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## National-Identitarian Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Putin, Trump, Orbán, and Bolsonaro's Reactionary Agendas

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A modern nation believes in its race, a greatly mistaken belief, however, especially [...] where all known populations [...] are evidently the outcome of innumerable and recent cross-breeding [...] for many, race creates nationality [...]. However, all these [...] sophisms of political interest are produced by an essential fact of which they are a translation: new races have formed within modern nations. [...] This process is so important that it has given rise to an exaggerated theory [...]. In short, because the nation creates the race, it was believed that the race creates the nation. Beliefs were thus simply extended to the whole people, beliefs that until then had been reserved for the divine races of kings, the blessed races of nobles, the castes that had to keep their blood pure, to the point of promoting blood marriage to guarantee it. [...] They almost always have the illusion of being the best in the world. [...] Even the smallest nations can't escape this. [...] They are heirs to the prejudices of the ancient clans, tribes, parishes and provinces, because they have become the

corresponding social units and constitute the individualities of a collective character.<sup>1</sup>

(Marcel Mauss comments after the end of the First World War)

## I. INTRODUCTION

According to Marcel Mauss' classification of societies<sup>2</sup>, nations are those whose members are characterized by the establishment of direct reciprocities between each one and the group as a whole, regardless of their differentiations and respective other groups of possible collective belonging (Mauss, 2013, p. 70-79).

As self-centred societies, widespread integration entails both the individuation of its members and that of the entire encompassing group, which becomes the bearer of a specific (national) cultural character, as nations are culturally equivalent to *collective individuals*: outside of national integration “[...] none of the large groups was characteristic of a given society” (Mauss, 2013, p. 81, emphasis added). General trust underpins the nation in all its social relations, including “[...] also the notion, inherent in currency, that all the citizens of a state form a unit in which there is even a belief in national credit, a credit in which the other countries trust to the same extent that they trust this unit [...]” (Mauss, 2013, p. 77).

As a self-conscious society, the nation would contain amid its integrative generalization a dynamic conducive to the identification between individual and citizen, and between homeland and state: “This local, moral and legal unity is expressed in the collective spirit by the idea of homeland, on the one hand, and that of citizen, on the other. The notion of homeland symbolizes the totality of rights [...] that the member of that nation has in correlation with the duties that must be fulfilled” (Mauss, 2013, p. 79).

Nations would move towards democratic institutionalization (converting individuals into citizens

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<sup>1</sup> Translated by the author (Mauss, 2013, p. 82-83, 86-87).

<sup>2</sup> Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) classified societies into increasing levels of social integration: the polysegmentary of closed articulated groups; the tribal which synthesizes family clans; the dynastic or kingdom whose diffuse integration depends on an extrinsic central power; and the national or nation whose generalized integration does not require internal differences (Mauss, 2013, p. 63-70).

and not just patriots) as national integration – the standardization of individuals by the state (mainly the legal form) – would only reach its fullness through parliamentary democracy, which would be fundamental to enabling the state, adhered to by individuals, to become an instrument of the nation. Citizenship would consist of the user exercise of the state by national individuals whose unity comes from the “[...] idea that the best administration of things is that of those concerned” (Mauss, 2013, p. 293).

The process that leads to relative internal standardization also leads to external cultural diversity. The national (uniform) and the international (diverse) overlap: “All this means that the way a Frenchman walks is less like the way an Englishman walks than the way an Algonquin walks is like a Californian Indian” (Mauss, 2013, p. 81).

The intrinsic diversity of internationality (relations between nations) would not tend towards wars – due to occasional highlights of the modern tendency to unify individuals without intranational distinctions (Mauss, 2013, p. 77) – but towards the international channelling of the same integrative dynamic in which national societies emerge. Hence, the generalized social integration of Modernity is internationalized by what Mauss had called cultural “loans” between different societies through the expansion of means of transport and communication (Mauss, 2013, p. 120-128); “pacts” through regional blocs (foreshadowed by Mauss) for varied synergies between nations (Mauss, 2013, p. 138-139). 120-128); and reciprocal “gifts” to citizens from other nationalities, including in the modern circulation of tourism (Mauss, 2013, p. 183-184).

