

The Alert Period in the Residency of Bogor-Indonesia (Bogor around the Proclamation for Independent)

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Abstract

Masa Bersiap (The Alert Period) was the post Proclamation of Indonesian Independence period: August 1945 to January 1946. This sort period of alertness was very critically and decision, it was describe as a very disordered time, laden with numerous acts of violent, looting, even massacres. Bogor is one of example that reflected this situation. Ki Nariya who was known as jawara from Leuwiliang, Bogor, had tried to seized the power. He tried to capture all the official government at this residency. Ki Nariya's and followers nearly were acknowledged by the government of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta who did received little information the social development around the Jakarta to Bogor area, and had nearly acknowledged his leadership. But after a report was obtained from Bogor, the leaders in Jakarta gave instruction to the TKR to immediately take strong action against the Ki Nariya movement. After obtaining that instruction, one combined groups of the Bogor regiment were successful to surround and intercept Ki Nariya in Dermaga.

Index terms— alertness, seized the power, acts of violent, looting, vacuum of power, disorder, collective action, TKR, and Ki Nariya movement.

1 I. Introduction

The Alert period was a relative short duration time span in the history of the Indonesian people. Actually there was with a certain time span about when it started and ended. Even so, one could estimate that this sort time span started about four month after the Japan surrender unconditionally to the Allied Forces. This sort period of alertness was a period, which was very critically and decision, it was describe as a very disordered time or a chaotic period, laden with numerous acts of violent, looting, even massacres. This situation was the result of a vacuum of power, there was nobody who could takes control of the situation. At that time past government (The Japanese) had surrendered, while in the meantime the new government (the Indonesian government), which had no experience, was relatively weak. According to Adam Malik there were plenty of young man went up and down the streets using several attributes and put their hands up while shouting "siap", and this period of alertness was there therefore called Masa Bersiap (The Alert Period).

2 Whether you agree with Adam Malik opinion, what is certainly the alert period was really a disorderly

Author: e-mail: abahsepuh2009@gmail.com period and full of violence. This collective action with violence, which took place at the early period of Indonesia independence, could also be experience at start of the reformation regime at the end of 1990s up to the year 2000s; upheavals could be seen in Ambon (1999), Poso and Sampit (2000). Looking from the violent actions, these collective actions of the two periods gave the same impression. That mean, the cause of the violent action were based on relation, ethnical problems or race and religion. Since these problems are also faced by the other countries like Southern Thailand. (Aslam, 2008:81-82). The question

3 II. SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE BOGOR RESIDENCY DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

42 which across us, is it true that the cause or the culture which pushed these collective actions were the same? Before
43 being able to answer that question, we should first study the opinion of Van Doorn about the "Masa bersiap". He
44 said: "Maar voor goed begrip van de maatschappelijke historische betekenis van deze periode is het nuttig te
45 beseffen dat de "bersiap" veel meer was; een revolutionair proces, waarbij met geweld van wapenen een sociale
46 opstand werd doodgevoerd en een collectief nationaal sentiment werd gedemonstreerd, gericht tegen terugkeer van
47 de "kolonie" ("But for a good understand of the social historical meaning of this period, it would be good to
48 know that the "bersiap" was more than what was already mentioned; it was a revolutionary process, which was
49 demonstrated collectively national sentiment which was dedicated to the return of the colony ??Van Doorn,1983).
50 So what was meant by the "masa bersiap" social historical has to be interpreted as revolutionary change process,
51 where a social action with violent use of weapons with the national sentiments collectively directed to colonial
52 power which wanted to reign again.

53 Van Doorn's statement pointed out that these violence took place in such conditions were reasonable, and
54 should be taken as reasonable. Since reasonable in a certain place could not be reasonable in another place.
55 As told by Onghokham, many farmer uprisings, which were caused by high taxation. But this does not imply
56 that high taxation would cause uprisings. In other words what happened in one place could easily be used as
57 standardization to generalize similar events which took place in other places. Some events, which took place
58 around September 1945 -August 1946 showed a certain uniqueness like what took place in Jakarta -Tangerang
59 ??Cribb, 1991), Banten ??Iskandar, 1992), Three Areas in Central Java or Tiga Daerah ??Lucas, 1991), East
60 Sumatera ??Kahin, 1971 and Reid), which were mentioned by A.H. Nasution and B.R.O.G. Anderson (1972).
61 These events strengthened Onghokham's opinion, who mentioned that the cause which arose the collective actions,
62 whether mentioned as a social revolution and also as a revolt; were of several variants and sorts.

