacekeepers not being able to use force to even defend  
191 themselves, let alone stop any of the killings. Ten years later in 2004 Stockholm conference on international  
192 genocide, Kofi Annan noted that the world had the capability but lacked the will to prevent the mass slaughters  
193 happened at that time. ??6 Therefore, lack of will to take on the commitment necessary to prevent the genocide  
194 was the main reason for the failure to prevent civilian causality in Rwandan case. Thus, it can be argued that  
195 realism can explain UN's failed operation in Rwandan case.

196 In practical terms, the first time the Council made official reference to the responsibility to protect was on  
197 28 April 2006, in resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. ??7 The resolution, which  
198 recognizes a set of criteria to form a basis for humanitarian intervention in situations of armed conflict, was  
199 adopted after six months of debate among the council members. The resolution emphasizes a comprehensive  
200 approach to the prevention of armed conflicts by reaffirming previous resolutions including 1265 (1999) and  
201 1296 (2000) which are concerned with the protection of civilians in armed conflict and resolution 1631 (2005)  
202 that concerns about the Can be retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/07/rwandangenocide-failure-of-the-international-community/> 26 News24.com, web document, 26 January 2004, <[www.news24.com](http://www.news24.com)>. ??7 ICRtoP.  
204 01 May 2006. [web] <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/37-the-crisis-in-darfur/1449-01-may-2006-newsupdate> cooperative arrangement between UN and regional security organizations. Accordingly,  
206 three months later in August 2006, the council adopted resolution 1706 authorizing the first post R2P deployment  
207 of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur (United Nations Mission in the Sudan-UNMIS operation). To date, R2P  
208 has featured prominently in the number of resolutions adopted by the council to civil war states including Libya,  
209 Cote d'Ivoire, South Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Central Africa Republic.

210 For liberalists who are the moral crusaders for human right protection, the moral suasions that are advanced  
211 by R2P are effusively welcomed. However, the question remains (as to) whether states have been shifted to act  
212 as moral actors in the period after the adoption of R2P. Some evidences including fatal humanitarian crisis in  
213 the ongoing Syrian civil war and the previous Darfur crisis put a reasonable doubt on R2P's compelling nature  
214 to protect communities at the risk of humanitarian crisis. Africa, as depicted in the table below, suffered most  
215 from tragedies of civil war even after 2005, some of which are escalations of previously unresolved conflicts.  
216 The cases of Darfur, Mali and Libyan are examined below to see whether moral justification or realpolitik  
217 prevail over interventions in Africa Post R2P. The civil war in Darfur was started in February 2003 when the  
218 Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups began to fight the  
219 Sudanese government and its Janjaweed militia, which they accused of oppressing Darfur's non-Arab population.  
220 The war was initially triggered by the dispute among ethnic factions over access to resources, mainly land and  
221 water, and later culminated to genocide when the government of Omar Al-Bashir responded to rebel's attack  
222 by carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Darfur Peace Agreement which was signed between the  
223 government and one faction of Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi on May 2006, was short-lived  
224 when both Justice and Equality Movement and the rival faction of SLA (led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur) rejected  
225 the accord. Subsequently, the reaction of Al-Bashir led for the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians  
226 from the combat, starvation and disease, and the displacement of millions to refugee camps. Despite such  
227 humanitarian disaster, the response from the council was, in Flint and De Waal word, "too little too late". ??8  
228 The UN passed a resolution 1590 on March 2005 establishing the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)  
229 in response to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement between the government and Sudan people's

