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## Julian Amery: Navigating Britain's Shift from Imperialism to European Integration, 1950-1970

By Glenn Wasson

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*Keywords:* neo-colonial imperialism, european integration, suez group, Europeanism.

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# Julian Amery: Navigating Britain's Shift from Imperialism to European Integration, 1950-1970

Glenn Wasson

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**Keywords:** *neo-colonial imperialism, european integration, suez group, Europeanism.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

When the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Harold Macmillan delivered his 'Winds of Change' speech on 3 February 1960, he characterized a shift in Britain's political philosophy. The sun was beginning to set on Britain's imperial territories, and the British government was required to commit to a new course to maintain its influence on the world stage following public embarrassments at the Suez Canal in November 1956 and controversies of suppressing the Mau Mau attacks throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Macmillan acknowledged during his speech to the South African parliament that 'growth of national consciousness is a political fact... As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement'

*Author: e-mail: gwasson03@qub.ac.uk*

(Harrison, 1983). Thus, the British government elected to pursue membership in the European Communities as part of a new course. One man who represented the shift from imperialism and Europeanism was the Conservative Member of Parliament from 1950 to 1966 and 1969 to 1992 Julian Amery. This article seeks to explain Julian Amery's shift from neo-colonial imperialist to Europeanist as significantly influenced by international factors, including the emergence of superpower hegemony, the rise of nationalism in colonial territories, the creation of the European Communities, and the Cold War technological race. In doing so, this article will explore the reasons behind Amery's shift in political perspective. It will discuss two key questions. Firstly, how did Amery express this change in support towards Europe? And furthermore, why these international factors influenced his decision to move away from imperialism? For example, Amery held a different view to many of his pro-imperialist contemporaries, such as Enoch Powell and John Biggs-Davison, who openly criticized the Conservatives' policy of self-government among African nations. Biggs-Davison and Amery were at cross purposes over the issue of self-governance in former imperial territories. For instance, during a House of Commons debate concerning Gambian independence on 18 November 1964, Biggs-Davison lamented Britain's departure from the country since 'many British soldiers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' lost their lives in the country. In contrast, Amery had already looked to broaden Britain's horizons in Europe, criticizing Gambia in the vainest terms for its 'rickety landing stage.' While Amery accepted the United Kingdom's decline as a global power, his imperialist credentials cannot be underestimated. Amery was an out-spoken critic of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement passing control of the Suez Canal to the Nasserite government. Amery wrote to the Arabist British military officer Colonel Gerald de Gaury, stating his contrary position on the Agreement: 'Britain [must] retain sufficient fighting troops in the Canal Zone to safeguard the security of the Canal and to ensure that we have not only the right but the power to return in a crisis' (AMEJ/1/2/71).

Julian Amery's political career provides an insight into the necessary changes in British policy during rapid decolonisation. However, it has not received the same scholarly attention as many of his contemporaries. Studies have tended to focus on the

likes of Powell or Patrick Wall, both of whom argued vehemently against Britain joining the European Communities in 1973. Research into these figures proved to be *en vogue* during the Brexit debates and before Britain departed from the European Union in December 2021. Paul Corthorn, Frank Fazio, Simon Heffer, and Camilla Schofield have contributed to this growing historiography on the subject (Corthorn, 2019; Fazio, 2020; Heffer, 2014; Schofield, 2013). The widespread nature of debates on traditional Powellite ideas owes much to their weaponization by the Eurosceptic press during the last decade (Gilbert, 2021). Additionally, Powellite ideas of framing the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU as a grand design plan for re-asserting British control outside of the European 'prison' can be defined clearly in former Prime Minister Theresa May's 'Global Britain' rebrand (Zhou, 2023). A brand which her successors continue to develop. Perhaps unsurprisingly, very little exists on the profile of Amery. Sue Onslow has conducted a thorough examination of Amery's role within the Suez Group and Lucia Bonfreschi has discussed his part with the British delegation under Edward Heath responsible for European negotiations (Onslow, 2006; Bonfreschi, 2012). This article seeks to go beyond these contributions insofar as it looks at the reasons behind the change in Amery's stance on imperialism. The existing contributions on Amery focus on his roles within either the Suez Group or the British delegation to the European Economic Community. However, this article seeks to provide a comprehensive view of Amery's legacy, most notably in European aeronautic development – an area which merits further academic exploration.

In attempting to understand the direction of British policy-making and what caused such changes, this article draws on the extensive political and personal papers of politicians directly involved in defense decision-making. A selection of under-explored private papers and oral history interviews at the Churchill Archives Centre will be drawn upon throughout the prose. Included within these are the letters, press articles, and political documents of the British Minister of Aviation Julian Amery, the analyses and recommendations of the Chief Scientific Advisor to the British Government Lord Plowden, the diaries, letters, and memoirs of Shadow Foreign Secretary and later British Ambassador to Paris Sir Christopher Soames and finally, the dispatches of the Liberal peer and former British Ambassador to Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb, particularly during the Suez Crisis. With regards to the use of nuclear weapons as a means of exercising influence in European defense matters, these papers have been supplemented by the political documents of French politicians including Presidents Charles de Gaulle and French military leaders Admiral Pierre Barjot and Général d'Armée Charles Ailleret.

## II. A EUROPEANIST FROM THE OUTSET?

Julian Amery first entered parliament as an MP in 1950, representing the newly established constituency of Preston North. As is custom, newly elected MPs are granted the right to a maiden speech, effectively announcing themselves to the parliamentary cohort in the House of Commons. From the outset of his parliamentary career, Amery epitomized the idea of a political figure who defied standard conventions. When Amery stood to make his maiden speech on 28 March 1950, he prefaced it by saying 'the natural diffidence which any man must feel who speaks in this House... is heightened in my case by the apprehension that some of the things I want to say today may be thought more controversial than is becoming in a maiden speech' (1950). This introduction preceded a scathing criticism of the Labour government's defense policy, which tended towards internationalism - a key feature in the Party's ethos of working for the common good of the international community (Vickers, 2013). Amery pointed the finger of blame for Communist expansion on Labour's defense policy of 'containment.' He argued that the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger had stretched the terms of the 'containment' policy since the United Kingdom had 'permitted the Sovietisation of half of Europe and the whole of China' (1950). Amery called on the Labour government 'to secure... closer, European co-operation, in the sphere of defence.' Amery's calls for greater European co-operation in defense matters occurred against the backdrop of the British government's response to the Plevin Plan. When French Prime Minister René Plevin proposed a supranational European army in conjunction with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the United Kingdom approved the plan on the provision that the multinational element of control was significantly reduced (May, 2016). Amery supported Plevin's demands for a 'sense of collective security' within a supranational framework where the Labour government did not (France, 1951). Certain members of the parliamentary cohort took exception to Amery's inflammatory maiden speech. Raymond Blackburn, the Labour Party MP for Birmingham King's Norton, stressed in his response to Amery that the Conservative member 'will not, of course, expect everyone on this side of the House to endorse' his position on Soviet encroachment, going further as to say 'it used to be a tradition... that maiden speeches were not controversial.' Blackburn accused Amery of 'arousing comment' much like his father Leo. Blackburn's opposition stemmed from the established Labour position of 'Left understands Left.' In 1946, Blackburn had advocated opening direct trade links between Moscow and London, viewing European nations as Fascist regimes for not embracing Communist ideologies (Blackburn, 1947). He lamented the British

government's shift towards European cooperation since 'Communist ideology impels [Soviet states] at the same time not to cooperate.' While the Conservative governments of the 1950s and 1960s would guide the United Kingdom towards European integration, there remained some Labour MPs contesting that membership of the European Communities would halt the advance of socialism in Britain (Lord, 2018).

