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Agrarian Crisis India: an Aftermath of the New Economic Reforms Pauline Ahoy Received: 16 December 2015 Accepted: 1 January 2016 Published: 15 January 2016

6 Abstract

 $_{7}~$ The National Crime Records Bureau of India reported in its 2012 annual report that 135,445

 $_{\rm 8}$ people committed suicide in India, of which 13,754 were farmers (11.2

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10 Index terms— agrarian crisis, farmer suicides, indian agriculture, agriculture indebtednes s, new economic 11 reform.

12 1 Introduction

ince independence in 1947 due to the inward looking restrictive form of governance India was in complete 13 14 isolation .Overall backwardness and inefficiency of the economy was the aftermath. India was almost at the brink of economic crisis in July 1991. Foreign currency reserves had dwindled to almost \$ 1billion which was 15 not adequate to support import of food grains even for a fortnight, inflation had roared to an annual rate of 16 17%, fiscal deficit had rose to astron omical heights, foreign investors and NRI's had lost confidence in the Indian 17 economy. The second oil shock crisis in 1979 and the Gulf War in 1990-91 added fuel to the fire. Capital was 18 flowing out of the country and we were close to defaulting on loans. Default on debt servicing appeared imminent 19 and the Government of India was in real trouble. Default could be avoided only if credit was made available 20 from IMF or World Bank. Help was provided by them but on their own terms and conditions. India had no 21 alternative but to adopt the structural adjustment programme of the IMF and World Bank as the last resort. 22 These bottlenecks at home called for a change in the economic policies and programs. The new economic reforms 23 popularly known as LPG (liberalization, privatization and globalization) model initiated by the then finance 24 25 minister Dr Man Mohan Singh in the early nineties includeda) Devaluation of Indian currency by 18 to 19% against major foreign currencies in the international foreign exchange market b) Disinvestment where most of the 26 27 public sector undertakings (PSUs) were sold to private sectors. c) Foreign Direct Investment (FDIs) where wide range of sectors were opened for the foreign investors namely telecom, roads, ports, airports, insurance, defence 28 industries, pharmaceuticals, petroleum, manufacturing, chemicals, aviation, seed markets etc. 29

30 **2** II.

31 Review of Literature

³² 3 III. Sources of Data and Methodology

In the present study an attempt has been made to study the impact of globalization on the agricultural sector of India. The study has been based on secondary information and sees the picture of post globalisation in India through the lens of agriculture.

36 IV.

37 4 Results & Discussion

The reforms sought to gradually phase out government control from the market (liberalization), privatize public sector undertakings (privatization) and reduce export subsidies and import barriers to enable free trade (globalization). There was considerable amount of debate in India at the time of the introduction of the reforms, it being a dramatic departure from the protectionist, socialist nature of the Indian economy until then. In the

42 years since its independence, India has made immense progress towards food security. Indian population has

tripled, but food-grain production more than quadrupled; there has thus been substantial increase in available 43 food-grain per capita. Prior to the mid-1960s India relied on imports and food aid to meet domestic requirements. 44 However, two years of severe drought in 1965 and 1966 convinced India to reform its agricultural policy, and 45 that India could not rely on foreign aid and foreign imports for food security. India adopted significant policy 46 reforms focused on the goal of food grain self-sufficiency. This ushered in India's Green Revolution. It began 47 with the decision to adopt superior yielding, disease resistant wheat varieties in combination with better farming 48 knowledge to improve productivity. The Indian state of Punjab led India's green revolution and earned itself the 49 distinction of being the country's bread basket. The initial increase in production was centered on the irrigated 50 areas of the Indian states of Punjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh. With both the farmers and the 51 government officials focusing on farm productivity and knowledge transfer, India's total food grain production 52 soared. A hectare of Indian wheat farms that produced an average of 0.8 tons in 1948 produced 4.7 tons of wheat 53 in 1975 from the same land. Such rapid growths in farm productivity enabled India to become self-sufficient by 54 the 1970s. It also empowered the smallholder farmers to seek further means to increase food staples produced 55 per hectare. By 2000, Indian farms were adopting wheat varieties capable of yielding 6 tons of wheat per hectare. 56 With agricultural policy success in wheat, India's Green Revolution technology spread to rice. However, since 57 irrigation infrastructure was very poor, Indian farmer innovated tube-wells, to harvest water. When gains from 58 59 the new technology reached their limits in the states of initial adoption, the technology spread in the 1970s 60 and 1980s to the states of eastern India -Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal. The lasting benefits of the improved 61 seeds and new technology extended principally to the irrigated areas which account for about one-third of the harvested crop area. In the 1980s, Indian agriculture policy shifted to "evolution of a production pattern in line 62 with the demand pattern" leading to a shift in emphasis to other agricultural commodities like oilseed, fruit and 63 vegetables. Farmers began adopting improved methods and technologies in dairying, fisheries and livestock, and 64 meeting the diversified food needs of India's growing Year 2016 population. As with Rice, the lasting benefits of 65 improved seeds and improved farming technologies now largely depends on whether India develops infrastructure 66 such as irrigation network, flood control systems, reliable electricity production capacity, all season rural and 67 urban highways, cold storage to prevent food spoilage, modern retail, and competitive buyers of products from 68 the Indian farmer. This is increasing the focus of Indian agriculture policy. India's agricultural economy is 69 undergoing structural changes. Between 1970 and 2011, the GDP share of agriculture has fallen from 43% to 70 16% and further to 13.7% in 2013. This isn't because of reduced importance of agriculture but is largely due to 71 the new economic reforms -LPG (liberalization, privatization and globalization). 72

