

# Rising China: Not at War With Us

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## Abstract

The rise of China is indeed no less than a miracle as the state has shown splendid economic growth in the period of few decades. This rise has managed to attract the world wide attention. While many in the contemporary world look at China as an opportunity, the Western school of thought has portrayed it as nothing but ?a threat? to the United States in particular. Despite already having her allies in the region and a network of military bases other than the increasing economic relations with East Asian states, United States has adopted measures to contain China. China?s behavior, on the other hand, shows that the state is more inclined towards the economic interdependence thereby creating a harmonious environment which will ensure world peace and stability. Her regional policy shows that China not only wants to develop sound economic relations with all but also desires to sort out differences through dialogue and consensus. China has by far avoided making alliances at both the regional and international level. Furthermore, China?s growing economic relations with United States in particular point towards her peaceful rise.

*Index terms*— china rise; power; modernization; economic liberalization. asia-pacific.

## 1 Introduction

and the largest exporter and holder of foreign exchange reserves; China cannot be ignored. 1 Moreover, owing to her giant economy, there is no doubt left regarding China's great power status.

In economic realm, China has exhibited impressive willingness towards economic liberalization by opening herself up. China has presented a unique model of success to the world by undergoing structural changes. While Soviet Union failed to overcome its economic crisis because of its inability to adapt, China adopted the Soviet model of central planning when required and replaced it with economic openness and liberalization when needed. Her decision to join World Trade Organization and integration into global economy proves this point well.

This impressive economic development has been accompanied by growing suspicions by the U.S. The China's economic rise is indeed one of the most highly and hotly debated topics in the contemporary politics where different analysts have drawn various possible future scenarios. While the staunch realists believe that China's rise will imbalance the status quo thereby creating trouble in the region and at the international level, the liberalists think the other way round. For them, the rise of China as a super power will not only stabilize the world more, it will also create further economic interdependence which will benefit all the actors included. In the light of such divergent opinions, it is therefore important to carefully analyze the rising China's power, her behavior towards the regional states and the existing great power ie Unites States, and the credibility of the American suspicions regarding her rise.

The reason why the discussion of a relative power of a state in comparison to another is often difficult is probably because of the complexity of the nature of the word "power". Power, which occupies central position in world politics, has been defined in a number of ways and the exact definition is not yet complete. Generally speaking, the term power is often related to influence, control, force etc. For Robert A. Dahl, it is the ability of A to cause B to do something which B would not do if given the choice. 2 While the definition still occupies important position in the realist explanation of the world politics, it has failed to explain the increasing interdependence between

## 1 INTRODUCTION

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45 the states, the reby creating a situation in which B would do what A wants due to the common interests they  
46 share. Dahl's hina's economic rise is often described as a miracle by economists. Irrespective of social turmoil and  
47 economic sluggishness that China experienced prior to 1949, the state eventually managed to somehow stabilize  
48 its economy under the leadership of Mao Zedong. While the reforms for structural transformation were launched  
49 in early 1950's for the sake of modernization and industrialization, China's economic success story begins from  
50 1978-79 when Den Xiaoping launched an energetic era of economic reforms. His economic reforms like Household  
51 Responsibility System and Enterprise Responsibility System contributed a lot towards the economic growth of  
52 the state. Since then, the Chinese economy has improved and strengthened under the dedicated and intelligent  
53 leadership. Consequently, China has emerged as a global economic power. Today as the world's second largest  
54 economy, largest manufacturer second scenario suggests the likely possibility of a positive-sum game.

55 Power has been categorized in a number of ways but here one may start with the general division done by Kira  
56 Peterson who distinguishes power into coercive, bargaining, concerted and political power. Coercive power, as  
57 the name suggests, is related to use of force and violence to get the job done. Treating the international relations  
58 as a zero-sum game, a great power can convince a relatively weaker state to do what the great power wants  
59 either through the use of direct force or by creating deterrence. The bargaining power also relies on the available  
60 resources and so is somehow related to the first type, yet despite the competitive interests the states may agree  
61 to cooperate; not because of coercion but because of interdependence. Concerted power is not hierachal rather  
62 horizontal. It simply means that the outcome is not owned by one actor but belongs to many. Largely driven  
63 by the common interests and progress, the involved members work together. The fourth one is the institutional  
64 power which "is the capacity to implement decisions, enforce rules, provide essential collective goods and achieve  
65 collective goals." 3 Another nature of power that needs to be mentioned in the 21 st century is the soft power  
66 that for Joseph S. Nye is " the attractive power". 4 Keeping in mind this general overview of power, one can not  
67 only estimate China's power but also her behavior in the world politics. Moreover another important fact often  
68 overlooked is that despite China's increasing power in relevance to United States and her growing influence, the  
69 clear distinction can be made between the behavior of the rising powers of the previous century and China; not  
70 only because of the transition in the nature of international system but also because of China's willingness to  
71 adapt and peacefully co-exist. Therefore, equating China's growing power to aggressive or challenging behavior  
72 would be wrong.

