

1 Legislators' use of One-Minute Speeches

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4 Received: 9 December 2013 Accepted: 31 December 2013 Published: 15 January 2014

5

6 **Abstract**

7 This study examines how legislators use one-minute speeches (OMS) in a venue never before
8 considered, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset). The study considers two research questions.
9 First, do legislators use OMSs to set their agenda and make policy? If so, in what way?
10 Second, what are the characteristics of the legislators who make extensive use of OMSs? We
11 consider these questions in light of the global economic crisis of 2007-2010. The findings show
12 that legislators made very limited use of OMSs as tool for making policy about the economic
13 crisis. We found the same trend in the finance committee meetings and motions for the
14 agenda. Furthermore, while opposition MKs, junior MKs and Arab MKs used OMSs more
15 extensively than other MKs, they still rarely used them as a policy-making tool.

16

17 **Index terms—**

18 **1 Introduction**

19 Legislators have multiple roles including enacting legislation, and engaging in oversight, representation and policy-
20 making. (Mayhew 1974;Fenno 1978;Searing 1994;Saalfeld and Muller 1997; ??trøm 1997;Blomgren and Rozenberg
21 2012). Any political institution has its procedures, which define the opportunities and the limitations available
22 to its members in their daily work. In light of the limited time and resources that legislators have, we need to ask
23 why they would choose to use one-minute speeches (hereafter OMS) over other tools available to them. What
24 are the advantages of OMS over other parliamentary procedures? Furthermore, if legislators choose to use OMS,
25 how do they do so-as policy-makers, position takers or in another role? Finally, what considerations motivate
26 legislators to use OMS?

27 Existing studies on OMS have looked at how legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives use them
28 (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996;Rocca 2007), why they use them (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996;Rocca 2007),
29 and their content (Polletta 1998;Hall 2002). This study will examine the use of OMS in a venue never before
30 considered, the Israeli parliament (the Knesset). Using Israel as the research site will allow us to test existing
31 theories with fresh data. The study will focus on the time period before and after the first wave of the world
32 economic crisis of 2007-2010. We chose to investigate this period of time because through it we can examine
33 two of the roles of legislators—representing their voters and making policy. In addition, unusual events such as
34 economy crises can be a trigger for using the easiest tool available to them -OMS.

35 Author : Western Galilee College. e-mail: osnatak@bezeqint.net Furthermore, in Israel, security issues usually
36 receive priority attention. Hence, it is interesting to investigate whether a crisis in an area other than security
37 causes Members of the Knesset (MKs) to invest their efforts in talking about the subject and in what manner.

38 We will start with review of the theories about the legislator's role in policy-making. Then, after reviewing
39 the literature about OMS, we will present some background on their use in the Israeli parliament. Relying both
40 on the Rules of Procedure and on interviews with several MKs, we will describe the procedures governing OMS
41 in Israel, which are similar to those used in the U.S. House of Representatives, the European Parliament, the
42 Australian Parliament and the Canadian Parliament. We will argue that in difficult economic times Israeli MKs
43 prefer to concentrate on internal issues rather than external ones, so they do not take the opportunity to make
44 economic policy. In the course of the discussion, we will advance three hypotheses about the characteristics of

3 III.

45 MKs who use OMS extensively. We will then test these hypotheses using recently available OMS from the 17th
46 and 18th Knesset terms.

47 2 II.

48 Politicians as Policy Makers Downs (1957) was the first scholar to argue that the relationship between legislators
49 and their voters determines the policy decisions of the legislators. Furthermore, this relationship is founded on
50 the mechanism of demand (the public's desire for specific policies) and supply (the response of politicians, often
51 rooted in the desire to be reelected). Riker (1982) expanded Downs ?? (1957) argument and said that legislators
52 establish ad-hoc coalitions with different agendas, but with the same goal of maximizing their chances of being
53 reelected. The combination of the desire to be re-elected (Mayhew 1974) and to enact good public policies
54 (Fenno1978) is a powerful motivation for legislators' actions in parliaments.

55 Scholars of public choice theory (Taylor 1987;Mueller 1989) claim that reality is determined by rational actors
56 and that public policy is a result of actions of various actors. Studies have shown that legislators usually
57 behave like rational actors, listening to the voters' demands, creating ad-hoc coalitions in order to meet the
58 public's demands and hoping to be rewarded with reelection (Fenno1978; Searing1994; Saalfeld and Muller1997;
59 ??Iomgren and Rozenberg,2012).

60 Politicians are just one of three groups that interact in the public policy arena, as Heclo (1978) describe 'Iron
61 Triangle'. The phrase was used to denote the close relationship between interest group, congressional committees
62 and government agencies (Burstein 1991;Howlett and Ramesh 1995;Hayden 2002). The scholars of public choice
63 theory assumed that there are reciprocal relations between the three groups (Olson 1965;Mitchell and Munger
64 1991). Furthermore, they claim that interest groups supply politicians with the information they need to identify
65 the public's preferences (Ainsworth and Sened 1993;Austen-Smith 1998). In addition, they argue that government
66 agencies such as bureaucrats can change the preferred policy of politicians (Monsen and Cannon 1965;Miller and
67 Moe 1983).

