Ownership Trends in BSE 100-Index Companies from 2000 -2014: Evidence and Implications

Table of contents

1. Introduction

orporate governance as a subject has gained strong rise globally both in scientific and cultural community as well as in organization level. The separation of ownership and control is exactly what creates the necessity for corporate and business governance, which include mechanisms to ensure advisable decision making and earnings maximization. Ownership structure is an important aspect of corporate governance system. Berle and Means 1932 call focus on the prevalence of broadly held corporations in the United States in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders, but still control is concentrated in the hands of professionals. Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Grossman and Hart (1980) indicated that the modern field of corporate and business finance is rolling out around the round the same image of a broadly held corporation.

Looking back at the evolutionary background of the corporation as known today one could detect at least three major defining trends. First was the artificial creation of the corporate entity by the legal practice, followed launch of limited liability, the popularity of the corporations' to spend money on and hold stock of another firm, and lastly, the switch from democratic to plutocratic voting rights leaving one vote per shareholder to one vote per share and thence to even more skewed differential voting rights. The next was the introduction of the publicly traded (bought and sold) corporation representing a paradigm change in the manner business could be scaled up, where owners of the slice of the organization (represented by the percentage of shares hold) neither got claims to the property (net of liabilities) with their company in kind nor the compulsion to be permanently connected with their shareholdings; they could leave by selling their stocks disposing them off or otherwise. The developments of the organization board itself and its role, accountability and responsibility is the third defining component in modern corporate governance. However, the board is 'elected' by the shareholders but once so elected the board is practically its own arbiter in all matters associated with the company. With the demise of the lively, small time entrepreneurial investor-manager and the ascent of the generally unaggressive absentee shareholders in the organization format of business generally, professional management took over that function subject to the guidance and oversight of the board. The focus of this study is to analyze the trend of ownership structure for the period 2001-2014.

2. II.

3. Literature Review

Ownership structure has important implications for corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders' interest. Concentrated ownership structures and affiliation of companies with business groups is a common feature of Asian economies (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Influential legal scholars like Adolf Berle (1931), Merrick Dodd (1932), Lynn Stout (2002Stout ( , 2012)), Lucian Bebchuk (2005Bebchuk ( , 2006)), Stephen Bainbridge (2002Bainbridge ( , 2005) ) and Leo Strine, Jr. (2006), have been debating the pros and cons of higher shareholder engagement in corporate and business decision making but as of now the absentee shareholders in many jurisdictions need to be satisfied largely using their (theoretical) right of having a say in the election of the directors to the board and thereafter expecting their interests would be reasonably protected. Shareholder primacy is influenced by the ownership structures of the organization. Within the confines of the modern corporation, both accountability and responsibility are heavily influenced by ownership structure. Ownership structure can also settle/interviene firm strategy and behavior (Wright, et al, 1996) and can influence boardroom dynamics and stakeholder management (Goodstein and Boecker, 1991), executive compensation (David, Kochhar and Levitas, 1998;Balasubramanian, et al, 2013), and R&D investment (Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991). Knowledge of ownership patterns and trends can thus lead us to more nuanced knowledge of organizational behavior and its own predictability.

4. a) Ownership Trends around the World

Research on firm ownership has often been controlled by studies centered on the United States and the United Kingdom both with dispersed and concentrated ownership structures. Earlier studies by La Porta, et al (1999) of other economies and recently by Aguilera et al (2011) of companies in emerging marketplaces have found concentrated ownership as a general pattern in most other world economies. The La Porta research which included companies from 27 developed countries found that only 30% of the companies showed dispersed ownership. Japan, in effect qualified as concentrated ownership geography because of predominant inter-corporate holdings even after they returned dispersed ownership because of direct ownership not being higher than 20% which was made the study cut-off criterion. Significant ownership concentration, either in the form of holdings by corporate bodies, individuals or the state in their study of corporations in South America was found by Aguilera et al (2011).