Since nations, according to the Maussian classification, are societies founded on direct reciprocities between the social whole and each member, *regardless of their individual differences*, they are susceptible to monolithic interpretations that not only disregard them, but even reject their internal differentiation. It is from this analytical perspective that this essay presupposes the ideological positions of the Far Right, as conceptions arising from monolithic interpretations of nations that thus repel or reject citizenship to the individual and collective differences that are incongruous with monolithic national ideals.

## II. POLITICAL NEGATIONISM OF NATIONAL DIVERSITY

In ideological terms, positions on the right of the political spectrum are counterpoints to the binomial between freedom and equality of modern citizenship, in a broad sense and strictly opposed to egalitarian values. They make up conservative ideological tendencies for which the inherent social need for collective order is a countervailing parameter for

moderating, conditioning or rejecting liberal and/or egalitarian values (Bobbio, 1993; Scheeffer, 2014).

Ideological conservatives oppose, in particular, freedom of individual choice and equal social opportunities, from minimal to extreme degrees, the more moderate (center-right), reactive (right) or exclusionary (Far-right) depending on the intensity of their opposition to both values and adherence to the political criterion of the collective order. Their degree of conservatism also defines, respectively, how much they adhere to inequality in general (political, economic or social) as an ideological value, from its admission (by the more centrist expressions) to its promotion (by the more extremist expressions) by the state (Bobbio, 1993; Scheeffer, 2014).

While the extreme left suppresses freedom in order to promote equality (opposing both modern values), the extreme right rejects freedom – especially individual freedom – in order to ban equality, particularly in terms of social opportunities (Bobbio, 1993; Scheeffer, 2014). It is contained within the Far-right or reactionary right, but consists of a Far-right degree that refuses to take part in the democratic process. It is the most radical position on the right-wing spectrum, to the extent that it is so reactionary that it ceases to be merely conservative and goes further by challenging democratic rules. This supremacist stance, both external and internal to the nation as a society, characterized its fascist versions (Mussolini, 1938) – with the Aryan racial hierarchy standing out (Hitler, 1933) – and other totalitarian Francoist (Rother, 2005) and Salazarist (Rosas, 2001; Martinho *et al.*, 2013) versions.

Analyses of the Far-right, as reactionary positions that *compete in the democratic arena*, that have emerged since the end of the 20th century (with a political rise in the first two decades of the 21st century) have a consensus in the literature that they are *democratic vehicles for authoritarian values*, rooted on monolithic national identities. They don't have state models, like the authoritarian right-wing regimes that preceded them, still they are movements that vocalize, electorally, public policies against the permeabilization of their respective nations to specific segments that they consider incompatible through authoritarian interpretations of national traditions. There is also consensus that these are political reactions to the expansion of national citizenship in the face of ongoing globalization (Vieten and Poynting, 2016; Burni, 2018).

In light of this perspective, a joint declaration by several ultra-conservative European political parties explicitly called for an immediate halt to the European integration that has already been achieved, pushing for a progressive retreat, particularly of any new forms of social life based on supranational legality, understood as a form of annulment of national traditions in general (Le Pen, 2021). The initiative brought together the

political parties *Rassemblement National* (France), *Lega Norte* (Italy), *Fratelli d'Italia* (Italy), *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Poland), *Fidesz* (Hungary), *Vox* (Spain), *Freiheitlich Partei Österreichs* (Austria), *Vlaams Belang* (Belgium), *Dansk Folkeparti* (Denmark), *Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond* (Estonia), *Perussuomalaiset* (Finland), *Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija* (Lithuania), *Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat* (Romania), *Ellinikí Lýsi* (Greece), *Bălgarsko nacionalno dviženie* (Bulgaria) and *Ja21* (Netherlands).

The literature on the new Far-right, as some of its leaders have been elected, still differs in terms of the institutional role they have taken on in parliamentary democracies. Analysts have labelled their governments (and democratic regimes, possibly reformed) as Illiberal – adopting the self-identification proposed by Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, who emphasizes popular sovereignty that is inflexible to the values of individuality and pluralism (Goes, 2013; Burzogány, 2017), from which sometimes they use the concept (as traditional as it is questioned in Political Science) of Populists, due to the political questioning of the populations against public institutions (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Vieten and Poynting, 2016; Burni, 2018) or they designate them as Caesareans, emphasizing the charismatic aspect by which the government is personalized, including functionally, by a personal leadership that hovers over the political class in general (Sata and Karolewsky, 2020).