68 The current research concentrates on the relationship between legislators and government agencies (bureaucrats)
69 as they appeared during the debates in the Israeli finance committee about the world economy crisis.
70 The first scholar who studied this relationship was Niskanen (1971) who determined that bureaucrats are driven
71 by the desire to maximize the budget of their office, which increases their power. Subsequent scholars found
72 that politicians adopt strategies to control bureaucrats. Therefore, the relationship between politicians and
73 bureaucrats has built-in conflicts (Miller and Moe 1983). Miller and Moe (1983) offered an explicit model of
74 interactions between bureaucrats and political committees with four general assumptions. First, the relationship
75 between the actors is a bilateral monopoly. Second, the relationship is hierachic. Third, there are two polar
76 modes of legislative oversight. Fourth, the committee, knowing that its only information about costs comes from
77 the bureaucrats, does not try to arrive at a comprehensive estimate of the latter's cost function. Miller and Moe
78 claimed that bureaucratic behavior must be understood in its legislative context.

79 However, the technology and the information revolution of the last two decades have created a new environment
80 for the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats. How has this new environment affected the abilities
81 of both sides to create public policy? Is there an optimum point in their interaction that is beneficial for both
82 sides? Makris (2006) tried to supply an answer. He found that "despite its informational disadvantage due to its
83 lack of experience, the Congress can, by simply exploiting its political authority and deciding on the rules of the
84 budgetary game, ensure, under certain conditions, the design of an efficient administrative bureau" (p. 285).

85 Public policy is composed of a collection of decisions made by politicians, interest groups, bureaucracy and
86 the public, and is usually expressed as a law or regulation. The current research will look at public policy made
87 by politicians using parliamentary tools other than legislation. Specifically, we will analyze one-minute speeches,
88 motions for the agenda and the work in the finance committee regarding the world economic crisis.

89 3 III.

90 Omss in the us House of Representatives (Morris 2001). Maltzman and Sigelman (1996), who were the first
91 to study OMS, claim that they are viewed as a safety value for MCs who feel left out of the decision making
92 process. They found that unconstrained floor time was used primarily for policy purposes and that electoral
93 factors did not matter. The most recent study, conducted by Rocca (2007), maintains that MCs minimize risk by
94 discussing issues that appeal to the voters. If taking a position may be rewarding, MCs will do so hoping that the
95 voters will translate it into electoral gain. Other explanations for the use of the OMS include the introduction of
96 television onto the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives by the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network, which
97 gave members a forum from which they could pursue their personal and political goals (Maltzman and Sigelman
98 1996). The same explanation may be relevant to the Israeli parliament because there is a direct broadcast of
99 the parliament's proceedings on television (Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2004). In addition, when the party chooses
100 to, it may control the use of OMS (Harris 2005). Finally, changes in the control of Congress affected members'
101 speeches (Hall 2002).

102 What is the content of OMS? Aristotle was the first academic to analyze the content of speeches. He
103 divided them into three parts: the Ethos, the Logos and Pathos. Since his day, very few studies have used
104 this terminology. Hall (2002) examined how MCs refer to individuals in government on the House floor. He

105 claimed that members use symbols to send signals to their constituents and to frame the debate on public policy
106 issues (Hall 2002). Hall concluded that the parties use different symbols to frame political debates. While Hall's
107 analysis emphasized the Logos of the speeches, Polletta (1998) combined the Ethos and the Logos when she
108 examined how, when, and why African American legislators referred to Martin Luther King during their OMS.
109 She argued that congressional representations of King assimilated him into a pluralist framework by presenting
110 community service and institutional politics as the proper legacy of his activism. Neither Polletta nor Hall
111 examined the Pathos of the speeches.

112 Most studies have analyzed one specific term of the Congress. Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) examined
113 the 103rd Congress; Morris (2001) examined the 104th Congress; Harris (2005) examined the 101st Congress.
114 Hall (2002) and Rocca (2007) examined more than one term. Hall examined two terms, the 103rd and 104th
115 Congresses, and Rocca examined multiple Congresses from the 101st to the 106th. Since the current research
116 will examine the period before and after the world economic crisis, the database includes speeches made during
117 part of the 17th Knesset and part of the 18th Knesset.

118 Scholars have used a wide range of methodologies in order to explore OMS. Morris used a negative binomial
119 event count model to predict who would use OMS and who would engage in partisan rhetoric (Morris 2001).
120 Maltzman and Sigelman used a regression model to examine the number of lines spoken in the Congressional
121 Record about a number of policy-oriented and electoral-based variables (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). Harris
122 (2005) used four logistic regression models that examined the impact of electoral margin, tenure, party leadership
123 position, ideology, and DMB (Democratic Message Board) membership on whether or not a speech giver was on
124 message. Content analysis was used in order to determine the way in which terms such as "bureaucrats" and
125 "public servants" were manipulated in the floor speeches and the political gain members sought to achieve from
126 these moves (Hall 2002). In addition, Hall used logistic regression in order to determine the factors that influenced
127 the use of the term "bureaucrat" as a foil (Hall 2002). Polletta (1998) also conducted a content analysis; for
128 each congressional session she scanned all documents that referred at least once to "Martin Luther King" or "Dr.
129 King." The current research will use both content analysis and statistical models in order to draw as complete a
130 picture as possible of the use of the OMS in the Israeli parliament during economic hard times.

