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The word "Inyenzi?", which is a Kinyawanda word for cockroaches, came into political lexicon in Rwanda following the Revolution of 1959 in that East Central African nation. Following that Revolution, a hitherto politically dominant ethnic fraction of a broadly homogeneous population - the Tutsi, lost its status to an erstwhile dominated group - the Hutu. Consequent upon this scenario, and in order to escape statesponsored persecution, the Tutsi fanned out in different directions into the countries of the Great Lakes region - Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, DR. Congo. From these countries of asylum, Tutsi refugees began to carry out sporadic raids into Rwanda, in an effort to get even with the authorities, but more ostensibly to forcibly re-enter Rwanda and re-assume its former dominant position. The now dominant Hutu ethnicity responded by referring to them as cockroaches, so as to encourage not just disdain and hatred for them from the larger society, but a murderous pre-disposition, much like the natural human disposition toward cockroaches. It is the extent to which this contextualizes the denial of justice and human dignity that this paper seeks to determine. The paper also evaluates the consequences of this exercise for peace and development in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Index terms— justice, human dignity, Hutu, Tutsi, peace, development.

1 Introduction

One of the basic challenges of mankind over the ages has always been the need to recognize and preserve the dignity of the human person in times of conflict and war. Most times, parties in conflict tend to forget the essential humanity of their adversaries, and so proceed with unprintable cruelties against them. The unspeakable atrocities which are at times meted out to opponents or adversaries may be justified on the usual over-riding imperative of winning or triumphing over one's so-called enemies, but humanity must constantly keep in mind that these enemies remain human beings and that today's enemy may become tomorrow's friend! Perhaps it is this realization that propelled mankind to attempt to prescribe some rules on combatants, otherwise referred to as "Laws of War" (Garner II). These were formulated in various codes and conventions which largely emanated from the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and in many Geneva Conventions of the United Nations.

Aspects of warfare and rules governing them dealt with in these documents include, but not restricted to the following: blockade, the care of the sick and wounded, protection of medical personnel and facilities, the treatment of prisoners, forbidden weapons, the powers of military commanders in occupied territories, the rights and duties of neutrals, the use of poison gas etc. (Palmer, Perkins 273). In spite of these rules, which were enacted primarily to respect and preserve the sanctity of the human person, even in times of war, mankind has continued to agonize over atrocities being committed against fellow human beings simply because they happen to fall on the wrong side during conflicts and wars.

Even though a commentator has observed that "the laws of war have helped to humanize warfare", he went ahead to indicate, and rightly, that they have not availed to prevent the most inhuman practices (Palmer, Perkins 273). These straddle the broad spectrum of denial of justice and human dignity in times of conflict. It is the

4 A) BACKGROUND TO THE INYENZI PHENOMENON IN RWANDA 1959-1962.

extent to which the conflict situation that existed in Rwanda between 1959 and 1994 contextualizes this reality that this paper intends to analyze. We shall proceed by attempting a conceptual understanding of the basic terms of justice and human dignity, so as to enable us to appreciate their adherence or otherwise in the Rwanda of our period.

2 II.

3 The Concept of Justice

In discussing the concept of justice, we do not intend to delve into the legal rubrics of the subject. Our intention is to highlight the main features of the concept to enable an averagely enlightened mind to appreciate its place in the light of the analysis that will follow. According to Khaja A. Muntaqim, Justice refers to the remedy available to anyone who feels hurt, suffers any damage or has any of his rights infringed upon. Justice demands that the other party make good the loss and restore the infringed right (Muntaqim 170). Since in most cases, the individual, and even a group usually look up to public officials to dispense justice, it follows that the public must be able to rely on the law to ensure that the power available to public officials is used in a way conformable to its ideas of fair dealing and good administration. Thus the more power a government wields, the more the tendency to abuse, and so the more sensitive the public must be to any kind of abuse or unfairness. It is in this context that a commentator noted: "as liberty is subtracted justice must be added". If civilized society must subsist, then what is referred to as natural justice must be prevalent. This is the justice that is based on established principles and tenets of law. Over the years, these principles have crystallized into two rules: that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing. This presupposes that judicial, and indeed public officials must be unbiased, disinterested and or impartial when acting in the public realm-judex in cause sua-the adjudicator must be disinterested and unbiased.

