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1	Yemen Crises; Historical Roots & Solution Spheres
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#### 7 Abstract

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8 Yemen is an important central state within the Arabian Peninsula, it enjoys an important

<sup>9</sup> geographic and strategic location overlooking on Global maritime navigation. Moreover

<sup>10</sup> Yemen has various and promising natural resources. As far as its population, it represents

<sup>11</sup> almost half of the Arabian Peninsula inhabitants. The Importance of Yemen importance is

 $_{12}$   $\,$  increased after the north and south unity in 1992. In the first decade of the 21 st . century

<sup>13</sup> Yemen faced political instability status came to the surface by internal struggle on the power,

<sup>14</sup> regional and international interferences which worked to deepening the political crises that

<sup>15</sup> peaked in 2011. Given the gravity of such crises on the Yemenis state, region security,

<sup>16</sup> international peace and security, I selected this crises as my research scope.

18 Index terms— yemenis crises, yemen contem- porary history, yemenyouth revolution, yemen spring.

# <sup>19</sup> 1 Yemen Crises; Historical Roots & Solution Spheres

20 Dr. Mahmmoud Al Jbarat I.

# 21 2 Introdution

emen was and still a central state occupying an important position in Arabian Peninsula. Such importance came from components of concern as to its strategic Geographical location, natural resources, fish production as well as tour and economical activities therein. Its area is about 555SKMs, in addition to major part in the Rub al Khali desert. Its agricultural area is consisting of 166 SKMs, representing one third of its total area. While the actual planted area does not exceed one fourth of its agricultural area. Yemen Depends on Monsoon rain and there are no rivers in Yemen.

Its beaches are around 2500 KM, and it practices its control over the red sea routs heading northwards to Suez and Mediterranean Sea, and southwards to Indian Ocean and Arab Sea. It practices its control over Strait of Bab el Mandeb which Oil of Arab Gulf states runs through; i.e. 30% of international oil exports. 7% of global trade navigation passes through Yemen, carrying imports to the area population.

Yemen population is 25 Millions; the Arab Tribes represents 95% of total population. Yemen witnesses population increase at 3% per annum. In Yemen almost Half of the Arabian Peninsula population is living there (F. ??ause, Winter 1988, p.35). Even though the importance of Yemen, it still classified as poor country suffering water shortage and witnesses serious water drain. Current studies expectations refer to water drain in Sana' by 2025. The individual water share is 84 M/annum (less than one fifth of the minimum limit of individual consumption as defined by the International Heath organization (WHO). In fact the social disputes in Yemen form 80% of total disputes (Aryani, April 2014, p. 112) in addition to the fact that Yemen is classified in 2014,

as 1 st . Arab Country and the 2 nd . on worldwide level in terms of food poverty.

## 40 **3 II.**

#### 41 **4** Current Crises Signs

42 Yemen Suffered in the 2 nd . half of twentieth Century a political instability represented by internal power 43 struggle, conflict between north and south Tihama, Costal Plain, tribal revolutions, increase in severity of internal 44 political transformations; military coups, civil wars in a political trend which did not witness strong central state 45 who is able to control and manage Yemen Districts. The political segmentation severity has increased due to 46 tribal relations, hard natural terrains, lack of political national identity that may gather Yemenis population as 47 one nation.

Since establishing the Yemenis unity in 1990, that adopted Pluralist democratic system as alternative system 48 instead of mono-party system, the unity state inherited all disputes, trends, previous multiple crises together 49 without setting out solutions thereto. Democratic transition in Yemen did not generate Democratic transition 50 51 requirements pursuant to transition science field and its requirements in terms of gradual dismantling of mono-52 party comprehensive Arabian Peninsula, it enjoys an important geographic and strategic location overlooking on Global maritime navigation. Moreover Yemen has various and promising natural resources. As far as its 53 54 population, it represents almost half of the Arabian Peninsula inhabitants. The Importance of Yemen importance 55 is increased after the north and south unity in 1992.

In the first decade of the 21 st . century Yemen faced political instability status came to the surface by internal struggle on the power, regional and international interferences which worked to deepening the political crises that peaked in 2011. Given the gravity of such crises on the Yemenis state, region security, international peace and security, I selected this crises as my research scope.

