

1 The Critique of the Communitarians Arguments from an African 2 Perspective

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7 **Abstract**

8 The communitarians claim that the individual is a natural member of the human society, but
9 that he needs the society and all the opportunities it makes available for the realization of his
10 potential for living a life that is meaningful. This claim is synonymous to African conception
11 of individual and the community. Thus this work set out to carry out the critique of some
12 notable communitarians such as: John Dewey, Fredrick Hegel and Michael Sandel, Macinyre
13 Alasdair, Charles Taylor. We discovered in the work that the claim of these theorists on
14 individual and community is identical to African ideal. And the critique exposes the
15 inadequacies in their claim as well as the African ideal because development today is beyond
16 the narrow context of communal life which puts African under the illusion that communities
17 constitute a ?paradise lost?. As such there is the need for African to seek their rights; this will
18 enable them to function properly in the global scheme of things.

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20 **Index terms**— africa, community, communitarian, development, individual, government, society.

21 **1 Introduction**

22 Communitarianism emerged as a response to the limit of liberal theory and practice. While Liberalism affirms
23 belief in individual freedom or liberty, it also believes that it is desirable to maximize the amount of liberty
24 in the state. Communitarian advocates for equal placement of individual rights with social responsibilities,
25 and the autonomous selves should not exist in isolation, but shaped by the values and culture of communities.
26 Communitarians suggest that unless we begin to redress the imbalance towards the pole of community, our society
27 will continue to be norm less, self centered, and driven by special interests and power seeking. Invariably these
28 facts instigate the search for communitarian society where there will be a correct balance between individual
29 autonomy and social cohesion.

30 In this paper, we shall cursorily examine the works of communitarian scholars such as John Dewey, Fredrick
31 Hegel and Michael Sandel, Macinyre Alasdair, Charles Taylor. Their contributions shall be considered in turns.

32 Communitarians emphasize the fact that an individual needs the society and all the available opportunities to
33 realize his aims. This literally suggests that the community should be the main stay of the individual. As such,
34 Dewey believes that the community needs the individual in order to perform the numerous functions before it.
35 His philosophy is greatly influenced by Darwin's theory of evolution. Through the Darwin's theory, he acquired
36 the notion that a human being is like a complex natural organism that functions within its environment. To
37 function successfully, the organism must adapt itself either passively to its environment in order to meet its needs
38 and desires or actively to transform its environment.

39 Dewey further believes that for the community to progress, it needs individuals to perform a large array of
40 functions. One of which is, a healthy relationship. Dewey described the healthy community as "one in which
41 the individual is neither boss over other nor bullied by others" ??Alfred, D.1985). This invariably suggest that
42 the individual shares similar aspirations and responsibilities, which enables him to take decisions that enhance
43 the development of the community. As a neo Darwinian, Dewey knew the key to survival is diversity not

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44 homogeneity. As such, the idea of segregation may not produce the cooperation that is expected to move the
45 community forward. Observation reveals that Dewey's ideal community is a society where the ever-expanding
46 and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities is seen in the full sense of that word, so that an
47 organized articulate public is realized.

48 Dewey thought that the best kind of community for social self-realization is a participatory democracy, where
49 every individual have a stake. In this system of governance, public spiritedness, productive of an organized
50 self-conscious community of individuals responding to society's need, will be inculcated in the individuals in the
51 society.

52 Hegel in his phenomenology of spirit shows how rationally self-conscious individuals must interact with one
53 another to raise their subjective reasons to a universal, transpersonal level. Only then will individuals be able
54 to act freely, since the spiritual essence or substance of their common ethical life is the means by which they
55 can escape mere conformity to custom as well as their own subjective prejudices. By ethical life, Hegel means
56 the most fully and immediate identification with the community. That is, ethical life must be 'based on or
57 identification with others in a particular common enterprise' ??Taylor, C.1989).