5. b) Classification of Shareholders

Data in this study is analysed under two major categories of shareholders namely (i) Promoters, (ii) Non Promoters Holding sub divided into two other categories namely (iii) Non Promoters Institutional Holding, (iii) Non Promoters Non-Institutional Holding.

6. i. Promoters Holding

Holdings into various categories provide insight into control in the company. Promoters are the entities that floated the company and to a large extent have seats on Board of Directors or the Management. Relatives of the Promoters who hold shares also fall under this class and are termed the Promoter Group. Promoter Holdings show the extent of control Promoters have over running of the business.

7. ii. Non Promoters

Shareholders other than promoters are known as public shareholders. Public shareholding pattern consists of institutional and non-institutional investors.

iii. Non Promoters' Institutional Holding Institutional investors include the pension funds, money managers, mutual funds, insurance companies, investment banks and commercial trusts. They buy large quantities of shares leaving high impact on the stock market's movements. They are considered knowledgeable and experienced. Hence, their footprints are generally followed by small investors.

iv. Non Promoters' Non Institutional Holding Non institutional investors are those who carry their investments through a broker, bank, and real estate agent and so on. They are generally common people or organizations managing money on their own. III.

8. Methodology a) Results

In the research study, the long term trend is analyzed of the selected variables related Ownership structure. The descriptive analysis of the variables is done and represented. In descriptive analysis of the variables, the measure of central tendency (mean), distribution, minimum and maximum values are estimated for each variable and are represented in the tables below. In the research study, it is also found that among the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index, 42percent of firms in BSE 100 index are having average promoters holding of more than 50 percent, 23 percent of the firms are having average promoters holding in the range of 40 -50 percent of holding, 16percent of the firms are found to have average promoters holding of 30 -40 percent of holding, 16 percent of firms are found to have average promoters holding in the range of 20 -30 percent of holding, 0percent of the firms are found to have average promoters holding of 10 -20 percent of holding and 3 percent of the firms are having the average promoters holding less than less than 10 percent of holding.

The Frequency Distribution is also shown with the help of Graph shown in Figure 1.

ii. In the research study, the trends of non-promoter's holding in the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index is analyzed and it is found that Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. is having the highest non promoters holding of (100 percent) in last 15 In the research study, it is also found that among the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index, 57percent of firms in BSE 100 index are having average non-promoters holding of more than 50 percent of holding, 22 percent of the firms are having average non-promoters holding in the range of 40 -50 percent of holding, 11 percent of the firms are found to have average non-promoters holding of 30 -40 percent of holding, 7percent of the firms are found to have average non-promoters holding of 20-30 percent of holding, 3percent of firms are found to have average non-promoters holding in the range of 10 -20 percent of holding and there is no holding of average nonpromoters holding less than 10percent of holding.

The Frequency Distribution is also shown with the help of Graph shown in Figure 2 In the research study, the trends of nonpromoter's institutional holding in the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index is analyzed and it is found that I D B I Bank Ltd. is having the highest average Non Promoters Institutional Holding of (77.097 percent) in last 15 In the research study, it is also found that among the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index, only 1percent of firms in BSE 100 index are having average non-promoters institutional holding of more than 50 percent of holding, 8 percent of the firms are having average non-promoters institutional holding in the range of 40 -50 percent of holding, 29 percent of the firms are found to have average non-promoters institutional holding of 30 -40 percent of holding, 35 percent of firms are found to have average nonpromoters institutional holding in the range of 20 -30 percent of holding, 23 percent of firms are found to have average non-promoters institutional holding in the range of 10 -20 percent of holding and 4 percent of the firms are having the average non promoters institutional holding less than 10 percent of holding.

The Frequency Distribution is also shown with the help of Graph shown in Figure 3.

