

1 Superiority Struggles and Inter Agency Feud in Nigeria

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6 Abstract

7 Violent conflict is gradually becoming one of the defining characteristics of Nigeria, the nation
8 considered by many as the most populous nation of the continent of Africa. No part of Nigeria
9 is free from violence of one form or the other. The problem of violence in Nigeria has become
10 more worrisome as the security operatives whose duty it is to maintain peace, detect and
11 suppress crimes have themselves become engulfed in violent conflicts, thereby giving criminals
12 opportunity to unleash terror on the citizenry with impunity. Although, other unethical
13 practices are held accountable for the clashes, superiority struggles arising from their historical
14 past has of late become prominent. The implication of this professional missnormal is
15 grievous. The repeated violent clashes among these security professionals have consistently
16 alienated them from the public. It has further caused loss of confidence and respect of the
17 citizenry. The ultimate side effect is lack of civil co-operation that these forces need to succeed
18 in crime control. This explains why the nation has not been able to effectively manage
19 insurgency and other security challenges in recent times. If Nigeria's peace is pivotal to
20 African and global peace as stressed by some scholars, then there is urgent need for the
21 problem of superiority struggles to be addressed.

22

23 **Index terms**— africa, conflict, crime, nigeria, security, violent.

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36 Keywords: africa, conflict, crime, nigeria, security, violent.

37 ?He said there is no longer mutual trust between Muslims and Christians in the north, and people are forced
38 to live together in mutual suspicion, with security being imposed by combat ready policemen. This, according
39 to him is not peace?? There is no doubt that the problem of violence has overwhelmed Nigerians of the 21 st
40 century.

41 However, what is more devastating is interagency wrangling that has often left on its trail destruction to
42 public and private properties, loss of lives and disruption of commercial activities in the affected parts of the
43 nation. The enormity of the implications of inter-agency clashes is better appreciated when we recall the purpose
44 of their creation. For instance, Alemika and Chukwuma (1997) have argued that the police are paid to police,

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45 secure and ensure compliance with the existing laws and conformity with the precept of social order. In the
46 same vein, Oke, Oloruntimehin and Akinola ??1996) posit that the police exist to prevent and or reduce crimes
47 in society. They are further saddled with the right to protect the citizenry from harm and violations. Hence,
48 they are seen as indispensable formal agency of social control (Reid, 1997). The role of the army on the hand is
49 very similar to what is expected of the police. They are saddled with the task of protecting and defending the
50 nation against external aggression (Nigerian Army, 2006). They are further expected to work in collaboration
51 with civil police to provide internal For instance, the south-west produced O'dua People's Congress (OPC), the
52 south-south produced Igbesu Boys, the south-east produced Bakasi Boys, while the northern equivalent is Arewa
53 People's Congress (APC). One thing that is common to these sub-cultural groups is lawlessness and violence.
54 Violent crimes have sent many Nigerians to their early graves, permanently maimed several others, generated
55 several widows and orphans, as well as heightening doubts and suspicion among the divers ethnic nationalities
56 and religious groups that have cohabited for decades. Nigerians today find it difficult to believe that Islam and
57 Christianity (the two foreign but popular religions in Nigeria) are religions of peace. This is because, violent crises
58 arising from religious front have claimed uncountable lives and responsible for destruction of several public and
59 private properties in the recent past (Abimboye, 2009). The gloomy state of most parts of Nigeria is captured in
60 the words of the Christian Association of Nigeria's secretary quoted by Abimboye (2009) thus: Introduction ne
61 of the defining characteristic of most African societies and Nigeria in particular, at least in the past two to three
62 decades is violence and destructive conflicts. Violent conflicts in Nigeria have assumed a dangerous dimension
63 in recent times. The problem of violent conflicts in Nigeria is widespread to the extent that, no geo-political
64 zone is insulated from the social virus of violence (Albert, 2012). For instance, while the south-western zone
65 has National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) to contend with, the south-south has been under the
66 'claws' of youth gangs and youth restiveness, the south-eastern zone has been troubled by kidnapers, the middle
67 belt states of Benue and Taraba have not rested from Tiv/Jukun and Fulani clashes. On the Plateau have been
68 the problem indigene/settler clashes, while the Islamic sect "Boko Haram" has caged the north-eastern zone in
69 gory and endless nightmare. Furthermore, all the zones have evolved ethnic militias that seek to dictate power,
70 security and social interactions in their various areas. O security to the nation (Arabamen, 2004;Adebayo, 2004).
71 The similarity in origin, status, roles, remuneration and condition of service was what made Adekanye (1993) to
72 see the Nigerian Army and Police as peers. This also inspired Omoigui (2006) to advocate for jointness in training
73 and security operations. If the above is the popular perception of the roles of the army and the police in Nigeria,
74 it brings to mind the proverbial African 'oracle that ought to be consulted to unfold causes of misdemeanor in
75 the society is itself accused of criminal bahaviour'. By the same token, if the forces are thus involved in persistent
76 violent clashes that often cause destruction to lives and property then, where will the society seek the solutions
77 to such crimes when they are committed by the civil society?