63 In this paper, the author tried to disclose again events, which happened in the section (afdeling) area which
64 not is known as kabupaten/city of Bogor in the time span from 1945-1946. As one could read in the local
65 newspaper and Dutch intelligence reports (Netherlands Eastern Forces Intelligence Service -N.E.F.I.S.) not long
66 after the proclamation of independence of the Indonesian people on 17th August 1945, some areas violent actions
67 took place. The Bogor regency could not escape these brutal actions accompanied with actions against the law.
68 The question is, were the collective actions which took place in the area of the Bogor regency were an aftermath
69 of the event which took place in Jakarta -Banten or not? Second, if the actions had a local character, then
70 what local factors which were able to push the local inhabitants to carry out such actions? To answer both
71 questions comprehensively it would be maybe not very easy. Not only because there is scarcity of textual sources
72 which could cover these events, but also the actors and the witnesses, which experienced the actions are no more
73 available. For these reasons, not only as an excuse if in these articles the author used the word "to try" to disclose
74 the period which has been told as a mythos full of tensions and no order based on facts which could be found.

75 3 II. Some Information about the Bogor Residency during the 76 Colonial Period

77 The Bogor residency is located south of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, which from the past up to 1866 was an
78 assistant residency region, which was administratively included as a part of Batavia Residency.
79 The use of the name Bogor to indicate this area, up to present is still debated by the experts of the Bogor history.
80 But according to Baron von Imhoff, when the Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) took over this area,
81 the local people called this area Bogor. But after this area was under the VOC it was called Buitenzorg by Baron
82 von Imhoff which meant far from the noise, which is in contrast with Batavia which was noisy. At the end of the
83 VOC this area divided into six districts, Buitenzorg, Cibinong, Parung, Leuwiliang, Jasinga and Cisarua. It consisted
84 of about 374,903.26 ha or equal to 68 square miles. The southern and eastern were bordered with the Priangan
85 residency which is separated by a range of mountains Halimun, Salak, Gede, Pangrango, and Megamendung. While
86 at the western part the Bogor residency was bordered by the Banten residency which was separated by the Cidurian
87 river. Except for the Cidurian river also from the Bogor area there are the Cimandiri and Cisadane rivers, the
88 rivers which also passed the Bogor town are the Angke river, a branch of the Citarum river.

89 This area except for the Blubur government area which was the center of the Dutch East Indies government
90 next to Batavia, consisted of private lands with first of all coffee, cinchona, tea, sugarcane and rice, but you can find
91 private land cultivated with nutmeg, trees, cloves, pepper, and next to them all these were lands which produced
92 calcium and bird's nests. Most of these private lands were under Europeans and some were under Chinese. The
93 status of these private lands, difference from private property. The owner of these lands did not only have
94 ownership of the whole land, but also had rights over the population on the land. He obtained a special right from
95 the government, which gave him the right as monarch. For the above reason the private lands prices are mostly
96 highest if compared with common private lands. The price of the private land in 1894 is f. 16,691,150 (ENI,
97 1887: 298). But because of the special right, most of the time the owner or person who hired a private land,
98 exploited the people living on the land beyond their normal activities, this way of exploiting them made their
99 daily life dropped below the subsistence line. This condition created unrest, which often developed in uprisings
100 or farmer opposition.

101 One of farmers' opposition which at the same time was the biggest protest on a private land, exploded in 1886
102 in the Ciomas private land ??Iskandar, 2007). The impact of this opposition did not end until the opponents

103 were brought to the court, instead of it developed which forced Otto van Rees had to leave his position as the
104 Governor General of the Netherlands East Indie, until there was a demand to abolish the private land institution
105 (Indische Gids. Deel I: 740-741).

106 The monarch of Netherlands agreed to the demand. The purchasing of the private lands by the government
107 started since 1917 and ended in the year 1931. The economic crisis, which hit the whole world at that time made
108 the government of The Netherlands East Indie to stop the purchasing. According to reports from the Bogor
109 residency, there were still 12 private lands which comprises about 66,637 bau or about 53,310 ha. The rest of the
110 private lands at the end disappear when the independence war started in Indonesia.

111 Since the laws 1931 No.425 were introduced, the Bogor residency were united with Sukabumi and Cianjur
112 residencies became a Bogor residency and its capital was Bogor town. This condition was not changed when
113 the Japanese took over the government from the Dutch. Only the name of government' structure changed like
114 "keresidenan" or residency became "shu", "kabupaten" became "ken", and Keresidenan Bogor became Bogor
115 shu.