In my research I tried hard to shed the light on such crises in terms of; causes, beginnings, Yemenis youth revolution launching, internal outputs then Security Council and GCC efforts to dealing with the crises. I also identified the prominent opposition forces thereto, especially the Huthies who invested the crises to expand their control over Yemen lands then they changed the union state structure through their declaration to form the revolution commission, dissolving the House of Representatives and lastly controlling the state establishments.

This paper discusses the Security Council resolutions of concern to Yemen, Gulf Initiative and its chronic mechanisms, international and regional efforts to settle the crises during 2014/2015, then the Military operation; Decisive Storm was launched by alliance under KSA leadership to recover the legitimacy in Yemen.

This paper also discusses solution scopes in Yemen on the light of Security Council resolutions, Gulf Initiative, political and national Yemenis concurrence leading to road map to solve the crises, and further to re-establish the Yemenis central state supported by regional and international efforts.

system in due time and conclude reconciliation with the National memory, due to Yemenis' political elites in addition to its perceived awareness. (Shamsan, May 2015 p.102), under international and regional complex reality subject to dream to interfere in Yemen Internal affairs; each has its special reasons. The ruling regime in Yemen adopted formal democratic system ruled by tribal mentality. In order to maintain itself the regime head continued to play (Dancing on snakes heads) as President Ali Salih emphasized more than once and thus used

<sup>76</sup> to method of fueling the struggles among tribal and political parties.

The political parties incited each against another, and thus the loyalty was directed towards the president in person and persons rather than to the state, the State budget was used to corrupt the Regime loyalists and opponents or fighting thereof. The president and his close group worked to employ the political, tribal, regional struggle to strengthen his power, development plans were neglected which supposed to enhance the state role, gains, economical and social requirements as well as promotion.

Therefore, there were important indications laid its shadows on the Yemenis Scene, which is called Arab Spring started in Yemen by the beginnings of 2011, most important of which are: All of the above was witnessed in the absence of clear policies, as to economical construction & depletable sources, the wealth and political power were concentrated in the hands of one family who started to prepare itself to inherit the power to the President son, as well as the country was suffering of increasing political congestion the most important trends thereof are:

Clear strained relations between Coalition ruling party and Yemenis reformation party from one side and communist party from the other side since 1997 elections.

-Split the opposition parties on the light of participation in elections between participant and opponents. -Decrease in parliament elections participation due to many reasons, illiteracy among women, and declination in the political awareness, weak confidence in elections process, and poor registration methods and procedures. The relation among political process parties was shaped by tension. (Abdallah, 2001, p.229) -Tension increased once the ruling party insisted on performing parliament elections in April 2011, away from opposition party which agreed with ruling party to conclude many political and elections reformations before the parliament elections, and the ruling party did not respond thereto (Al Wafi, Oct. p.499)

The ruling regime brought back the traditional figures on the account of modernization figures, and their representations rate raised from 29.6% in 1990 to 44.1% in 2001. The political opposition party acquired only one third of the parliament seats during the period from 1999-2011 which weakened its power (Shamsan, May 2015, p.106.) III.

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## <sup>100</sup> 5 The tart of Revolution

The foregoing tension lead to a revolution started by the Yemenis youth on 11/2/2011 starting by peaceful comprehensive revolution against the regime, and mutiny against the tribal, social and party's loyalties which were participating in the political regime and directed towards the political corrupted system that seeks to inherit the power.

The Youth revolutionists raised their slogans expressing their needs; i.e. Our revolution is youth one rather than party and no parties "and" no negotiations, our revolution is free people revolution "and" No arguments or running away" No conference, the population is suffering hardships and crises.

The Revolution met the tribes, religious and conservatives support. The general trend of data and Fatwa came supporter as to youth demands and in line with the further stage of the gulf initiative which was laid down to transit to peaceful transition of the power and solve the political crises. All further months witnessed new Fatwa or declaration in addition to Friday's speeches in the mosques that supported the youth revolution, (Al Khateeb, Summer 2014, p.68-69).

After forty days from the revolution start and on 21/3/2011 the revolution has been supported by Military leaders in the Yemenis armed forces and some military troops; i.e. General Ali Muhsen Al Ahmer, East north region leader, 1 st . military armory band, Major General Muhammad Ali Mohsen Al Ahmer; eastern region leader who formed the revolution supporters army and Ali Al Ahmer declared his undertaking to protect the freedom avenues and changes avenues in the areas under his control.