78 Apart from the side effects of violence, is the absence of security to the citizens at the time of these clashes
79 and the rating of the giant of Africa (Nigeria) as unsecure and unsafe nation to do business with. This popular
80 perception has scared both domestic and international investors from the resource studded nation (Odoma,
81 2011). Instead of the public security operatives whose primary duties are to protect lives and property of the
82 law abiding citizens and secure territorial borders to develop professional synergy as expected of them (Alemika,
83 2003;Omoigui, 2006), they have been at each other's throat, thereby exposing the nation and her citizens to
84 perpetual threats, nightmare and insecurity. What then is the cause of inter-agency feud in Nigeria? How can
85 inter-agency clashes be controlled? How should these agencies be made to respect each other in the performance
86 of their duties? This are some questions that this work seek to address.

87 1 II.

88 2 The Problem

89 Security operatives are creation of the state to checkmate personal and group excesses of members of the society.
90 This is because it is only in the atmosphere of peace and tranquility that social life can be ordered and development
91 of the society achieved (Nwolise, 2005). However, the provision of security is an herculean task, as it requires the
92 synergy of members of the society with security operatives for this social virtue to be enjoyed. More critical to
93 the provision and enjoyment of security in society is the cooperation of security agencies who are saddled with
94 security provision in different domains, since security is ubiquitous ??Omoigui,2006;Odoma, 2011b). If security
95 agencies are involved in violent conflicts in the full glare of the civil populace as noticed in Nigeria of late, it spell
96 doom for national security. This mean inter-agency synergy would have failed, while public confidence leading to
97 civilpolice co-operation becomes difficult. Today, the civil society in Nigeria is economical with vital information
98 needed by the police to control crimes in Nigeria. In fact, it has been stressed that most Nigerians lack confidence
99 in the police and other law enforcement agencies and thus prefer private security outfits or vigilante groups to
100 public security operatives (Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008).

101 Furthermore, Nigeria is perceived by many as the most populous nation of the continent of Africa and the giant
102 of Africa (Hutchful, 1999;Kolapo, 2006). If this assertion is anything to go by, it therefore means that several
103 African countries are looking unto Nigeria as role model. It will not be out of place therefore, to state that the
104 insecurity of Nigeria as a result of inter-agency feud will have a spiral effect on the rest of African countries.

105 **3 III.**

106 **4 Inter Agency Feud in Nigeria**

107 Inter agency clash was first reported in Nigeria in 1977 in Port Harcourt between personnel of Nigeria Police
108 and Nigerian Army (Odoma, 2011). This problem has not only become repeated in several parts of Nigeria,
109 but has over the years involved virtually all the security agencies and para-military organizations in Nigeria
110 (MILPOPPROF, 2007). For instance, there were reported cases of violent clashes involving personnel of Nigeria
111 Police and Nigerian Navy, between the Nigeria Police and Nigerian Air force, between Nigeria Police and National
112 Security and Civil Defence Corps, and between Nigeria Police and Nigerian Custom Service, etc. However, army-
113 police clashes have been the most prominent of them all, considering the frequency of occurrence, the level of
114 casualties, losses and confusion that accompanied it. For instance, Odoma (2011) presented the chronicles of
115 army-police clashes in Nigeria and their implications as shown in the table below:

116 Similarly, the prolonged case of Boko Haram insurgent that seem to have defied all security prescriptions may
117 not be unconnected to the lack of synergy between security operatives and also between civil population and
118 security agencies. The security operatives because of lack of synergy have not been able to form formidable
119 resistance to the onslaught of insurgents. In the same vein, due to frequent frictions between security agencies,
120 they hardly enjoy the confidence of the civil population and by extension, lack the necessary co-operation and
121 support from them. It is therefore in the interest of Nigeria, Africa and the global community that this social
122 problem is quickly put under check.

123 **5 Source: Adapted from Odoma (2011).**

124 enhance the much desired but often elusive national security.

125 The foundation of army/police clashes was laid as far back as the mid 1970s. Prior to this period as remarked
126 by Adekanye (1993), the Nigeria Police which was the nearest occupational group to the army in terms of
127 origin, status, pay and conditions of service, enjoyed comparatively better status and pay. But after the 1966
128 coup and the corresponding civil war between 1967 and 1970 within which time the Nigerian military assumed
129 the leadership position of the nation, the army had through their privileged vantage position conferred by their
130 occupation effected a 'status coup', which marked the reverse of the pre-1966 state of affairs in police-army status
131 comparison. The salary differentials between the military and the police force became widened in favour of the
132 military in 1981 and became pronounced under the Babangida military presidency of 1985 to 1993. These public
133 security forces were in the cause of this development dragged into a form of 'cold war' as the Security operatives,
134 rather than exploring avenues of collaboration in security provision, capacity building and sharing intelligence as
135 is the case with developed nations of the world (Omoigui, 2006), have over the years been engulfed in unhealthy
136 rivalries. Such rivalry has been noticed between the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and Nigeria Security and Civil
137 Defence Corps (NSCDC) over security duties in several parts of the nation as well as between the Nigeria Police
138 Force (NPF) and Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) over the management of vehicle registration and licenssing
139 (Oluwole, 2012). Rather than complementing each other, the existence of one is viewed as a threat to the other.
140 The overall effect of inter-agency feud is the inability of the security sector of Nigerian society to proffer workable
141 solution to the lingering terrorism and several security challenges facing the nation in recent times. Security
142 operatives are often accused of seeking organizational glory rather than the synergy that will IV.

143 **6 Literature Review**

144 a) The Origin of Inter Agency Conflicts in Nigeria sudden status twist did not go down well with other
145 occupational groups in the country. ??dekaney (1993:13) further asserts that:

146 Thus it was that the Nigerian Soldiers were able to elevate themselves above not just their peers in Nigeria
147 Police but other groups hitherto at the apex of the occupational prestige hierarchy. The above, no doubt have
148 inspired series of social unrests and agitations among other occupational groups in the country that characterized
149 the entire period of military rule and specifically, the reign of Ibrahim Babangida (Onyeonoro, 1996).

150 Puritt and Carnevale (1982) quoted in Irwin and Kenneth (1995) argues that conflicts between groups, nations
151 and individuals occur when the aspirations and goals of the parties are incompatible or where the parties have
152 divergent interests regarding a particular issue. Due to the diametrically opposing interests of the groups, a
153 resolution to conflict is always problematic because, the resolution that satisfies one party to the conflict may
154 not necessarily satisfy the other.

155 Coser (1998) maintains that conflict between groups or individuals stem from the withdrawal of legitimacy.
156 People are sufficiently aroused for conflict when channels for expressing grievances do not exist and when their
157 desire for membership into higher ranks are thwarted, at this point, withdrawal of legitimacy occurs. With the
158 withdrawal of legitimacy, conflict becomes the ultimate end product.

159 To understand the nuances of intergroup conflict, social parameters alone do not provide complete explanation.
160 The interplay of the social forces such as competition among groups for resources, religious beliefs etc and the
161 cognitive or perceptual factors such as stereotyping groups, misperception of out-groups etc, will no doubt provide
162 better understanding, because the way a group of people think about the social world (specifically about an

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163 opposing group) profoundly affects how they feel and behave in response to the other group (Irwin and Kenneth,
164 1995).