9. iv. Non Promoters Non Institutional Holding

10. Company

Mean min max In the research study, the trends of nonpromoter's non institutional holding in the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index is analyzed and it is found that M R F Ltd. (58.06 percent), is having the highest average non promoters non institutional holding of (58.06 percent) in last 15 In the research study, it is also found that among the 100 companies selected for the study in BSE 100 index, only 1 percent of firms in BSE 100 Index are having average non-promoters non institutional holding of more than 50 percent of holding, 10 percent of the firms are having average non-promoters non institutional holding in the range of 40 -50 percent of holding, 18 percent of the firms are found to have average nonpromoters non institutional holding of 30 -40 percent of holding, 42 percent of firms are found to have average non-promoters non institutional holding in the range of 20 -30 percent of holding, 24 percent of firms are found to have average non-promoters non institutional holding in the range of 10 -20 percent of holding and 5 percent of the firms are having the average non promoters non institutional holding less than 10 percent of holding.

11. Conclusion

In this study, there is empirical confirmation of the predominance of concentrated ownership and control in corporate India. Out of the BSE 100-Index companies the number of dominant ownership entities (promoters), nearly 42percent of firms are having more than 50 percent of shareholding which indicates that there is concentration of ownership in the hands of promoters. Such entrenchment and control offers immense potential to the owners/controllers for tunneling and personal enrichment at the expense of absentee shareholders.

However, only 1 percent of firms are having more than 50 percent of average non promoters institutional holding as well as average non promoters non institutional holding. 35 percent of firms are found to have average non promoters institutional holding in the range of 20 -30 percent of shareholding. In case of average non promoters non institutional holding it is found that 42 percent of firms are having 20-30% of shareholding. It indicates that institutional as well as retail shareholders don't have the majority powers. In line with the trends in other developed markets, noninstitutional retail shareholdings are on the declining mode in the country. In the BSE 100-Index companies, much of these holdings were picked up by the promoters to boost their entrenchment and as a defense against hostile takeovers.

