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# Assessing Fiscal Sustainability: A Comprehensive Analysis of Brazil's Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC) Program

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## Abstract

This paper analyzes the Brazilian social benefit known as Continuous Cash Benefit Programme (BPC), considering its rules, resource utilization, potential impacts, and adverse effects on society. The literature review was based on the Austrian Theory of Economic Intervention. We observed that the BPC needs to be reassessed regarding values, long-term sustainability, and control of adverse effects. Results showed that the value of the BPC per capita is higher than the value of other social benefits in Brazil. 37

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**Index terms**— social protection, continuous cash benefit program, public expenditure, government intervention.

## 1 Introduction

Interventionism in Brazil is communicated to society through 'goodwill packages,' impacting various population groups to varying degrees. Each measure may appear well-intentioned, aiming for social wellbeing, and the groups benefiting from these interventions may seem deserving. But are the results of interventionist measures satisfactory for society as a whole?

Brazilian economic indicators reflect a high degree of government intervention in the country: General Government expenses reached a level close to 50% of GDP in 2022 [https://sisweb.tesouro.gov.br/apex/f?p=2501:9:::9:P9\\_ID\\_PUBLICA\\_CAO:44070#:::~:text=A%20despesa%20total%20do%20Governo,39%2C8%25%20do%20PIB](https://sisweb.tesouro.gov.br/apex/f?p=2501:9:::9:P9_ID_PUBLICA_CAO:44070#:::~:text=A%20despesa%20total%20do%20Governo,39%2C8%25%20do%20PIB).

, the tax burden is close to 35% of GDP <sup>2</sup>, and we have a public debt close to 90% of GDP by the IMF <sup>3</sup>. One of this government interventions is the Continuous Cash Benefit Program (BPC). BPC is a Brazilian social benefit, provided for in Law 8,742 of December 7, 1993, known as the Organic Law of Social Assistance (LOAS), which guarantees a monthly minimum wage to individuals with disabilities of any age and to elderly individuals aged 65 (sixty-five) or older who can prove they do not have the means to provide for their maintenance or have it delivered by their family. methodology. Despite these data signaling a high degree of state intervention in the economy, the feeling is that the return brought to society is not commensurate with the promised and expected results, given such interference. <sup>4</sup> In this context, the primary aim of this study is to undertake a thorough analysis of Brazil's Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), scrutinizing its regulations, resource allocation, potential consequences, and societal drawbacks. The methodology adopted is bibliographic research discussed through the data analysis related to the benefit under review and other existing benefits in Brazil. The following factors will be analyzed: (a) the budget allocated to this benefit, both in total and by type of beneficiary, (b) a comparison of the relationship between the cost of the benefit and the total number of BPC beneficiaries with the Bolsa Familia program, (c) the evolution of expenses related to BPC and its link to the minimum wage, (d) an analysis of the potential increase in the cost of the benefit according to the age. This benefit is part of the group of interventionist measures aimed at social assistance provided by the Brazilian government. Despite its good intentions, as resources are scarce, and the benefit is paid with the population's funds, it should be evaluated in light of its overall effects on society, its cost-benefit analysis, and possible points for improvement in its formulation/ implementation.

<sup>2</sup> [https://sisweb.tesouro.gov.br/apex/f?p=2501:9:::9:P9\\_ID\\_PUBLICA\\_CAO:43205#:::~:text=Em%202021%2C%20a%20carga%20de%20trabalho,PIB%20em%20rela%20%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20a%202020](https://sisweb.tesouro.gov.br/apex/f?p=2501:9:::9:P9_ID_PUBLICA_CAO:43205#:::~:text=Em%202021%2C%20a%20carga%20de%20trabalho,PIB%20em%20rela%20%C3%A7%C3%A3o%20a%202020). <sup>3</sup> By the methodology of the National Treasury, the public debt is close to 80% of GDP. <sup>4</sup> The direct rule established to qualify for the BPC is that the per

47 capita income of the family group of the individual seeking the benefit should be equal to or less than 1/4 of the  
48 minimum wage. Nonetheless, a considerable number of beneficiaries do not meet these criteria but still manage  
49 to obtain the benefit through legal channels, demonstrating their inability to sustain themselves or receive  
50 support from their families. I pyramid of Brazil, (e) an analysis of the BPC value considering the distribution  
51 of poverty by age group in Brazil, and (f) adverse effects of BPC on the Brazilian social security system.