131 The goals of the study are based on the desire to deepen our understanding about the way OMS are used in
132 the Israeli parliament with respect to these three legislative areas. The first goal is to examine how MKs use
133 OMS as a tool for policy-making. To accomplish this goal, we investigated policy-making by MKs with regard to
134 the global economic crisis. The second goal is to investigate the motivations for MKs to use OMS. How are MKs
135 who use OMS extensively different from those who make little use of it? The two goals complement each other
136 and allow us to address the three subjects with which the literature deals. The unconstrained nature of OMS
137 facilitates position taking, and the motivations for using OMS shed light on why legislators design the institution
138 the way they do and on legislative participation.

139 4 IV.

140 5 Omss in the Israeli Parliament a) Procedures governing OMSs

141 Only five legislatures have adopted OMSs: the US House of Representatives, the European Parliament and
142 the parliaments of Australia, Canada and Israel. A comparison of the procedures governing OMS in these five
143 legislatures yields several insights. First, OMS provide one of the few opportunities for non-legislative debate,
144 where debate is almost always confined to the pending legislative business. Second, the recognition of the right
145 to give a OMS is the prerogative of the Speaker. Third, in the US House OMSs are not provided for in the
146 rules of the House, while in the Israeli parliament, the Australian parliament and the European Parliament they
147 are. Fourth, there are set periods when OMS can be given. Finally, each Member can give only one speech
148 each legislative day. In sum, we can see that the opportunities OMS give the Members in all five legislatures are
149 similar. The speeches are not about legislation. The speech is initiated by a Member at a given time and lasts
150 for a specified period. In the light of these restrictions, the main question is what motivates MKs to use OMS?

151 V.

152 6 Policy-Making by other Means

153 One of legislator's roles is to make policy, usually by legislation. However, this study analyzes the policy-making
154 role by other means: OMS, committee debates and motions for the agenda. All of these tools are available to
155 legislators in their daily work and have never before been analyzed as instruments for policymaking.

156 The first question is, what is the essence of OMS used by legislators regarding the world economy crisis? How
157 are they used for policy-making? To answer these questions, we must first understand the role of OMS in the
158 legislator's life. An ordinary legislator has two types of tools at his/her disposal: lightweight procedural tools and
159 heavyweight procedural tools. He or she must decide the number of tools to use, how often, with what content
160 and in what combination.

161 Our interviews showed that there are three strategies for using the OMS: beginning with the lightweight
162 procedural tools, beginning with the heavyweight procedural tools or combining the tools as needed. Disadvantaged
163 MKs prefer to adopt the first strategy. Recently well-established MKs use the second one. Senior MKs,
164 committee chairs and party leaders tend to adopt the third strategy.

8 C) CAN MOTIONS FOR THE AGENDA BE USED AS A TOOL FOR POLICY MAKING?

Given that the OMS is a very easy tool for ordinary MKs to use, we expected them to use it to address the issue of the world economic crisis. However, only 4 OMS out of 1630 dealt with economic hard times, two by MKs from the ultra-Orthodox party, United Torah Judaism, one from the extreme left The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) Party and one from the center-left Labor (Avoda) Party. No right-wing party members gave speeches on this topic. While there were a lot of speeches about the Israeli economy, specifically about the hard times people were experiencing, they were no different from the speeches given before the research period. Furthermore, none of them referred to the worldwide economic crisis.

a) Can OMS be used as a tool for policy-making?

Legislation is one of the major tools for policymaking, but can OMS be used as a first step toward policy-making? In order to answer this question, we analyzed the content of the OMS that referred to the world economic crisis looking for suggested alternative policies or criticizing the current government's policy. He criticized the current policy, but did not suggest an alternative policy.

While all four of the speeches used the world economic crisis as the background to a specific issue they wanted to raise on the floor, none of them discussed the economic crisis as the main issue. Nevertheless, most of them used OMS as a tool for criticizing existing policies and suggesting alternative policies. We define this use as a first step toward policymaking. However, it is uncommon for legislators to use OMS as a tool for policy-making, and the issue of economic hard times rarely arose in the OMS. Furthermore, whenever it was used, its use was only indirect. The question is why, even though this tool was available to the MKs, did they not use it more often to discuss economic hard times, criticize existing policies or suggest alternatives? Is it because they did not see the world economic crisis as an important issue or because there were other procedures they could use to talk about economic hard times and criticizes existing policies or suggest alternatives?

Here we have the same question Polletta (1998) raised—is anything actually accomplished on the floor? Polletta noted that MCs are now investing more time and effort in their constituencies. In addition, congressional committees and sub-committees have expanded their roles (Polletta 1998). Perhaps these explanations also help us understand why few in the Israeli parliament have used the OMS to address the world economic crisis.

