

1 The Cold War in the West Asian Planet: A Historical Study of 2 the Afghanistan Unsettledness

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6 **Abstract**

7 The cold war in West Asia was come across by the world in shape of Afghanistan conflict.
8 This battle besides unfocused the U.S.S.R. from her armaments competition by way of the
9 U.S.A, consequently let America to achieve a scientific plus. USA ratcheted up stress on
10 U.S.S.R. all the way through several means. The Reagan government initiated introducing
11 missiles in Western Europe, principally in Western Germany, tactically positioned to terrorize
12 Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. Reagan moreover initiated buttressing the United States
13 armed forces. Reagan custom-built innovative jumbo jet carriers and long-drawn-out
14 America's stealth aircraft curriculum. Toward the Soviets, these measures indicated a broaden
15 armaments fissure, in particular in terms of scientifically sophisticated armaments.
16

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18 **Index terms**— cold-war, ussr, usa, afghanistan, west-asia, unsettledness.

19 A subsequent purpose of Soviet course of action had been to exercise its relationship with Afghanistan to
20 fashion complexities for Pakistan, a US ally and one-time base for spying operations against the Soviet Union.
21 Unstated support from the USSR was significant in Afghanistan's decision in December 1953 to repudiate the 1921
22 treaty in which Afghanistan had recognized the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan
23 and what was then British India. The same year, the Afghan premier declared that American military aid to
24 Pakistan constituted a threat, a view that was shared in Moscow. And when Kabul articulated its support for
25 Pakhtoonistan [2], Moscow announced and repeatedly confirmed its support of the Afghan moves. [3] The anti-
26 Pakistan policies of Afghanistan elicited strong Soviet support in the diplomatic crises, which on two occasions
27 led to diplomatic breaks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nor has the Soviet objective in playing up the
28 nuisance value of Afghanistan for Pakistan always been subtle. To that day, Moscow pressed on Islamabad the
29 need for strong Soviet-Pakistani relations as the only real guarantor of improved Pakistan-Afghan relations and
30 of a peaceful northern border for Pakistan.

31 The 3rd Soviet objective in Afghanistan was to demonstrate its good neighborly policies. The Soviets had
32 repeatedly emphasized a policy termed by Khrushchev in 1960 as never having a friendly neighbor alone in her
33 needs [4]. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was part of this policy and Soviet cultivation of good relations with Muslim
34 Afghanistan kept their common border peaceful and did not provoke the ethnically related Soviet Muslims. The
35 USSR's objective here was to demonstrate in Afghanistan the advantages that accrue to a Third World country
36 that remain outside the American orbit.

37 The 4th soviet objective could be' characterized as an outgrowth of the Soviet Union's perceptions of it role.
38 The USSR was an Asian as well as a European power and it projected it image in the Third World more as an
39 Asian power, which identified with the concerns of die less-developed countries. Despite the challenge from the
40 People's Republic of China in that quarter, Moscow had persisted Soviet involvement with Afghanistan helped
41 to legitimize the Soviet Union operations in a region that had seen rivalry between the three superpowers. The
42 Soviet objective was to neutralize and if possible to exclude other powers from the region, and Afghanistan was
43 an important part of that regional strategy.

44 1 II.

45 2 Mechanism of Soviet Guiding Principle

46 The USSR as a superpower had numerous means at its disposal, which it could utilize in pursuit of its foreign
47 policy objectives. The Soviets offered Afghanistan military aid as well as training for the Afghan armed forces,
48 much needed economic aid to help develop their backward neighbor, trade which helped to offset the foreign
49 aid debt and to offset the geographic disadvantages of diplomatic support for Afghan causes in particular the
50 Pakhtoonisian quarrel with Pakistan. Each of these is analyzed below.

51 Primarily, the Soviet Union gave military aid to Afghanistan to counter US aid to Pakistan and Iran.
52 Reflections of realpolitik demand that Soviet concentration to Afghanistan in the interests of refuting that
53 bordering country to the rapidly growing American alliance system. Stuck between 1955 and 1972 Afghanistan,
54 officially, nonpartisan, was given \$455 million in military aid [5]. To that date "Soviet military aid deliveries
55 to Afghanistan were in excess of \$600 million [6]. Since 1956 the USSR has made available 95 percent of Afghan
56 military paraphernalia. Additionally, at the same time as of 1979 there were some 4,500 Soviet military gurus
57 in Afghanistan serving to maintain military equipment and to direct the fighting against rebels. As Afghanistan
58 moved closer to Moscow, its military dependence increased. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet
59 military had essentially taken over all of the functions previously performed by the Afghan army.

