

# 1 Cross Border Crimes in West African Sub-Region: Implications 2 for Nigeria's National Security and External Relations

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## 7 **Abstract**

8 Despite the efforts of cross-border security agencies like the Nigeria police, customs service,  
9 Immigration services, and Nigerian civil Defense etc, Nigeria borders have been described as  
10 porous allowing all sorts of cross border or transborder criminal activities such as human  
11 trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, arm robbery, money laundry and illicit arms trafficking  
12 resulting to proliferation of SALW. Thus, West Africa's regional superpower, Nigeria,  
13 continues to face serious security challenges due to cross border or transborder criminal  
14 activities. We argue that; one, the spate of cross border criminal activities in West Africa  
15 undermines Nigeria's national security; and two, frequent trans-border crimes in West African  
16 sub-region impede Nigeria's external relations. The focus of this paper therefore is to examine  
17 the implications of cross border crimes in West Africa for Nigeria's national security and  
18 external relations. The study is basically a historical research method relying mainly on  
19 secondary sources of data from internet sources, official documents and country websites as  
20 the method of data collection. In other words, we made use of qualitative-descriptive analysis  
21 as our method of data analysis, that is, documentary studies of official document and other  
22 materials in analyzing the secondary data. This paper titled ?Cross Border Crimes in West  
23 African sub-region: Implications for Nigeria's National Security and External Relations?. The  
24 paper is basically a historical research method relying mainly on secondary sources of data  
25 from internet sources, official documents and country websites as the method of data  
26 collection. We made use of qualitative-descriptive analysis as our method of data analysis,  
27 that is, documentary studies of official document and other materials in analyzing the  
28 secondary data. The major purpose of embarking on this research is to examine the  
29 implications of cross border crimes in West Africa for Nigeria's

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31 **Index terms**— cross border crimes, west africa, nigeria, national security and external relations.

## 32 **1 Introduction**

33 Nigeria is a diverse and a vast country covering 923, 768 square kilometres with more than 36, 450 kilometres of  
34 land and maritime borders, and shares land borders with four countries namely, Benin Republic in the West,  
35 Chad and Niger in the North, and Cameroon in the East. It shares international water Lake Chad in the North  
36 with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, and a maritime border coastline in the Gulf of Guinea or Atlantic Ocean.  
37 Along the Western border, Nigeria has 770 kilometres of shared land border with the Republic of Benin, in the  
38 North, around 1,500 kilometres with Niger and 90 kilometres with Chad and in the West, 1,700kilometres with  
39 Cameroon. Along the Southern coastline it also shares 853 kilometres of maritime border with the Atlantic  
40 Ocean known as the Gulf of Guinea. All totaling outstretches of about 4910 km of borders ??Yacubu, 2005;Stohl

#### 4 C) OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

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41 and Tuttle, 2009;Nte, 2011). Despite the effort of cross-border security agencies like the Nigeria police, customs  
42 service, Immigration services, etc, Nigeria borders have been described as porous allowing all sorts of cross border  
43 or trans-border criminal activities such as human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, arm robbery, money  
44 laundry and illicit arms trafficking resulting to proliferation of SALW. For example, out of the 640 million small  
45 arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan  
46 Africa and 8 million in West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians,  
47 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups ??Ibrahim, 2003;Stohl  
48 and Tuttle, 2009;Nte, 2011). Between 1999 and 2003, there were over 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence  
49 and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of  
50 women and children. The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed  
51 more than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999. The majority of casualties about 66%  
52 in Kano riot of 2004 were SALW victims sustaining permanent disabilities. Injuries due to SALW have increased  
53 as much as ten-fold in urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using SALW (John, Mohammed,  
54 Pinto and Nkanta, 2007;Nte, 2011). The problems of armed violence and proliferation of SALW are worsened  
55 by the inability of the police to reduce violent crime, ensure law and order and provide adequate security to  
56 the populace. None of the security agent currently possesses the training, resources or personnel to perform  
57 their duties effectively due to lengthy and porous nature of Nigerian borders (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nte  
58 (2011) posits that there is a direct link between the acquisition of weapons like SALW and escalation conflicts  
59 into a full-brown war. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is often one of the major security  
60 challenges currently facing Nigeria, Africa and indeed the world in general. The trafficking and wide availability  
61 of these weapons fuel communal conflict, political instability and pose a threat, not only to security, but also to  
62 sustainable development. The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed  
63 crime, and militancy (Nte, 2011).

#### 64 2 a) Statement of the Problem

65 Statement of problem is the fundamental question that requires an answer, it is the most worrying issues  
66 that need to be properly examine and understood. It is a fundamental question because many other specific  
67 research questions are derived from it. The research problem is the fulcrum which the research objective and  
68 hypotheses revolve (Obasi, 1999). Under the statement of problem the researcher is expected to examine the  
69 'why' related issues the researchers does not only describe as such but rather raise question that attract curiosity  
70 and expectation in terms of answer. West Africa's regional superpower, Nigeria, continues to face serious security  
71 challenges due to cross border or trans-border criminal activities. African countries generally have experienced  
72 direct, indirect and consequential impacts of weapons proliferation. Thousands of people, -both civilians and  
73 combatants are killed or injured every year on the continent. Yet, even when death or injury is avoided, small  
74 arms proliferation and misuse can dramatically impact a community, country or region's landscape. The threat  
75 and use of small arms can undermine development, prevent the delivery of humanitarian and economic aid,  
76 and contribute to refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) populations (Stohl and Tuttle, 2009). Thus,  
77 despite the effort of cross-border security agencies like the Nigeria police, customs service, Immigration services,  
78 etc, Nigeria borders have been described as porous allowing all sorts of cross border or trans-border criminal  
79 activities such as human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, arm robbery, money laundry and illicit arms  
80 trafficking resulting to proliferation of SALW. For example, out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally,  
81 it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in  
82 West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned  
83 by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups. ??Ibrahim, 2003;Stohl and Tuttle,  
84 2009;Nte, 2011). Between 1999 and 2003, there were over 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence and ethno-  
85 religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of women and  
86 children. The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed more than  
87 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999. The majority of casualties about 66% in Kano  
88 riot of 2004 were SALW victims sustaining permanent disabilities. Injuries due to SALW have increased as much  
89 as ten-fold in urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using SALW (John, Mohammed, Pinto and  
90 Nkanta, 2007;Nte, 2011).