190 7 b) Can the finance committee be used as a tool for policy-making?

Digging deeper into the finance committee, we found that during the 17th Knesset there were 11 discussions regarding the effect of the world economic crisis on the Israeli economy. In the 18th Knesset there were eight discussions regarding the same subject. We conducted a similar examination in the economic committee, but failed to find any discussion of the topic there. Note, however, that the economic committee's mandate is to deal with internal affairs, so the fact that it did not have any discussions about an external issue is not surprising.

The finance committee has 17 members including the chair committee. In 8 out of the 11 discussions on the topic, there was an impressive attendance by MKs (ranging from 7 to 17 MKs), while in 3 discussions attendance was poor (ranging from the chair only to 6 MKs). The list of guests was longer than the number of MKs who attended (from 5 up to 45!). Most of these guests held important positions relevant to the subject of the discussion: the finance minister, the Governor of the Bank of Israel, the CEO of the finance ministry, CEOs of economic organizations, and bank managers. Miller and Moe (1983) would consider these guests as bureaucrats who are important actors in the public policy process. Here we can see that their presence in the committee meeting is significant both in their number and in the content of the discussion. Most of the discussion time was devoted to the presentations of the guests, which provided important information about and analysis of the Israeli economy. The discussions lasted from half an hour to three hours, and most of them focused on the relevant issues.

The world economic crisis was not the main issue in 10 out of 11 discussions, but it was part of the background and helped place the Israeli economic crisis in the global context. We see here much the same picture as in the OMS that did talk about the world economic crisis. One discussion was all about the consequences of the world economic crisis for Israel. Most of the time the finance minister discussed the actions his ministry was going to take in order to cope with the crisis. We found a similar picture in the 18th Knesset with eight discussions regarding the world economic crisis.

214 8 c) Can motions for the agenda be used as a tool for policy making?

In addition to OMS, MKs can propose a motion for the agenda, another lightweight procedural tool. When we looked at the floor debate, we found just one motion for the agenda about the world economic crisis during the 17th Knesset, which was initiated by seven MKs. At the end of the debate, 14 MKs voted to pass the motion on to the finance committee, a decision that is considered the best option for a motion for the agenda because it allows a longer and more professional discussion on the motion. A similar picture emerged from the 18th Knesset, where there was one motion for the agenda, initiated by several MKs and passed on to the finance committee. The legislator utilizes this tool, but the government's representative can ask the Knesset to reject the motion. Therefore, if the government is not in favor of the policy suggested in the motion, it has the ability and the power

224 to keep it from coming to a vote. Unfortunately, legislators in the Israeli parliament do not consider motions for
225 the agenda as relevant tool for policy-making about the world economy crisis.

226 **9 VI.**

227 **10 Research Design**

228 The world experienced an economic crisis in two waves. The first wave was between 2007 and 2009 ii . The
229 second wave began in 2010 and is still going on. The definition of this period of time is based on a review of the
230 major daily newspapers iii

231 The research uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze how MKs use OMS and to understand
232 what motivates them to do so. First we analyzed the content of the OMS manually. During the manual analysis,
233 we also checked for inter-coder reliability. Then, we examined the research hypotheses by using a statistical
234 analysis. The database contains the following information for each OMS: the name of the initiator, his/her
235 party affiliation, opposition/coalition affiliation, junior/senior rank, nationality and the subject of the speech. In
236 a separate data file we entered the text of each OMS and used content analysis to obtain the essence of each
237 speech. The final step was a series of in depth interviews we conducted with MKs in order to understand the
238 "behind the scenes" process at work with regard to OMS. We sampled 15 MKs out of 90 who were not ministers
239 or deputy ministers. The sampled MKs covered the broad spectrum of elected representative in the Knesset.
240 Each interview took 45 minutes and dealt with general questions about the goals of the MK, the way he/she uses
241 the parliamentary tools and specific questions about their motivation for using OMS. In addition, we analyzed
242 the content of the finance committee protocols and transcripts of floor debates. that reported on the economic
243 crisis. The reasons for this crisis and the steps taken by governments to overcome it are beyond the scope of
244 this research. We are using the first wave of the economic crisis simply as a framework for our study, which will
245 examine OMS delivered in the Israeli parliament between 2007 and 2010. ??ur

246 **11 Legislators' Motivations for using Oms a) Hypotheses**

247 Based on the literature review and the preceding discussion, we posited several explanations for the motivations
248 of MKs to use OMS: membership of the MK's party in the coalition or outside it, seniority, nationality and
249 position. Seniority was coded as follows: first term MKs were defined as junior MKs and those who were in their
250 second term or later were defined as senior MKs iv H1: MKs from the opposition will tend to use OMS more
251 often than MKs from the coalition.

252 . In the category of nationality, we distinguished between Jewish and Arab (non-Jewish) MKs. Given that
253 some of these explanations overlap, to see the effect of each of the variables on the number of OMS, we ran a
254 negative binomial event count model.