Competition then split in the Yemenis Armed Forces between Revolution supporters army and what called Family Army, originated severe confusion in the Yemenis scene even though the general national trend, and Fatwa, speeches and statements which were supporting the demonstrations and youth demands continued to support the peaceful power transition and claims to remove president Ali Salih under slogan (Leave).

The most impressive statements in terms of time and strength, was that declared by Yemen religious scientists 122 and tribes leaders which was singed by 110 powerful figures including Yemenis Judge Mohammad Ben Ismail Al 123 Omrani, and issued on 17/6/2011, whereas he asked the Yemenis president to quite his office due to his failure 124 125 to perform its duties as Republic president caused by injuries he was subject to. Also he asked the president to 126 hand over his constitutional power to the vice president to ward off evil and bloodshed. The foregoing formed 127 shock to the regime and the president replied to such demand via Fatwa from Yemen Scientists society via which he deprived rulers from leave their houses and assured that demonstrations and current set-ins are neither legal 128 nor Shaira (statement was published on 19/6/2011. 129

#### 130 6 IV.

## **131** 7 Gulf Initiative

132 After less than one year from the inner struggle in Yemen between expositors and political regime, through 133 which some powerful figures inside & outside the regime could transfer the revolution process into negotiable process and political compatibility. GCC states tried to rescue the Yemenis state and signed what is called "Gulf 134 135 Initiative and its chronic mechanize" on 23/11/2011 based on the Security Council's resolution No. 2014 of 2011. The Foregoing initiative included many reformations to avoid the Yemenis state declination, and signed by JMP 136 of opposition parties with the ruling National conference party under the supervision of GCC states (Excluding 137 Qatar) and global understanding with states who have vital interests in the Gulf, through which the necessity 138 of peaceful political power transition is to be established that respect the Yemenis people & revolution youth 139 aspirations. By such the Yemenis president is to quite his office to his deputy Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi, 140 national reconciliation government is to be formed then conclude comprehensive national dialogue conference 141 142 paving the way to text new constitution in Yemen via which new parliament elections are to be formed and new presidency as well in the beginning of 2014. 143

During 2012, President Salih abandoned his office to His deputy Hadi, national reconciliation government was formed, and the national dialogue conference started its sessions on 18/3/2013. The conference was supposed to close down on 18/9/2013, but due to some difficulties its sessions were extended until 26/1/2014. The latest term witnessed for the first time the neutrality of President of the Republic. All traditional political powers in addition to new powers participated in the conference such as; youth, women, Hothiyoon, Salafis, South Harak and this wide participation worked to make such dialogue and negotiable process close to be cooperative game rather than zero-sum game. (Al Modei', march 2014, p.7)

After ten months from the start of Yemenis' national dialogue the Yemenis powers coincided on one paper included Yemen State re-construction under Federal basis, and authorizing the president of the Republic to form a commission to define number of regions. The first step of President Hadi was to carry out the foregoing and issue presidency decision to form a commission chaired by him consisting of 22 members to divide Yemen into regions.

The conferees agreed to perform legal and institutional procedures to develop the Democratic system and enhance separating the three powers and balancing thereof as well as exchanged control, enhance wise ruling including strengthening transparency and accountability, equality before law, developing institutional structure of all state organs and institutions. The conference as well, sat out recommendations to establish entity to recover the public and private funds and lands which were stolen, issue transitional justice law, perform institutional reformation that prevent human rights infringements, review supreme jobs occupiers law to subject thereof to accountability, convert to individual election system in minor departments to election system based on closed relative list to elect the parliament members on the federal level and federation council on the regional level, provided the woman is to be presented in its legislative commission lists at not less than 30%.

Also the conference recommended to establish independent judiciary council which the judges' General society 165 elects 70% of its members, 15% thereof are elected by lawyers society, and 15% thereof are to be elected by joint 166 meeting of sharia and law colleges councils out of law professors, enhancing judiciary independency, establishing 167 independent constitutional court, establishing independent administrative judiciary, the sub judiciary organs 168 are to report to judicial authority, prohibiting conclude civil trails before Military courts, cancel Journalism 169 court, control and accounting organs to report to judicial authority. The conference also recommended issuing a 170 law and form supreme national body for financial and administrative reformation in order to stop public funds 171 exhaustion and politicization of public offices, and another body for civil service, body for foreign affairs to check 172 up administrative and financial decisions. 173