58 Hegel claims that strong identification is the appropriate orientation towards one's ethical tradition. It was
59 his attempt to portray the state as an inherently rational entity that made him to suggests that a community's
60 ethical tradition must be rational in order to satisfy the needs and desires of its members"(Hegel, G.W.F.1981
61). In addition, the individual must learn how to recognize precisely, what right is and evaluate the rationality
62 of their ethical tradition. He rejects the authority of the abstract to undermine the validity of tradition. For
63 example, he rejects Kant's notion of abstract rational principle or "universal fixed rule" (Hegel, G.W.F.1979
64), such as the law of noncontradiction. Hegel did not argue that individuals should simply identify with the
65 positive contents of their legal tradition but he requires the individual to assess the rationality of this tradition
66 and in the process, such a tradition should not be compare with any abstract principle or any set of principles.
67 He maintains that philosophy must recover the sense of "solid and substantial being" (Hegel, G.W.F.1979) that
68 the modern spirit has lost. In order to achieve "substantial being", the individual must identify with the ethical
69 judgments of their community as embodied in laws and customs. Hegel sees the community as something that
70 is good for the individual because, according to him, it is only by virtue of this that we can find a deep meaning
71 and substance to our moral beliefs. And since the individual; can only maintain his identify within a society/
72 culture of a certain kind, he is concerned with this society and interested in having certain activities, institutions,
73 and even some norms in the society flourish (Pitkin, H. 1967). Michael Sandel in his own case holds the view
74 that, an individual cannot be described independently of his life goal and the values which determine them. He
75 argues that every person has been shaped by some life goals, constitutively to the extent that a person cannot
76 adopt a distant attitude towards all possible life goals. So, it is not possible to talk of a subject that is situated
77 and ethically neutral; we can only talk of a radically situated person. Thus, our social circumstances are part of
78 the meaning of our lives. It is not possible to understand the individual apart from the particular social contexts
79 in which he is inevitably embedded.

80 So, the identity generating life goal, can only be acquired inter-subjectively through cultural socialization. The
81 idea of independent subjects who are isolated from another person is untenable because no matter how distinct
82 a person may be, he must draw the understanding of him from inter-subjective cultural values and orientation.
83 It is not possible to conceive of the human subject as a pre-societal being.

84 However, what is crucial for the communitarian is that these features of our lives are not chosen by us nor can
85 we detach them from us. They are there already. Macintyre puts it in this way:

86 We all approach our circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter,
87 someone else's causing or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I
88 belong to this clan, this tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be good for one who inhabits these
89 roles. These relations thus provide a sort of moral compass; we inherit from our social and traditional context
90 a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations which constitute the given of my life, my
91 moral starting point (Axel, H. 1995).

92 Our language, heritage, ethnicity and our locality thus encumber us. Our community is part of our life. What
93 is good for my community is good for me. What is good for me has to be good for another person who inhabits
94 these roles; the people in my town are all part of who I am.

95 In his communitarian discourse, Macintyre has tended to argue against both liberalism's method-logical
96 individualism and the priority it places on individual rights over public goods. Macintyre argue that an individual
97 could not be understand apart from his particular social context "the identities and attributes with which she
98 find herself encumbered her language, her ethnicity, her locality" (Avineru S. and De Shalit. 1996). All the
99 features of our lives are not chosen by us or detachable from us, instead, they are already there, we cannot do
100 without them. But modern liberal life puts that claim under threat, in fact it has led to an erosion of the fact
101 that, we may have unchosen or chosen responsibilities or that we may even 'owe' the community whose tradition
102 and resources have helped make us what we are anything. Macintyre tend to overthrow the liberal capitalist
103 ideology that has dominated the world, both in the realm of ideas and in its manifestations in political and social
104 institutions. He intends to do this by changing the way people think, the way they understand and act in the
105 world. In his effort to show that the changes he wants are possible and desirable he returns to an older conception
106 of morality.

107 Macintyre built his moral theory around Aristotle. Aristotle claims that; the basic harmony exists in nature
108 and that species are fixed. An individual human's purpose is attached in achieving or fulfilling the telos or
109 purpose of the species ??MacIntyre, A.1985).

110 He revises Aristotle's claims and holds that conflict, not harmony, is inevitable in life and the rules of morality
111 emanated from it. In addition, species do not have a fixed, identifiable nature or purpose, each human person
112 engaged in a quest for meaning in life. According to Macintyre, the life of human person; is a narrative quest for
113 the meaning of his or her life. To engage in the quest is to place oneself within a practice. Purpose in life is not
114 created in a void. To enter a game, an art, a science or to engage in making and sustaining a community is to
115 enter a practice(Alasdair 2005).

116 Morality according to him sprang up from practices, individual action are performed on a particular occasion,
117 but are judged in relation to standard. In the process of practice, a situation of teacher and learner exist.
118 Macintyre, notes that when a learner first start to engage in a practice, he must accept external standards for the
119 evaluation of his performances "a practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the
120 achievements of goods"(Alasdair 2005). An individual become an apprentice/ learner and with the development
121 of skills, he will be able to locate his place. Macintyre makes a distinction between the "goods external to
122 and goods internal to a practice" ?? MacIntyre, A.1985). The external goods include, fame, power and wealth.
123 The internal goods also include, the accusation of a specific skill necessary for a particular practices and the
124 development of those skills. The internal goods are goods for those who are engaged in a practice in a particular
125 country, while the external goods are privately own goods. The more an individual acquire, the less will be left
126 for others. Macintyre gave a central place to the internal goods and link it with virtue.