#### 91 3 b) Research Questions

92 Research question is the fundamental question about the study that requires an answer. It is the fundamental  
93 question because other specific research questions derive from it. It, also, shapes or determines the research  
94 objectives and hypotheses. Obasi (1999) notes that research question is the most worrying issue or fact that  
95 needs to be properly examined and understood. From the foregoing, therefore, we raised the following questions:

#### 96 4 c) Objectives of the Study

97 Under the objectives of the research, one is required to state in concrete terms, what are expected to be achieved  
98 at the end of the research. In other words, it represents the end product of what is being researched upon, in  
99 terms of the expectation or solution required. One is therefore required to present identifiable or concrete things

100 to be accomplished by the research. This study has broad and specific objectives. The broad or general objective  
101 is to examine the implications of cross border crimes in West Africa for Nigeria's national security and external  
102 relations. While the specific objectives include the following: 1. To ascertain if the spate of cross border criminal  
103 activities in West Africa undermines Nigeria's national security.

## 104 **5 To ascertain whether frequent trans-border crimes in** 105 **West African sub-region impede Nigeria's external relations.**

### 106 **6 d) Significance of the Study**

107 The significance of the study is one, the value or contribution which the research is going to make to existing  
108 knowledge in terms of theoretical justification or relevance; and two, the solution the research is going to provide  
109 towards ameliorating a practical problem of concern (Obasi, 1999). A research can be justified because it is (i)  
110 timely, topical or auspicious (ii) closing an existing gap in knowledge or the literature (iii) theoretically relevant  
111 (iv) practically relevant (v) in accordance with national priority (vi) in accordance with priorities set by research  
112 funding agency (vii) wider in scope in terms of issues covered or geographical arrears covered, and (viii) useful for  
113 confirming/ accepting or rejecting existing findings. It lists out the groups, institutions that are likely to benefit  
114 from the findings or discoveries of research. Therefore, the study has theoretical and practical relevance. The  
115 theoretical relevance of this study is that it examines the implications of cross border crimes in West Africa for  
116 Nigeria's national security and external relations. By so doing, the study enriches the existing stock of literature  
117 or expands the frontiers of knowledge through its findings, therefore serves as a source of data/material to those  
118 scholars who may be interested in further studies in this area. Empirically or practically, this study will be of  
119 immense benefits to Nigerian government, security advisers, defence advisers, policy makers, regional institutions  
120 like AU, ECOWAS, etc. the study is also timely and topical.

### 121 **7 e) Nature and Meaning of Cross Border Criminal Activities**

122 The nature of cross-border crime has changed rapidly over recent years through the use of technology, networks,  
123 the loosening of travel restrictions and through criminal diversification. Crime networks are complex and to  
124 break them is a massive task for police forces worldwide. This is in part due to the fact that the heads of  
125 these organisations have powerful connections, and their wealth enables them to bribe officials. Transnational  
126 crimes are crimes that have actual or potential effect across national borders and crimes which are intra-State but  
127 which offend fundamental values of the international community ??Boister, 2003). In recent times the term is  
128 commonly used in the law enforcement agencies and academic communities. The word "transnational" describes  
129 crimes that are not only international (that is, crimes that cross borders between countries), but crimes that by  
130 their nature involve cross-border transference as an essential part of the criminal activity. Transnational crimes  
131 also include crimes that take place in one country, but their consequences significantly affect another country  
132 and transit countries may also be involved. Examples of transnational crimes include: human trafficking, people  
133 smuggling, smuggling/trafficking of goods (such as arms trafficking and drug trafficking and illegal animal and  
134 plant products and other goods prohibited on environmental grounds (e.g. banned ozone depleting substances),  
135 sex slavery, terrorism offences, torture and apartheid. Transnational organized crime (TOC) refers specifically  
136 to transnational crime carried out by organized crime organizations. Transnational crimes may also be crimes of  
137 customary international law or international crimes when committed in certain circumstances. For example they  
138 may in certain situations constitute crimes against humanity. According to the UNODC, "Transnational crime by  
139 definition involves people in more than one country maintaining a system of operation and communication that  
140 is effective enough to perform criminal transactions, sometimes repeatedly" (UNODC Report2005:14). While it  
141 may be true that the fragility of states in West Africa and the weakness of state institutions mandated to combat  
142 the drug menace has contributed to the upsurge of TOC in recent times, the complicity, active or passive, of state  
143 officials in the region and outside, cannot be ruled out. For example, the January 2004 arrest of an international  
144 smuggling gang in Ghana that had imported 675 kilograms of cocaine, with a street value estimated at USD  
145 140 million, led to the suspects being released on bail of just USD 200,000, causing a public outcry in the press  
146 (Aning, 2007).

147 The task of defining or describing "trans-border crime" would not be an easy one, because many elements  
148 have been recognized as constituting it. However, "trans-border crime" represents a number of illegal and  
149 notorious activities carried out by individuals and groups across national and international borders, either for  
150 financial or economic benefits and also sociopolitical cum religious considerations. It is a set of criminal acts  
151 whose perpetrators and repercussions go beyond territorial borders. These would include human trafficking,  
152 money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling or trafficking of weapons, cross-border terrorism, illegal oil  
153 bunkering, illicit trafficking in diamonds, corruption, business fraud, to mention but these notable few (Asiwaju,  
154 1992, Ering, 2011,). Money laundering is the practice of engaging in financial transactions to conceal the identity,  
155 source, or destination of illegally gained money. It could also be defined as the process of taking any action with  
156 property of any form which is either wholly or in part the proceeds of a crime that will disguise the fact that that  
157 property is the proceeds of a crime or obscure the beneficial ownership of said property (Ering, 2011 ?? Boister,  
158 2003). In the past, the term money laundering was applied only to financial transactions related to organized

## **8 F) ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES OF TRANS-BORDER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA, WEST AFRICA, AFRICA AND GLOBE**

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159 crime. Today, its definition has been expanded by government and international regulators such as the "US office  
160 of the controller of the Currency" to mean" any financial transaction which generates an asset or a value as the  
161 result of an illegal act", which may involve actions such as "tax evasion" or "false accounting". In some countries,  
162 the concept is broader than the involvement of money to include "any economic good" and other transactions.  
163 Money laundering is ipso facto illegal, the acts generating the money almost are themselves criminal in some way  
164 (for if not, the money would not need to be laundered) ??Addo, 2006, Park, 2006, Ering, 2011).