60 Soviet military instructors accompanied modern Soviet weapons. In fact, Soviet instructors replaced the
61 Turkish and German officers who were the traditional instructor of the Afghanistan. Both at the military
62 academy in Kabul and in the field Soviet mentors became strictly involved with the enlargement of the Afghanistan
63 military, helping with the assemblage and maintenance of military equipment, schooling local personal in the use
64 and maintenance of military apparatus and advising staff and armed forces officers. Besides, soviet instructors
65 had skilled a substantial number of Afghan pilots and crewmen to operate the modern jets delivered by the USSR.
66 The closeness of that affiliation had developed strong pro-Soviet elements inside the officer corps in the Afghan
67 military, and that was that group, which carried out the coup d'etat against King Zahir Shah in 1973 and played
68 a key role in the 1978 coup against President Daud which "brought the Communists to power in Afghanistan.

69 Military support to Afghanistan had been a part of the overall prototype of Soviet relations. It was originally
70 given to increase Soviet power and prestige. Military support to Afghanistan had been a part of the overall
71 prototype of Soviet relations. It was originally given to increase Soviet power and prestige. In order to continue
72 the pursuit of that power and prestige, Moscow had had to undertake a greater military commitment to the
73 Afghan regime than it might at first have foreseen.

74 Economic aid had also been an important component in the Soviet-Afghan relationship. Between 1954 and
75 1975 the Soviet Union gave \$1.263 billion in aid to Afghanistan, making it one of the largest recipients of Soviet
76 assistance [7]. Grants comprise a larger share of Soviet aid to Afghanistan than to any other Third World country.
77 About 1,500 Soviet economic advisors and technicians were assisting Afghanistan in a massive amount of projects
78 [8].

79 Afghan dependence on the USSR for economic aid had 'been pronounced since the fall of Daud. Indeed, the
80 offer of 52 billion made by the Shah of Iran to help counteract that dependence was a factor in the overthrow of
81 Daud who was perceived by the pro Soviet factions in Afghanistan as moving to the right and also as weakening
82 the growing ties to Moscow. Economic aid from the United States reached \$500 million by 1977 but was cut off
83 in February 1979 after the murder of the American Ambassador Dubs. Thus Kabul was no longer able to exploit
84 the competition between Washington and Moscow, as previously it had done so successfully.

85 The Soviet Union was Afghanistan's principal trading partner. Afghan Trade with Eastern Europe was also
86 shipped from first to last the USSR, while trade with the West and with India in handled through Pakistan.
87 Pakistan kept constant to allow transit facilities but because of the unfortunate stale of its relations with
88 Afghanistan the latter's reliance or trade with and through the Soviet Union had increased.

89 Soviet diplomatic support had been influential in strengthening Afghani claims against Pakistan, Afghan
90 calls for Pakhtoonisian had been believable because of Soviet backing, and that was for that reason 'that they
91 had been taken gravely in Pakistan. Soviet diplomatic hold up was used as an instrument for gratifying the
92 "appropriateness" of Afghan policy toward the USSR.

93 3 III.

94 4 Reviewed Evaluation of Proceeds and Overheads

95 The epoch of Zahir Shah's epoch was the most trouble-free time in Soviet-Afghan relations. In retrospect, it is
96 ironic that Moscow's tacit support was instrumental in the kings overthrow the subsequent declaration of the
97 Republic by his pro-Soviet cousin Mohammed Daud, who took over as President and the pro-Soviet elements in
98 the afghan military for a time after Pakistan stand. Thereby pleasing the activists in the military who felt that
99 Soviet backing was essential for a solution to Afghanistan's only problem-the Pushtoonistan issue [9]. Moscow
100 greeted the Daud coup with enthusiasm and hailed the new regime's determination to pursue a policy of non-
101 adherence and no adherence to military blocs [10]. Reaffirming the classic Soviet approach to South Asian politics,
102 Pravda stated.

103 "Naturally the people of the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to the political changes taking place in
104 Afghanistan. The question is not merely concerned with the fact that our southern neighbors, Afghanistan,
105 and the Soviet Union have a common border more than 2,000 km. long, but that Afghanistan is a friend and
106 its people are our friends." [11] There were supplementary contestants for Soviet benevolence, at a distance
107 from Daud himself and the Soviet-trained Afghan military personnel. The Marxist-Leninist Khalq party led by
108 Taraki and Hafizullah Amin set off Daud's program by working for a course of action which would lighten "the
109 boundless sufferings of the oppressed natives of Afghanistan," through a conquest of international Marxism over
110 intercontinental entrepreneurship," incomparability of municipal over clandestine sector, and land reorganization
111 to over haul the feudal organism overlooking Afghan society. The Parcham party led by Babrak Karmal was
112 an derivative of the Khalq party from which it had come apart in 1966, as an upshot more of devices than
113 philosophy. Parchamies were more in good turn of working within the structure and were ever accused after the
114 1978 coup of group effort with Daud, even though they had turned out to be disheartened with the weakening
115 of the progressive side of his rule and had largely inhibited their hold. Even though they had helped in the 1978
116 coup beside Daud, Parcham leaders were either sent out of the country or shut down when the Khalq party took
117 power.

