

Emotional Management in Spanish Institutions: when Institutional Trust Draws New Horizons

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Abstract

This paper seeks to explain how and why people join social movements. In a study of the Occupy movement, the authors set out to demonstrate that participation is a function of emotional attachments between participants ? attachment through shared emotions regarding the loss of trust in traditional institutions and belief in efficacy of alternative, open, institutions. Using the concept of second-order emotions, the authors argue that the movement through horizontal democracy helps to regulate emotions through recognition of those emotions. The researchers argue that, in addition to a distrust of traditional institutions, social rituals in the Occupy movement serve to fortify collective emotions and create strong bonds between participants.

Index terms— institutional trust, second-order emotion, collective emotions, horizontal democracy, indignados movement.

1 Introduction

motions are a perceptual construction of complex situations (Roberts, 2013). When emotions meet social movements, the situation is even more complex. We observe how people challenge the authority of "traditional" (political and economic) institutions, and where distrust in these institutions can evoke anger, anxiety, resentment, despair, depression and loss of self-esteem. A lack of trust in mainstream institutions often helps to explain the grievances and emotional dispositions that bring people to participate in movement-based communities and events, such as those affiliated with the Indignados movement in Spain.

The case-study is based in the Spain area between 2011 and 2014 on social institutions and emotional processes involved in what normally is referred to as social movement. We present narratives by activists from these institutions because they embody a type of innovation and creation in the Spanish scenario in the last years. They offer different examples of how trust is managed through narratives and actions in horizontal infrastructures (social institutions). This study allows us to introduce institutional trust as a second-order emotion in emotional management practices of the social movements. We show how trust funnels in other first-order emotions, which represents emotional ties between activists, allowing them to achieve other emotions, where emotions are perceptual constructions of complex situations, as Roberts (2013) explains. Along this paper, we will propose the concept of a second-order emotion as a tool for social analysis in social movements.

2 II.

3 ON TRUST AND EMOTION MANAGEMENT

Second-order emotional practices have an important role in emotion management in social movements, considering that emotion management is not a conclusion to a process, but a phase of a continuing cycle of activity (Barbalet, 2011). Secondorder emotional practices represent a tool ??Jakupcak, 2003), "an instrument of freedom rather than a tool of self-oppression" (De ??ousa, 1990: 446), where we cease to think of our emotions as inevitable and to view them as open to modification. A person may 'regulate' anger against an institution, constructing trust, promoting rewarding actions, sharing knowledge and information, etc.

6 IV. FROM INDIVIDUAL NEGATIVE EMOTIONS TO COLLECTIVE POSITIVE EMOTIONS

43 For Barbalet (2011), emotions can be regulated in an implicit social regulation and through processes of self-
44 monitoring, in an explicit way. Emotions can only be regulated in interactionally with other subjects and so require
45 cooperation among individuals in trust relations as a social movement, hundreds of persons fighting together for
46 the same cause. The regulation of the person's activism draws on other emotions, such as anger or love, and is
47 composed by other second-order emotions such as sincerity, trust or blame.

48 People rarely express fear, anger, jealousy, chagrin, joy, and so on, by using the corresponding words in a self-
49 description (Harré, 2009). An angry person might verbally show anger by shouting "F###k the politicians!" but
50 not "I am angry with them" without turning red in the face. First-and second-order emotions in our narratives
51 emerge in multiples ways, rarely using the corresponding words. This matters for how we recognize our usage of
52 these second-order emotions in our narratives. Spiraling out first-order emotion, there are all sorts of second-order
53 emotions which depend on tacit knowledge of the first-order emotions. Harré (2009) suggests analyzing which
54 words are common in the expression of emotions. What do the uses of the words "rage" and "anger" have in
55 common? What about "anger" and "love"? Second-order emotions help us answer these questions, analyzing
56 what words and expressions have in common in the context of these emotions. The latter is a prime ingredient in
57 the grounds for describing one's emotional experience. The first-order emotion is always a kind of process where
58 this emotional process is composed by second-order emotions.