This brings us to the very related concept of human dignity. To properly contextualize respect or otherwise of human dignity in Rwanda based on the Inyenzi phenomenon, we must attain a firm grasp of the concept itself. The issue of human dignity cannot be discussed in any significant detail without relating it to the basic principle of right to life. Hence, taking a cue from section 33 and 34 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, C. A Omaka entitle his article on that subject "Rights to Life and the Dignity of Human Person" (Okpara 111). According to Omaka in this article, the right to life is the most basic, the most fundamental, the most primordial and supreme right which human beings are entitle to have and without which the protection of other human rights becomes either meaningless or less effective (Rancharam 63). Further expatiating on this, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated that the right to life is a fundamental right in any society irrespective of its degree of development or type of culture which characterizes it, since this right forms part of the "jus cogens" in international human rights law (Okpara 112). Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties is a preemptory norm from which no derogation is permitted. It emphasizes the fundamental nature of the right to life. The preservation of this right is one of the essential functions of the state, as the numerous provisions of national legislation establish guarantees to ensure its enjoyment.

But for this right to be enjoyed, a corollary, the right to dignity of the human person must also be enshrined, respected and strictly adhered to. The right to life necessarily includes the right to live with human dignity, and all that goes with it (Okpara 129). These include bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, facilities for reading, writing and expression of oneself. From the foregoing, it is apposite that every individual or group of individuals or ethnic group is entitled to be treated with dignity accorded to human beings, irrespective of their social status. The dignity of the human person is an inalienable right that must be protected and jealously guarded if humanity must continue to maintain its claim as a higher being, next to God on planet earth. As we proceed in this analysis, we shall now endeavour to determine the background of the Inyenzi phenomenon in Rwanda, and how it developed and began to raise issues of justice and human dignity for those involved.

4 a) Background to the Inyenzi Phenomenon in Rwanda 1959-1962.

Rwanda is a tiny land-locked country of about 26, 338 km² in land area (Ndunayezu 44). It is geographically located in east central Africa, and formed part of former German East Africa in the colonial days. For space constraints, we may not delve into the details of the history of this rather fascinating, and at same time, foreboding land, that is tucked into the deep recesses of central Africa, even though we may need to do just that if we must get the average reader to really appreciate the actual basis of the Inyenzi phenomenon. (Prunier 1995, Newbury 1988, Maquet 1970, Kamukama 1997). We shall therefore proceed to highlight only the main features of that history that can portray this background.

It has become customary to speak of Rwandan society as being divided into three groups -the Hutu, about 85% of the population, the Tutsi about 14%, and the Twa about 1%. These may not be racial groups, nor are they ethnic groups in the conventional sense. Overtime, the meaning of the terms, and the categories they describe have changed, influenced as it were by changing contexts of power, and by the role of the state (Newbury 112).

Rwandans of all categories and groups live side by side each other on physical layout marked by alternating "musozi" or hills, (Prunier 1) and speak Kinyarwanda language.