Evidently, all three aspects are relevant and still require at least a synthesis to characterize their relationship with modern democracy. From an objective point of view, since these are democratic formulations of public policies that selectively exclude citizenship – both freedom of individual choice and egalitarian social opportunities (already enjoyed or only considered) – from culturally differentiated segments of national populations also makes it possible to identify their ideological orientations more precisely today.

These political orientations that exclude differences in national unity include the Asian governments of Putin (Russia), Duterte (Philippines), Erdogan (Turkey), Netanyahu (Israel) and Modi (India); the European governments of Orbán (Hungary), Johnson (UK, at least until the Covid-19 pandemic) and Duda/Kaczynski (Poland); the African governments of Sisi (Egypt); and the American governments of Trump (USA) and Bolsonaro (Brazil).

In that regard, the following contents (which inspire the new right-wing reactionary militancy) and the corresponding ideological forms (which delineate their militant activity) can be detected in the emerging selectively exclusionary political tendencies of citizens in parliamentary democracies:

1) *Ideological Content*: They are Far-right-wing deniers of the national diversity of populations in two

aspects: on the one hand, by not recognizing distinct population realities within nations; and on the other, by repressing internal ways of life that differ from majorities or traditions. Their normative ideal is of nations that are so culturally monolithic and immune, particularly to globalization, that they only admit homogeneous and traditional ways of life, whose cultural supremacy<sup>3</sup> is politically guaranteed through the systematic political and social denial of morally alternative ways of life in any social aspect (including economic).

In this respect, the new Far-right consists of politically militant moralism in favor of conservative customs aimed at the supremacy of certain national segments over others, in all aspects of the population. It contains proposals that exclude individuals from citizenship who differ from conservative moral normality:

- Civil rights for immigrants, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals and adherents to traditional customs (including religious customs), non-traditional to the nations where they are located;
- Social rights for women, subordinate workers, those with specific bodily disabilities or social vulnerabilities, and those who are ethnically and/or genetically diverse, especially when they are minorities.

Therefore, its ideological bias (negating national diversity) discriminates in a discriminatory manner its nation, establishing a population division between national individuals that grants supremacy, even if unofficially, over all others national segments that differ from them, converting their individual differences into social vulnerabilities.

2) *Ideological Patterns*: By denying the social reality of cultural diversity, their militant denialism has also specialized in the anti-scientific denial of facts in general. In this process, the social-political militancy of the new Far-right results in the following corresponding negative externalities in the nations where it has developed:


- 2.1) Routine broadcasting of lies about different segments of the population (including their political opponents on the ideological spectrum), or facts related to them as a type of political persuasion that does not require public debate;
- 2.2) Institutional constraints, if not reduction, of the mechanisms established for public transparency and corresponding governmental accountability in an effort to block external controls of the government, making it immune to legal counter-powers;

<sup>3</sup> Culture, as currently understood in anthropology, has strict and broad meanings. In the first case, it relates to symbolizations formulated by human experience; in the second case, it implies specific ways of life within populations (Lopes, 2019, p. 17-50).

2.3) The spread of perverse reinterpretations of the modern value of freedom, reconvertng it into its opposite and postulating individual freedoms to oppress in order to: expose intimacies, slander crimes, attack with insults or physical violence and, eventually, even to contaminate others with diseases whose contagion is the subject of health measures. By legitimizing the daily oppression of individuals who are different from them or their ideological opponents, it contributes to making the common sense of the nations in which it operates morally chaotic, to say the least.

These ideological patterns also characterize a strategic peculiarity of the new Far-right: they are political movements that reform modern democracies. Their authoritarian reformism – the progressive introduction of reforms, both institutional and moral, which gradually reduce the scope of citizenship for individuals different from their conservative moral standards – is an innovative political option whose effectiveness has been relevant. By setting up democracies that are contrary to citizenship, both are, although they remain precarious.

The following diagram summarizes the ideological characteristics of the new Far-right:



Source: Prepared by the author.

Figure 1: Characteristics of the new Far-right.