59 4 III.

60 5 Methods to Trust in Institutions Again

61 The case-study is based in the Spainarea between 2011 and 2014 on social institutions and affective processes
62 involved in what normally is referred to as social movement. These are the institutions :Plataforma de Afect
63 adospor la Hipoteca (PAH -Movement of Mortgage Victims); 15Mpedia/ Informa Sol/Padland/People witness
64 (from Indignados movement); Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP -Popular UnityCandidates); and Asamblea
65 Vivienda Centro (AVC -Housing Center Assembly).The four cases represent different types of social institutions
66 with a strong component of militancy and responsibility for the citizens. We present narratives by activists from
67 these institutions because they embody a type of innovation and creation in the Spanish scenario in the last
68 years. They offer different examples of how trust is managed through narratives and actions.

69 In narratives, epistemic trust constructs and "fabricates" these micro-institutions composed of subjects,
70 because claims of the participants an explicit assent to the aim of sharing knowledge with a collaborative
71 intentional attitude. Micro-institution stake the form of joint actions which require explicit collaborative
72 intentions, such as fight together for the same cause. These social actions represent microinstitutions as
73 testimonial acts which constitute reliable sources of knowledge, a form of trusting someone without the need
74 to say so in an explicit way using the word "trust".

75 These types of institutions are communitarian and emotional ties between people, based on the second-order
76 emotion of trust for the construction of the relationship. The second-order emotion of trust is a relation of
77 epistemic dependence between agents and society through a communicative process, where every communicative
78 process represents a narrative. Daukas (2006) gives us a good example of how epistemic trusts in social interaction
79 and in institutions work. In a multidisciplinary group of social scientists, their goal is to understand the social
80 problems of a given community. This investigating group should be socially and socio-economically diverse,
81 because their diversity represents different perspectives and are shaped through individual epistemic histories.

82 In the next section, we will present a model for observing this epistemic trust as a second-order emotion in
83 institutions from the data collected.

84 6 IV. From Individual Negative Emotions to Collective Positive Emotions

86 In research on the social movement, secondorder emotions play an important role in achieving the movement's
87 intended purpose. In the African-American Civil Rights Movement between 1954 and 1968, black pride was one
88 of the most important elements in constituting a collective action and in achieving equal rights in US society.
89 Black pride was not the purpose of this movement, but it is the second-order emotion which allowed the creation
90 of the community and a collective action to achieve their shared purpose. In Britt and Heise's (2000) essay on
91 LGBT movement, they trace the emergence of pride and shame through emotional control processes involving
92 fear and then anger. This social movement revolves around efforts to transform shame into pride. Pride and
93 shame are second-order emotions in this context, and fear, anger, joy and empowerment represent the first-order
94 emotions. Shame and pride in this context are elements of sharing other emotions in groups and achieving equal
95 rights in society. The purpose of these actions is not to show pride, but pride is the second-order emotion which
96 connects these subjects.

97 In the Spanish scenario of the last years (Author XXX1, 2013, 2014; Author XXX1&-, 2013; Author XXX1&-,
98 2014), we have observed how people challenge the authority of "traditional" (political and economic system)
99 institutions. A multitude of subjects which shared the emotions in the same place (Puerta del Sol in indignados
100 movement), caused face-to-face and interaction contact. They shared the same practices of occupying public
101 space to fight against traditional institutions (Author XXX1&-, 2014).This represents a democratic mobilization

102 in which people have challenged traditional institutions of neoliberal capitalist ideology and practices (Benski
103 and Langman, 2013).

104 As we observed in the previous section, trust and institutions are highly interrelated. An activist says that is
105 not possible to live in a democracy without trust in the institution of democracy. This is why democracy needs
106 rules, and trust and confidence are two of them. Young adults in Spain have lost trust in traditional institutions
107 for different and precarious reasons (economically, politically and socially). Being assembled in large crowds and
108 subjected to contagious face-to-face processes promoted the emergence of a common collective identity ??Melucci,
109 1989), in a We-mode way (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006;Perrugoria &Tejerina, 2013; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).