165 Historically, money laundering evolved in 1931 when many methods were devised to disguise the origins of  
166 money generated by the sale of illegal alcohol. During this period Al Capone's was convicted for tax evasion,  
167 mobster Meyer Lansky transferred funds from Florida "Carpet Joints" to accounts overseas. After the 1934 Swiss  
168 Banking Act, which created the principle of bank secrecy, Lansky bought a Swiss Bank into which they could  
169 transfer his illegal funds through a complex system of "Shell Companies", holding companies, and "offshore bank"  
170 accounts (Ering, 2011 ?? Addo, 2006). Drug trafficking, on the other hand, typically refers to the possession of an  
171 illegal drug in a predetermined quantity that constitutes the drug that is going to be sold. Legally, the US defines  
172 drug trafficking as "an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,  
173 distribution or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled  
174 substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense ??Addo,  
175 2006, Ering, 2011, Passas, 2002).

176 However, drug trafficking involves selling drugs and drug paraphernalia, whether it is a local exchange between  
177 a user and a dealer or a major international operation. Drug trafficking is a problem that affects every nation in  
178 the world and exist on many levels. It has also been described as the commercial exchange of drugs and drug  
179 paraphernalia which may include any equipment used to manufacture illegal drugs or use of them (Ering, 2011,  
180 Park, 2006).

### **181 8 f) Issues and Perspectives of Trans-Border Criminal Activities 182 in Nigeria, West Africa, Africa and Globe**

183 The international community is confronted with an increasing level of transnational crime in which criminal  
184 conduct in one country has an impact in another or even several others. Drug trafficking, human trafficking,  
185 computer crimes, terrorism, and a host of other crimes can involve actors operating outside the borders of  
186 a country which might have a significant interest in stemming the activity in question and prosecuting the  
187 perpetrator. Contemporary transnational crimes take advantage of globalization, trade liberalization and  
188 exploding new technologies to perpetrate diverse crimes and to move money, goods, services and people  
189 instantaneously for purposes of perpetrating violence for political ends (Dan, 2013). Ortuno and Wiriychai  
190 (2009) have maintained that the past few years have been characterized by a significant increase in global criminal  
191 activities such as money laundering, trafficking in human and nuclear technology and material, the trade in human  
192 organs and migrant smuggling. At the same time, emerging crimes such as modern piracy, and trafficking in  
193 toxic waste, counterfeit medicines, precious metals or natural resources have been added to the list of traditional  
194 illegal activities such as prostitution, drug trafficking and arms trafficking. Most recently, transnational crime has  
195 grown in scope and is characterized by increasingly global reach, involved in multiple forms of criminal activity,  
196 expanding criminal markets to include large-scale financial fraud and cybercrime. And the syndicates are willing  
197 to protect their activities through violent and ruthless means, linked to international terrorist groups and devising  
198 novel and notorious organizational strategies to deter capture (Luna 2008). As it stands, no region is immune  
199 from global reach of transnational crime groups. Since the end of the Cold war, we have seen international  
200 organized crime groups continue to branch out beyond their traditional parameters, take quick advantage of new  
201 opportunities, and move more readily into new geographic areas. The major international organized crime groups  
202 operate in the United States, Latin America, West Africa, Southeast Europe, Asia, Russia and all other regions  
203 (Ering, 2011, Park, 2006). In the post-world war II era, legislators found themselves in a quandary as they were  
204 confronted with a growing list of commercial, fiscal, and environmental offenses that did not actually cause direct  
205 harm to any one identifiable victim, there was no stinking corpse. They decided that confiscating the proceeds of  
206 crime would adequately deter potential criminals. Anxious to avoid confiscation, organized criminals now needed  
207 to give these huge sums of money -not easily consumed or invested in the legal economy without raising eyebrows  
208 a patina of Money laundering has been dubbed the "Achilles heel of organized crime", for it compels mobsters  
209 to seek out and co-opt established businessmen and women with highly technical knowhow and access to legal  
210 institutions like banks to launder their plunder. The term "money laundering" does not derive, as is often said  
211 from Al Capone having used Laundromats to hide ill-gotten gains. It is more likely to mean that dirty money is  
212 made clean. The first reference to the term "money laundering" itself actually appeared during the "watergate  
213 scandal" in United States of America (Ering, 2011, Park, (2006). This was when the then US president Richard  
214 Nixon's "Committee to Re-elect the president" moved dirty campaign contribution o Mexico, then brought the  
215 money back through a company in Miami. It was Britain's "The Guardian" newspaper that coined the term,  
216 referring to the process as "Laundering". Money may be laundered through a complex business network of Shell  
217 Companies and trusts based in tax haven example cashing up-moving large amount of small change each week  
218 into banks in order to avoid suspicion; captive business -involve starting up a business whose cash inflow cannot

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219 be monitored, and funnel the small change into it and pay taxes on it. Money laundering has attendant effects  
220 on the socioeconomic development of societies (Asiwaju, 1992, Ering, 2011).

## 221 **9 Cross-Border Challenges**

222 The Secretary-General reports every six months the Security Council on the fulfillment of the mandate of the  
223 United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). The report focuses on country-specific political developments  
224 within the sub-region, on cross-border and crosscutting issues in West Africa and on activities undertaken by  
225 UNOWA in cooperation with other United Nations entities and regional organizations, including the Economic  
226 Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as civil society and other international organizations.  
227 UNOWA works in synergy with other United Nations entities in regional organizations in West Africa to raises  
228 attention on and tackle the situation in the sub region. Its action is focused on a number of priorities: encouraging  
229 recovery efforts in countries affected by crisis, consolidating good governance and the rule of law, promoting human  
230 rights and gender mainstreaming, and raising awareness of the imperative need for economic growth and the fair  
231 distribution of wealth.