These national-identitarian right-wingers are reactionary because, despite proposing to reform their national democracies, their focal point is exclusion and not mere moderation of the rights – civil, political and social – of modern citizenship (Marshall, 1967) towards nationally differentiated individuals. They instrumentalize public institutions, which they intend to reform in order to make them insensitive to diverse segments of the population and to the emerging Global Law (Badin, Brito and Ventura, 2016), which tends to be humanitarian.

### III. CASE ANALYSIS: POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF PUTIN, TRUMP, ORBÁN AND BOLSONARO

Given the current profusion of relevant political experiences of cultural reactionism, their ideological characterizations are also verified by the following four cases of authoritarian reformism for internal cultural supremacists:

#### Russian Neo-Eurasianism

And I'll say it again: in all the European countries and in Russia, there is a big population problem [...]. A demographic problem. The birth rate is very low. Europeans are dying. You don't understand that, do you? Homosexual marriage doesn't produce children (Vladimir Putin on Apr. 28, 2016)<sup>4</sup>.

Vladimir Putin's political leadership (since 2000) has combined two Russian identity doctrines: 19<sup>th</sup>-century Pan-Slavism (which attributes to Russians the leadership of Slavic populations in general) and 1920s Eurasianism (which attributes common ethnicity to Slavs

and Turkmen), under Russian leadership legitimized even for military interventions (in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014) of Eurasian regional control (Ferreira and Terrenas, 2016)<sup>5</sup>.

Such identity evocations permeate both the rhetoric (Putin, 2020) and the political organization – erected by reforms followed by the post-Soviet Constitution of 1993 – in which formal and informal regulations, according to the vertical *vlasti* principle (verticalization of powers), were progressively superimposed on the emerging parliamentary democracy and market economy: namely by conspicuous favouritism to the ruling party (systemic electoral irregularities, including banning opposing candidacies) and business oligopolies (discriminatory access to energy sources and public finances – mainly natural gas) allied with minority non-state media apparatuses (Schpuy, 2013).

This institutional tunnelling, which promotes adherence to the government as a patriotic imperative, is based on a reformulated Russian identity with a clear homophobic connotation that extends to the minority human conditions of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, transvestites, queers, intersexuals and asexuals (LGBTQIA+). The daily stigmatization of these Russian minorities is still justified by fundamentalist interpretations of Orthodox Christianity – whose dissemination is one of the main programmatic topics of the United Russia (government) party and conceived as

<sup>5</sup> On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine during the latter's negotiations to join the European Union. This violation of Ukrainian self-determination was condemned by the United Nations General Assembly, however, without the intervention of the Security Council, which is also integrated by Russia and whose decisions depend on unanimity (author's note).

<sup>4</sup> Excerpt from the speech of the President of the United States of America (Morris and Treitler, 2019).

an inherently Russian tradition – in laws that equate them with paedophilia and public indecency (Rubbi, Batista and Freitas, 2017).

In conclusion, under Putin's formal leadership, for several government mandates, the Russian nation has been the object of public policies that are systematically as negative as they are discriminatory against groups and individuals that are divergent from the monolithic Neo-Eurasian normative ideal.

#### *North-American Neo-Nativism*

When Mexico sends its people. It doesn't send the best. It doesn't send them to you. They're sending people with lots of problems. They're bringing drugs, they're bringing crime, they're rapists and some I suppose are good people, but I talk to border guards and that's common sense (Donald Trump on Jun. 16, 2015)<sup>6</sup>.

Donald Trump's presidential leadership (2017 to 2020) has radicalized "nativist" interpretations – since their national immigration genesis (Glazer, 1988) – which on the one hand emphasized English, Scottish and Irish pioneers (as white as they are of Protestant religious traditions), and on the other they reject the ethnic diversification that was brought by the influx of Latin American and Asian migrants – exponentially accelerated since the 2000s – whose prospect of a non-white majority in the nation in 2044 (according to the American Statistical Institute) has reshaped and intensified the polarization between its main parties.

While Democrats have become the preferred choice of diverse and growing segments, Republicans have called for "American authenticity", driving new extremist movements from within (Tea Party) and outside (Birther) the party, already under President Obama (Levitsky and Zibblatt, 2018).