110 Following the description of the activist, survey of seven European countries in 2012 showed that citizens
111 had no trust in government. In the same year, 62% of British voters responding to aYou Gov polla greed that
112 "politicians tell lies all the time and you can't believe a word they say". When the credit crisisin Spain in 2010-
113 2011 began, people started to lose trust in banks, firstly, as physical space of the economic system, and later they
114 lost trust in the political system. The banks were saved, the people were screwed (Langman, 2013). Trust was
115 broken between people and these old institutions; bank offices had to physically change their position in Spain
116 to try to reconstruct this trust with society, the same activist explains. When citizens feel threatened, their
117 emotions lead them to seek additional information and process it more thoroughly. Distrust in these institutions
118 caused by the crisis evoked negative emotions such as anger, anxiety, resentment, despair, depression and loss of
119 self-esteem as emerged in narratives collected.

120 For Bennett (2013), the reasons for changing the terms of the relationship are prudential, reasons of a subject's
121 self-protection from an institution. This is why subjects revise their expectations and intentions in a relation, so as
122 to change or modify the relation with that subject or object. The relation between citizens and these institutions
123 was now broken and it was impossible to repair. So these social movements in Spain have their origin in the
124 loss of trust regarding traditional institutions and the political mismanagement of the socioeconomic crisis. This
125 authority and institutional system are defined as 'unjust', and it is this frame of injustice which has generated this
126 loss of trust. When this second-order emotion of trust between society and institutions is violated, it generates
127 a lot of negative first-order emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety and resentment (Jasper, 2011; ??arcus et al.
128 2000;Neuman, 2007). Given this distrust in economic and political authorities, persons managed this second-
129 order emotion toward another object, a different way of understanding democracyas we activists describe in their
130 narratives.

131 These institution swere born to manage this second-order emotion between citizens in Spain. In 2011, people's
132 trust in other people allowed them toooccupy public spaces to gether and to express their individual negative
133 emotions in a collective way. Negative emotions expressed in I-mode were shared in these public spaces and
134 transformed into positive emotions expressed in We-mode.

135 People started to build alternative institutions together, in a public space, establishing emotional ties between
136 themselves. Activists explain that protestswere led under the slogans: "We are not commodities in the hands
137 of politicians and bankers", "They don't represent us", etc.. Collective emotions emerged with the use of "We"
138 (citizens)against "They" (bankers and politicians). People trusted members of their in-group, and experienced
139 resentment toward the out group (institutions, politicians, bankers, and so on).

140 For Melucci (1995), collective emotions, like collective identities, are constructed and negotiated in a dialectical
141 interaction with historical events and networks of groups and individuals. Anger, fear and anxiety are a strong
142 force in creating a sense of collectivity in the street and an attractive force in collective actions (Eyerman,
143 2005). Individual negative emotions force people to occupy a place together and share positive emotions. People
144 recover institutional trust, as a relationship between an individual and an institution, and share happiness and
145 empowerment. In these four institutions, trust was negotiated in a dialectical interaction between subjects in order
146 to achieve different positive emotions collectively. Management of thisemotion is important for understanding
147 how subjects have changed their negative emotions expressed in an I-mode to positive emotions expressed in a
148 We-mode. Subjects have moved from their private spaces to a public space thanks to a change ofthe object which
149 they direct their second-order emotion of trust toward.

150 Emotions and joint actions play together when sharing trust. Institutional trust connects positive commitments
151 to people, ideas and places, forming a solid basis between subjects and more persistent emotional management
152 with the action. 'We', bound by bonds of trust in persons, the heart of the process of emotion management -a
153 change of language, of words, from people to person, indicating a change towardengaging in politics, a narrative
154 of becoming persons and the trust between them asa collective identity (Polletta, 1998).