165 Taking a historical look at conflict on the continent of Africa, Olutayo (1997) remarks that long before the
166 experimentation of military rule on the continent of Africa, the seed of military dictatorship had been planted
167 by the French and British colonizers whose use of force left the post colonial African nations on the pedestal of
168 force and discord. Colonial collaborators and imperialists who at the background provided support for military
169 adventurers often exacerbated post-colonial conflict in many African countries. The erstwhile colonial masters
170 supported military regimes in Africa with the socialization they bequeathed their former colonies. Metcalf and
171 Metcalf (1993) further argue that individuals and groups are likely to work for peace only when the interest at
172 stake is mutually advantageous or beneficial, but when their interests are diametrically opposed and incompatible,
173 they are likely to be involved in destructive conflict not mindful of their past cordial relationship.

174 Systemic failure is considered as one of the potent causes of conflict especially within and between the army
175 and the police forces in Nigeria. Sankara (2005:4) submits thus:

176 Men and women of the Nigeria Police, many of whom have to pay their way to join the Police, train under one
177 of the most inhuman conditions imaginable, as attested to by the state of the Police colleges and after training,
178 buy their own uniform, boots, writing materials, torchlight and all other working tools. Beside these, they have
179 to go on for upward of four or six months before they can earn first monthly salary, which amount to nothing at
180 the end of the day.

181 It is universally accepted that the strongest motivation in any place of work is proper care or the welfare
182 of the workers. To fail to take good care of worker's well-being is to create a sense of alienation in them.
183 This undoubtedly will have adverse effect on their performance. The Nigeria Police Force has until recently
184 suffered from government and social neglect. This has drastically destroyed the morale of officers. Their personal
185 emoluments until recently was one of the lowest in the country while their working environment was one of the
186 most unkept, not to talk of their residences. Generally they were marginalized in the scheme of things??.

187 In the same vein, the personnel of the Nigerian Army had suffered for a long time from neglect especially by
188 their leaders who at sundry times were accused of misappropriating funds that was meant for their troops. This
189 has led to grumbles and unrests among the lower echelon of the army (Dongjur, 2002;This Day, 2008).

190 However, conflict is not always entirely evil as it engenders cohesion, consensus and solidarity among individuals
191 and groups (Kukah, 1994;Ritzer, 1996; ??old, 1996;Coser, 1998;Nwolise, 2005). Furthermore, the nature of
192 conflict between groups will to a great extent depend upon their past experiences. If the groups involved in
193 conflict enjoyed cordial relationship in the past, they might likely tread the path of compromise and avoid the
194 extreme. But if their past is bedeviled with animosity, suspicion and hatred, conflict between themVolume XIV
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196 is likely to be volatile and destructive (Irwin and Kenneth, 1995).

197 Corroborating the views of Sankara is Bashir (1993) who remarked that the welfare of the forces especially
198 members of the Nigeria Police force were neglected for a very long time. The neglect by their leaders and
199 governments created a sense of alienation among them. Bashir, (1993:584) succinctly argued that:

200 One factor that has aggravated the violent interservice rivalry especially between the police and the army
201 personnel in Nigeria is envy occasioned by the illegal opportunities available to the police to extort money
202 and or receive bribe from the citizenry in the course of their duties. The army (especially the lower echelon),
203 who are poorly paid do not enjoy such opportunities. This experience breed envy as the army sees this as an
204 opportunity for the police to overcome poverty and neglect which they equally suffer. Due to this reason, any
205 slight provocation or error from the police sparks destructive conflict between the forces (Omoigui, 2006;Odoma,
206 2011). The matter is heightened with the enthronement of democracy which empowers the police as the only
207 domestic security operative to handle and prosecute civil offences even if soldiers and senior army officers are
208 involved. According to ??moigui (2006:15), "this has gone hand in hand with the perception of soldiers that the
209 police no longer know its place and that the police which they used to deride, now feel superior". This has no
210 doubt deepened inter-service animosity in the Nigerian security sector.