73 As far as the first form of power is concerned, China no doubt has an impressive military power but it has  
74 not used the power for violent or coercive purpose. China, by spending 2% of its GDP, occupies second position  
75 in the military spending after U.S.A, though the difference between their spending is roughly that of 1.2% 5 .  
76 The state is also a nuclear power since the Cold War. Yet as said earlier, the behavior of the state needs to be  
77 analyzed as well. China has adopted the doctrine of No First Use and self-defense. Secondly, China has always  
78 given more priority to the economic power rather than the military power. China has also insisted on the limited  
79 development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore though China had previously been engaged in territorial rifts, it  
80 has resolved these disputes not with the use of coercive power but through compromise and dialogue. Even with  
81 the contrasting territorial claims that are left, China's leadership has assured to resolve the issues peacefully.

82 Bargaining power, which is less intense than the coercive power but encourages competition and rift, also does  
83 not define China's influence well; provided the fact that China's "inviting in" and "going out" strategies create  
84 more of a win-win situation for all. By opening up her economy, China has provided a great opportunity to  
85 world community as well via her contribution to the international trade. China's relations with third worlds  
86 states, for example, do not reflect an unequal partnership rather economic interdependence; thereby benefiting  
87 both and creating opportunities for further integration. Hence it can be said that unlike the other powers,  
88 China does not want to concentrate power rather share it. As Zheng Bijian writes in "China's Peaceful Rise to  
89 Great Power Status" that China will not follow the example of great powers who strive for global domination,  
90 in fact, it strives for development and peace of the world. 6 China's determined commitment to the strategy  
91 of "peaceful co-existence" and the introduction of "China's peaceful rise" under the leadership of Hu Jin Tao  
92 further elaborates the point. Talking about the institutional power, China has institutional influence in the  
93 world mainly due to her permanent membership of United Nations Security Council. China's performance in the  
94 Security Council demonstrates well that she realizes the authority and responsibility that comes with this status.  
95 In the post-Cold war era, China's participation in UN peacekeeping has been enlarged. It is the 13 th largest  
96 contributor to United Nations troops overall and the first largest contributor among the P5. 7 Furthermore;  
97 China has always advocated strengthening the international law and supremacy of United Nations against the  
98 unilateral interventions and state-led coercive measures. Four Chinese requisites in this context are: all activities  
99 should be authorized by UN, cooperation of the concerned state, stability of the state and region, and fourthly  
100 China's own limitations as the state is fully aware that commitments need to be made after full consideration of  
101 one's capacity. 8 This is the reason why China has urged dialogue in the contemporary nuclear crisis of North  
102 Korea and Iran . She urged them both to abide by their commitments, failing which both the states have faced  
103 sanctions. However based on the assumption that any use of force may worsen the situation, China has urged  
104 all the actors to resort to dialogue. The Six-Party Talks, initiated by China to reach a compromised agreement  
105 over North Korean nuclear crisis is one such example.

106 Lastly, China's soft power is increasing with the passage of time due to various reasons. Though many analysts  
107 believe that China's soft power lags behind that of Western powers, Chinese elite's increasing desire to expand

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108 the soft power demonstrates the importance this power occupies in Chinese politics. Moreover, China has all the  
109 elements of soft power ranging from the cultural, language and civilizational power to the intellectual power. 9  
110 Five principles of peaceful coexistence play an extremely important role. The five fundamental rules governing  
111 China's foreign policy include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression,  
112 non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 10 It can  
113 be argued that it is not just the capital that a state invests in other states or at the international level that helps  
114 the state to improve its image, the behavior also matters a lot. For instance despite enjoying military supremacy  
115 and elevated supreme soft power, anti-American sentiments are increasing around the globe. This evident decline  
116 in United States' intangible influence is probably because of U.S interference in the internal matters of the state,  
117 her unilateralism which often contrasts with the international norms and standards, strings attached with her aid  
118 or assistance to other states in the form of proposed reforms or strict conditions and most importantly because  
119 of the dual approach towards the issues concerning allies and foes.