127 Furthermore, Macintyre believes that politics can only be played effectively in a small community, because
128 politics is more healthy there, that is the reason why he advice us to focus our energies on building and maintaining
129 small communities, where practices and virtue have a place, and also to protect them from depredation of modern
130 state and modern capitalism. "Small communities will also make it possible for people to evaluate political
131 candidates in varieties of setting and judge them on the basis of integrity rather than adaptability"(Macintyre,
132 A.1999).

133 In his hermeneutic epistemology, Taylor claims that; man as the self-possessed interpretative capacities assume
134 the centre stage. He holds the view that human beings are self-interpreting animals, which understand and reflect
135 upon the meaning of their lives as well as their relationship with others.

136 This kind of self-interpretive activity is not based on priori epistemological principles, but on practical
137 knowledge and everyday encounters with cultural framework (Macintyre, A.1999).

138 Taylor marks himself as a philosopher of morality by arguing that, interpretation necessarily involves evaluation
139 of moral worth. According to him, "Human beings are not simply self interpreters, but they are the kind of
140 interpreters for whom things matter" (Taylor, C. 1985). Precisely, what matter is worked out as individuals
141 articulate their position within the moral spaces of the society.

142 Taylor believes in the community, because whatever a man wishes to be can only be accomplished within
143 the community. He sees the community as good because only by virtue of our being members in communities
144 can we find a deep meaning and sustenance to our moral belief. He talks on ethical life and by ethical life, he
145 means, the most fully and immediate identification with the community. That is, ethical life must be "based
146 on or identification with others in a particular common enterprise" (Taylor, C. 1985). It is only through our
147 identification with others within the community that the desired objectives can be attained. That has been the
148 reason why Taylor was against Rawlsian liberalism, because, it rested on an overtly individualistic conception of
149 the self. Rawls argues that, we have a supreme interest in shaping, pursuing, and revising our own life plans,
150 he neglected the fact that the human being is constituted by various command attachments such as a tie to the
151 family and a tie to religious tradition which are so close to the extent that they are only set aside at a great cost.

152 Furthermore, Taylor attacks the liberal self. In an influential essay entitled 'Atomism', Charles Taylor objected
153 to the liberal view that men are self sufficient outside the society. Instead, Taylor defended the Aristotelian view
154 that "man is a social animals, indeed a political animal because he is not self sufficient alone and in an important
155 sense, he is not self-sufficient outside a polis"). To Taylor, people depended on each other as well as on the
156 community in which they live in order to live a fulfilling life. ??ven and meaning, without this background and
157 meaning, life choices are vulnerable to a nietzschean reduction.

158 Taylor, in the Source of the Self, eloquently attacks the cult of the self that arose during the sixties, and he
159 explores the illusion that human beings can 'choose' their values, or find their fulfilments simply by enhancing
160 the means of self-expression. Yet the community that he wishes to recommend in place of the old liberal has a
161 decidedly liberal aspect. For example, he defends 'multiculturalism' against the tyranny of majority values, the
162 welfare state against the 'selfishness' of unbridled capitalism, and participatory democracy against the shadow
163 machination of institutional power.

164 However, Taylor put forward the following proposal. He imagines a cross-cultural dialogue between
165 representatives of various traditions. Instead of arguing for the universal validity of their views, he suggests that
166 the participants should allow for the possibility that their own belief may be mistaken. In this way, according to
167 Taylor, the participants will be able to learn from each others, 'moral universe'. Along the line there will definitely
168 come a point when differences will not be reconciled. Again Taylor himself recognizes the fact that, different

169 groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations hold incompatible fundamental views on theology,
170 metaphysics, and human nature.

171 Taylor argues that a 'genuine unforced consensus' on human rights norms is possible, if only we allow for
172 disagreement on the ultimate justifications of those norms. Instead of defending contested fundamental values
173 when point of resistance is encountered and started condemning those values we do not like in other societies,
174 Taylor said we should try to abstract those beliefs for the purpose of working out an overlapping consensus of
175 human rights norms. As Taylor puts it, "we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were
176 the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus undisturbed by the differences of profound
177 underlying belief" (Avineru S. and De Shalit. 1996).