255 **12 H3: National minority (Arab) MKs will tend to use OMS 256 more often than national majority (Jewish) MKs.**

257 In general, the hypotheses maintain that MKs who are operating at a disadvantage within the government,
258 either due to their position in the opposition or in their party, will be more likely to use OMS as a tool to make
259 themselves heard.

260 **13 VIII.**

261 **14 Results and Discussion**

262 As mentioned before, our database can be divided into two periods of time: part of the 17 th Knesset and part
263 of the 18 th Knesset. Hence, the research hypotheses will be examined separately for each Knesset term.

264 We examined the independent variables by calculating the ratio between the number of OMS and the number
265 of MKs who used the tool. It is interesting to note that even though MKs have a quota for using various tools,
266 they do not use them to their full potential.

267 H1: MKs from the opposition will tend to use OMS more often than MKs from the coalition. In the 17th
268 Knesset more OMS were initiated by MKs from the opposition, then MKs from the coalition, we found a similar
269 picture in the 18th Knesset. To get a better picture of the use of OMS, we calculated the proportion between
270 the number of OMS of opposition members and the number of opposition members who used OMS, and created
271 the same calculation for coalition members. The results strengthen our previous findings. Thus, hypothesis H1 is
272 supported for both Knesset terms. Scholars have suggested that those who use the OMS are individualistic and
273 institutionally disadvantaged (Morris 2001). Our findings add to this description by indicating that members of
274 the opposition are more likely to use OMS than members of the coalition. However, why if opposition members
275 use them more extensively than coalition members did they fail to talk about economic hard times or use OMS as
276 a policymaking tool? Again, the answer may be that the bureaucrats in the finance ministry are more powerful,
277 seem to have a better understanding of the subject and have a professional staff to help them determine economic
278 policy. H2: Junior MKs will tend to use OMS more often than senior MKs. Junior MKs

15 H3: NATIONAL MINORITY (ARAB) MKS WILL TEND TO USE OMS MORE OFTEN THAN NATIONAL MAJORITY (JEWISH) MKS.

279 In the 17th Knesset more OMS were initiated by junior MKs then by senior MKs. When we looked at the
280 proportion between the number of OMS and the number of junior MKs who used OMS, we found a different
281 picture; 6.15 OMS were initiated by junior MKs, while 5.86 OMS were initiated by senior MKs. In the 18th
282 Knesset more OMS were initiated by junior MKs then by senior MKs. The proportion index shows a similar
283 picture.. These findings are similar to those in Morris' (2001) study; junior members of Congress consider the
284 OMS an easy and readily available tool for communication, so they tend to use it more frequently than senior
285 members. Thus, the proportion index supports hypothesis H2 in both Knesset terms.

286 We were curious as to whether there was a connection between the variable of being an opposition/coalition
287 member and the variable of being a junior/senior MK. Based on the literature review, we expected junior MKs
288 from the coalition to use OMS more often than senior MKs, in a manner similar to that of senior MKs from
289 the opposition (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). We ran a chi-square test and found a significant connection as
290 expected ($\chi^2=170.129$, $\text{sig}=0.00$). The same tendency emerged from the data from the 18th Knesset ($\chi^2=65.648$,
291 $\text{sig}=0.00$).

292 Why don't junior MKs use OMS as a tool for making economic policy? Based on the interviews, it appears that
293 these newly elected legislators are not yet familiar with the advantages and disadvantages of various parliamentary
294 tools. Therefore, in their first Knesset term junior MKs explore these tools, and only in their second term do
295 they focus on one or more parliamentary tools that they feel will be most useful for them.

296 15 H3: National minority (Arab) MKs will tend to use OMS 297 more often than national majority (Jewish) MKs.

298 The creation of the national majority-minority in the Israeli context began in 1948 with the establishment of the
299 state of Israel. During the British Mandate, before the Israeli War of Independence, Arabs were the majority of
300 the population and the Jews were the minority. Since 1948, the Arabs have been in the minority both de facto
301 and de jure (Smooha 1984; Jamal 2011). Hence, relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are not simply those
302 of majority to minority. These relations revolve around differences in nationality, religion and the connection
303 to the global Arab world. During the 17th Knesset there were 12 non-Jewish MKs; 2 were Druze and 10 were
304 Arabs (9 Muslims and 1 Christian). In the 18th Knesset there were 14 non-Jewish MKs; 3 were Druze and 11
305 were Arabs (10 Muslims and 1 Christian). Most of the non-Jewish MKs were in non-Jewish parties, while just
306 a few were part of Jewish parties. The raw data show that 78.4% of the OMS were initiated by Jewish MKs,
307 while 20.2% were initiated by Arabs MKs (the rest were initiated by Druze MKs). However, when we created
308 the index that calculated the proportion between the number of OMS and the number of MKs by their religion,
309 we found a different picture; the proportion of OMS of Jewish MKs was 5.2, while that of the Arab MKs was
310 14.5 and that of the Druze MKs was 5. The 18th Knesset showed a similar picture. The proportion of OMS of
311 Jewish MKs was 6.5, while that of the Arab MKs was 17 and that of the Druze MKs was 10. Thus, hypothesis
312 H3 is supported. These findings strengthen previous studies about the way minorities use OMS (Maltzman and
313 Sigelman 1996).