Figure 1. Ownership
Trends in BSE 100-Index Companies from 2000 -2014: Evidence and Implications
Figure 2. Table 1 .
1
Ownership Trends in BSE 100-Index Companies from 2000 -2014: Evidence and Implications
Year 2016
54
Volume XVI Issue II Version I A time series analysis of ownership structures in corporate India for the period 2000-2014 is presented in this section. The research design of the study is descriptive. In the research study the secondary data of different variables related to ownership structure in the Index BSE-100 in Indian stock marketwas extracted from the Prowess databases from CMIE related to the years ended 31 March 2000 to 2014. The descriptive analysis of the variables is done and represented. In descriptive analysis of the variables, the measure of central
( E ) tendency (mean, median), distribution, minimum and maximum values are estimated. While the focus of this
-Global Journal of Human Social Science i. Promoters Holding paper is the publicly traded companies, it would be helpful also to recognise the phenomenal growth in the overall corporate sector in the last 15 years to show the trend of ownership structure in India.
Table 1.1 : Average promoters holding of the firms in BSE 100 Index for the period 2000-2014
Company Mean min max
Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. 85.1514 68.22 88.58
Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 84.9886 80.00 85.82
Godrej Industries Ltd. 80.2914 68.22 88.61
Bharat Electronics Ltd. 75.8000 75.02 75.86
Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. 75.2043 68.94 84.11
s
Note: s-Year 2016
Figure 3.
Bharat Forge Ltd. Bhushan Steel Ltd. 60.0207 35.1262 53.25 28.78 65.68 56.84
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. Bosch Ltd. 59.8079 34.5329 41.78 28.82 100.00 43.00
Atul Ltd. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 59.6336 32.6086 49.38 32.27 66.80 36.94
Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. Procter & Gamble Hygiene & Health Care Ltd. 59.2379 31.3850 40.33 29.36 73.32 35.00
Ramco Cements Ltd. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 58.6779 31.3736 57.38 5.24 65.68 35.08
Tata Elxsi Ltd. Pidilite Industries Ltd. 58.5821 28.8543 54.89 28.12 61.85 29.94
Max India Ltd. Essar Oil Ltd. 58.3329 28.2664 48.36 9.46 66.22 79.88
Century Textiles &Inds. Ltd. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 57.5621 27.0493 54.63 25.90 59.45 28.49
L I C Housing Finance Ltd. Dabur India Ltd. 57.3129 26.8036 34.92 21.47 65.30 31.36
Tata Motors Ltd. Tata Communications Ltd. 57.2657 25.2593 44.41 15.09 74.65 48.87
50.00% Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 40.00% J K Lakshmi Cement Ltd. Bharat Electronics Ltd. 30.00% 20.00% E I D-Parry (India) Ltd. Godrej Industries Ltd. 10.00% C E S C Ltd. Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 0.00% Rallis India Ltd. Crisil Ltd. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. [Merged] Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. less than 10% Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. 10 -20% 20 -30% 30 -40% 57.0479 24.7950 56.4579 24.1957 56.4550 19.7071 54.0764 15.0014 40 -50% 52.1979 52.2207 than 50% 52.3143 more 53.7821 14.8486 47.56 15.89 53.42 24.13 51.45 11.39 47.43 14.14 48.93 32.30 34.29 27.54 11.42 61.64 31.06 60.44 24.98 61.26 31.78 65.80 19.99 54.80 67.51 67.96 60.00 31.78
Asian Paints Ltd. 52.0907 47.21 57.54
Reliance Industries Ltd. 51.4493 44.92 56.76
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. 51.3286 39.88 60.12
Kajaria Ceramics Ltd. 50.8071 46.49 55.95
J S W Steel Ltd. Company Mean 50.6850 min 34.11 max 61.95
Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. State Bank Of India 100.0000 50.5921 100.00 32.40 100.00 100.00
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. Britannia Industries Ltd. 98.2050 50.4364 95.87 49.04 100.00 56.28
Federal Bank Ltd. Exide Industries Ltd. 97.0386 50.1379 84.69 43.93 100.00 54.01