The maiden speech indicates that Amery was more than the 'caricature of a Tory imperialist' that political observers would somewhat unfairly label him later in his parliamentary career (Louis, 2002). Instead, the historical truth is more intricate. Amery purported an interesting continuity between the pro-Commonwealth development attributes of his father, and the new trend of advancing European integration. The move towards an increased role for the United Kingdom in Europe began as early as 1946 with the gradual decolonization of European empires. The decline of the United Kingdom's overseas territories can be attributed to the new wave of nationalism which swept across Africa and Asia, with independence movements rising to challenge British dominance (Overy, 2001). Such movements which catalysed Amery's desire to see the United Kingdom play a grander role in Europe resulted from his lamentations over the loss of imperial property. His brand of imperialism was more 'ethical than strategic', notably as Amery, much like his father, advocated for equal rights for all citizens, albeit under the supervision of the British settler class (Faber, 2007). Early in his tenure as an MP, the United Kingdom's control of Kenya became increasingly threatened, with rebellious citizens causing a prolonged period of terrorist incidences between 1952 and 1960. Thus, Amery's maiden speech introduced him as both a pro-Europeanist and a critic of the handling of Britain's imperial decline. Amery would become an increasingly effective Europeanist, most clearly through his – and by extension, the United Kingdom's – commitment to continental defense matters. However, the shift towards Europeanism was a matter of necessity given the increasing spread of US Capitalist and Soviet Communist ideologies throughout the British empire following the beginning of the Cold War in 1947.

The spread of anti-colonial sentiment alongside the infiltration of left-wing ideologies in Kenya drew vehement criticism from Amery. For instance, in May 1952 Amery criticized the Churchill government for only prioritising 'our freedom to extend the system of Imperial Preference' in the Middle East when Jomo Kenyatta had succeeded in stirring up racial hatred against British settlers in Kenya (1952). Indeed, Amery was among several Conservative politicians who were critical of the Attlee and Churchill government's handling of the early phases of imperial retreat. Oliver Lyttleton, 1<sup>st</sup> Lord Chandos, Churchill's Colonial Secretary, grew increasingly frustrated with the lack of British

involvement in averting Kenyatta's Mau Mau terrorists, particularly as those of the Kikuyu tribes, which made up the main crux of the insurgent membership, were 'a trading and intelligent, but somewhat uncongenial people' (Lyttleton, 1962). However, neither Amery nor his contemporaries could solve the terrorist insurgence, stopping short of advocating for offering Kikuyus a 'share in government' (ibid). Winston Churchill's government instead took an overly cautious approach even when it came to detaining Mau Mau prisoners, considering the United Kingdom had recently signed up to the Convention on Human Rights (1954). Additionally, any deterrent measures implemented against Mau Mau terrorists, including forced labor, resulted in a technical infringement of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930. Even discussions around a multi-racial government were rejected by those who prioritized Kenyan independence, such as Major E.P. Roberts, Chair of the Federal Independence Party (Van der Bijl, 2017). Even before the Mau Mau rebellion was crushed in 1956, it was clear that European influence was no longer accepted in Kenya as the British government firmly believed that a national administration ruled by British and Kenyan officials was a likely outcome of the crisis (Wasserman, 1976).

When considering Julian Amery's political career, it is essential to analyze the influence of such events as the Mau Mau rebellion. The weakening of British control between 1952 and 1954 served as another painful reminder of the United Kingdom's gradual transition from the member of a 'Big Three' during the Second World War to a 'second-rate nation.' Amery and his contemporaries used the calamities of the initial Mau Mau rebellion, the Labour government's mismanagement of the Abadan crisis, and the Churchill government's decision to allow parliamentary elections in the Sudan as part of a compromise between the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1953 to argue against further decolonization, something that several British administrations seemed to entertain throughout the early- to mid-1950s. The Anglo-Egyptian resolution allowed the Sudan Civil Service to begin preparations for an election while the existing Sudanese government drafted an electoral legislature (1953). Amery's reaction to the Anglo-Egyptian resolution was unequivocal. The British government's accusation that Egypt had interfered in the Sudanese elections pushed Amery to take coordinated action to argue against the further decolonization, despite it seeming inevitable (Onslow, 1997). The result was the Suez Group. This was a Conservative protest group that sought to refute further reductions of British troops in Egypt and other dominions in Africa. Amery played a vital role in the Suez Group, circulating papers and arguing in favour of maintaining British presence in the Suez Canal Zone, which became increasingly contested following Britain's withdrawal from Sudan.

The Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which saw King Farouk replaced by General Neguib (himself later deposed by the progenitor of the Suez Crisis, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser), represented a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East – Egyptian pan-Arabism became a force for change in the region as an opponent to the neo-colonialism that Amery, and the leader of the Suez Group, Charles Waterhouse espoused. The Suez Group found relevance in combatting the perceived trend of appeasement within Anthony Eden's Conservative government (Herzog, 1990). Martin Thomas and Robert Toye have viewed the Suez Group as a pressure group, which worked with the populist press, such as the *Daily Mail*, to establish their 'firm imperialist credentials' (Thomas and Toye, 2015). Amery wrote frequently in the *Daily Mail*, going as far as answering listeners' queries on the BBC Light Programme 'Any Questions?' (AMEJ/5/6). Rebellious tendencies marked the very nature of the Suez Group, whose members viewed Eden with visceral contempt. Eden had previously stated in a speech at the 1948 Conservative Party Conference in Llandudno, that the British empire is 'our life... We are an imperial power or we are nothing' (Tory Conference at Llandudno, n.d.). Thus, when Eden entertained bilateral discussions between the United Kingdom and Egypt over the reduction of British military personnel in the Suez Canal Zone base, the forty backbench Conservative MPs considered it a betrayal. In a diary entry from 12 March 1956, Amery himself criticized Eden for not taking 'every opportunity of being tough with the Egyptians' when their revolution was still in its infancy (Amery, 1956). Amery, Lieutenant-Colonel Neil 'Billy' McLean, MP for Inverness, and other Suez Group members turned against Eden for his plans to withdraw British troops from the Canal Zone entirely as a means of handing more control to an increasingly militant Egyptian administration. This occurred despite the Suez Canal Company being Franco-British property due to the treaty between the United Kingdom, France, and the Khedive Ismail in January 1882 (McNamara, 2015). For Amery, the Canal Company acted as a helpful medium for Franco-British cooperation, mainly when regular meetings between both controlling powers permitted governments with opposing ideologies, in this case the Radical left-wing government of Pierre Mendès-France and Eden's Conservative administration, to share ideas in a common forum (Großmann, 2016). Amery articulated his disgust at Britain losing its 'teeth' in the Middle East in a letter to Eden on 18 March 1953, 'I do not see how the Commonwealth could continue as an independent force in the world, if any other power – even the United States – were to take our place in the Middle East and on the Canal' (AMEJ/1/2/71). Amery's position represented the general consensus within the Suez Group, many of whom stressed the