314 Given the findings, why don't Arab MKs use OMS as a policy-making tool? First, the Arab minority in Israel
315 faces a more complex reality than other minorities in Western democracies. They struggle to improve the status
316 of the Arab citizens of Israel and speak up for the Palestinians as well. Second, while they often criticize the
317 government's policies on a variety of issues, they do not have the political power to make policy.

318 Thus, with regard to all of the research hypotheses, we can say that despite the differences in the political
319 systems between the United States and Israel, with regard to the use of OMS, Israeli MKs tend to behave the
320 same as members of Congress in USA. Those who are outside the corridors of power, including members of the
321 opposition, junior MKs, non-Jewish MKs, rank-and-file MKs, and those who are not party leaders, look to a
322 readily available tool for making their voices heard. That tool is the OMS. Similarly, as previous studies have
323 found, MCs who are at a disadvantage within the legislative institution will also use the OMS to accomplish the
324 same goal.

325 As noted earlier, one of the weaknesses in our explanation is that in the Israeli context some of the variables
326 we looked at overlap with one another. To see the effect of each of the variables on the number of OMS, we
327 ran a negative binomial event count model the same as Morris (2001) did in his research. (The criterion for
328 assessing goodness of fit was 1.1338, indicating that we used the appropriate statistical model). In the 17th
329 Knesset the only variable that affected the number of OMS was being a member of the opposition ($\chi^2=11.12$,
330 $\text{Sig}=0.0009$). The probability of an opposition MK's using a OMS was 2.4 times greater than for coalition MKs
331 (Mean estimate= 0.4123, $\text{sig}=0.0005$).

332 To achieve a better understanding of this sole significant variable, we created a new coding for it and separated
333 the party with the largest presence in the coalition Forward (Kadima) from the other parties (including parties
334 from the opposition and the coalition). The t-test we ran showed that MKs from Forward used fewer OMS than
335 all of the other parties combined ($F=8.065$, $\text{Sig}=0.006$). In contrast to Harris' (2005) point about the power of
336 the majority party to schedule OMS and place limitations on the number of OMS per day, we saw a different
337 picture in the Israeli parliament. The largest party in the coalition does not try to limit or to put restrictions
338 on OMS, perhaps because it regards them as less important and less effective tools compared to other tools that
339 are available.

340 The data from the 18th Knesset showed a little bit of a difference. Here two variables affected the number of
341 OMS: membership in the opposition party ($\beta_2=3.87$, $\text{Sig}=0.0490$) and being a junior MK ($\beta_2=11.62$, $\text{Sig}=0.0007$).
342 Opposition MKs were 1.4 times more likely than coalition MKs (Mean estimate= 0.6694, $\text{sig}=0.0458$) to give
343 a OMS. Similarly, junior MKs were twice as likely as senior MKs to give a OMS (Mean estimate= 0.5083,
344 $\text{sig}=0.0005$). The additional presence of the latter variable is not surprising because the data are from the first
345 year of the 18th Knesset when junior MKs had just been elected. Furthermore, there was no significant difference
346 between the use of OMS by the largest party in the coalition and other parties. Perhaps members of the largest
347 party had not assimilated the fact that they were now running the coalition, so they still behaved like members
348 of the opposition.

349 The second part of the analysis was a qualitative one. In order to tell the story behind the numbers, I
350 interviewed 15 MKs, usually by telephone. Most of the interviews lasted about 45 minutes. I asked them
351 questions such as: why do you use the OMS so often, and how do you choose the subject of a OMS? Several
352 insights arose from the MKs' answers. First, the respondents pointed to the availability of the tool and that
353 fact that the MK can use it as much as he or she wants. There are almost no restrictions on its use. Junior
354 MKs in particular are looking for any forum available to gain prominence. In addition, OMS are usually not
355 interrupted. Hence, MKs can talk loudly and clearly for one whole minute. Finally, statistics from the television
356 channel covering the Knesset show that many people watch the show. Therefore, for MKs the OMS is a quick
357 way to attract potential voters. These answers can help us understand the motivation of MKs for using OMS.
358 The tradeoff between using OMS and using other parliamentary procedures is insignificant, especially because
359 there are almost no restrictions and MKs need only to be on the floor and register. The benefit MKs gain from
360 using OMS is a one-minute weekly exposure to potential voters, which is consistent with what Mayhew indicated
361 as the primary goal of being reelected.