120 It is, therefore, without any doubt that China is a power today but China's approach towards her rising power  
121 and influence in the world politics is different from the powers of the past. China understands it well that the 21  
122 st century is different from the previous centuries where the great powers would plunder other countries' resources  
123 by expansion, invasion, and aggression. China's rise has been motivated by technology, capital, and resources  
124 acquired through peaceful means. ??1 To add in more, China is smart enough not to jeopardize the influence she  
125 has gained through peaceful means by adopting aggressive military posture; a mistake too often committed by  
126 the great powers of the past. Indeed like the rest of states, the ultimate goal is the pursuit of national interests  
127 but China seems to understand that power comes with responsibility. This is the reason why China wants to  
128 share the power to share the responsibility of maintaining world peace and harmony.

## 129 **2 III.**

### 130 **3 Rise of China and Overstated Concerns**

131 While the world has observed the economic rise of China with surprise and praised this economic development,  
132 United States has shown concerns and wariness. Despite Chinese assurances and devotion to the peaceful rise,  
133 the concerns raised are often overstated and exaggerated. John J. Mearsheimer, a staunch supporter of offensive  
134 realism, needs to be mentioned here. He argues that China will follow in the footsteps of other great powers  
135 that seek regional and then the global hegemony to ensure their survival. His theory of offensive realism asserts  
136 that as the world is anarchic and uncertain and the states have offensive capabilities, every state lives under  
137 the constant fear for her safety and survival. Such an adverse situation, therefore, prompts the countries to  
138 seek hegemony and the already-existing powers to maintain the status quo. He predicts that China will seek  
139 hegemony in Asia by translating her economic power to military power and will try to push United States out of  
140 there because he says: "most Chinese surely remember when Japan was powerful and China was weak. In the  
141 anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi." 12 A large number of modern day  
142 writers frequently use the term "new Cold War" to explain the atmosphere of competition and contention that  
143 surrounds the Asia-Pacific in particular and the world in general. The new Cold War, according to these writers,  
144 will involve China and United States as key players; both striving to woo allies and expand their influence across  
145 the world. It is believed that the growing mistrust between U.S.A and China reflects "cool war", if not Cold  
146 War and therefore poses serious threat. 13 Hence the U.S administration is imprudently advised to "contain"  
147 China's rise, giving an impression that United States cannot afford to overlook this important development. The  
148 reason given is that if U.S wants to maintain its contemporary position in the world, it has no other option  
149 but to balance China. 14 While U.S.A, after enjoying considerable hegemony with the disintegration of Soviet  
150 Union, is worried about China's rise, China seeks no hegemony. The fact is that due to her integration in the  
151 world economy, it would be ridiculous on behalf of China to behave aggressively. China cannot afford to and  
152 surely does not intend to show that aggression; as China's main focus has been on the economic development  
153 and not to achieve the military supremacy. It is well aware that a confrontational foreign policy will thwart  
154 the development and by affecting life of millions of Chinese will cause domestic instability. Hence China is  
155 rational, calculating and conscious. 15 Moreover Mearsheimer compares emerging China with United States of  
156 20 th century that emerged as the super power after the fall of European powers. Nonetheless, he forgets one  
157 important point; which is that the modern China has preferred dialogue over force and compromise over coercion  
158 to settle down her inter-state differences. While U.S has been engaged in multiple wars in the Cold War and  
159 post-Cold War era across the globe, China has avoided such foreign meddling. It is, for sure, concerned with her  
160 border and home security in particular and world security in general but she appears to avoid direct military  
161 encounters. Not only that China's main focus has been on economy, her tools of persuasion are also different  
162 from those employed by United States. Secondly though the mistrust and suspicion between the powerful states  
163 is natural and understandable, making comparison between U.S-U.S.S.R rifts of Cold War with today's Sino-U.S  
164 relations is a bit of exaggeration. The competition between the Soviet Union and United States was based on  
165 arms race, where both the sides sought domination in military realm. Today's world is highly interdependent  
166 because of the increasing commercial relations. Whilst U.S is busy establishing military bases across various  
167 regions of the globe, China is busy engaging states in economic relations which further create interdependence  
168 and this interdependence, the majority agrees, assures peace and stability. To add in more, those who believe that

169 China's strategic culture is dominated by the concept of war need to realize the fact that China has undergone  
170 considerable changes on its journey from being an empire to a modern state; the changes that were brought from  
171 within and not forced upon it. This reflects China's rationality and flexibility. Therefore though the realists can  
172 predict a gruesome future, they cannot be certain. Unfortunately, however, it is their prediction that creates a  
173 sense of fear often leading to anarchy and aggression.

