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U.S Policy Towards Jerusalem in Accordance with International Legitimacy (An Analytical Study)

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Abstract - This study entitled, "U.S Policy towards Jerusalem in accordance with international legitimacy (An Analytical Study)", aimed at studying and analyzing the reasons that stand behind the successive American administrations' policy towards the Arab Israeli conflict in general and Jerusalem in particular. The scholar reached into a point that, in most cases for the White House, presidential candidates pledge to solve the issue of Jerusalem, but none of them can solve it after arriving at the Chair, and couldn't even to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, because of the sensitivity of the Holy City which is the core of the Arab Israeli conflict.

The study tried to answer essential questions: What are the principles governing the American position regarding the issue of Jerusalem?, Is it possible to understand the American position toward Jerusalem in isolation from its position regarding the Palestinian issue?, What is the extent of the continuity and the transformation in the American positions and policies vis-à-vis Jerusalem in the light of the relevant United Nations resolutions?, What is the future of the policy of the United States of America towards Jerusalem, in particular, and the Palestinian issue, in general?

This study contains of: abstract, introduction, principles that govern the policy of U.S towards Jerusalem, American policy on Jerusalem, stage of the post declaration of the establishment of Israel until its aggressive expansionist war (1948-1967), American Policies toward Jerusalem in different Administrations, future of the American policy towards Jerusalem, conclusion and references.

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to identify the policy of the U.S towards the issue of Jerusalem in isolation of its policy towards the Arab Israeli conflict, in which the Palestine issue is counted as its core. This is evidenced by the fact that the idea of the colonization of the Jews of Palestine started with, and revolved around Jerusalem. Jerusalem was the starting point in the Jewish colonial scheme in both its intellectual-spiritual side and the applied one in its various forms.

Since the Jewish seeks in applying its strategy to the principles of gradualism and transformation, it

soon discovered, after it began to have an entity of its own, the regional and the international variables caused by the post WWII system and their impact on the establishment of a Jewish entity and availing the necessities of its permanence. The most important of these were:

- The retreat of the superpower (UK) towards secondary positions on the international and the regional scenes, and the beginnings of the ascendancy of the alternative international power (US).
- The need of the United States for a strategic permanent ally in the Arab region.
- The confidence of the U.S that the Jewish movement has exhausted its objectives from Great Britain and began to search for an alternative strategic ally that guarantees its permanence. The Jewish usability of Britain has expired with the Balfour Declaration, the mandate instrument, the facilitation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the partition of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem and the bringing into existence of the Jewish entity (*UN General Assembly, resolution no: 181/1947*).

Accordingly, the Jewish movement has employed all the means of pressure at its disposal-the most important of which is the electoral power of the Jews in U.S to bring it around a strategic international ally as a substitute to Great Britain. Israel attaches great importance to an international role to America and the international organizations, particularly the U.N and its main organs: General Assembly and Security Council. It was right in its reading of the future of the international policy of the United States.

II. THE PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN THE POLICY OF U.S. TOWARDS JERUSALEM

Based on the afore-mentioned, it is possible to summarize the principles that govern the U.S position towards the Jerusalem issue as follows:

- The abandonment of the U.S policy of isolation and self-centrism towards a global policy whose foundation is the American vital interests, the most important of which is the oil in the Arab homeland.

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- The strenuous strive by the U.S to fill the vacuum that resulted from the receding British influence and power in the Arab region.
- The need of the U.S for a strategic ally and an "advance eye" in the Arab region and the Middle East to confront the Arabs who are aspiring for independence and renaissance and are seeking to establish a unified Arab state, armed with historically deep-rooted divine and cultural message. On the other side, to confront communism and the former Soviet Union that aspires to reach the warm water - the waters of the Gulf where oil lays.
- The strive to establish a new international order under American leadership.
- The identity of the American vital interests and the colonial Jewish substitutive interests to a near absolute identity on the ideological and applied levels.
- The importance of the Jewish Lobby in determining the electoral campaigns due to its possession of an influential electoral power in determining the U.S presidents and their foreign policies. This is evidently, clear from the response of the American president Harry Truman to the attempt of four heads of American diplomatic missions in a number of Arab states who tried to convince President Truman to turn away from his policy that is biased to the Jews in order to solve it at the expense of the Arabs of Palestine. This was particularly so regarding the initiative of his Secretary of State at the time George Marshall in October 1945. The Secretary was vehemently opposed to that policy as being prejudicial to the higher interests of the U.S. President Truman answered all of them by saying "excuse me gentlemen! I am forced to answer to the hundreds of thousands who are anxious to see Zionism succeed, whereas there are no thousands of Arabs in my electoral constituency" (*al-Sheikh, 2008*). The same was the answer of President Truman to the Arab delegation that later protested against his pro-Israel policy. He said "sorry gentlemen! I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who look forward to the success of Zionism, whereas there are no hundreds of thousands of Arabs in my electoral constituency" (*al-Sheikh, 2008*). Based on these principles, U.S began to take early interest in the Zionist Judaism and its schemes and programs before the exit of Britain from Palestine. The American interest in the Zionist Judaism and its plans was reflected in the adoption of the U.S of the Jewish Zionist "Biltmore Program" that demanded the facilitation of the immigration of the Jews to Palestine, and availing the requirements for the establishment of the Zionist entity, in it and guaranteeing its permanence in the future. The clearest indication of the influence of the

American Jewish Zionist lobby and the Jewish Agency in formulating the U.S policy- in its Arab and Jewish dimensions- was in the U.S being the first state in the world that recognized the State of Israel immediately upon its declaration, to be followed in this by the former Soviet Union who was also subject in its policy to the Zionist Jewish influence, especially at the level of the central committee and the political bureau of the communist party that contained an influential number of the Jews.

III. THE AMERICAN POLICY ON JERUSALEM

The American policy towards Jerusalem went through several stages. These were:

a) *The stage preceding the rise of the Jewish entity (1917-1948)*

The American policy towards Jerusalem during that stage (which practically extended from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 to the declaration of the rise of Israel in 1948) was characterized by the following:

First : The adoption of the U.S policy of the Jewish agency in pressuring Britain to facilitate and hasten the Jewish immigration to Palestine, especially to Jerusalem, due to its impact in attracting the greatest possible number of the European Jews-especially the young, the educated, the skilled laborers and people with capitals. Accordingly, the American administration during the time of President Roosevelt rejected the "white paper" that was issued by the mandatory state, Britain in the year 1939.

It viewed it as a negative transformation in the British policy that is contrary to the Zionist Jewish project. In 1944, a year of American presidential elections, President Roosevelt authorized the head of the American Zionist emergencies council to state the non-approval of Washington of the "white paper". The American orientation that is supportive of the Zionist Jewish project and the intensification of the Jewish immigration to Palestine was enhanced in the electoral program of the Democratic Party under the then leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt. The electoral manifest of the Democratic Party on 20 July 1944 called for the following:

- Support the wide opening of the door of the Jewish immigration to Palestine and the immediate Jewish Zionist colonization of Palestine without restraints.
- Adoption of the policy leading to the establishment of a free democratic Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

Second : The adoption of the U.S of the project of the Jewish Agency that included the partition of Palestine into two states: an Arab one and a Jewish one within the framework of the United Nations. This did actually take place. The Zionist Jewish project was submitted to the General Assembly in its 1947 session.

It was not presented to the Security Council for the fear of President Truman from being surprised by the use of one of the permanent members – particularly the Soviet Union-of the right of veto.

Third : The exercise by the U.S – through its permanent representative in the United Nations organization – of strong pressures on the representatives of the member states via intimidation and inducement to support the partition project... as took place with nationalist china, Abyssinia, Greece, Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines which all were then against the partition project but were forced to vote in its favor.

The result of these American pressures was in favor of the partition project and the internationalization of Jerusalem in the borders contained in the resolution of the General Assembly No. 181 for the year 1947. The Zionist Jewish colonial project was passed with the majority of (33) votes, the first of which was the vote of the U.S, and the abstention of ten members from voting.

Certainly, the partition plan and the internationalization of Jerusalem would not have seen the light-which is the sole resolution that enables Israel to cite it in justifying its legitimacy – if the U.S did not throw all its regional and international political and economic weight behind it. This was recognized by (David Hurwitz) - one of the then representatives of the Jewish Agency at the U.N.O, he commented on the resolution by saying: "the United States put the weight of its influence at almost the last hour. The result of the final vote is due to this fact" (*Abdul Azeez1991,p.23*).

Fourth : The recognition of the U.S of Israel after eleven minutes of its declaration on 15 May 1948 before the demand of Israel of the American administration to do so. The establishment of Israel was to president Harry Truman and his administration a pivotal national objective, though the American State Department- that was led by George Marshall-has opposed the idea of the establishment of Israel out of its keenness on the American vital interests in the Arab and Islamic regions, and to avoid pushing the Arab and Islamic states towards the Soviet Union as a result of the policy of the American administration. If Britain has laid the cornerstone for the establishment of the Jewish state-through the Balfour Declaration-, this usurping entity would never have seen the light without the adoption of the U.S and its unlimited support to the project of the Jewish State in Palestine. The result was the emergence of Israel in practice on 78% of the area of Palestine in the aftermath of the first Israeli-Arab war in 1948. This is more than that contained in the resolution of the United Nations No.181/1947 which stipulated that it be established on 56% of the area of Palestine.