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230 liberation movement (SPLM) on January 2005. The mission's tasks were to support the implementation of the  
231 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, protection,  
232 promotion of human rights, and to support Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS's inadequate resources  
233 (around 7000 peacekeepers), which is under-funded and illequipped, hampered its mandate of protecting civilians  
234 and eventually was substituted by UNAMID, or African Union-United Nation Hybrid Mission in Darfur, under  
235 the council's approval of Resolution 1769 in July 2007. ??9 Though the UNAMID mission sustains so far, the  
236 answer to the question whether the intervention was successful is certainly precise, it was failed to protect the  
237 genocide. Rebecca Tinslay (2009) explains this failure as "The most obvious hindrance to the UNAMID force  
238 has been its lack of troops. To date only 9,000 of the 26,000 troops promised are on the ground. UNAMID is  
239 so resented and mistrusted by Darfuri people?who believe it is in league with the Sudanese government. ...From  
240 the start UNAMID has lacked helicopters, logistics and communications equipment, all essential to cover an  
241 area the size of France with very few paved roads. ? UNAMID is unable even to protect itself from attacks,  
242 let alone protect civilians and humanitarian operations in Darfur. ??0 Furthermore, Bensouda, an international  
243 criminal law prosecutor and legal adviser, presented her report to the council's 7199 th meeting in 17 June  
244 2014 saying,"It is indeed an understatement to say that we have failed Darfur's victims who continue to bear  
245 the brunt of these crimes". She further lamented over the impunity of the suspects of genocidal crime to bring  
246 them to justice. Her report also covered a deep concern of the large number of continuing displaced people,  
247 constraints over humanitarian aid workers and Al-Bashir's impunity despite his six international travels. ??1  
248 Similarly, HervéLadsous-a former French diplomat and current U.N. peacekeeping chief explained that there was  
249 no tangible progress towards resolving the conflict. ??2 In answering the reason for the reluctance of international  
250 community over Darfur, Bellamy and Wheeler (2011) Russia, China and AU over western intervention in the wake  
251 of war on terror was another hindrance. Their third view corresponds with the realists' argument of "statism"  
252 tendency of states. They argue that great power leaders do not have the moral right to shed the blood of their  
253 own citizens on behalf of suffering foreigners. They also add that majority of great powers have self-interested  
254 reasons for not taking offensive measure over the Sudanese government, for instance, "China has significant  
255 interests in Sudanese oil; Russia has a smaller oil interest but also sells arms to Sudan; and the United States  
256 sees Sudan as a vital regional ally in the war on terror. The enduring logic of statism means that these powers  
257 afford more weight to their interests than they do to the lives of Darfurians". ??3 It is worth noting that the first  
258 two reasons of Bellamy and Wheeler don't hold water for the simple reason that foreign soldiers were deployed  
259 despite Sudan government's refusal and the moderate stance of Russia and China in the council. In addition,  
260 as amnesty international report showed, China and Russia involved in arms sell to the Sudanese government  
261 despite the UN arm embargo. ??4 Therefore, the failure in Darfur crisis is attributed to the primacy of national  
262 interest of council members over humanitarian motive. R2P was neverdefunct in Darfur case but the international  
263 community was less willing, under the R2P, to undertake proportional intervention to protect innocent Sudanese  
264 from the threat of mass atrocity.

265 The Libyan civil war or Libyan revolution was an armed conflict between loyal forces of Col. Muammar  
266 Gaddafi and rebel forces that broke out in the context of the wider "Arab spring" in mid-February 2011. The  
267 protest over the undemocratic regime of Gaddafi, who ruled for forty-two successive years, was inspired by the  
268 revolutions in the neighboring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. Within few weeks of the revolution, the  
269 opposition group's movement for change and quest for democratic change was evolved into an armed struggle  
270 following violent reaction by Libyan authorities. Oppositions took control of several towns and announced  
271 the formation of a "transitional national council". ??5 In 26 February 2011, the council passed the first  
272 resolution 1970, freezing the assets of Gaddafi and his inner circle and ban for their travel, and referred  
273 the 33 Alex J. Bellamy and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics, in: John  
274 Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford University Press,  
275 Oxford, 5 th ed., 2011), pp. 510-525. 34 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/02/darfur-newweapons-china-and-russia-fuelling-conflict/> 35 "Country analysis: Libya" [http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6314-v~Peace\\_and\\_security\\_council\\_report\\_No\\_\\_21.p](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6314-v~Peace_and_security_council_report_No__21.pdf) df matter to the international criminal court  
276 for investigation. In the following month, before the start of the armed measures taken by allied western countries,  
277 Gaddafi's forces began pushing the rebels back and retaking many of the towns eastward previously under the  
278 control of the rebels. This led for the council under the auspicious of France and Britain authorized UN resolution  
279 1973 enforcing member states to establish a no-fly zone over Libya and to use all necessary measures to protect  
280 innocent civilians. 36 However, though the subsequent air strikes by the allied forces resulted in the overthrow  
281 of Gaddafi's regime, the campaign couldn't end conflicts in Libya and bring the desired outcome of intervention  
282 under R2P. The independent's 2013 report under the title "we all thought Libya had moved on -it has, but  
283 into lawlessness and ruin" shows that Libya has plugged into its worst political and economic crisis since the  
284 overthrow of Gaddafi. The report also claims that "Despite threats to use military force to retake the oil ports,  
285 the government in Tripoli has been unable to move effectively against striking guards and mutinous military  
286 units that are linked to secessionist forces in the east of the country" 37 Later in 2014, the General National  
287 Congress (GNC), which was elected by popular vote earlier, started to govern Libya for a while till discontent  
288 arises allegedly for being dominated by Islamists and its funding of other Islamist militants. The discontent  
289 led for the second civil waramong several rival factions in May 2014 resulting in closing of business activities,  
290 drop of oil exports, death of 4000 and mass exodus of Libyan to neighboring Tunisia. ??8 At the outbreak of