52 The Austrian Theory of Interventionism forms the main theoretical framework, providing insights for the  
53 discussion proposed here. The main works used for the academic discussion in this study are Mises (1977), Mises  
54 (1990), Hayek (1987) and Rothbard (2009).

55 In addition to this introduction, this work is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical foundation  
56 of the study. Subsequently, in section 3, an analysis of the general data of BPC, its characteristics, and its  
57 distribution among beneficiaries is conducted. Finally, the last section presents the study's conclusion.

## 58 2 II.

### 59 3 Literature Review

60 According to prominent authors from the Austrian School of Economics, state intervention, even when well-  
61 intentioned with the goal of rectifying market failures or improving the social conditions of a population, can  
62 lead to adverse consequences for society. (Mises (1990), Mises (1977), Hayek (2001), Rothbard (2009)). Mises  
63 (1977) defined intervention as "a limited order by a social authority forcing the owners of the means of production  
64 and entrepreneurs to employ their means in a different manner than they otherwise would".

65 The author distinguishes two groups of state intervention adopted by government authorities with the aim  
66 of altering consumption in relation to what would occur in a market economy. They are interference through  
67 restrictions and interference through price controls.

68 The interference through restrictions can be exemplified by trade barriers imposed. The interference through  
69 price controls can be exemplified by policies of maximum and minimum prices, as seen in the setting of interest  
70 rates and minimum wage floors. This definition of interventionism, according to Lavoie (1982), can be considered  
71 relatively narrow as it excludes crucial aspects such as public spending, taxation, operation of state industries,  
72 subsidized goods supply, and other forms of interventions. In this context, Rothbard (2009) expands the scope of  
73 Mises' analysis. The author defines state intervention as 'the intrusion of aggressive physical force into society;  
74 it means the substitution of coercion for voluntary actions.'

75 The author identifies three comprehensive types of government intervention: autistic intervention, binary  
76 intervention and triangular intervention. Autistic intervention occurs when an agent, which can be the  
77 government, coerces an individual without receiving any goods or services in return.

78 Binary intervention occurs when the state compels someone to make an exchange or unilaterally offer goods  
79 or services (for example, taxes and government expenditure). Triangular intervention occurs when a third party  
80 (state) interferes in the exchange relationships of other agents such as, for instance, through price or product  
81 control. Interventionism is often justified in classical theory by the existence of so-called 'market failures.' This  
82 situation theoretically occurs when the free market fails to achieve efficient resource allocation through the  
83 voluntary interaction of acting agents. In this case, according to theory, state intervention may be considered  
84 justifiable to achieve more efficient market allocations and enhance overall societal well-being.

85 However, even from this classical perspective, there is a necessity to analyze the cost-benefit relationship  
86 of government intervention. In addition to creating market distortions and affecting individual choices, the  
87 intervention entails costs for the population, as it is financed with public resources, typically sourced from taxes  
88 and borrowing. In this context, as stated by Gianturco (2017), it's important to note that state failures can, at  
89 times, be even more significant than potential market failures. Within the public choice theory, state failures  
90 result from unachieved or undesirable policy outcomes formulated by imperfect human decisionmakers.

### 91 4 a) Interventionism aimed at social benefits

92 Most government intervention measures use resources from society and redirect these resources for purposes  
93 determined by those in government, as explained by Rothbard (2012). Aids and social benefits, such as the  
94 Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC), are called 'free' for society. However, according to Rothbard (2012), a genuinely  
95 free good should be abundant for everyone. If a good is not abundant for everyone, it shows that this resource  
96 is scarce, and offering it 'freely' costs society the loss of other goods.

97 According to the author, the resources required to supply the government's free service are taken from the  
98 remainder of production. However, payments are not made by users through voluntary purchases but rather  
99 through mandatory contributions from taxpayers. A fundamental division is made between payment and receipt  
100 of the service.