116 4 III. The Era of the Japanese Occupation

117 In general the social condition of the Indonesia society during the Japanese occupation was relatively worse than
118 the Dutch colonial period. The war was not the cause of this situation, but because of the Japanese government
119 had hardly built economic facilities. The result of this a big paid of the plantations were neglected and changed
120 into the small forests. The same case was with rice plants, soya bean, cassava, and ma is which all had deteriorated
121 the Japanese Kempetai to local economic development could only be noticed in the position of the Japanese was
122 at the front started to be pushed back. This condition could be noticed in the contents of speech of the leader of
123 the Jawa Hokokai (to fight the enemy, the development of a new Java, you all have to work hard to strengthen the
124 economy and to restore the health of the animals (Tjahaja, ect). But if take a good look, this concern basically
125 was not for the well being of the people of Indonesia, this all was for the interest of the Japanese.

126 There were Indonesian people who were pushed by the Japanese (like for instance by Tonarigumi institution)
127 as laborers without pay to build a new Java. They were forced to build several economic and military facilities,
128 including to dig big holes and tunnels for defense outside Indonesia, like in the Philippines and Myanmar. Even
129 so the Japanese government called these forced laborers with a respectable name, economic heroes, a name
130 which was not so well-known, romusha. According to Wertheim nearly about 300.000 romusha were sent abroad
131 and only about 70.000 came back to Indonesia alive ??Wertheim, 1956: 228). Next to these there were many
132 Indonesian women who were made to satisfying the sexual inclinations of this Japanese soldiers. They were called
133 jugun ianfu. The Javanese people suffered this time of the Japanese occupation as zaman edan alias a crazy time
134 ??Anderson, 1972: 15).

135 Although the Japanese occupation period was named crazy period, there was also a positive side, especially for
136 the young men. Like what Anderson said, the Japanese government had given the young Indonesians selfconfident.
137 They were involved in military and youth organizations like the sainendan, keibodan, heiho, and at the end in
138 the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta) soldier organization. Not directly, but the Japanese had also contributed in the
139 spread of the Indonesia national language, by forbidding the use of the enemy's languages (Dutch and English)
140 at schools and formal events. The only language, which may be used was the Japanese and Indonesia languages.
141 In line with the spreading of the use of the Indonesia language, the Indonesia national idea also spread out. The
142 more propagandizing idea "Perang Asia Timur Raya" (The East Asian Great War) to the people of Indonesia,
143 the Japanese government involved political personalities and religious leaders, like Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta,
144 Gatot Mangkupradja, Kiai Haji Mas Mansyur, Ki Hajar Dewantara, local personalities from the Bogor residency
145 who were asked to join by the Japanese were among others Mr. Syamsuddin, he was appointed as chairman of
146 the "3 A movement" (an propaganda institution which was formed for the first time in Indonesia) and Kiai Haji
147 Ajengan Ahmad Sanusi who was appointed as vice resident (shu fukuchokan) Bogor shu ??Benda, ??218). He
148 in the past was known as a leader of an organization which was militant enough, Al-Ittihadiyah Islamiyyah
149 ??Iskandar, 2001: 184). But the vice resident position did not last long. He felt that he was not enough competent
150 for that position taking into consideration that the knowledge he had obtained were only from the pesantrens,
151 which gave enough support (Asia Raja, 27 November 1944).

152 During the Japanese occupation the name Batavia was changed in to Jakarta. A different process counts for
153 Buitenzorg, this name disappeared and was changed into Bogor, a name which was already familiar among the
154 local inhabitants since the VOC period. Some event took place in the area of the Bogor resident which are should
155 be noted, because its impact is quite big for the independent war of the Indonesia people. One of the events
156 was the creation of the center for the Japanese military exercises which was named Jawa Bóei Giyúgun Kanbuon
157 the 15 th of October 1943. In this institution officer candidates for soldier to perfect the fatherland were named
158 Pembela Tanah Air (Peta). In January 1944 the name of center for exercise was changed by its new commander,
159 Captain Yanagawa into Bó-ei Giyúgun Kanbu Kyóikutai, in line which its perception that this institution was
160 not only training (rensei), but also to education (kyóiku) its to be soldier(Nugroho ??otosusanto, 1979: 90).

161 The number of the Peta soldier which obtained a Japanese education were 66 battalion (daidan) in Java and 3
162 battalion in Bali. In Java the Peta spread to each residency. In Bogor residency, there were 4 battalion, they were
163 concentrated at Jampang Kulon, Pelabuhan Ratu, Cibeber, and Cianjur. In general, whose who were educated
164 and appointed to become battalion commander (daidanchó) were known as personalities or local elites, like Kiai

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165 Haji Abdullah bin Nuh, Moslem scholar (ulama) from Empang, Bogor and Kiai Haji Basuni ulama form Cipoho,
166 Sukabumi. The both ulamas were before activist from Al-Ittihadiyah Islamiyah under the leadership of Kiai
167 Haji Ajengan Ahmad Sanusi (Iskandar, op.cit; Tjahaja Februari 12 th 1944).