IV. THE STAGE OF THE POST DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL UNTIL ITS AGGRESSIVE EXPANSIONIST WAR (1948-1967)

The American support for Israel did not stop at wrenching an international agreement to the establishment of the Zionist entity, but has dedicated most of its political and material capabilities to entrench this usurping entity and force its Arab, Islamic and regional surroundings to accept it and normalize the relation with it irrespective of American cost and time. Washington insisted on reaching the decision on the first truce in Jerusalem and the ceasefire according to the Security Council resolution No. (49) on 22 May 1948 which saved Israel from a crushing defeat if the war continued. Thus it enabled it to catch its breath and prepare for the decisive battle. The renewal of the war resulted in the acquisition of the Jewish usurping entity of more land even after the permanent truce agreement. This is what took place in (Omm al-Rashrash) that was occupied by gangs from the Zionist entity in 1949 and transforming it to a port for it on the Gulf of Aqaba. It called it the port of Eilat which represented a foothold for it on the Red Sea. Thus Israel became neighboring five Arab states: Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

But what about the political American support for the Zionist entity? The American political support for the Zionist entity has been manifested in various spheres and its most prominent aspects were as follows:

First : Preparation of the international stage to accept Israel as a member of the international setup. Israel was accepted as a full-fledged member in the United Nations after it tactically submitted to the demands of the United Nations and recognized the General Assembly resolution No. 194/1948 that calls for the return of the Palestinian refugees and the compensation of those not willing to go back, and the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Second : Maintain the status quo in Palestine and safeguarding the armistice lines inside Jerusalem. These constituted the pillars of the American policy towards Jerusalem until it was completely occupied in 1967.

Third : Concentration on the issue of the Palestinian refugees and the receding American interest in Jerusalem. The issue of the Palestinian refugees and the right of return were a source of concern for the U.S due to the ground they constitute for the Soviet Union in attracting the Arab world to its sphere of influence (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.37*).

Fourth : The issuance of the Tripartite American, British and French Declaration in 1950 that undertook to guarantee the security of the Zionist entity and

protecting it against any threat that it may face. The dangerous aspect of this declaration lies in its issuance after Israel occupied the western part of Jerusalem. It was contrary to resolution No. 181/1947 that stipulated the internationalization of Jerusalem in its two parts within the borders contained in the resolution, and the insistence of Israel in rejecting the internationalization resolution, putting a practical expression to this by moving governmental agencies to it at the beginning of 1949.

Fifth : The protest in 1953 of the Department of State, under John Foster Dallas, against the decision of Israel to move the headquarters of its foreign ministry from Telaviv to Jerusalem. This was motivated by the fears of the State Department that this may lead to the enablement of the Soviet Union to induce some influential Arab States, and Egypt in the forefront, to its sphere of influence ,which will increase the tension in the region and distance the Arab states away from the Western courtyard. This constitutes a danger to Israel and lays the ground for a military attack against it by the Arab states.

Thus the difference between the Department of State and the American administration regarding Israel and its policy towards Jerusalem was not a principled one, but a temporary one that both sides seek the interest, security and permanence of Israel. Since the establishment of Israel, it sought to target and gains the support of the American administration, since the President is the one who takes the final decision in the foreign policy.

Sixth : The abstention by the U.S of recognizing Jerusalem as a capital for Israel. This position does not mean coming closer to the Arabs or supporting their right. The American administration remained faithful to its undertakings to Israel and more leaning to it. It did not exercise any pressure against the states that recognized Jerusalem as a capital for Israel in order to dissuade them from their decisions, and the necessity of committing to the resolutions of the United Nations that call for non-transferring their embassy to it (*Abu Haleiwa, p.40*).

Seventh : The keenness of the U.S on seeing that the Jerusalem- related resolutions of the United Nations are consistent with its pro-Israel supportive policy and the taking into consideration of its vital interests in the Arab and the Middle East, including Israel, and seeing these put into execution. In addition the successive American administrations viewed the Jewish problem and Israel as an internal and decisive matter in the American presidential elections and the American Congress (both the Senate and the House of the Representatives). These were:

- Resolution No. (185) on 26 April 1948 that included demanding the Trusteeship Council to conduct a

study regarding the measures of protecting Jerusalem and its population.

- Resolution No.(187) of 6 May 1948 that called for the appointment of a special municipal commissioner for Jerusalem.
- Resolution No.(194) of the General Assembly which stressed in one of its items, the placement of Jerusalem in a permanent international regime. But the United States reversed its position and voted against resolution No.(303) of the General Assembly on 9 December 1949 that stressed the placement of Jerusalem under a permanent international regime within the framework of borders.
- The resolution of the Security Council No. (49) on 22 May 1948 relating to the ceasefire in Palestine and in Jerusalem, and the call on the Armistice Commission and all the concerned parties to give absolute priority to the negotiations regarding the armistice and its maintenance in the city of Jerusalem.
- The resolution of the Security Council No.(5) on 29 May 1948 calling for ceasing war operations in order to protect the holy places.
- Resolution of the Security Council No. (54) on 15 July 1948 calling on the international mediator to continue his efforts in disarming Jerusalem.
- Security Council resolution No. (60) on 29 October 1948 concerning the formation of a sub-committee to amend the draft resolution dealing with the status of Jerusalem (*Security Council Resolutions on Palestine Issue and the Middle East*).

Eighth : The participation of the U.S in the Tripartite Conciliation Committee that included, beside it Turkey and France, which was tasked with "laying down a permanent system for the internationalization of Jerusalem", in addition to other tasks. This was opposed by the Arab States, especially Jordan.

Israel also opposed it vehemently stressing the necessity of recognizing the policy of fait accompli, after it was able to occupy the greatest part of the city. It demanded that the internationalization should be confined to the holy places in the old city. But, and for tactical reasons, It reversed its rejectionist position due to its interest in seeing that its application to join the membership of the United Nations organization be accepted. But It soon disavowed this after getting what it wanted under the pretext that the Arab States have rejected the internationalization resolution.

As a result of the Israeli rejection of the internationalization resolution, and the influence of America and France, the Tripartite Conciliation Committee proposed a project to divide the city into an Arab area and a Jewish area on condition that the immigration do not affect the standing population balance in the city, and that the mission of the United

Nations takes charge of protecting the holy places, and guarantees the freedom of access to them, and the area of Jerusalem be demilitarized, and the formation of a public council for the city, and an international court for Jerusalem, and the representation of the United Nations by a representative appointed by the General Assembly for a period of five years to supervise also the holy places outside the area of Jerusalem.

The partition project that was recommended by the Tripartite Conciliation Committee did not mean the approval of the status quo only, but was in response to the Israeli demand that it must not be made a capital for any side. This was rejected by both sides as well as the General Assembly on 9 December 1949 since it went beyond the idea of the complete internationalization of Jerusalem which was stipulated in its resolution no. (181) for the year 1947. And although the General Assembly asked continuously the Trusteeship Council to continue with taking the measures of internationalizing Jerusalem, and the council continued to issue its resolutions in this respect until the year 1950, the year in which the Trusteeship Council was dissolved, yet it did not take any decision regarding the report of the trusteeship council, and did not submit the issue of Jerusalem in its sessions. The project of the internationalization of Jerusalem was frozen. This was consistent with the Israeli position and in accordance with the policy of the U.S. that was putting the confrontation of the then increasing Soviet influence in the Arab area at the top of its concerns in the area of foreign policy.

Since the problem of the refugees and the right of return represented the breach in the wall of besieging the Soviet Union and the prevention of any penetration of the wall of its Middle Eastern policy. Since the U.S viewed the issue of the Palestinian refugees as the point of easy entry of the Soviets and the key of the Soviet Union to the Arab region then, it was forced to close that gap in the wall of the besiegement of the Soviet Union by concentration on the issue of the refugees and the ignoring of the issue of Jerusalem.

V. AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD JERUSALEM IN DIFFERENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS

In order to manoeuvre and analyze the United States attitude toward Jerusalem indifferent periods, it needs to shed the lights and talk about the following selected American Administrations:

a) *During the period of President Lyndon Johnson*

The policy of the American president Lyndon Johnson towards Jerusalem cannot be fathomed in isolation of the political principle that governed his foreign policy towards the Arab area and the Arab Israeli

conflict and their impact on the policy of the international polarization. It is:

- The keenness on the success of the siege of the Soviet influence and the prevention of the Soviet Union from inducing some Arab States to its sphere of influence, especially that the beginnings of joint cooperation and coordination began to appear between it and more than one Arab state, especially Egypt.
- Concentration on guaranteeing the effectiveness of the temporary armistice lines of 1957 between the Arab States and Israel.
- Invest the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands in Palestine, the Syrian Golan and the Sinai Peninsula to achieve a settlement with Israeli American terms and specifications under the pretext of the futility of any settlement that is imposed from the outside without the will of its parties. America succeeded in marketing this through Security Council resolution No.(242)1967 by connecting "peace" to the withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and between the negotiations on the basis of the exchange of land for peace and the Arab recognition of the legitimacy of Jewish existence in Palestine (*Abu Baker, 1973,p.212*).

The question rises here, how did the administration of the American president Johnson dealt with the question of Jerusalem after Israel completed its occupation and the rest of Palestine in its aggressive war against the Arab states in June 1967?

The return of the interest of the U.S at this period in the question of Jerusalem came to represent a substantive transformation in its policy in favor of the Zionist Entity. Its concern focused on the eastern part of the city after its concern was equally on both parts.

In other words, the resolution of the internationalization of Jerusalem became a thing of the past and the start of turning the page over the relevant U.N resolutions. This position is completely identical to the Israeli position which continued to reject the internationalization of Jerusalem and its demand that the international community recognize the western part of Jerusalem as its capital.