73 Reforms in the agricultural sector in particular came under severe criticism in the late 1990s, when 221 farmers in the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh committed suicide. Agriculture employs 60% of the Indian 74 population today, yet its contribution to GDP is poor. Agricultural production fell by 12.6% in 2003, one of 75 the sharpest drops in independent India's history. Agricultural growth slowed from 4.69% in 1991 to 2.6% in 76 1997-1998 and to 1.1% in 2002-2003. (Agricultural Statistics at a Glance, 2006) This slowdown in agriculture 77 is in contrast to the 6% growth rate of the Indian economy for almost the whole of the past decade. Farmer 78 suicides were 12% of the total suicides in the country in 2000, the highest ever in independent India's history. 79 (Unofficial estimates put them as high as 100,000 across the country, while government estimates are much lower 80 at 25,000. This is largely because only those who hold the title of land in their names are considered farmers, 81 and this ignores women farmers who rarely hold land titles, and other family members who run the farms). 82

Agriculture seems to be at an advanced stage of crisis, the most extreme manifestation is in the rise in the number of suicides amongst farmers. On an average one Indian farmer committed suicide every 32 minutes between 1997 and 2005. Since 2002, this has become one suicide every 30 minutes.

Volume XVI Issue III Version I The institutions produced its own seeds, were responsible for their quality 86 and price, and had a statutory duty to ensure that seeds were supplied to all the regions in the state, no matter 87 how remote. The seed market was well regulated, and this ensured quality in privately sold seeds too. With 88 liberalization, India's seed market was opened up to global agribusinesses like Monsanto, Cargill and Syn Genta. 89 Also, following the deregulation guidelines of the IMF many state government institutions were closed down 90 in 2003. These hit farmers doubly hard: in an unregulated market, seed prices shot up, and fake seeds made 91 an appearance in a big way. Seed cost per acre in 1991 was Rs. 70 but in 2005, after the dismantling of 92 state organizations, the price jumped to Rs. 1000, a hike of 1428%, with the cost of genetically modified pest 93 resistant seeds like Monsanto's BT Cotton costing Rs. 3200 or more per acre, a hike of 3555%. Expecting high 94 yields, farmers invested heavily in such seeds but alas 35% of their investments in seeds were a waste. The 95 claims of Monsanto that their seeds produce higher yields and are pest resistant are highly disputed. Output 96 is not commensurate with the heavy investment in the seeds, and farmers are pushed into debt. The abundant 97 availability of spurious seeds is another problem which leads to crop failures. Tempted by their lower price 98 99 farmers invest heavily in these seeds, and again, low output pushes them into debt. Earlier, farmers could save a part of the harvest and use the seeds for the next cultivation, but some genetically modified seeds, known 100 as Terminator, prevent harvested seeds from germinating, hence forcing the farmers to invest in them every 101 season. 2) Cutback in agricultural subsidies and low output cost: Farmers were encouraged to shift from growing 102 a mixture of traditional crops to export oriented 'cash crops' like chili, cotton and tobacco. These need far 103 more inputs, pesticide, fertilizer and water than traditional crops. Liberalisation policies reduced pesticide and 104 fertilizer subsidy (another explicit condition of the IMF agreement) . Fertilizer prices have increased by 300%105

and electricity tariffs have also been increased .Pre-liberalisation, subsidised electricity was a success, allowing
farmers to keep costs of production low. These costs increased dramatically when farmers turned to cultivation
of cash crops, needing more water and higher consumption of electricity.