362 As for the subject matter of the OMS, MKs initiate OMS based on events from the newspaper or stories of
363 ordinary people that have not receive the attention they deserved. Here their benefit is the ability to represent
364 the voters, a goal that is consistent with the representatives' mandate to enact good public policies. MKs can
365 take a stand on issues of public policy using OMS. The content analysis we conducted revealed a broad range
366 of subjects in the OMS: unemployment, the life of the elderly, the poverty report, land expropriation, illegal
367 building, anti-Semitism, problems facing minorities, violence, security issues, strikes, and inequality in society.
368 These topics resemble those that Rocca (2007) found in his research. In addition, we found that three MKs chose
369 to concentrate on a single subject during their OMS. MK Menahem Ben-Sasson from Kadima talked about new
370 research and gave a mini lecture about the constitution. MK Ran Cohen from New Movement -Meretz (Meretz)
371 talked about the number of soldiers who committed suicide every year and MK Michael Ben Ari from National
372 Union talked about the section of the Torah read on the Sabbath in synagogue. An interesting innovation was
373 Kadima's invitation to the public to submit OMS that Kadima's MKs would read on the floor v Given that
374 OMS have been studied only in the US House, it is important to understand the similar characteristics that can
375 lead MKs to behave in the same way as members of Congress. While we acknowledge that there are essential
376 differences between the US House and the Israeli parliament, we maintain that the legislators' core behavior is
377 similar. For example, in the US House, the "safety-valve" aspect of OMS allows members of Congress who are at
378 a disadvantage (e.g., freshmen and minority party members) to use this forum because they are shut out of other
379 informal activities. Similar behavior is evident in the Israeli parliament (Hazan and Rahat 2006). Freshmen want
380 to get reelected, so they must take a position on issues and be able to claim credit for doing so. Given that they
381 cannot pass policy on their own, and are unlikely to participate in important informal activities, they turn to
382 public and guaranteed forums such as OMS to show voters they are working on their behalf. Although Israel has
383 three candidate selection methods, each of which leads to a different number of voters to address (Akirav 2010),
384 we can still see similar behavior among Israeli freshmen MKs as among first-year members of Congress. Despite
385 differences in candidate selection methods, type of government, size of country, or culture, the unconstrained
386 nature of the OMS seems to make it an ideal tool particularly for legislators with less clout to make themselves
387 seen by the public. Thus, we can understand why the Israeli Knesset adopted it as a tool and why certain MKs
388 are eager to use it.

389 . They called this initiative direct democracy and were very proud of it during the speeches.

390 One might argue that the issue of OMS, which is a tool that exists in only five legislatures worldwide, is a
391 minor one. There are already numerous studies about legislation and committees (Gamm and Huber 2002;Tsebelis
392 2002). The main questions in these studies are about the distribution of power among the different players in the
393 legislatures (e.g., minorities, coalition/opposition members, religious groups, and constituencies). The procedures
394 surrounding legislation and committees are complex because of the need to create checks and balances among
395 the various forces in a legislature. In this context, OMS is an easy tool to use, one that offers short-term benefits,
396 such as allowing a legislator to take a position on a topic of special interest to him or her, and long-term benefits,
397 such as demonstrating ongoing participation in legislative procedures. Hence, it is relevant tool, and we should
398 deepen our understanding about it in two ways. First, in those parliaments in which OMS does exist, we should
399 determine who uses it, how it is used and for what purpose. Second, in those parliaments in which it does not
400 exist, we should consider the pros and cons mentioned above in arguing for its introduction.

401 Four of the five legislatures that have OMS are federations (Canada, Australia, US and the EU). Israel is
402 the exception. In these four entities, the electoral system is based on constituencies. Israel is the exception. In

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403 addition, these four entities are spread out over a wide geographical expanse. Israel is the exception. Looking at
404 the electoral system of the five legislatures, we can see that two are strong legislatures (the US Congress and the
405 European Parliament) and two are ex-Westminster systems (Canada and Australia). Once again, Israel, with its
406 system of proportional representation, is the exception.

407 Why would Israel, whose characteristics differ so markedly from those of the other four entities with OMS,
408 have adopted this tool? To answer this question, we looked at the House Committee's protocol from January
409 2000 (when MKs voted in favor of having OMS). Adopting the OMS in the Israeli parliament was part of the
410 procedural reforms introduced by the Speaker of the House, MK Burg. Adoption of the OMS was designed
411 to keep the Knesset's agenda relevant (House Committee Protocol 4.1.200 p. 2). This goal is echoed in the
412 motivations of the other legislatures that have adopted the one-minute speech vi. For example, in the case of the
413 Canadian Commons, the adoption of OMS was a practical response to a need strongly expressed by legislators
414 to speak out on matters of current and often local interest. The Members felt that this need was vital enough
415 to modify the rules of the House to allow for such statements. Thus, the Members clearly did not feel that the
416 statements were extraneous to the work of the House. Similarly, in the US, OMS help the individual legislator
417 because it is a candidate-centered electoral system. If parties were completely in charge of the system, there
418 would be less need for OMS. OMS serve the interests of the individual Congressperson because they allow him
419 or her to take a position on an issue or claim credit for the successful passage of a piece of legislation.

420 Still, why do Israeli MKs make such limited use of OMS as a tool for economic policy-making? Our interview
421 with those MKs who did make extensive use of the OMS yielded four explanations. First, MKs prefer to talk
422 about issues that are close to them. The world economic crisis is a distant and abstract issue that is less relevant
423 to the daily work of the ordinary MK. Second, the Israeli political system is very turbulent, so political issues such
424 as Israeli-Palestinian conflict considered more urgent than other issues. Third, MKs may use other tools such as
425 urgent motions or motions for deliberation in a committee to discuss the world economic crisis. Fourth, senior
426 officials at the finance ministry are considered very powerful in the decisionmaking process about the economy.
427 Perhaps MKs felt that the world economic crisis was their major official responsibility rather than an issue that
428 the MKs needed to address. Such an explanation accords with Miller and Moe's (1983) finding that the power
429 of the bureaucrats trumps the power of legislators in economic issues.