232 Source: UNOWA-United Nations Office for West Africa, 2014 II.

## 233 **10 Theoretical Framework**

234 A theoretical framework refers to how the researcher or writer of the report not only questions, but ponders  
235 and develops thoughts or theories on what the possible answers could be, then this thoughts and theories are  
236 grouped together into themes that frame the subject. It is the process of identifying a core set of connectors  
237 within a topic and showing how they fit together. Obasi (1999) states that, by theoretical framework, we mean  
238 a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of a theory in the  
239 description and analysis of a research problem. It is a way of describing, analysis, interpreting and predicting  
240 phenomena. This study is anchored on the combination of the theory of relative autonomy of the state and  
241 failed state theory. The state relative autonomy theory is situated within the ambit of the neo-Marxist political  
242 economy paradigm. The theory of relative state autonomy depicts the level or degree of detachment or aloofness  
243 of the state in the discharge of its duties such as mediating inter-class and intra-class struggles. Thus, this  
244 theory presupposes that in any state or political society, there are two levels of contradiction, namely primary  
245 contradiction and secondary contradiction. Primary contradiction is inter-class struggle or depicts class struggle  
246 between two antagonistic classes such as the ruling class and the ruled class or the bourgeois class and the  
247 proletariat (i.e. the working class). Whilst, secondary contradiction is the intra-class struggle, denoting class  
248 conflicts within the ruling-class or between different segments of the ruling-class. Marx and Engels demonstrate  
249 this intractable phenomenon of class struggle when they declare in the preface of their book, The Communist  
250 Manifesto that "the history of all the hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels,  
251 1977). The exponents of the theory hold that a state can exhibit either low or high relative autonomy. A state  
252 exhibits high autonomy when there is high commodification of capital or excessive penetration of capital into  
253 the economy such that the bourgeois class indulges in accumulation of capital through direct exploitation of the  
254 working class or appropriation of surplus value when they enter into social relationships of production (i.e. private  
255 capitalism). Here, the state is not interventionist, in other words, it does not intervene in the domestic economy  
256 like participating in the productive activities (i.e. public/state enterprises) or controlling or nationalizing means  
257 of production. The role of state here, therefore, is to regulate. As such, the state is relatively an impartial umpire  
258 mediating inter-class and intra-class struggles through harmonization and reconciliation of class interests. The  
259 developed capitalist states of the West are, therefore, considered to exemplify this high relative autonomy, and as  
260 a result, exhibit high level of human rights observance and protection (Ake, 1976; Alavi, 1972). Conversely, a state  
261 exhibits low autonomy when there is low commoditization of capital or low penetration of (private) capital into  
262 the economy in such a way that the ruling class is constantly engage in primitive accumulation of capital through  
263 embezzlement of public fund. The state becomes the only avenue for capital accumulation. The state is thus,  
264 interventionist for engaging in productive activities of means of productive activities (i.e. public corporation) by  
265 nationalization of major means of production. This state does not limit itself to regulatory rule and is hence  
266 compromised, such that instead of rising above class struggle it is deeply immersed in it ??Ake, 1981; ??985).  
267 The Nigerian state like other developing state exhibits a low level of the autonomy of the state as a result of low  
268 commoditization of capital. Under the electric mixture of mixed economy, Nigeria experiences the phenomenon  
269 of lack of penetration of (private) capital into the economy creating a parasitic petty bourgeois class whose major  
270 source of accumulation of capital is the state. Hence, the Nigerian state becomes the only avenue for (primitive)  
271 accumulation of capital through which the governing class (i.e. petty bourgeoisie) produce and reproduce their  
272 dominance. The implication of the low autonomy of the Nigerian state is that it is immersed in the class struggle  
273 rather than rising above it leading to intense struggle for the control of the state for primitive accumulation  
274 and marginalization of everything ??Ake, 2001). According to Patrick (2007:644-662) the term "failed state"  
275 is often used to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of basic conditions and responsibilities of a  
276 sovereign government. A failed state is one that has shattered social and political structures. It is characterized  
277 by social, political and economic failure. Common characteristics of a failing state is when a central government  
278 is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory, nonprovision of public

## 11 A) BACKGROUND TO CROSS BORDER CRIMES IN NIGERIA AND WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION

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279 utilities or services, widespread corruption and criminality; refugees and involuntary movement of populations, 280 and sharp economic decline. Thurer (1999) notes that failing states are invariably the product of a collapse of 281 the power structures providing political supports for law and order, a process generally triggered and accompanied 282 by anarchic forms of internal violence. It is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary 283 with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only 284 are the functions of government suspended, but its assets are destroyed or looted; and experienced officials are 285 killed or flee the country. According to Thurer (1999:1-5) failed states are:

286 The Fund for Peace propose the following attributes or characteristics of a failed state in order to make it 287 more precise (a) loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical 288 force (b) erosion of authority to make collective decision (c) an inability to provide reasonable public services and 289 ??d) an inability to interact with other states as full member of the international community. Anyanwu (2005) 290 states that by a failed state we mean a state that is unable to meet the needs and aspirations of its masses. A 291 failed state as opposed to capable state is a state which has failed to provide for its citizen such basics needs like 292 adequate security, food, water, electricity, health care, good roads, etc. Nigeria is by all Volume XIV Issue III 293 Version I 50 ( F )

294 indications or indices a failed state -a state where nothing works. Even those ones that work in other countries 295 once adopted in Nigeria refused to work.