293 the revolution, Gaddafi's violation of human rights was quickly condemned by supranational institutions like  
294 AU, EU, GCC and UN, and world leaders. Almost all of the Western countries cut off diplomatic relations  
295 with Gaddafi's government over an aerial bombing campaign in February and March 2011. Using the R2P  
296 doctrine, the council condemned 'the gross and systematic violation of human rights' and recalled the Libyan  
297 authorities to discharge their responsibility to protect their population. It also imposed a series of international  
298 sanctions and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. ??9 The independence 3 September 2013  
299 [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on-it-has-but-](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on-it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html)  
300 [into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/special-report-we-all-thought-libya-had-moved-on-it-has-but-into-lawlessness-and-ruin-8797041.html) extent pressed the international community, specially allied force, to  
301 intervene.

302 However, the case of Libya was not a fullfledged manifestation of R2P norm as it couldn't prevent, protect  
303 and rebuild the nation Libya. Therefore, it can be argued that international norms are not sufficient to explain  
304 intervention in Libya. In contrast to the R2P norm advocates, I argue that intervention in Libya has little to do  
305 with the humanitarian norm. Instead, foreign policy doctrine of realism or realpolitik i.e. economic and security  
306 concerns were greater driving forces behind the intervention than a pure humanitarian concern. Here are some  
307 of the explanations.

308 First, Europe's interest in general and France in particular was in play. Countries like Britain, Italy and  
309 France have had interest in Libya as a large sum of their oil comes from Libya. Kazianis (2011) argued that  
310 the drop in the level of oil import due to the civil war has caused damage to the economies of those importing  
311 countries and subsequently they played leading roles in the intervention by providing air force, training and arming  
312 Libyan rebels. 40 Türkmen (2014) argued that France in particular played a decisive role in the intervention,  
313 from starting the air attack before even the NATO mission was officially launched to supporting rebels with arms  
314 without informing its allies "which was against the UNSC Resolution 1970 that constituted the base of Resolution  
315 1973 and prohibiting arms shipments to the parties. It was severely criticized by Russia on the grounds that  
316 NATO engagement exceeded the decisions of the UN Security Council". ??1 Second, for chemical weapons in  
317 Libya, making the country more dangerous and intervention therefore a higher priority. In 2003 the Libyan  
318 government has agreed to dismantle its weapon of mass destruction program (chemical and biological weapons)  
319 and to limit the range of Libyan missiles to no greater than 300 kilometers. However, they didn't give up the  
320 program to develop medium-range missiles based on Scud technology.

321 Moreover, Sarkozy's failure to deal with the "Arab Spring", as the people of Tunisia turned against him  
322 at the wake of the eruption of revolution, and the heated debate in French politics over Islam had damaged  
323 France's reputation in the Arab world, hence taking the lead on Libya was part of the strategy to recover France's  
324 reputation in the Arab world. 1986 and 1987. Kazianis (2011) highlighted that the west was afraid the danger  
325 that "Libya may use its remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons against its own people or in a terrorist attack  
326 against western powers". ??3 Third, Western's fear of Gaddafi's sponsorship of terrorism if he won the civil war.  
327 Kaplan (2007) discusses that Gaddafi was accused of establishing terrorist training camps on Libyan soil in 1970s  
328 and was also 'suspected of attempting to assassinate the leaders of Chad, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
329 and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo)'. ??4 Hence, till 2003 when the government renounce terrorism  
330 and WMD, Libya was on the US list of States sponsoring terrorism and implemented trade restrictions against  
331 Libya. Therefore, due to its bad record of relations with the west Gaddafi can return to sponsoring Islamic  
332 terrorist groups if he wins the civil war. This potential return, as Kazianis (2011) argue, can be a danger to the  
333 neighboring Europe. 45