Before the arrival of the Europeans in the late 19 th century, the ruling elite had a sense of its own superiority. In the late 18 th and early 19 th centuries, when Rwanda was located in regions best suited for pastoralism, (De Forges 44) members of the elite prided themselves on their knowledge about, and control of cattle, and looked down on cultivators lacking in both. Later in the 19 th century, the central state expanded into regions dominated by cultivators, and the elite responded by making alliances with local leaders, which comprised of abahinza-persons with ritual importance ie King makers, and Abakuru -heads of important lineages. In the same period, the ruler, Rwabugiri took into his service significant numbers of men from outside the elite in order to increase his control over the old aristocratic lineages. In keeping with these political changes, and in order to keep its superiority, the aristocrats adjusted their attitudes to stress military skills, and scorned the masses that fell short in martial ability and experience. This sense of superiority tended to have been linked to the aristocrats' sense of what they owned and what they could do than to any emphasis on racial characteristics. As Des Forges informs us, the elite we now call Tutsi "encompassed a number of competing lineages who had arrived in Rwanda at different times over a period of centuries and who had different interests as well as varied backgrounds" (De Forges 44). On the other hand, the masses that we now know as Hutu included both peoples long resident within Rwanda and those who had just arrived from Zaire (DRC) or Uganda. Due to the complex variables of the situation, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi remained flexible as individual could, and did move from one to the other.

We observe that the Tutsi sense of superiority over the Hutu appeared more elitist rather than racist. But the attitude of both groups towards the Twa was clearly racist. They scorned this small, if grotesque (personal observation), part of the population by not only refusing intermarriage, but even the normal courtesies of sharing food and drink with them.

But, when the Europeans arrived at the beginning of the 20 th century, they brought their own kind of racism. This was to have enormous impact upon Rwandan ideas and practices. Given the rather almost obsessive pre-occupation with race in the late 19 th and early 20 th century Europe, on their arrival in Rwanda, the Europeans assumed their superiority, and proceeded to value others in relation to their perceived nearness physically and otherwise to themselves. Thus translating their racism into the African context they formulated the "hamitic hypothesis", according to which "white Africans" from the north east had brought civilization to the rest of the "benighted" continent. Colonialists -first the Germans, and then the Belgians found the Tutsi of Rwanda the ideal Hamites: "tall, elegant, narrow featured". (De Forges 44). Being determined to validate their own prejudices, the Europeans explained as unfortunate aberrations those Tutsi who did not conform to their image of what a Tutsi should look like-a darkskinned European. Having been accustomed to viewing Tutsi and Hutu as homogeneous groups (which they really were in any case), the racist obsessed anthropological thinking of the period proceeded to ascribed stereotypical intellectual and moral qualities to the people of each category.

With little hesitation, the European decided that the Tutsi, were more intelligent, and perhaps more devious and so born to rule. The Hutu on the other hand, dumb but good natured, could not be other than productive loyal subjects. These ideas were put into practice by the Europeans by limiting posts in the administration, as well as the higher education needed for the jobs to Tutsi. To further ensure that only Tutsi had access to these benefits, they instituted a system of population registration by introducing what can be regarded as ethnic identity cards, labeling each person at birth as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.

Politically astute by training rather than by birth as the Europeans supposed, the Tutsi readily understood the prejudices of the Europeans, and exploited them fully to their own benefit. They not only used European backing to extend and intensify their control over the Hutu, they also joined with the Europeans to create the ideological justification for this exploitation. In a great devious, even cynical collaborative enterprise over a period of decades, European and Rwandan intellectuals created a history of Rwanda, that fit European assumptions, but which essentially advanced Tutsi interests. While the Europeans provided the theoretical and teleological, framework, the Rwandans provided the supporting data to explain and describe the progress of Rwanda to the height of its power at the end of the 19 th century. According to this description, the first and most "primitive" inhabitants were the Twa hunter gatherers. Next, came the trusty Hutu, who happened upon the scene to cut the forests and create some fledging political organization. Then swooped the "conquering" Tutsi from Ethiopia or from the sky (. The thesis of "conquerors" appeared plausible as the Tutsi was a minority that managed to subjugate a far more numerous mass through their martial skill and superior intelligence, as the Europeans supposed. Then finally, came the lighter skinned and more clever minority, still fewer in numbers but more powerful in organization-the Europeans, These then established their control over all the others, and proceeded to recruit the Tutsi closest to them in intelligence and physical outlook to embark on a collaborative effort in dominating Rwanda.