The new direction of the American policy towards Jerusalem became evident through more than one declaration of President Johnson. On 19 June 1967, he said that "there must be sufficient recognition of the three particular interests in the holy places" (*Abu Baker, 1973, p.212*) that is the holy places of the Muslims, Christians and Jews as alike. Only three days passed when he enhanced this statement with another on 28 June 1967 where he stressed "the necessity of recognizing the special interests of the three religions in the holy places, and the necessity of consulting with the religious leaders and the concerned others before taking

any unilateral decision regarding the status of Jerusalem".

The danger in such statements lies in the fact that the administration of President Johnson did not view anymore the issue within the framework of a larger question-the Palestinian question and a substantive cause in the Israeli Arab conflict, but a religious issue revolving around the holy places in Jerusalem and assuring the freedom of access to them to all callings. And when we realize that the holy places that president Johnson meant lie in the eastern part of Jerusalem, it means that the eastern part only will be the subject of the negotiations among the parties to the conflict, whereas the western part became as a matter of fact heading towards the recognition of America of the policy of the fait accompli.

The American position did not stop at the point of negotiation over the occupation of Israel to the west Jerusalem. President Johnson in his succeeding statements began to hint at an American readiness to accept the annexation of Israel of the two parts to it and its declaration as a unified capital for Israel, minimizing the importance of this Israeli measure as being an administrative measure that does not change the inadmissibility of the occupation of the territories of the others by force.

On 10 September 1968, President Johnson made clear the support of Washington for Jerusalem to remain a unified city by saying "no one wishes to see the holy city divided once again. The parties must think of a solution that guarantees their interests and the interests of the world in Jerusalem". But who is this (one) who does not wish the re-division of the city that Johnson meant in his declaration? As for the international community, it stated its position by adopting Security Council resolution No. 242 which would not have seen the light without the approval of Washington and the permanent members of the Council. The resolution stipulates the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, though Israel continued to argue that the English text does not talk except about withdrawal from Arab territories, contrary to the French text". But all the relevant succeeding resolutions – the most prominent of which was Security Council resolution No.238 of 1973-put an end to this by re-affirming the necessity of the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories that it occupied in the aggressive expansionist war of the 5th June 1967 that Israel started.

As for the American department of state, it considered the decision of Israel to unify and annex the two parts of Jerusalem-through its enactment of the basic law of Jerusalem, on 28 June 1967, as a temporary administrative measure that "cannot affect the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem, and that the U.S doesn't recognize unilateral actions that decide the international status of Jerusalem (Abu Baker, 1973, p.212).

The American administration and its state department did not suffice themselves with the Justification of the measures of judaizing Jerusalem-that contradict the relevant resolutions of the international legitimacy – by minimizing their importance and the verbal opposition to the measures of judaizing Jerusalem, but abstained from voting in favor of the resolutions of the General Assembly No.2253 of 4 July 1967 that stipulated the necessity of the abolishment of Israel of its judaizing measures in Jerusalem and consider these measures as not affecting the status of the city.

Though this abstention did not mean the opposition of the two resolutions, but it points to the real reasons for the abstention, the most important of which are:

- The futility of the opposition of the U.S to the draft resolutions of the General Assembly since its majority is supportive of the Arab right, and that there is no place there for the veto.
- Protection of the Zionist entity from itself and its expansionist aggressive policy. The most prominent aspect of the double dealing of the American political conduct was its voting in favor of Security Council resolutions No. (250) on 7 July 1968 and No. (251) on 2 May 1968 that demanded of Israel not to conduct a military parade in Jerusalem. But the U.S abstained from voting in favor of the resolution No. (252) on 2 May 1968 that calls on Israel to abrogate all its measures to change the status of Jerusalem. With its double standards, the U.S has coupled between the tactical and the strategic that enabled it to gain the support of both sides of the conflict and not to cause the Arab side to despair from the United States. This is a method that the successive American administrations used to invest for its interests and the interest of its strategic ally Israel and caused the Arabs to sing praise of worthless resolutions since these were not backed by mechanisms of implementations within specified time spans. In addition, Israel does not consider these resolutions as binding on her as long as they are not taken on the basis of the seventh chapter of the charter of the United Nations organizations. The duplicity of the American policy towards Jerusalem-in both its tactical and strategic aspects were made clear by the speech of the permanent representative of the U.S before the General Assembly concerning the question of Jerusalem on 14 July 1967. It was very specific regarding the policy of his administration towards Jerusalem: "Jerusalem is one of the most holy cities of the world due to the sanctity and the importance accorded to it by the followers of the three divine faiths. As for the impact of holiness on the legal status of the city, the U.S is of the view that (east

Jerusalem) that was occupied in 1967 is an occupied territory that is subject to the law of military occupation. It is not permitted for Israel to introduce any changes. Accordingly, the changes that Israel caused are null and void and do not constitute prior judgment on the final and permanent status of the city. As for the question of sovereignty over the city and the determination of its final future, it is a matter that is decided in the light of the solution that is to be decided in the region"(*The Arab Report and Record (16-31) January 1969, pp. 47- 48*). The solution that is decided by the direct parties of the conflict, not the settlement that is imposed on the area from the outside... meaning the United Nations which the majority of its setup supports the Arab position and which Washington was unable to disable or balance except through its use of the American veto in the Security Council. The same applies to the succeeding American official statements – especially that of Arthur Goldberg, the permanent American representative to the United Nations, in respect of the abstention of Washington on voting in favor of resolution (252). These showed the tactical approach of Washington without removing the many questions relating to its real position concerning the measures of the judaization of Jerusalem. The U.S. justified its abstention in voting for resolution (252) by saying that it was needless, since the illegitimacy of the measures of judaization of Jerusalem was included in resolution 242/1967 dictating the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories including east Jerusalem. This is in addition to this being within the mission of the representative and mediator of the United Nations, Junar Jarring.

- The preservation of Jerusalem as being united.

b) During the period of President Richard Nixon

Though the American policy during the term of President Nixon towards Jerusalem continued to be governed by the same principles controlling its Middle Eastern policy, yet it was distinguished with some flexibility during this period for the following reasons:

- Its efforts to get out of the Vietnamese quagmire with the least political losses after it realized it was waging a militarily lost war was by all standards. This war constituted a strategic transformation in favor of its ideological and global enemy the Soviet Union in the southeastern part of Asia.
- The shift of its interest from southeastern Asia-where there was no hope of winning the war there-towards the Arab area where there exists its vital interests, the most important of which are Israel and Oil.
- Its conviction that the state of no war and no peace on which its policy towards the Arab area is based cannot last as long as Israel sticks to its conditions to settle the Arab Israeli conflict, and insists on

keeping Jerusalem as a unified capital for it. Accordingly, the American administration began to search for political tactics that enables it preserve its vital interests in the Arab area and prevent the war of attrition on the Egyptian front from turning into a long term war for Israel that ends into a military defeat for it, since all indications and developments in the area pointed to the determination of President Jamal Abdul Nasser to this defeat Israel. Accordingly, the U.S began to look for the means that it thinks will avoid its strategic ally Israel the expected military defeat. In order to achieve this, it moved through two paths:

The Jordanian path: where it exploited the authorization that President Jamal Abdul Nasser gave to King Hussein Bin Talal to work in all the politically available means, and the taking advantage of his relations with the west-specially the U.S to restore the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem to the Arab sovereignty on condition of non-recognition of Israel. In order to lure Jordan to direct negotiations with Israel regarding the future of the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem, the American National Council declared on 1st February 1969 a number of principles regarding the Arab Israeli conflict, the most prominent of which was that "Jordan will have a civil and religious role within the context of the unified Jerusalem"(Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.596).

This American position was reaffirmed again through the proposals that the American administration submitted to ambassador Jarring in April 1969, and in the settlement plan that it presented at the quad partite talks that included representatives from Jordan, U.S, United Nations and Israel, and the consultations that the American administration has conducted in this respect with the then Soviet ambassador in Washington. The Jordanian Israeli settlement plan which the American administration presented on 18 December 1969 contained two items regarding Jerusalem. These were:

- It dealt with the secure borders and stated that "the recognized secure borders should be near to the armistice lines with the exception of that stated in item four (the one relating to Jerusalem)", meaning the non return of Jerusalem to the way it was before (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.596*).
- It dealt with the status of Jerusalem and the final arrangements.
- It stated that "Jordan and Israel work to reach an agreement regarding the status of the city of Jerusalem and the final arrangement, including the municipal boundaries of the unified city, and the two sides agree that Jerusalem has a special status" that starts from the following principles:
 - It must be a united city with no restrictions on the movement of persons or goods in it.

- There must be no restrictions on the freedom of access to the united city for any person of any religion or nationality.
- The administrative arrangements of the united city must take into consideration the interests of all its inhabitants and the interests of the international Jewish and Islamic and Christian sects, and the roles of the governments of Israel and Jordan must be guaranteed in the civil and economic and religious life of the city (*Department of State bulletin, vol.62, no.1593 (5 January 1970) p. 10*)

The Egyptian path : was represented in the 1970 Rogers Plan dealing with stopping the war of attrition. It was accepted by Egypt and Jordan and rejected by Palestine and Syria and Iraq. This caused a split in the Arab ranks which was an objective of the American administration. This began to constitute a primary policy for the U.S and Israel that stands on inundating the Arabs with settlement plans, not for settling the Arab Israeli conflict, but to first deepen the splits in the Arab ranks, and second to save Israel from the quagmire of the war of attrition, and third to cause the Arab states to doubt the position of Egypt and Abdul Nasser, and fourth as a preparation to isolate Egypt from the Arabs at the right moment. This is what took place in fact through the visit of Sadat to occupied Jerusalem in 1977 and was concluded with the signing of the Camp David agreements on 26 March 1979, leading to ousting Egypt out of the Arab Israeli conflict.