211 A forum of the Military, Police and Paramilitary Public Relations Forum [MILPOPPROF] submits that,
212 the incessant violent clashes between the various security agencies and army /police in particular in the Lagos
213 metropolis are largely due to the dearth in information available to the personnel of these forces about their
214 sister forces. This has led to widespread ignorance especially among the junior officers in such matters as the
215 complementary roles of other forces to the actualization of own roles, areas of mutual cooperation and exclusivity
216 as well as their perception of the ranks and organizational structure of other forces. This condition has more often
217 than not, led to many unnecessary and avoidable violent clashes in recent times in Lagos ??MILPOPPROF, 2007).
218 The ignorance about other forces is however attributed to the lack of professional forum for regular interaction
219 especially among the lower echelon and more importantly, the low educational qualification required for entry
220 into the various security forces.

221 Furthermore, Marizu (2007) identifies myriads of factors responsible for the fracas among the public security
222 forces. Such reasons include among others, defending a regime's interest, economic poverty and ignorance among
223 the lower ranking officers. In his words:

224 The skirmishes between the lower ranks especially among the Armed Forces and the Police are largely due to
225 ignorance and perhaps a case of defending regime interest. Another factor could be economic poverty because

226 the officers have maintained solid discipline? It has been identified that indiscipline, ignorance and poor training
227 among others are the bane of the clashes. (Marizu, 2007:2) Similarly, it has also been stressed that, of all the
228 causes of the army, police and paramilitary forces clash in Lagos, illegal business 'stand tall'. For instance, ??aiwo
229 (2007:4) suggests that:

230 The friction among members of these government agencies that necessitated the birth of this Association are
231 mostly perpetrated by the lower ranks, especially among the Armed Forces and Police, or Customs and Police and
232 sometimes between Customs and Soldiers who may want to engage themselves in a manner inimical to Customs'
233 laws and regulations especially as it affects smuggling. I know that the engagement of these personnel in this
234 act is largely due to ignorance and economic poverty. The junior officers who display acts of gross indiscipline
235 require reorientation. They must eschew intolerance and always embrace our traditional esprit-de-corps and
236 camaraderie in the discharge of their essential functions.

237 The forces have been accused of various degrees of professional excesses on their host communities. This
238 has been the defining characteristics of the agencies since their colonial days and has therefore, not only been
239 responsible for conflicts with other security agencies, but have equally alienated them from the people they are
240 meant to protect (Alemika and Chukwuma, 1997;Olutayo, 1997). Omoigui (2006) presents some reasons for the
241 destructive rivalries between the army and the police in Nigeria. They include extortion, complex protections,
242 the desire to avenge dishonor suffered at the hands of the police etc. ??moigui (2006:4) further stresses that:

243 The most common scenarios for these clashes include traffic police demanding vehicle particulars and driving
244 licenses from military personnel or seeking to search their private vehicles;

245 complex "protection" deals between servicemen in uniform who ride for free in public transport vehicles and
246 then proceed to protect their hosts from bribe seeking policemen; or the desire of the military personnel to
247 retrieve friends and colleagues who have been arrested by the police for one reason or the other. Sometimes it
248 is a desire to "avenge" perceived dishonour suffered at the hands of the police. Another potential for crisis is
249 when the police engage in hot pursuit of suspects who for one reason or another then take refuge inside military
250 barracks. One particular scenario that is not fully appreciated by the public revolve around the fact that in order
251 to make ends meet many junior soldiers own and operate motorcycles (a.k.a "Okada") with which they engage in
252 the business of public transportation after normal working hours. This Furthermore, the overlapping historical
253 origin of the army and the police has been linked to their rivalries in recent times. This overlapping historical
254 origin and the dramatic status transformation (especially) in favour of the army is argued to have engendered
255 the struggle for seniority and superiority among the forces, which in essence has been the source of the "cold
256 war" between the forces, from which destructive clashes result (Adekanye, 1993;Omoigui, 2006).