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations rendered imperial 'disintegration... inevitable' (Hickson, 2020).

Amery's role in the Suez Group has received a mixed reception in political discourse. Barry Turner has been overtly critical of Amery and Waterhouse's attempts to dissuade the parliamentary Conservative Party from supporting Eden's Suez Agreement – the treaty effectively transferring control of the Suez Canal to the Egyptian government. He described both men as 'political blusterers, immune to strategic and economic realities, who were convinced that higher powers were intent on destroying Britain's imperial heritage' (Turner, 2007). However, others, such as Sue Onslow, have correctly understood the paradoxical nature of Amery's stance. Amery preferred continuing Britain's military influence in the Middle East while pursuing further European integration. Amery's attitude, as well as that of the other Conservative members within the Suez Group, contrasted heavily with the general trend of British political thinking. The Suez Group demanded a continued British military presence in the Canal Zone, particularly as it played a vital role in the United Kingdom's EURAFRICA initiative. Amery supported the EURAFRICA concept as it amalgamated British colonial property within the Western European Union (WEU), which featured in multilateral negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Community nations to create a 'Third Force' to co-exist alongside the superpowers of the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the international stage (Dietl, 2009; Mace, 2017). The WEU and its outcrop the EURAFRICA developed further as a new dynamic approach to European integration following the breakdown in multilateral discussions to create a European Defence Community in 1954 to retain continental influence during the Cold War. The general academic consensus on the EURAFRICA concept considers that this model served to allow European military integration through the processes of colonialism (Hansen & Jonsson, 2015; Avit, 2005). The EURAFRICA idea was not popular with the United Kingdom's Atlantic partners. Incorporating existing colonies into a supranational defense association was viewed as delaying the inevitable advancement of Soviet communism from within the administration of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Halting the advance of communism was the United States' primary concern in the Middle East during the Cold War when the United Kingdom attempted to cultivate its imperial territories to forestall decolonization. Indeed, the Suez Canal had strategic importance for the Eisenhower administration as a site from which military action against Soviet advance could be undermined (Ashton, 1993).

The US government worked to undermine the 1954 Suez Agreement, which Amery increasingly criticized. In his 1953 treatise, *What Europe Thinks of*

*America*, Amery pointed out the irony of the Eisenhower administration's plan for the Middle East: 'We might say that in America the colonies are inside the metropolis' concerning the division between the Northern and Southern states (Amery, 1953). Nonetheless, when Eden shared at a tri-lateral meeting between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France that Britain would withdraw its troops from the Canal Zone under the provision that they could intercede if the Canal became the focus of a conflict, the United States took the opportunity to offer military assistance to the Egyptian government. This offer was conditional 'upon Egyptian fulfilment of the Base Agreement' (Foster Dulles, FRUS, 1954). According to the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, US paternalism towards Middle Eastern countries was designed to countenance the rise of communism in the region and movements that the Soviet Union generally supported (Gaddis, 2005). The United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Canal Zone was agreed with Egypt and signed on 19 October 1954. The signing of the Suez Agreement represented a failure of Amery's political ambitions since he was among the twenty-six Conservative MPs to vote against the deal in July 1954, signaling a reluctant concession of the United Kingdom's declining position as a former world power. Indeed, the Suez Agreement began a twenty-month transition period wherein the Egyptian military forces assumed control of the Canal Zone (Selak, 1955).

It could be argued that Amery's move towards Europeanism was forced by the events following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Enoch Powell predicted in a speech to the Wolverhampton Conservative and Unionist Association on 4 December 1953, when discussions around the transition period had already taken place between the United Kingdom and Egypt, that 'no one should imagine that... the rot will stop there' (POLL/3/1/11; FO/371/102796/1192/31). In essence, Powell's prediction was accurate as when Nasser successfully nationalized the Canal on 26 July 1956, the United Kingdom's diminishing position as a world power was clear for all to see. The Suez Crisis followed the Canal's nationalization, precipitating the collapse of the United Kingdom's imperial influence in the Middle East. Now the historiography on the Suez Crisis is vast and this article does not seek to augment the discourse on this topic. Instead, it aims to understand how the Crisis changed Amery's political thinking. The failure of Franco-British military intervention to bring the Suez Canal back to international control prompted a reassessment of the United Kingdom's place on the world stage. Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin's threat to use nuclear weapons against France, Israel and the United Kingdom demonstrated that conventional military techniques were no longer sufficient in signifying influence outside of a nation state's domestic sphere (Olivi and Giacone, 2007).

Indeed, when the United Kingdom's Middle Eastern dominions, such as Jordan, began to move towards independence following the withdrawal of French and British troops from Port Saïd in December 1956, Cabinet Ministers looked at new means of maintaining influence in military affairs since the United States had successfully marginalized British involvement in matters of Middle Eastern defense (McKercher, 2017).

Amery supported the move away from requiring absolute control of the Canal and finding a new course. International factors pre-determined this new course, primarily as the growing global trend focused on rejecting imperialism. The United Nations' intervention in the Canal Zone was devised to return the canal to 'international control,' however this still guaranteed Egyptian ownership of the Suez Canal Company as per the terms of the 1954 agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, thereby severely limiting British influence in the Middle East and undermining its economy (Johnson, 1997). Furthermore, between sixty and seventy percent of the United Kingdom's oil came through the canal each year, which justified the Ulster Unionist MP for Belfast West Patricia McLaughlin's defence of the canal as 'one of Britain's greatest resources... [and] it must be freely available for all people' (1957). It has been estimated that the lack of shipping through the canal cost the Treasury of the United Kingdom approximately \$71 million in oil-based revenue (Pierre, 2014). Thus, the restrictions placed upon the United Kingdom, from reductions in oil revenues to inadequate nuclear deterrents, necessitated a change in the course for the British government – one which Amery fully backed. For instance, he wrote in his diary on 30 December 1956 that the need for a move towards Franco-British cooperation was essential given 'the grip which the U.S. have on' the Middle East (Amery, 1956).