## 334 6 n) Intervention in Mali

335 The case of Libya shows that though initially R2P was referred, the mission failed to both 'protect' the innocent  
336 civilian from falling into an ongoing second civil war and 'rebuild' their state.

337 The roots of Mali's crisis date back to May 2006 following sudden eruption of minor conflicts in northern part  
338 of the country (the so called Azawad region) between government force and alliance of Islamic fighters and armed  
339 ethnic Tuareg insurgents. The escalation of conflicts and government's ineffectiveness in handling the conflict  
340 resulted in the March 22 military coup that ousted president Amadou Toumani Toure. The following month,  
341 the ethnic based rebel, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), declared independence  
342 of Azawad. However, the collapse of MNLA's relation with Islamic militants (including Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in  
343 the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) led for the waning of its  
344 power and was driven out from the northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. ??6 Subsequently, the Islamic  
345 rebels, after establishing their power in north, expanded to south. In general terms, the Mali crisis has resulted  
346 in the displacement of hundreds of thousands and the death of thousands.

347 The advancement of Islamic rebels forced the MNLA to call for the intervention of its former colonial 43 Harry  
348 Kazianis, "Intervention in Libya: Example of R2P or Classic Realism," *eInternational Relations*, 2011. 44 Eben  
349 Kaplan(2007), "How Libya got off the list", retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-got-off-list/p10855> 45  
350 Harry Kazianis, "Intervention in Libya: Example of R2P or Classic Realism," *eInternational Relations*, 2011. 46  
351 [http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/current\\_conflict.php?id\\_state=137](http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/current_conflict.php?id_state=137)

352 The paper has analyzed five cases of UN peacekeeping operations, two in the pre R2P period and three since  
353 after the adoption of R2P in African conflicts along with their motivations. As indicated in the essay, the case  
354 studies show that interventions in African conflict hasless significant humanitarian outcome. This was, as the

355 paper argued, because of the primacy of council members' national interest over humanitarian intent. The paper  
 356 shows that the case of Darfur was an exception that the R2P was totally violated. Mali and Libyan crisis,  
 357 though references were made to R2P, the motives were mainly of national interest than humanitarian. Though  
 358 France's intervention in Mali has squashed terrorists in the north part of the country and the Libya intervention  
 359 resulted in ousting of the brutal regime of Gaddafi, it is made clear that the interventions were never cost free-  
 360 more unrest followed intervention in Libya and Mali. There is an optimism that in the post R2P regime there  
 361 was a move from single state domination (like US in Somalia and Belgium in Rwanda) to multilateral effort in  
 362 addressing humanitarian intervention (cases of Mali and Libya). However, as shown in five of the case studies, all  
 363 interventions couldn't bring the desired level of security or peace, in some led for worst humanitarian crises which  
 364 is against the principles of R2P. In Somalia and Rwanda case studies, it was evident that the council dealt with  
 365 unreliable operations with no clearly stated problem, underlying cause, integral strategy and befitting capacity.  
 366 Yet in Mali and Libya cases though it seems that the interventions were organized, they failed to realize peace  
 367 and security. In general, the essay underlines that economic and security interests than humanitarian intentions  
 were the main drivers of intervention in both periods, before and after the adoption of R2P. <sup>1 2 3 4 5 6</sup>

