

China's Seat in United Nations, Kashmir Issue and the India-Pakistan War of 1965

Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi¹, Dr. Manzoor Khan Afridi², Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan³ and Dr. Abdul Zahoor Khan⁴

¹ International Islamic University ISLAMABAD pakistan

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Abstract

On the one hand, the Sino-Indian border war, Sino- Soviet hostile relations and the US-China rivalry and on the other hand, Pak-India enmity, Pak-Soviet hostility and Pakistan's disillusionment with the US brought China and Pakistan closer to each other. China was in struggle to get membership in United Nations where the Western powers were blocking its way and Taiwan was allowed to be a Chinese nation representative. In 1960s, Pakistan abandoned its policy of following the West and voted for Communist China in the UN. China too refrained from its policy of neutrality regarding Indo-Pak issues and openly started to support Pakistan on Kashmir issue. Beijing supported Islamabad in its war with New Delhi. China condemned Indian aggression against Pakistan and appreciated the Kashmiri freedom fighters in their struggle from Indian illegal occupation. This paper covers discussion and analysis on China's seat in UN, Kashmir issue and Indo-Pak war of 1965.

Index terms— pakistan, china, UN, kashmir, indo-pak war.

1 I. Introduction

he China's membership in the United Nations and Security Council was a hot issue for a long time, that, who was a sole legitimate authority to represent the Chinese nation in the world body until the PRC succeeded to replace the ROC on October 25, 1971. The representatives of the PRC first participated in the UN and United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as Chinese representatives on November 23, 1971. Pakistan's support for the People's Republic of China's membership in UN was a milestone in the development of friendly bilateral relations between China and Pakistan. Pakistan took a start to abandon its previous pro-West policy and support thereon, PRC in the United Nations. Pakistan's leaders reviewed its foreign policy for the purpose that alliance with the West was serving more Western interests than her own. The aim of Pakistan's joining military pacts was obviously to strengthen its position vis-à-vis India mainly on Kashmir issue and thus taking the pro-West stance against the China's membership in the UN. While the United States and other Western countries were helping India, accordingly, Pakistan's interests were not sincerely served.

"To Pakistanis, Kashmir is not merely an issue of territory; it is a reminder of an "incomplete" Pakistan and is a restatement of all the massacres and injustices. Kashmir is economically and psychologically the jugular vein of Pakistan, which unlike any other nation, has faced the severest challenges to its very existence since its inception" (Malik, 1997). With the conclusion of the trade, air and boundary agreements, on 5 January, 29 August and 3 March 1963 respectively, Pakistan and China moved closer to each other. Parallel with the Pakistan's support for China's legal seat in UN, the Chinese started too, lobbying for Pakistan on Kashmir issue. Pakistan had long been demanding the peaceful solution of Kashmir dispute through the United Nations resolutions and considering the wishes of the local inhabitants of the area.

In September 1965, with the outbreak of full scale war between India and Pakistan, first in Kashmir and later spread to their international border, China came with all possible political help for Pakistan. Early in

2 II. PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR PRC'S SEAT IN THE UN

September, Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi reaffirmed complete Chinese sympathy and assistance for the Kashmiri freedom fighters that were in constant struggle to liberate Kashmir from the illegal control of India. He also condemned the Indian provocative action and supported Pakistan's strategy of hitting back for her self-defense (Survey of China Mainland Press, 1965).

2 II. Pakistan's Support for Prc's Seat in the un

The world was divided on the Chinese representation in the UN. The capitalist countries were supporting US for blockade of the membership of PRC while the communist states were demanding her entry. At first, the United States initiated a policy of neutralism between the two, Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists. The Kuomintang asked US for her assistance and appointment of a political and economic adviser in Taiwan, but the United States turned down the Nationalists' demand. The US could not keep consistency in her neutrality about the two camps of Chinese nation. The start of Cold War and tilt of the PRC leaders towards the USSR created a crack between the Communist China and United States. Washington assessed that the Nationalists could better serve her interests due to the Taiwan's capitalist system and their already established diplomatic relations. The PRC-US relations further worsened when the Beijing criticized the On the other hand, the Soviet Union, the then close friend of Communist China campaigned for the membership of the mainland China into the UN and demanded an immediate expulsion of Taiwan. The Soviet Union went so far in its campaign for PRC that boycotted the Security Council and confirmed to not take part in UNSC activities until the Taiwanese delegation forced out.