101 As we have observed, the BPC is a measure designed to ensure a minimum income for specific segments of  
102 society who lack the resources to support themselves or receive support from their families. Hayek (2001) discusses  
103 the importance of guaranteeing a minimum of subsistence means for everyone. In the author's perspective,  
104 economic security is often presented as an indispensable condition for genuine freedom.

105 According to the author, in a society that has attained a certain level of overall prosperity, there is no  
106 justification for not ensuring basic security for all individuals without it being considered a privilege, while still

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107 upholding the overall freedom of the society. However, Hayek (2001) clarifies that the idea of economic security  
108 is vague, and the general approval of the security claim can become a danger to freedom.  
109 This demonstrates the author's concern regarding policies offering social benefits, as often their needs will be  
110 subjective, and they may be provided to some at the cost of others' freedom.

## 111 5 III.

### 112 6 Analysis of BPC Data a) General Analysis of Citizen Benefits 113 in Brazil

114 Data from the first half of 2023 5 reveals that in Brazil, the primary social benefits extended to citizens ('Auxílio  
115 Brasil', 'Bolsa Família', 'BPC', 'Garantia-Safra', and 'Seguro Defeso') reached over 46 million recipients, which is  
116 roughly 25% of the population. The total disbursement for these benefits during the first half of 2023 amounted  
117 to R\$ 111.8 billion.

118 Considering Brazil's vast territorial expanse, it is crucial to analyze the regional distribution of these benefits.  
119 The figure ?? below illustrates the comparison of benefits by location in Brazil, displaying the percentage range  
120 of the population in each Federal Unit that receives some of the listed social benefits mentioned earlier. It  
121 becomes apparent that there is a significant variation in the demand for these benefits across the country,  
122 with a concentration in the Northern and Northeastern regions. Notably, these regions, which have a higher  
123 concentration of these benefits, generally coincide with areas characterized by lower average income in the country.  
124 6 Furthermore, these regions have also witnessed higher rates of labor underutilization 7 and informal employment  
125 8 in recent years.

126 Source: <https://portaldatransparencia.gov.br/beneficios> In this section, we will analyze the BPC data from the  
127 year 2022. As explored in the introduction, the BPC, a social benefit provided by Law 8,742 of December 7, 1993,  
128 known as the Organic Law of Social Assistance (LOAS), guarantees a monthly minimum wage to individuals with  
129 disabilities and elderly individuals aged 65 or older who can prove that they do not have the means to provide  
130 for their maintenance or have it delivered by their family.

131 Following the mentioned law, those eligible to receive the benefit are individuals with disabilities or elderly  
132 individuals whose monthly per capita family income is equal to or less than 1/4 (one-quarter) of the minimum  
133 wage 9 9 Destaca-se que existem iniciativas, inclusive proposição já aprovada no congresso, o Projeto de Lei do  
134 Senado nº 55, de 1996, (porém vetada pelo presidente, e suspensa pelo TCU após derrubada de veto), que buscam  
135 elevar o limite de renda familiar per capita para fins de concessão do BPC, de 1/4 de salário mínimo para 1/2  
136 salário mínimo . However, a significant portion of this benefit is granted through legal action to families with per  
137 capita income exceeding 1/4 of the minimum wage, provided that it can be demonstrated that the beneficiary  
138 lacks the means to maintain themselves with dignity.

139 The cost to public accounts for this benefit is significant. In 2022, the total expenditure on the BPC was R\$  
140 70.9 billion 10 10 Fonte: <https://www.mds.gov.br/relocrys/bpc/docs/downloads/2022/DezTodos.pdf> . Out of  
141 this total, R\$ 38.5 billion (54%) were designated to People with Disabilities (PCD), while R\$ 32.4 billion (46%)  
142 were allocated based on an age criterion. In December 2022, approximately 2.77 million PCD and 2.34 million  
143 elderly individuals received the monthly benefit, totaling more than 5.1 million beneficiaries.