The results of this collaborative enterprise were accepted by intellectuals around the court circles. It was not surprising that the Tutsi were pleased with this version of history, but even the Hutu majority swallowed the distorted account of the past hook-line-and -sinker. Thus the people of Rwanda learned to think of the Tutsi as winners and the Hutu as losers in every great contest of the Rwandan past. As time went on, extremist Tutsi, encouraged by European admiration and influenced by the amalgam of myth and pseudo anthropology, moved

5 B) THE INYENZI PHENOMENON AND DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN DIGNITY IN RWANDA OF THE 1990S

from elitism to racism. They then proceeded to transform the dividing line between themselves and the Hutu into the same kind of line that had once separated them and Hutu from the Twa.

The colonial policy of the Europeans helped to intensify bipolar differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu, by inscribing ethnic identification on identity cards, as we noted earlier; by relegating the vast majority of Hutu to particular onerous forms of forced cultivation and "corvee"-forced labour exacted through the whip; and by actively favouring Tutsi in access to administrative posts, education, and jobs in the modern sector generally. By the end of the colonial period in Rwanda, though not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful but most of those who were wealthy and powerful were Tutsi.

But this situation was not destined to last forever. As the nationalist era dawned in Africa of the 1950's and 60's, things began to change. Due multiplicity of self-reinforcing factors, (Prunier 44-46, Gatwa 52-53) the colonialists switched sides, abandoning their erstwhile protégés, the Tutsi, for the Hutu-the Rwanda Revolution of 1959 had begun. For the Hutu, the Rwandan Revolution was an important watershed. It marked the end of Tutsi domination of the state, and the accession to power of the Hutu. As the revolution ran its course, it culminated in the abolition of the monarchy, the arrow-head of Tutsi power. Nyinginya aristocracy collapsed, as the last Mwami (king) Kigeli V fled abroad to the United States. On January 28 1961, at an emergency meeting of burgmestres and municipal counselors in Gitarama, the sovereign democratic Republic of Rwanda was declared by acclamation. (Prunier 53). Following the toppling of the monarchy, an interim government was formed after controversial elections won by Dominique Mbyonyumutwa. But as the UN withheld recognition for the elections, a fresh one held under its auspices in September 1961 was won by Gregoire Kayibanda, who became President designate on 26 October 1961. The UN Trusteeship status granted following the defeat of Germany in World War I was formally terminated, and independence was granted Rwanda on 1 July 1962.

In the midst of these momentous events, an estimated 150,000 (Kamukama 23) Banyarwanda, mostly Tutsi had fled Rwanda to neighboring countries to escape state-sponsored terrorism directed against them by the new Hutu elite.

Between March 1961 and July 1966, ten major armed incursions into Rwanda was carried out by the Tutsi refugees sequestered in neighbouring countries Uganda, Burundi, Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Zaire (Congo DR). These attacks initially targeted Hutu officials, but as time went on, they began to take the form of an organized armed struggle aimed not only at forcing their way back into Rwanda, but reclaiming the lost dominant status of the Tutsi in Rwanda, and possibly re-establishing the monarchy. The issue of getting back into Rwanda became particularly vexatious following the accession to power of Army General, Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973, who began to argue that Rwanda was too small to accommodate the refugees.

Since the attacks took place at night, Tutsi guerillas who took part in them soon came to be referred to as "Inyenzi" cockroaches in Kinyarwanda. Once again, as time went on, especially during the regime of Habyarimana (1973 -1994), the entire Banyarwanda Tutsi community both within Rwanda, and in the diaspora came to be identified as 'Inyenzi'. So, every Tutsi became a legitimate target of reprisal attack from the state whenever the Tutsi guerillas attacked. Besides, following the heightened rhetoric of hatred in the period leading up to the genocide of 1994, the public was made to see every Tutsi as a "cockroach", not a human person, such that the moral inhibition of killing human beings would be removed if the target or victim is Tutsi. Such was the power of the 'Inyenzi' phenomenon in the Rwanda of the Hutu Republic. The question remains, could this be justified under any circumstance? Can the ends of Justice and human dignity be served in any way by the use to which the 'Inyenzi' phenomenon was put in the Rwanda of the Habyarimana days?.