Playing its role in the UN on the said issue, Pakistan gets started supporting the PRC's seat. Clearing its view, the representative of Pakistan in the UN, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan argued in a debate that according to the Article 4 of the UN Charter, every new member could get admission and it was not about the representation issue. He stressed the point that China was not applying for her admission; instead she was already a member, a permanent member of the Security Council and one of the Big Fives. Mr. Khan continued his speech and stated that the Taiwanese delegation present here was unable to exercise its control over any part of the mainland China. The struggle between the Chiang Kai-shek's and Mao Zedong's forces had already come to an end with a clear victory of the Communists in mainland China. The Nationalists could no longer claim to be the sole legitimate representatives of the Chinese nation (Arif, 1984). However, his proposal was rejected by a majority vote.

Even after joining the security pacts of the USled West, Pakistan maintained its independent stand on the issue of Chinese representation in the UN by supporting the PRC. Pakistan had cleared its position regarding the alliance in Bandung Conference to the PRC's Premier Zhou En-lai, that Pakistan had no fear of the Communist China. Again in 1955, Pakistan's Ambassador to China assured the participants at the Independence Day reception that his people, both in and outside the government, wished for the China's seat in the United Nations (Syed, 1974).

When the Pakistan's dependence increased on the United States in military and economic fields, Pakistan took a "U" turn in its policy about the China's seat in the UN. It was clear from the Pakistan's Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy statement, when he visited the US in July 1957 and praised the US and assured them his support. Later in the same year, Pakistan supported the West resolution regarding the blockade of the PRC's seat in the UN. By the signing of Pakistan's bilateral defense agreement with the US in the late fifties, the Pakistan's tone about China's seat was harsher. However, with the rapid changing regional security environment, Pakistan assessed its policy and gestured for a hand of friendship towards PRC. Pakistan also turned back to its previous position to the support of China's admission in the UN. A fundamental change came on 10 March 1960, when the Pakistan's President Ayub Khan declared at the Commonwealth session in London that the Commonwealth countries would support the Chinese seat in the United Nations. Again on 19 March 1960, he told to journalists that Pakistan would probably vote for the admission of PRC to the UN in the upcoming session. Later in November of the same year, a special meeting of the Pakistan cabinet approved the Ayub's decision (Arif, 1984).

Pakistan indeed took a radical step in its previous announced policy when in December 1961 at UN session; she overtly supported the PRC to be a sole and legitimate authority of Chinese people in the UN (Syed, 1974).

The then Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto expressed his feelings: "It would be beneficial to all mankind if the People's Republic of China were to become a member of the World Organization. How is it possible for the United Nations to bring to bear the full weight of authority on any issue when the representatives of 650 million people are excluded from its deliberations and discipline (Bhutto, 1964)? Beijing duly appreciated this change in Pakistan's foreign policy. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while focusing on Sino-Pakistan relations, expressed its concern that Pakistan took a great change for the improvement of the bilateral relations by advocating the China's legal seat in United Nations. Zhou En-lai in the same month, while talking to a correspondent of the Associated Press of Pakistan appreciated the Pakistan's bold stance that the latter took for a rightful place in the United Nations and did not follow the US position of supporting the Nationalists. The Sino-Pakistan border agreement gave a new life of recently warm bilateral relations of China and Pakistan. On this occasion the Chinese official Chen Yi, stated that Pakistan, instead of the US pressure, voted for the legal seat of China in World Body. For this act of Pakistan, The Chinese Government and people were grateful to the Pakistani Government and people (Arif, 1984).