168 The formation of the Peta in fact was one of the idea of Japan to directly involve the Indonesia people into
169 the war against the Allied Forces. They hope the

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171 The news about the Japanese last the war against the Allied forces has been actually already disclosed by a
172 the leader of the Bogor shu Peta, Daidancho Haji Abdullah bin Nuh. According to him a few days before the
173 proclamation when his soldier were on duty at Ujung Genteng, Jampang Kulon, Sukabumu residency, he saw
174 that that Japanese in change to look after the troops was took the weapons from his soldier while giving the
175 reason for this that the weapons was no more good enough and this would be replaced by a more modern one
176 (Susanto Zuhdi, 1979: 223-227). The unweaponing doen by the Japanese towards they troops did not only take
177 place in The Bogor region only, but it took place all at once in every regions. Apparently the Japanese occupation
178 government is still traumatized by the events of the Peta rebellion in Blitar a few months earlier. They anxious
179 that, if Peta army came to known about the Japanese surrender, they would take retaliation to the Japanese
180 ??Notosusanto, 1979: 128). 2 A day after the proclamation was read, the PPKI organized a meeting and the
181 topic of the meeting was to select a head of the state. In this meeting, Ir. Soekarno was elected as the president
182 of the state and Mohammad Hatta as the vice president by acclamation. What also was achieved at that meeting
183 was the Indonesia Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia conformed and the Indonesian National Committee,
184 which had the duty to assist the president to carry out the government's policies.

185 The central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) was only establishment on August 29 th 1945. It had 135
186 who were appointed by Soekarno -Hatta. After the formation of the KNIP, they also formed a Local Indonesia
187 National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah -KNID), while the members were elected by the people,
188 like the Bogor residency. The chairman in this area was dr. Abu Hanifah (Abu Hanifah, 1978: 47). But there
189 other which were protested even they pulled off coup, and forced to retreat by a part of population like what
190 had happened in Banten residency. During the first of independence, this KNID, which were in reality were
191 governing the Republic of Indonesia including controlling the People's Safeness Committee Peta soldiers would
192 join the war seriously to defend their country. Except making the Peta, the Japanese also made a promise became
193 well known as the promise Koiso (The Japanese Prime Minister at that time). This promise was then followed
194 by the establishment of the investigation body to investigate the preparation for the independence of Indonesia
195 (BPUPKI) which after that was continued (carried on) by the Committee for the Preparation of the Indonesian
196 Independence (PPKI). But the promise could be fulfilled in the middle of August the Japanese surrendered to
197 Allied forces unconditional.

198 The news about this event came to be known among the young Indonesian who were working in the Japanese
199 news agency office, Domei. Although these Indonesian were already increased their self confidence and a critical
200 attitude towards the Japanese. They had already a strong historical confidence and felt uneasy if the independence
201 of Indonesia was given by the Japanese made them uneasy in front of the Allied forces whose won the war. For
202 this reason they pushed the old generation, Soekarno and Hatta to immediately proclaim the independence of
203 Indonesia (Nugroho, 1979: 131-132).

204 But the old generation in the meantime thought that the independence had been promised. So what is urgency
205 to hurry, especially to oppose the Japanese which nota bene as a matter of fact had still a force which was in
206 full power, it would be better that the strength they had be saved and used later to confront the Allied forces
207 who would come to take over the Japanese power. These young men later kidnapped Soekarno and Hatta and
208 brought them to Rengasdengklok, a little town in east Jakarta. These case later could be solved by Ahmad
209 Subardjo, who gave a guarantee to the freedom fighters, that when release Soekarno and Hatta, the independence
210 proclamation would soon take place at long last, Soekarno, Hatta were brought back again to Jakarta, and the
211 next day, on frijday, august 17 th 1945, the proclamation of the Indonesia independence, was declared.

212 The news about independence was spread rapidly to all parts of Indonesia by radio, telegram, including courier.
213 But, since the condition of the country and also the situation was still critical, these situation caused that the
214 news reached the people not at the time and the reaction was also not the same. These were spontaneous happy
215 reactions and offered immediate support to the government of Indonesia and other reacted suspiciously, i.e. an
216 independence where people would act according to his interest. This way of thinking made some local leaders
217 in certain areas make actions, which contributed to an certain situation which became frightening. As already
218 mentioned, this period was known with the words "Masa Bersiap" sera of being ready.