5 b) The Inyenzi Phenomenon and Denial of Justice and Human Dignity in Rwanda of the 1990s

The very analogy the inyenzi Phenomenon provoked was a pointer to the denial of human dignity to the Tutsi, and their sympathizers both nationally and internationally. This became increasingly evident following the reprisals that were being exacted on the local Tutsi population, each time the so called "inyenzi" attacked, and culminated in the mass arrests that followed the Rwanda Patriotic Front's (RPF) invasion of 1 October 1990. Perhaps we may relay a dialogue between two Rwandese Tutsi on the issue. It ran thus:

"If the Tutsi refugees attack", I said, it will only mean reprisal killings of Tutsi living in Rwanda". "But we must fight", he said, "Habyarimana will never allow Tutsi to have equal rights" "Yes, I know", I said, cutting him off But a rebellion is not the answer. You know as well as I do that if there is an attack, massacres of Tutsi will begin". (Sebarenzi 47). The ends of justice could not be served, since these massacres did not discriminate between culprits, accomplices and those completely innocent or even sympathetic to the Hutu cause (Prunier 248-49). We are told that there are two basic postulates of natural justice: Audi alterant partem -the other party should; also, be heard, as no one can be a judge in one's own cause. In other words, judicial (public) officials: must be unbiased, was denied so was the dignity of the human person dispensed with during the rather frequent massacres that attended the "Inyenzi" attacks. As Joseph Sebarenzi has informed us, during these episodes Tutsi families would be huddled in plantain and banana grooves for days or weeks without food, shelter or provisions of any sort. If they are lucky to survive, their homes would have been burnt and food, properly and cattle looted, stolen or killed respectively (Sebareuzi 250-1). All these culminated in the RPF invasion of 1 Oct. 1990, as we indicated earlier. As Tharcisse Gatwa has indicated, following the invasion, in the night of 4 and 5 October

1990, the army organized-in the city of Kigali and other places a feigned RPF attack with automatic weapons and shootings” (Gatwa 124). Taking it as a pretext, they imposed a curfew the next morning, and proceeded to arrest more than 10,000 persons. These were herded into football stadiums and later detained under appalling conditions, without food or water over several days. According to a renowned commentator on the Great Lakes regional affairs, over 90% of those arrested were Tutsi (Reyntjens 94). When human beings are herded like cattle, and put in an open space without food and water, their dignity as human beings has certainly been denied.

But this was only a tip of the ice-berg on coming calamities. We are given an inkling by a speech given by Leon Mugesera, the Vice Chairman of President Habyarimana’s political party-National pour le Movement Revolution et la Development -National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) in Gisenyi in late 1992: This speech, and many others like it that was to follow in the build up to the cataclysm of 1994, had a foreboding and ominous connotations. First, its reference to the theories that made the Tutsi foreigners, from Ethiopia, and not Rwandans, tended to a Justification of Habyarimana’s insistence that Rwanda was already filled with its own citizens, so foreigners must either stay where they are, or better still locate their original homes and go there; and that genocide had already been planned (Gatwa 125). The speech eventually proved to be a prophetic reading of coining events. When genocide began in April 1994, the river became a conduit pipe for corpses of men, women, children, old people and-infants, Tutsi and moderate Hutu elements. Hundreds of Thousands of these victims never had the chance to defend themselves or to prove their innocence for whatever may have been their offenses. The ends of justice and human dignity were deliberately sacrificed on the altar of political expediency.