155 As we have seen in the cases of the LGBT and African-American Civil Rights movements, as in these four
156 institutions too, people share and manage emotions to achieve a purpose. Emotions in the social environment
157 crystallize in narrative experiences which structure individual emotions. When people interact with each other
158 in specific situations, they construct narratives to generate a shared understanding of the situation through
159 shared emotions. For Clark (1996), linguistic categories provide the common ground which allows for efficient
160 communication and enables people to coordinate joint action, as in social movements. The four activists
161 confirm that banners, slogans, manifestos and tweets constitute these narratives and allow the management
162 and organization of their social actions. One of the deepest satisfactions of collective actions in this social
163 movement is a sense of trust and confidence, an end that in turn becomes a means to further action. These four

164 institutions have created a pre-and a post-in social movements in Spain, where these collective emotions and joint
165 actions facilitate the development of participatory habits in democracy and trust in it again.
166 V.

167 7 Trust Contagion Feedback Loop

168 "When the government is against the people, the people are against the government" An activist interviewed.
169 For Jasper (1998), trust is an example of basic affects which have important political implications. Lack Volume
170 XVII Issue V Version I of institutional trust is shown many times in elections (Brady & Sniderman, 1985;Kam,
171 2005;Lupia, 1994;Lupia & Mc Cubbins, 1998;Popkin, 1991) and a lack of trust is a lack of information, in many
172 cases, which produces a list of negative emotions such as aversion, anger, disgust, contempt and bitterness
173 (Mac Kuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010). So citizens try to acquiring information and trust, but they must
174 possess the resources necessary to obtain this information in a democratic system (Kymlicka, 1991; Wolfinger &
175 Rosenstone, 1980). An activist explains that to participate in a meeting or in a demonstration, a citizen must
176 know where to go, have time to engage in that activity and understand the language of this information (i.e.
177 migrants who don't speak that language will not be able to engage). "[W]hen the expectations involved in trust
178 and respect are not met, (?) emotions tend to appear in the form of disrespect, distrust, anger, and indignation"
179 ??Benski & Longman, 2013: 10).

180 The above epistemic (lack of) trust generated in a negative auto-mood was what Dakaus (2006) called
181 an "untrustworthiness feedback loop". Institutional trust is associated with certain practices or objects in
182 institutions, but when these practices are not followed, it generates institutional distrust and negative emotions.
183 Traditional institutions collapse because they are not to be able to follow these practices and are no longer able
184 to deliver positive political goods to their citizens, like human security, rule of law, civil and human rights, health
185 care, education, physical infrastructures, and so on (Srblijinovic & Bozic, 2013). These effects cause loss of trust
186 in institutions. Institutions fail since they lose their capacity to guarantee the social contract. When traditional
187 institutions fail, people search these emotionally intensive rituals at different levels, in family or the neighborhood,
188 as in the Spanish scenario. It is when they exit from this untrustworthiness feedback loop that they generate
189 many negative emotions in an Imode and they begin to manage this second-order emotion in a different way, such
190 as placing their trust in an "alternative" institution that distributes knowledge and understanding among the
191 members of the community. A social group involved in collective actions to generate collective positive emotions.

192 For Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk (2009), anger in young people increases internal efficacy in
193 successful participation, creating a feedback loop which promotes the development of such habits in the future.
194 Emotion contagion is common in family life, social rituals, political rallies, and mass meetings ??Hatfield,
195 Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) and it is the heart of collective emotions for many social psychologists, it is a
196 pre-requisite mechanism. This face-to-face contagion process in the last years in Spain is based on trust in
197 others. An activist says: "Then I trust another person, I try to empathize with her, because I believe in what
198 she says and I recognize that it is the correct way to begin social action with her".