118 The 1973 coup was projected to auxiliary Moscow's objectives in Afghanistan, and for a while it did. Daud
119 in the beginning allowed bigger contribution for the pro-Moscow left in Afghan political affairs and reaffirmed
120 Afghan thankfulness for Moscow's support largesse he not only moved closer to the Soviet Union in municipal
121 support, but he also articulated support of Moscow's Asian united safekeeping sketch and became aggressive
122 to Iran and Pakistan but in a little while Daud set in motion to run into complexity, losing the support of
123 pro-Soviet fundamentals who well thought-out his modernization curriculum and reform a farce exportation that
124 Hand would make wider the decision making bottom to comprise those who helped him to muscle proved false,
125 and the constricted base of power remained in actual fact in Mohammadzai hands. What's more, the conventional
126 traditionalist essentials in Afghan world were apprehensive of Daud for his known flirtation with Moscow and his
127 dependence on the latter in his 1973 invasion. [12] Daud's takeover expenditure of Soviet Union got increased
128 the aid support in economic and military sectors. While half of the \$ 1.3 billion aid committed by Moscow
129 to Kabul had been delivered, the pace of delivery was stepped up after 1973. The Soviet Union committed
130 itself to 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power, oil and gas exploration, mineral and metal
131 processing and transportation. [13] Moscow's honeymoon with Daud began to bitter later than the Shah of Iran
132 lucratively enticed the Afghan President away from exclusive reliance on Moscow. Daud, who was in problem
133 with household splinter groups of the left and the right, acted in response by straightening out his differentiation
134 with Pakistan? He blamed domestic troubles for the stoppage in signing a concord identifying the Durand Line
135 as the authorized border line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. When Daud, at some stage in a visit to Sadat's
136 Egypt in 1978, reprimanded Cuba for its inclined stand in the nonpartisan pressure group, the Soviet Union saw
137 that the accomplishment of its intentions in Afghanistan, pulled off decades of international relations, was in
138 danger of spinning to malfunction.

139 5 IV.

140 6 The Nur Muhammad Taraki Coup and Union Pro Moscow

141 Although Daud's removal from power came at a time when Moscow was progressively gloomier with his course
142 of action, there is little substantiation to put forward direct Soviet intervention in the April 1978 overthrow.
143 There, Daud was killed by the side of 29 other associates of his family and a projected 3,000 others who were
144 either Mohammadzaies or minimally blameworthy by unification with the ruling family. There is, on the other
145 hand, the prospect that Moscow's despondency with Daud's policies was a fundamental dynamic in heartening
146 the Parcham and Khalq divisions to amalgamate and integrate.

147 The new Soviet leverage in Afghanistan was best understood in historical perspective. Whereas, the successive
148 Afghan rulers had been competent in the 19th and 20th centuries to take part in oil. Russian concentrations
149 against those of the British and later the Americans, their aptitude to carry out that paired act then had been
150 complicated by the existence of domestic forces named or predisposed by Moscow. In other words, Moscow had
151 got hold of neighboring allies who could force down for transformations and policies that could be approving and
152 favorable for the USSR. But which it could not bear down on directly. Pro-Soviet rudiments in the military, a
153 decisive resource of support and muscle in Afghanistan organism had provided evidence principally helpful to
154 Moscow in carrying out The 1978 revolution had been referred to as the unintended overthrow by an observer
155 of the Afghan scene who witnessed it from close quarters. [15] It resulted from the aggravation caused by Daud
156 and moved toward a direct upshot of the assassination on ??pril 17, 1978, of Akbar Khyber, the ideologue of
157 the Parcham splinter group. Although the Khalq faction was suspected of attachment, annoyance was lined and
158 veined against Daud, and he well thought-out an onslaught and crackdown beside leftist leaders, Hafizullah Amin,
159 the Khalq co-leader who afterward grew to be president of Afghanistan, was proficient without more ado before
160 his apprehension to get in touch with three military officers, a couple was major in the army and a colonel in the
161 air force, who set off the rebellion because of a feeling of at this time or on no account. The 2000 bodyguards of
162 Daud were to conclude subdued by air force terror bombing campaign. Air force squadrons trustworthy to Daud

163 could not get their own back owing to a communicational collapse. As a consequence the Democratic Republic
164 of Afghanistan was born espousing open-mindedness, the wellbeing of peasants, workers, and land reforms.

165 Once upon a time, the budge towards Moscow came instantaneously; Soviet acknowledgment was absolute
166 to the new government, and Moscow showed its gladness at Afghan gradient in her favor. Soviet intentions of
167 pro-Soviet Afghan administration, serving as an example for next-door countries and backing up in rebuffing the
168 area to great-power contestants, was being fulfilled and pleased. Afghanistan had become yet another triumph in
169 a series that-encompassed Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. It confirmed and demonstrated the hostile source
170 of power followed dynamically or by failure to pay of budding Soviet credence and weight. The United States,
171 by contrast, appeared in the eyes of regional countries to be on the self-protective and condemned to inaction.