178 2 III. t Critique of the Communitarians Theorist

179 In our discussion so far, we have carried out a critical analysis of some communitarian Philosophers such as John
180 Dewey, Fredrick Hegel, Michael Sandel and Macintyre Alasdair, Charles Margrave Taylor. We found out that
181 communitarianism is synonymous with African ways of life because an authentic African is known and identified
182 through his community. We shall now pick them one by one.

183 It should be noted that Dewey's formula is most difficult to apply to the great community because the self-
184 governing and tightly knit localities of those days are gone. Today, the population is so large that many people
185 may not be ready to participate in the building of any community. Our society is decaying, and our education
186 is not well organized. People think more of themselves than of the community. Furthermore, Dewey fails to
187 recognize the threat that unplanned technological, economic and political development may pose to the future
188 of democracy both in the developed and developing worlds.

189 It is necessary to note that Hegel's account of trust seems to be inconsistent with his theory of strong
190 identification because individual members of an ethical community do not identify themselves spontaneously
191 with their ethical tradition nor do they necessarily identify with the content of that tradition. It should also
192 be noted that the consequences of accepting any community as constitutive of the self is odd. Members of
193 the community have conflicting desires and ends that can change. And even identifying the boundaries of the
194 community is also difficult. If my talents are to be used for the good of the community because the community
195 is part of me, it remains to be determined how far reaching the community is. In any case, membership in the
196 community changes through death and procreations. On inter subjective view; we are frequently changing and
197 potentially different from moment to moment.

198 Furthermore, Sandel fails to tell us why it is important that these particular aspects of our identity are inter
199 subjective rather than random. If occupying a given social role can be morally obligatory for me simply because
200 it is an overriding desire of mine, then the question is, could not other fail to give us an account of why these
201 convictions have moral force? The only thing I think is that such convictions can only have psychological force
202 given the fact that human psychology is profoundly shaped by experience. We do not need any moral theory to
203 explain our feelings of attachment to a family or community; what we need is an explanation of why or whether
204 the action we take based on those feelings will be morally acceptable. If no such explanation can be provided, or
205 if the acts are not morally acceptable, then Sandel cannot possibly be advancing a non-liberal theory of rightness.

206 However, the claims of the communitarians that the features of our lives are not chosen by us or detachable
207 from that and us they are always already there in the individual person may not be attainable because modern
208 life has put that significance under threat. The liberal approach to issues now permeates contemporary civil
209 society to the extent that it has led to an erosion of the sense that we might have unchosen responsibilities and
210 that we might 'owe' something to the community whose traditions and resources have helped make us what
211 we are. People tend to be more individualistic. Today we think of the self-first before other. The Critique of
212 the Communitarians Arguments from an African Perspective he Philips(1993) in his appraisal of communitarian
213 position criticizes Macintyre for "ascribing supreme value to the community itself rather than to its individual
214 members" because the community placed constrain on individual, since the community believe that individual
215 rights are better protected within the community. This constrains has been responsible for a lot of noticeable
216 inadequacies in African societies. But what we are saying is that the individual and the community are very
217 important, there should be a solid band between the individual and the community, all member will have the
218 same basic moral, social and political standing, value and policies will be formulated in a free give and take; it
219 is then that the individual rights can be guaranteed in the community.

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221 Moreso, Macintyre, places more emphasis on the establishment of small communities, because he thought that, it
222 is the only place where practices and virtue have a place. Beside this, there is more intimate in the communities
223 which truly define human fulfilment and individuality. But there is the possibility that small communities may
224 not be compatible with human fulfilment, that has been the reason why many seek protection from constraints
225 of the small communities in large communities. Even in today's world many find it more convenient to stay put
226 in the large cities no matter their condition, than coming back to small communities (villages).

227 Macintyre also faces difficulty with relativism, we find out that he cannot distinguish between evil and good
228 practices; he failed to specify the different categories of standard. In other words, he seems to be giving them

229 same moral footing, for example, the standard that arises from a charitable organization and the standard that
230 arise from a criminal organization. But the fact is that, not all practices have the same moral footing, Macintyre
231 needs to differentiate the different categories of practices, and the idea of classifying all practices as one delimits
232 his theory.

233 Taylor's proposal on the universal human rights faces certain difficulties, because it may not be realistic to
234 expect that people will be willing to abstract from the values they care deeply about during the dialogue on
235 human rights. Even when people agree to abstract from culturally specific ways of justifying and implementing
236 norms, the likely outcome is a withdrawal to a highly general abstract realm of agreement that fails to resolve
237 actual disputes over contested rights, for example, the participant in a cross-cultural dialogue can agree on the
238 right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment. But a committed Muslim can argue that theft can
239 justifiably be punished by amputation of the right hand while a non Muslim will definitely label this as an
240 example of cruel and unusual punishment.