### III. A COMMITTED EUROPEANIST?

The aftermath of the Suez Crisis led to a profound rethink of British policy, in which Amery was closely involved. The Suez Group gradually broke up with members, including Amery and Powell now prioritising external relations rather than ensuring control from an imperial centre or hub (Greenwood, 2000). However, the question remained as to what the foundation for external ties between nation states would be? The Suez Crisis undermined Britain's position in the Middle East to such a degree that King Hussein of Jordan terminated the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty of Alliance (1948), guaranteeing Jordanian dependence on the United Kingdom's military and economic resources. The agreement to terminate the treaty provoked much anxiety within the House of Commons. On 18 February 1957, former Labour Minister Philip Noel-Baker, the MP for Derby South, asked the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs David Ormsby-Gore:

As the Government have spent £70 million on subsidies to Jordan and we have, by the Suez policy, lost all military advantage and all political influence in the area, will not the Government consider a new policy? (Feb 1957).

Amery and his fellow Suez Group member Victor Montagu, Viscount Hinchinbrooke, supported Noel-Baker's calls for a new course, illustrating a softening of their vehement imperialist tendencies. Britain risked isolation on the international stage unless a new course was adopted. The secret nature of Franco-British military planning in the prelude to their intervention in the Canal Zone as part of the Sèvres Protocol guaranteed both European nations would assume a 'peace-keeping role' to 'avoid any overt military collaboration with Israel' (CAB/195/15/37). The covert planning of the Suez intervention contrasted heavily with the public humiliation when the British government agreed to a cease-fire without consulting their French partners. Kenneth Younger, the backbench Labour MP for Grimsby, was overtly critical of the Conservative government's mishandling of the Suez policy. So much so that, on 10 May 1957, he warned the government must be cautious of 'the very deep suspicions that were voiced in recent weeks by most of our European allies about our intentions with regard to defence are... a legacy from our utter failure to consult them over our Middle Eastern policies.' The cease-fire of 5 November 1956 had an isolating impact for the United Kingdom on the international stage. By February 1957, the Macmillan government would come to regret turning against France when French Prime Minister Guy Mollet raised the EURAFRICA concept with the United States. The British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd interpreted the potential Franco-American rapprochement as 'politically embarrassing' given the closeness by which the United Kingdom and France cooperated over the Suez intervention (Lloyd, 1980). Eisenhower perceived the EURAFRICA as a 'meritorious idea,' but did not support creating 'a partnership on more equal terms' outside of the Atlantic Alliance (Eisenhower, FRUS, 1957). The Soviet nuclear threat heralded a *pax atomica* which solidified the hierarchical standing of the Soviet Union and the United States above the European powers.

Amery had shared his views with parliamentary colleagues around the possibility of a British-built missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, so the embarrassment of the Suez Crisis would not be repeated (Middeke, 2000). During the post-Suez period, Amery shared correspondence with the University of Cambridge scientist Hermann Bondi, in which the Cambridge don stressed that the new reality concerning the supremacy of nuclear weapons 'cannot change' given their use as a threat in the new age of high technologies (GBR/0014/GWLY/1/3). Amery's change of perspective represented a shift in how the United Kingdom perceived power as a means of exerting

influence. Thus, the loci of defence policymaking veered away from traditional ideologies focusing on colonialism, and towards the establishment of a credible nuclear deterrent (Urwin, 2016). The reorientation of British foreign policy towards nuclearization followed similar decisions across Europe. Indeed, France had already begun to concentrate its efforts on nuclear weapons development after withdrawing some of its forces from West Germany and Algeria in August 1956 without supplying a 'discernible reason for this largely unexpected move' (NATO, 1956). Moreover, Amery's shift towards Europeanism and advocating further nuclear integration was provoked by cooperation between France, West Germany, and Italy to institutionalize nuclear defense on the European continent following the signing of the Protocol of Colomb-Béchar in 17 January 1957. The construction of a European nuclear defense network would have further isolated the United Kingdom following the disaster at Suez (O'Driscoll, 1998).

The exchanges between Amery and Bondi demonstrate the unique links between government and academia, which contributes to formulating a nation state's policy-making in a coherent manner. Bondi's encouragement was formative for Amery's stance on nuclear politics. Atomic weapons were considered to grant the holder significant influence on the international stage. Bulganin's threat at the end of the Suez intervention demonstrated the coercive power that nuclear weapons states (NWS) possessed. Indeed, the specters of Suez still lingered in the memory of Conservative thinkers, including Amery. The Suez affair has been described as a decisive blow to what Conservative MP Brigadier Otho Prior-Palmer claimed as Britain's 'jugular vein' (Hill, 1978). Amery considered Bondi's lack of criticism for nuclear weapons as a rationale for his support of British nuclearization, particularly as a deterrent capacity would answer the reactionary concerns for national security and European peace in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis. Macmillan also knew the United Kingdom needed a nuclear deterrent. He impressed upon US Presidents Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy continuously that the Suez Crisis necessitated the change in British defence policy. He wrote in December 1962, before the Nassau Summit, which secured the United Kingdom its nuclear deterrent force, 'the UK wants a nuclear force not only for defense, but in the event of menace to its existence, which the UK might have to meet; for example: when Khrushchev waved his rockets about the time of Suez' (Macmillan, FRUS, 1962). Essentially, knowledge entrepreneurs, such as Bondi, profoundly impacted British policy since their scientifically tested viewpoints were seen as imperatives during the Cold War, according to Jasmine K. Gani and Jenna Marshall (Gani and Marshall, 2022).

The United Kingdom had a policy of pursuing nuclear weapons development since 1947. The loss of the Suez Canal furthered accelerated British efforts to develop a credible nuclear weapons deterrent. This acceleration occurred in tandem with reductions in troops stationed around the globe as part of the 1957 Defence White Paper. British Secretary of State for Defence Duncan Sandys introduced the Paper as part of a reorientation of the country's defense policy under the new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, the man primarily responsible for starting the United Kingdom's shift away from its imperial heyday towards a multinational European Community. Macmillan tasked Sandys and his Minister of Aviation Peter Thorneycroft with spearheading the development of a practicable nuclear arsenal. Sandys understood that reducing the number of British troops abroad was a necessary obstacle to overcome to facilitate the construction of a nuclear deterrent. Sandys commented on 4 February 1958 that 'Present-day military preparations can no longer be planned on a national basis, since no country is strong enough to stand alone... there remains no effective protection against global war, save the threat of devastating retaliation' (1958). The jargon in Sandys' White Paper epitomized the shift in the UK government's way of approaching defense in the post-Suez period. The multilateral terminology remained, however the references to imperial property or colonial responsibilities were unsurprisingly absent since the British government had taken the position of negotiating access to the European Communities.