144 Regarding the Brazilian Federative Units with the highest proportion of their population benefiting from the  
145 BPC, it is observed that, in general, the concentration of this benefit is higher among people in the North and  
146 Northeast regions. This distribution shows similarities with the map of aggregated benefit distribution, as seen  
147 in Figure 3, and seems to be consistent with the socioeconomic situation of the country, as the target audience for  
148 this benefit consists of individuals with low per capita family income. These regions generally have the poorest  
149 socioeconomic indicators in the country.

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152 This data indicates that the value allocated to each beneficiary of the BPC is higher than the per capita  
153 amount distributed to beneficiaries of other programs. beneficiaries, Bolsa Família (income transfer program  
154 in Brazil) corresponds to only 47% of the total value allocated to benefits. For example, despite covering 72%  
155 of the total increases in nominal and real benefit values have been observed over the years. Since the BPC  
156 value is linked to the minimum wage, increases in the minimum wage value, while keeping the total number of  
157 beneficiaries constant, also increase total BPC expenditures.

158 This information becomes more relevant when considering the real increases in Brazil's minimum wage over  
159 the years. According to the OECD Economic Report: Brazil 2018 11 11 [https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/conteudo-de-regulacao/brasil-oc-de/eventos/2018/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil-il-1/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil/survey\\_2018.pdf](https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/conteudo-de-regulacao/brasil-oc-de/eventos/2018/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil-il-1/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil/survey_2018.pdf) , the real minimum wage in 2018 was  
162 80% higher than the minimum wage in 2003. By way of comparison, the per capita GDP of the country only  
163 saw a 23% increase over the same timeframe. The legislation mandates that the value of the BPC paid to its  
164 beneficiaries should be equivalent to one minimum wage. In Brazil, the minimum wage for the year 2022 was  
165 set at R\$ 1,212.

## 9 F) ADVERSE EFFECTS OF BPC: CONFLICT WITH ELDERLY AND SOCIAL SECURITY

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166 Article 7 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil establishes the right of both urban and rural workers to receive  
167 a minimum wage, as determined by law. This minimum wage is nationally standardized and should be sufficient  
168 to cover both the basic essential needs of individuals and those of their families. The minimum wage should also  
169 undergo periodic adjustments to preserve its purchasing power.

170 When we compare the minimum wage value in 2022 with the nominal monthly per capita household income  
171 in the Federal Units of Brazil for the same year, we observe that the BPC amount exceeds the per capita  
172 income in 12 Federal Units, representing over 44% of the country's Federal Units. We have observed that  
173 approximately 45% of the BPC is allocated to the elderly (individuals aged 65 or older who qualify for the  
174 benefit). Data on the proportion of the resident population in Brazil by age group indicate that the country is  
175 experiencing a demographic aging process, as illustrated in Figure ?? . In analyzing the BPC, this information  
176 deserves attention because the pool of individuals eligible to receive the benefit is likely to grow significantly.  
177 This could make the benefit financially and budgetarily unsustainable for the country in the coming decades.  
178 , the current [https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/conteudo-de-regulacao/brasil-ocde/e/2018/ocde-lanca-](https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/conteudo-de-regulacao/brasil-ocde/e/2018/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil)  
179 [survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil](https://www.gov.br/casacivil/pt-br/conteudo-de-regulacao/brasil-ocde/e/2018/ocde-lanca-survey-economico-de-2018-sobre-o-brasil) minimum wage level is at least six times higher than the country's  
180 poverty line.

181 The distribution of poverty among age groups in Brazil, as depicted in Figure 3, highlights the lack of uniformity  
182 in poverty across the country. While 30% of In this context, although the BPC aims to target the poorest  
183 population, it is not a policy aimed at reducing inequality among age groups in Brazil, as a significant portion  
184 of its resources is directed towards individuals over 65.