257 Lack of regular interaction between the forces especially among officers of the lower ranks is argued to be
258 responsible for the clashes. ??kong (2007:10) submits that:

259 Army/police clashes are not limited to Nigeria alone. There are reported cases of the army/police clashes
260 in some parts of the world. For instance, in Ouagadougou-Burkina Faso, there was a violent clash between the
261 nation's army and the police on the 26 day of December 2006. The clash led to the death of five security officers
262 (3 soldiers and 2 policemen), while several others particularly civilians sustained various degrees of injury from
263 stray bullets fired in the shoot-out. Additionally, about 600 inmates serving various jail terms in Ouagadougou
264 prison escaped from detention during the unrest. The clash was sparked by a group of angry soldiers who were
265 on a revenge mission for the death of their colleague the day before in a late night brawl.

266 In the same vein, the Pakistan Press International [PPI] reported an army/police clash in Lahore on 20th
267 ??ctober, 2003. Matters relating to the use of tinted glass reportedly caused the clash. The clash generated
268 unnecessary tension among the forces as well as the civil population. The organized civil society in Pakistan
269 condemned the disgraceful act, which was interpreted to mean that, the security operatives have by their action
270 leading to the clash shown that they were above the law. A probe panel was therefore demanded of the government
271 that was accused of failure to maintain law and order.

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274 We are very happy to see the Forum making this move. Personally, I have participated in the Presidential Retreat;
275 we called a spade a spade -no interaction. Hence we recommended that there should be regular interaction among
276 members of the security operatives. It is very painful reading about needless clashes involving uniform personnel.
277 Furthermore, the early superior status enjoyed by the police, which they lost to the army through military rule
278 may have been linked in part to their persistent clashes. From their origin, the police was not only senior to the
279 army, but they also enjoyed superior status and remuneration until the first military incursion into civil politics
280 (Adekanye, 1993) which saw them [police] losing their erstwhile superior status to the army. ??dekaney (1993:7)
281 argues further that:

282 Army member of the NCO grade received less pay than their counterparts in the Police?Thus it was that
283 Nigerian soldiers were able to elevate themselves above not just their peers in the Nigeria Police but other groups
284 hitherto at the apex of the occupational prestige hierarchy This occupational twist in favour of the army was
285 underscored by the uniqueness of the military job coupled with its high risks, such as the risk of possible death
286 (Adekanye, 1993;Olutayo, 1997). But the police did not only lose their status; they were also exposed to some
287 forms of repressive measures by which the army targeted at weakening the police force. Such repressive

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288 measures included operational jealousy and suspicion, denial and hijacking of security equipment procured to
289 enhance the performance of the police ??Omigui, 2006). This situation, which commenced from former President
290 Shagari's regime, lasted throughout the military era in Nigeria and has further fuelled a 'cold war' between the
291 security agencies.

292 Group conflict often have their causes rooted in the perception of one group about the other. The cognitive
293 orientation directs the definition a group gives to social life and it in fact, directs their action and interaction
294 with such group. The cognitive culture manifests when a group stereotypes the other, that is, a false notion that
295 a group develops about the out-group.

296 The belief and stereotype that groups hold about each other play crucial role in intergroup conflict. Stereotype
297 enhances misperception of the others, which is often at the heart of intergroup conflict. On 1st October 2002,
298 another army/police clash occurred in Jakarta-Indonesia. The clash that claimed at least lives of four police
299 officers occurred among about 100 Indonesian soldiers and their police counterparts. The clash was reportedly
300 caused by the arrest of a soldier by the local police for drug offence. As a result, a group of soldiers attacked a
301 police post with machetes, rifles and grenades, killing about four police officers.

302 The Afghan experience presents the worse case of army/police clashes ever reported considering the number
303 of death and destructions recorded in a single clash, the kinds of weapons used by the security officers and the
304 number of days the clash lasted. The clash, which lasted for five consecutive days, was said to have started
305 from a minor argument between personnel of the forces. The clash left in its trail, two military commanders,
306 eight police officers and nine civilians dead, while unquantified amount of properties were destroyed with several
307 civilians left with various degrees of injury. The level of destruction to lives and property could not have been
308 less as the fighting forces used dangerous weapons such as rockets and heavy weapon not only on the location of
309 their opponent, but also on residential districts.