In line with the reaction of the United Kingdom's European partners, Amery remained broadly enthusiastic about the British government's renewed efforts towards nuclearization. From Amery's perspective, the overture to Europe provided a novel opportunity to extend British influence in a new period of high technology cooperation. Nuclear politics became the focus of European powers following the Suez debacle. French, Italian and West German officials designed a framework for creating a European superpower – the *Europe puissance* – to promote and strengthen already established ties of European unity. Mollet, the leader of the *Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO), spoke of the need for a European-wide nuclear defense network. His reasoning was two-fold. Firstly, a nuclear weapons capacity was envisioned to protect against further decolonization as Nasserite 'dogma' had dominated revolutionary thinking in Algeria, where French colonial rule was increasingly threatened (Meynier, 1990). Furthermore, the prodromes of superpower hegemony forced France and its European Community partners to embrace nuclearization to protect their security concerns around the politico-economic unification of Messina Treaty signatories, ensuring their role as influential powers in the field of public and cultural diplomatic relations (1961,

AG/5(1)/688; Ciappi, 2023). Mollet's appeals for a European nuclear defense system drew support from British Conservatives, including Amery. By 1958, Macmillan had promoted Amery to the position of Colonial Secretary, where in 1959, he had conducted a report into the French attitude towards nuclearization. Amery stressed his backing for European nuclear integration to return the United Kingdom to the 'forefront of the international community.' However, he reported some concerns as to the French President Charles de Gaulle's idea of using a European nuclear deterrent as a foundation for a *directoire à trois* between the United States, United Kingdom and France (Deighton, 1994). The *directoire à trois* idea grew from previous nuclear assistance between the United Kingdom and France dating back to 1953. The United Kingdom's government had previously agreed to supply the French Fourth Republic with nuclear secrets during a multilateral conference on the Korean War (PREM/11/1311).

Franco-British collaboration over civil nuclearization in Paris commenced with the construction of the Chinon nuclear power station on 1 February 1957, after French politician and oil industrialist Pierre Guillaumat and British physicist Sir John Cockcroft agreed on cooperation between both countries in December 1954 (Bédarida, 1985). Cooperation with Continental powers over nuclear secrets was indicative of the new course for European nations in the period of decolonization. The United Kingdom, thus, adopted a policy of increasing European military cooperation at the WEU Council Meeting on 26 February 1957. The British government went as far as committing itself to the sharing of weapons procurement with France to bolster the European conventional military within an Atlantic framework, which was agreed bilaterally between French Prime Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury and Her Majesty's Ambassador to Paris Sir Gladwyn Jebb on 1 March 1957 (FO/371/131074; PREM/11/3721). Amery wrote his recommendation for the British government to continue pursuing military and industrial links with France and the other EC nations, despite his concerns of the *directoire à trois* proposal. His desire to strengthen bilateral links owed to French eagerness to perfect their nuclear weapon capability (PREM/11/2696). The emphasis on nuclear cooperation with France put Amery at cross purposes with many Cabinet colleagues. The Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Defence Secretary Harold Watkinson put stock in the United Kingdom's commitment to nuclear cooperation with the United States, at which point US Thor Missiles would be stationed at RAF Feltwell in Norfolk from 11 February 1959 indicating that Britain had reclaimed some of its strategic value on the international stage which was lost in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis (White, 1991; Brugioni, 2010). Thus, several prominent Cabinet members including Macmillan viewed Amery's arguments as a distraction to the British government's

efforts of restoring its international influence. For instance, while Amery promoted Franco-British nuclear cooperation, Macmillan wrote to de Gaulle calling for an end to atomic weapons testing at sites close to the borders of former British colonies as the Conservative government was facing backlash from newly-established governments in West Africa (Hill, 2018; Regnault, 2003). The diplomatic tensions between the United Kingdom and France reached a crescendo when the *Cours Supérieure Inter-armée* actioned a nuclear weapons test in Sierra Leone on 24 April 1961 (PREM/11/4242).

Despite ongoing tensions between the United Kingdom and France, Amery continued to fly the flag for British involvement in Europe. In 1960, Amery was promoted again to the position of Secretary of State for Air. However, his elevation to a high-ranking position was not the primary method for advancing his pro-Europeanist ideology. From January 1962, Amery was a prominent – and much valued – member of the Conservative political pressure group The Monday Club. The club was a broad-church for political opinions on how best the Conservative Party can lead the United Kingdom forward in the decolonization period. It boasted 'a mixed assortment of right-wing thinkers' ranging from traditional Conservatives, such as Biggs-Davison and Wyndham Davies, the MP for Birmingham Perry Barr, to those of the Party's center-right like Amery (Copping, 1971). Amery argued that Conservative policy needed to shift away from the Left and its position of decolonizing British nationalism towards empire after he was removed as Colonial Secretary (Norton, 2002). His calls were disregarded as the now Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd encouraged the MPs in the House of Commons to adopt a stricter economic program focusing on creating a new planning institution to limit further Sterling crises, which became a frequent occurrence following the run on the Pound during the Suez Crisis (Pemberton, 2004). The divisions within the upper echelons of the Conservative government support Miles Kahler's judgment that success in policy reorientation away from the antiquated traditions of empire can be measured by the limitations of internal party disruption during the decolonization period (Kahler, 2014). Thus, Amery found himself increasingly isolated from his Cabinet colleagues since the general direction of British policy focused on re-engaging military relations with the United States and fostering a new leadership role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Nonetheless, Amery remained committed to the cause of European integration. In the early 1960s, Amery investigated avenues for furthering cooperation with European powers, primarily France. Amery was consigned to fighting his European cause through the Monday Club forum since Whitehall civil servants had taken measures to deliberately block Franco-British

sharing of nuclear weapons technologies. For example, General Jean Crépin had been delegated to consult with officials from the British Ministries of Aviation, Defence and Supply around the use of the Blue Streak missile, an Anglo-American creation, which the US government considered to be unfit for their nuclear deterrent purposes (AVIA/65/739). Despite Amery and Minister of Aviation Duncan Sandys' endorsement of bilateral collaboration over atomic weapons, British officials, such as Ministry of Defence mandarin J.T. Williams, strongly argued against divulging such technological secrets shared through the Bermuda Conference with the French. Crépin was infuriated by this move since the French government had previously consented to the forging of cooperative links between British and French electrical and aeronautical firms (O'Driscoll, 1998). Bilateral cooperation was rendered impotent after the Ministry of Aviation refused to allow any inter-company exchange of high technology information, which was previously shared under Article II of the MacMahon Act – the legal act permitting closer nuclear ties between the United Kingdom and the United States passed on 29 October 1957. These decisions provoked a backlash from the French Ambassador in London Jean Chauvel who sent a series of telegram to Prime Minister Macmillan demanding that Anglo-American nuclear cooperation be 'extended to include all WEU countries.'