199 Second-order emotions are contagious because they are embodied and internalized in our social practices. The
200 chain reaction in different places in Spain has caused the facility to construct and manage these second-order
201 emotions in an epistemic way: a trust reaction, where citizens have decided to place their institutional trust in
202 this form of protest and to adopt the same strategies. Socially shared emotions are not just an aggregation of
203 individual emotions, but represent unique holistic qualities of social collectives as an emergent phenomenon (Bar-
204 Tal, 2001). Physical proximity may substantially amplify and reinforce convergence by way of facial mimicry
205 and contagion; hand signals and verbal communication contributes to the symbolic transmission of appraisal
206 outcomes and the descriptive labeling of emotion (von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).Trust in these social institutions
207 represents the new social ritual of living together post-indignados movement. In the next section, we will describe
208 how these social institutions and these new social rituals work thanks to the second-order emotional institutional
209 trust management.

210 8 VI. Democracy and Institutional Trust

211 We have observed that new collective forms of understanding democracy allow us to recover institutional trust
212 in it. The in frastructure in the indignados movement implies a flat plane upon which to communicate, which
213 requires the use of direct tools against hierarchy. This is an anti-authoritarian creation rather than reaction,
214 where the vertical methods of topdown organization and relation are broken, according to Sitrin (2006). Trust
215 is the basis of this horizontal institution -a type of democracy where community being together and sharing
216 collective emotions is based on trust in each other as citizens of this democracy. Town-meetings, working groups,
217 and assemblies are the structures of horizontal decision-making and nonhierarchical social relationships as they
218 promote civic involvement, innovation and transparency.

219 Horizontal democracy was based on social institutions of cooperation and knowledge, stabilized as a valuable
220 good for society and individuals (Sennett, 2012). Cooperation and knowledge requires positive emotions in social
221 interactions. Institutional trust,as we have observed before, represents an important source of sharing information
222 and knowledge because it contributes to extending in an effective way the knowledge among the members of a
223 community. People share emotions, common problems and being together in an inclusive, horizontal, non-violent,

224 and participatory fashion (Perrugoria & Tejerina, 2013). Horizontal democracy is a social contract to establish a
225 new social order in society and it becomes a habit whereone abandons all hope of being represented. Representing
226 second-order emotional ties between family, friends and one’s neighborhood for surviving at the micro level and in
227 micro institutions. So the most promising way to restore social order seems to be the ‘bottom-up’ way, according
228 to Srblijinovic and Bozic (2013). Horizontal democracy is composed of these bonds, because trust is an essential
229 part in everyday social relationships. When trust changes between people and institutions, often it changes their
230 relationships with others and wider social structures.

231 Micro-, open and social institutions represent a new beginning for recovering this trust, leading to an
232 allpervasive social change at the macro level too. These processes, Srblijinovai and Bozic (2014) argue, are
233 inherently complex and frail, just as first-order emotions. Emotions may prove to be the missing piece in a
234 variety of puzzles with which political scientists have struggled with for decades ??Groenendyk, 2011). Horizontal
235 democracy in the Spanish scenario poses collective actions which have resulted from old problems in traditional
236 democracy. Because these new typesof institution are concernedwith the restoration of trust, theyfulfill social
237 rituals, practices and infrastructures which can connote a sense of participation in social life.

238 The regulation ofsecond-order emotional ties is the first step to transforming society from distrust in the
239 old democracy to trust in the new democracy. This is why democratic society cannot function without trust
240 and loyalty of the people (Rawls, 1993). Democracy starts with citizens caring about one another and acting
241 responsibly from that sense of care, taking responsibility both for themselves and for their community (Lakoff,
242 2011). As we have observed in the previous section, these second-order emotional ties work as a feedback loop
243 between individual, society and the polity. Often these second-order emotional ties are social norms or social
244 contracts between citizens and institutions -the basis of the democracy.