219 rejected by Soekarno-Hatta since they wanted to avoid to provoke the Allied forces. They were afraid that
220 the Allied forces would destroy to Republic of Indonesia, which in fact had not yet enough power and military
221 knowhow to confront them ??Notosusanto, 1979: 141-142). The Indonesia government wanted to show that the
222 Indonesia people love peace. The government only agreed to establish an organization for people security, named
223 BKR, which would be under the control of the KNIP and KNID. In fact the BKR was not an military organization.
224 But since clashes occurred with British army which were difficult to be avoided, this events made the government
225 to call the former KNIL Major Urip Sumohardjo together with some former Koninklijk Nederlands Indië Leger
226 (KNIL) members and Peta members. They had a meeting and at the end of the meeting they agreed to establish

227 a military organization for the safety of the population. Urip was given the authority to establish the Tentara
228 Keamanan Rakyat (TKR -The Military organization for the Nation Safety), and he was appointed as the chief
229 commander of general staff with the rank of general lieutenant.

230 Although it was already certain about the formation of a military organization, but at that time there were still
231 a lot of political forces in the country which judged this describes as an hesitating attitude which would be taken
232 as a hesitating attitude. For this reason many political groups formed for themselves a military organization like
233 the Hizbullah, Lasykar Leuwiliang, Lasykar Pesindo, Bambu Runcing, etc. This weakness at the end pushed
234 personal action as well as group actions with violent actions, which hardly could be controlled by government.
235 Even in some areas, there jawara's (head of some groups which sometimes made violent action and thieves used
236 strong action towards the Indonesia government and killed them and accused them to be the Dutch side. The
237 result of these kind of violent action created victims, like Amrin Pane (the best man of letters from Eat Sumatra,
238 Indonesia) and Otto Iskandar Dinata (the top Indonesian politician from Bandung, West Java, Indonesia).

239 The fight for power in the Bogor residency itself started with the fight to get the suchokan office, not after
240 the news of the independence proclamation reached this area. It started with the news that the Japanese obtain
241 the mandate from the Allied forces to guard the status quo, did not want to hand over that building. But with
242 the approach of the young freedom fighters leader Muhammad Sirodj, at along last the Japanese were willing to
243 hand over the mentioned office (Tjahaja, 19 th August 1945). But in the process in handing over the rule not
244 everything went smooth and peaceful like Muhammad Sirodj did. There were many brutal actions and anarchy,
245 which took place in this area. In Depok for instance, on 7 th October 1945, a upheaval took place because the
246 local inhabitants boycotted the Europeans including the people considered an accomplice Netherlands. They
247 tried to stop those Europeans to buy their daily needs, and next to that they forbid the traders to sell their
248 goods to the Europeans. Even according to the report of the Dutch Intelligence, their actions were not only
249 directed to the Europeans, but also to the Eurasians and those who professed Christianity, which in the past
250 were very closed to the Dutch. Furthermore this report also mentions that in some localities in the Depok, West
251 Java, these robbery involved also people from the Barisan Pelopor, 3 whose were known as workers of asisten
252 wedana (assistant district officer) of Depok (ANRI, Alg. ??ec. 1942 ??1945 ??o.1240).

253 On the 9 of October, a little bit later a sharp bamboo weapon group robbed five families who were mentioned
254 as Dutch accomplices. They took all their properties. The next day, turn the cooperative warehouses where food
255 store was looted by a bunch of bums. The Police and the government officials knew about the two incidents but
256 did not take action except only stand around as onlookers (I b i d).

257 The upheavals became worse because of coordination weakness of the police and BKR, which actually were
258 in charge for the security. On the 11 th October around 4000 people came to Depok, some came by train, truck
259 and lazy even bullock carts. The Dutch intelligence reported about the arrival of those people was known by the
260 Indonesia government officials and the Republic of Indonesiapolice. These groups easily and freely robbed, made
261 a mass of the houses and sent the inhabitants out of their houses, especially those who were Europeans Christian
262 inhabitants. It was difficult for those people to get protection, for even they went into the forest it would also
263 be difficult for the guarantee of their safety, even in the forests there were many robbers who would take their
264 properties like clothes, food, Japanese and Dutch paper money, diamond and the Dutch silver coins. The report
265 of intelligence mentioned by looking at characteristics, it was clear that those actions were collective action well
266 organized. There area were person or certain groups who organized those actions (I b I d).