172 The 1978 coup was followed by stepped up Soviet economic and military aid. The price of coalition could
173 be witnessed here in greater than before support. 72 up-to-the-minute economic support accords were signed
174 by Moscow between April 1978 and March 1979, and those were accompanied by an incursion of almost 4,500
175 Soviet counselors. As the Taraki administration exchanged blows for authenticity, legitimacy and power, which
176 schemed the Soviet Union by virtue of its selfdeclared alliance with Moscow into giving greater support.

177 The vigilant equilibrium in Afghanistan policy under Daood. Who had hunted fiscal support from both east
178 and west, was once another time went down in favor of entire reliance on Soviet, relieve. For the reason that the
179 Taraki management turned not in favor of all technically trained or opinionated Afghans. Most of whom were
180 connected to the prior rule; it very much needed Soviet consultants to fill in the space in all ministries of the
181 government. Additionally, Soviet advisers were posted in the office of the president. The finale of the slant came
182 in the office of companionship signed by Taraki in Moscow on December 5, 1475. That concordat institutionalized
183 Afghan reliance in the USSR. Taraki was not capable to get a mainstream of Afghans to support his hallucination
184 of an original Afghanistan. His transformation in education, land, over ship, and communal strategy ran into
185 complicatedness as a mutiny by a small number of tribesmen grew into an extensive confrontation in a mainstream
186 of the 28 Afghan provinces. A dribble of refugees entered Pakistan after May 1978, and by August 1979 their
187 number had augmented to 100,000. They had a discussion regarding the movement beside the Communist rule
188 in Kabul as a religious over and above a nationalistic upheaval, since Taraki had been abnormal and got against
189 Islam and put up for sale Afghanistan to the Soviet Union.

190 Pakistan was the first country to recognize the Taraki government and had offered full mutual aid in
191 transportation, travel and trade amenities and facilities. The Pakistani president, General Zia ul Haq, visited
192 Kabul devoid of invitation in September 1978. On the other hand, as well-liked opposition to the Taraki regime
193 spread, Pak-Afghan relations deteriorated. Pakistan counted 56 violations of its air and ground space and
194 Afghanistan charged Pakistani involvement in the mounting insurgency inside the country. These charges were
195 held up by the Soviet Union, as Afghanistan's neighbors were made scapegoats on a campaign to influence
196 Afghans that the revolt was not inside based.

197 The Soviet Union sustained to put anxiety on Pakistan to send back the 450,000 Afghan refugees for the
198 reason that their occurrence was seen as constituting an embarrassment and mortification to the victory of a
199 socialist regime. Pakistan had responded that it couldn't force them back for humanitarian and compassionate
200 reasons. Furthermore, these refugees had relatives and unavoidable associates in Pakistan with whom many were
201 staying. The border was a porous one and Pakistan was unable to stop them from crossing over. Nevertheless,
202 consistent with the Pakistan government, that was up to the Afghan government to stop them, that could one
203 way or another be managed. Moscow had subsequently put pressure on India to persuade Pakistan to return the
204 refugees. The Indian response under Desai was to give advice the Afghans to generate in-house state of affairs,
205 which would make possible their come back.

206 As the fighting increased, the Soviets were drawn in with increased military aid, and soon there were reports
207 of Soviet pilots flying combat missions against rebel strongholds. In addition, an East German embassy was
208 opened, and the Cuban mission enlarged

209 The Cold War in the West Asian Planet: a Historical Study of the Afghanistan Unsettledness to eighty persons.
210 In contrast Kabul asked the missions of the United States, China, Iran and Pakistan to decrease their staffs.
211 While the Soviet Union benefited in that Afghanistan began to follow Moscow's line slavishly after April 1978, the
212 costs were increasing as Moscow became more heavily committed. It could be seen as a case of the tail wagging
213 the dog and Moscow, for the first time, faced a dilemma in Afghanistan. It had a duty to support a self-declared
214 socialist regime, but the cost in material and diplomatic terms was increasingly high. Not to support the regime
215 meant the collapse of Afghanistan's socialist experiment and a victory for "reactionary elements there as well as
216 in Iran, Pakistan, China and the United States, since Soviet propaganda has repeatedly linked these countries
217 as conspirators seeking the overthrow of the Communist regime. There appeared to be no easy responses and
218 Moscow's search for a solution was complicated once more by yet another coup.

219 V.

220 7 A Punter State for Moscow

221 Soviet advisers cautioned Taraki and Amin to act more slowly in implementing reforms in order not to alienate
222 so many so rapidly shah who lived in tome sparked rumors of the kings return under a soviet aegis. This may
223 have contributed to the September 1979 coup in Kabul.