The dual American approach has been enhanced at the level of the United Nations. At the same time that it was sponsoring Jordanian Israeli negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations, and advancing plans to settle the conflict within a bilateral context that guarantees to Israel the keeping of Jerusalem as a unified capital for it, we find the U.S supportive of Security Council resolution No.(267) of 3 July 1969 that chided Israel for its failure to respect the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council relating to Jerusalem, and the voidness of the measures of Judaizing Jerusalem, and the call on Israel to abolish them. Yet it abstained from voting on paragraph five of that resolution under the pretext that the "language of the paragraph is inconsistent with the clear language of the preceding paragraph that stresses that these measures cannot change the status of the city", which meant the continued differentiation of the U.S between the Israeli legislative and administrative measures, and between its annexation by a decision which Israel did not do. But this American policy prepared the ground before Israel and encouraged it to annex Jerusalem in 1980 by a decision taken by the Israeli Knesset in this connection. Charles Yost, the then representative of the U.S in the Security Council justified the approval of his country of the draft project by saying "Jerusalem is a sacred place for three of the largest

religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. As a result of this fact, the U.S has always considered that Jerusalem enjoys a unique international status, and that no measure should be taken there without taking into consideration the special history of Jerusalem and its special status in the international community, unfortunately some actions took place that has stopped peace in Jerusalem and the U.S considers that part of Jerusalem that fell under the control of Israel since the June war an occupied territory like the rest of other territories that Israel have occupied, thus it is subject to the stipulations of the international law that regulates the rights and the obligations of the occupying state, that states have no right to affect changes in the laws or the administration and the occupying state cannot confiscate or destroy private properties... we have continuously refused to recognize that these measures have any other capacity other than the temporary capacity and must not be permitted to affect the final status of Jerusalem" (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.39*).

Though many people rightly considered that American position to be the boldest and clearest-in the history of the Arab Israeli conflict since it assigned to Israel the responsibility of the breakdown of peace through its illegitimate measures, and the recognition that it is an occupying state that must fulfill its international obligations towards the international law regarding occupation that does not allow it to cause any changes in the lands it occupies. This became evident through the American abstention from voting in favor of Security Council resolution No.(271) on 5 September 1969 regarding the crime of burning al-Aqsa Mosque and the condemnation of the Israeli crime.

But the American administration supported security council resolution No.(298) on 25 September 1971 whose contents did not differ from the previous Security Council resolutions relating to Jerusalem. George Bush, the then American representative at the United Nations, explained the position of his country in supporting resolution (298) by saying that "the Security Council has shown a stern position (towards Israel) and stressed the regret of the U.S for the failure of the Zionist entity to respect its obligations under the fourth Geneva convention, in addition to the fact that its actions contravene the spirit and the texts of this Convention (Pointing out) that the United States has supported the resolution, not because it agrees to all its contents-since some of its elements cause difficulties to his government-but the support came to emphasize the concern of his government that no action shall be taken in Jerusalem that harms the final peaceful settlement of Jerusalem" (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.63*).

The important point in the statement of George Bush before the Security Council was not the repetition of the previous positions of his government, but his admission that his government faces difficulties and problems when it takes balanced positions regarding

the Arab Israeli conflict, and the question of Jerusalem in particular. Everyone certainly realized that Israel and the American Zionist Jewish lobby are the sources of these difficulties.

Before that, Henry Kissinger, the American secretary of state and the head of the American National Security council and the one who is well-known for his absolute loyalty to the Zionist entity and the author of the step-by-step policy, has sought to overcome these difficulties that were referred to by George Bush-without specifying them or mentioning their source- through the plan that was ascribed to him regarding Jerusalem which calls for the partition of Jerusalem between Jordan, the Vatican and Israel. The project that was attributed to Henry Kissinger regarding Jerusalem was based on the following principles:

- Placement of the holy places in Jerusalem, al-khalil (Hebron), and Bethlehem under the administration of the United Nations.
- Placement of the Jewish Quarter and the Armenian quarter in (east Jerusalem) under the administration of Israel.
- Return to Jordan the Islamic Quarter that lies between Bab al-Asbat and Bab al-khalil.
- Placement of the Christian Quarter that lies between Bab al-Amoud and Bab al-khalil under the administration of the Vatican.
- Proclamation of Jerusalem as an open city for all.
- The proposed status does not prevent Jerusalem from being taken as a capital for a certain state, or for several states at the same time. The danger that lies in the "Kissinger project" for the settlement of the issue of Jerusalem lies in the fact that it constitutes a mechanism to passing the policy of the Zionist entity towards Jerusalem that revolves around keeping Jerusalem united and capital for it, which is clearly evident in the last item of his project. This danger is not mitigated by the possibility of Jerusalem being a capital for more than one side. On the contrary, it is an admission of Jerusalem being united and a capital for Israel and a prelude to the transformation of the American policy towards Jerusalem in this direction and gaining world support for it.

c) *During the period of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1980)*

The American policy towards Jerusalem during the period of President Jimmy Carter was characterized by the following features:

- The movement away from the policy of step-by-step that was led and sponsored by the then American secretary of state, Henry Kissinger -in complete coordination and cooperation with the government of the Zionist entity-towards the policy of the "comprehensive settlement" of the Arab Israeli

conflict without the reference of the project of President Carter to Jerusalem even in one word.

- That project was shelved due to the rejection of the American Zionist Jewish lobby and Israel- which was led for the first time in its history by a Likud government headed by Menahem Begin, who vehemently opposed the project of Jimmy Carter.
- Transferring the file of the Palestinian cause and the Arab Israeli conflict from the United Nations organization to the framework of the bilateral negotiations that are sponsored by the U.S. The aim was to prepare for separate agreements and peace treaties that the administration of President Carter and the new Israeli leadership decided to start with Egypt, which will impact negatively and dangerously on the future of the Arab Israeli conflict and its core the Palestinian cause. Thus it was not odd for the administration of Carter to receive the initiative of Sadat-that began with his visit in 1977 to the occupied Jerusalem, and delivering his speech before the Israeli Knesset-that ended with the signing of the Camp David Accords on 26 March 1979. Events have proved that initiative was not far from the scheming of the American administration, in cooperation with Arab parties.
- Exclusion of the complex subjects that affect the proceeding of the negotiations to the stage that was designated since then as the final status negotiations. Jerusalem was one of the issues that were excluded from the Egyptian Israeli negotiations and the Camp David accords as a result of the pressure of the American Zionist Jewish lobby, the Zionist entity and the unlimited American support for the Israeli position. This set a precedent that was emulated in the negotiations of the "post Madrid conference" where the issue of Jerusalem was postponed to what was called the final status negotiations.
- Adoption of the "diplomacy of letters" that contains the principled positions of both negotiating sides: Egypt and Israel. This was adopted as a negotiating style that paved the way for the convening of the "Madrid peace conference" in October 1991, as well as the secret negotiations in Oslo, and the Palestinian declaration of principles, and the succeeding negotiations at the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks.
- The affirmation of the American administration of its previous position of the question of united Jerusalem as stated by the statements of its permanent representatives at the United Nations by ambassador Arthur Goldberg on 14 July 1967 and ambassador Charles Yost on 1st July 1969, that is the U.S.A considers east Jerusalem as still being an occupied territory that is governed by the law of military occupation that imposes on Israel,

obligations towards the occupied territory and its inhabitants. Though the letters of President Sadat and the then leader of the Zionist entity Menahem Begin were only affirmations of their principled stands regarding Jerusalem, the diplomacy of letters points to dangerous matters, the most important of which are:

- The difficulty of arriving at common denominators those constitute the basis for the satisfactory solution of the issue of Jerusalem by the two parties, especially the Palestinian side, which was not participating in the negotiations, to start with.
- There is no political or legal value for these letters as long as they are not incorporated in the texts of the accords, meaning they do not commit the Zionist entity.
- The exclusion of the western part of Jerusalem from any future negotiations and confining them over the eastern part. This means the success of Israel in imposing its position on the largest Arab negotiating side which will be the basis for any succeeding negotiations that may take place between any Arab side and Israel.
- The focus of the American diplomacy of letters on the spiritual side of Jerusalem, while ignoring any reference to the international legitimacy and its resolutions that govern the issue of Jerusalem now and in the future. Due to regional reasons like the rise of the Iranian revolution that ended with the downfall of the Shah and the assumption of the Mullahs of the power in Iran, and the breakout of the Iranian Iraqi war, and the theatrical farce of the American hostages in American embassy in Iran, caused the U.S. to shift its concern away from the Israeli-Arab conflict to the Arab Gulf sufficing itself with the great political victory that it has achieved for itself and Israel on the Egyptian front and the complete ignorance of the question of Jerusalem. In addition, the political activity on the international scene regarding Jerusalem has lessened. The institution of the international legitimacy did not pass except three resolutions, one of which was issued by the General Assembly (35/169) on 25 December 1980 demanding that the Zionist entity abolish its measures in Jerusalem, especially the decision of the Israeli Knesset that is known as the "basic law of Jerusalem" through which it annexed united Jerusalem to Israel. The U.S.A. abstained from voting in favor of Security Council resolution No.(476) on 30 June 1980 and NO.(478) on 20 August 1980, since the first demanded that Israel abrogate the "basic law of Jerusalem"

and its annexation of the city to it, while the second stressed the content of the first (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.63*).

d) *During the term of President Ronald Reagan*

This was characterized by the following traits:

- The elevation of the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv to the level of the strategic alliance. What helped to prepare the American public opinion for the elevation of the American-Israeli relations to this level was the fabricated fear of the expansionist intention of the Soviet Union, and the importance of Israel in combating the communist tide in the Middle East area. Begin exploited his visit to the U.S to realize several objectives, the most important of which was causing America to retreat from the positive side of its Middle Eastern policy, and urged the Reagan administration to ignore that part of the Camp David accords relating to the Palestinian self-government-along that demanded by Sadat-that omitted to mention Jerusalem, and committing the American administration to preserve the security and permanence of Israel and the adoption of its colonistjudaizing and substitutive policy, especially in Jerusalem. This was made clear by President Reagan in his speech on 9 September 1981 when he stated: "the security of Israel is one of the objectives of the American policy towards the dangers (surrounding her) in the area, and that Israel is a strategic ally to the United States" (*The bulletin of Palestinian studies, 1986 volume, p.638*). The American-Israeli memorandum of strategic understanding that contained the logistical. Intelligence and operational levels proved the reality of the American role in the Arab area which is completely aligned to the interest of Israel.
- Support the Israeli armed aggression against Lebanon in 1982. Thus it was no accident that Israel began to go over its head and increase its intransigence and turn its back on the international legitimacy and its resolutions, and start a new military campaign against the Palestinian resistance in Beirut that got the unlimited American support, and ended with the occupation of the Lebanese south and the expulsion of the Palestinian resistance and its leader Yasser Arafat from Lebanon so that a new Palestinian journey of dispersal began.
- The declaration of the Reagan project to settle the Arab Israeli conflict so as to offer an international cover for the new Israeli aggression, that (the project) contained the emphasis that the "settlement must be based on guaranteeing the security of the Zionist entity, and the land for peace in application of resolution (242), and the adoption of Camp David

as the basis for the dialogue"(*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p. 73*), Calling for a Palestinian participation to arrive at self-governing.

- The policy of Reagan regarding Jerusalem as stated in his project was based on two principles:

The first : Jerusalem should remain united

The Second: The determination of its future in the final status negotiations, which means postponing it to the negotiations of the final settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict, which caused this goal and those that preceded it to be constants of the American policy towards Jerusalem. The aim is to enable Israel to consecrate it as a unified and eternal capital for it.

As for the project of George Shultz, the then American secretary of state, it was identical with the principled framework of the American policy towards Jerusalem. His project, which he declared in April 1988, included discussing "the question of Jerusalem in the light of the results of the Arab Israeli talks, but its people can vote like the rest of the people of the West Bank and the Gaza strip"(*Amen, 1993, p. 256*). This means that Shultz has in practice separated between "the question of resolving the sovereignty over Jerusalem and between its Palestinian inhabitants"(*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p. 73*) this means in practice the identity of the position of the American administration with the Israeli position. Israel has annexed Jerusalem to Israel while keeping its inhabitants outside the annexation.

- As for the United Nations level, the General Assembly took sixteen resolutions regarding Jerusalem that do not recognize the measures of its judaization, and the call for the abrogation of these measures, and the submission of Israel to the international conventions, especially the fourth Geneva convention that impose on the occupying state obligations regarding the occupied territory and its people. The American position regarding these resolutions oscillated between verbal support and abstention. It voted in favor of nine of them and abstained from supporting the other seven. The reality of the American policy towards Jerusalem during the term of president Reagan was clear in its opposition to two draft resolutions relating to Jerusalem that were submitted to the Security Council. The American veto was used against both. These were the draft resolution of 20 April 1982, and the draft resolution of 30 January 1986. The first called for the condemnation of Israel for the shooting of one of soldiers of the occupation of the prayers in the neighboring courtyard of Al-Haram Al-Sharif. The draft resolution was supported by (14) states and was opposed by the U.S only. The second revolved around decrying the measures of the Zionist entity in occupied Jerusalem and its threats against the sanctity of the holy places. It was supported by (13) states, and opposed by the U.S only.

The regional and the international transformations that the world witnessed before and after the entry of the first George Bush to the White House has impacted the formulation of the American policy towards the Arab Israeli conflict and the causes of Palestine and Jerusalem. The most important of these were the following:

- The breakout of the Palestinian intifada (uprising) in 1987 which the West, and especially the U.S understood correctly as being an uprising with a political goal that revolves around extracting their right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state on their completely sovereign territory with Jerusalem as its capital. It will not stop until it achieves its political objectives. It is not a passing uprising and the Zionist entity cannot suppress it with the military means, which meant that it must be circumvented by political means.
- The end of the Iranian-Iraqi war and the emergence of Iraq from that war as a regional power whose role in the future of the Arab Israeli conflict cannot be ignored. This unpleasant regional setback to the U.S and its strategic ally Israel and their Middle Eastern policies must be addressed before the danger deepens, and the emerging regional power gets out of hand and breaks the barrier of fear and hesitation towards Palestine. The question of this political regional development was made more dangerous to the American regional strategy by being simultaneous with the increasing tempo of the Palestinian uprising. So it was absolutely necessary to lure Iraq towards the inevitable killing zone.
- The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp and the fragmentation of its states into separate sovereign states.
- The end of the cold war with an ideological, political, religious and military victory for the Atlantic Alliance under American leadership.
- The American policy towards Jerusalem during the term of the first George Bush, within these regional and international variables, was as follows:
 - Continuation of the same American policy towards Jerusalem during former president Ronald Reagan since both Reagan and Bush belonged to the Republican Party and Bush occupied the position of vice-president during Reagan.
 - Jerusalem must remain united and must not be allowed to be divided again.
 - Confinement of the extent of international legitimacy to the eastern part of Jerusalem and the exclusion of the western part from it.
 - Retreat from its policy that rejected the Jewish colonialist settlement in the West Bank and Jerusalem. In the middle of March 1991, the then American secretary of state, James Baker, sent a

letter to the pro-Zionist American congressman, Ted Levin, stating in it the following: "it is evident that the Jews and others can live wherever they want east and west, and the city must remain undivided" (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.83*).

- Imposition of a settlement on Israeli American conditions. The imposition of an Israeli American peace taking advantage of a historic opportunity that may not occur again that took place as a result of the Arab weakness and disruption in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. In an article in the Washington Post newspaper in October 1991, the American former president Richard Nixon called for "forcing Israel to its luck" by reaching a settlement with the Arabs and the Palestinians through exploiting a golden opportunity that history may not provide again in order to preserve the American vital interests in the region, the most important of which are: the oil and Israel. It is the first time that oil takes precedence over Israel. Accordingly, the Madrid peace conference took place.
- Circumventing the issue of Jerusalem and the representation of the Palestinians in the Madrid Conference through the proposal of Baker of postponing the Jerusalemites to a later stage by appointing Jerusalemites in the negotiating team who have resided in Jerusalem before. Thus their role was limited to the accompaniment of the delegation within the framework of the Jordanian umbrella through a joint Jordanian Palestinian delegation in their capacity as advisers.

The convening of the Madrid Conference on bases compatible with the Israeli view, which is as follows:

- A mini international conference whose participants are confined to the direct parties of the struggle under an American Soviet sponsorship.
- Exclusion of the United Nations organization and ignoring its role as a source for international legitimacy. The Madrid Conference was not held under its umbrella, and it sufficed itself with the role of an observer. This meant in practice the transfer of the file of the Arab Israeli Conflict from the United Nations and its placement in the hands of the U.S. Thus the United Nations was relieved of what the Western media and politics used to call the Middle East conflict.
- Circumventing the resolutions of the international legitimacy through adoption of the diplomacy of the letters of assurance, and the exclusion of the basic controversial issues, foremost among which was Jerusalem, from the negotiations. This meant ignoring its point of reference in order to get rid of the resolutions of the international legitimacy as a framework of reference for any negotiations, and re-negotiate over it once again, though it has been

approved by the General Assembly and the Security Council and have gained final status. It is not subject to negotiations, but needs a mechanism to apply them and make Israel commit to them. This dangerous trend by the U.S became clear when it invested all its capabilities and exploited the regional and the international variables that were in her favor, to force the cancellation of some resolutions of the international legitimacy that bothered it and caused concern to its strategic ally Israel, exactly as happened with the resolution of the General Assembly No.(3379) in 1975 stating that Zionism is a form of racism. It was abolished by an American initiative during the first session that the General Assembly convened on 16 December 1991 following the end of the second Gulf War.

- Postponement of the consideration of the future of Jerusalem until the final status negotiations. This principle was adopted in the following Oslo Agreement (Gaza Jericho first) and the Israeli Palestinian declaration of principles. The American letter of assurances to the Palestinian leadership regarding Jerusalem stated the following: "the United States understands (realizes) the importance that the Palestinians attach to the question of east Jerusalem. Thus we want to assure you that nothing that the Palestinians will undertake in selecting the members of their delegation at this stage will impact on their demanding of east Jerusalem, or constitute a pre-judgment or a precedent of that which will result from the negotiations. The constant position of the United States is represented in the fact that the city should not to be divided again, and that its final status must be determined in the negotiations. Accordingly, we do not recognize the annexation of Israel of east Jerusalem or the expansion of its municipal boundaries" (*Palestinian studies Journal, issue (8) 1991 autumn, p. 297*).
- Concentration on the priority of the security of Israel as a goal that precedes any other goal. This was affirmed in the letter of assurances that it sent to Israel, and said: "the key to push peace forward is the recognition of the security needs of Israel, Israel has the right to secure and defensible borders, the aim of this process is a durable and just peace that is attained through talks based on the resolutions of the Security Council No.(242) and (338) (*Text of the American letter of assurances to the Zionist entity, journal of Palestinian studies, p. 288*). The different interpretations of the content of resolution (242) were left to the negotiators, which caused it to be of reference nature and not one of being an obligatory point of reference. The afore-mentioned letter stated the following: "you and the other parties have informed us that there are different interpretations for Security Council resolution No.(242), and that

these interpretations will be presented during the negotiations" (*Text of the American letter of assurances to the Zionist entity, journal of Palestinian studies, p. 288*).