174 China's economic integration can be well explained by analyzing her commercial relations with the regional  
175 states and most importantly by looking at her relations with United States. However before moving on to China's  
176 evolving relations and foreign policy, it is preferable to look into U.S policy towards Asia-Pacific and her upgraded  
177 involvement in the region due to notable China's emergence.

### 178 4 IV.

## 179 5 U. Policy Towards Asia-Pacific

180 "The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at  
181 the center of the action." 16 Hillary Clinton United States' engagement to the Asia-Pacific is not new. Indeed it  
182 was in the latter part of 19th century when United States sent delegations to various countries, forcing them to  
183 open their ports for trade. Throughout history, U.S has managed to influence the behavior of the states using  
184 various means. It was, however, in the Cold War when the region occupied important position in U.S policy.  
185 Japan, the emerging power of Pacific, surrendered in World War II (after U.S dropped nuclear bombs) thereby  
186 creating a power vacuum. The vacuum had to be filled to contain the spread of communism and to restrain  
187 Soviet's influence to reach the strategically important region. United States, therefore, seized the opportunity  
188 and extended strategic, economic and diplomatic relations to the already existing and the newly independent  
189 states of the region. It was, in fact, the Second World War that enabled U.S to establish military presence  
190 in the region, the presence that has been strengthened and upgraded since then. While the attention of U.S  
191 was diverted towards Middle East and South Asia in the post-cold war era and particularly after 9/11; after  
192 her failures in both Afghanistan and Iraq U.S.A has once again shifted towards areas of her key interests, with  
193 Asia-Pacific being most important. Five officially stated interests U.S has in reference to the region are: retention  
194 of access to Asian markets, continuance of a permanent American military presence, prevention of the rise of a  
195 dominant regional rival, maintenance of military bases and facilities to assure freedom of access and maneuver,  
196 and advancement of democracy. 17 America which looks at itself not only as a superpower but also as the Pacific  
197 power has developed relations with the regional states through both bilateral and multilateral forums. As far  
198 as the bilateral relations are concerned, the degree and extent of these relations have varied from state to state  
199 and from time to time. Brief overview, nonetheless, is required to better understand the U.S policy toward the  
200 region. Starting with Japan, the first encounter of both countries was quite hostile where Japan was forced to  
201 open itself up for trade. In fact General Ishiara Kanji, when prosecuted for his war-crimes in 1946, demanded  
202 to charge Commodore Matthew Perry of the U.S. navy who negotiated first U.S-Japan trade treaty. The point  
203 he made was that it was through this experience that Japan learned about aggression. 18 The history of their  
204 bilateral relations is also tainted by the catastrophic nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ironically, the  
205 war-torn Japan then became U.S key ally rather a junior partner in the region. Though this unequal alliance  
206 increased with the passage of time, it also received some setbacks owing to the economic development of Japan  
207 during 1970's and 1980's. The same advancement could be observed in the strategic realm where the need to  
208 build sufficient Japanese forces was felt. At present, U.S is actively supporting the Japanese military upgrade.  
209 Moving forward, America's relations with South Korea are dominated by the common threat of North Korea.  
210 The Korean War of 1950 in the cold war era and the nuclear status of North Korea in the contemporary world  
211 have had large impact on South Korea; thereby pushing the state under U.S umbrella. U.S also enjoys cordial  
212 relations with Taiwan. Though the formal relations with Taiwan ended in 1979 when U.S recognized the People's  
213 Republic of China, the informal ties have been extensive and cordial which have been kept alive through Taiwan  
214 Relations Act. The fact is that irrespective of the developing relations with China, U.S.A has never backed  
215 from her relations with Taiwan. It was in 2000 when the Congressional bill titled Taiwan Security Enhancement  
216 Act was passed by one of the two houses of Congress. Had it become law, it would have further jeopardized  
217 Sino -U.S relations as it suggested exalted military support to Taiwan. U.S.A needs to be more vigilant in this  
218 context as her military assistance may adversely affect peace in region by fueling suspicions. Recently, U.S has  
219 shown eminent interest in strengthening relations with her regional allies. This suggests that Asia has once again  
220 become Volume XV Issue IV Version I S "central to U.S policy" as said by Joel R. Campbell. 19 Another U.S  
221 key ally in the Pacific is Australia with which U.S enjoys cordial relations since long. Other than trade and  
222 economic relations, both the allies have been working exclusively on the military relations as well. Being the  
223 members of ANZUS, Unites States and Australia along with New Zealand have agreed to cooperate on military  
224 and defense matters. As far as the South East Asia is concerned, with the arrival of Nixon Doctrine and bitter  
225 defeat in Vietnam, U.S disengaged herself from the region largely. Though U.S provided financial and non-lethal  
226 aid against Vietnamese and Cambodian rebels, the superpower turned her focus from security to economic issues  
227 in the region of ASEAN. Though the "Vietnam Syndrome" affected U.S influence in the region, the economic  
228 relations between U.S and ASEAN have improved. In the light of many analysts, U.S.A is working on improving  
229 its bilateral relations with the states of Asia-Pacific after a period of "neglect". Not only this, United States has