The conference obliged the government to perform the National Civil record quickly (within maximum 3 years) 174 to prevent job duplication and set out National database, prohibit appoint any of the relatives of president, prime 175 minister, legislative power chair, Ministers of defense and interior, chief of General Intelligence up to fourth degree 176 177 and their close relatives in any leading offices in the army, security or intelligence during practicing their offices, 178 cancel the tribes affairs interests, separating among parties and government entity, completing army, security 179 and intelligence organs re-structuring, issuing law of possessing or carrying personal arms, withdraw arms from the Militias, state president and all who fill supreme political offices shall of University graduates, neutralize the 180 army, security and intelligence to practice political business, adopting clear standards, considering transparency 181 in promotion processes and legal rights as to public employee. 182

As far as Saada Cause is concerned, the paper sat out the religious & intellectual freedom, practicing religious 183 rites, prohibiting imposing thereof or forced prevention thereof from any entity whatsoever, the state and its 184 organs shall be neutral under constitution rules, setting out restrictions as to study methods, religious and 185 private education and to be under the control of the state, setting out constitutional provisions to condemn 186 acquiring money from outside entities under any name and consider such as treason ?. Deprive and condemn 187 employing the army in internal struggles ? recover the heavy and medium weapons from all parties, groups and 188 individuals and bring it back to the government within defined period of time? preventing trading therewith ? 189 treating disputes and revenges due to Saada wars within transitional justice frame and national Interests. 190

As far as South Yemen's cause is concerned, the conference adopted transitional principle from unified state to federal state provided South Yemen is to be represented through the 1 st. election course after adopting the federation constitution at 50% in all leading structures in executive, legislative and judicial entities, including institutions where appointments therein are to be adopted via decisions issued by the President of the Republic or Prime Minister; i.e. army and security (National charter).

The south is represented at 50% in the House of Representatives, after the 1 st . electoral session. The Federation constitution states "to form executive, judicial, and parliament mechanisms to protect the vital interests of the south. Such mechanisms may include challenge rights, private voting rights on causes relating to vital interests of the South and in terms of representation process it is based on equalization of area and population. Prohibiting performing amendments on federal constitution of concern as to South, save after obtaining Parliament members majority approvals thereto.

We could notice that the outputs of the dialogue conference were balanced and compatible and further it 202 treated all causes in dispute as well as replied Most Yemenis people aspirations. Moreover, it sat out solutions 203 to existing problems and prospected disputes that may take place in periods to come as well as establishing 204 restrictions thereof. On the other hand, the conference did not set out guarantees to solve the South cause, even 205 though the civil powers, youth and woman achieved clear gains, and in the same time there were losing entities; 206 i.e. tribes Sheikhs who lost some of their political strength in parliament election system and source depending 207 on war economy. But they gained in turn, from linking oil & gas sources management contracts to the region 208 that produce oil rather than region authority or federation authority (Alshurjobi, March 2014, p.9) 209

The paper formed also, model for national charter specifying basis and main lines to re-building the state and achieve the national interest, then bring Yemen out of its crises; political and social, then stop Yemen's sliding into chaos.

The Security Council issued its resolution No. 2051, whereas it enhanced the dialogue conference steps by 213 imposing penalties and sanctions on anybody who tries to hinder the conference works and in the same time 214 demanded to stop all acts that are directed to undermining the National Government and also undermining the 215 political transition; i.e. undermine carrying out the presidency decrees issued on 6/4/2012 as to Military and 216 civil appointments Yemen declared officially on 10/2/2014, that the Yemenis republic is federal state including 217 six regions; two in the south and four in the north. But such decisions faced the problem represented by the 218 social support weakness; the preservatives power who suffered damages from such decisions and in the same time 219 own weapons, funds and foreign support to practice its influence on the President of the Republic. (Al Shurjobi, 220 march 2014, p.12) 221

Whereas the process of national dialogue outputs were incapacitated, the gulf initiative parties and UN failed to convince the political Yemenis' forces to attend the dialogue and reach at political solution, the Security Council decision was issued under ref. No. 2140 in 2014, via the XII. Chapter, ordering to form global sanctions commission against the parties who incapacitated the dialogue outputs, and thus it has been transferred into global paper rather than dialogue paper.