- The American position became bound with, and subject to, the Israeli position regarding the negotiating subjects and the estimation of Israel of its security needs. The same applies to the recognition of the principle of connecting the point of references of the peace with that which Israel understands and what she estimates as being necessary to its security and its defensible borders.
- Launching an American media and political war against the Palestine liberation organization (P.L.O) and the exercise of pressure on the international organizations that accept the (P.L.O.) in its membership to stop paying its commitments in this respect, as the case of the United Nations itself and the (UNESCO). This was so despite the fact that the Bush administration has started a dialogue with the (P.L.O) after the latter agreed to Security Council resolution (242), and the right of the existence of Israel and disavowed terrorism, these conditions that Israel has constantly advanced as an introduction to agree to any dialogue between the U.S and the (P.L.O). This was an American undertaking that was made by Henry Kissinger in 1975 for the Zionist entity. But the Palestinian-American dialogue did not last long due to Israeli pressure and the Israeli-connected Zionist Jewish lobby on the administration of President George Bush. As for the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Bush administration voted against four draft resolutions and abstained from supporting another four of the resolutions issued by the General Assembly regarding the Arab Israel conflict, including Jerusalem. As for the Security Council, and for tactical reasons relating to the preparation of the political stage for the second Gulf War and the aggression against Iraq, and the coherence of the alliance that is led by the U.S and contains Arab and Islamic states, the U.S voted in favor of the resolutions of the Security Council No.(672) on 12 October 1990 that condemned the acts of the Zionist occupation that was perpetrated against the worshippers in the Jerusalemite Haram al- Sharif, and No. (673) on 24 October 1990 condemning Israel for refusing to receive the mission of the United Nations and urging it to comply with resolution (672). The most dangerous aspect in the policy of the Bush administration towards Jerusalem was that it laid the cornerstone for the foreign political American conduct towards Jerusalem which is still standing until now due to its position of the negotiations regarding Jerusalem.

e) *During the period of President Bill Clinton (1993-2002)*

During this period the American policy towards Jerusalem was based on the following principles:

- The priority of the Israeli security and the American Israeli strategic alliance above every other issue. This was early evident from the electoral program of the presidential couple Clinton /Gore. It stated "the United States has a basic interest, not only in the security of Israel, but also in the strategic cooperation between our two countries in the Area (*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.83*) thus it is not strange that their electoral program contained plans that spoke of what their administration will do in the event of their victory, "It will fulfill the American commitments towards storing military equipment in Israel, and the enhancement of the logistical cooperation, and strongly support the need of Israel to maintain a qualitative military superiority over any possible alliance among its Arab adversaries" (*Journal of Palestinian studies, Issue 12, autumn of 1992, p. 258*).
- Concentration on the policy of the keeping Jerusalem as a united capital for Israel. The electoral program of Clinton said "Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and must remain a united undivided city, available to people irrespective of their religious beliefs, and the peace that does not take into consideration the security of Israel cannot be always safe" (*Journal of Palestinian studies, Issue 12, autumn of 1992, p. 285*).
- The consideration of the Arab territories that were occupied in 1967 as being disputed territories that are unprotected by their reference framework represented in the Security Council resolution no. (242) 1967. This was considered a dangerous transformation in the American policy in favor of the Zionist entity that was contained in the project of the American administration to be the basis for the declaration of the joint principles that was presented on 30 June 1993 to the Palestinian and the Israeli negotiators. It was apparently adopted as a principle that governed the secret negotiations that were taking place in Oslo between the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators.
- Non-objection of the American administration to the continuation of Israel of building the settlements under the cover of the natural growth of the population of the Zionist Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories, and Jerusalem, in particular, and its responsiveness to the Israeli logic that differentiates between security settlements that are not subject for negotiations or dismantlement, and settlements of political character that can be negotiated about. These terms were the fabrication of Isaac Rabin. But this differentiation was not

entertained by his successor Benjamin Netanyahu due to this reliance on the support of the Bill Clinton administration.

- The verbal declamation of the U.S of the constancy of its position regarding the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the rejection of the policy of the colonial settlement therein though it is keen that the negotiation regarding them be in "correct place" and not in the "wrong place" in the corridors of the United Nations. It is within this meaning that President Clinton responded-in the press conference with the Israeli Prime Minister, Isaac Rabin, on 16 March 1994-to a question around Jerusalem and the settlements. He said "really about the solution of the (question) of Jerusalem, the position of the U.S did not change. But this question must be discussed by the two sides according to the text of the declaration (of principles). It is a matter that has to be settled later. This is what we think should be done"(*Journal of the Palestinian studies, spring, issue 18, 1994*). The attempt to plant a wedge between Jordan and the Palestinians so as to sabotage the Jordanian Palestinian relations by promoting a special Jordanian role represented by giving Jordan the role of guardianship over the holy places in the final status negotiations regarding Jerusalem. Clinton addressed King Hussein before the signing of the declaration of the termination of the state of war between Jordan and Israel. He said: "in the declaration we are going to sign, your role as a guardian to the Islamic holy places, including al-Aqsa Mosque, has been formulated, and Israel has agreed to give the historical Jordanian role the priority regarding the holy places during the final status negotiations"(*Journal of the Palestinian studies, issue 19, 1994 summer, p. 288*). Clinton did not only want to plot between Jordan and Palestine, but also to pass the Israeli scheme. This is what has been contained in the "Jordanian Israeli peace treaty" in its ninth item and the declaration of the end of the state of war in its second item.
- The holy places are the subject of the negotiations and not the eastern part of Jerusalem or Jerusalem as a whole. Every time the negotiating Arab side admits the policy of the fait accompli, the list of Israeli demands increases and the American support for it increases. From negotiating over the whole of Jerusalem, to the eastern part of Jerusalem, to the holy places, to an upper sovereignty and a lower one, as Clinton demanded, on behalf of Israel in the second Camp negotiations.
- Non-exercise of any pressure on Israel under the pretext that this harms the proceeding of the negotiations and cause their complication instead of their felicitation. It is a mission that the American administration views as being tasked to it. Within this meaning was the statement of the former American ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, when he testified before the foreign relations committee of the Senate at the beginning of 1995 on the occasion of his appointment as an ambassador to Israel. He clarified the policy of his country towards Jerusalem as being based on "leaving the parties to solve the issue through negotiations, and not taking any position by his administration that may exclude the U.S from the task of facilitating these negotiations"(*Abu Haleiwa, 2001, p.93*).
- The contradiction of the American political behavior towards the Arab Israeli conflict. The Clinton administration claims, on one side, its keenness not to interfere with that which may undermine the negotiations, whereas it does not hesitate to provide the material, military, political and informational support for the Zionist entity which strengthens its negotiating position and causes it to be more rigid. This flagrant bias to the Israeli side and the duality of the American standards were the subject of a letter that was sent by American Christian personalities to President Clinton on 6 February 1995 that contained their concern from the policy of retreat of his administration from the traditional positions of the U.S regarding Jerusalem. It said: "what concern us is the retreat of the administration from the traditional American position that dictates that east Jerusalem is subject to the Security Council resolution no.(242) relating to the territories that the Israeli army occupied in 1967, and the non-recognition of the administration of the rights and interests of the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the support for these rights, and the non-use of the administration of its immense influence to stop the works of the Israeli construction in east Jerusalem and the continuation of the expansion in the Palestinian territories (*Journal of the Palestinian studies, issue 32, 1995 spring, p. 232*).
- The affirmation of President Clinton of the continuation of his policy that is committed to the Israeli positions regarding the occupied Arab territories and Jerusalem and the strategic alliance with it. In the electoral statement of the democratic party for the American presidential elections, which Clinton ran in it for the second time, the following was stated: "the Democratic Party remains committed to the special and old relationship of America with Israel, a relationship that is based on common values and a mutual commitment to democracy and a beneficial strategic alliance to both countries. The United States must continue its assistance to Israel so as to assure its qualitative superiority, and Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and must remain a united city with easy access to it

by all religions"(*Journal of the Palestinian studies, issue 32, 1995 spring, p. 228*).