Pakistan had continued its policy of supporting China's seat in the UN. On the Premier Zhou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in February 1964, Ayub Khan re-stated Pakistan's position of support for China's rightful representation

in the UN. He claimed that without the one-fourth population of the world, the UN would remain incomplete. He further stressed for the immediate membership of China in the United Nations (Arif, 1984). Meanwhile, to solve the issue, some countries put forward an idea of dual representation of China in the UN, that both the Communists and Nationalists delegation should be given separate seats in UN. China rejected the idea on the basis that Taiwan had no separate identity but a part of mainland China. The issue -Year 2015 (F) further remained unsolved. Pakistan disapproved the idea of dual representation and fully supported the China's stance. The China's position was more strengthened at the nineteenth session of the UN General Assembly, when the Pakistan's representative clarified to the world community that the dual representation had no meaning for China. He stated that China's seat is not only important for the UN but also for the sake of peace. Doing so, the situation in Asia could be addressed and peace could be restored for the people of the disputes-led continent (Pakistan Horizon, 1965).

III. China's Support for Pakistan on Kashmir Issue

China had a neutral position on Kashmir. After signing the border agreement, Pakistan hoped for a change in Chinese policy over the said issue. It was due to the fact that Pakistan got recognition in the agreement from China over its northern areas attached with Sinkiang. Also China secured a large area in Ladakh region. Again measuring by the common enemy's concept, the Chinese support for Pakistan was imperative in the wake of the Soviet leaders' persistent support for India, since 1955. It was the first occasion when China displayed sympathy for Pakistan over Kashmir conflict. In the joint communiqué signed between the two countries, China appreciated the Pakistan's role of striving for the peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem. Beijing hoped that the as early as possible solution of the problem would be better for to flourish peace not only in Asia but also in the world (Arif, 1984). Mr. Zhou invited President Ayub to visit China in March 1965 which was reciprocated by Zhou En-lai in June 1965 for two days, with extensive meetings with Ayub and Bhutto in Rawalpindi.

The time for China was crucial to make a pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir issue. It became a needed weapon in the period of mounting Sino-Soviet rift and going closer to each other by India and Soviet Union, resulting in defense cooperation. Beijing wanted to balance the situation with Pakistan when the two giants, Soviet and India were undermining the Chinese authority in Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese concerns were understandable when she severely criticized the Soviet assistance to India. The security-torn climate of China made it conducive to side openly with Pakistan. "This indulgence by China was aimed simply at (a) ensuring security of their problematic regions bordering Kashmir by befriending neighboring Muslim countries and (b) using Pakistan as its bulwark to tie down India in South Asia, thereby warding off any future threats to Tibet's peace and security".

Looking to the irreparable relationships with India, Soviet Union and United States, China formulated a long term policy by aligning with Pakistan. Although the US-Pakistan relations were not as cordial as were in 1950s, but still they were bound to their alliance. Also, Pakistan had signaled for normal relations with the Soviet Union by pursuing almost an independent and balanced foreign policy. The Soviet Union hinted for a shift in her policy on Kashmir, which was totally unqualified before, for support to India. It was evident from the Indian President Radhakrishnan's September 1964 visit to Moscow, where they issued a joint communiqué but without a word about Kashmir issue, unlike the previous episodes of high ranking figures. Later, during the Indian Prime Minister Shastri's visit to USSR, in the spring of 1965, Kosygin avoided any reference to Kashmir (Simon, 1967). The Soviet Union attempted to accelerate the already despair in Pakistan about the American attitude, slow down the Sino-Pakistan entente and make a common front of India and Pakistan in South Asia. Considering all strategies, the Soviet refrained from the resolution on Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council to veto it in September 1965. The previous position of the Soviet Union was that of the India that Kashmir was an integral part of India, when the US and the UK were on the Pakistan side (Ibid.). Before the United States, Soviet Union or any other power take an initiative for the solution of Kashmir, at least from a neutral side, China grasped the situation to win Pakistan's sympathies. The drop scene of Beijing's position on Kashmir happened at the Pakistan's invitation of Zhou En-lai's visit to Karachi in February 1964, when he publicly sided with Pakistan on the concerned issue. After meeting, at the end of the visit, China and Pakistan issued a joint communiqué with the hope that Kashmir issue would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people as pledged to them by India and Pakistan (Arif, 1984). Pakistani nation was jubilant over Chinese Premier's remarks. Everywhere Zhou and Chen went, Pakistani public greeted them as heroes. The press in Pakistan had promptly reacted in the appreciation of China that no Head of Government had ever realized the recognition of the Kashmiri people's right of selfdeterminations as China had done.