Although immigration was mainly legal (77%) and vital to the national future (17% of the economically active population) in 2017 – as Americans usually classify themselves as white, Asian, Latino (or Hispanic) and black (Morris and Treitler, 2019) – the immigrant origin is made up of Latin Americans and Caribbeans (50%), Asians (27%) and blacks (9%) altered the (traditional) "racial state" of the nation (Radford, 2020).

In addition to stricter immigration restrictions, the Trump administration has made the cuts ever in business taxes and environmental regulations. Banned from the social media site Twitter<sup>7</sup> after 26,000 insults, including slander against opponents or the dissemination of non-existent facts, under his mandate most Republicans began to use only one source of journalistic information (Fox News) and distrust scientists in general (Dimoch and Gramlich, 2020).

The Supreme Court becomes more susceptible to interpretations that exclude citizenship for immigrants

and sexual minorities, his widespread approval only declined from 45% to 29% at the end of 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic (denied in its social relevance) was already causing 600,000 deaths and the recessive interruption of economic expansion, that was consistent since the Obama administration. His latest fake news (of alleged electoral fraud, which has not been indicted) did not prevent his political defeat, in which the popular support was decisive (55%) among white voters for the anti-racist protests over the police murder of George Floyd (Dimoch and Gramlich, 2020)<sup>8</sup>.

In conclusion, during Donald Trump's first mandate (2017-2020), consistent public policies have been formulated and implemented as measures against the national diversification of the United States, which contrast with the neo-nativist monolithic national ideal.

#### *Hungarian Neo-Crusadism*

Today it is written in the book of destiny that hidden and faceless world powers will eliminate everything that is unique, autonomous, millenary and national. They will come to mix cultures, religions and populations until our multifaceted and proud Europe can finally be taken over meekly and without bloodshed (Viktor Orbán on Mar. 15, 2016)<sup>9</sup>.

Viktor Orbán's government (which began in 2010) made it its governmental objective (enshrined in the Hungarian Constitution, reformed in 2011) to promote a medieval interpretation of Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox religious traditions, in order to reunite them (unlike the current papal ecumenism) against all merely different cultural expressions, especially Islamic or LGBTQIA+. In that regard, referencing the medieval King (St.) Stephen, Orbán directly undertook the renovation of 3,000 and the construction of 130 new churches, providing them with various public services, such as family leisure and education, including the compulsory teaching of Christianity (from the conservative perspective officially declared) in public schools (Novák, 2021).

The government's aversion to immigration has not been limited to the helplessness of possible immigrants, which is exemplified in the cases of refugees from foreign calamities, who are often victims of Hungarian citizens encouraged by official migratory hatred and also by building two border walls (2015 and 2016). It is also a reactionary Hungarian option, even under the generational gap between children and the elderly that has already shown the urgent need for

<sup>8</sup> While running for re-election, Donald Trump questioned the USA's electoral process as the polls went against him. This culminated in an unprecedented invasion of the Capitol by Trump supporters during the Electoral College meeting. Although this led to a formal indictment against Donald Trump, he was victorious in the 2024 presidential election against Kamala Harris (author's note).

<sup>9</sup> Excerpt from a speech by the Prime Minister of Hungary (Bastos, 2020).

<sup>6</sup> Excerpt from the Russian president's speech (apud Rubbi et al., 2017).

<sup>7</sup> Twitter is currently called social network X (author's note).

population replacement, to deal exclusively with the issue only by encouraging births (Bastos, 2020).

There is a consensus in the literature about the Russian influence (Putin's model of "sovereign democracy") on the Hungarian *centrális erőtér*: this institutional principle of reducing public debates as a means of increasing government has led to successive government interference in the judiciary and universities, contrary to their institutional independence, and also, in particular, to the systematic reduction of Parliament's prerogatives along with its shrinking representation<sup>10</sup>. As in the Trumpist experience, Hungarian reactionaryism has included neoliberal measures, restricting support for the unemployed and unlimited freedom to work beyond working hours (Buzogány, 2017).

In conclusion, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán for several mandates, the Hungarian nation has been the object of consistently retrograde public policies, inspired by a mythical Hungarian past and also adhering to the Islamophobic rejection of current migratory currents.