224 Hafizullah Amin was the strongman and ideologue of the Khalq party. He perceived that Taraki was

225 succumbing to pressures to moderate for example at the Havana Summit of Nonaligned Nations. Taraki moved
226 away from the direct confrontation with neighbors that he had previously threatened that this moderation was
227 not distasteful to the Soviets is suggested by the fact that Taraki stopped in Moscow on his journey home from
228 Havana and was given a warm welcome. However, reports circulated that Moscow was less than satisfied with
229 the Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, and would seek to replace him in a move to win support from the rebels.
230 Instead, Amin moved first, and a week after Taraki returned from Havana he was overthrown in a coup and was
231 killed. Amin declared that Taraki was alive but sick and almost a month later admitted he was dead as a result
232 of a long illness.

233 Amin declared that his September 16, 1979, coup marked the beginning of a better socialist order" in which
234 the enemies of the people had been eliminated. [16] He moved harshly against the opposition, dropping napalm
235 on rebel villages, removing political opponents, organizing the secret police under his personal control, appointing
236 his brother as Governor of four provinces and other friends and relatives to key posts. He had not previously
237 listened to Soviet advice to go slowly, and there was little to indicate that he would do so after he assumed power.

238 8 VI.

239 9 A Glove Puppet

240 Soviet stakes in Afghanistan were high, and Moscow was put in a position where it had to support Amin at least
241 for a limited time or face the prospect of a backlash, similar to the anti-US feelings in post-Iran if the rebels won.
242 But Moscow was looking for an alternative leader even as President Brezhnev sent Amin a letter congratulating
243 him on his "election" shortly after the coup. [17] Amin was committed to ensuring that reforms launched after
244 1978 were not set back. The coup was a desperate attempt to prevent a change in policies. To win Moscow's
245 concurrence, Amin acted as a client of Moscow's but a client that told its patron that it couldn't be forced off its
246 chosen path to socialism. It was a new version of the patron-client relationship, and it turned out that Moscow
247 did not like its new equation with Amin.

248 Anyway, on December 27, 1979, the Soviets moved with 50,000 troops into Afghanistan and established control.
249 In the process, they killed Hafizullah Amin and brought in three days after the coup Babrak Karmal, the leader
250 of the Parcham party, to be the new president of Afghanistan. This move, characterized as the most serious
251 challenge since World War II by President Carter, destroyed detente and put Southwest Asia directly in the path
252 of a possible US-Soviet confrontation. [18] The timing of the Soviet move was curious. As early as June 1979
253 there had been reports in Pakistan of a Soviet division within Afghanistan's borders waiting to interject direct
254 Soviet force. It is surprising that US intelligence reports did not pick up this information. Contrary to many
255 reports, the rebel movement was inflicting no more damage against the Kabul government in December than
256 it had been in the months past. In fact, there was some indication that the Soviet-backed Afghan army would
257 make a successful bid against the insurgents before the winter snows deepened. Hence why did the Soviets invade
258 Afghanistan at the moment in time?

259 There were a number of plausible reasons for the Soviet move. Principally, Moscow perceived US policy in
260 Southwest Asia to be essentially bankrupt and US responses limited by an inability to project American power
261 beyond a temporary naval presence. The 100,000 men Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was operationally years
262 away, and the lesson learned in projecting US forces even 90 miles from American shores in Cuba could not have
263 been lost on Moscow. The exercise hopelessly delayed by foul weather and bogged down in bureaucratic and
264 logistic problems, demonstrated the inadequacy of any US response in a critical situation half a world away.

265 Subsequently, the Soviet Union took advantage of the American-preoccupation with Iran. The spectacle of
266 a United States condemned and held hostage in a country where only in January 1978 President Carter had
267 proclaimed the Shah to be an island of stability in an unstable area of the world permitted a unique chance for
268 Moscow to move to project its own power in a region where the United States had only recently been dominant.

269 In the same way, in the foray of Afghanistan the Soviet Union took advantage of a golden opportunity to move
270 towards the final play of the Great Game. By means of fulfilling its ambitions to secure a warm water port on
271 the Indian Ocean-then only 300 miles from Soviet army positions through troubled Baluchistan. The temporary
272 collapse of detente seemed a price-worth paying for the achievement of such a major and concrete objective.
273 While the United States may threaten future action against further Soviet moves for then the Soviet Union had
274 dramatically changed the political map of areas under its domination and control. One had to understand the
275 larger objectives of that invasion-Afghanistan in and of itself was not a sufficient prize. The Soviet invasion had
276 destroyed what remained of the regional leaders, a concept put forward by Dr. Brzezinski and endorsed in the
277 Carter visit to New Delhi and Teheran. With the collapse of the Shah and his role as the policeman of the Persian
278 Gulf, the return of a Moscow-oriented Mrs. Gandhi, and the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan, Washington could
279 no longer count on any of its regional powers in Southwest Asia to guard its interests in a game where the stakes
280 were high.