### 296 11 a) Background to Cross Border Crimes in Nigeria and West 297 African Sub-Region

298 There is increasing concern about cross border crime and its implications for the international community. A 299 variety of explanations have been put forward for its increase. In this era of so called globalisation, it is suggested 300 that the incentives for cross border crime have increased, as criminals have identified the opportunities to gain 301 greater rewards from criminal activity outside their traditional boundaries. These cross-border crimes are mostly 302 symptomatic rather than as causes of instability in the region. The higher levels of disposable income in Western 303 Europe and North America create a marketing opportunity for the illicit trade of the rest of the world. This is not 304 limited to the trade in drugs but extends to almost all criminal currency; prostitution, pornography, protection 305 and counterfeiting ( Van, 2002, Julins, 2002).

306 However the flow of criminal trade is not all one way. The more developed countries export crime as well 307 as import it. Corruption is an example of a crime exported from more developed countries to those that are 308 vulnerable in the rest of the world. Citizens and corporations from the most developed nations would head any 309 worldwide most wanted list. The 2004 UN Secretary-General's Report on ways to combat subregional and cross 310 border crimes in West Africa identified major cross-border problems including the continued weakening of the 311 security sector, proliferation of roadblocks, youth unemployment, environmental degradation, social exclusion, 312 explosive remnants of war (ERW), mass refugee movements and forced displacement. Inequitable and illicit 313 exploitation of natural resources, weak national institutions and civil society structures and violations of human 314 rights, including the rights of women, were also identified as other serious problems afflicting the sub-region 315 (de Andrés, 2008 ?? Boister, 2003, Mueller, 2001). Crossborder crimes in West Africa have been in existence 316 since the 1970s. Initially, they were manifested in the form of individuals or groups of traders and businessmen 317 and women smuggling goods across the borders. These activities eventually assumed alarming proportions when 318 human trafficking, for the purposes of domestic slavery and illegal sexual activities, accompanied such activities as 319 the peddling of narcotics and car-jacking among other things by transnational syndicates (de Andrés, 2008). The 320 outbreak of intra-state conflicts in West Africa, beginning with Liberia in 1989, added mercenaries, small arms 321 trafficking and the recruitment of child soldiers and fighters to the cross-border crimes. West African criminal 322 networks are generally characterized by their flexibility and their ability to take on different forms and modes 323 of operation. The criminal enterprises in West Africa use similar techniques to that of the legitimate traders 324 and business people, typical of lineage-based societies. The standard procedure entails a successful individual 325 entrepreneur inviting one or more junior relatives or dependants to join him or her in an illegal business deal 326 (Boister, 2003, Dan, 2013, de Andrés, 2008).

327 Since the 1990s, cross-border criminal activities have become widespread and highly sophisticated. They 328 have served as an industry for former combatants and transnational criminal syndicates who undertake illegal 329 or criminal activities in the sub-region and in the process of undermine state security structures and abuse of 330 human rights (de Andrés, 2008). The neglect of these communities by various tiers of government over the years, 331 which led to their underdevelopment has not only made them transcend international boundaries to boost what 332 Bratton (1996), Chazan (1996) and Mackenzie (1992) dubbed as "second", "parallel", "informal", "underground", 333 "black" or "irregular" economic centers; but it has also 'transformed' them into sites for global criminal economy 334 smuggling routes. There have also been marked features of those criminal routes in Nigeria waterways where 335 up to half of pirate attacks around the world take place. Despite the global fall in the number of attacks in 336 2004, Nigeria's figure doubled the number of casualties recorded in other hot spots around the world, including 337 Vietnam, Bangladesh and the Philippines (The Guardian, ??uly 27, 2004). For example, Nigeria, Senegal and 338 Côte d'Ivoire were named and shamed for allegedly fuelling the illegal ivory trade. Having largely wiped out 339 their own elephant production, the three countries were believed to be importing and selling tones of ivory which

340 has been poached in nearby countries, according to a new report from conservation watchdogs (de Andrés, 2008,  
341 Julins, 2002). Analysts and counter-terrorism experts point to the fact that the terrorist group, al Qaeda, is used,  
342 and is continuing to use, rough diamonds in West Africa. The think-tank Global Witness presented evidence  
343 that confirms that al Qaeda has been involved in the rough diamond trade since the 1990s. Firstly in Kenya  
344 and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading  
345 in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in Kenya  
346 and Tanzania. This report argues that there are several reasons why al Qaeda has used rough diamonds; as a  
347 means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells; to hide money targeted by financial sanctions; to launder the profits  
348 of criminal activity; and to convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily transportable (de  
349 Andrés, 2008 ?? Addo, 2006).

350 In this context, it would be worth highlighting the past and current use of diamonds by Hezbollah as a source  
351 of revenue and a mechanism for asset transfer. Western intelligence sources have examined the alleged links  
352 between a network of Lebanese diamond traders and their associated companies, and Lebanese terrorist group  
353 Hezbollah, before briefly considering the evidence of the past and recent involvement of Hezbollah and AMAL  
354 in raising funds from diamond trading in West Africa. It is widely accepted that Hezbollah has been using the  
355 rough diamond trade throughout the 1980s and 1990s to raise funds, and that it continues to derive financial  
356 support from it (de Andrés, 2008, Dan, 2013). Some of these activities are made possible by common ethnic  
357 affiliations (in terms of language, beliefs, perceptions and support) at either side of the borders and intense  
358 economic activity undertaken along these corridors. Armed attacks and extortion at illegal check points, and  
359 '419' robbery and criminal activities experienced especially along the Benin-Nigeria corridor of the West African  
360 borders also constitutes common cross-border crimes (de Andrés, 2008, Dan, 2013). Some of the small arms are  
361 manufactured locally, while others are imported into the sub-region. In 2002 and 2003, for example, Côte d'Ivoire  
362 allegedly received several deliveries of military equipment, while Liberia received 49 deliveries in 2002 and 25  
363 deliveries in 2003. Additionally, some of the countries in the sub-region, but especially Ghana, Mali, Nigeria,  
364 and Sierra Leone, have a flourishing artisanal industry of local arms manufacture. These arms are smuggled out  
365 of Ghana through Togo, Benin to Nigeria, and used for violent crime. In November 2008, UN report on Drug  
366 Trafficking in West Africa shows that declining US cocaine and a rising European one appear to have prompted  
367 South American cocaine traffickers to make use of lowgovernance areas in West Africa as transit zones. This  
368 gave rise to at least 46 tons of cocaine seizures to Europe via West Africa since 2005. Prior to this time, the  
369 entire continent combined rarely seized a ton annually. There appear to be two parallel one, mainly involving  
370 large maritime and private air shipments, owned and managed by South Americans. In exchange for logistics  
371 assistance with these shipments, West Africans are paid in cocaine (Ering, 2011, Mueller 2001). This has created  
372 a second flow, as West Africans also traffic these drugs to Europe, usually via commercial air flights. Senegal  
373 and Nigeria were the source of the greatest volumes of cocaine seized on commercial air flights, but they also  
374 have the largest international air traffic volumes. Guinea (Conakry) and Mali are disproportionately represented  
375 in terms of the number of air couriers detected relative to their air traffic volumes (Ering, 2011 ?? Dan, 2013).