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230 also extended her strategic relations with India. The Civil Nuclear Deal of 2005 is important to mention here  
231 which has not only grown suspicions in Pakistan but is also believed to be another measure to contain China.  
232 Bilateral relations with regional actors reflect U.S strategy of "raising others up" as is said by Ashley J.Tellis. 20  
233 V.

## 234 **6 U.S Pivot to Asia**

235 U.S views Asia Pacific stretching from Indian subcontinent to America, spanning across Pacific and the Indian  
236 Ocean, including engines of the global economy and home to several emerging powers. At this time when the  
237 region has emerged as an economic engine, it has attracted the attention of the world including the U.S.A. As the  
238 once hegemon of post-cold war era realizes that the region has become important in the 21st Century, "Strategic  
239 pivot or rebalancing" has been launched by Obama administration to increase influence over this part of the  
240 globe. U.S Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton explains this pivot to Asia as "U.S commitment" to the region  
241 that is working on its security and economic structure which U.S will assist through "American leadership". The  
242 reason she gives is that "Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is vital to Asia's future.  
243 The region is eager for our leadership and our business?" ??1 With this belief, United States has embarked on  
244 strengthening relations with the allies and improving relations with key regional players. By engaging the region  
245 in different multilateral and bilateral arrangements, U.S has not only speeded up trade but has also expanded  
246 her military presence. The reemphasis approach is multidimensional; ranging from security and economic to  
247 diplomatic enhancement. In the security realm, owing to the increasing significance of the Asia-Pacific, United  
248 States has refocused attention towards the military deployment in the region particularly after the decision of  
249 forces withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. The doctrine of Air-Sea Battle has been enforced, to counter  
250 the state and non-state threats. However, it has been accepted at both the official and academic level that  
251 the doctrine is intended to contain China in East Asia and Iran in Persian Gulf. 22 With already established  
252 permanent bases in South Korea and Japan, U.S has enhanced strategic partnership with Australia, Thailand,  
253 Singapore and Philippines. Other than that, by strengthening her allies' position, United States aims at ensuring  
254 her influence in the region by countering the other rising powers, particularly China. 23 America is also working  
255 on improving relations with the regional states through multilateral engagements including APEC, TTP and  
256 EAS. U.S.A, irrespective of expressing suspicions regarding SCO, applied for its membership.

257 The U.S relentless efforts to project power region coincide with China's economic rise. The question is despite  
258 having economic ties with almost all regional states, having a web of military bases stretched across the region  
259 and the growing strategic relations with important players of the region like Japan, Australia and now India;  
260 why does United States fear rise of China?

## 261 **7 VI.**

262 China's Regional Policy After looking at United States' policy towards the region, it is necessary to review  
263 China's regional policy as well. While U.S policies enable us to understand U.S concerns and the consequent  
264 containment of China, China's regional policy will help us comprehend how Chinese leadership look at her rise  
265 and the available opportunities. For it is important to know how China interprets her global emergence.