310 The above literature provides two striking revelations. Firstly, the destructive army/police clashes occurred
311 as a result of flimsy reasons such as minor quarrels, brawling at the pub, indiscipline and the involvement of
312 the forces in drug related offences. Equally striking is the fact that, once checked for those misdemeanors, the
313 security officers get offended and then embark on murder, assault and destruction. Secondly, none of the cases
314 reported in the literature involves security forces of the developed nations of the world; rather they involved army
315 and policemen from the developing or less-developed countries of Africa and Asia.

316 V.

317 8 The Implications Of Inter-Agency Feud

318 Continuous inter-agency feud has grave implications. There is no doubt that the greatest of such implications is
319 insecurity of the Nigerian state and her people. As noted earlier, all the parts of Nigeria have experienced various
320 kinds of security threats in the past decade or two. One thing that have remained constant across the nation is
321 that, at the peak of all the security challenges, security operatives are often found helpless, not really knowing
322 what to do (Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008;Odoma, 2011). With such development, miscreants and hooligans have
323 always had free days to unleash terror on defenceless citizens with impunity.

324 Repeated and uncontrolled violent clashes by the public security agencies put the security operatives in danger
325 of the loss of their own lives and equipment. All the clashes between the police and the army in Nigeria for instance,
326 have led to the death of operatives themselves, their properties and operational equipment (Odoma, 2011). In
327 the same vein, Omigui (2006) noted that, the cold war between security forces had on several occasions led to
328 unnecessary death of troops during joint operations, all in the name of accidental discharges. This development
329 is not good for national security.

330 9 VI.

331 10 Recommendations

332 Widespread violent conflicts have tarnished the image and reputation of Nigeria among international community.
333 It has equally threatened the corporate existence of the nation as nearly all the geo-political zones have their share
334 of violent conflicts, yet, the public security agencies seem to have failed to provide adequate checks to the social
335 menace. Although Nigeria and Nigerians have had their image dented by violent conflicts across the nation, the
336 clashes between the formal and public security forces seem to make the situation hopeless. The question on the
337 lips of most Nigerian in the past decades is "if the security operatives who are supposed to protect and safeguard
338 the law abiding citizens from violence are themselves violent, from where do we expect peace and security"? The
339 situation has caused a lot of disaffections, not only among the civil populace, but equally among the security
340 agents themselves. If Nigerians must be secured as they have often desired, both the security operatives and the
341 civil society must turn a new leave. It is only when this attitudinal change is effected that civil/police relationship
342 as well as the synergy between the various security agencies will improve. This paper recommends particular
343 attitudes and or behaviours that must change for sustainable security to be provided for the teaming Nigerian
344 populace. They include:

345 ? All the relevant agencies and stakeholders involved with the provision of security must endeavour to sponsor
346 regular interactive forum among the forces. Ignorance relating to the roles, organizational and rank structures
347 of other forces, areas of cooperation and exclusivity etc were identified by the study to have caused some of

348 the clashes. These can be resolved by such interactive forum. ? Discipline is the hallmark of any security
349 organization. The leadership of these forces must ensure that discipline is rightly enforced among the junior
350 officers who for the nature of their roles are more visible than their commissioned officers. In a democratic polity
351 such as ours, these security officers must learn to accord people of other profession the respect they deserve
352 especially in their places of responsibilities. The forces must see the naked use of force always associated with
353 the military regimes as belated and uncivilized mode of behaviour. ? Seniority or superiority struggles among
354 the forces have no basis. The existence, roles and powers of these forces are products of the constitution of
355 the Furthermore, constant wrangling among security operatives will no doubt continue to dampen the regard of
356 the citizens for security agents. If all that these professionals do is to always get involved in selfish clashes and
357 destroy selves and property with weapons bought with tax payer's money, or maim citizens, their reputations and
358 civil co-operation will continue to dwindle as has been noticed over the years. Today, average Nigerians prefer
359 private security guards to public security agencies (Ajayi and Aderinto, 2008). The issue here is that, if the
360 police cannot protect the citizens, they are left with the option of protecting themselves. The danger inherent in
361 the people protecting themselves with all forms of private security guards is the possible generation of confusion
362 as it is already noticed in many parts of the country, where several ethnic militias have evolved. These militias
363 have taken laws into their hands in all the parts they exist and have further worsen the security situation in the
364 country. So, rather than controlling crimes rate in the country, the freedom of creating ethnic militia sub-cultural
365 groups, have enhanced the generation of more criminals ??Reid, 1996).