However, the Ministry of Aviation's hostility towards European overtures was muted in July 1962 when Amery was placed in charge of it. Immediately, Amery continued to search for avenues of cooperation with the brief of institutionalizing the Franco-British working partnership over aeronautical innovations in civil aviation. As the 1960s progressed, the feeling within the British Cabinet shifted from the bygone era of colonialism towards embracing pan-Europeanism. Macmillan's decision to radically reshuffle his Cabinet during the infamous 'Night of the Long Knives' in July 1962 prompted this dramatic policy change. It is important to note that international factors did not influence this decision. Rather, Macmillan sacked seven Cabinet ministers, including his Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd and Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson, to rejuvenate the public face of the Conservative Party after a series of by-election defeats and the stagnating nature of the United Kingdom's economy (King and Allen, 2010). Nevertheless, the domestic context by which Amery was moved from the Air Ministry to the Ministry of Aviation affected the United Kingdom's stance on the international stage. Amery was now responsible for coordinating the United Kingdom's acquisition of civil and military aeronautical hardware, as well as their development. His greatest triumph as the Minister of Aviation was the commencement of the Concorde Supersonic Transport (SST) program. Concorde was symbolic of closer ties between France and the United Kingdom as the Anglo-French

Agreement of November 1962 established a framework through which both countries collaborated to secure an influential European aeronautics sector to rival the hegemony of the superpowers (Nelson, 1969). Amery's role in negotiating the Anglo-French Agreement demonstrated a wholehearted departure from his neo-colonialist pedigree, mainly as it committed the United Kingdom and France to combining the efforts of their aeronautics industries – the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Sud-Aviation – to develop and explore new civil and military aviation opportunities.

The signing of the Anglo-French Agreement proves Amery's credentials as a Europeanist. The bilateral treaty permitted the Minister of Aviation to achieve two key aims in his policy brief. In the first instance, the Concorde SST provided the United Kingdom with an opportunity to establish a new role for itself on the international stage. Amery hailed the Anglo-French Agreement as a critical success in undermining superpower hegemony. In his speech to the House of Commons on 29 November 1962, Amery described Concorde as being capable of commanding 'a leading position on the air routes of the world' (AMEJ/7/2/2). The Anglo-French Agreement cemented the impact of joint European projects in a competitive market cornered by the superpowers. In 1963, the US aerospace manufacturer Boeing purchased six Concorde options totaling £118,366,000 (AMEJ/7/1/46). Amery believed the Concorde SST would greatly benefit the British economy, stating that the Treasury department would 'make a killing' with the prospective sales on the aircraft (ibid). He went as far as describing the aircraft in its initial design stage as the 'golden goose' (Chandola, 1972). Furthermore, the Anglo-French Agreement set a precedent for military cooperation between both nations. Soon after the Agreement's ratification in Parliament and the *Assemblée nationale*, British and French politicians signed a Memorandum of Understanding to work together on military technologies. French Minister of Defence Pierre Messmer and Amery signed this Memorandum intending to design an anti-radar tactical strike weapon for the French nuclear deterrent – the *force de frappe*. Amery explained to his Cabinet colleagues that cooperation with the French over tactical nuclear weapons development and civil aviation concerns were essential as 'they form part of the same United Kingdom Operational Requirement... to provide strike aircraft with a precision weapon which can be launched without exposing the aircraft to local defences' (CAB/129/118/68). Thus, Amery's success with the Anglo-French Agreement provided a foundation, which turned BAC and other industrial entities (Bristol-Siddeley, Rolls-Royce etc.) into a prime industrial centre for European Community nations to exchange ideas. So much so, Belgian industrialist Comte René Boël, the chairman of the European League for Economic Co-operation between 1950 and 1981, pushed several

French Finance Ministers during British applications to the European Communities to allow the United Kingdom's accession since it would bolster Europe's ability to 'counter-balance the tendency on the part of the United States to act in too precipitate a fashion' (PLDN/5/16).

#### IV. AMERY'S LEGACY IN FRANCO-BRITISH AFFAIRS

Amery's fingerprints can be found over the direction of British aeronautical policy from his departure following the Labour Party's victory in October 1964. Before this, Amery actioned Lord Edwin Plowden's report arguing for technological cooperation between the United Kingdom and France as the groundwork for the production of successful aircraft (Owen, 1999). The report and subsequent bilateral negotiations between Messmer and Amery aiming to produce military aircraft further engrained Franco-British cooperation and the United Kingdom's pursuit of European Community membership. Martin W. Bowman has previously argued that Concorde gave the United Kingdom a foundation to rebuild its reputation as a leading power in the world (Bowman, 2007). While the British government required the Concorde SST to restore its tarnished image, France enjoyed the fruits of the *Trente Glorieuses*, a period of substantial growth in its domestic industry, which resulted in exports of its aeronautical products abroad. Philip H. Gordon has argued that the offshoots of the Anglo-French Agreement supplemented France's military role on the European Continent since the French Air Force already possessed a fleet of Mirage IV capable of carrying nuclear weapons, rather than in the British case (Gordon, 1993). Regardless, Amery was instrumental in plotting the course for a fruitful bilateral partnership between French and British industries. He even went as far as acquiring the support of his Cabinet colleagues by courting US opinion on the terms of Anglo-French cooperation. US Air Force General Curtis Emerson LeMay wrote to Amery between February 1962 and August 1963 stressing that access to the French aeronautical industry would grant the United Kingdom a new superiority over her nearest neighbours, going as far as arguing British 'military interests would find [it] hard not to exploit' the bilateral partnership (*Daily Herald*, 10 February 1962; PREM/11/3772). By late 1963, British Cabinet Ministers were beginning to accept the United Kingdom's need to develop closer ties with the European Community nations to regain a role as a world power. Prime Minister Macmillan became ill with a prostatic obstruction before the annual Conservative party conference and was quickly replaced by Sir Alec Douglas-Home on 19 October (Ramsden, 1996). According to David Dutton, Douglas-Home only pursued options to augment Britain's 'political clout in the wider world' (Dutton, 2006). Repositioning British

defense policy towards Europe was part of Douglas-Home's new approach. One which Defence Minister Thorneycroft and Amery fully exemplified. For example, following the signing of the Nassau Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States, Thorneycroft openly criticized Macmillan's decision to access a US-controlled nuclear force, branding it 'military nonsense' (Pierre, 1972). Thorneycroft's criticism represented a deep divide between the Conservative way of thinking and the opinions of Whitehall officials. First Sea Lord and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John called on Thorneycroft to buy every Polaris missile system that the Americans 'will sell to us' (ADM/1/29269). Similarly, former First Sea Lord Mountbatten of Alamein branded Thorneycroft's pro-Europeanism and overt criticism of the Anglo-American nuclear deal as 'poppycock.'