281 Correspondingly, the Soviet Union did not wish to see an uncompromising Islamic revivalist area encompassing
282 Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which might encourage its own Muslim population-a goal it probably shared
283 with India. This could not have been a goal uppermost in the minds of the Soviet planners, but in combination
284 with the other factors it undoubtedly influenced the decision to intervene.

285 As a final point and lastly, the prospect of a failing Socialist experiment invited a Soviet response to move-with

286 force sufficient to get the job done. While socialist honor had to be defended, Moscow must have recognized that
287 the negative publicity of the move would not redound to its propaganda advantage, as seen in the condemned of
288 the Soviet move in the General Assembly and Islamic Nations Conference.

289 Babrak Karmal had, in the words of one Afghan, been brought to power perched on Soviet tanks. Despite his
290 efforts to harm the reputation of Amin as a stooge of the CIA and his undertakings to wipe down the atrocious
291 excesses of the Amin regime through gesticulations such as the release of Afghan opinionated prisoners, there
292 were few indications that he was perceived as being more benevolent-or more in-dependent. At the same time as
293 the USSR was carrying out policies to soften the dead set against religion and rebellious traditional perceptions
294 of the Communist. Organization in power the presence of Soviet troops everywhere fed the opposite belief that
295 Babrak Karmal was not the master of his fate even in his own house. [19].

296 In nutshell Soviet policy in Afghanistan had so far been a success. Soviet Objectives to keep Afghanistan out
297 of the Western orbit, to use the country to legitimize Soviet concern with Asia, to demonstrate to Pakistan the
298 need for Soviet friendship-had then largely been realized. While the virtues of Soviet friendship were suspect in
299 light of the strong embrace of Afghanistan, there was grudging respect for the extent of the support that a Soviet
300 commitment brings.

301 The primary position of Moscow was ensured in Afghanistan by virtue of its size and common border and
302 because it was Afghanistan's foremost trading partner. Soviet international relations had sophisticated Afghan
303 good will over decades. In the last 5 years, it had become more heavily committed to the course of events
304 unfolding in Kabul. Post-1973 success for Soviet policy in Afghanistan came as Moscow reaped the benefits of
305 domestic discontent and pro-Soviet Afghan groups sought to initiate progressive changes. They had operated, at
306 times, with direct Soviet approval, but had always had Moscow's tacit support in aiming Afghan policy towards
307 a clearly Soviet orientation. These groups were encouraged by their perception of American unwillingness to get
308 involved in regional problems driven by a desire to settle scores with their neighbors-Pakistan foremost among
309 them.

310 The USSR was then heavily involved in Afghanistan. The cost of that involvement was rising. While Moscow
311 might wish reconciliation between the Afghan government and the rebels who disagreed with the socialist path,
312 and might even look for a compromise, there was little indication that the regime would be able to get the
313 support of the population. But they had military control and while Soviet power was dominant, their control
314 was ensured. The Soviets might even succeed in pacifying the rebels with their vastly superior force and the use
315 of nerve gas. They would run a puppet regime in Kabul knowing that otherwise the conservative Muslim rebel
316 forces could win, thereby changing the Southwest Asian scene to a mullah controlled one-with possible adverse
317 implications for Soviet control of the USSR's Muslim population.

318 10 VII.

319 11 Butt of Counterfeit Viewpoints

320 The Soviet invasion might have been the last card that Moscow chose to play, but there was no doubt that it
321 preferred to play the card rather than to lose its long cultivated and hard won place in Afghanistan. Moscow
322 could not have wished for the souring of the Afghan revolution, but faced with its demise again the Soviets would
323 protect the Revolution. [20] It is too fact that Afghanistan is one of those unfortunate countries that have been
324 the victim of false (F)

325 beliefs. The Afghan confrontation between Afghanistan and British Indian were not measured opinionated
326 wars by several Afghans but were between Islam and Christianity. As a result of these wars, abhorrence urbanized
327 between the Afghanistan and the British.

328 King Amanullah of the Mohammadzai dynasty wanted to bring Afghanistan to the same level as any European
329 country. Although there was great hatred against the British, king Amanullah advised the Afghans to learn the
330 English language, as it was the key to technological and scientific knowledge. He also thought that devoid of
331 educating the women the new generation could not originate evolution. King Amanullah advised the Afghans
332 to seek knowledge giving the example of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.W.) who said that of necessary;
333 one should go even as far as China to search for and rummage around for knowledge. But some of the fanatical
334 groups disagreed with Amanullah Khan. They disagreed that the Prophet (S.A.W.W.) had meant that those in
335 the hunt for Islamic knowledge should go to China. King Amanullah Khan also used to say that in Islam any
336 person could lead the prayers consequently he himself used to lead the Friday prayers but the fanatical clergy used
337 to say that he was not eligible to do so, for the reason that he did not wear a beard. [21] King Amanullah did
338 not hope the flatterers around him and in order to be familiar with what the people considered with reference to
339 him and his government, he made it a customary practice to camouflage himself and roam in the bazaars of the
340 Afghan people. On one occasion he was more or less recognized by an Afghan was said to him, yours eyes are
341 as beautiful as the eyes of the king Amanullah'. The king by the way had been blessed with a pair of extremely
342 attractive eyes. It can be expressed that Afghanistan has the dubious honor of being the first state outside
343 Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe to be invaded by the Soviet Union since the Second World War.
344 The invasion of this out-of-the-way country, in December 1979, also sounded the final death knell for 1970s-style
345 East-West detente. The continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan still sours relations between East and