- The complete identity of the views of the American administration and the American Congress regarding Jerusalem by the adoption of the Congress of a resolution calling for the transfer of the American embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, and the approval of president Clinton of this resolution keeping to himself the right of the timing of its implementation, whereas the previous administrations viewed the demands of members of the American Congress in moving the American embassy to Jerusalem as prejudicial to the American vital interests in the Arab region, and constitutes a useless provocation for the Arabs, and burdens the friends of America, and strengthens the position of their common enemies, especially since other states expressed their wish to take such step but have backed from it as a result of the Arab official reaction that was contained in the joint Iraqi Saudi communiqué in 1974. The joint Iraqi Saudi communiqué threatened to sever the diplomatic relations with any state that transfers its embassy to Tel-Aviv. This led not only to the retreat of Spain from its decision, but caused other states with embassies in Jerusalem to move them to Tel-Aviv while other states opted not to transfer their embassies to Jerusalem. The American Congress, in both its houses, was sterner in its positions than the American administrations regarding Jerusalem. On 3 February 1995 the members of the American senate sent a letter to the then American Secretary of state, Warren Christopher, that contained their support for the policy of Israel in keeping Jerusalem united and capital for Israel and called for the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem. They said that they took four resolutions in this regard during the past decade. They said that it should not be subject to negotiation. The same positions were contained in a similar letter sent by the House of Representatives to Warren Christopher. Senator Dole, the majority leader in the Senate proposed on 5 September 1995 the opening of the American embassy in Jerusalem on 31 May 1999 at the latest. He called for not disbursing more than 50% of the budget of the American Department of State for the financial year 1999 except after an assurance of the official opening of the American embassy in Jerusalem. He assigned one hundred million dollars to cover the cost of the construction of the embassy in Jerusalem. President Clinton invoked the necessities of the American vital interests and did not use his presidential veto against the resolution of the Senate stating his personal position of his personal friendship to Israel. Thus there was no difference between the position
- of the President and the Senate. The difference was in the timing only. The same took place in the identical resolution of the American House of Representative in this respect that passed with a majority of (406) votes against (17) stating that Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel.
- The identity of views between the Republican and the Democratic parties regarding Jerusalem as shown by the afore-mentioned two resolutions. Though there were a minority that opposed these orientations and projects, yet it was ineffective in facing the pro Israel flood. Though no American administration ventured in transferring the embassy for fear of an Arab and an Islamic reaction, the present circumstances of the Arab, Islamic, regional and international situations will not cause the Arab and Islamic sides to do anything that may stop the implementation of the American decision if the President decided to comply with the Dole project. Clinton was more hurtful in this position towards the Arabs than any other American president. This was evident in the second Camp David negotiations that he sponsored during the last stage of his second presidency. He exercised all his pressures against Late Chairman Yasser Arafat to accept a settlement that gives him a state let, and ends the problem of the refugees and their right to return or compensation, and keeps Jerusalem as the united and eternal capital for Israel with a symbolic and nominal sovereignty for the promised Palestinian state over the Jerusalemite Haram al-Sharif, in return for an Israeli subterranean sovereignty on it, and the end of al-Aqsa liberating uprising. When Arafat refused to comply with the conditions of the American Israeli peace, Clinton blamed him for being responsible for the failure of the negotiations exonerating Ehud Barak and trying to incite the Arab leaderships against him. The policy of Clinton in the United Nations witnessed a dangerous turn that was represented in its consideration of the occupied Arab territories as being disputed territories, and that Jerusalem is not an occupied city. Thus it voted against so many United Nations resolutions and focused on the exclusion of the United Nations and its organs (the General Assembly, the Security Council and UNESCO) from dealing with the Arab Israeli conflict and its core causes, Palestine and Jerusalem, as being the monopoly of the U.S. This dangerous transformation was evident when the U.S. abstained from voting on the paragraphs that were in the preamble of Security Council resolution no.(904) on 18 March 1994 relating to the condemnation of the massacre of the Haram al-Ibrahimi in al-Khalil (Hebron) on 25 February 1994 due to the mention of Jerusalem, which the American administration feared that it may be

interpreted linguistically as being sovereignty (*Al-faari, 1995, p. 211*). The same reasoning was made regarding Security Council resolution of 17 May 1995, relating to the condemnation of Israel for its confiscation of the land of the French Hill in the eastern part of Jerusalem. Madeline Albright said "we did not vote against the decision because we support the confiscation of Israel of the lands of Jerusalem. But because the council sought to voice an opinion regarding the final status of Jerusalem, while this is to be determined in the negotiations between the parties concerned with the issue" (*al-Hyatt newspaper, 15 March 1997*), the U.S absented itself from the process of voting regarding Security Council resolution no.(1073) of 28 September 1996 relating to the events that took place following the opening of the tunnel beside al-Aqsa mosque. The rest of the fourteen members of the Security Council supported the resolution. The U.S used its veto twice in the Security Council against the first Security Council draft resolutions on 8 March 1992 and the second on 22 March 1997 that condemned the continuation of the Israeli occupation authorities in the judaization of Jerusalem and the construction of more settlements in and around it, like AbuGhneim Mountain. It did not suffice itself to vote against the two draft resolutions but stressed the necessity of the non-interference of the United Nations in matters that are none of its business or involve itself in the bilateral negotiations between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel. The same was true in the General Assembly though some flexibility was shown by the U.S regarding some General Assembly resolutions since these do not limit the Israeli judaization activates in Jerusalem and their non-binding nature as it and Israel view them. The positions of the Clinton administration regarding the occupied Arab territories in Palestine and Jerusalem can be summarized as follows:

- Opposition to the inclusion of Jerusalem in resolution (242) and its consideration as disputed territory not an occupied one. The sovereignty over it is being decided in the negotiations, and not within the framework of the institutions of the legitimacy or on the basis on its resolutions.
- The retreat of the American position regarding the Israeli colonial settlement policy and the call for their dismantlement from being illegal and illegitimate to considering them as an impediment to peace.
- The non-application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Arab territories that were occupied in 1967, or on Jerusalem since the Clinton administration does not consider them occupied territories.

f) *During the period of the second George Bush (2002-2008)*

The policy of George Bush was the same in favor of the American vital interest and its strategic ally with Israel. The Bush administration in its first term sought to avoid involving itself in the negotiations leaving the weaker party, the Palestinians, at the mercy of the Israeli military machine and the Israeli negotiators. It refused to intervene in the negotiations saying that the will to peace must come from the two parties to the conflict hoping that the Palestinian side will submit to the wishes of the Israeli negotiator.

But the second Palestinian uprising confused the American and the Israeli calculations. It forced the administration of Bush to abandon the policy of wait and see. It opposed the resolution of the Security Council that decided to send a committee headed by the professor of the international law, Richard Falk, to investigate the massacres that Sharon has committed in the occupied Arab territories, and the sending of international observers to protect the Arab Palestinian people from the total and systematic war of annihilation that was waged by the Israeli forces of occupation to put down the intifada (uprising). Accordingly, the Bush administration was unable to resist the will of the international community. Instead, it sought to circumvent the Security Council resolution by activating a committee head by senator George Mitchell and the membership of a former president of Turkey, and the foreign minister of Norway, and a former American senator and the responsible of the foreign and security policy in the European union in order to marginalize the efforts of the United Nations and its committee that is chaired by Falk. The Mitchell committee was defined as "fact-finding committee" and was formed by former president Bill Clinton after consultations with Israel, the Palestinian authority, and Egypt, the United Nations, and the European Union, as stated by the concluding statement of president Clinton on 17 October 2000 at the "the Middle East conference for peace" at Sharm al-Shaikh in which he determined the mandate of that committee of fact finding regarding the current events in the Palestinian territories and how to prevent their recurrence. He was referring of course to the renewal of the second Palestinian uprising that was ignited by the Arab Palestinian people after the breaking of the courtyard of the Jerusalemite Haram by the war criminal Sharon under the protection of more than three thousand armed Israeli soldiers.

Accordingly, the Mitchell committee was formed to suppress al-Aqsa uprising and save Israel from its colonial policies. He said that the committee must not assign blame but only to determine what has taken place. The committee concluded its report with the following:

- A meaningful pacification period.

- Condemnation of the acts of violence and the necessity of stopping it.
- The commitment of the Israeli government that its army will use untypical responses against unarmed demonstrations.
- The Palestinian National Authority undertakes the prevention of the armed persons from using the Palestinian populated areas to fire on Israeli populated areas and the positions of the Israeli defense army. This means that the P.N.A. will take charge of guarding the Israeli settlements amidst the Palestinians, and the Israeli occupation forces.
- The Israeli government commits to lifting the closures. The committee used the word closure instead of blockade, so as to mislead the world public opinion.
- The Israeli government undertakes to transfer the due taxes yields to the P.N.A., and allows the Palestinians to return to their jobs in Israel. Thus the cause of the Palestinian people and his uprising was- in the view of the Mitchell committee-one of material rights and humanitarian nature and not one of national liberation.
- The Israeli government undertakes that its security forces and the settlements will not destroy the Palestinian properties.
- The Israeli response to the recommendations of the Mitchell committee were as follows:
 - Absolute rejection of the freezing of the construction in the settlements.
 - Stressing that the struggle with the Palestinians is an armed struggle and not a civil uprising.
 - The demand from the Palestinian side to observe an immediate unconditional ceasefire.
 - A week long period of pacification.
 - Confidence building measures.
 - Resumption of the political deliberations.

g) During the period of president Barrack Obama (2008-until the present):

He started to follow an American Middle Eastern policy that seemed at first to be different to that of his predecessor Bush. He appointed the American senator- of Arab Lebanese origins- as his special envoy to the Middle East to discuss the opportunities of arriving at a settlement on the basis of Security Council resolutions no.242/1967 and 334/1973 and the Arab peace initiative of 2002. President Obama prepared this by receiving a number of the Arab leaders -with the Jordanian monarch king Abdullah II in their forefront-, followed by the Saudi king, the Egyptian president, and the prime minister of Israel.

The Jordanian monarch (King Abdulla II), in all his meetings with the American, the Israeli and European officials, used to tempt Israel with relations with Arab and Islamic states if it agrees to the

establishment of a viable Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. This effort which the Jordanian monarch carried with him to Washington met with inclination by the Obama administration. Accordingly, Obama decided to re-consider the American Middle Eastern policy. He started by two visits to the area. The first was to Turkey the ally and member of the NATO Alliance and a pivotal one in the Islamic world, whereas the second was to Cairo, the pivotal state in the Arab world. In his reference to the Middle East during his visit to Turkey he stressed that the United States strongly supports the objective of the existence of the two states, Israel and Palestine that live alongside each other in peace and security. As for the speech of president Obama in the University of Cairo which was directed to both the Arab and the Islamic world. The speech combined flexibility and sternness in some issues on one side, and hope and implicit threats, on the other side.