Europeanism was now the guiding force of British policy and continued under Harold Wilson's new Labour government. However, Amery's early work set the British government on course for further European integration, which both Conservative and Labour Ministers supported. Despite Wilson's Minister of Economic Affairs George Brown investigating the feasibility of discontinuing the Concorde project, branding it 'a prestige project of low economic and social priority', the Labour government committed to Franco-British cooperation to create a European Community for technological innovation (AMEJ/7/1/42; CAB/130/212/MISC12). This new Community was part of Wilson's plan for modernization, which possessed a military element. The Anglo-French Agreement was the basis for this Community proposal, but more than that, it heralded a new period for technological innovation in the military field. In addition, declining diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the United States contributed to Wilson's further reorientation towards Europe. US military actions during the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s and the subjugation of the United Kingdom's role in nuclear weapons development as a result of the Partial Test Ban Treaty negotiations in August 1963 had soured Anglo-American relations, to the point where Wilson risked antagonizing President Lyndon B. Johnson with his calls for a British-axis in European defense planning (Edgerton, 1996; Vickers, 2008). Wilson's proposed Atlantic Nuclear Force – a NATO strike force with each member nation able to exercise sovereignty over its involvement – led Johnson to withdraw US proposals for the augmentation of atomic defense on the European Continent (Wasson, 2023). The result of the United States' withdrawal from discussions around European nuclearization left the door open for Franco-British reconciliation on the issue of military planning, something that Amery significantly affirmed.

1965 and 1966 marked a critical turning point in Franco-British technological cooperation. After General André Pujet had continued negotiations with Defence

Minister Thorneycroft in August 1963, the United Kingdom and France had worked towards developing a concept of a new military fighter jet. These negotiations bore much fruit for the Franco-British working partnership. The final designs were the Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) aircraft and the SEPECAT Jaguar jet attack aircraft. Labour Defence Minister Denis Healey and his French counterpart Messmer signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 19 May 1965, ratifying the development of AFVG and SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft. Upon signing the agreement, Messmer stressed that Franco-British industrial cooperation was required for the 'wider working unity of Europe' (PREM/13/714). The British government agreed, and this view was shared throughout the legislative chambers. Notably, Derek Edward Anthony Winn, 5<sup>th</sup> Lord St. Oswald, remarked in the House of Lords 'coming-in of the variable geometry aircraft, of course I knew it was within our plans; it was, indeed the brain-child of our mutual friend Mr. Julian Amery' (1966). Lord St. Oswald's comments demonstrate the impact of Amery's transition from neo-colonial imperialist to Europeanist. In addition, Amery's transition matched the course of Conservative defense policy under Edward Heath. Unity on the European continent in defense matters was something Conservative thinkers argued for (AMEJ/1/6/17). Lord Carrington, the chair of the Conservative Policy Group on Foreign Affairs, concluded that joining a European defense organization was necessary. The bilateral supremacy that the United States and the Soviet Union obtained over 'modern weaponry' as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the rationale behind this fresh support for the British Prime Minister from the opposition benches. The nuclear threats during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated the 'new and gigantic fact' that the United Kingdom needed European integration to have a relevant voice in international affairs given the Soviet Union was now able to directly threaten the United States (PREM/11/4413). Amery laid the groundwork on which Healey and Messmer institutionalized Franco-British aeronautical cooperation. The initial negotiations conducted by Amery and Pujet in May 1963 kick-started an effective trading partnership over aeronautical technologies in the first instance, and further mediums of Franco-British cooperation, namely, the Channel Tunnel (Davis, 1997). Something that both Conservative and Labour governments throughout the 1960s lauded as it meant the UK aeronautics industry was not dependent on US-manufactured hardware. The MoU resulted in an abandonment of the British 'Buy American' policy meaning that the European hardware alternatives, primarily the SEPECAT Jaguar was competition for US and Soviet hardware solutions (AMEJ/1/6/5).

While Amery was instrumental in establishing Franco-British aeronautical cooperation, the off-shoots of the Anglo-French Agreement were not warmly

welcomed within French academic circles. A prominent critic of French President Charles de Gaulle, Claude Fresnoy, represented the general feelings of disgruntled elites in France over the decision to construct the SEPECAT Jaguar with the United Kingdom. Fresnoy stated that the proposed introduction of the aircraft was a 'futility' since its influence 'would ultimately be limited' (Fresnoy, 1964). Fresnoy used the size of the Soviet Union and the United States as the empirical rationale for his criticism. However, the French academic's judgment could not have been wider of the mark. Franco-British military cooperation established through the Anglo-French Agreement led to the development of more than just aircraft. In 1970, the French government authorized the technical director of Compagnie Fabre to purchase the Decca 914 radar to be incorporated into French nuclear submarines (SOAM/3/1/11). Amicable military and industrial cooperation between the United Kingdom and France helped to alleviate some of the pressures of their international decline. Between the signing of the Anglo-French Agreement and the purchase of Decca 914 radars in 1970, the United Kingdom had experienced a further weakening of their influence abroad, especially following the Wilson government's decision to withdraw British forces 'East of Suez'. To combat the perception of British decline, the Defence White Paper of 1968 envisaged a reorientation of national defence towards a greater role on Continental Europe. Defence Minister Denis Healey wanted to use the White Paper to 'emphasise the positive aspects of the now primarily European role' for the United Kingdom (CAB/128/43/34). In addition, the chairman of the Conservative Group for Europe, Miles Hudson, argued that the United Kingdom needed to integrate further into organisations on the continent, otherwise 'Britain will have no special capability for use outside Europe.' Thus, the cross-party consensus on the United Kingdom's role in international affairs rested firmly on cultivating a European role. In many ways, Amery was ahead of his time in paving the way for this new approach to bolstering European defense. Healey carried on Amery's foray into European aeronautical defense cooperation as he brokered a deal with the West German government for the development of a Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), to be constructed by both BAC and Messerschmitt-Bölkow in 1969. Claire Sanderson has stated that the British Defence Ministry sought to maintain its global influence, while establishing a world role through cornering the European defense market (Sanderson, 2011). The cooperation over a MRCA preceded the establishment of the EUROGROUP in 1973, which contradicts Raymond Courand's point that the period 1954 to 1973 was utterly void of military initiatives in the field of defense aeronautics (Courand, 2009). Nevertheless, the genesis of the EUROGROUP would not have been possible without the decision for the United Kingdom

and France to collaborate on aeronautic technologies. The British government viewed the MCRA – alongside the Concorde and SEPECAT Jaguar projects – as critical to maintaining the output of the British aeronautics industry, particularly as the United States and the Soviet Union were financially competitive in the global market. The Franco-British military partnership spearheaded further innovation in the aviation sector throughout the remainder of the Cold War period. In particular, the SEPECAT Jaguar allowed the United Kingdom and France to organise global conventional defense measures. Oman and Ecuador purchased SEPECAT Jaguar options in September 1974 following its immediate introduction into service, which permitted both countries to initiate further development into the project. Therefore, Amery's legacy in the establishment of bilateral negotiations between the United Kingdom and France over Concorde was the flourishing of European defense cooperation on a multilateral scale. The expansion of BAC's industrial network to include West German and French defense projects illustrates how critical Amery's initial negotiations with de Courcel for the construction of Concorde and Pujet for the design of AFVG were, notably as they created an infrastructure for further projects and cooperation to occur, with the ultimate intention of proving to their Continental partners that the British were, in fact, 'good Europeans' (Ziegler, 2011).