¹⁰⁹ 5 3) Reduction on import barriers: With a view to open

India's markets, the liberalization reforms also withdrew tariffs and duties on imports, which protect and 110 encourage domestic industry. By 2001, India completely removed restrictions on imports of almost 1,500 items 111 including food. As a result, cheap imports flooded the market, pushing prices of crops like cotton and pepper 112 down. Import tariffs on cotton now stand between 0 -10%, encouraging imports into the country. This excess 113 supply of cotton in the market led cotton prices to crash more than 60% since 1995. As a result, most of the 114 farmers in Maharashtra who were concentrated in the cotton belt committed suicides (after which paddy farmers 115 followed the suicide trend). Similarly, Kerala, which is world renowned for pepper, has suffered as a result of 0% 116 duty on imports of pepper from SAARC5 countries. Pepper, which sold at Rs. 27,000 a quintal in 1998, crashed 117 to Rs. 5000 in 2004, a decline of 81%. As a result, Indian exports of pepper fell by 31% in 2003 from the previous 118 119 year.

Combined with this, drought and crop failure has hit the pepper farmers of Kerala hard, and have forced them 120 into a debt trap. Close to 50% of suicides among Kerala's farmers have been in pepper producing districts. 4) 121 Paucity of credit facilities: After 1991 the lending pattern of commercial banks, including nationalised banks, 122 to agriculture drastically changed with the result that loan was not easily available and the interest was not 123 affordable. This has forced the farmers to rely on moneylenders who charge exorbitant rate of interest sometimes 124 even up to 24% a month and has thus pushed up the expenditure on agriculture. When the farmers were not able 125 to pay back loan with high interest, they fell into the debt trap. Studies show that most of the farmer's suicides 126 were due to the debt trap. It is part of the policy of privatisation that banks, even nationalised banks, look 127 for profit over their social responsibilities to the people. Credit extended to farmers was reduced dramatically, 128 falling to 10.3% in 2001 against a recommended target of 18%. 5) Decline of government investment in rural 129 development: Studies show that after the economic reforms the government's expenditure and investment in 130 the agricultural sector has reduced drastically. This is based on the policy of minimum intervention by the 131 government enunciated by the policy of globalisation. The expenditure of the government in rural development, 132 including agriculture, irrigation, flood control, village industry, energy and transport, declined from an average 133 of 14.5 per cent in 1986-1990 to six per cent in 1995-2000. When the economic reforms started, the annual 134 rate of growth of irrigated land was 2.62 per cent; later it got reduced to 0.5 per cent in the postreform period. 135 India has very poor rural roads affecting timely supply of inputs and timely transfer of outputs from Indian 136 farms. Irrigation systems are inadequate leading to crop failures in some parts of the country because of lack 137 of water. In other areas regional floods, poor seed quality and inefficient farming practices, lack of cold storage 138 and harvest spoilage cause over 30% of farmer's produce going to waste. The Indian farmer receives just 10 to 139 140 23% of the price the Indian consumer pays for exactly the same produce, the difference going to middlemen who 141 are the parasites for the society. Employment Guarantee Scheme, are effectively implemented. Food security of the poor will be ensured if the public distribution system is efficiently run. 7) Bold steps should be taken to 142 implement land reforms which were not implemented in most States. Feudal structures and landlordism based on 143 large holdings of land by high caste and class people even now tend to keep a majority of the people, especially 144 Dalits and backward castes, in the rural areas under their control and domination. Neo-liberal policies with 145 privatisation will only reinforce and strengthen these unjust and exploitative structures. Therefore, there is a 146 need for conscious efforts and positive steps from the government side to implement land reforms. Surplus land 147 acquired thus should be distributed to the Dalit and adivasi farmers. 148 V. 149

150 6 Conclusion

The agricultural sector in India is facing a crisis today. The LPG process, which started in the 1990s, is the main 151 reason for this crisis. The solution of the problem is not in a few "packages" but in drastic changes in the present 152 153 economic policies related to agriculture. For this, the government should be ready to take bold steps. It is high time that the government and the people realise that India can become a real "superpower" only when the vast 154 majority of the people, especially the farmers in the rural areas, become prosperous and are really empowered. 155 The words of Dr M.S. Swaminathan are relevant here: "In a country where 60 per cent of people depend on 156 agriculture for their livelihood, it is better to become an agricultural force based on food security rather than a 157 nuclear force." $^{1\ 2}$ 158

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


Figure 1: 1)




Figure 2:

6 CONCLUSION

[/nation/Modis-one-year -in-Power-Saw-/306-Farmer-Suicides-in-Maharashtr (2015)] /nation/Modis-one-year *in-Power-Saw-/306-Farmer-Suicides-in-Maharashtr*, 2015/05/25/article2832563ece.

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