366 Federal Republic of Nigeria and other relevant Acts. The same constitution did not anywhere define seniority
367 or superiority of the forces. The superiority or otherwise of the weapon used by these forces should not imply
368 seniority/superiority of the users, but they should be seen in the light of the role they are meant to perform
369 to the nation rather than defining the status of anyone carrying them. He that carries weapon should respect
370 the person that does not, as no one carry any weapon outside official duties. Similarly, whatever the status of
371 any security personnel, as soon as he/she meets another in his/her beat, such a personnel must be accorded due
372 respect to the officer on the duty post. Furthermore, officers and civilians as well should be seen as superiors in
373 their own right and must be accorded their due respect and dignity while in their official working environment.
374 In this way, superiority struggles will be checked not only among the security operatives, but also in all facets of
375 our social lives, if democracy must be stabilized in Nigeria.

376 ? A good and respected law enforcement officer should at any time be willing to submit himself/herself to the
377 authority of other governmental agencies for routine checks where necessary. This does not only speak of how
378 disciplined the officer is, but also shows how mature such an officer is. ? After trying several forms of government,
379 if Nigeria has settled down with representative democracy as the best form of government for her citizens, then
380 every segments of the Nigerian population must work for its success by respecting the tenets of democracy.
381 Security agencies should be reoriented to dissociate themselves from the dark days of coercion and ignorance
382 and strive to come to terms with modernity that will get Nigeria the needed recognition among international
383 communities. ? The Police Acts of 1958 and 1990 present the constitutional responsibilities of the Nigeria Police
384 to include among others the power/right to perform such military duties within and without Nigeria as may be
385 required of them by or under authority of this or any other act (Asemota, 1993;Odita, 1993; ??igeria Police,
386 2006). In the same vein, the Nigerian Army is saddled in part with the task of collaborating with the civil police
387 to provide internal security to the nation and perform any other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the
388 National Assembly (Arabamen, 2004;Adebayo, 2004;Nigerian Army, 2006). From the foregoing it is safe to state
389 that the founders of these forces envisaged the possibility of collaborative security roles from the very beginning.
390 Therefore, the police and the army must seek to down play any organizational differences and develop operational
391 synergy that will enhance the actualization of the expected national security.



Figure 1:

1

Serial	Date	Location	No: of Death	No: of Wounded	Extent of Destruction	Civilian desert their
1.	09/11/77	Port	Several Policemen killed	Several	others	
2.	06/09/99	Yaba	1 Army Colonel	Nil		
3	06/07/00	Ikeja	1 Soldier	25 Policemen	homes, tensions, threat to security and withdrawal of police from duty posts.	
4.	04/10/00	Juelegbogi	2 Policemen & 3 Civilians	6 Policemen several Civilians	Tension, threat to security, withdrawal of police from checkpoints, lawlessness among security agencies and miscreants. Traffic flow hindered and economic and commercial activities disturbed.	Area Police station Police burnt unlaw
5.	16/01/01	Bauchi	Nil	2 Policemen	2 Soldiers, 2 Civilians and several Civilians released while traffic flow was hindered.	
6.	24/09/01	ESTATE Town		3 Soldiers and 1 Policeman	Bayan-Gari Police Officer's Mess burnt and several days of tension and uncertainty.	Satell
7.	30/03/01	Benin	Nil	10 Policemen	destroyed and confusion among civil populace	
8.	29/05/01	Rile	1 Soldier	Several Police men	Ring-Road Police station destroyed.	
9.	11/02/01	Benin	2 Soldiers &	10	Confusion, fear and panic among civilian population.	Tensi seriou threat to
10	11/04/01	Badan	3 Mobile Policemen	wounded	security and fear among civilians	
			Several and injured	Soldiers Policemen	civilian, commercial activities.	Confu appre disrup

Figure 2: Table 1 :

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