185 It's important to consider that, given Brazil's economic situation, the BPC provides relatively high benefits  
186 per individual, equivalent to one minimum wage. This value is relatively high because, according to data from  
187 IBGE, in 2018, the average income of the poorest 40% of Brazil's population was R\$376, significantly below  
188 the benefit provided by the BPC (which was set at R\$954 in 2018). When comparing, for example, the BPC  
189 to the Bolsa Família Program (PBF), the PBF can be considered a well-targeted benefit and is the program  
190 that contributes the most to reducing inequality in Brazil. Most of its resources (57%) are directed towards  
191 the poorest quintile of the population, and approximately 90% of the total subsidy is received by the poorest  
192 50%. This is not the case for the BPC transfer, as indicated by World Bank data. Figure ?? below illustrates  
193 the distributional analysis of subsidies for Bolsa Família and BPC by quintile of the population. A significant  
194 portion of the BPC is directed towards the portion of the population in the wealthiest quintiles. It is largely due  
195 to many of legal actions involving the benefit. the population between the ages of 0 and 17 are considered poor  
196 13 , among the elderly (aged over 65), this proportion is approximately 8%.

## 197 8 Source: World Bank

198 These data become even more noteworthy when comparing the proportions of poverty across age groups with other  
199 countries. Considering OECD countries, not only do they exhibit more excellent uniformity in the distribution of  
200 poverty by age group, but the proportion of young people below the poverty threshold is much lower than that  
201 of Brazil.

## 202 9 f) Adverse Effects of BPC: Conflict with Elderly and Social 203 Security

204 The BPC aimed at the older people presents a direct conflicts with Brazil's social security system. It can be  
205 considered both assistive (as one needs to prove insufficient resources to receive it) and possess characteristics of  
206 a pension benefit since, in the case of the BPC for the older people, it serves the purpose of replacing the income  
207 of those who can no longer work, starting at the age of 65.

208 The conflict arises because to receive the benefit no contributions to the system are required, and the amount  
209 paid is the same as contributory benefits for those who contribute to social security.

210 To illustrate this conflict, TAFNER and NERY (2018) provide an example that vividly portrays the situation.

211 "Consider two Brazilians: one contributed for 34 years, the other never. Suppose that the first insured  
212 individual always received one minimum wage. Both can only receive benefits at the age of 65 because they are  
213 not eligible for retirement due to the contribution period (which requires 35 years of contributions). The first is  
214 suitable for age-related retirement (starting with 15 years of contributions), while the second is not. However,  
215 the minimum pension and the assistance benefit floor are the same: one minimum wage. Due to the effects of  
216 tying Social Security to the minimum wage (as explained in the chapter on urban age-related retirement), 34  
217 years of contributions would result in the minimum pension, which is precisely the same amount as the BPC.

218 Both Brazilians would be eligible to receive a benefit at the same age and of the same value: 65 years old, with  
219 one minimum wage. One of them contributed for 34 years, and the other never did. Does this make sense? There  
220 is concern that these rules may discourage formalization and contributions. Clearly, having formal employment  
221 is not simply a matter of choice, at least for a significant portion of insured individuals, but the disincentive is  
222 there. Interestingly, there is an additional disincentive: the legislation allows for accumulating 2 BPC benefits in  
223 the same household (for example, an elderly couple). It means that the first received BPC is not counted when  
224 assessing the poverty condition for the second BPC. The law does not extend the same treatment to retirement  
225 benefits, potentially making it impossible to receive a BPC, even if they are of the same value. In practice,

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226 jurisprudence has extended the treatment of income received as BPC to exclude income from being considered  
227 part of the poverty line, even for pensions and retirement benefits of 1 minimum wage.”

228 (Note: This is a translation of the provided text.) It demonstrates that this government intervention generates  
229 the adverse incentive of reducing contributions to social security, as the benefit of one minimum wage is offered  
230 to those who meet the BPC criteria, even if they have not contributed anything to social security throughout  
231 their lives.

232 IV.

## 233 10 Conclusion

234 This study aimed to assess the BPC, a Brazilian social benefit that is part of the group of interventionist measures  
235 aimed at social assistance in the country and had a total cost of R\$ 70.9 billion to public accounts in 2022.