## 1

Country	Start of conflict	Lives lost (mil)	IDP* and refugee population (mil)	Intervention
DRC	1989	5.4	1.5	2000 MONUC
Sudan	1983	2	4	2004 AMIS, 2004 AMIS hybrid mission, 2005-UNMIS
Angola	1974-2002	0.6	3	1989 UNAVEMI, 1991 UN-AVEM II, 1995 UNAVEM III
Liberia 1 st and 2 nd civil wars	1989-96 and 1999-2003	0.25	1.25	1990 ECOMOG, 1993 UN-OMIL, UNMIL (observer)
Sierra Leone	1991-2002	0.05	2	UNAMSIL
Rwanda	1994	0.8	2	UNAMIR
Somalia	1991	1	1.6	1992 UNISOM I & II, 1993 UNITAF, 2007 USA
Burundi	1993	0.2	0.507	UNOB
Ethio-Eritrea	1997	0.1	0.7	2000 UNMEE

Source: author's compilation from UN and Wikipedia sources(\*IDP-internally displaced People)

Figure 1: Table 1 :

368

<sup>1</sup>Daniel Golebiewski. 2013.The Humanitarian Interventions of the UN. <http://thepolitic.org/the-security-councils-humanitarian-intervention/>, emphasis mine However, this mission was thwarted because the US decision to take sides during the operation led to the retaliation of Aideed-one of the warring faction who killed 18 US soldiers. This ultimately 15 UN UNOSOMI <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>

<sup>2</sup>© 2017 Global Journals Inc. (US)

<sup>3</sup>Daniel Golebiewski (2013), op cit note 14 24 UN. u.d. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirFT.htm> © 2017 Global Journals Inc. (US)

<sup>4</sup>Dominique Maritz (2012) Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International Community?

<sup>5</sup>Julie Flint and Alex de Waal Darfur: A Short History of a Long War Zed Books, 2005. 29 Sudan Tribute. 28 December, 2007. [web news] <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25356>

<sup>6</sup>UN News Centre. 17 March 2011. Retrieved 14 August 2011. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37808&Cr=libya&Cr1#.VpQaPRWGPIU>

**2**

Country	Start of war	Death and displacement	Intervention
Sudan	2003-present	2.3m displaced;~300kdeath	UNMIS 2005; UNAMID 2007
Chad	2005-2010		MINURCAT 2007
Congo	1999-2007; 2004-2013.	~5m death in general	MONUSCO 2010
South Sudan	2013	1.86mil displaced; ~50k death	UNMISS 2011
Mali	2012-2015	374k displaced; ~8k death	MINUSMA 2013
Central Africa Rep.	2012-	~1mil displaced; ~10k death	MINUSCA 2014

Source: author's compilation from UN and Wikipedia (m= million, k= thousands, ~= nearly)

Figure 2: Table 2 :