The Chinese interest of making enduring friendship with Pakistan was reflecting from this joint communiqué, where a severe blow was present against the Indian stand on Kashmir. New Delhi had of the opinion before that the neutral position of Beijing meant Indian right of authority in Kashmir. Beijing Regime was also successful in her policy, of what was expected of the doubts in their mind, when the spokesman of the US State Department blended the Pakistan's invitation to the Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi as unfortunate event. On the eve of the Chinese Premier's visit, the Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan revealed the information that the United States and the USSR were in a struggle to bring Pakistan and India near to each other for the purpose to keep out China from the issue. The United States, even during the Sino-Pakistan border talks, angered over the possibility of Chinese role and backing of Pakistan on Kashmir conflict. "In the matter of negotiations which Pakistan was then having with China about their common border, in February 1963 America

warned Pakistan that the proposed border agreement with China might endanger Pakistan's negotiations with India on Kashmir" (Sherwani, 1980).

On the one hand Pakistan attempted to bring China in the full circle of the region's politics and gain her support on the debated issue, when the US placed blame on Pakistan for the failure of Kashmir talks with India and their own relations. On the other hand, China was ready for support to tone down the superpowers' monopoly on the issue and avoid losing Pakistan's role in its Afro-Asian politics, which she, since the Bandung Conference, had zealously trying to organize under its leadership. Latif has commented: "Incredible though it seems, America placed the blame for the estrangement on Pakistan, particularly on her growing relations with China. It is true that America's burgeoning support to India had led Pakistan to seek friendly relations with China (as well as the Soviet Union) but there was nothing sinister about this relationship. In fact, all the developments in Sino-Pakistan relations during 1962-63 resulted from events over which Pakistan had hardly by control" (Ibid., pp. 117-118). Despite the common alliance, at any cost, the US was not ready to see an upward move in Sino-Pakistan relations. "Whatever might have been of the thinking of Americans about the relations of their own country with China, the United States Government was then not prepared to reconcile to Pakistan's friendly relations with China. Consequently, Pakistan's improved relations with China very adversely affected Pakistan-American relations" (Ibid., p. 133).

4 IV. China's Role in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965

A further test for Sino-Pakistan relations was the Indo-Pakistan war, initially in the Rann of Kutch area in April and later, on the entire western border in September 1965. Pakistan was in a grave situation when aggressor India attacked on Pakistan's sovereignty and hampered her security. Like the recent exemplary concluded agreements between China and Pakistan, this tough time on the latter also tested the Chinese commitments. Ayub Khan had addressed "a mass rally of 10,000 people in Peking", during his visit to China from 2-9 March, 1965, long before the breaking out of war with India that Pakistan's friendship with China was long-lasting and not a product of decision in hurry, which proved true later with the Chinese assistance for the former. Accompanied by the Foreign Minister Bhutto, Ayub Khan signed a joined communiqué with China, longer and agreed on more points than the previous year's communiqué (Pringsheim, 1965). In the joint communiqué, Ayub Khan supported China's stand on PRC's seat in UN and condemned the attempts for the creation of two Chinas. Zhou En-lai reaffirmed that Kashmir problem was unresolved which had posed a serious threat to the region's peace and security.

Already mentioned statement of Bhutto in the National Assembly about the involvement of the largest state of Asia, if Pakistan had to attacked by another state and the same claim by Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade, Nan Hanchen (The Times, 1963), changed into a reality by China's help of Pakistan in the latter's war with India. Again, during the Zhou's visit of Pakistan in February 1964, Chen Yi thanked Pakistan's support during the Sino-Indian war and pointed that if attacked, China would be on Pakistan's side.