430 Finally, perhaps the infrequent use of OMS is related to the characteristics of the MKs who use them
431 extensively. There are two rewards for using OMS. First, through them, the MK can make his or her voice
432 heard by taking a position on an issue. Second, disadvantaged MKs who have fewer tools available to them than
433 their more well-established peers are more likely to use them.

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436 Representatives in different assemblies tend to behave in the same manner. The current research provides empirical
437 proof that Israeli MKs behave in the same way in their use of the one-minute speech as MCs in the US House of
438 Representatives. Those who favor this format tend to be individualistic and institutionally disadvantaged MKs,
439 just like the MCs who Rocca (2007) and Morris (2001) found in the US House of Representatives. MKs from
440 minority parties use OMS more often than other MKs, just as Maltzman and Sigelman (1996) and Morris (2001)
441 found among MCs.

442 Our study examined the use that MKs make of OMS as a tool for making policy in response to the world
443 economic crisis. We argued that in economic hard times Israeli MKs prefer to concentrate on internal issues
444 rather than external ones, so they do not take the opportunity to talk about worldwide economic policy. The
445 findings strengthened our claim. The data showed that MKs talked about a wide range of subjects during their
446 OMS, including the Israeli economy, but only four talked directly about the world economic crisis, and few used
447 it as policy-making tool. After interviewing MKs, analyzing the content of the finance committee's protocols
448 and motions for the agenda, we offered some explanations for this puzzling data. We suggested that MKs prefer
449 to talk about issues that are close to them. Second, political issues in Israeli politics are more urgent than
450 other issues. Third, it is possible that MKs talked about the world economic crisis using other tools available to
451 them. Finally, given the power of senior officials in the finance ministry in the decision making process about
452 the economy, MKs might have felt that the world economic crisis was their area of concern rather than one the
453 MKs should address.

454 Given that this study about the use of OMS in the Israeli parliament is a pioneering one, we must bear in mind
455 that we have just scratched the surface of the issue. Future research should dig deeper into the content of the
456 speeches, with the goal of determining how characteristics such as gender, being a member of a minority group,
457 humor in political speeches, religion, and criticism of the government affect the choice of this parliamentary tool.
458 In addition, given that there are no studies about OMS other than in the US House of Representatives, future
459 research should compare the use of OMS in parliamentary environments such as in Israel, Australia, Canada,
460 and the European Parliament with that in the US House of Representatives. Although the twenty-first century
461 provides legislators with new challenges and new opportunities to be accessible to their audience through social

1

Who?	When	What?	Policy?
MK Braverman Labor (Avoda)	26.2.2008	The budget and the fact that indicators such as the economic crisis should be taken into account.	He did not suggest a policy.
MK Khenin The Democratic Front for Peace and	18.3.2008	The world economic crisis and the fact that Wall Street capitalism had brought down the American economy.	He criticized the government policy and suggested an alternative policy.
Equality (Hadash)			
MK Halpert United Torah Judaism (Yahadut HaTorah)	3.6.2008	He quoted a resolution from the American government that decided to compensate poor people for the losses they had sustained due to the economic crisis and offer them a special grant.	He suggested an alternative policy.
MK Cohen United Torah Judaism (Yahadut HaTorah)	15.6.2008	He wondered why, when most people in Israel were experiencing hard times, the government had a positive balance sheet.	

Figure 1: Table 1 :

VII.

Figure 2:

1

	17 th Knesset	18 th Knesset
Coalition MKs	35.4% (254 out of 717) 3.25	35.8% (327 out of 913) 4.4
Opposition MKs	64.6 % (463 out of 717) 11.02	64.2% (586 out of 913) 12.7

Figure 3: Table 1 :

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2

	17 th Knesset	18 th Knesset
Senior MKs	62.2% (446 out of 717)	48.5% (443 out of 913)
	5.86	5.09
	37.8% (271 out of 717)	51.5% (470 out of 913)
	6.15	14.24

Figure 4: Table 2 :

3

	17 th Knesset	18 th Knesset
Majority MKs	5.2	6.5
Minority MKs	14.5	17

Figure 5: Table 3 :

⁴⁶² networking tools such as Twitter and Facebook, the good old-fashioned speech, which has been around since the days of Aristotle, is still an important communication tool. ^{1 2 3}

¹ Legislators' use of One-Minute Speeches

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³ In the Israeli parliament, a term lasts for four years. Previous studies indicate that MKs adjust very quickly to the fast-lifestyle of being an MK. Therefore, we made a clear-cut distinction between the first term, which we called junior term, and the following terms, which we defined as senior terms.⁵ It was taken into account when the OMSs were coded and assessed⁶ We asked the speakers of those legislatures by email about the use of OMS.

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