6 c) Implications of the Inyenzi Crisis to Peace and Development in the Great Lakes Region to 1994 and Beyond

A major implication of the crisis induced by the inyenzi phenomenon was the creation of security problem for the government of the Hutu Republic in Rwanda. With this came economic troubles, as peace is always a concomitant to any form of economic progress. For the region also, implications arose in the form of economic and security and political issues. Traditional Rwanda was an agro-pastoral country where vast land-holdings competed with small farms (Gatwa 182). The republican regime spurned by the 1959 revolution had proceeded to distribute to the agriculturist Hutu the lands and pastures that belonged to what Tharcisse Gatwa called “the barons of the monarchical regime ??Gatwa 182). Due to this redeployment on new lands, dramatic food shortages could not become immediately evident, but 50% of the families came to live on a piece of land estimated at between 0.25 and acre ??Eripicum 6). As population growth stood at 3.7% per annum in the early 1990’s, the inheritance system required a continuing division of the family land into pieces distributed to male children. This tended to a contraction of production rather than growth. As if this was not bad enough, by the late 70’s, 1977 to be precise, disadvantageous terms of world whoever wants peace prepares for war. Listen well to me, it is the fourth or fifth time I repeat this in our prefecture of Gisernyi... I was recently talking to a militant of PL (a political party which was associated with the Tutsi and to the RPF), that the grave mistake committed in 1959, though I was too young was to allow the Tutsi to escape alive outside the country. I told him, I tell you that your country (Tutsi) is Ethiopia, and we will soon send you on an express trip via the Nyabarongo River (that is the source of the Nile) Here you are, I repeat this to you we must start the work right now. Finally, I want to remind you of the essential part of my speech: Vigilance. In the first instance, know that whoever you have not beheaded is the one who will behead you .

trade manifested in the fall in the international price of coffee. This, coupled with bad climatic conditions, led to a deficit equivalent to 6.2% of GDP, which increased within the year to 10.7%. All these combined to a degradation of the economy, impoverishing the population. Thousands of young men left jobless were ready to accept recruitment by the extremist groups for “dirty jobs”. This was a recipe for the tension and insecurity that prevailed in the Rwanda of the period.

Meanwhile, in the “near abroad”, especially Uganda, which had received a disproportionate number of the Tutsi refugees, situations began to get from bad to worse as the 80’s wore on. Even though the Banyarwanda Tutsi refugees were initially accepted and enthusiastically welcome, especially in areas such as Mbarara, Ntugama and Bushenyi with dominant Banyarwanda population, as time went on, they began to attract the hostility of local people. This and other factors forced them to enlist in Yoweri Museveni’s guerilla army of the 1980’s. But as victory was won in 1986, other set of factors arose to cause Banyarwanda Tutsi to become a liability to Museveni in his attempt to achieve national reconciliation in his country . Consequent upon this, and other factors, the “Rwandans abroad” as the Tutsi refugee community came to be designated, began to be treated as second class citizens. The situation culminated in their expulsion from Uganda during the second Obote regime. This coincided with the time when the Habyarimana junta in Rwanda adopted and pursued the policy represented by the analogy of ‘already filled cup of water’ as mentioned earlier. According to Catharine Newbury ??Newbury 13), this policy can be explained by the claim by Habyarimana that there was insufficient land for the population already in the country, and so repatriation of refugees, often the children of Tutsi who had fled the country over the intermittent episodes of violence, was denied. So, rejected by the country of asylum, and also rejected by their own home government, the Tutsi or the so-called sympathizers of the ‘inyenzi’ had no other option than what happened on 1 October 1990: invasion of Rwanda. Thus the ultimate implication and aftermath of the inyenzi phenomenon was the RPF invasion of Rwanda which initiated a period of internal insurgency that culminated

in Tutsi (RPF) seizure of power in Kigali in the wake of the 1994 genocide. By so-doing, the history of Rwanda came full circle. The greatest nightmare of the Hutu, which was the driving force behind the inyenzi phenomenon and propaganda: the return of the Tutsi to power in Kigali following their ouster via the 1959 revolution, was accelerated by the injustice of the inyenzi contraption.