267 This uprisings increased since the coordination of the police and the BKR to take care of the security was
268 weak with an passive attitude the government and Republic of Indonesia police, the personal actions, especially
269 the collective actions with violent actions increased more and more. An October 13 th for instance, 10 Depok
270 inhabitants were murdered. Next to it the BKR and the Barisan Pelopor (known by their using of force of
271 material around their arm). went of the Dutch 3 Barisan Pelopor is a youth organization that was established
272 in September 1944 as a form of support for Java Hokokai propaganda agency. Hokokai top job to Bogor area
273 held by Gatot Mangkupradja (chairman) and Suradiredja (vice-chairman). See Tjahaja, September inhabitants.
274 They were detained brought together at the back of the old Depok station. There men, women, and children
275 were unclothed excepted for their underpants and bra's. All their clothings were taken away by these robbers
276 were at that time together under guardian of the Barisan Pelopor.

277 The violence actions were not only directed to the groups whom they were claimed suspect as Dutch sympathies,
278 but sometime this violence actions also were experienced by the republicans. There were plenty of muggers or
279 robbers who made used of the upheaval for their own benefit. Mayor A.E. Kawilarang who at that time was
280 the head of the Regiment Bogor Staff Division II TKR, heard a report from his the soldiers under his command
281 that in Cisarua there were two Menadonese women with their children, one of them still a baby, they evacuated
282 to this place. He got the chance to meet the two women and promised to bring them to Bogor and further to
283 send them to safe place. But next day when the two women would be transported, it turned out the houses of
284 these two women were already robber. The two women with all their children 12 person totally were dead with
285 wound caused by knives or sharp weapons all over their bodies. All properties of them were stolen or robbed
286 (Ramandhan K.H., 1988: 74).

287 From the big amount of violent actions, the collective actions under the leadership of Ki Nariya from Leuwiliang
288 was quite a dangerous action for the Republic of Indonesia government in the Bogor resident. Especially in the
289 district degree. Ki Nariya who got assistance from the Lasykar Gulkut alias Gulung Bukut under leadership of

290 The Mamat detained the Bogor resident Raden Barnas Tanuningrat and the Head of the Police Raden Enoch
291 Danubrata and fired them from their positions. Thereafter all the officials of the Republic of Indonesia in Bogor
292 were changed by Ki Nariya -The Mamat. After that Ki Nariya retreated to Dermaga, southwest Bogor, after
293 the police and apparatus he had confiscated changed them by his followers. Please note that The Mamat and
294 his Lasykar Gulkut reached Bogor, to be exact in Leuwiliang because they ran away after the take over action
295 in Banten, failed. Ki Nariya's and followers nearly were acknowledged by the government of the Republic of
296 Indonesia in Jakarta who did received little information the social development around the Jakarta -Bogor area,
297 and had nearly acknowledged his leadership. But after a report was obtained from Bogor, the leaders in Jakarta
298 gave instruction to the TKR in Bogor area to immediately take strong action against the Ki Nariya -Tje Mamat
299 movement ??Ramadhan, 1988:62-63 In such an chaos situation, the Republic of Indonesia side had to face the
300 British as a part of the Allied forces who came to disarmed the Japanese army and liberate the Japanese prisoners
301 of war as has already been much disclosed by many historical researchers, a misunderstanding and perception
302 between the Republic of Indonesia and England, the recapitulation process was not smooth, there were many
303 disputes and war between the Lasykar or BKR/TKR who Since there was not a good coordination between
304 the TKR and Badan-badan Kelasykaran (the organization troops), like Barisan Pelopor and Lasykar Hizbullah,
305 often fighting took place between the TKR against the lasykar (Ramadhan K.H., 1988: 61). The lasykar also
306 often attacks which actions were not favorable for the Republic of Indonesia reputation, for instance attacked the
307 convoy which transported the Japanese troops, which actually had already made an agreement with the Republic
308 of Indonesia government and the Allied forces to go through the Bogor area. The leader of the TKR in the Bogor
309 Residence therefore warned that the convoy of the 11 lorries which would pass Cimande on the way to Jakarta
310 should not be disturbed, because what they have in the trucks or lorries were Japanese soldiers who would be
311 returned to their country (Algemeene Secretaries No. 1240, ANRI).

312 6 V. The End of t he Alert Period

313 If in the beginning the Republic of Indonesia leaders were not to enthusiastic to establish a national military
314 institution, "afraid" of being branded not having good intention and are fascistic, but the reality made them to
315 change their way of thinking. This change of mind could be noticed by the publishing of the announcement of
316 October 1945 concerning the establishing the People's Military, troops for the safety of could say after the 3 rd
317 July 1946. Although after this date there were still revolutionary parasites who took the opportunity for their
318 non benefit.

319 7 VI.