As for Jerusalem, it came within what He called the issue of the Palestinian Israeli conflict "which came second to the issue of extremism and terrorism. What was ironic is that he started his talk about this question with the persecution that the Jews suffered from in Europe and caused more than six million victims as being an absolute fact, whereas the ordeal of the Palestinian people, which is continuing for six decades, was not referred to except in his (the Palestinian people) search for a state. He stated "that the relations between America and Israel are historical ones, and that Jews were persecuted and more than six million Jew were killed, the denial of this fact is without any foundation, that the Palestinian people has suffered the ordeal of the search for a homeland all over sixty years and many camps in Gaza suffer from the circumstances of the occupation and America will not look the other way from the rights of the Palestinian people to obtain an independent state. The solution lies in our working to find two states. The Palestinians must renounce violence that will not lead us to solutions. Hamas has support in achieving the dreams of the Palestinians. The Israelis must recognize the right of the Palestinians in existence. America will not accept the Israeli policy of settlement. The Arab states must help the Palestinian people to develop their institutions. America cannot impose the peace. Jerusalem must be the home to all religions"(The speech of president Obama before the Turkish parliament on 6 April 2009/the white house/the office of the press secretary).

Though he talked about the solution of the two states, he did not refer to Jerusalem except one time in its consideration as a home for all religions, this is consistent with the Israeli view which shows no flexibility regarding Jerusalem except as it relates to the holy places which it does not object to them being placed under international supervision in which the followers of these religions are represented.

Nonetheless, this ambiguous formulation represents a retreat by Obama from his speech before the American Jewish organization, which Jerusalem will remain the united and eternal capital of Israel. He did not refer at all to the eastern part of Jerusalem as a capital to the expected Palestinian state. No objective assessment of the policy of president Obama towards Jerusalem can claim that it went beyond the familiar. It is just statements and road maps which soon wither away. No hope for a viable Palestinian state, and no stopping of the colonization. Nothing in the horizon points to the abandonment of Israel of its aggressive expansionist policies which caused the P.N.A. to think of dissolving itself so as to lay bare the Israeli occupation and cause it to shoulder the burden of the resulting developments, in addition to forcing Israel to fulfill its obligations towards the Arab Palestinian people, which it occupies its land, according to the provisions of the international law and the international humanitarian law and the four Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, especially the fourth one, and paragraph three of the charter of the United Nations stipulated the right of the peoples to self-determination.

VI. THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS JERUSALEM

The Arab Israeli policy of the U.S, including Jerusalem, will remain now and in the future dependent on the echo of that policy unto the two parties of the Israeli Palestinian conflict and the extent of their responsiveness to the American policy. The Arab states attach great hope on an active and an effective American role to settle the Arab Israeli conflict on the basis of the resolutions of the international legitimacy, which the U.S contributed to their making-especially resolutions (242) and (338) of the Security Council, and the relevant General Assembly Resolutions-the most important of which are resolutions (181) and (194) On the other hand, Israel bets on an American role that is always to its interest, and an American policy whose contents are the Israeli views of the struggle and its settlement. It is completely right in this connection. The successive American administrations only saw the Israeli interests in the quantity and the manner that Israel wants. This is evidenced by the plan of Secretary Powell, the mission of general zinnia and the admission of president Obama of his failure to convince Israel to freeze the settlement in the West Bank, without Jerusalem, despite the inducements he offered to Israel, the most dangerous of which is to provide it with (20) F 35 fighter jets and its insistence not to respond to the demand of the American administration that the government of Netanyahu submits its vision for its borders and the borders of the future Palestinian state. All of these are evidences that the successive Republican and Democratic American administrations

do not care except for Israel and its security and its permanence. Here one is faced with a tragic tableau that it is drawn by the three sides: the Arabs and Israel and America each in his own way. The moaning of the Arabs over an American role, and the Israeli disdain and plundering of the Palestinian blood and scorn of the international legitimacy, the blind unconditional American adoption of the Israeli vision and policies. General Colin Powell called in a speech to the revival of the resolutions (242,338) and the restoration of the spirit of Madrid in an area where there exists two states: Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders. The settlement activities must cease, and the occupation must stop and cannot be stopped except through negotiations. The future of Jerusalem, in Powell's view, represents a challenge that the two sides must search for a solution to the problem of the Palestinians that is just and realistic at the same time"(The London Times newspaper, 9 March 2002).

The Colin Powell plan, as seen by Avneri in its skeleton, is based on the following principles:

- The peace that is based on two states: Palestine and Israel. When Powell talks about Palestine he means a solution with two states avoiding ambiguous terms that are less committing like the Palestinian state. The point of reference in drawing the borders of the two states are:
 - The borders are based on the Security Council resolutions (242) and (338) with the emphasis by Avneri that (242) forbids states from possessing territories by force.
 - The occupation must end and a limit must be put to the suffering of the Palestinian people.
 - Stopping the settlement activities, whether building new settlements or expanding the existing ones.
 - The ability of the coming Palestinian state to survival, not a group of pockets as the view of Barak and Sharon, but a complete continuous state with a strong economic foundation that is guaranteed by America.
 - Recognition of the Palestinians of the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state.
 - Lack of clarity regarding Jerusalem. He did not say frankly that Jerusalem will be the capital of the two Palestinian and Israeli states, though he said that the religious and national interests of the two parties must be taken into account, and the defense of the religious affairs of the Jews and the Christians and the Muslims the world over. But, according to Avneri, the conclusion is quite clear, that it should be a capital for the two states.

According to Avneri, the Powell plan would not have appeared if it were not for the second uprising. Avneri saw the plan as responsive to the ambitions of the Arab Palestinian people, and similar to a large degree to the principles of the "Israeli peace movement".

The future of the awaited Palestinian state, and Jerusalem as its capital, is bound by directing the pressure towards Israel. Israel is the tool of pressure on America to change its position in favor of a just durable and comprehensive peace, and not vice versa.

VII. CONCLUSION

It is possible to summarize the American policy towards Israel-since the creation of the Zionist entity and until now-as follows:

- the siding of the U.S with the Zionist Jewish vision is not connected with the vital American interests in the Arab homeland and the role of its strategic ally Israel in the American regional strategy, or internal reasons relating to the capabilities of the Zionist Jewish lobby, but also the complete intellectual and ideological identity between the Zionist Judaism and the fundamental Christianity. The variations between the positions and policies of the American Department of State and those of the American administrations in the following decades. The differences were not related to the goal, but to the political mechanisms.
- The policy of the U.S towards Israel was based on the principle of the strategic alliance, whereas the Israeli American policy was, and still is, based on the theory of the depletion (using up) of the American administrations by throwing them after they realize its objectives. This is evidenced in the recent history. President Bush (the first) and Richard Nixon allowed the exhaustion of their roles and were thus deposed, while Bill Clinton and George Bush (the son) proved to Israel and the Jewish lobby that they still has more to give to the Zionist entity.
- The American position and policy towards Jerusalem is governed by the Israeli position regarding Jerusalem which is: Jerusalem is a united and eternal capital for Israel.
- The verbal support for the legislations of the international legitimacy and the following of the policy of the double standards.
- The discrepancy of American positions and voting record on the resolutions of the international legitimacy, abstention mostly, supporting rarely, opposition a lot. This was caused by the international variables, and keeping the Arab official position deceived by the trick of the honest American mediator.
- Transferring the Palestinian cause and Jerusalem from the United Nations towards bilateral tracks and banning anyone from approaching it without the measure the America decides so as to devoid the Palestinian cause from its Arab, Islamic and international dimensions and dismantle the question into urgent and postponed ones.
- Cancellation of the resolutions that do not agree with the Israeli vision like General Assembly resolution no.3379 of 16 October 1975 that considered Zionism a form of racism.
- The adoption of president Obama of a different approach from most of his predecessors in searching for a settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict. He did not start from square one, but from the thesis of George Bush (the son) of the road map of the two states solution which was accepted by the two parties to the conflict: the Palestinian and the Israeli, though the latter accepted it tactically working in all means to devoid it of its content in practice. But the dreams of Obama went with the wind when he informed the Palestinian side of the failure of his efforts to persuade Israel to freeze the settlement activity for a second period of three months, without including Jerusalem, despite all temptations to the Netanyahu government who refused to respond to the demand of the American president to submit a map for the borders of his state and the Palestinian state, contrary to the Palestinian side which responded to the American demand immediately.
- The future of the "two states solution", and the eastern part of Jerusalem as its capital, as viewed by the Arab side, including the Palestinians, is conditioned on two decisive basic factors:
- *The first:* A pressuring Arab will where pressure must be. No question that cause concern to the U.S, with its successive Administrations, than the security and future of Israel, in addition to the oil. The U.S knows that there is no future for Israel except through integrating it into the Arab and Islamic surroundings which king Abdullah II -with Arab support-tries to market unto the Israelis and the Americans. It received the appreciation and acceptance of the American administration, but faced repulse from the Israeli side. But who will force Israel to its luck? As narrated by the former American president Richard Nixon. The only American president who can achieve this is the one that puts the higher American interests above the interests of its ally Israel. This calls for giving up the Jewish problem as being an internal question. It also means that such president must be ready beforehand to venture into not being re-elected for a second term. But where is he? Do we hope that we shall someday see that anticipated president?
- *The second:* The possession of the Arabs of the ability and the will to give up the dreams and the policy of begging, in favor of self-reliance and the potential energies that they possess and the giving up of their leaders of "peace as a strategic option" through involving their peoples in the existentialist Arab Israeli conflict.

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