346 West, and between the Soviet Union and China. But strangely enough, this poor and remote land has a history
347 of drawing the attention of great powers.

348 Russian interest in the orientation of Afghanistan could be traced to the eighteenth century expansion of the
349 Czarist Empire southward, taking over central Asian khanates. For some two hundred years the Russian and
350 British (India) empires battled for influence in Afghanistan, the key buffer state in the Great Game. Britain
351 established and helped maintain an independent kingdom in Afghanistan until a coup in July 1973 by the King's
352 cousin. Afghanistan had remained neutral in two world wars and non-aligned in the early days of the cold war.
353 After a request for aid from the United States was refused in the early 1950s, Afghanistan turned to a closer
354 relationship with its Soviet neighbor.

355 This pro-Soviet gradient was of little consequence for many years, except to Pakistan-a CENTO collaborator
356 of the United States. Afghanistan's population of fifteen million included and integrated eight million Pathans,
357 who every now and then sought an independent and sovereign Pushtoonistan, which would take in Pakistan's
358 the then North West Frontier Province (now KPK). Conflict with Pakistan along the frontier was contained, but
359 continuous, and led Afghanistan to lean more heavily on Soviet aid. The 1973 coup installed a more pro-Soviet
360 regime but at the time the Soviet Union seemed to have done little directly to bring this about. Further unrest,
361 especially in the armed forces, led to another coup in April 1978. [22] The armed forces put in power the People's
362 Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a radical Marxist group sharply divided between two factions, the Parcham
363 and Khalq. The new Prime Minister, N.M. Taraki was a Khalq leader and immediately set about radical land
364 reform. He also antagonized wide sections of the population with vicious attacks on members of the Parcham
365 faction. Above all, he pursued uncompromising Marxist policies, including anti-Islamic campaigns, and a growing
366 Soviet influence emerged in social and political life. The resulting alienation of the people led Taraki's deputy,
367 Hafizullah Amin, to strengthen his position. [23] In September 1979 Taraki, with Soviet support, botched an
368 attempt to purge Amin and was he killed.

369 It was at that point that the Soviet Union began serious plans to invade Afghanistan. In the meantime, Amin
370 began undoing Taraki's handiwork. He even signaled his desire to re-open contact with Iran and Pakistan, as
371 well as western states, in order to win support against the growing Muslim fundamentalist opposition movements
372 in Afghanistan. The Soviets feared the loss of Afghanistan and invaded on 24 December 1979. They installed
373 Babrak Karmal, a Parcham faction leader in exile in Moscow, and arranged for him to request Soviet assistance.
374 The' basic Soviet motive was the security of its southern border and maintenance of a friendly Afghan regime.
375 Apparently the Soviet Union did not fear a spread of Iranian-type Islamic fundamentalism to its own central
376 Asian territory, because Moscow used its own Muslim troops and at first relied on the Afghan army to control
377 the rebels. However, it soon became clear that Muslim fundamentalism was a greater threat than originally
378 appreciated. Troops from the European part of the Soviet Union were hurriedly brought in. [24] By sooner
379 or later sending some 115,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan, Moscow demonstrated its ability to deploy large
380 numbers of troops beyond its territory and its determination to wage a dirty and prolonged war. By 1985, it was
381 estimated that the campaign had cost \$12 billion and at least 25,000 Soviet casualties. Perhaps half-a-million
382 Afghan soldiers and civilians have been killed out of a population of 14 million. But the war can hardly be
383 seen as a success, except in its most limited objective of keeping the Afghan regime out of hostile hands. The
384 Soviet armed forces appear to be bogged down in a war where superior firepower merely allows the Russians
385 to control towns and most major roads but not the three-quarters of the countryside. Cynical observers noted
386 this might be called 'socialism in one town'. Soviet access to the Gulf is not significantly enhanced and, on the
387 international scene, Moscow has earned widespread criticism from the non-aligned and Muslim worlds, not to
388 mention the West. New Soviet tactics in 1984 concentrated on using air power to depopulate the countryside,
389 creating free-fire zones. The short-term military position was stabilized but the regime in Kabul seemed no more
390 secure than in 1980. Factional politics in the ruling Afghan party and low morale in the army were the most
391 serious problems.