## 376 **12 b) Trans-Border Crimes in West Africa Sub-Region and 377 Nigeria's National Security**

378 As it is in sea piracy, so it is in the area of trafficking of children and women where the increasing desperation  
379 to leave Nigeria, to secure higher living standard, has put Libya and Morocco under severe trans-border security  
380 threats by young Nigerians, especially of Edo stock (Garuba, 2010, Julins, 2002). This is also the context in  
381 which an extensive web of international commercial fraud otherwise known as '419', found expression in the  
382 country. Owing its popularity to the worsening economic crisis that reached the beginning of a climax in the  
383 1980s, '419' takes its name from Nigeria's criminal code on fraud. It is difficult to ascribe a specific stereotype  
384 mode of operation to the dozens of small groups and independent operators involved in the 'business' that has  
385 expanded into internet scam, as their activities do not only take a variety of guises ranging from "seemingly  
386 legitimate business solicitations" to "illicit proposition for collusion in money-laundering." But whatever method  
387 or technique employed, what remains common to all of it operations is that its consequences often range from  
388 "financial loses to instances of kidnapping, extortion and death" ??Lewis, 1996;Garuba, 2003). Apart from  
389 its economic loss, negation of investment onshore exploration and production, security risks and damage to  
390 equipment, illegal oil bunkering fuels conflict and militancy through increased armed proliferations and drug  
391 abuse which have destabilized the Niger Delta region.. The complexity of the business of illegal oil bunkering  
392 is also illustrated by its sheer number of players. While Niger Delta youth may handle the local tapping and  
393 loading, international syndicates from Eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands and France  
394 (including new entrants like Filipinos and Ghanaians) all play roles in financing, transporting, and laundering  
395 the money associated from the business (Garuba, 2010). This explains the basis upon which security sources  
396 claim that control of the bunkering routes, rather than politics around familiar agitations, is responsible for  
397 much of the unrest in the Niger Delta region, particularly in more volatile states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers  
398 (Garuba, 2010, Asiawaju, 1992, Julins, 2002). When sustained at a measured level such that will not close down  
399 oil production completely, conflicts in the Niger Delta clear the creeks of other traffic to lubricate the engine  
400 of illegal oil bunkering. What it takes the well organized syndicated crime gangs involved in the business to

401 sustain the flow of the commodity is to plug back a part of the proceeds from the stolen crude oil into weapon  
402 acquisition to fan the conflicts. Apart from outright insecurity that the foregoing situation poses to the Niger  
403 Delta region and the entire country, the huge profit of the illegal private business also translates into incalculable  
404 loss to the Nigerian state ??Garuba, 2010, Ate andAkinterinwa, 1992). The incessant incidents of trans-border  
405 armed robbery (such as the networks of Shina Rambo and Hammani Tidjani) and proliferation of arms and drug  
406 trafficking operations that now endanger Nigeria's national security have been largely responsible for Volume  
407 XIV Issue III Version I 52 ( F )Year 2014

408 Global Journal of Human Social Science insecurity, as a result of opportunities provided by ECOWAS protocol  
409 on free movement of people and trade are criminally exploited by cross border criminals (Obasi, 2010;Garuba,  
410 2010). Therefore, we conclude that the spate of cross border criminal activities in West Africa undermines  
411 Nigeria's national security.

#### 412 13 c) Porous Borders, Ungoverned Space and Cases of

413 Transnational Crimes in Nigeria and West Africa Cross border crime is however somewhat shadowy. Much  
414 is made of its existence in the popular press. Barely a day passes without some reference to criminal gangs  
415 targeting the UK. Little research has been done to comprehensively analyze and empirically confirm the perceived  
416 growth of cross border crime. Trans-border criminal activities in West Africa straddle weak borders into specific  
417 geographic locations in affected countries where state capacity to respond to the threat and challenges posed  
418 by these illegal activities is equally weak. The smuggling of goods, especially cocoa, timber, ivory, petroleum  
419 and diamonds across national borders is most prevalent along the Côte d'Ivoire-Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria and  
420 Burkina Faso corridors of the sub-region. Ordinary businessmen and women, and sometimes rebels and criminal  
421 gangs involved in civil wars in the sub-region engage in the smuggling of there or other products. These goods  
422 are smuggled in vehicles or on foot, using secret and illegal routes across borders to evade special regulations,  
423 levies or taxes, thereby making more income through the transaction of these products (de Andrés, 2008, Julins,  
424 2002, Mueller 2001). The porous borders of West Africa, however, continue to engender cross-border crime and  
425 instability in the subregion, owing to the lack of an appropriate mechanism for the monitoring movements and  
426 illegal activities across the borders. Cross-border criminal activities obviously undermine good governance and  
427 security, with negative impacts on the Rule of Law, economic activities and growth, human rights and general  
428 societal and cultural advancement within the sub-region. Some of these activities involve the illicit trafficking  
429 of small arms and light weapons/ammunitions and human beings, especially women and children. Mercenaries  
430 and the recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed conflict, transnational syndicates involved in crimes such  
431 as peddling of narcotics, armed robbery and '419' activities, and the smuggling of goods are other crossborder  
432 related crimes (de Andrés, 2008). Organized criminal groups or individuals carry out their illicit activities using  
433 major technological tools such as information networks, the financial system and other sophisticated means. They  
434 also take advantage of differences in legislation, legal systems and traditions, which often seriously hamper state  
435 efforts to respond adequately to the threat of organized or trans-border crimes (Ering, 2011, Mueller (2001).