#### *Brazilian Social Eugenics*

You didn't stop during the pandemic. You didn't fall for the line: "stay home, we'll deal with the economy later". That's for the weak. The virus, I've always said, was a reality, and we had to face it. No cowering in the face of what we can't escape (Jair Bolsonaro on Sep. 18, 2020)<sup>11</sup>.

The government of Jair Bolsonaro (2019 to 2022) has brought together all the socially violent segments:

- *Rural*: Who invade other people's land (including Indigenous people), deforest preserved areas and cultivate with illegal or excessive pesticides;
- *Religious*: Discriminatory against religions of African origin and LGBTQIA+ individuals;
- *Military*: Nostalgic for Brazil's military dictatorship (1964-1985), which rejects government transparency, Indigenous villages or Quilombolas (descendants of refugee slaves) on national territory, and whose policing in favelas (housing that concentrates national poverty) treats them as battlefields with illicit drug traffickers or commands violent extortion from residents;
- *Business*: Encouraging the sale of firearms, non-compliance with labour or environmental laws and willingness to sell state assets at low prices.

Conceived as due only to Brazilians endowed with social superiority (physical or economic), both traditional and eventual, and justified as divine (Judeo-Christian) pillars of "Brazilianness" (Aliança pelo Brasil,

2021), violence (including by weapons released in large and unprecedented magnitudes) would characterize active regenerations of those whose successful merits would exclusively confer citizenship (Kalil, 2019).

As a result, it has become a central government objective to legally exempt people from any negative externalities by exercising violence – particularly armed violence, especially police violence – for the sake of individual self-defence, as this would be socially eugenic. Formulated generically, the government's armed liberation ratifies the generalization of violence, already exercised on a daily basis in and over areas of social vulnerability in Brazilian territory (Cruz, 2020), including where the self-organization of black descendants of refugee slaves (Bargas, 2018; CONAQ, 2021) and the self-organization of the 305 remaining Indigenous ethnic groups (OPAN, 2020) have been increased, in national territory and by citizenship, in general.

The government's eugenicist policy reached its apex during the global COVID-19 pandemic, in which the Brazilian government – never establishing any national restrictions on movement in a nation where the disease was raging – promoted the contamination of the population, acted in a reluctant manner to vaccinate them and even prescribing (scientifically) ineffective drugs to maintain an unsustainable pandemic normality (Moitinho et al., 2020).<sup>12</sup>

In conclusion, under Bolsonaro's leadership, in a single mandate, public policies were implemented to support the daily social violence in order to ostensibly guarantee the traditionally predominant social positions in Brazilian society.<sup>13</sup>

As can be seen from the values conveyed by the authoritarian reforms of the Russian, American, Hungarian and Brazilian democracies, the new national-identitarian reactionaryism – just like classic right-wing totalitarianism – also radicalizes a romantic (Berlin, 2015) conservative bias (Romano, 1981), as it presupposes national cultural standards that are absolutely immune to any other values held by different population groups, both recent ones from abroad and traditional ones articulated to global exteriority.

#### IV. CONCLUSION: THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE OF HUMAN DIVERSITY

As information, production and migration continuously spread across the globe, human diversity

<sup>12</sup> At the end of 2024, police investigations uncovered a plot to prepare a military coup, with Bolsonaro's consent before and during his stay in the US, where he resided temporarily, without passing on the presidential inauguration to his elected successor.

<sup>13</sup> On June 30, 2023, the Supreme Electoral Court made Bolsonaro ineligible until 2030, convicted of attempting institutional subversion by spreading fake news about the functioning of the electronic ballot boxes that were used during the 2022 presidential election, in which he was defeated by Lula da Silva (author's note).

<sup>10</sup> On February 10, 2024, Katalin Nóvak resigned from the Hungarian presidency, which she had held since 2022, due to popular demonstrations criticizing her for having pardoned a person involved in child sexual abuse (author's note).

<sup>11</sup> Excerpt from the President of Brazil's speech (Moitinho et al., 2020).

permeates all social relations, because global networks contain all possible individual differences corresponding to globalized locations (Castells, 1999; UNESCO, 2005; Lopes, 2017). In this perspective, the new Far-right is a reactionary political response to national diversification through globalization, by rejecting the differences encountered.