Early in April Zhou En-lai paid a one-day visit to Rawalpindi. Since this visit was during the Ayub Khan's state visit to the Soviet Union, it was crucial in this regard that the Chinese Premier might give advice and suggestions about the Pakistan's ties with the USSR. On 2 June, Zhou En-lai came to Rawalpindi again. In the meantime, the Chinese leader stated that "in recent years, friendship between our two peoples has undergone a remarkable development and the cooperation between our two countries has been exceedingly fruitful" (Survey of China Mainland Press, 1965). Later in the month, Ayub Khan and Zhou En-lai met in Cairo in connection with the projected second Afro-Asian Conference. Their entente was evident from the official visits of the leaders to each other's countries with great pomp and show.

In August 1965 when the Indo-Pakistan skirmishes held in Kashmir, on 27 August China sent a note of condemnation to India. China claimed that India had destroyed the peace along the China-Sikkim border by violating the border on 22, 23 and 24 July 1965. The note also said: "The Chinese Government must warn India that if it does not immediately stop such acts of aggression and provocation it must bear full responsibility for the consequences that may arise therefrom" (Beijing Review, 1965).

India had already arrested a Kashmiri leader Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah for having met with Zhou En-lai in Algiers. China reacted in a more angry way and stated that India was an aggressor which played the game with the support of United States and the Soviet Union. China was confirmed that Indian ambition was to dominate the region, as she had not resolved border issue peacefully and clashed with China. It means that China and Pakistan were striving to balance the power game created by India and the superpowers. On 7 September the Beijing Government issued a statement saying: "The Indian Government probably believes that since it has the backing of the U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists it can bully its neighbours, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes. This will not do. Aggression is aggression. India's aggression against anyone of its neighbours concerns all of its neighbours. Since the Indian Government has taken the first step in committing aggression against Pakistan, it can not evade responsibility from the chain of consequences arising there from. The Chinese Government sternly condemns India for its criminal aggression (and) expresses firm support for Pakistan" (Peking Review, 1965).

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On 9 September, Zhou En-lai further declared that the Indian aggression against Pakistan qualified its reactionary behavior. India had been claimed a nonaligned country, but how could a peaceful and neutral country attack its neighbours like Pakistan ??Peking Review, 1965). With repeated reference to neighbour, China believed that India also had ill-wishes for China; because, with the explosion of nuclear weapon in 1964, the latter had gained a considerable prestige and India was trying for possession of same nuclear device for her own influence. "This area is what might be called 'rimland' defence" (Edwardes, 1967). By attack on Pakistan, India stepped for her long-hoped dominance in the region. Chinese concerns were seeable in the time of her enmity over unresolved border and other issues with India.

The Chinese press harshly condemned the Indian war crimes against Pakistan. India had started propaganda that Pakistan was the country who first crossed the border, started war and infiltrated into the Kashmir territory. China dismissed these allegations against Pakistan and fired back on India. On 11 September, Rinmin Ribao wrote in an editorial that "it was not Pakistan but India that first crossed the ceasefire line in Kashmir and launched military provocations and undertook armed occupation. It was not Pakistan but India that first threw its air force into action and bombed peaceful cities of the other side. It was not Pakistan but India that first crossed the international border into the territory of the other side and launched massive armed attacks. So India is in every sense the aggressor and Pakistan its victim" ??Peking Review, 1965). With the horrible consequences of the war Ayub Khan appealed to the US and China to stop it. The United States was unable to warn India of its aggression against Pakistan but China issued the following ultimatum to India. On 17 September, Chinese Foreign Ministry asked India for dismantling all military activities on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim border within three days, otherwise, Indian Government would be held responsible for all grave consequences. China again stated about the aggressive launching of war against Pakistan and warned that as long as India continued her aggression against Pakistan, China would continue her assistance and support to "Pakistan in her just struggle against aggression" (Ibid., p. 9). On 19 September, China sent another note to India and extended its previous ultimatum to the midnight of 22 September (Singh, 1987). There were also some reports about the China's order for her troops to move and be alert along the Sino-Indian border.