266 While China was somehow isolated during the Cold War, her policy has been completely transformed in the  
267 post-Cold War era. Peaceful cooperation, win-win situation and the harmonious world form the three pillars of  
268 China's foreign policy. These three guiding principles indicate that China does not want to play the role of a  
269 destructive major power, rather it wants to participate towards the construction of the international community  
270 which will benefit the world and of course China itself. 24 Last year's speech by Foreign minister Wang Li  
271 at the symposium titled "New Starting Point, New Thinking and New Practice 2013: China and the World"  
272 points towards the new approach in China's foreign policy including the regional policy. Wang Li explains that  
273 the basic principles of Chinese neighborhood policy revolve around the concept of "amity, sincerity, mutual  
274 benefit and inclusiveness". Realizing the fact that the neighborhood is extremely important for China's own  
275 security, progress and prosperity, the Chinese government has designed an effective regional Volume XV Issue  
276 IV Version I diplomatic agenda. China, he says, has not only proposed a number of cooperation initiatives  
277 but has also upgraded high official contacts for the sake of building confidence and enhancing mutual trust.  
278 Representing the China's government, Wang Li expressed the state's welcoming attitude towards the region and  
279 suggested strengthening the regional and bilateral relations. 25 China's Ambassador to United States Cui Tiankai  
280 expressed the similar official desires this year. Owing to the fact that the region has experienced many bloody  
281 wars in the past, China is committed towards the peace and stability. He says: "The last thing we want to see  
282 in our neighborhood today is instability, be it in the form of armed conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass  
283 destruction or rise of terrorism." China also wants inclusive integration of the Asia-Pacific and believes that the  
284 creation of alliances and blocs is likely to produce negative consequences. He further adds that China wants to  
285 see itself as a strong, democratic, culturally advanced socialist state and these goals can only be achieved through  
286 peace. 26 The reason strong enough why unlike United States, China has avoided making alliance to counter  
287 increasing U.S influence in the region.

288 With this realization in mind, China has developed bilateral and multilateral relations with the region that  
289 holds significance for her because of security, economic and political reasons. China's improving relations with the

290 states of Southeast Asia illustrates the point as the states, which previously viewed each other with suspicion, now  
291 acknowledge one another's importance and interdependence. China's response towards the East Asian Financial  
292 Crisis and SARS, which further deepened the economic crisis, was appreciated by the Asian countries and China's  
293 responsible role was praised by both the leaders and public. The result of the special treatment by China is that  
294 "the concept of China threat" has been replaced by "the concept of "China opportunity." 27 To achieve this  
295 goal, China's policy towards Southeast Asia is based on trade relations, CBMs, and providing the developmental  
296 assistance without conditions with special emphasis on uplifting the poorer states like Laos and Burma. ??8  
297 This approach has not only helped China make the economic gains but has also improved China's image in the  
298 region. The tool employed, therefore, is often interpreted as China's soft power.

299 Lu Jianren explains the different stages in the China-ASEAN relations. Before 1991, he argues, was the  
300 period of confrontation and fluctuations. While both sides established diplomatic relations in the mid of 1970's,  
301 it was not until 1990's that China and ASEAN speeded up the cooperation in various sectors. The second  
302 phase was that of creating a framework. It was between 1991 and 1996 that both sides laid down proposals to  
303 establish mechanisms. In this period, the actors involved not only worked to improve trade ties but also expressed  
304 willingness to address the territorial disputes of South China Sea, which indeed reflects the level of seriousness  
305 from both sides. The third period represents the mutual trust and good neighborhood policy. It was the time  
306 of Asian Financial Crisis when China proved her sincerity towards the relation with ASEAN by not devaluing  
307 its currency and by offering unconditional assistance to the states. This grandiose gesture of China convinced  
308 the regional states that China is not only a responsible regional power but also trust-worthy. The fourth period  
309 is that of setting the strategic partnership and China and ASEAN have made important developments in the  
310 domain of security and strategy as well. 29 Hence the relationship which started with some hesitancy and much  
311 fear has been transformed into an all level partnership. Statistics show that trade between China and ASEAN  
312 rose more than 10% in 2012 and by 2020 and the annual trade is expected to reach \$1 trillion. The two-way trade  
313 not only makes China the largest trading partner of ASEAN but also makes ASEAN the third largest source of  
314 China's FDI. 30 Not only the bilateral but also the multilateral arrangements connect the region to China. Being  
315 the member of ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ARF, and EAS, China wants to ensure her involvement in the important  
316 regional forums. Boao Forum of Asia also provides a platform for the regional states to improve relations by  
317 extending cooperation in different fields. Moreover, the growing relations between ASEAN and SCO illustrate  
318 the level of engagement China has achieved bilaterally and multilaterally in the region.