I F C I Ltd. Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd. 92.0671 49.0000 44.47 49.00 100.00 49.00
M R F Ltd. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 73.6350 48.9400 72.67 48.89 74.80 48.99
Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. Bajaj Finance Ltd. 72.7000 48.9071 69.30 37.93 80.85 58.49
Voltas Ltd. Bata India Ltd. 72.4700 48.6329 69.39 47.04 79.96 48.99
Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. Piramal Enterprises Ltd. 72.4621 48.6129 69.38 45.58 78.56 50.76
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. Ashok Leyland Ltd. 71.6621 48.3150 64.15 45.24 77.91 50.41
Satyam Computer Services Ltd. [Merged] Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 71.0400 48.0714 46.20 25.00 86.96 51.17
N C C Ltd. Amara Raja Batteries Ltd. 70.9300 47.9700 51.78 47.94 80.41 48.00
A C C Ltd. Hero Motocorp Ltd. 70.8507 47.3386 49.70 45.04 100.00 60.08
Trent Ltd. Reliance Capital Ltd. 70.5700 47.3236 67.39 37.12 74.82 51.84
Infosys Ltd. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 70.0500 47.0621 64.31 36.39 80.50 56.26
Tata Chemicals Ltd. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 70.0293 47.0164 68.40 32.75 72.93 48.58
Tata Steel Ltd. Lupin Ltd. 69.7736 46.7829 65.67 32.78 73.77 53.25
Grasim Industries Ltd. SesaSterlite Ltd. 69.3929 46.7707 60.05 36.64 79.61 49.00
Tata Global Beverages Ltd. Cummins India Ltd. 67.3079 46.7607 63.24 41.97 71.39 49.00
Bajaj Holdings &Invst. Ltd. S K F India Ltd. 66.8607 46.5350 59.56 46.04 71.42 49.19
Escorts Ltd. Titan Company Ltd. 66.8493 46.5321 58.02 44.93 73.22 47.34
Tata Power Co. Ltd. B E M L Ltd. 66.6050 42.3657 64.31 38.76 67.95 45.97
H D F C Bank Ltd. A B B India Ltd. 66.3186 41.4293 55.13 25.00 78.00 49.00
Hindalco Industries Ltd. Oriental Bank Of Commerce 65.7486 41.3586 53.74 33.52 78.61 48.91
Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd. Siemens Ltd. 65.0507 41.0186 27.73 25.00 72.32 48.99
Finolex Cables Ltd. I D B I Bank Ltd. 64.4823 40.0179 60.16 23.50 71.99 47.33
Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. Sanofi India Ltd. 64.1429 39.6086 55.61 39.60 74.24 39.62
Raymond Ltd. Nestle India Ltd. 62.8921 39.4350 57.18 37.24 71.58 48.77
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 62.1557 38.2364 62.15 33.79 62.16 45.07
BalrampurChini Mills Ltd. Thermax Ltd. 61.0550 37.9071 52.92 36.47 68.18 38.02
Arvind Ltd. Bajaj Electricals Ltd. 60.8800 36.6571 48.78 25.44 84.59 51.72
Cipla Ltd. Shree Cement Ltd. 60.6993 36.5000 59.03 34.44 63.11 43.54
Figure 4.
(97.04 percent). The companies with lowest percentage
of non-promoters holding are Mangalore Refinery &
Petrochemicals Ltd. (14.85 percent), Steel Authority Of
India Ltd. (15.0014 percent). and Godrej Industries Ltd.
(19.7 percent).The frequency distribution is shown below
in Table 1.4.
Average Non Promoters Holding Frequency Percent
less than 10% 0 0.00%
10 -20% 3 3.00%
20 -30% 7 7.00%
30 -40% 11 11.00%
40 -50% 22 22.00%
more than 50% 57 57.00%
Total 100 100.00%
Figure 5. Table 1 . 5 :
15
59
Volume XVI Issue II Version I
E )
(
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
less 10 - 20 - 30 - 40 - more
than 20% 30% 40% 50% than
10% 50%
Note: © 2016 Global Journals Inc. (US)
Figure 6.
Average Non Promoters Institutional Holding Frequency Percent
less than 10% 4 4.00%
10 -20% 23 23.00%
20 -30% 35 35.00%
30 -40% 29 29.00%
40 -50% 8 8.00%
more than 50% 1 1.00%
Total 100 100.00%
61
Volume XVI Issue II Version I
E )
(
Figure 7. Table 1 . 6 :
16
Year 2016
62
Volume XVI Issue II Version I 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00%
( E ) less 10 - 20 - 30 - 40 - more
Global Journal of Human Social Science M R F Ltd. Federal Bank Ltd. Tata Elxsi Ltd. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd. Finolex Cables Ltd. Trent Ltd. than 10% 20% 30% 58.0586 47.7364 47.1929 46.0314 45.2679 45.2238 44.8800 40% 50% 46.28 29.22 34.17 41.56 37.64 39.04 30.93 than 50% 60.75 73.14 61.78 55.91 53.98 48.75 72.84
I F C I Ltd. 44.3407 26.33 57.60