245 These second-order emotional ties happen for the same reasons that Daukas (2006) argues that trust is a
246 second-order epistemic competency, where our ability to rightly judge and be judged as trustworthy is in the
247 social interaction and expressed as epistemic trust. Trust is a second-order emotion in this sense, because it
248 doesn’t emerge in a direct way in our narratives.

249 9 Examples include hand signals in Indignados movement

250 for the negotiation of a consensus in a universal and open language 1 1 More information:
251 <http://www.nycga.net/resources/general-assemblyguide/> . Everybody can participate in horizontal democracy
252 using these signals to agree, to oppose, etc., with other persons in the square. Epistemic trust is managed in
253 this way too.

254 The institution of democracy has adjusted to modes which can be designed by the citizens. A new space
255 was opened up by a series of negotiations, interactions and actions between subjects and objects. Horizontal
256 democracy is a traditional institution adjusted to the modes which can be designed, following Latour’s concept
257 (2013).Institutional trust is managed in these processes by occupying a public space in order to reestablish these
258 institutions, a collective action to design new forms of sharing knowledge and authority between subjects.

259 10 VII.

260 11 Discussion

261 In the 1960s, observers used the obvious emotions of protest to dismiss protestors as irrational or immature; later
262 analysts denied any and all emotions in an effort to demonstrate that protestors are rational (Goodwin et al.
263 2000;Jasper, 2011). We have presented the casethat social movements are in large part emotionally conditioned
264 and originate from interaction rituals. Democracy provides the infrastructure for these interactions and stimulates
265 positive emotions in citizens; the failure of this institution leads to the collapse of these interactions and produces
266 negative emotions in citizens.

267 We have observed how social order is socially constructed through interpersonal interactions in everyday life
268 by cooperation and positive emotions. Citizens know this set of emotional beliefs, which are formed in every
269 interpersonal encounter in their life in society. In the four institutions, often initially negative emotions are
270 collectively expressed in an individual way, or I-mode. We may think like individuals, in I-mode, but our brains
271 have evolved to allow us to feel as part of groups, in We-mode (Hermann et al., 2007). People have constructed
272 networks where they elaborate and manage these emotions. These networks are constructed thanks to the second-
273 order emotions of trust, asecond-order emotional tie between subjects for achieving a purpose or an emotion.
274 These emotions prompted many to engage in protests and mobilizations as an expression of contentious politics
275 which become mediated through interpersonal networks. We-mode represents the heart of the process of collective
276 identity construction being conducted. Collective emotions, collective context and collective action represent a
277 new area of study of emotion in the coming years, and the second-order emotion of institutional trust is the basic
278 structure for studying these complex processes.

279 Second-order emotion account allows an understanding of how emotion regulation and emotion management
280 generates collateral emotions. In our view, the central aspects of institutional trust are emotional and epistemic.
281 Trust as a second-order emotion constitutes an epistemic space for people to share knowledge. Trust is not just
282 needed to gain access to knowledge goods, but it is essential to becoming a Volume XVII Issue V Version I
283 socially situated self, to engaging in more public conversations with others. Institutional trust as a second-order

284 emotion is internalized through social practices, in our discourses and in our practices. In the model explained,
285 we have observed that trust is essential to becoming a socially situated self. Authority migrates to the subjective
286 level of these horizontal and open institutions. People cannot feel strong emotional experiences without trust in
287 the other people that participate in the same movement.

288 Although trust and distrust are the fundamental social ties, it is not yet quite understood how it works or
289 how to figure out its nuances and distinctions. Trust becomes a second-order emotion which tames the future
290 into horizons of the expected, of that which we count upon, of that which we feel more or less sure about.
291 Institutional trust contributes to taming and narrowing the horizons of the expectable so that our social life
292 becomes possible. The construction and maintenance of the emotion and bond of trust appears to be crucial in
293 our daily relationships, and we suggest that it appears as a crucial question far beyond the system of democracy. In
294 our analysis, this second-order emotion of institutional trust forges the bond between subjects, where an emotional
295 constellation is produced by this emotional tie.

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