319 It is important to realize however that despite the deepening economic integration, the overlapping territorial  
320 claims made by states in South China Sea and East China Sea continue to pose a serious challenge in the  
321 region. Though China's territorial issues remain unresolved with ASEAN members, both sides have signed non-  
322 aggression pact and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea and there appears to be a  
323 reaching consensus between the various parties involved. In the presence of strong economic ties, there are high  
324 hopes that China and ASEAN states will reach a compromise. The matter is different with Japan, however.  
325 It is, nonetheless, worth mentioning that for China, her "peaceful rise" does not contradict with her territorial  
326 claims. Chinese Chief of Defense Fang Fenghui has recently explained China's stance in his press release along  
327 with United States' General Dempsey where he stresses that China means no harm to her neighboring states but  
328 she has firm stance when it comes to her sovereignty and territorial integrity. He stresses that China will "not  
329 lose an inch" by arguing that "we do not make trouble, we do not create trouble, but we are not afraid of it."  
330 Moreover, he demands that the world needs to adopt objective approach towards the region's dispute. 31 While  
331 his remarks are being used to criticize China's peaceful rise argument, what needs to be understood is that China  
332 is not a weak state and like the rest of members of international community, gives immense importance to her  
333 national interests and sovereignty. Yet China has a wide experience of peaceful settlement of border disputes and  
334 has, in fact, successfully settled down boundary issues with 12 of its neighboring states. 32 Therefore, the world  
335 should give as much attention to Chinese President Xi Jinping's remarks as much as has been given to China's  
336 military statements when he says: "There's no gene for invasion in Chinese people's blood, and Chinese people  
337 won't follow the logic that might is right." 33 The rising power fully understands her power but also acknowledges  
338 the fact that her rise is possible only in a peaceful environment.

## 339 8 VII.

## 340 9 China-U.S Interdependence

341 China's regional policy indicates that though China wants to improve her relations with the neighbors, she does  
342 not intend to snatch United States' share. From Latin America to Africa and from Middle East to Asia-Pacific,  
343 China is extending relations but has not adopted "the containment policy", the tactics too often employed by  
344 the rest of major powers. While the great powers normally try to create blocs and/or counterblocs; China, other  
345 than building relations with the rest, has always endeavored to maintain warm and sound relations with U.S.A.  
346 The fact is that principles of peaceful co-existence do not just apply to China's neighbors but have also greatly  
347 influenced China's policy towards United States.

348 The expanding trade between the two since last decades is considered to be just a start by China and urges to  
349 further speed up the economic ties. In 2013, China became the second largest trading partner of U.S by exports  
350 totaling \$122 billion and imports totaling \$440 billion. 34 China's serious commitment towards trade relations

351 with United States can be further explained by the fact that China increased her imports from United States  
352 after the international financial crisis though her exports to U.S have decreased. This is the reason why many U.S  
353 firms have turned towards the China's market. 35 Another sector promising further integration between China  
354 and U.S is that of foreign investment. According to Rhodium group's findings, China's FDI in U.S doubled in  
355 2013 36 and only in the first quarter of 2014, Chinese companies have already announced deals worth \$8 billion.  
356 37 Moreover while American exports to rest of the world increased only by 162% between 2000 and 2011, her  
357 exports to China increased by 632%. 38 China's increasing trade and lucrative FDI made in United States reflects  
358 the building confidence and trust or at least such an effort on behalf of China. Moreover, China offers market  
359 to the American small and medium businesses, thereby attracting U.S direct investment as well. The trends  
360 in economic relations predict the growing interdependence between the two powers in the future despite little  
361 setbacks. Mr. Zhong Shan, the vice minister of commerce of PRC urges, as the representative of government,  
362 that the two states should enhance trade and investment by avoiding the politicization of economic ties. 39 The  
363 study of U.S-China 2022: Economic Relations in the Next Ten Years suggests that the two states have impressive  
364 opportunities to extend cooperation in fields of agriculture, tourism, and energy and research sector. The study  
365 not only predicts the possible future bilateral relationship between them but also represents the wishes of both  
366 sides. Moreover, even if the states decide to conduct the trade at a same pace as now, their trade is expected  
367 to reach up to \$1 trillion by 2022. 40 It is not just the economic interdependence that binds them only. Rather  
368 now in the globalized world, United States and China have to cooperate and work together on a number of  
369 issues. Ranging from the issues of global warming, climate change to countering terrorism, China's ability and  
370 the growing interest in active participation in the global issues cannot be ignored by the world now. The two,  
371 for example, being the permanent members of the U.N Security Council have every reason to cooperate with  
372 each other or else the world affairs and progress may get paralyzed as was experienced in the Cold War. The  
373 fact is that their approach may be different but as the major powers, China and United States share the same  
374 concerns regarding the various global issues. China, for instance, wants the earliest possible solution of North  
375 Korea's and Iran's nuclear crisis. She is equally concerned about the growing terrorism, has condemned the acts  
376 of terrorism worldwide and has promised all kind of support to the international community in this context.  
377 Particularly, her proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia makes her more vulnerable to the rising  
378 assemblage of non-state actors in the region. Likewise, China is as concerned about the misuse of Syria's chemical  
379 stockpiles as is United States. Being the responsible members of U.N Security Council and the powerful states of  
380 the world, therefore, both need to converge rather than diverge their energies if want to secure the world peace.  
381 The approach adopted is often different though, this difference is not a conflict in itself. China believes that the  
382 issues of North Korea, Syria and Iran should be resolved at the table and not in the battlefield, for this will make  
383 matters only worse. While China's preference for dialogue is often interpreted as her intent to delay, the fact is  
384 that haste and use of force have always accelerated the tension and misunderstanding.