227 V.

## 228 8 Crises Peak

Due to various reasons most prominent of which are: Ansar Allah group, Huthies, came out of the Yemenis 229 consensus as to divide the regions and their challenge thereto was attributed to preventing them from having 230 access to the sea, and considering thereof as Yemen division between rich and poor, and also the division aim is to 231 maintain KSA interests in Yemen through linking Al Joof; oil-rich area, with Sabaa' being adjacent to KSA and 232 connected tribally with KSA rather than Azal Region (Abdel haleem, July 2014, p.125) and their AC position 233 from suggested constitution and referendum thereto, then the ability of President Hadi and his government 234 to dismantle the deep government in Yemen through armed forces re-structuring commission. Moreover, the 235 government failure; both social and economical. For the foregoing reasons and may be due to others as wekk, 236 The Huthies invested the population disturbances originated from raising the oil derivatives prices, known by 237 ??Al Juraah) In 2004, President Salih felt that Huthies exceeded the allowed frame and they are circulating for 238 alternative political project instead of its regime in some of Saadah Regions, especially in Maran Directorate. 239 President Salih organized Military campaign against them continued for months and ended by the murder of 240 Hussain Al Huthey then occupy their strongholds. Al Najaf Hawza issued in April 2005 a statement titled " 241 Call for human rights forums in the world, whereas it referred to the fact that Shia party in Yemen are subject 242 to unprecedented mass elimination. Popular demonstrations came out in the streets supporting Huthies and 243 claiming to change Yemen street name in Tahran to read Hussain Al Huthey street. The national defense council 244 in Yemen held its meeting to discuss reviewing the relations between Yemen & Iran. Due to communications 245 between Yehya Al Huthey-brother of Hussain, and Iran, his parliament immunity was lifted on 28/2/2007 by 246 accusing him by illegal communication with foreign state, Iran, then he declared his political asylum to Germany 247 (Shathan Jan. 2015, p. 107) 248

Various sources referred that Huthies received support from Iran since 2004 up to 2009 and such support was financial, and military equipments which were smuggled from Iran to Yemen via Assab port in Eretria to sea coast near Saadh, Medi directorate whereas it were stored then carried by smugglers to Saadh Region, Huthies stronghold. ?? During the military operations it was clear that Iran supported Al Huthies with arms which were caught and proved to be made in Iran, gun machines, rockets, ammunition etc., this was the start of KSA and Iram entry into Yemen crises line for the first time.

In It seems that Iran invested the religious variation in Yemen to achieve its regional ambition and to carry out its strategy in extending its power and achieve its ambitions. So it established the supreme Shia council in Yemen chaired by Yemenis scientist Ayat Allah Issam Ali Al Emad who was residing in Iran. Then its relations with non Shia power such as leftists was developed after the Libyan Ambassador visit during Al Qathafi regime to Saadah region and his donation of 50,000 US\$ to establish Ahl Al Bair organization, (Shathan, jan. 2015 p.106).

#### <sup>261</sup> 9 VI.

## <sup>262</sup> 10 Huthies Expansion

The Huthies invested the term which the national dialogue took in expanding their military operations and their sites outside their strongholds Saadah, and they could, within short time, to achieve wide expansion to the strategic security zone surrounding the capital city, and in the same time showed military superiority in its ability to fight in more than one front at the same time such as:

-Kattaf and Dammage, against tribal powers and Salafist, and the battle was stopped via agreement.

-Hashed tribe front whereas they achieved victories on Al Ahmar Sheikhs in Hooth and Al Khamri -Arhab front whereas they achieved victories against the tribes loyal to Reformation party in the zone overlooking to Sanaa airport. The revolutionary commission shall take necessary procedures to protect country sovereignty, security and stability. This caused the Security Council to issue its resolution No. 2201 whereas it demanded the Huthies to withdraw their troops from the governmental establishments which they controlled, and starting negotiations among all concerned parties under the supervision of the UN. But the Huthies refused such decision and remained controlling the Yemenis cities by force.

Huthies and Salih Troops controlled the government structures, establishments and strategic decisions. They disrupted the parliament, formed military commission and cancelled the political transfer and peaceful power transition. They cancelled the comprehensive national dialogue outputs and used military power, armed violence, and killed political opponents to achieve their political aims.