436 Another case of political involvement in organized crime in the region concerns the late Maurice Ibekwe, a  
437 member of Nigeria's Federal House of Representatives arrested for financial fraud, forgery and conspiracy. He  
438 had served as chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Police Affairs. However, only in a small number of cases  
439 can it be shown beyond reasonable doubt that senior political figures like Ibekwe have been directly implicated in  
440 organized criminal activities (Ebo, 2003; ??ning, 2009). In this context, the Nigerian Customs Service reported  
441 the interception of small arms and ammunition worth more than 4.3 billion naira (US\$34.1 million) on their  
442 way into the country in the first six months of 2002. Important quantities of small arms have come through the  
443 border with Benin, and were brought into Nigeria either overland or by sea -in small boats. Equally active in  
444 this respect are the northern borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon (de Andrés, 2008).

445 In spite of this hot chase of illegal oil bunkerers which has been further boosted with the provision of new speed  
446 boats and refurbished old ones for the newly resuscitated Marine Police, the syndicates have refused to give up  
447 their nefarious activities, thus prompting curiosities and accusations that the government is not proactive enough  
448 in her efforts at redressing the problem. Emerging investigation reveals that Nigeria lacks what it takes (in terms  
449 of equipment and manpower training) to effectively police the entire area of her maritime jurisdiction (Garuba,  
450 2010). The scope of the human trafficking problem is widespread in West Africa. Child trafficking in particular  
451 spreads across eleven of the fifteen Member States of the ECOWAS including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso,  
452 Nigeria, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali. Available statistics indicates that  
453 the scale of the problem is enormous with an estimated 200,000 children experiencing this practice in both West  
454 and Central Africa. In 1998, about 10,000 to 15,000 Malian children worked in plantations in neighboring Côte  
455 d'Ivoire while in Nigeria, in 1996, 4,000 children were trafficked from Cross River State to various parts within  
456 and outside the country. Benin registered over 3,000 children trafficked between 1995 and 1999 (de Andrés, 2008,  
457 Julins, 2002). In a more recent human trafficking case, two Nigerians were suspected of trafficking Bangladeshi  
458 nationals to Ghana in transit to London in the United Kingdom and were arrested by the Ghanaian police. The  
459 victims reportedly paid US\$2,500 each to the Nigerians to support their upkeep and stay in the country. These  
460 transactions were undertaken through non-existent employment and placement agencies both in the UK and  
461 Ghana respectively (de Andrés, 2008, Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992).

462 West African seashores and harbors have become the hub of transatlantic cocaine trafficking. Similarly, West

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463 African international airports have become major redistribution exit points towards the new cocaine markets  
464 of Europe, South Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (de Andrés, 2008). The analysis of the almost  
465 daily seizures conducted both in West Africa and destination markets indicate the presence and interaction of  
466 three different and complementary trafficking structures: the first, led by foreign operators, move large, multi tons  
467 shipments of cocaine from Latin America (Colombia via Brazil and Venezuela) to West Africa by the use of ships,  
468 private yachts, and more recently private airplanes (de Andrés, 2008). The second is operated by well established  
469 local trafficking networks, mainly Nigerian and Ghanaian, who buy directly from foreign drug trafficking networks  
470 shipments up to a couple of hundreds kilos of cocaine which is then either sold on regional markets or rerouted  
471 via human couriers to final destinations in Europe and South Africa. These trafficking networks which are able  
472 to mobilize dozens of human couriers on the same flight are the natural development of local drug trafficking  
473 entrepreneurs who started their operations in the region the late 1980s and 1990s and who progressively graduated  
474 from small subcontractors to larger regional independent entrepreneurs (de Andrés, 2008). West Africa and West  
475 Africans are not only an attractive location and partners for foreign criminal networks but are gradually building  
476 up and exporting their own criminal network model. Besides the well-known Nigerian networks, new ones are  
477 developing in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Following the example of the Nigerian "network" type, such  
478 criminal organizations have in common the very loose, fragmented, and business oriented features which made  
479 them extremely successful in the global village of modern "disorganized" crime (de Andrés, 2008). According  
480 to the opinion of national experts, elicited in the Annual Reports Questionnaire, cocaine use among the general  
481 population was increased in Senegal and Guinea-Conakry in 2005, whereas the situation was reported as stable  
482 in Nigeria and Burkina Faso. The use of crack cocaine was reported in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire and  
483 the Gambia. In any case, if the flow through the region is highly organized, it is unlikely that much cocaine will  
484 be "spilled" into local markets, as there are strong economic incentives to bring as much of the drug as possible  
485 to its highest value destination -the European Union particularly and more generally West Europe (de Andrés,  
486 2008). (Ering, 2011).

487 Report in This Day Newspaper of November 29, 2010 shows that in the last three months of 2010, officials of  
488 the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) have impounded hard drugs valued at N5 billion. Within  
489 the same period, 130 kilogramme of heroin shipped into the country from Iran were impounded at the Tin Can  
490 Island Port, Apapa, Lagos. The substance is valued at \$10 million. All of these are indications of the increasing  
491 profile of West African route for Drug Trafficking. Also, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC  
492 2010) reported that there is a rapid rise in the consumption of hard drugs in the country. And according to  
493 its statistics, the increase in drug use in Nigeria is directly linked to the high level of corruption in the country  
494 (Ering, 2011, Julins, 2002, Passas, 2002).