385 The interdependence between China and United States is unique and unparalleled and it is because of this  
386 interdependence that many conflicts have been overcome or at least pacified. It indeed is the "new type of great  
387 power relationship" where if U.S desires to be treated as an "indispensable nation" then it needs to recognize  
388 China as an "indispensable partner" 41 which may help her sort issues which United States cannot solve on its  
389 own, either because of its limitations or because of problem's gravity. In short while many in the Western circle  
390 draw the sketch of China as a rising power which is desperate to compete with United States, China is nothing  
391 but an opportunity for U.S and it is through cooperation that U.S can get the maximum out of this opportunity.

## 392 10 VIII.

## 393 11 Conclusion

394 The attitude of Chinese leadership, her growing economic relations with the regional states and the level of  
395 interdependence she has with United States point towards one direction and that is China views itself as a  
396 responsible member of international community. Moreover, the state fully realizes that her designed goals are  
397 only possible to achieve through cooperation, collaboration and co-existence. The logical question to be asked at  
398 this point is why will China jeopardize what she has gained so far to challenge the status-quo? While the realists  
399 may hold the aggressive behavior of powerful states responsible for it, the fact is that China is not following the  
400 track of other powers. China has neither pursued the imperialism of Japan after her industrial revolution nor has  
401 shown any inclination to challenge United States and her allies by making an alliance similar to that of Allied  
402 powers in the Second World War. Furthermore, never in the history can we find an example of a rising power  
403 with policies such as peaceful co-existence, peaceful rise and harmonious world. Had China inclined towards  
404 becoming a regional or global hegemon, she would not have favored economic integration equally with all.

405 Though the Western writers present the bleak future scenario, China does not seem to agree with that. It  
406 is, hence, essential to know how China views the future. One can look into the concept of "harmonious world"  
407 presented by the last Chinese president Hu Jintao, for instance. He made the four point proposal and argued  
408 that a harmonious world can be achieved through multilateralism, mutually beneficial cooperation, spirit of  
409 inclusiveness, and rational and necessary reforms. Not only this, but he also defied forceful interference in  
410 another country's affairs, use or even threat of a military force against the sovereignty of a state. 42 Xi Jinping's  
411 speech at the opening ceremony of Boao Forum points to the similar emphasis on "common development"

412 and "boost cooperation" to "uphold peace." He further vowed that as an important member of global family  
413 China "will continue to develop itself by securing a peaceful international environment and, at the same time,  
414 uphold and promote world peace through its own development." 43 Country's white paper on the peaceful  
415 development expresses similar future vision. China's foreign policy is aimed at promoting harmonious world  
416 based on mutual benefit, mutual trust and coordination; where politically the states should be treated equally,  
417 cooperate economically and seek common ground culturally. 44 None of this hints China's inclination to either  
418 threat or challenge United States or any other state of the world.

419 The fact is that China is a responsible power of the contemporary world that has always cooperated and  
420 desires to cooperate in future as well. She neither follows any belief similar to that of "Manifest Destiny" to lead  
421 the world nor is she striving to reach the top by pushing others down like other major powers. The state has  
422 shown flexibility in her foreign policy and her leaders have expressed goodwill towards all including the United  
423 States. Now it is time for United States to reciprocate in a positive way as it is the need of time, for China has  
424 already made it clear that "the Chinese people want peace do not want war." ??5

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