7 III.

8 Conclusion

Modern statecraft must be based on statesmanship. Gains from injustice will always remain a chimera. They have a way of slipping through the fingers of those who claim to have made them. Craftiness and injustice can only bring continuing agonies in the political economy. That is the lesson of Rwanda to the world of the 21st century.

We do understand that unlike the pre-colonial ethnicity, the ethnicity that emanates from the rapidly changing national and global conditions is fiercely competitive. It is not aimed at promoting production and commerce, but the control and monopolization of power and maternal resources. It seeks advantage in the socio economic and political scheme of things. These characteristics are reinforced by the partisan nature of the African state-in factional disputes, the extensive intervention of the state in economic and social life. This makes the state a strategic instrument for power and wealth in Africa. From this stand point, one can understand the intensity of the struggle among ethnic groups to control and dominate the state. The above was true of the Rwanda of our period.

We recall that in Rwanda, the Nyinginya state machine as represented by the Mwami and his Court had rejected a hand of fellowship extended to it by the Hutu majority in the period leading up to independence. In what came to be regarded as the Hutu Manifesto, nine young Hutu leaders had petitioned the Mwami (King), making demands which ostensibly amounted to asking the Mwami to institute social reforms that would replace injustice with justice. These, among others were the demands: The abolition of indirect administration favouring the Tutsi elite; the abolition of forced labour; the installation of a social charter designed to promote trade unions: Freedom of speech: The privatization of property and the creation of a rural trust for the promotion of the peasantry: The codification of customs: The promotion of the Hutu in the public administration; equal access to opportunities in education and scholarship; as well as the abolition of the heresy of 'Hamite supremacy'. They also demanded a democratization of institutions before independence is granted, to avoid what they perceived would be "indigenous colonization" should the Belgians withdraw.

Rather than respond to these demands, the Mwami and his entourage energetically rejected the demands en bloc, and in a very arrogant and ethnic tone. They ridiculed the claim of co-operation, and rejected that of brotherhood with the Hutu. Supporting their argument with myths and legends, they wrote:

The tone, content and rationale for this reaction is clearly evident, the intention to control and dominate the state for the resources and material aggrandizement of the group, irrespective of the ends of justice and fair play. But as we indicated, benefits derived from injustice cannot long endure. In the 1990's, it was this same group that denied brotherhood with the Bahutu that were agitating to be allowed to return to a supposed home land with the Bahutu as compatriots.

The lesson of Rwanda, once again, to the rest of Africa in a 21st century international system remains the abiding need for good governance. The African values of brotherhood and the sanctity of human life must continue to condition our relationship with one another. The timeless virtues of justice and respect for human dignity must also continue to define our interactions either as groups or as individuals. The need to deliberate on the traditional African values of brotherhood and the sanctity of human life, as we indicated earlier, becomes more imperative as we realize that solutions to ethnic intolerance and under development in Africa are unlikely to come from outside the continent, as Rwanda has equally proved. ¹

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- 360 [This Kigwa found the Bahutu in Rwanda. How then could Kanyarwanda, far posterior to the three races, Bahutu, Batutsi and B
361 ‘This Kigwa found the Bahutu in Rwanda. How then could Kanyarwanda, far posterior to the three races,
362 Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa be considered as their common ancestor? Our history says that Ruganzu had
363 killed many Bahinza’. *The ancestor of the Banyiginya (the reigning lineage) is kigwa. He arrived in Rwanda*
364 *with his brother Mututsi Mutusi and their sister Nyampundu*, (of Merano, of Randa, of Kobo, of Gisa, of
365 Kijuru, of Kimanuka, of Kigwa) 1961. (But the relations between us (Batutsi) and them (Bahutu) have
366 always been built on servitude. Thus, there is no foundation for brotherhood. Hutu Monarchs) and then
367 conquered the Bahutu counties of which these Bahinza were kings. How then could the Bahutu pretend to
368 be our brothers? (Nkundabagenzi)
- 369 [Eripicum et al. ()] *Vredescilanden*, R Eripicum , Le Rwanda , Maintenat . 1990. (Print)