320 8 Epilog

321 History is the past of the human being, a period which could not be repeated. If so what is the use of studying
322 history, if the results would not be importance and useful for the present? In fact to study history is just
323 only to the "beginning" or the origin of the institution, genealogy of rulers, or the services and the role of the
324 certain figures in the past, than the benefits would stop after curiosities had been fulfilled. But impact would
325 be different if you study history for the present. Like it was disclosed by Nugroho Notosusanto in his speech on
326 the inauguration of his professor, "history is for the present, not for the past". It means that we study the past
327 is the wisdom. With that wisdom we build the present and plan for the future (Nugroho Notosusanto, Sejarah
328 Demi Masa Kini, 1980).

329 From the Bersiap period which was relatively short, many things could become lessons or comparisons to
330 develop the present, especially in Bogor residency. First, the Bersiap period took place because the Central
331 Government, since it dared not take quickly and decisively actions. There was states needs which actually should
332 be quick developed, was instead kept hanging or postponed, like the formation of army. At that time actually
333 the Republic of Indonesia was facing serious threats. Second, there was no clear coordination and division of
334 tasks, for instance the police and TKR under the KNID even with other troops organizations which in general
335 became forces of political powers, like religious and secular political power. The result was that every group felt
336 itself independent or had autonomic rights to give its idea about independent was which was then reflected in
337 actions among others in violent action, including collective actions as seen in the three areas in Central Java
338 (Lucas, 1989), the seizure of power by Tje Mamat in Serang Banten (Iskandar in Ghazali ed., 1995), and events
339 Cumbok in Aceh ??Iskandar cs., 2000).

340 From those actions one could understand that basically it is human being who decided the history the history.
341 If the history is changing to process, then the human being would be an agent of change. The question, is it
342 possible that all people can become the agent of change? If such a question could be converted with one of the
343 religious or faiths then the answer would be "yes". But if it associated with the reality of society, the answer
344 would be "no". As said by Giddens and Lloyd, who can be an agent of change only the people who have the
345 ability and willingness to make changes. For instance at the district level, the regents can be an agent of change
346 because he has the authority and power. Meanwhile among certain tribes, a person who has great opportunities
347 as an agent of change is tribal chief. Just as regent, he has the charisma and authority to make changes. The
348 problem is whether these people want to change. Therefore, the socio-political or community structures have the

349 property set at the same curb, which simply could not be changed. This means, without the ability and strength
350 with a strong will, a change will be difficult to realize.

351 Ki Nariya and Tje Mamat is a case of people who fail to change the way they wanted. Though they have a
352 charisma that can affect a particular group to do his will. Relatively, they are able to also read the sociopolitical
353 situation in the vicinity, so it can see the opportunity to realize a dream or ambition. Both see the Masa Bersiap
354 as a great time to realize their dream as ruler of the area. Generally people are supporting a political movement
355 of those two men, in addition to having an emotional bond with them, as well as those who were persuaded
356 to benefit from changes later, including vent desire and resentment against those who have been regarded as
357 detrimental.

358 Their movement ultimately failed, mainly because both were wrong in judging political issues that developed
359 during the Masa Bersiap. The issue of independence and unity of the Republic of Indonesia, which before a
360 debate over many of the political elite, quickly spread and be accepted into the ideals shared by most people in
361 the Indonesian archipelago. The ability of the two figures was not strong enough to influence and encourage all
362 communities in the district of Bogor or Serang, Banten to continue to support their movement. On the contrary
363 many people who oppose Bogor as reflected by the presence of paramilitary troops like Lasykar Leuwiliang and
364 Lasykar Hizbullah (Hezbollah) postscript is the military of the local community. The attitude of society as well as
365 be a very valuable advantage for the Indonesian government, which at that time was still relatively weak. History
366 prove that charismatic of Ki Nariya -Tje Mamat could be defeated by the spirit of nationalism of Indonesia, that
united the nation to defend the sovereign of the nation. ^{1 2}



Figure 1: (

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

¹The Alert Period in the Residency of Bogor-Indonesia (Bogor around the Proclamation for Independent)

²Some argue that the Peta and Heiho dissolved on the basis of Otto Iskandar Dinata proposal through PPKI. In his opinion, the Allies dislike the politics product smelled Japanese, so that the Republic of Indonesia can be considered as a doll Japanese creation. Starting from the proposal, then PPKI asked the Japanese occupation government to dissolve both the military organization. See R.H.A.Saleh, 2000: 102-103

367 the people (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat -TKR). In February 1946 this name was changed into the Republic of
368 Indonesia Military (Tentara Republik Indonesia -TRI).

369 At that time the formation TKR/TRI was took the example of Department van Oorlog, Koninklijk Nedelands
370 Indië Leger(KNIL) in Bandung. According to A.H. Nasution, at the first the plan was the composition of the
371 organization be consisted of three divisions in Java and one division in Sumatera. But in reality at that time
372 there already a dozen of generals in Yogyakarta with ten divisions in Java and six divisions in Sumatera which
373 cover about 100 infantryregiments (Nasution, 1963).