Atul Ltd. 42.2721 32.49 52.10
Bajaj Holdings &Invst. Ltd. 41.7907 33.44 51.75
Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. 41.2700 29.40 58.59
N C C Ltd. 38.2221 20.23 61.48
Bajaj Finance Ltd. 36.1014 19.11 53.68
Arvind Ltd. 35.4086 19.03 62.48
Escorts Ltd. 34.9929 25.63 48.97
Kajaria Ceramics Ltd. 34.8071 18.44 48.87
Note: s -
Figure 8. Table 1 . 7 :
17
Century Textiles &Inds. Ltd. 34.5229 30.31 38.31
Amara Raja Batteries Ltd. 34.2221 21.34 46.30
Tata Chemicals Ltd. 33.9479 24.02 44.37
A C C Ltd. 32.3007 16.84 71.03
Voltas Ltd. 31.6436 21.53 51.43
J K Lakshmi Cement Ltd. 31.4550 21.52 39.98
Bharat Forge Ltd. 31.2321 22.78 38.33
Cipla Ltd. 31.1814 27.35 39.72
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. 30.5529 18.72 42.57
Titan Company Ltd. 30.3300 22.84 37.08
Tata Steel Ltd. 30.2879 23.34 40.97
Max India Ltd. 30.2821 8.37 47.47
Rallis India Ltd. 30.0393 22.78 42.60
Raymond Ltd. 29.6879 23.17 40.73
Ramco Cements Ltd. 29.4143 20.80 35.11
H D F C Bank Ltd. 29.3871 16.40 49.76
Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd. 29.3121 11.37 62.29
Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd. Bhushan Steel Ltd. 29.2500 28.9777 22.05 23.03 39.31 32.87 63
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. Tata Global Beverages Ltd. BalrampurChini Mills Ltd. J S W Steel Ltd. E I D-Parry (India) Ltd. Reliance Capital Ltd. Hindalco Industries Ltd. Crisil Ltd. Grasim Industries Ltd. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. Bata India Ltd. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. [Merged] Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 28.7621 28.4807 28.1643 27.9286 27.9021 27.8529 27.3021 27.1771 26.7986 26.7021 26.5429 25.9562 25.4650 22.99 20.86 20.10 17.37 21.41 14.43 13.82 13.78 20.04 12.89 16.85 10.58 14.38 34.87 41.94 36.69 38.27 35.13 49.94 37.48 43.56 41.36 47.69 37.20 65.64 44.37 Volume XVI Issue II Version I
Piramal Enterprises Ltd. 24.7393 15.94 34.50 E )
Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. 24.4707 15.05 27.49 (
Shree Cement Ltd. 24.2200 20.30 33.47
Tata Power Co. Ltd. 23.2671 16.01 33.51
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. [Merged] 23.0486 13.80 33.58
Infosys Ltd. 22.9814 12.20 36.14
Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. 22.9029 12.33 45.38
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 22.6564 15.51 53.21
S K F India Ltd. 22.6036 13.93 34.28
Reliance Industries Ltd. 22.4964 17.71 25.72
Essar Oil Ltd. 22.2707 4.85 74.62
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 21.9821 14.55 34.06
Crompton Greaves Ltd. 21.9707 14.64 35.46
Tata Motors Ltd. 21.9100 7.53 44.10
Asian Paints Ltd. 21.9043 19.88 24.70
SesaSterlite Ltd. 21.8857 11.22 34.74
Britannia Industries Ltd. 21.4193 18.94 24.63
Procter & Gamble Hygiene & Health Care Ltd. 21.1064 14.77 25.81
C E S C Ltd. 21.0957 8.33 43.80
Bajaj Electricals Ltd. 20.6879 14.18 30.79
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 20.5650 9.07 59.56
L I C Housing Finance Ltd. 20.3100 12.25 34.24
Nestle India Ltd. 20.0421 18.23 25.26
Exide Industries Ltd. 19.8736 12.82 22.84
Lupin Ltd. 19.4700 9.02 31.47
Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 19.4571 14.53 23.58
Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 19.4336 13.54 25.07
Siemens Ltd. 19.2221 12.01 27.55
Figure 9.
Average Non Promoters Non Institutional Holding Frequency Percent
less than 10% 5 5.00%
10 -20% 24 24.00%
20 -30% 42 42.00%
30 -40% 18 18.00%
40 -50% 10 10.00%
more than 50% 1 1.00%
Total 100 100.00%
Figure 10. Table 1 . 8 :
18
Year 2016
64
E )
(
Global Journal of Human Social Science -
s
1
2
3

Appendix A

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Notes
1
© 2016 Global Journals Inc. (US)
2
Ownership Trends in BSE 100-Index Companies from 2000 -2014: Evidence and Implications
3
© 2016 Global Journals Inc. (US) Ownership Trends in BSE 100-Index Companies from 2000 -2014: Evidence and Implications
Date: 2016-01-15