236 The methodology adopted was bibliographic research discussed through the analysis of benefit data, considering  
237 its rules, resource utilization, potential impacts, and adverse effects on society. The Austrian Theory of  
238 Interventionism was chosen as the primary theoretical framework because it highlights the potential negative  
239 consequences arising from government interventionist measures.

240 It was noted that the per-recipient value of the BPC benefit exceeds that of other social benefits in Brazil. 37%  
241 of the budget of the analyzed social programs is allocated to the BPC, reaching only 18% of the total beneficiaries  
242 covered by all programs under review. Comparatively, the Bolsa Família program, for example, accounts for 47%  
243 of the total value allocated to benefits but reaches 72% of the total beneficiaries.

244 The value of the BPC benefit is also higher than the nominal monthly per capita household income of 44% of  
245 the Federative Units in Brazil.

246 Furthermore, concerning the financial sustainability of the benefit, worrisome factors were identified. Since  
247 the BPC benefit is linked to the minimum wage, and Brazil has a history of significant real increases in its value,  
248 expenditures on this program tend to rise over the years. From 2002 to 2022, for example, the real increase in  
249 the minimum wage was nearly 80%. Population aging should also be considered. Since approximately 45% of  
250 the BPC is allocated to the elderly, and Brazil is experiencing a demographic aging trend, it is anticipated that  
251 expenditures on this benefit will significantly rise in the forthcoming decades. The population aged 65 and over  
252 is expected to grow from 9.8% in 2020 to nearly 30% by 2100.


253 Finally, it was found that the BPC generates some adverse incentives. One is related to not contributing  
254 to the country’s social security by a portion of the population that expects to qualify for the BPC when they  
255 retire. Another adverse incentive is related to the possibility of the benefit being subject to judicial proceedings,  
256 which leads to the distributional analysis of BPC subsidies by income quintile of the population showing that a  
257 significant portion of the benefit is directed towards the portion of the population in the wealthiest quintiles.

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
<sup>1</sup> According to the Wealth Map of Brazil: <https://cps.fgv.br/riqueza>

<sup>2</sup> © 2023 Global Journals




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Figure 1: Figure 1 :Figure 2 :




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Figure 2: Figure 3 :



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Figure 3: Figure 4 :



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Figure 4: Figure 5 ,Figure 5 : 6 Global




Brazilian federative units	Monthly nominal per capita household income of the resident population (R\$)	Brazilian federative units	Monthly nominal per capita household income of the resident population (R\$)
Brasil	1.625	Pernambuco	1.010
Rondônia	1.365	Alagoas	935
Acre	1.038	Sergipe	1.187
Amazonas	965	Bahia	1.010
Roraima <sup>(1)</sup>	1.242	Minas Gerais	1.529
Pará	1.061	Espírito Santo	1.723
Amapá	1.177	Rio de Janeiro	1.971
Tocantins	1.379	São Paulo	2.148
Maranhão	814	Paraná	1.846
Piauí	1.110	Santa Catarina	2.018
Ceará	1.050	Rio Grande do Sul	2.087
Rio Grande do Norte	1.267	Mato Grosso do Sul	1.839
Paraíba	1.096	Mato Grosso	1.674
		Goiás	1.619

Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Pesquisas por Amostra de Domicílios, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua - Pnad Contínua - 2022.

20226

Figure 5: Source: Censo 2022 Figure 6 :



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Figure 6: Figure 7

## 10 CONCLUSION




Figure 7:




Figure 8: Figure 7 :




Figure 9: - 1 /Figure 8 :

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- 259 [Accordinging and Brasil] , ” According , Brasil . [https://www.fundobrasil.org.br/](https://www.fundobrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/mapeamento-trabalho-informal-cortel-1.pdf)  
260 [wp-content/uploads/2023/01/mapeamento-trabalho-informal-cortel-1.pdf](https://www.fundobrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/mapeamento-trabalho-informal-cortel-1.pdf)5Fonte:  
261 [portaldatransparencia.gov.br](https://www.fundobrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/mapeamento-trabalho-informal-cortel-1.pdf)ReferencesRéférencesReferencias
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- 267 [Accordinging to data from IBGE] [https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/livros/](https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/livros/liv101979.pdf)  
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