374 Looking at the reality, one could say that the division already exist were formulated in three commandments
375 in Java and one commandment in Sumatera. The three commandments in Java were: All the three commanders
376 were appointed base on the letter of appointment form the 19 th December 1945 No.44/MT which was signed
377 by Lieutenant General Urip Sumohardjo, the Head of General Headquarters of the TKR ??Saleh, 2000: 129). In
378 reality only Commandment I could be established, while the three others could not be established. The reason for
379 this was since the three areas, Central Java, East Java, and Sumatera, there was a certain competition between
380 the formar military trained by the Japanese (an particular the Peta) and the former trained by the Dutch, KNIL
381 (Anderson, 1972). While in West Java Java there was an agreement and sympathy among the former Peta and
382 KNIL, they were willing to cooperate in the Commandment although most of the leaders and it staff members
383 were ex KNIL military men (Saleh, I b I d).

384 What was not important for them was the national interest, in particular to fight against the Dutch -NICA
385 who were already in front of them, instead of to dispute about, whom of them were the most nationalistic or to
386 the right to be the commander.

387 This spirit of nationalism could also be noticed in the reorganization in the TRI in the region of the Bogor
388 residency. At that area was divided in two pasts, which was included in Division I Banten -Bogor with Colonel
389 Kiai Haji Syam'un as its commander and Division III Priangan -Bogor with Colonel Arudji Kartawinata/Colonel
390 A.H. Nasution as the chief commander. In course of time, the area under the responsibility of Divisi I only consist
391 of the Banten residency, because for that time, the Chief of General Staff has formed Division XI TKR under the
392 leadership of Colonel Abdul Kadir, who was responsible for the security of Bogor district. In this division two
393 regiments were erected under commandership of Husein Sastranegara. The formation the division and even the
394 regiment were formed earlier and had also already a serial number, took place peacefully and easily, there was
395 no protesting.

396 While the battalion which was in Bogor was battalion I under the commandership of Mayor Ibrahim Adjie who
397 was also responsible for Depok, Bojonggede, and surroundings. Battalion II was under the leadership of Mayor
398 Toha who was responsible for Cijeruk area up to the Bogor environment. Battalion III was under leadership of
399 Mayor Haji Dasuki Bakri who was responsible for the area Ciampea and Leuwiliang. Battalion IV under the
400 leadership of Mayor Abing Sarbini was responsible for the Cileungsi, Citeureup, up to Cibarusah (Ramadhan
401 KH, 1988: 62).

402 As already mention before, the reorganization and structuration in the West Java area had a positive impact
403 either internally or externally. There was no more suspicion among the former KNIL, Peta and Heiho, even with
404 former the national struggle troops who asked to join or to be acknowledged as a part of the TKR. In Garut for
405 instance, there was a Resimen Perjuangan (regiment of struggle for independence) fighters under the leadership
406 of Colonel Sutoko and in Subang there was the Lasykar Rakyat (People struggles) under leadership of Mayor
407 Rambe ??Nasution, 1963: 200).

408 In Bogor area itself, the reorganization and structuration army made a line of military command bet-
409 ter, included the coordination with other struggle for independence organizations. These reflected in the cooperative
410 to crush movement or rebellion of Ki Nariya -The Mamat in the Leuwiliang and Dermaga area. It be known
411 that since January 1946 the head Quarters of the Bogor Division (Division II) was situated in Darmaga, because
412 at that time Bogor was already under the British although the civilian government was still in Bogor. Even as
413 already explained by Kawilarang, "Bogor was very strange". When the TKR and the Allied forces troops played
414 hide and seek, and shoot each other and also stop each other. While the local government (Bogor) and the police
415 had meeting with the British about the local security, and part of the meeting report also reached the TKR.

416 Even according to Kawilarang, the Resident of Bogor Barnas Wiratuningrat had a dinner together with the
417 Mayor of Bogor Odang inviting the British Brigade and his staff. In addition to inviting the British military
418 officers, they also invite leaders of TKR like Colonel Abdul Kadir, Lieutenant Colonel Hidayat Sukamwijaya,
419 Captain Yusuf Hardjadiparta. Colonel Kawilarang also attended the dinner ??Ramadhan KH, 1988: 69). The
420 more coordinated the relationship among the TKR and the police , the control of the government in this area
421 improved. This condition slowly ended the period of uncertainly. It is quite difficult to say when exactly the
422 alert period or Masa Bersiap ended, but in general one

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