495 Criminal activities damage the financial sector institutions that are critical to economic growth, reduces  
496 productivity in the economy's real sector by diverting resources and encouraging crime and corruption which  
497 slows economic growth and can distort the economies external trade, internal trade, and capital flows or economic  
498 development. Money laundering causes monies appropriated for specific development projects to be diverted to  
499 individual bank accounts. This is the situation involving many individuals specifically members of the political  
500 class in Nigeria who are privileged to occupy governmental positions to siphon people's money to foreign banks  
501 to the detriment of the Nigerian public. These monies would have been used in providing. Another case of  
502 political involvement in organized crime in the region concerns the late Maurice Ibekwe, a member of Nigeria's  
503 Federal House of Representatives arrested for financial fraud, forgery and conspiracy. He had served as chairman  
504 of the House Sub-Committee on Police Affairs. However, only in a small number of cases can it be shown beyond  
505 reasonable doubt that senior political figures like Ibekwe have been directly implicated in organized criminal  
506 activities (Ebo, 2003; ??ning, 2009). Similarly, the social consequences of allowing these groups to launder  
507 money can be very disastrous and damaging to a nation. It can erode a nation's economy by changing the  
508 demand for cash, making interest and exchange rates more volatile and causing high inflation in countries where  
509 criminals are doing business ??Ering, 2011, Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992). Nigeria's development is jeopardised  
510 because available evidences show that the country is used as a transit for drug smuggling, particularly for the  
511 West African route. This paints a bad picture for Nigeria's image and could deter investors from investing in  
512 the economy. The dimensions of heroin smuggling through Nigeria are best illustrated by seizures, which in 2007  
513 amounted to more than five tons of heroin and have been on the increase in succeeding years (Ering, 2011, Passas,  
514 2002, Julins, 2002).

515 In addition, the Colombian cartels are now setting up shops; Colombian traffickers are corrupting law  
516 enforcement authorities and buying protection against prosecution. This act apart from worsening the rate  
517 of corruption in these West African States, fragile states such as Guinea-Bissau are becoming increasingly  
518 vulnerable and are in danger of spiraling down into ungoverned narco-states. Others in the region, including  
519 Cape Verde, Guinea, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Mauritania are hanging at the precipice of a  
520 similar fate of instability and insecurity. This pattern of corruption and crime is repeating in many parts of  
521 the world (Luna 2008; UNODC 2010). Transnational criminals are not only expanding into multiple criminal  
522 activities, which transcends trafficking in drugs, and humans, but are also pioneering new more sophisticated  
523 types of criminal operations. Among the hottest today included cyber crime, financial crimes are becoming more  
524 prevalent throughout the world as criminals have become more computer-savvy and continue to coordinate many  
525 sophisticated illicit operations including through modern and innovative channels such as e-currency or digital

526 funds and through mobile payments technologies (Ering, 2011). In many instances, the police aid and abet drug  
527 traffickers, gangs and criminal insurgencies. In Nigeria, the dimension of these criminal activities has increased.  
528 The emergence of militancy in the Niger Delta, and the spade of kidnappings have created serious problems  
529 of insecurity. This is however done in connivance with security agencies. This situation is scaring to foreign  
530 and local investors and impinges seriously on the socioeconomic development of society (Ering, 2011). Apart  
531 from drugs, the circumvention of the formal economy via trafficking of contraband goods has also haunted local  
532 industries. At a pre-yearly general meeting with the media in Lagos in July 2004, Nigerian industrialists under the  
533 aegis of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) declared that the country lost \$6.3billion (about N800  
534 billion) to unwholesome trade practices of smuggling and product counterfeiting in 2003 (The Guardian, ??July 5,  
535 2004).Nigeria's border communities play a central role in the smuggling activities. While virtually all the routes  
536 they are located predate present-day artificial boundaries created by colonialism, the desperation to de-link from a  
537 distrusted and disliked system which the Nigerian economy came to symbolize turned such border communities as  
538 Jibia in Katsina State, Kiisi in Oyo State, Idiroko in Ogun State, Bakassi in Cross River State, Badagry in Lagos  
539 State and Bama in Borno State, into informal centers for substitute exchange relations ??Garuba, 2006). Thus,  
540 we conclude that frequent trans-border crimes in West African sub-region impede Nigeria's external relations.

### 541 14 III.

### 542 15 The Summary

543 We started by dwelling on all the technically in this paper, where we posed four research questions, stated four  
544 specific objectives, and four research hypotheses. We, also, demonstrated the theoretical and empirical relevance  
545 or justifications of this study. The issues, time frame and subjects covered by the study were also highlighted.  
546 The main concepts or terms used in this paper were operationalized or defined as they are applied or used in this  
547 study. In this paper we reviewed the related extent and relevant literature concerning definition and meanings  
548 of cross border criminal activities and issues and perspectives of trans-border criminal activities in Nigeria, West  
549 Africa, Africa and globe. Still in we also adopted a combination of the theory of relative autonomy of the state  
550 and failed state theory as our theoretical or conceptual framework. We discussed background to cross border  
551 crimes in Nigeria and West African sub-region, and as well examined the relationship between trans-border crimes  
552 in West Africa sub-region and Nigeria's national security. Whilst, we discussed porous borders, ungoverned space  
553 and cases of transnational crimes in Nigeria and West Africa, and also examined the nexus between the frequent  
554 cross border criminal activities in West Africa and Nigeria's external relations. Finally we summarized the entire  
555 work and drew some conclusions on the basis of which we made some recommendations.

### 556 16 IV.

### 557 17 Conclusions

558 From the foregoing, we reached the following conclusions:

- 559 1. That the spate of cross border criminal activities in West Africa undermines Nigeria's national security. 2.  
560 That frequent trans-border crimes in West African sub-region impede Nigeria's external relations.

561 V.

### 562 18 Recommendations

563 In the course of this study, we suggest the following recommendations:

- 564 1. Reconstitute the Nigerian state in such a way as to be proactive in dealing with the rampant cross border  
565 criminal activities that undermine its national security. 2. Strengthen the cross-border law enforcement agencies  
566 in order to enable them check the frequent trans-border crimes that impede its external relations.

### 567 19 Meaningful engagement of other West African

568 states through both bilateral instruments and multilateral sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS <sup>1 2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Cross Border Crimes in West African Sub-Region: Implications for Nigeria's National Security and External Relations



Figure 1:

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Figure 2: d )



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