By giving warning to India, China wanted to save a weak Pakistan as compare to India, pressurize superpowers and United Nations to stop war. Consequently the war ended by a passed resolution of the Security Council on 20 September which called for a ceasefire to begin on 22 September and for withdrawal of all troops to the lines held on August 5. It was a strategy to halt any assistance of superpowers to India and their try to manipulate the situation. Although, China did not involve itself physically in the Indo-Pakistan war but the warning played a great role to bring an end. Gurnam Singh has calculated the situation as, a "calculation which possible prevented China from encouraging Pakistan to go to war with India, was the Chinese perception that in between Pakistan and India, the former had extremely limited capacity to fight a prolonged war. India's geographic mass, defence capability and industrial base was far superior to that of Pakistan's, to fight a prolonged war, latter's geographic compulsions and vulnerability on the East Pakistan border notwithstanding. Pakistan's economic and military dependence on the US, after even a limited war, would have immensely increased thereby providing the latter greater opportunities for penetration in Pakistan, distinctly to the disadvantage of China" (Ibid., p. 173).

The Chinese ultimatum came at a time when Indian Prime Minister Shastri threatened Pakistan that India would open the East Pakistan border. The East Pakistan was more vulnerable and was in close proximity with China. The Indian occupation of East Pakistan would definitely bring the Indian hegemony in South Asia and also cause complexities for China, because of the Indian conspiracies in Tibet (Ibid., p. 179).

The ultimatum was helpful in the context that the United States had already cut its supply of military aid to India and Pakistan, where the latter had suffered more than India. "Perhaps, Chinese hyperbolic support to Pakistan and ultimata to India were motivated by such thinking because a weak and demoralised Pakistan, after the war, would be more vulnerable to the US pressures than a strong and stable Pakistan" (Ibid., p. poets and authors were fulsome in their praise" (Vertzberger, 1983).

China did not want for superpowers to have a strong foothold in South Asia. The United States and the Soviet Union positions regarding India were against to those of China and Pakistan. By taking a pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir issue, China successfully made thinking superpowers for balanced role on the issue in future. The Indo-Pakistan war provided a supportive case for Beijing's anti-double policy, that of against both of superpowers. In the context of Afro-Asian diplomacy, Beijing fulfilled its promise of supporting the weak and condemning the aggressive state. On the other hand, despite of the status of a trusted ally, United States didn't come for assistance to Pakistan regarding Kashmir. The embargo on supply of military aid and hardware in Indo-Pakistan war further created deadlock in the US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan realized that its pro-West policy could not bring a stable security, at least for the region, as the anti-West bloc had consistent suspicions.

6 V. Conclusion

The ongoing Sino-Indian deteriorating relations and China's unanimous support for the new-established states of the Third World awakened Pakistan, who was looking towards Western nations to solve her core issue of Kashmir. With the admission of PRC to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, Pakistan hoped to gain support on Kashmir from Chinese side, because the Soviet Union was a hurdle in the UN who was overtly supporting India by exercising her veto power. Later, Pakistan's dream changed into reality, when PRC brought

a radical change in her policy from neutrality to Pakistan's support on Kashmir. The tit for tat policy of China and Pakistan helped them to unite together, in the balance of power existed in subcontinent. China supported Pakistan in 1965 war to make a counterweight to India. The boundary agreement resulted in upward swing of Sino-Pakistan relations which facilitated for China to support Pakistan's views on Kashmir, Pakistan; to support China's seat in the UN and One China policy. The Indian aggression was a signal for its hegemony to China in the region. It was also Chinese calculations to show that India was a reactionary state to undermine the securities of its neighbors, as was evident from the Sino-Indian border war. The Indian hegemony was not only a threatening factor for small countries of the region but also for China. It was in Chinese thinking that in the absence of a counterbalance and a strong Pakistan, India would emerge as a giant.^{1 2 3}



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