## V. CONCLUSION

The parliamentary career of Julian Amery provides historians with a novel lens in which to analyse the trajectory of the United Kingdom's foreign and defence policies from 1950 until 1962. Amery's journey from neo-colonial imperialist to Europeanist was influenced dramatically by the emergence of superpower hegemony and further European integration initiatives. When Amery first entered parliament, the sun was slowly beginning to set on the British empire. The losses of the Second World War meant that the United Kingdom could do little to slow the spread of nationalism and socialism across its imperial territories. According to Daniel F. Calhoun, 'no European power had anything like [the Soviet Union's] military clout' (Calhoun, 1991). Calhoun's argument is undoubtedly credible since in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill asserted in a visit to the United States in March 1946 that the Soviet Union sought to enjoy the 'fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines' throughout the Middle East, Continental Europe and Africa (Gaddis, 1972). Significantly, it was the reluctance of the British government to counteract calls from African and Middle Eastern nations for self-governance following the Second World War that provoked Amery's shift towards Europeanism. The public embarrassment of the Suez Crisis for the United

Kingdom and France also contributed to the escalation in African nations calling for self-government. For instance, by 1957, Nigerian politicians were applying further pressure on the British government for a transfer of legislative powers before independence in April 1960. The growing interest in independent self-governance across the Middle East and Africa found popular support in the British parliament with over 100 MPs comprising the Movement for Colonial Reforms in London, which criticized the Conservative government for delaying the advancement of sovereignty across its imperial territories (Lawal, 2010). In attempting to understand Amery's role in the trajectory of British foreign and defense policy from 1950 onwards, imperial retreat must be considered. The Mau Mau rebellion and the Suez Crisis act as two embarrassing milestones for the British Conservative government and greatly underpin Amery's decision to move away from neo-colonial imperialism. The nuclear threat from Bulganin triumphed in forcing Eden to accept the UN cease-fire following the Franco-British intervention into Egypt. Thus, nuclear weapons were seen as the new instruments of power on the international stage, rather than the out-dated methods of colonial expansion. Amery understood this and, along with his Cabinet colleague Thorneycroft, favored a British nuclear policy as a means of furthering European integration, effectively 'killing two birds with one stone' insofar as reorienting the United Kingdom's defense policy towards its European allies, while also developing a credible nuclear deterrent during the early phase of the Cold War.

Amery's legacy in the field of Franco-British aeronautical defense cooperation contradicts the interpretation that the United Kingdom should not play a role in construction of a European military bloc (Dietl, 2002). Rather, Amery played a critical role with Geoffroy de Courcel in developing the framework through which Franco-British civil and military aviation projects, such as the SEPECAT Jaguar, could be created. However, the hegemony of the superpowers tarnishes Amery's legacy in broader British defense policy. In October 1962, Amery, Macmillan, and Thorneycroft met to assess whether British nuclear delivery systems could be used for a European deterrent, therefore promoting the United Kingdom to an influential position on the international stage. Amery and Thorneycroft's posturing towards further nuclearization of British defense policy came a little too late to be considered effective. As early as 1957, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations Arkady Sobolev clarified that while nuclear weapons tests continued, the Soviet Union valued discussions around disarmament, thus laying the groundwork for future negotiations around nuclear non-proliferation. Indeed, the 1960s saw great strides towards non-proliferation with the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) being signed between the United States, Soviet

Union, and the United Kingdom in August 1963 – less than twelve months after Amery and Thorneycroft's discussions with Macmillan. In addition, the advent of the Cuban Missile Crisis in November 1962 meant there was less potency in the nuclearization debate. In the immediate aftermath of the blockade of Cuba, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, opened negotiations to find a common position regarding the 'cessation of nuclear tests' and more importantly the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and non-transfer of missiles across sovereign borders (Mikoyan, 2014). The PTBT acted as a precursor to further non-proliferation agreements. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) followed in 1968. The main issue regarding the NPT on Amery's legacy in Franco-British cooperation was the French decision not to sign the treaty. The NPT was the critical turning point for the institutionalization of superpower hegemony as it tied the United States and Soviet Union into further negotiations over arms control measures. Further, the NPT became a deterrent to Britain in facilitating nuclear cooperation with the French. The Labour MP for Sheffield Park Fred Mulley expressed concern over Franco-British nuclear collaboration in 1969, stating that 'proliferation [with France] is a serious danger' characterizing it as 'extremely unwise to link' Franco-British cooperation with EC accession under Britain's obligations to the NPT. Thus, Amery's aim of using nuclear weapons as a makeweight for British accession to the European Communities could not be realised due to overwhelming political influence of the superpowers during the 1960s.

Nonetheless, Amery achieved some successes during his time as Minister of Aviation. The Anglo-French Agreement cemented the United Kingdom's legacy as an aeronautical innovation during the Cold War technological race. While some off-shoots of the Anglo-French Agreement – namely, the AFVG supersonic aircraft – failed to make it into service, the impact of Amery and de Courcel's initial treaty cannot be underestimated (James and Judkin, 2010). The roots of the successful Concorde and SEPECAT Jaguar projects stem from the decision in November 1962 to combine British and French efforts affirmed by Amery and de Courcel. The SEPECAT Jaguar's legacy and technological supremacy brought stability to a Franco-British military and security partnership, which had experienced measurable damage following the Suez Crisis. Military collaboration over Jaguar construction was a crucial factor in the Franco-British working partnership. It formed part of the basis for British entry into the European Communities in January 1973. In addition, the project achieved two aims. The SEPECAT Jaguar acted as a fruitful medium for Franco-British cooperation while also advancing European research and development to such a degree that it began to

challenge superpower dominance in aeronautics. While both countries may have disagreed on the idea of non-proliferation and the construction of a nuclear deterrent, their military partnership allowed for further innovation in the aviation sector throughout the remainder of the Cold War period. In the broadest possible terms, Amery's legacy was to institutionalize Franco-British cooperation when the United States and the Soviet Union critically undermined their international influence, particularly in African dependencies (Schraeder, 2000). Regardless, the Concorde and SEPECAT Jaguar aircrafts serve as historical reminders of not only Amery's legacy, but both his and the United Kingdom's reorientation from imperialism towards embracing Europeanism as a means of restoring international influence.

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