370 .1 Realpolitik Behind Humanitarian Interventions in Africa

371 Volume XVII Issue V Version I Intervention: Operation Serval, MINUSUMA and Operation Barkhane power-  
372 France. France, backed by UN resolution 2085, immediately deployed around 4000 troops under Operation  
373 Serval in January 2013. France's attack on Islamist rebels not only restrained their southward expansion but also  
374 debilitated their capacity. The first mission was ended in 2014 and replaced by a wider geographic operation  
375 in Sahel region. The ongoing counter-terrorism operation, operation Barkhane, covers five countries including  
376 Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso with French forces of 3000. The UN also established the United  
377 Nation Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSUMA) in 2013 under resolution 2100.  
378 The mission's duty was renewed in 2014 under resolution 2164 that include ensuring security, stabilizing and  
379 protecting civilians, facilitating national dialogue and reconciliation, reestablishing state authority, promotion of  
380 human right and rebuilding the security sector. 47 However, the missions including France, UN and AU was  
381 failed to restore peace. The missions failed to rehabilitate the displaced people. Though France's bombing of  
382 jihadists driven them out from the north Mali, it has apparently helped them to spillover their organization and  
383 influence to the neighboring countries like Niger. Richard Reeve summarizes the five-strategic failure of France's  
384 mission. First, France has miscalculated the crisis as an only a jihadist terrorism problem and forgets the  
385 chronic division in internal politics, hence failed to solve the conflict between state force and Tuareg separatists.  
386 Second, France failed to fight in ground the dispersed terrorist forces which leads to the deterioration of security  
387 condition when jihadists start reorganized themselves. Third, Operation Serval displaced jihadists problem to  
388 neighbors. Fourth, Operation Barkhane's 'partnership' with Sahel military was less effective in the fact that  
389 these militants of Sahel had a record of inflicting their own citizens than protecting them. Last, the partnership  
390 with national governments over the war on terror has strengthened and legitimize their regime despite their  
391 autocratic tendency. 48 UN's rejection of MNLA's independence entitlements and France's mission upon the  
392 request of the interim government seems that interventions were for the best interests of the Malians. President  
393 Hollande in his 2013 new-year speech addressed to the journalists and diplomats saying "We are faced with a  
394 blatant aggression that is threatening Mali's very existence, I have decided that France will respond, alongside our  
395 African partners, to the request from the 47 UN MINUSUMA [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/)  
396 [minusma/](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/) 48 Richard Reeve (2015) The Broker [http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/](http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/Fivestrategic-failures-of-the-French-intervention-in-Mali) Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-  
397 [analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/Fivestrategic-failures-of-the-French-intervention-in-Mali](http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/Fivestrategic-failures-of-the-French-intervention-in-Mali) Malian authorities. We  
398 will do it strictly within the framework of the United Nations Security Council resolution. We will be ready  
399 to stop the terrorists' offensive if it continues." 49 However, contrary to this, the objective of France's incursion  
400 is debated. For instance, the question for intervention was raised simultaneously from Central Africa Republic  
401 (CAR) and Mali, but France immediately responded to Mali's request in January 2013 and delayed CAR's  
402 request till the end of 2013. Among other reasons, economic and security interests were along the drivers  
403 of France's intervention in Mali than a pure humanitarian intervention. Kimenyi (2013) quoting Katrin Sold  
404 (member of German council on Foreign relations-DGAP) "France has interests in securing resources particularly  
405 oil and uranium, which the French energy company Areva has been extracting for decades in neighboring Niger"  
406 concludes that France's foray is driven by economic interest than humanitarian.

407 From this perspective, it seems though the intervention has an element of the responsibility to protect. 50 This  
408 was also evidenced in France's deployment of its force near the Uranium mines, extracted by French company,  
409 in Niger-a former colony. Similarly, Mazyaev (2013) contends that the intervention was aimed at economic  
410 recolonization of Africa by vying with China. 51 Moreover, the presence of large scale French firms that provide  
411 service in construction, energy, communication and finance sector, such as Bouygues, Bolloré Africa Logistic,  
412 Areva energy, Orange and BNP-Paribas, can be another argument that interventions were directed at keeping  
413 economic interest. On other hand, the expansion of Islamist rebels in west and north Africa is a threat to Europe  
414 in general. This is supported by Derian, French defense minister, "In Mali, it is our own security that is at stake:  
415 the security of France, the security of Europe..." 52 and Katrin Sold "France fears that Mali could become a  
416 retreat and training center for Islamist terrorists if an Islamist state were established there". 53 Besides, though  
417 David Cameron complimented Hollande's intervention, he refused to send British troops 54 49 Reuters news Jan  
418 11, 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/malirebels-hollande-idUSP6E7N600P20130111> 50 Kimenyi and Rout-  
419 man (2013) <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2013/01/18-mali-challenges-kimenyi> 51 Alexander  
420 Mezyaev January 14 2013, [http://www.globalresearch.ca/military-intervention-in-mali-special-operation-to-](http://www.globalresearch.ca/military-intervention-in-mali-special-operation-to-recolonize-africa/5318820)  
421 [recolonize-africa/5318820](http://www.globalresearch.ca/military-intervention-in-mali-special-operation-to-recolonize-africa/5318820) 52 BBC News, 11 November 2012 Cited in [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20292797)  
422 [20292797](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20292797) 53 DW News 16.01.2013 [http://www.dw.com/en/the-interests-behind-frances-intervention-in-mali/a-](http://www.dw.com/en/the-interests-behind-frances-intervention-in-mali/a-16523792)  
423 [16523792](http://www.dw.com/en/the-interests-behind-frances-intervention-in-mali/a-16523792) 54 The Guardian January 14 2013 [http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/14/france-](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/14/france-lonely-intervention-mali)  
424 [lonely-intervention-mali](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/14/france-lonely-intervention-mali), an indication that Libya was more important for British than Mali. Therefore, I argue  
425 that realism can best explain the intervention in Mali.