241 Taylor is associated with other communitarian political theorists like Michael Walzer and Micheal Sandel,
242 most especially in their critique of liberal theory's of the self. To them, "communitarianism is said to emphasize
243 the importance of social and communal arrangements and institutions to the development of individual meaning
244 and identity" ??Taylor, C.1999). The individual need the society and all the opportunities that are available
245 for the realization of his goals. In his 1991 Massey lectures "The malaise of modernity" ?? Taylor, C.2007).
246 Taylor addressed what he saw as the central problems or "malaises" plaguing modern societies. He argues
247 that traditional liberal theory's conceptualization of individual identity is too abstract, instrumentalist, and one
248 dimensional. For Taylor, theorists like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have
249 neglected the individual's ties to the community, because they assigned more value to the individual in the
250 society than the community itself. That is the reason why, Darek Philips in his appraisal of the communitarian
251 position criticizes Charles Taylor for "ascribing supreme value to the community itself rather than to its individual
252 members" ?? Taylor, C. 1991).

253 With all the sort coming of communitarian as attested to the critique above, one would have thought that
254 probably liberalism would have been the next option. But to an African, the community is the custodian of the
255 individual; hence, he must go where the community goes in spite of his material acquisition. Africans believe that
256 every normal individual has three levels of existence as an individual, as a member of a group and as a member of
257 the community. These three levels are fused together through the belief that all forces are perpetually interacting
258 with one another and inter-penetrating each other. So there is nothing like solitary individual in African society.
259 This is simply because the life of the individual is the life of the whole society, whatever an individual does affects
260 the whole web of social, moral and ontological lives. Anyanwu and Omi have opined that; while the individual
261 strives to satisfy his personal desires, and to develop his abilities he must see all his efforts and aspiration in the
262 light of the whole (Omi, R; and Anyanwu, K.C1984). ??biti (1970) has classically proverbialized the community
263 determining role of the individual when he wrote, "I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am" (p.
264 108). The community, according to Pantaleon (1994), therefore gives the individual his existence and education.
265 That existence is not only meaningful, but also possible only in a community. Thus in the Yoruba land (a tribe
266 in Nigeria-Africa), no one can stand in an isolation, all are members of a community; to be is to belong, and
267 when one ceases to belong, the path towards annihilation is opened wide. According to Azeez (2005), "When
268 the sense of belonging is lost, mutual trust betrayed, we-feeling is destroyed and kinship bond broken, then the
269 individual sees no meaning in living. In the Yoruba society, everybody is somebody; everyone Volume XVI Issue
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272 has commitment towards the other, and shares in the experience of the other. Yoruba community is so personate
273 with the issue of the source (Orirun eni); the community gives each person belongingness and cultural identity
274 for self-fulfillment and social security. That is why individualism as an ideology and principle may not succeed
275 in Africa. In the words of Steve Biko;

276 We regard our living together not as an unfortunate mishap warranting endless competition among us but
277 as a deliberate act of God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a
278 composite answer to the varied problems of life. Hence, in all we do always place men first and hence all our
279 action is usually community-oriented action rather than the individualism ??Onwubiko, O. A.1988).

280 At this stage what can one say is the way out? Liberalism cannot work, and the communitarian nature that
281 African is well known of fail to work. The African situation is palpable; the continent of Africa is confronted
282 with numerous challenges which impede their development socially, politically, technologically and economically.
283 These have resulted into; an unending circle of violence with its attendant destruction of lives and properties,
284 abject poverty, devastating diseases, a troop of corrupt leaders as well as a citizenry that has lost total confidence
285 in them. Surely African needs a way out.

286 **5 IV.**

287 **6 Conclusion**

288 Therefore, there is the need for African to discard those constrains that have been imprisoned them. To do this,
289 Africans should no longer confine themselves to the narrow context of communal life which puts them under the
290 illusion that communities constitute a "paradise lost". As such there is the need for them to seek their rights;
291 this will enable them to function properly in the global scheme of things. There is also the need for the state as
292 an institution to provide the essential foundation for the pursuit of such public benefits as peace, welfare, and
293 the opportunity for the individual to pursue their own happiness. Africans should stop living in the shadow of
the past and move with the world in the new millennium. ^{1 2}

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Figure 1:

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295 [Onwubiko et al. ()] *African Philosophy: An Introduction to the main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa Rome*, O A Onwubiko , R Omi , K Anyawu . 1988. 1984. (Wisdom Lectures on Africa Thought and Culture. Owerri: Totam Publishers)

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