392 Rebel forces could take pride in holding the Soviet Superpower at bay, but they were just as far from achieving
393 power in Kabul in 1986 as in 1980. The two hundred or more rebel movements lacked a common Programme
394 even if they had a common enemy and offered no real alternative to the Soviet-supported regime. They found
395 uneasy allies in the United States, Egypt and, to a certain extent, China and Pakistan, all of whom provided
396 limited arms to the rebels. Western interests were more straightforwardly anti-Soviet than pro-rebel. After all,
397 the fundamentalists among the antigovernment rebels had much in common with Khomeini's Iran. While these
398 anti-Soviet forces cheered every minor military triumph over Soviet troops, they regularly expressed concern
399 every spring when Soviet forces swept into rebel-held areas in force. The result has been military stalemate. [25]
400 The Soviet intention was to impose a military solution but, in the longer term; to drive Pakistan into cutting
401 off the rebels' access to arms. Some four million refugees from Afghanistan were already straining Pakistan's
402 resources, especially since the refugees were mainly Pashto and threatened to destabilize Pakistan's northwestern
403 border province. The challenge to the Pakistan regime also gave the Soviet Union some hope that a new leader
404 in Pakistan would solve their problems. Pakistan's policy is to sit tight, arguing that only a more broadly based
405 Afghan regime has any chance of survival. It is also unclear whether Pakistan could now move against rebel
406 bases on its territory without destabilizing its own border region.

407 Negotiations, organized by the United Nations and managed by Diego Cordovez, began in 1982 and, despite
408 early indications of progress, have remained deadlocked. The key question was whether and when Soviet troops

12 CONCLUSION

409 would quit and whether the Kabul regime would really change its character. After five years of war, the Soviet
410 Union was unlikely to quit without having confidence in the stability and friendliness of the regime in Kabul. To
411 be sure, the war was a drain on a Soviet economy now looking for savings but in the Soviet definition, national
412 security has always been worth a high price. Some political concessions on the nature of the Kabul regime may be
413 possible and the reforming Mikhail Gorbachev did install a more pragmatic Dr Najib in May 1986 as the Afghan
414 leader. In January 1987, Najib proposed a unilateral ceasefire and the Soviet Union indicated that it was prepared
415 to quit Afghanistan soon. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union intends to transform Afghanistan into
416 yet another central Asian republic. However, the incentive for Afghanistan's neighbors to help arrange a deal is
417 not very high. Only Pakistan seems vulnerable to pressure but a direct Soviet attack on Pakistan would certainly
418 raise the stakes since that country has enjoyed American support. In the flurry of diplomatic activity in early
419 1987 the United States made it clear that it was discouraging Pakistan from accepting the new Soviet offer of a
420 ceasefire and troop withdrawal within eighteen months. Thus, despite much apparent diplomatic and military
421 activity, the political and military situation in Afghanistan seems deadlocked. Perhaps the best the Afghans can
422 hope for is to become the Asian Finland. [26] VIII.

423 12 Conclusion

424 In nutshell, this research paper lets everybody make out that Mr. Gorbachev came to power in March 1985;
425 Afghanistan presented his most immediate foreign policy dilemma in the Third World. His approach to this
426 problem provided the proof that new thinking did involve a substantive change in Soviet foreign policy and that
427 Moscow would no longer allow secondary, regional issues to drive its foreign policy to the detriment of its primary
428 objectives.

429 Gorbachev's policy toward Afghanistan provided a model for Moscow's subsequent approach to other regional
430 conflicts. In Afghanistan, Gorbachev demonstrated that his commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional
431 disputes was not rhetoric alone and that the drawdown of military force was a primary objective. In Afghanistan,
432 the national reconciliation emerged as the favored Soviet political solution to those regional disputes in which
433 Moscow sought a facesaving compromise. Furthermore there in Afghanistan, Moscow showed that, while it would
434 seek to reduce the costs and risks associated with its Third World realm and sphere, it would go on with to make
435 available its clients with the indispensable assistance and backing to shore up them.

436 Moscow's wrapping up to pull out Soviet ground forces from Afghanistan was an inferred admission and
437 right of entry of its incapability to hold back the uprising. It was also an acknowledgment and admittance that
438 the unrelenting pledge of Soviet forces to an unwinnable conflict and inconsistency was a bleed dry on sparse
439 domestic possessions and a pricey embarrassment and loss of composure. As a final point, the decision was
440 a sign of Moscow's acknowledgment that the charisma and magnetism of Soviet combat forces in Afghanistan
441 was a foremost obstacle impediment both to its longstanding regional objectives and to the relaxation of the
442 intercontinental milieu, which Gorbachev needed in order to chase his domestic precedence and primacy.^{1 2}

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