The democratic response to the new Far-right is the same response needed for globalization itself: a continuous synergy of individual differences, through societies in which we are equally different and these differences should be conceived as individual talents to be exercised, in other words, as socially beneficial gifts (Lopes, 2024).

Table 1 below summarizes the ideological aspects of national-identitarian reactionarism in the four selected cases:

**Table 1:** National-identitarian Reactionary Government Comparisons: Russia, USA, Brazil and Hungary.

National-Identitarian Reactionaries	Internal Supremacy Promoted	Social Oppressions Promoted	Militant Lies (Fake News)	Reductions in Government Accountability
Putin	Cossack traditions	Discrimination against LGBTQIA+	Government media control	Electoral fraud and party-state
Trump	Descendants of immigrant pioneers	Police violence against blacks and illegal immigrants	Social media posts that are outright lies	Rigging the Supreme Court
Orbán	Medieval Christian traditions	Discrimination against immigrants, Islam, LGBTQIA + and workers	Government media control	Submission of Parliament and the Judiciary
Bolsonaro	Greater physical or economic strength	Overt shootings in poor areas	Prescribing ineffective drugs for COVID-19	Official government confidentiality

Source: Buzogány (2017), Dimoch e Gramlich (2021), Rubbi et al (2017), Goes (2013), Kalil (2020), Levitsky e Ziblatt (2018), Novák (2021), Bastos (2020), Schpuy (2013), Sata e Karolewsky (2020), Cruz (2020) e Moitinho et al (2020).

In parallel with environmental sustainability (Brundtlandt, 1987), human diversity challenges modern political ideologies, however, by assuming it as a value implied in solidarity (Lopes, 2017, p. 57-74), which enables democratic improvement to prevent its detachment from citizenship, notoriously exploited by the contemporary Far-right. This has been the guiding

principle for “all” of its various current leaderships to deny citizenship to national members (or those in the process of becoming immigrants) who don't fit into their monolithic national ideals.

Table 2 below summarizes reactionary and democratic responses to national diversification brought about by contemporary globalization:

**Table 2:** National Diversifications due to Globalization.

National Diversification	Global Flow of Information	Global Product Flow	Global Migration Flows
Various habits	Increased general cognition	New habits	Coexistence of styles
Identity reaction	Censorship or slander	Local prejudices	National aversion
Empowering talent	Data selection	Local certificates	Job placement

Source: Prepared by the author.

In this perspective, democratic political actors must formulate and implement, among other measures and through the broadest possible democratic dialog, public policies for social diversification that:

- Ensure, immediately or progressively, parity between men and women in public and private decision-making bodies, without neglecting a minimum reserve for minority human conditions that are unconnected to the genders. Such a measure would turn individual differences into real ingredients of democratic normality (Briolli, 2013);
- Facilitate the accessibility of genetic tests that identify the gene flows that make up individuals and provide individual knowledge of their multiple ancestries. Such a measure would both weaken racist prejudices, given that actual human beings have shared genomes, and encourage the adoption of lifestyles more suited to healthy longevity (Scerri, 2018). Obviously, care must be taken to ensure that access is absolutely private for the individuals who wish to consume them, and therefore to ensure that this is effectively only an individual right, and does not infringe on their differentiated ethnic belonging.



- Provide comprehensive psychological counseling to interested adolescents (12 to 17 years old), in their schools and with psychotherapy available to families. Such a measure would lead to school and family environments that are more compatible with any individual differences in their spheres, including discoveries and vocational training of their own;
- Provide societies with a population deficit and whose demographic dissolution cannot be reversed by birth increases alone, with immigration flows through which the replacement of the population takes place, as concomitantly as possible, also with its cultural renewal: such measures would attract qualified immigrants also because they are already part of possible social circles of emigrants from the nationally declining population.

Human diversity underlies contemporary issues, bearing in mind that the different ways of life, in their marital, family, productive and housing planning, or merely individual, imply adopting the right to difference (as has been expressed, contemporarily, by women's recourse to abortion, by formal homosexual unions and by the medical admission of consensual euthanasia or assisted suicide). Taking this on board is fundamental so that modern democracy can extract all the human possibilities that globalization – at all intercultural levels (Jullien, 2010) – offers to citizens in general.

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