#### 279 **11 VII.**

#### 280 12 Decisive Storm

Due to the political split among President Hadi legitimacy, those who agree on peaceful solution through Gulf 281 initiative provisions and its chronic mechanisms, and UN decisions of concern as to Yemenis cause from one side 282 and those who controlled Yemen by force and trying to impose their ideas by force and armed violence against the 283 political opponents and thus they turned against the national dialogue outputs, kidnapped the power, disrupted 284 the constitution, all is referred to Huthies Coup; President Hadi left to KSA and gulf states seeking their suppo 285 rt. Decisive Storm started in its way to recover the legitimacy via military alliance lead by KSA and the military 286 operations started in 26/3/2015, with its political aims; Stopping Huthies expansion and Iran interference and 287 oblige them to set on the nego tiations table with all national powers to seek comprehensive solution as to the 288 Yemenis crises. 289

immediate cease fire -Withdrawal of all troops from all zones under Huthies control -Deliver all arms which were seized from security and governmental foundations -Release all detainees -Stopping all provocative actions of adjacent states -Prohibition of arms imports in illegal manner or indirect manner to Yemen -Conclude Al Riyadh conference -Enrolling Abdel malik Al Huthey name, Ali Abdallah Salih and his son Ahmad in the black list.

KSA believed that decisive storm achieved its Military goals represented by destroying Ballistic Rockets, air defense means, weapons and fuel stores, targeting Huthies and cut all their support lines and their strongholds in south Saudi Arabia.

KSA started to launch new stage in Yemen called (Hope recovery), and declared the aim of such issue is to start new life in Yemen and its has been launched on 21/4/2015. The declaration included that during this stage all foreign citizen shall be evacuated from Yemen, offer a room for International efforts to offer their human aids and medical care to stand in front of Huthies operations and their aliens.

It was noticed that transfer from Decisive Storm to Hope recovery has been done without achieving the political aims of the storm represented by forcing the Huthies to abide by the International decision and set on negotiations table then enter in political settlement of the crises away from imposing the current stand, and evacuating the Huthey worriers from Yemenis cities and provinces which they occupied. Also to support President Hadi to

<sup>306</sup> recover the power and control on the establishments and stop Iran interference in the Yemenis issue.

# 307 **13 VIII.**

## 308 14 Solution Spheres

No doubt that the Yemenis' political and National reconciliation to work on fixed term political agendas and work as one team is very important issue in Yemen current circumstances. Also compatibility on road map of the transitional stage, dissolve Militias and armed parties, building national army and reviewing applying the regions split of the final stage in building Yemenis government, as applying thereof requires the availability of central government, enjoying power and financial capacity.

Yemen Needs the International community and regional states support, especially GCC, in terms of financial, political and economical support, in order to rebuild the Yemenis government and straightening up its internal relations among all the Yemenis community within transitional justice approved by the Yemenis people.

The Gulf initiative and chronic mechanisms are still acceptable frame and subject to development in order to solve the Yemenis cause. Also the Security Council resolutions on Yemen were compatible in the international sphere and could be activated to reach a solution in terms of Yemenis cause. In the first two weeks from the war, Yemen spheres were controlled, all its air defenses and telecommunication systems were destroyed then the Yemenis spheres were declared as Air ban area. <sup>1</sup>

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#### a) Who are The Huthies

Ansar Allah group, name addressed to their revolutionary component in demonstrations avenues during the youth revolution in 2011. Such name is close to Allah Party name (Al Khidari, January 2014, p.68), and they started as religious and social society called (Itihad Alshabab Al Moumen) in 1986 established by Bader Eddin Al Huthey. The group was turned to political party in 1990 under the name of (Right Party). The Union and party depended to gather the youth since early stages in summer camps whereas they received militant doctrine and trained as battle professional groups out of which the Militias were formed. It was clear that the foregoing is calling up for Allah Party (shamsan, May 2015, p.105). Al Huthey family had good relations with President Salih and Hussain Bader El deen was representative in the parliament representing the ruling General conference party chaired by Salih. About this party, Hassan Zaid, member of the president political office, stated in 2001 " The party in its current route has revolutionary vision but intellectually disciplined on basis, as the Islamic history did not witness assassinations, which characterized Al Haq Pary in its Yadeidi isolated current. He added " once there were circumstances imposing to establish alternative new regime, such current and thought used to have its role therein, but once such leader who claimed his legacy, the current remains accept the reality" (Alsagaf, February 2001, pp, 41-42). This means that Al Haq party remained till 2001 receives Al Zaidi thoughts basically. The relation between President Salih and Huthy was changed after Hussain Al Huthey travel to Iran, in summer 1994.

#### Figure 1:

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